Jugement n° 4822
Décision
The complaint is dismissed.
Synthèse
The complainant challenges the decision not to renew his fixed-term contract.
Mots-clés du jugement
Mots-clés
Non-renouvellement de contrat; Requête rejetée
Considérant 4
Extrait:
The Organisation asked that the two complaints be joined because it considers that they rest on the same facts and originate from the same decision of 29 January 2020. But, while it is true that the facts in each of these complaints are part of a same continuum of events, the legal issues raised in each of them are different. The two complaints also do not pertain to the same impugned decision. The provisions of the Staff Rules and Regulations involved are furthermore not the same, and the processes that led to the impugned decisions identified by the complainant were not the same either. Finally, the reasons developed by the parties, notably on the issues of receivability, are different from one complaint to the other.
Accordingly, the complaints will not be joined. But, if necessary, the Tribunal will refer to the two judgments to avoid any potential overlapping.
In this regard, the Tribunal observes that one of the motivations for the request for joinder of the Organisation is pecuniary. In the proceedings it filed in the second complaint, ESO mentioned that a joinder “would absolve [the Organisation] from having to pay twice the Tribunal’s substantial court expenses irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings”.
The starting point in dealing with this issue is whether the cost to the organisation is a relevant consideration in determining whether there should be joinder. The principles applied by the Tribunal on the general issue of joinder have developed over a period of more than 45 years. As discussed in Judgment 4753, consideration 3:
“Plainly the Tribunal can, and often does, consider related complaints at the same session and by the same panel of judges. The joinder of two complaints is a legal device deployed by the Tribunal in order that one judgment can be rendered, and orders then made disposing of the joined complaints. When considering the scope and purpose of a joinder, it must be borne in mind that while such an order can be made in relation to multiple complaints by one complainant, they can also be made in relation to complaints by two or more individuals who, in substance, raise the same grievance. This latter situation illustrates the need for such orders to be made only in quite explicit circumstances and to be guided by focused principles and not loosely expressed generalities. This is particularly important given the res judicata effect of the Tribunal’s judgments. It would be wrong, in principle, to burden one individual with the legal outcome of proceedings where her or his complaint has been joined with the complaints of others in which legal issues have arisen and are resolved, but not legal issues raised by that individual.”
And later in consideration 6:
“The question that arises is whether it is appropriate to join the two complaints. The touchstone for formal joinder has historically been that the complaints involve the same or, more recently, similar questions of fact and law, and it is not sufficient that they stem from the same continuum of events. [...]”
The cost to the organisation of multiple judgments has no part to play in the exercise of the discretionary power concerning joinder. It is an irrelevant consideration.
Additionally, while ESO pleads that having only one judgment would protect the Organisation “against the cost[s] and administrative demands of unnecessary litigation issues”, the Tribunal cannot ignore that ESO itself acknowledged that “it is the law of its Staff Rules and Regulations which provide that different procedures apply for challenging the Director General’s decisions not to grant [the] complainant an indefinite contract and not to extend his fixed-term contract beyond the one year granted”. In other words, there are two different and separate complaints filed not because of unnecessary litigation issues raised by the complainant, but because of the way the Staff Rules and Regulations of ESO are organized.
That said, the Tribunal notes, however, that, while arguing that the submission of two complaints was not chosen by him since he had no other alternative than to follow the procedural paths imposed by the Organisation, the complainant still disputes the assertion of ESO that it should not “be punished twice for the same conduct”. As a result, he maintained the separate claims for relief sought in both complaints even though there was clearly some overlapping between the two. Conceding there was indeed some overlapping here would have been the expected and logical position to adopt on the part of the complainant. It is regrettable to see that he did not do so.
Référence(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4753
Mots-clés
Jonction; Considérations financières
Considérant 6
Extrait:
The question of whether a decision is a final decision is of fundamental importance to the operation of the Tribunal’s Statute. The Statute defines and limits the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Article VII, paragraph 1, requires a decision to be a final decision before the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is enlivened. Once it is, time limits are triggered: see Article VII, paragraph 2. The question of whether a decision is a final decision is essentially a legal question arising from the language of the Statute.
Mots-clés
Décision définitive
Considérants 7-8
Extrait:
[A]s […] mentioned in Judgment 4741, consideration 12, the Tribunal has indicated on many occasions that, “[w]ith respect to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute, the Tribunal’s case law requires strict adherence to the ninety-day time limit on the grounds that time limits are an objective matter of fact and that strict adherence is necessary for the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions” (see Judgments 4354, consideration 7, 3947, consideration 5, and 3559, consideration 3).
The Tribunal has repeatedly emphasised the importance of the strict observance of applicable time limits. In Judgment 3847, consideration 3, involving again ESO, it notably stated that “the time limits for internal appeal procedures and the time limits in the Tribunal’s Statute serve the important purposes of ensuring that disputes are dealt with in a timely way and that the rights of parties are known to be settled at a particular point of time. The consistently stated principle that time limits must be strictly adhered to has been rationalized by the Tribunal in the following terms: time limits are an objective matter of fact and strict adherence to them is necessary for the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions. An inefficacious system could potentially adversely affect the staff of international organisations. Flexibility about time limits should not intrude into the Tribunal’s decision-making even if it might be thought to be equitable or fair in a particular case to allow some flexibility. To do otherwise would ‘impair the necessary stability of the parties’ legal relations’” (see, to the same effect, Judgment 4673, consideration 13).
Référence(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3559, 3847, 3947, 4354, 4673, 4741
Mots-clés
Recevabilité de la requête; Délai
Considérant 9
Extrait:
As the Tribunal recalled in Judgment 4741, consideration 13, “officials are expected to know their rights and the rules and regulations to which they are subject, and ignorance or misunderstanding of the law is no excuse (see, in this regard, Judgments 4673, consideration 16, 4573, consideration 4, 4324, consideration 11, and 4032, consideration 6)”.
Référence(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4032, 4324, 4573, 4673, 4741
Mots-clés
Devoir de connaître les règles
Considérant 15
Extrait:
In Judgment 3870, consideration 4, the Tribunal recalled that “for a decision, taken after an initial decision has been made, to be considered as a new decision (setting off new time limits for the submission of an internal appeal) and not a purely confirmatory decision, the following conditions are to be met: the new decision must alter the previous decision and not be identical in substance, or at least must provide further justification, and it must relate to different issues from the previous one or be based on new grounds (see Judgments 660, 2011, under 18, and 3735, under 4).
Référence(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 660, 2011, 3735, 3870
Mots-clés
Décision confirmative
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