



International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)



International
Labour
Office

IPEC Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict. An Inter-Regional Program

**P340 03 900 052
INT/03/P52/USA**

**An independent mid-term evaluation by a team of external
consultants**

Inter Regional Program: Africa, Colombia, Phillipines, Sri lanka

November 2005 / March 2006

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.

The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants¹. The field mission took place in March 2006. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such serve as an important contribution to learning and planning without necessarily constituting the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

Funding for this project evaluation was provided by the United States Department of Labor. This report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Department of Labor nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government.

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Introduction

The mid-term evaluation of the inter-regional project “Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict: An Inter-regional Programme” was conducted, as per ILO/IPEC procedures and in line with donor requirements, in the second half of 2005 to early 2006. ILO/IPEC’s Design, Evaluation and Documentation section designed the evaluation process to take place in two phases.

The **first phase** of the evaluation process consisted of an independent evaluation team leader developing the Terms of Reference for the national evaluations of the activities carried out in Colombia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka (conducted by national evaluation consultants). A standard evaluation framework and TORs were developed and then adapted to the country-specific context and the team leader was engaged for the full period to ensure that the national evaluators upheld a common approach to the evaluations.

The **second phase** began in November 2005 with the evaluation of the sub-regional and national activities in Africa by the same team leader. This phase was to conclude with an evaluation report on the Africa component of the project as well as a **global synthesis report** covering all of the project countries and activities.

The synthesis work was to be based on the four individual evaluation reports (Colombia, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Africa component which covered: Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda). The synthesis report was designed: 1) to provide information on the overview of key findings and conclusions for each country; 2) to analyze common elements and overall lessons learned; 3) to provide a view on the inter-regional aspects and finally 4) to provide stakeholders and IPEC further strategic considerations on future work on the issue of child soldiers.

The varying levels of technical quality found across the four reports rendered it difficult to produce a synthesis report that covered the four key areas. Upon discussion it was decided that the four evaluation reports would be released as one without the synthesis report. The work done for the synthesis report will be used in the final evaluation process scheduled to take place in April – May 2007.

This report includes all four evaluations of the four components of the inter-regional project. All of the reports followed the ILO/IPEC approach to a consultative process and each draft report was shared with appropriate stakeholders, their inputs solicited and the reports were finalized by the individual evaluators taking into consideration the stakeholder inputs and comments.

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IPEC Evaluation

Inter-Regional Programme for Prevention and Reintegration of Children involved in Armed Conflict Central Africa Component

(P340 03 900 052 – INT/03/P52/USA)

**An independent mid-term evaluation by a team of external
consultants**

Central Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo,
Rwanda, Burundi

May 2006

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² Bugnion, Christian

Acronyms and abbreviations

A.P.	: Action Programme
CAR	: Central African Republic
CNP	: Country National Project Coordinator
CONADER	: National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration (DRC)
CTA	: Chief Technical Advisor
CTS	: Project Monitoring Committee (in French comité technique de suivi)
DBMR	: Direct Beneficiaries Monitoring and Reporting Systems
DDR	: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	: Democratic Republic of Congo
FFT	: Food For Training
IDA	: International Development Aid
ILO	: International Labour Organisation
IPEC	: International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour
MICS	: Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey
MDRP	: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MONUC	: United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC
M&E	: Monitoring and evaluation
NCDR	: National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration (Bur.+Rw)
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	: National Plan
RoC	: Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
SNES	: Child Soldiers National Structure (Structure Nationale Enfants Soldats)
USDOL	: United States Department of Labor
VGU	: Vulnerable Groups Unit
WFP	: World Food Programme

I. Executive Summary

1. The Inter-Regional Project document dated 17 September 2003 and covering the seven countries is an impressive accomplishment. With over 150 pages its contents show that serious documentary research has taken place in order to prepare the project, and it is both very meticulously written, logical, coherent, and very detailed. The evaluation recognises the enormous amount of work that went into the preparation of this very good project document.
2. Unfortunately, the operating environment in the African countries is anything but logical and coherent. All four African countries covered in this project are in conflict or post-conflict phase. All are trying to transition towards a democratic and functioning state, with different degree of endeavour according to their current leaders and the pressures from the international community. Three of four countries are in a very delicate process of transition or change: in DRC elections are due to take place by summer, which many see as the last chance for lasting peace; this is coupled with the continued disintegration of the state administration as a result of ten years of war and turmoil, and the country and particularly the capital city Kinshasa living in the midst of generalised chaos, repeated power failures, and widespread corruption. DRC has been and remains a country with many problems, as exemplified by the lack of reliable transportation means to travel across the country, just one example of the many challenges of working in this environment.
3. In Rwanda wide-ranging reform at ministerial and administrative level is also a cause of uncertainty as the country has been divided into only four provinces since January 06 (where 12 provinces existed previously) and the number of ministries is due to be reduced. In Burundi the new democratically-elected government has just recently begun its work and is struggling, with a recognisable degree of success, on the path to lasting peace (the latest rumours include a possible agreement with the only party which did not participate in the elections and has retained a fighting force led by Rwasa, although this is not officially confirmed). The start of good governance appears to be on its way, although the process is incipient, remains fragile and needs to be consolidated.
4. As a consequence the four African countries are marked by an uncertain environment, where a return to violence and open-conflict should not be excluded, particularly in the DRC which hosts the CTA and the project management team, should contested electoral outcomes spark a new wave of violence. In this context, any project is bound to consider the operating environment and adapt itself to the realities and constraints of each of these countries, else it fails. The frailty of the structures commands what can be realistically achieved. And understanding the constraints in each country are of paramount importance to appraise the project's successes and shortfalls to date, something that is unfortunately not covered, documented or researched in the project document. However the constraints of the country's operating environment are so numerous and varied that a special section has been dedicated to them under the main findings of the report.
5. A first lesson is therefore to identify how other actors who have been previously working in these countries deal with the specific constraints. And a first finding shows that

flexibility is a key variable in unstable environments, and projects require a substantial degree of decentralisation of responsibilities. The evaluator is not familiar with ILO/IPEC procedures, being this the first evaluation undertaken on behalf of ILO/IPEC. However as compared to the thirty five evaluations undertaken over the last twelve years for eighteen customers, including state donors, UN agencies and NGOs, it appears that this particular project has an unusually high number of decision-makers at the different levels, which appears to point towards a lack of confidence in the capacity of the CTA and the project staff. Its inter-regional nature requires a certain degree of decentralisation, but in practice there are too many levels of clearance to facilitate project implementation. This is covered in more details in the management structure under the main findings in the body of the report, as it directly impacts on the project results.

6. In terms of accomplishments, the project team has had to work extremely hard in order to be able to ensure the actual start of the project. Serious underestimation of constraints caused by insufficient resourcing in terms of inputs have lead to further delays. Given the overall sum of internal and external constraints, the evaluation concludes that the project team has done a commendable job under extremely constraining and difficult working conditions, showing a dedication and commitment to the project which goes beyond the normal call of duty.
7. The project has by now approved 14 A.P.s which are being in the four target countries, with a total of 4,921 beneficiary children ex soldiers or at risk of being recruited in the armed groups. This represents 62% of the total target group for the four countries of 7,940 children. In addition three A.P.s are in the pipeline in the process of approval. A number of studies, destined to guide and serve project implementation, were also undertaken in DRC and in Burundi.
8. There are seven different levels of constraints in the project's operating environment. Some of these constraints are internal, while other are external. They are described in the main findings section of the report. While taken individually, these constraints would not jeopardise the project results, the aggregate sum of these constraints has pushed the project to the limit. It is currently on the brink of implosion if measures are not taken immediately to minimise the constraints given it has used all its margin of manoeuvre.
9. In its conception and approach, the project has been identified by many stakeholders as a potential model for economic reintegration in the four African countries. There are three reasons for this :
 - 1) IPEC has focused on economic reintegration as a specific component, whereas most other actors have undertaken a wide, even perhaps too wide, range of activities including under the label of "socio-economic reintegration". However their achievements to date show that there was no specific focus on economic reintegration, and particularly as regards to sustainability. In three of the four countries the IPEC project was therefore judged to be of great interest as a potential model for economic reintegration of child soldiers - provided it attains its stated objectives. It is thus quite unique in its approach and focus.
 - 2) The whole DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) is a concept which is fairly new and it still being experimented with various degrees of success

in the seven countries which are eligible to receive World Bank funding under the MDRP. The MDRP is the overall framework under which DDR activities are carried out in each of the four African project countries (with seven countries in the sub-region eligible for MDRP funds). Each of the IPEC project countries now has elaborated a National Demobilisation and Reintegration Plan (most of which were drafted as late as 2003), which is compulsory for governments to access MDRP funding. However the MDRP has not foreseen a separate programmes for children. Therefore the "special projects" component of the MDRP has been used for funding actors dealing with former child soldiers in Burundi and DRC, while there have been no special projects for Rwanda and ROC. Until the IPEC project, no actor was dealing exclusively with the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.

