Judgment No. 4820
Decision
1. The decisions of the Director General of Eurocontrol of 27 March 2020 and 12 May 2022 are set aside.
2. Eurocontrol shall pay the complainant moral damages in the amount of 15,000 euros.
3. It shall also pay him 7,000 euros in costs.
4. All other claims are dismissed.
Summary
The complainant challenges the decisions to dismiss his moral harassment complaints, and claims compensation for the injury which he considers he has suffered.
Judgment keywords
Keywords
complaint allowed; absence of final decision; direct appeal to tribunal; internal remedies exhausted; reasonable time; adversarial proceedings; procedural flaw; harassment; right to information; motivation of final decision; investigation report
Consideration 4
Extract:
Although the complainant’s counsel, by a letter of 6 September 2019 addressed to the Director General, requested both that the complaint with respect to Mr H.B. continue to be considered and that the two investigators appointed to examine the first harassment complaint inasmuch as it was directed against Mr P.H. be recused, he did not formally submit this document as an internal complaint under Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations against the Director General’s decision of 4 September 2019. The Tribunal considers that, in the present case, this letter was correctly not considered by the Director General to constitute an internal complaint.
It follows that, since the complainant has thus not properly exhausted the internal means of redress provided for in the Staff Regulations in this regard, his complaint must be declared irreceivable insofar as it is directed against the dismissal of the first harassment complaint against Mr H.B.
Keywords
internal remedies exhausted
Considerations 6-7
Extract:
Insofar as the complaint is directed against the decision of the Director General to dismiss the complainant’s first complaint for moral harassment against Mr P.H. as unfounded, the Tribunal notes the following:
(a) Where the Administration takes any action to deal with a claim, by forwarding it to the competent internal appeal body for example, this step in itself constitutes a “decision upon the claim” within the meaning of Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Tribunal, which forestalls an implied rejection that could be referred to the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 3715, consideration 4, 3428, consideration 18, and 3146, consideration 12).
(b) Under Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations, the complainant should have filed a complaint before the Tribunal within 90 days from the expiry of the four-month time limit for the Administration to respond to his internal complaint, even if the matter had been referred to the Joint Committee for Disputes. The present complaint should therefore, in principle, be declared irreceivable as time-barred under Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, combined with Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations.
(c) However, in this case, the Tribunal considers that the complainant was misled by the Organisation when it indicated to him that, since his internal complaint had been referred to the Joint Committee for Disputes, he had, in accordance with the Tribunal’s case law on the application of Article VII, paragraph 3, of its Statute, to await the final decision of the Director General before being able to file a complaint with the Tribunal. By so doing, the Organisation overlooked the fact that, pursuant to Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations, failure by the Director General to respond to an internal complaint within four months from the date on which it was lodged shall be deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting it, which may be impugned before the Tribunal. There is no need to declare the complaint irreceivable as time-barred, insofar as it is directed against an implied decision to reject from the Director General. To rule otherwise would amount to unduly depriving the complainant of his right to refer the matter to the Tribunal solely due to the conduct of the Organisation.
(d) The Tribunal observes that, while the complainant’s failure to comply with the 90-day time limit to file a complaint with the Tribunal is recognized above as admissible due to the fact that he was wrongly informed by the Organisation that he had to await an express decision, the complainant did not wait for this decision to be issued before filing his complaint. The complaint should therefore, in principle, be declared irreceivable for failure to exhaust internal means of redress, as required by Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Tribunal. However, in this case, taking into account the period of one year and seven months that had elapsed between 5 June 2020, when the complainant filed his internal complaint, and 7 February 2022, when he filed his complaint with the Tribunal, and the fact that his counsel had followed up, to no avail, with the Director General, the Tribunal considers that the complainant was faced with a paralysis of the internal appeal procedure that would allow him to proceed directly to it. Under the Tribunal’s case law, a complainant is entitled to file a complaint directly with the Tribunal against the initial decision which she or he intends to challenge where the competent bodies are not able to determine the internal appeal within a reasonable time having regard to the circumstances, provided that she or he has done her or his utmost, to no avail, to accelerate the internal procedure and where the circumstances show that the appeal body was not able to reach a final decision within a reasonable time (see, for example, Judgments 4660, consideration 2, 4271, consideration 5, 4268, considerations 10 and 11, 4200, consideration 3, 3558, consideration 9, 2039, consideration 4, or 1486, consideration 11).
(e) In addition, the Tribunal notes that a final decision was ultimately taken by the Director General on 12 May 2022, as was the opinion of the Joint Committee for Disputes relating thereto, and that that decision was issued in the course of proceedings. Since the Tribunal has the complete dossier in its possession and the parties have had the opportunity to comment fully in their written submissions on the express decision to reject the complainant’s internal complaint of 5 June 2020, and thus on the decision to reject the first harassment complaint inasmuch as it was directed against Mr P.H., it considers that, in accordance with its case law, it is appropriate to treat the internal complaint as being directed against the latter decision of 12 May 2022 (see in particular, for similar cases, Judgments 4769, consideration 3, 4768, consideration 3, 4660, consideration 6, 4065, consideration 3, and 2786, consideration 3).