- 3) The aspect regarding the prevention of recruitment (or re-recruitment) of former child soldiers has generally been the object of weak attention by the different actors involved in child soldiers. Where prevention has been done, it has been with a rights-based approach focusing on raising awareness and dissemination. However there is no demonstrated link between the impact of these campaigns and concrete results. The revised approach used by the IPEC project is strategically and ethically interesting and unique for three motives :

- a) by using the reintegration component as the basis of the prevention strategy, results can be demonstrated as the monitoring of project beneficiaries will be able to show the status of the reintegrated children at the end of the project, and therefore the degree of effectiveness of the reintegration AND the prevention component together.
- b) The stigmatisation of former girl child soldiers makes it extremely difficult to identify this target group. They will not willingly make themselves known. Therefore in order to address this difficulty the IPEC project has foreseen the inclusion of "vulnerable groups" in the prevention component, which is where most girls have registered according to the sample beneficiary groups visited by the evaluation. Although this cannot be demonstrated by the evaluation with hard data and given the lack of time to carry out individual interviews, nonetheless they are reasons to believe that within the girls who have been targeted for prevention there may also be former child soldiers who did not want to be identified as such.
- c) The fluidity of the political and social environment in three of the four countries makes it such that an approach based only on dissemination and awareness raising would not be acceptable, in view of the generally unfulfilled needs faced regarding the reintegration of child soldiers (particularly in DRC and Burundi).

10. While this is not the focus of the project, it needs to be stated that being successful in prevention of recruitment equally leads to being successful in preventing the child's entrance into other worst forms of labour, something which is customary and widespread in all of the project's countries (for examples in Rwanda according to UNICEF's MICS survey some 352,000 children are believed to be working, many of whom are involved in some of the worst forms of child labour). So while this an indirect result of the prevention strategy, it needs to be stated that this leads to a

positive impact on the reduction of the number of children generally involved into the worst forms of child labour, over and beyond the obvious direct result which is that they are prevented from being recruited into armed groups.

11. The results of this justified approach to prevention is however reverting in higher costs than anticipated, as economic reintegration is much more costly than dissemination campaigns. This needs to be recognised and budget adjustments are necessary to reflect this reality.
12. All of the above explains why in terms of strategy, objectives and approach, the IPEC Child Soldiers' Project has the potential for becoming a model for economic reintegration of former child soldiers and children associated with armed groups. This could certainly become the case provided the means to reach to stated results were allocated to the Project team. Unfortunately in the current situation and after having reviewed and in some cases even experienced some of the numerous constraints, the evaluation sees the project currently lagging behind with consequences on the rest of project implementation. Any further delay in implementation or payment are likely to cause a fatal blow to the expected implementation results. In order to avoid such a situation, the evaluation recommends the following measures to be taken : Timely payments to partners and suppliers, effective decentralisation of programmatic decision making and budget, increase funds for oversight functions (field monitoring of implementation and results), and shifting one expatriate IPEC staff to be based in Bukavu.
13. The aggregate constraints, stemming as much from the internal and international IPEC procedures, lack of staffing at headquarters level (the VGU which oversees the project and is responsible for the project budget and backstopping the project team originally had three people, one of whom was to be out posted in DRC. Currently the unit has been reduced to one person, (expected to do the work that was previously done by three people), delays regarding the approval of documents in Kinshasa given that administrative functions are assumed by the ILO Office Director, (as a consequence reinforcing the controlling function of management and overloading the director with petty administrative work, which does not allow him to keep up to date with payment requests and other important issues – something which only strengthens an already highly centralised management style), a general lack of decentralisation³ in terms of decision making, adding to further delays, coupled with the constraints of the specific working environment (for example lack of regular power supply during days in three of the four project countries – with one country with a fairly steady power supply has seen the project office move regularly within the Ministry where it is hosted (as often as every six weeks) still adding to delays, and the UN security procedures (requiring an escort in Burundi which is on phase II on the UN security scale, whereas no escort is necessary in Eastern DRC which is on phase IV) constraining the mobility of the project staff, the logistical constraints -which require sometimes days to reach places which appear nearby on a map, but given the absence of road maintenance and/or security, require sometimes a loop of 300 km to reach a place only 50 km distant! and unreliable flight connections, all these constraints have cumulatively pushed the project to its limits. The results of all this is that while the project was to start in December 2003 the A.Ps and activities actually only started in the second half of 2005. This means that **half of the project life was**

³ Due to IPEC procedures and management setup

necessary just to prepare the project set up, without any activities having taken place. All this while objectives have been maintained and are expected to be reached within a seriously compressed time frame. The project currently has no margin of manoeuvre and constraints should be minimised quickly to ensure smooth implementation. Some of the A.P. are based on seasonal factors, and delays in the execution means they simply cannot succeed given the agricultural calendar. Likewise the IPEC implementing partners are finding out that the whole process of formulating, approving and obtaining the first instalment of an A.P. can take a substantial amount of time, up to 14 months in one case, and that they are able to obtain much more easily funding from different sources. In one example the first A.P. presented to IPEC was actually taken by the partner to another UN agency and became immediately funded. And examples are multiplying as partners learn from the IPEC experience and use the same approach to obtain more flexible funding elsewhere.

14. Because of the importance of MDRP funding in DRC and Burundi there is a variety of funding sources which are available for actors dealing with the DDR process, and therefore also with the economic reintegration of former child soldiers. There is a real risk that IPEC partners simply choose to obtain funding elsewhere for the economic reintegration activities under more flexible and rapid funding. The project's approach and objectives are good, but procedures and management structures are simply inadequate.
15. While it is not part of the TOR to evaluate the IPEC structure and procedures, it does need to be said however and in support of the above point that partners have clearly indicated that IPEC was the slowest and most difficult funding agency they had worked with. Some specific recommendations have been made under the recommendation section at the end of the report. Partners have struggled with IPEC regulations (such as opening of a bank account, understanding the procedures, etc). In DRC, it is a requirement to deposit US\$ 5,000 in order to open a bank account, something which is not in every local association's capacity (and US\$ 2,500 for a private individual!). Delay in funding also means that in a number of cases, partners have actually advanced the money on their own funds for the activities undertaken (such as the initial identification of the target beneficiaries). It has often taken over a month to make bank transfers. All this is not contributing to the perception that the IPEC project is a reliable funding partner. Because there are still large uncovered needs, there will be continued support for economic reintegration of former child soldiers (concurrently with that of former adult soldiers, as the approach to economic reintegration is essentially the same). Therefore unless IPEC is able to give greater flexibility both in budgetary and programmatic terms, it seriously risks losing the hen that lays the golden eggs by having other funding agencies take up the economic reintegration of former child soldiers, simply because it has not been able to adapt its procedures to the enormous difficulties of the operating environment in the field.
16. The evaluation strongly recommends an urgent review of the procedures, as it is convinced that if the project must continue to operate under the same constraints it will not be able to reach its objectives. It is almost miraculous that it has been able to come thus far given the conditions. At the time of writing this draft report the third budget revision has not yet been granted and the IPEC project are on the verge of expulsion from some of the offices that have been rented, but unpaid, since October 2005! In one case the security company officer in charge of providing the office guards came physically to the

project office to collect its first payment since the project office was installed (in Bukavu). It is really urgent to settle these administrative and financial problems.

17. The evaluation further recommends that a person from USDOL be detached as observer for the final evaluation of the project, in order to gain a hands-on experience of the reality of the environment and the constraints under which the project is operating and incorporate this knowledge for future project designs. USDOL were invited to participate in parts of this evaluation as a key stakeholder. Only by being physically present on the ground will USDOL be able to appraise the incredibly difficult working conditions which are characteristic of this project, require an important amount of flexibility and that do not appear to have been considered in the project design and document. Minimising the project constraints are both as a priority and a necessity.
18. The project also needs to catch its breath and cannot continue to function properly under such a tight time-frame. As a result of a careful analysis and after discussion with the project team, the evaluation believes it is entirely justified to seek a 6-months extension to accomplish results in RoC and Rwanda, until July 2007. For a number of reasons, and chief of which the amount time which has passed since these children were involved in the armed groups (now they are mostly full grown adults), the project should not be continued into a phase II, independently of the results attained, in Roc and Rwanda. IPEC should therefore concentrate on ensuring a close monitoring of these two project countries, something which cannot be done with the current staff structure and the budget. Increased monitoring capacity is needed in both these countries, given both the fact that only one staff in each country is not sufficient to ensure field based monitoring and that budget allocation for monitoring and evaluation is not sufficient. One assistant for each project country should be recruited until July 2007 to allow proper monitoring of the project activities. The implication of inadequate monitoring are very important to the project results as it may question the validity of the data being reported. Therefore it is of capital importance that partners understand and apply the selection criteria rigorously.
19. In DRC and Burundi, there are large uncovered needs. Provided the project reaches its stated objectives and that this is supported and confirmed by the end of project evaluation, there should be a second phase for these two countries to continue their efforts. Discussions with the project team have also given a number of reasons for the evaluation to recommend a possible extension into Uganda, given that there are already existing ILO programmes, that they are also a part of the sub-regional conflict into DRC, and that there remains a large child soldiers problem.
20. It should be remembered that a project document does not automatically entail good results. Good results have been obtained by other projects despite poor and badly written project documents, and conversely good project documents have not always been matched by good results on the ground. A lesson to IPEC should be to balance its effort more to monitoring of implementation at field level, something for which it has a weak capacity given its insufficient budget and staffing, and spend less time and efforts into ensuring a good project document or A.P. document. In the end, documents remain only words on paper, and the final evaluation will have to judge the project on the basis of its concrete results, and not on the basis of how well the project document, country annex and the A.P.s were written.

II. Methodology

21. The methodology used was a multi-method approach. A documentary review of the documents was done as preparation for the mission. In April 2005 meetings were held in IPEC Geneva with the former DED evaluation specialist in charge of this evaluation, with the Technical Specialist in the VGU (today limited to one person only), as well as with other IPEC and ILO departments. In addition and as part of the Phase I of the evaluation (covering the three non-african countries) the evaluator prepared a series of tools and interview guides which were used as much as possible into the current evaluation. A phone conversation with USDOL was also held prior to the fielding of the evaluation.
22. An evaluation instrument detailing the stakeholders and the approach to the mission was submitted after discussion with the project team on 16 January 2006.
23. The stakeholder matrix for this evaluation has been the following, and included a visit to each of the project countries :

Country	IPEC staff	UN agencies (Unicef, WFP)	Government (DDR, Min. Labour, etc.)	IPEC Implementing partners (including APs and studies)	Beneficiaries (reintegration & prevention)	Benef. parents
RoCongo	X	X	X	X		
<i>Rwanda</i>	X	X	X	X		
<i>Burundi</i>	X	X	X	X	X	
<i>DRC</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X

24. In total the evaluation carried out 69 individual and group interviews with a total of 237 people. Details of the interviews are as follows :

interview stats	meet	people	meet	people	meet	people	meet	people	meet	people	meet	people	meet	people
	IPEC		UN		Govt		partners		other		benef		parents	
Roc	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	8	0	0	0		0	
Rwanda	1	1	0	0	2	2	3	7	2	10	0		0	
Burundi	1	2	1	1	3	4	5	7	1	1	5	39	0	
DRC	2	5	5	8	8	9	6	17	7	8	6	20	1	5
DRC rapid group interview											3	78		
sub-total	5	9	7	10	15	18	17	39	10	19	14	137	1	5
total interviews 69 of which 14 with beneficiaries, 1 with parents and 54 with key informants														
total persons 237 of which 3 rapid interview with 78 beneficiaries														

25. For each key informant category, the first column is the number of meetings/interviews held, while the second column represents the number of people who attended the meeting. The average interview time was 45 minutes, except for the 3 beneficiary rapid group interviews which lasted some 15 minutes each. 66 of the 69 were semi-structured interviews using deductive enquiry.
26. The present report is one of the inputs into a synthesis report which will be prepared in the framework of this evaluation, and will cover in addition to the present report the national evaluations undertaken in Colombia, The Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

The evaluator

27. Mr. Christian Bugnion is the founder and director of Subur Consulting S.L., a private consulting company specialised in evaluation work, based in Spain. Mr. Bugnion is familiar with all four countries covered by the project, having worked in all of them on repeated occasions since 1994.⁴

Evaluation constraints and bias

28. Due to the tight time-frame the evaluation discussed with the Project Team how to make the best use of the time available. It was agreed that field work would only take place in Burundi and DRC where the largest target groups are.
29. Not all available project documentation had been given prior to the fielding of the mission, and additional documents were provided by the Project Team.
30. The other constraints relating to the working environment are described at length in the main findings section of the report.

⁴ Mr. Bugnion is a trained socio-economist and has carried out thirty five evaluations over the past twelve years for eighteen different customers including donors (World Bank, USAID, DfID, ECHO, DANIDA), UN agencies (UNHCR, UNTAET, UNDP, WFP, UNOCHA, UNILLO), IOM, NGOs (Mercy Corps, SFCG, CARE, IRC, DARA) and others (ODI/ALNAP). Mr. Bugnion is a board member of the Spanish Evaluation Society, and member of the European Evaluation Society. Mr. Bugnion also teaches evaluation and humanitarian aid in post-graduate degrees in Spain.

II. Main Findings

Summary

31. Summary of main findings :

- The project faces an enormous amount of constraints and difficulties. These are detailed hereunder
- The project has managed to deal with constraints and difficulties and has been able to actually start the implementation of activities at beneficiaries level.
- Most activities on the ground are just starting as the evaluation takes place; only in Kananga are beneficiaries near completion of their training
- Three A.P.s remain in the pipeline and require urgent approval and implementation
- Given the delays the time-frame is too tight to reach the objectives, and an extension is necessary for all countries
- Governments welcome the IPEC project. Despite its perceived small budget, it is interesting and can be seen as a model for economic reintegration and prevention through reintegration of the ex child soldiers and other vulnerable groups.
- Governments and partners have complained about the rigidity of the IPEC project.
- Partners have welcomed the availability and support from the IPEC staff for assisting them in designing and writing the A.P.s. Some have even been funded by other donors for their proposal. Positive capacity building of IPEC partners.
- Beneficiaries are happy with the training received : they feel more confident and have higher self-esteem
- Former child soldiers and at risk youths are no longer seen as a threat to society by their family and neighbours; if they can live from their job it will be a successful economic reintegration coupled with social reintegration

32. As mentioned in the executive summary, the project is faced with an enormous amount of constraints and difficulties. These exist at different levels, and must be clearly understood in order to properly appraise the project's results. Seven different levels of constraints have been identified, which can broadly be divided into two categories: internal and external constraints.

33. Among the internal constraints, there are three major elements which contribute to constant delays in project implementation :

1. The project design
2. The management structure
3. The decision making structure

As regards to the external constraints, there are also there major elements which contribute to a very difficult project implementation, something like trying to roll a stone uphill:

1. The political situation in the project countries
2. The state of degradation of the governance and government structures and infrastructures, particularly in DRC which now hosts the project team and CTA
3. The extreme difficulties in logistical and communication means between the four countries and even within countries (particularly DRC internal travel to the East)
4. The security situation in the different project countries

34. While the project can only directly influence its internal constraints, the external constraints are just as important in terms of affecting project implementation.

Internal constraints

1. Project design

35. The project design has been recognised to be of very high quality, both in terms of its structure, amount of research, and the logical and coherence that are part of the design. However it has one essential gap : it does not reflect the conditions or constraints of the different operating environments in each of the project countries, nor the difficult relationships between each of these countries. As a result the chain of logic in the interaction between the different project elements is expected to take place as if the project was working under optimal conditions in a very different working environment. The project design has further gone into great efforts to identify specific budget lines and even prepared a detailed calendar and budget, but again without considering existing difficulties and without any flexibility to reallocate funds. This invalidates to a large extent the excellent work that was placed into the project document, and creates unnecessary constraints for the project management team as it already places the project team, even before the project starts, in a rigid situation. A review of how other actors in DDR operate under the same conditions would have immediately shown the lack of applicability of a fixed and detailed budget.⁵
36. IPEC should not be reinventing the wheel nor attempt to force all its projects to come under the same model. Child soldiers' economic reintegration is a new and specific activity within the IPEC projects. As all newborns it requires a certain degree of flexibility in order to establish itself, something which the project design does not give it. In fact the design for project activities is so detailed that it appears to micro-manage what the project team is expected to accomplish. It almost seems as if the project document was meant to take a life of its own.
37. This however is simply impossible. As the usual saying states, "a picture is worth a thousand words" : it is therefore strongly recommended that USDOL appoints one staff as observer for the final evaluation to learn from this process how to identify and incorporate constraints in future project designs, and the necessary need for budget flexibility to be recognised in similar projects from the onset.