The present complaint is, accordingly, receivable insofar as it challenges the lawfulness of the Director General’s decision of 12 May 2022 to reject, as unfounded, the first moral harassment complaint directed against Mr P.H. It will therefore be examined from this standpoint by the Tribunal.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1486, 2039, 2786, 3146, 3428, 3558, 3715, 4065, 4200, 4268, 4271, 4660
Keywords
absence of final decision; express decision; implied decision; receivability of the complaint; administrative delay; direct appeal to tribunal; internal appeal; internal remedies exhausted; time limit; delay; exception; reasonable time; case law; iloat statute; staff member's duties; judicial review; impugned decision
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal has consistently held that the question as to whether harassment occurred must be determined in the light of a careful examination of all the objective circumstances surrounding the acts complained of (see, in particular, Judgment 4471, consideration 18) and that an allegation of harassment must be borne out by specific facts, the burden of proof being on the person who pleads it, but there is no need to prove that the accused person acted with intent (see, for example, Judgments 4344, consideration 3, 3871, consideration 12, and 3692, consideration 18). When a specific procedure is prescribed by the organisation concerned, it must be followed and the rules must be applied correctly. The Tribunal has also held that the investigation must be objective, rigorous and thorough, in that it must be conducted in a manner designed to ascertain all relevant facts without compromising the good name of the person implicated and to give that person the opportunity to test the evidence put against her or him and to answer the charges made (see, in particular, Judgments 4663, considerations 10 to 13, 4253, consideration 3, 3314, consideration 14, and 2771, consideration 15). It is, however, well settled that a staff member alleging harassment does not need to demonstrate, nor does the person or body evaluating the claim, that the facts establish beyond reasonable doubt that harassment occurred (see, in this connection, Judgments 4663, consideration 12, and 4289, consideration 10). The main factor in the recognition of harassment is the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate her or him (see Judgments 4663, consideration 13, and 4541, consideration 8).
The Tribunal recalls, furthermore, that it is not its role to reweigh the evidence before an investigative body which, as the primary trier of facts, has had the benefit of actually seeing and hearing many of the persons involved, and of assessing the reliability of what they have said (see, in this respect, Judgments 4291, consideration 12, and 3593, consideration 12). Accordingly, the Tribunal will only interfere in the case of manifest error (see, in particular, Judgments 4344, consideration 8, 4091, consideration 17, and 3597, consideration 2).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2771, 3314, 3593, 3597, 3692, 3871, 4091, 4253, 4291, 4344, 4471, 4663
Keywords
procedure before the tribunal; appraisal of evidence; burden of proof; inquiry; adversarial proceedings; right to reply; due process; organisation's duties; judicial review; right; harassment; standard of proof; manifest error
Considerations 10-11
Extract:
It is firstly clear, on the one hand, that the final investigation report, although requested by the complainant on several occasions, was never forwarded to him during the internal proceedings, even in anonymized form, which made him unable to be properly heard with full knowledge of the facts in these proceedings.
It emerges from the Director General’s decision of 27 March 2020, whereby he dismissed the internal appeal filed against the decision to dismiss the first harassment complaint inasmuch as it was directed against Mr P.H., that only the conclusions of the investigation report, set out in point 5 thereof, were forwarded to the complainant as an annex to the decision, while, in the decision itself, the Director General merely stated that “the facts examined in [the complainant’s] case [were] not constitutive of moral harassment”. Furthermore, if the Tribunal also refers to these conclusions of the investigation report, it must be noted that they are limited to the following considerations: firstly, “[t]he perception of the facts given by [the complainant] is not in line with the perception by Mr [P.H.] and by all heard MUAC [in Maastricht] witnesses. Documents give prove [sic] of meetings, appraisals, and situations, but do not prove any form of psychological harassment”; secondly, “[t]he investigation only focussed on possible psychological harassment by Mr [P.H.], it was not mandated to go further into the broader context”; thirdly, various observations made by the investigators about how the recruitment programme for young graduates was organized by the Organisation.
The Tribunal considers that such limited disclosure of the conclusions of the investigation report clearly does not meet the requirements laid down in its relevant case law and that the complainant may reasonably claim that he was unable to verify, even at the internal appeal stage, the content of the statements of the alleged harasser and the witnesses or the seriousness of the investigation conducted (compare, in particular, with Judgment 4471, considerations 14 and 23). The Tribunal recalls that it is firmly established that a staff member must, as a general rule, have access to all evidence on which the competent authority bases its decision concerning her or him (see, for example, Judgments 4739, consideration 10 (and the case law cited therein), 4217, consideration 4, 3995, consideration 5, 3295, consideration 13, 3214, consideration 24, 2700, consideration 6, or 2229, consideration 3(b)). This implies, among other things, that an organization must forward to the staff member who has filed a harassment complaint the report drawn up at the end of the investigation of that complaint (see, in particular, Judgments 4217, consideration 4, 3995, consideration 5, 3831, consideration 17, and 3347, considerations 19 to 21).