⁵ Feedback received from a stakeholder on this point : It should also be highlighted that while the evaluation report criticizes on the one hand the time and effort put into APSOs design it does not recognize on the other hand that the technical soundness and uniqueness of the project, expressed generally by the implementing agencies, governments and other UN agencies, might actually be an indirect consequence of this long and thoroughly process of design. In fact, the design stage of the APs is considered a learning process and are extremely pleased with the comments made by the implementing agencies as regards the crucial role of facilitation and technical advice by the IPEC's team in this process.

2. The management structure

38. The project management structure is complex and has many different levels. One finding is that the nature of a project such as this makes it impossible for the CTA to be based in third countries. This project is not a typical development project, but a very sensitive and high profile experience which requires the capacity for rapid adjustments to exist both at management level and within the IPEC structure. For logistical reasons and in terms of travel and communication, the initial posting of the CTA in Yaoundé proved to be a nightmare. A lesson learned is therefore that for this type of project the CTA must be based in one of the project countries, probably on the basis of the number of beneficiaries and on its communication/logistics capacity with the other project countries. This is one of the reasons which explain part of the delay that the project has taken.

39. Another constraint is the fact that the project decision making and budgetary allocation has not been decentralised. This means :

- 1) that an enormous amount of time was spent simply in obtain the official signing and approval of the A.P.s;
- 2) that further delays were experienced in making the funds available

Figure : Table of A.P. partners payment delays

Delays between Partners Submission of technical proposals for A.P.s, actual date of signature and date of reception of first payment						
IPEC/ILO CHILD SOLDIERS A.P. LIST						
A.P. partner Name	Submission date of A.P. for technical proposal (dd/mm/yy)	Date of signature of contract by agency (dd/mm/yy)	Date of reception of first payment (dd/mm/yy)	Country	number of days between	
					submission and approval	submission and payment
ONEMO	15-08-05	18-11-05	15-12-05	ROC	94	122
DMI	27-06-05	26-08-05	24-11-05	ROC	60	150
ASOFERWA	13-10-05	30-11-05	06-01-06	RWANDA	48	85
APROPOL	28-10-05	14-12-05	28-12-05	RWANDA	47	61
ADEPE	31-10-05	14-12-05	28-12-05	RWANDA	44	58
TPO	15-07-05	18-08-05	06-10-05	BURUNDI	34	83
CFR	15-08-05	18-09-05	21-10-05	BURUNDI	33	67
BICE	10-06-05	27-07-05	05-09-05	DRC KAN	47	87
FSH	29-07-05	31-08-05	12-01-06	DRC BUK	33	167
G1	15-07-05	19-08-05	03-10-05	DRC BUK	34	80
AASD	23-08-05	12-10-05	09-12-05	DRC	50	108
APEE	23-08-05	12-10-05	01-12-05	DRC	50	100
AVERAGE					48	97
NB : dates obtained from A.P. Partners and verified by IPEC project						

40. The table above shows that the average time between submission of the AP proposal for technical clearance until the date of receipt of the first payment is 97 days, or three months and one week! And this for projects ranging from 12 to 15 months duration. In fact the delays for A.P. approval are on average 48 days. The problem lies in the delay to transfer the funds through a conjunction of three factors : the capacity (or lack thereof) of the banking system, ILO office, or IRIS, as an additional 49 days are required on average just to transfer the funds to the project partners.
41. There are two reasons for the delays in funding allocation : 1) the internal structure of the IPEC approval process, and 2) the lack of functionality of the banking system in DRC
- 3) the internal structure of the IPEC approval process
42. The project team has been as thorough with the design of the A.P. projects as IPEC and USDOL have been for the overall project document. All partners received support and guidance from the project team in order to improve the quality of the project proposal. However here the same comment applies as to the overall project document : the writing of a good project document does not entail automatically a successful application and good results. The evaluation finds that too much efforts were placed on the proposal writing phase while insufficient efforts are being developed to ensure a proper monitoring of implementation.
43. Another aspect is the complicated approval process internal to the IPEC. From the moment the VGU approves an A.P. proposal technically, it still has to go through different clearing stages within IPEC including through the ILO PROCUREMENT Department for financial approval before the ILO Director actually signs the contract. While the signing of the contract is supposed to be a formality, the management style of the ILO Director has provided additional delays. In this type of project further unwarranted delays negatively affect project implementation and should be avoided.
44. Likewise it is important to the success of the project that the financial approval that is to be given by ILO PROCUREMENT Department be accelerated.
45. VGU are a key structure in the project management and are normally very rapid and cooperative. Therefore they are not responsible for any delays and have always pro-actively supported the project team. Recent staff turnover led to a temporary situation of the unit being depleted from three staff to one staff which had some consequence on the project.
- 4) the banking system in DRC
46. In addition to the stringent requirements to open a bank account in DRC, the banking system is hardly well functioning. In Eastern DRC almost everyone's bank account is in Rwanda, as the banking system in the neighbouring country is much more reliable and efficient. Nonetheless IPEC regulations require A.P. partners to have an account in the same country. This has entailed countless delays, and in one case more than four months were required only to open the bank account! In addition errors in banking transfers have

also contributed to delays in the partners' reception of funds (such as transferring the money to a bank in Burundi for a Rwandese A.P. partner).

47. The sum of these different factors explain to a large extent the delays experienced under the project implementation. But there are also other factors involved.
48. Staffing also proved to be a difficult issue. Finding the proper staff took great efforts. In the two largest target group countries (DRC and Burundi), the two CNP had to be replaced. This also contributed to further delays as the new CNPs had to quickly take charge of the project. Not only did the necessary staff turn-over contribute to delays, but in addition the staff recruited for the project are not IPEC staff and are therefore not knowledgeable regarding the procedures and the ILO/IPEC system (with the exception of the DRC CNP). This lack of procedural knowledge also translates into additional delays (e.g. not knowing how the system works). Day to day hassles also diminish the IPEC staff's effectiveness in many countries : for example, in Rwanda the lack of a UN ID card for the CNP obliges him to wait at the security desk of the UN and he is not granted entrance until the person he comes to see confirms the appointment in the UN building! Many small but significant elements contribute to a general loss of efficiency and effectiveness of the overall project performance. In the opinion of the evaluator, the hosting of the IPEC project within UN offices wherever possible, rather than outside the UN, might have contributed to lessen these unnecessary additional limitations.⁶

5) constraints from budgetary system

49. While the ILO/IPEC financial system is determined by the nature of ILO as a UN organisation using public funds, it is also the case that such a system on occasion is not conducive to working under conditions found in the project countries. One such illustration of how other organisations operate under existing conditions is the inclusion in their budgets of a 'miscellaneous' budget line. Although ILO/IPEC would not be able to emulate this it is nonetheless illustrative of what obstacles IPEC faces and how others have been able to maintain flexibility. The project's experience is that the staff have to work for days in order to find "arrangements" to compensate for the missing "miscellaneous" budget line to settle utilities, instead of spending these days working for the beneficiaries. By including a simple "miscellaneous" budget line this allows the other projects to handle minor problems in a few minutes, while its absence may occupy the whole staff for days. This is a typical and regularly occurring example of how the rigidity of IPEC's financial rules, instead of increasing the productivity of the project team, reduces it. However, IPEC explicitly does not allow such a BL in the budgets of APs, and only recently accepted a limited BL for the IPEC project as a whole. On the other hand, and IPEC should be well aware of this, the CONADER is allowing a 5% BL "miscellaneous" (expenses to be justified) + a 10% "fees" (not be justified, corresponds to "agency costs" in the UN system) to all their implementing agencies (versus 0% in IPEC). The Project is finding itself in the absurd situation concerning the well advanced plans for IPEC/CONADER co-funding of APs that some of IPEC implementing agencies

⁶ The Project Team disagrees with this statement : « In none of the 4 countries this was an option, because there was simply no office space available. But even if it were, we would have refused it, because UN security regulations would have made it impossible for our target group to come to us. We intentionally excluded this option anyway. »

executing APs that are co-funded by the CONADER and IPEC will get 5% + 10% as indicated above, while those executing APs funded only by IPEC get neither fees nor miscellaneous. Under these conditions, and apart from the impossibility to function without a BL “miscellaneous” in the given context, it is clear that IPEC implementing agencies will sooner or later turn away from IPEC and go to the CONADER.

3. The decision making structure

50. The IPEC project implementation is established under a fragmented decision making structure. This means that the VGU in Geneva has “overall responsibility for ensuring technical consistency and coordination”, as mentioned in the project document. With the only project CTA being based in one of the four African countries, he has no real possibility to follow up the project implementation outside these four African countries. As a result the VGU is providing both technical assistance and backstopping to the project staff in Philippines, Sri Lanka and Colombia, in addition to its overall responsibility for all of the countries and backstopping the CTA in Africa. But the real decision making power, in terms of formal authorisations for signature and fund disbursement, is held both by IPEC Geneva, in charge of the overall budget allocation, as well as by the Kinshasa ILO Office Director who must authorise each and every disbursement. In practice this means that the CTA has no authority to take the final decision regarding funding allocations and is therefore consistently dependent on the ILO/IPEC structure’s procedures. Again as compared to other projects working in the field of DDR (such as Unicef and SCF or the Consortium in DRC) it appears clearly that IPEC has the most centralised management and control structure which also leads to the longest delays both in terms of decision making and in terms of funding allocation. It is critical for IPEC to review whether it wants to maintain this structure despite its comparative disadvantages with other actors and its negative impact on the smooth implementation of the child soldiers’ project.

The external constraints

1. The political situation in the four project countries

51. The operating environment is a major factor which directly affects day to day implementation of the project in all four countries. One of the first factors which needs to be identified is the political situation of the four project countries. All are attempting to transition out of a period of strife and conflict, but each has a different political system, culture, history, and of the four countries it can be said that DRC, which hosts the project team and the CTA, is probably the most fragile of the four project countries. Undoubtedly as the big brother in the Great Lakes region, anything affecting DRC will continue to have spill-over effects on the neighbouring countries, and beyond.

52. Rwanda has had a stable leadership since 1994 under Paul Kagame, marked by a large number of reforms and measures (for example the *imidugudu* policy, the *gacaca*, *land rights*, *inheritance laws*, etc.). In the latest series of government reshuffles and

administrative restructuring, Rwanda is currently undergoing since the beginning of 2006 a major administrative reform. The number of provinces have been reduced to 4 from the original number of 12. At the same time and in order to contain costs, all government ministries and staff have been required to move into government and public buildings. As a result of both decisions a cabinet reshuffle is expected and the current period is not conducive to introducing new projects or proposals as those in charge today may no longer be there tomorrow. In concrete terms this was demonstrated by the interview with the Director of Labour and Employment who was interviewed on 25 January 2006 by the evaluation and replaced on the 27th. In Rwanda the issue of child soldiers is a difficult issue and heavily politicised, as dates of services in the armed groups are clearly marking the type of group to which the child belonged. A unique feature in Rwanda was the existence of a former Child Soldier's Association (CECA), which is currently undergoing a name change to RUYAAC (Rwanda Union of Youth Affected by Armed Conflict) for a number of justified reasons. In the current political context, the Child Soldiers issue is certainly not at the top of the government's agenda. Neither are there any special projects under the MDRP in Rwanda.

53. The Republic of Congo, partially thanks to its oil revenues, has been able to continue on the road to recovery since the end of its civil war in 1999, with only the Pool region under Reverend Ntoumi maintaining an armed struggle with the government. It appears probably as the most stable country of the four, but the underlying widespread poverty and uneven distribution of the benefits of the oil revenue does not contribute to a visible improvement in the daily lives of Congolese. As compared to the previous visit to RoC by the evaluator in 2003 the price increase was surprising. Indeed the government partners interviewed even highlighted the need for the project budget to be indexed on the cost of living increase in each of the countries, as they claimed to be the big losers in the budget allocation exercise given the sharp rise in prices. The government, through the Coordination of the National Plan for DDR, expressed its interest in the IPEC project on three accounts : 1) because of its specific child soldier focus (again as in Rwanda in RoC there are no special projects under the MDRP), 2) because of its advocacy work with legislators and government in order to support both the application of convention 182 and preventive aspects and 3) because it works in prevention, with people who did not directly participate in conflict but are at risk of being recruited. Despite the government's interest however, it needs to be stated that the government also believes it has the capacity to deal with the child soldiers' problem itself . As regards to the existing needs, the government uses the figure of 3,500 children in the NP for DDR. Considering that seven years have passed since the civil war, from the evaluation's perspective the only remaining real need will be for those children who remain in the Pool region, once and if the Reverend Ntoumi finally decides to give up its armed resistance and the children can be demobilised.

54. Burundi has just gone through a tense but peaceful and up to date successful transition phase, since October 2005 when a new government was voted in. After 12 years of regional and internal conflict, initially triggered by the assassination of the first democratically elected president, M. Ndadaye in October 1993, Burundi has known very few periods of peace. It appears now to be heading towards a consolidated peace process, and rumours report the possibility that the last of the political and armed group led by Rwaswa (essentially in Bujumbura Rural) might be joining the democratic peace process. Results to date are certainly very encouraging, but it is too early to confirm that lasting

peace will be possible. Furthermore Burundi is land-locked and sandwiched between three countries : DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania. Its internal situation is also tributary on the regional political situation. Nonetheless there is room for optimism and a vote of confidence to the new government is necessary to assist the consolidation of peace. In Burundi the needs for economic reintegration are far from covered, and there is a very receptive government, both from the new Minister of Labour, and from the National Demobilisation Commission, looking forward to a continuation and extension of the IPEC project (provided the anticipated results are reached and demonstrated).

55. Finally in DRC, the multiplicity of the crises that have affected the country since 1994 have not yet come to an end. A main turning point are the elections that are scheduled to take place this spring, and that many see as the last chance for peace in DRC. The continued unreversed trend of degradation of all administrative and social structures has not been halted, and small-scale corruption has become a general means of survival for all. Civil servants haven't been paid for months (or is it years?), and the provincial governments do not receive any funding from the central level. In this growing state of anarchy and chaos, poverty remains rampant and the fragility of the current peace is only expected to last until elections take place. However should the elections be contested or the process not judged as fair, there is a real risk of returning into a spiral of widespread violence. It would also be useful to foresee contingency mechanisms for the project staff and structure should a return to violence become a reality in DRC.
56. In terms of needs there is no doubt that DRC, together with Burundi, has the largest number of uncovered needs for the reintegration of child soldiers. The estimated number of child soldiers is 33,000 according to the CONADER. While this figure is likely to overestimate the current number of accessible children (it is based on a 10% estimation of the existing DDR beneficiaries), two issues must be clearly raised. First that the part where most of the damage was done was in the Eastern DRC, which is also where most of the child soldiers are to be found. Second that there is no capacity outside the IPEC project designed to specifically target economic reintegration of child soldiers.

2. The state of governance and government structures

The state of degradation of the governance and government structures and infrastructures, particularly in DRC which now hosts the project team and TCP

57. As mentioned above most governance structures in the project countries are fragile, particularly in the DRC where most of the project team and the CTA are based. As a example of the sad state of affairs, it needs to be recognised that anyone wishing to board even an internal flight without hassle is strongly advised to recruit one of the many "helpers" which will ensure check in and customs and immigration clearance for a small fee (normally US\$ 10). And this is reproduced everywhere and at every level, including some of the authorities ("by the way, I'm out of credits on my mobile. You don't happen to have an extra phone recharge card" –worth as little as US 5.--, has been according to partners and interviewees a very common request). It is quite impossible to function according to a logical and coherent plan in such a state, as is the currently the case with DRC . If this is by itself a major difficulty, this only enhances overall difficulties in terms

of travel and communication both within the DRC and within the region. Additionally power supply is at very short demand in the region. On the first day when the evaluation arrived the project office power supply in Kinshasa shut down at 18h00 and the team meeting continued with candle lights until 20h30. Power supply has been uneven and haphazard in Kinshasa, Kananga, Kigali, Bujumbura, Bukavu – with only one country having a regular power supply for the time being – RoC. This means that no work can be undertaken which require any electronic material, or internet access, without resorting to the use of backup power supply groups for project offices.