The Organisation argues in this regard that the full investigation report is annexed to its reply and that this is in line with the Tribunal’s case law on this point, whereby the reasons for a decision may be provided in other proceedings or may be conveyed in response to a subsequent challenge (see Judgments 3316, consideration 7, 1757, consideration 5, and 1590, consideration 7).
However, the Tribunal has already recalled in this regard that, while the non-disclosure of evidence can be corrected, in certain cases, when this flaw is subsequently remedied, including in proceedings before it (see, for example, Judgments 4217, consideration 4, and 3117, consideration 11), that is not the case where the document in question is of vital importance having regard to the subject matter of the dispute, as it is here (see Judgments 4217 consideration 4, 3995, consideration 5, 3831, considerations 16, 17 and 29, 3490, consideration 33, and 2315, consideration 27).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1590, 1757, 2229, 2315, 2700, 3117, 3214, 3295, 3316, 3347, 3490, 3831, 3995, 4217, 4471, 4739
Keywords
internal appeals body; confidential evidence; disclosure of evidence; general principle; due process; organisation's duties; duty to inform; procedural flaw; harassment; right to information; motivation; official; motivation of final decision; investigation report; duty to inform about the investigation
Consideration 12
Extract:
Secondly, it appears, as the Organisation acknowledges in its reply, that the investigation report was also not provided, either in full or even in anonymized form, to the Joint Committee for Disputes before it gave its opinion on 27 February 2020, which in itself also constitutes a flaw since the Committee must be able under all circumstances to give a full and informed opinion (see, in this respect, Judgments 4471, consideration 14, and 4167, consideration 3).
The fact that the members of the Committee considered unanimously that the complainant’s internal complaint was well-founded is irrelevant in this respect, since the Committee could have given an even more reasoned opinion on the merits had it been provided with the final investigation report.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4167, 4471
Keywords
internal appeals body; procedural flaw; harassment; final decision; motivation; motivation of final decision; investigation report
Consideration 13
Extract:
The Tribunal observes, thirdly, that, although the two matters outlined above were, among others, specifically noted by the Joint Committee for Disputes in reaching the unanimous conclusion, in its opinion issued on 24 January 2022, that the complainant’s internal complaint was well-founded, they were not in any way addressed in the reasons given in the Director General’s final decision of 12 May 2022.
Accordingly, there are grounds for considering that the reasons given for this decision are also not adequate, within the meaning of the Tribunal’s relevant case law (see Judgments 4700, consideration 4, 4598, consideration 12, 4400, consideration 10, and 4062, consideration 3).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4062, 4400, 4598, 4700
Keywords
duty to substantiate decision; impugned decision; motivation; motivation of final decision
Considerations 15-17
Extract:
The Tribunal notes, however, that the complainant also submits that the review of the merits of his complaint is tainted by various legal flaws at the first stage of the procedure followed in that regard.
Among the various flaws alleged by the complainant, there is one which also appears substantial in the Tribunal’s view.
As is clear from the above, it is established, as he claims in his written submissions, that the complainant, although he addressed a specific request to the investigators on 28 October 2019, even before the alleged harasser and the witnesses were heard and before the investigators drew up their report, did not have knowledge of the statement made to them by Mr P.H., nor indeed of the witness statements gathered by them, or at least of their content, even in anonymized form, to be able to challenge these before the investigators drew up their report and the Director General made his original decision. This is clearly contrary to the Tribunal’s case law whereby, by virtue of the adversarial principle, the complainant in a harassment complaint must be informed, even before the end of the investigation, of the content of statements made by the persons accused and any testimony gathered as part of the investigation, in order to challenge them if necessary (see, in this respect, Judgment 4781, consideration 9, and the case law cited therein).
It follows that the review of the merits of the first complaint filed by the complainant is itself tainted by at least one substantial flaw which also renders unlawful the decision taken by the Director General on 27 March 2020.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4781
Keywords
inquiry; adversarial proceedings; harassment; right to be heard
Consideration 22
Extract:
The complainant requests that the Organisation be ordered to pay 25,000 euros in punitive damages for its unfair conduct.
However, the Tribunal recalls that, according to consistent precedent, an award of punitive damages is only warranted in exceptional circumstances (see, in particular, Judgments 4659, consideration 14, 4658, consideration 10, 4506, consideration 10, and 4391, consideration 14), and finds that such circumstances are not evident in this case.
There are, therefore, no grounds for granting this request.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4391, 4506, 4658, 4659
Keywords
punitive damages; exemplary damages
Consideration 23
Extract:
The complainant also requests that the Organisation be ordered to pay 11,000 euros for the costs incurred “relating to the harassment proceedings and the internal appeal, on which no action was taken”.
However, as the Tribunal has consistently held, such costs may only be awarded under exceptional circumstances (see, in particular, Judgments 4665, consideration 10, 4644, consideration 3, 4554, consideration 8, 4541, consideration 12, 4348, consideration 8, and 4217, consideration 12). There is nothing in the complainant’s written submissions that would support a finding that such circumstances were present in this case.
Accordingly, that claim must also be rejected.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4217, 4348, 4541, 4554, 4644, 4665
Keywords
internal appeal; costs; costs for internal appeal procedure
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