58. The evaluation itself witnessed the frequent and repeated power cuts –sometimes lasting days- in all but one country of the four African project countries. This contributes to the isolation of the project staff and also partly explains the high cost of the phone communications, which are virtually the only reliable communication means between the IPEC project team, its field offices and the IPEC partners implementing the A.P.s on the ground.

3. Logistics and communication difficulties

The extreme difficulties in logistical and communication means between the four countries and even within countries (particularly DRC internal travel to the East)

59. As if the general state of degradation of infrastructures was not enough, in addition severe logistical constraints further hamper smooth project supervision. Again of particular difficulty is the DRC, which has very poor connections for internal flights and very insecure internal flights to the East of the country (during the security briefing the evaluator was told to avoid commercial planes in DRC and only to use MONUC planes. However non-MONUC staff are not given priority and they can be dropped off at the last minute. Furthermore MONUC is just as unreliable in its flight plans as the commercial companies). Therefore travelling from Kinshasa to Eastern DRC, or to Kigali or Bujumbura, cannot be done in a direct straight flight. The IPEC staff coming from Burundi and Kigali have to transit through Nairobi to reach Kinshasa. Again the unreliability of planes caused the project staff from Burundi and Rwanda to miss the evaluation restitution session on 3.2.06 as their flight was cancelled. Internal travel in DRC is just as difficult and unreliable. The road conditions make road travel a journey, and a trip of 50 km in straight line can take six hours given the unkept road network, or even more during the rainy season. Finally for example it took the evaluation one entire day to return from Bukavu to Kinshasa, after spending more than 3 hours on a boat (Bukavu – Goma). Because the Governor of Sud Kivu was on board, the boat left late and arrived late in Goma. The flight from Goma was awaiting at the airport with a nervous pilot anxious to depart soonest, so the commercial airlines agent drove with its minibus filled with people to the brim at over 60 mph through the centre of Goma to reach the airport as soon as possible. Somehow we all made it alive to the airport. The flight made a further stop in Kinsangani, and eventually arrived in Kinshasa in the late afternoon, with the usual round of people and army soldiers and police requesting some “help” from the newcomers to make ends meet. While this might appear to be an anecdote, it is in fact part of the usual travelling conditions. It is almost impossible to describe all the impediments to smooth travel in the country. But experiencing it is believing it.

4. The security situation in the different project countries

60. An added constraint which limits smooth field work in Burundi is the UN security rules. The four project countries are subject to the same UN security rules. Within each country each capital city and the rest of the country is ranked according to a security scale which attributes a risk level from phase 1 to 5, with phase 5 being evacuation of all UN staff. The higher the phase the higher the risk. Bujumbura, Burundi's capital city, and most of the countryside are in phase II, with the exception of Buja Rural which is on phase IV (Rwasa armed opposition group). Despite being on phase II, the security officials make it compulsory for all UN staff to have a police escort when going to the field. This of course does not apply to NGOs or donors, only the UN. During the field visit to Cibitoke it was obvious that departure could not take place before 10h00 with a compulsory return at 15h00 from Cibitoke. In the best of cases, there were five working hours in that day (of which 2 were travel time to Cibitoke and back), therefore only three working hours could be spent in the field! Each time, IPEC has to pay not only for the fuel, but also for the per diem of 6 military/police escort which makes any field visit a nightmare for IPEC travel budgets which never foresaw such type of expenses.
61. These security requirements stem partly from the large number of deaths from expatriates in Burundi over the last ten years, particularly UN staff (although in 1994 and 1995 the evaluator worked throughout Burundi on phase IV without any escort) but are both ridiculous and uneven across the region. Even to reach Uvira (border town on the lake Tanganyika, half an hour drive from Bujumbura to DRC, some thirty miles out), the evaluator should have requested an armed escort. But when this is compared with the regional situation, particularly neighbouring Eastern DRC, which is on phase IV of the UN security scale, but require no armed escort (as the car that picked up the evaluator in Uvira to drive up to Bukavu clearly showed), the comparison shows the inconsistency of the UN security system across the different countries of the region.
62. While in Eastern DRC it is a recognised fact that some areas are still out of bounds for MONUC and UN and NGOs, with pockets of armed resistance, there is only one province in Burundi on phase IV. The compulsory armed escort for the UN severely constraints the field monitoring capacity of the IPEC staff and obeys no clear rationale. It is a specific constraint applicable only to Burundi, although most of the areas where IPEC operates in DRC –including Bukavu– have a higher risk ranking in the UN security scale.
63. Clearly realising and understanding the implications of all these seven types of constraints are key in understanding how far the project has been able to evolve.

MDRP : the overall framework for DDR in the four project countries

64. In the four African countries there is a similar framework for DDR which has been established by the World Bank as a multiple-agency response with a large number of donors, but administered by the World Bank, through the MDRP (Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program).

65. The objective of the MDRP is to contribute to the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes Region. Eligible countries are seven, the four IPEC project countries, plus Uganda, Angola and CAR. Funds can either be accessed through the multi-donor Trust Fund (TF) or through IDA. According to the MDRP website information, the estimated pledges and disbursements per country were as follows :

MDRP FRAMEWORK				
www.mdrp.org				
MDRP fundings				<i>IPEC project</i>
Country	amount pledged	disbursed	source	
Rwanda	\$53.000.000			
of which	\$14.400.000	\$6.500.000	Trust Fund	
	\$25.000.000	\$18.300.000	IDA	
No special projects	\$0			
				\$312.228
RoCongo	\$25.000.000			
No special projects	\$0	included in overall figure		\$312.228
Burundi	\$84.400.000			
of which	\$41.800.000	\$4.000.000	Trust Fund	
	\$33.000.000	\$11.000.000	IDA	
Special projects				
Unicef	\$3.536.000			
				\$780.450
DRC	\$200.000.000			
of which	\$100.000.000	\$9.000.000	Trust Fund	
	\$1.000.000	\$20.000.000	IDA	
Special projects				
SCF	\$5.370.000	\$2.400.000		
Consortium	\$9.160.000	\$2.770.000		
UNDP CR	\$5.000.000	\$5.000.000		
UNDP RRM	\$12.600.000	\$4.700.000	not children	
RC	\$1.140.000	\$640.000		
Unicef	\$4.998.000	\$2.775.000		
				\$1.092.000
sub-total	\$362.400.000			
total children				
sp.proj.	\$24.206.000			
				\$2.496.906

Note : the Special Projects are a separate funding category from which activities specifically targeting children soldiers have been funded (in total for US\$ 24 millions)

66. Two of the four countries, RoC and Rwanda have no special projects. However actions in favour of ex-child soldiers is one of the five components of the RoC National Plan for DDR, and are also contemplated in Rwanda.

67. In RoC the national DDR Commission foresees 3,500 ex-child soldiers as its objective. In Rwanda, the figure is of 2,500 ex-child soldiers (source NCDR). In DRC the target figure is 33,000 ex-child soldiers, with 17,000 already “liberated” with 30 partners (source CONADER). And in Burundi the NCDR indicates the target figure of 3,015 ex-child

soldiers to date, with an additional 500 ex-child soldiers foreseen by the end of 2006, raising the total to over 3,500.

68. Adding all these figures, the target for the MDRP funding in the four countries amounts to an anticipated 42,500 ex-child soldiers in the four countries, with 78% of the target group in DRC. As compared to the IPEC beneficiary figures, the numbers appear as follows :

Ex child soldiers figures

Country	estimate Govt sources*	IPEC Reint.	IPEC Prev.	IPEC Total	difference	coverage IPEC/Reint. only versus Govt figures
Rwanda	2500	200	600	800	1700	8%
RoCongo	3500	200	500	700	2800	5.7%
DRC	33000	2000	2000	4000	29000	6.1%
Burundi	3500	1440	1000	2440	1060	41%
Total	42500	3840	4100	7940	34560	9%

*Official statistics given during evaluation interview by each country's National DDR Commission

69. This indicates that equity in coverage as compared to needs was not a criterion for defining the target group in each of the IPEC project countries. As it stands Burundi has received the lion's share of coverage, with 41% of the government's estimate taken up by the IPEC project, while in DRC the figure is a meagre 6% of the identified needs. It should be noted however that the figures both in RoCongo and DRC are based on a flat 10% estimate of the total number of ex-combatant and do not reflect actual surveys. Therefore governments' figures are essentially estimates which may or may not be grounded in reality.
70. The MDRP was behind the funding and creation of a number of activities involving DDR and therefore also including ex-child soldiers' activities and programmes (such as the Unicef funding in Burundi). The MDRP has been designed as the framework for the entire region as regards to DDR activities, inclusive of ex-child soldiers. Each of the countries' recent National DDR Plan was drafted with a view to access MDRP funding.

Actual IPEC implementation and achievements

71. Somehow, the project managed to survive thus far all constraints and eventually was able to start the implementation of activities on the ground. The project strategy is described in overall project document, but for each country a more context specific country annex has been prepared. Unfortunately it reproduces to a large extent the project document model and therefore inherits many of its strengths and weaknesses, particularly in regards to the lack of explanation regarding the constraining operating environment and the project's inherent limitations given the country's situation. Again a substantial amount of work and effort is placed both in a very thorough drafting and design of the country annex (including detailed calendar activities and budgets), as well as for each of the A.P.s, but

the relationship between project proposal writing and implementation is not at all explicit. Preparing a detailed logical framework does not automatically entail that activities will actually take place. In terms of the design and preparation for the project, both at IPEC/USDOL levels and at country level, the evaluation finds that too much efforts were placed on paper proposal and insufficient means were allocated and foreseen to monitor the actual implementation. This creates a serious imbalance within the PCM (Project Cycle Management) and gives an excessive importance to project writing versus field monitoring. This is probably due to ILO's long standing experience in development aid, and limited experience in fluid environments. However balance between project design and proposal writing versus the need for effective field monitoring and supervision needs to be found.

72. For all four countries, the development objective of the programme is : “To contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups”. In each country the same three immediate objectives apply :

1. ***“By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict”.***
2. “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income”.
3. “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited into armed conflict in the targeted countries”.

The findings of IPEC implementation and achievements per country are as follows :

Republic of Congo

73. In RoC there are currently two A.P.s which have started, the first on 24 November 05, the second on 15 December 2005. An additional A.P. has yet to be approved and started. The A.P. table appears as follows :

IPEC partner	Start date	Reint.	Prev.	Length Of A.P.	Sub –total	Location
DMI	24.11.05	100	400	15 months	500	Niari/Lekoumou/Bouenza
ONEMO	15.12.05	115		14 months	115	Cuvette/Plateaux/Brazza
NIOSI	pipeline		100	? max 9 ?	100	Pool

74. It has taken almost two full years of the project life to start A.P.s in RoC. The original duration of the A.P.s actually exceed the project deadline of 31.12.2006, which means that partners must strive to accomplish the same results within a compressed time-frame. However this is not possible in many cases, because some of the components which are part of the intervention strategy are subject to seasonal and climatic factors. This means that the overall delays in designing the A.P., approving the A.P., funding the A.P. (as mentioned previously with an average of 97 days having passed between the submission on an A.P. for technical approval and the reception of the first funding allocation) have obliged some of the partners to simply have to substantially change their initial strategy.

This has been one of the constraints on IPEC partners. After having placed many efforts into a specific project design and approach, the excessive delays have invalidated a large part of the approach and negatively affected their implementation capacity. Another point which has negatively affected partners in RoC and in the other countries is that in order to facilitate the start of activities, many partners actually financed the first beneficiary identification mission on their own funds. However given the delays between the identification mission and the actual starting date of activities, in a number of cases a secondary identification had to be undertaken (something neither foreseen nor budgeted for in the project). There have also been delays for questionable bureaucratic requirements regarding the approval of the A.P., such as the fact that the A.P. must first be signed by the ILO Director (so the partner's signature cannot be placed on the A.P. before it is signed by ILO), and that an electronic copy is not acceptable (so the original document has to physically travel to the ILO Office)⁷. For DMI the project staff was already recruited in September 2005, but the staff was suspended in October 2005 as funds had not been received (which eventually arrived on 24 of November 2005 only, and staff was again deployed on 26 November 2005). Another consequence of the delay in starting the activities is the actual quality of the work that can be accomplished. Maintaining the same work plan, work load and objectives on a reduced time-frame can only be done at someone's expense. This means that some of the training choices, and the variety of choices, have to be reduced. It also means that some activities have been undertaken two at a time, instead of progressively developing the activities. In concrete terms for example, both beneficiary's identification and the orientation and sensibilisation process were conducted at the same time (DMI), to the detriment of the orientation process.

75. A similar experience was done by ONEMO, as on their own funds in July 2005 they deployed a four-day mission to identify beneficiaries, with 82 ex-child soldiers in Owando (Cuvette) and 85 in Gamboma (Plateaux). But given funding delays until mid December a new identification mission was fielded in January 2006, at which time 51 and 55 ex-child soldiers were identified in Owando and Gamboma respectively. However most of them proved over the target age group and only 22 and 25 were retained in the respective towns, with an additional 40 in Brazzaville, raising the total of beneficiaries who meet the selection criteria 87. ONEMO is the only government partner of 13 currently approved A.P.s.
76. Both partners are equally worried that IPEC funding, divided into different instalments, will also continue to arrive late as the activities continue to be underway. A further delay of funding would deal a final blow to an already difficult project implementation.

Feedback from government

77. It needs to be noted that in RoC even the Government (Coordinator for the National Plan for DDR and also President of the Technical Committee in charge of supervising the IPEC project) stated that ILO procedures were too rigid, slow and stringent both in administrative and financial terms (something echoed by the MinLabour representative) .

⁷ This is no longer true as the ILO Director has reportedly accepted a scanned copy provided the original is submitted at a later date upon request of the Project Team.

The rest of actors working in DDR simply use more flexible and fluid structures with faster funding allocation and decision making (Unicef was cited as an example).

78. The IPEC project is of great interest to the government for three reasons : 1) because of its specific focus on former child soldiers; 2) because of an approach which requires government's and legislators' advocacy and support for applying the ILO convention 182 including in the prevention aspect, and 3) because it works on prevention with people who haven't directly participated in armed conflict but are at risk of being recruited. As regards to the evaluation process of the IPEC project, the Coordinator further stated that "if adequate means are not given to evaluate the intervention, it is not possible to appraise the relevance of the approach and the choice of the operating mode". This is both a request for more funding to the Technical Project Committee in order to be able to evaluate the results of the IPEC project on the ground but also a request that a full-fledged evaluation be undertaken at the end of the project (unlike the current evaluation which did not foresee any field visit to the project sites). It was further indicated that the HCR would also be potentially interested in fielding a joint mission at the end of the IPEC project phase. The choice of implementing partners for the A.P.s was judged to be good.

Overall findings

79. In RoC the two A.P.s have recently started their activities and even if no further difficulty is encountered they will be hard pressed to reach the stated objectives within the specified time-frame. It is urgent that the third A.P. be approved and funded as soon as possible – else it will not even be able to start. The third A.P. is interesting because it works on prevention in the vicinity of the Pool region, which is the last remaining area with armed groups confronting the government. It would be therefore very useful to pilot such an approach and see what results can be obtained, and whether the success of the third A.P. may lead to a multiplier effect from the bordering Pool districts. However considering the situation and the very slow project implementation the evaluation recommends a six-months extension to ensure that positive results might be obtained and the third A.P. can be implemented. There are no other actors focusing specifically on the economic reintegration of ex-child soldiers, and therefore the IPEC project is filling a critical gap through its pilot approach.

Rwanda

80. In Rwanda there are three A.P.s currently on-going, as per the following details :

IPEC partner	Start date	Reint.	Prev.	Length Of A.P.	Sub –total	Location
Asoferwa	6.01.06	100	300	13 months	400	Gysenyi, Ruhengeri
ADEPE	28.12.05	56	300	12 months	356	Byumba, Umutara
Apropol	28.12.05	40		12 months	40	Kigali

81. In Rwanda the delay in starting the activities was even greater than in RoC, and activities were virtually just starting when the evaluation took place. This was also a problem for the identification of beneficiaries. According to Asoferwa initially in July 2004 when the

IPEC staff was recruited many potential beneficiaries expected the project to start quickly. Now when it finally starts 18 months later a substantial number of potential beneficiaries are found to exceed the maximum age limit. Funding was only received at the end of 2005 for 2 of 3 A.P.s. However the surprising new territorial and administrative division is also causing some problems to IPEC partners as some of the areas under responsibility of Asoferwa are now in the ADEPE area of coverage, and vice-versa. This external constraint will therefore negatively affect work until both partners are able to closely coordinate their activities. Of particular interest in Rwanda is the Apropol pilot which targets the restaurant and hotel/tourism sectors with an interesting approach and substantial success on their previous experience. However again given that activities are just starting it is not possible to talk about concrete results to date. A former Child Soldiers Association (CECA) including women formerly involved in armed groups benefited from a mini-programme on capacity building so the Association is able to prepare project proposals and obtain some funding for their own activities and objectives. This has been strongly appreciated by the CECA.

82. In addition ILO/IPEC funded some specific studies in Rwanda. However the results of the one study that was seen by the evaluation (JOUPE) showed that the quality of the study that is requested by ILO/IPEC is rather low, in line with what is usually produced. In addition there lacks some degree of experience to undertake user-friendly, practically oriented studies. Finally as already mentioned the administrative reform negatively impacted the study's capacity to identify the administration's focal points in order to carry out the baseline in the field. Rwanda is very much a state under strong administrative control and collaboration are necessary to undertake field work in any province. The lesson here is that before studies are commissioned their level of applicability should be clearly identified and that studies should be avoided when reforms are taking or are due to take place.

A Feedback from government

83. In Rwanda feedback was obtained from the NCDR (the child protection and liaison officer) and the Ministry of Labour (Director of the Labour and Employment Department, substituted two days after the interview). In general Rwanda did not have a specific child soldier component until 2004. The focus and importance of reintegration, including as a form of prevention, was again discussed with the evaluation. No other actors intervene specifically on economic reintegration. A comment was made about the very small budget size for this kind of project. The objective of the project is important because it caters for target beneficiaries that NCDR cannot account for. Despite its small budget it is therefore politically important. The lack of identification of the constraining factors in the country was mentioned as a weakness of the country annex.

B Overall findings

84. In Rwanda the project office, hosted within the Ministry of Labour, has been consistently changed from one location to another, on average every six weeks. Whether or not this is linked to the perceived small project budget is irrelevant, but the fact is that under these

conditions the project CNP (only IPEC staff) is unable to work properly and adequately. When the evaluation visited the office five other people (from the MinLabour) were sharing it and additional furniture was being moved across the room, turning it into an impossible working environment. A budget for a separate office has reportedly already been accepted. It is urgent that the project office can be installed outside the government office, and that adequate monitoring capacity of the project's implementation at field level is ensured. The current situation both in RoC and Rwanda with only one CNP and no other staff does not allow proper monitoring and progress reporting on the A.P.s. An assistant should be recruited for a six-months period in each country to facilitate the supervision and monitoring of results, with an adequate budget.

Burundi

85. In Burundi there are two on-going A.P.s, with one additional proposal in the pipe-line as follows :

IPEC partner	Start date	Reint.	Prev.	Length Of A.P.	Sub –total	Location
CFR	21.10.05	350	100	12 months	450	Cibitoke, Bubanza, Mura.
TPO	06.10.05	300	50	12 months	350	Makamba, Bujumbura
CONSEDI	pipeline	165	236	??	401	Bujumbura rural

86. Burundi is one of the two countries where field work was carried out, including visits to a number of project beneficiaries (both CFR and TPO A.P. beneficiaries). A separate CD with a number of pictures at the different training sites was prepared by the evaluation and sent directly to the CTA in Kinshasa and another CD to IPEC Geneva (DED). As mentioned in the methodology, five group interviews of 39 beneficiaries were undertaken by the evaluation in Cibitoke and Bujumbura in to obtain beneficiary feedback on the training and on potential change as a result of the training.
87. Burundi is a project office where a new CNP started in February 2005, and where the UN security rules heavily restrict the mobility of the UN staff. This means that historically there were difficulties with the former CNP and that part of the new project staff's time had to be devoted to addressing and solving the previous problems. Not a single A.P. was ready when the new CNP started in February 2005 and therefore one of the first tasks was to make sure that A.P.s were identified, prepared, finalised and approved.
88. The evaluation had field visits and project site visits from which the detailed information on the tables included in this section come from.
89. Five beneficiary interviews were undertaken in Burundi as per details hereunder :

A.P. partner	location	Name of centre	Number of children	girls	boys	Type of training	Remarks
CFR	Cibitoke	CFR	9	0	9	Sheet metal welding	All demob 2005. 7 orphans, 2 with one parent
CFR	Cibitoke	CFR	8	6	2	sewing	2 boys demob 2004, 6 girls vulnerable (not ex-soldiers)
TPO	Buja	CNTA	6	4	2	cooking	2 vuln., 4 ex-soldiers, demob. 2004. 3 orphans, 2 one parent, 1 extended family
TPO	Buja	St-Luc	9	0	9	car repair sheet metal electricity	All former child soldiers
TPO	Buja	Musaga	7	3	4	sewing	6 ex child soldiers, demob in 2005. 1 girl vulnerable
Total			39	13	26		9 vulnerable, 30 ex soldiers

90. The group interviews took place while the children were being trained, and had not reached yet the end of their training. Therefore the primary purpose of the interview was to obtain their feedback regarding the training received and, more importantly, on the possible changes or impact that the training was having on their daily lives.

91. The results and key messages of the interviews are summarised as follows :

The good points - strengths	The bad points - weaknesses
1. Children do not have the means to afford a training school, so they are happy and grateful. It gives them something to do and will allow them to live from this activity in the future. Without this opportunity some of them would be earning a living on the streets	1. All are hungry and request to be fed to continue their training. (To date the WFP has not signed any agreement for the IPEC project to supply food to the children during training as foreseen in the annex. The Deputy WFP director instructed ILO to present a formal request). No food is being provided while they are on training.
2. It gives them a profession (before they had no particular civilian skills which they could use to earn a living)	2. Also request from those who live far away support for transportation
3. The communities (families, friends, neighbours) encourages them to attend the training, as they see the training as part of the reintegration process	3. Another request concerns having soap to wash their clothes, as they become dirty during the training (this is not a high cost and could be considered)
4. The neighbours are gradually starting to be less afraid of the children as they learn a job, so they won't have to resort to other	4. Request some support for those who are in bad health or become ill (this is part of the lack of social safety net and social

The good points - strengths	The bad points - weaknesses
means of obtaining money – they are no longer becoming seen as a menace to civil society	security and the evaluation does not recommend support in this aspect through the project)
5. All are enthusiastic and most of them want to set up associations to continue their activities at the end of their training (rather than individually) because a) it makes access to bank credit possible and b) it facilitates getting customers	5. Request for IPEC to assist them in finding employment at the end of the training (finding an incentive for potential employers to hire them)
6. Especially useful training given that most employment and income comes from individual family farming but given current drought agricultural production non existent	6. Request some equity in the end of training kits that will be provided, but preferably will create an association to maximise the end of training inputs to be received
7. The kits which will be received at the end of the training will allow them to start income generating activities	

92. The length of the training as well as the weekly and daily schedule vary according to the type of training. This is quite normal as there are several types of training cycles. The one interesting pilot in Cibitoke is actually related to bee-keeping, and all the training skills are part of an integrated approach to producing the necessary inputs for bee-keeping. Therefore the metal sheet workshop allows the children to prepare the specific material necessary for fumigation and processing the honey, while the sewing is useful to prepare the special clothing necessary to collect the honey. This pilot is interesting because the product which is being sold, honey, is actually not the result of human work, and therefore not very labour intensive. According to CFR they have received requests from South Africa to export honey, and this may therefore be an interesting pilot for the project beneficiaries.




Uniform for honey collection made by the sewing group trainers, and fumigation material made from the metal sheet workshop

93. As a result of these interviews, it appears that the project has the potential to reach its objectives but the weaknesses that have been raised have to be addressed. Of particular concern is the lack of WFP food for training (FFT), which was supposed to start at the same time as the training. This has been a recurrent problem with WFP as in none of the four countries was FFT given out to project beneficiaries. although it is foreseen in three of the four country annexes. It is likely that some misunderstanding regarding the procedures between WFP and ILO/IPEC are the cause of these delays, as the target group of the IPEC project falls clearly within the mandate and the programming category of WFP. Urgent attention to this matter is required, as the provision of food will act as an additional incentive for the children to attend the training. IPEC staff should become more informed about WFP procedures for supplying food.

A) Feedback from the government

94. In Burundi a new Labour Minister has been appointed. There is a strong interest that ILO develops a formal structure in Burundi, and the minister has formally requested the ILO DG in Geneva for such a structure. This is also politically important as the country is successfully transitioning out of a prolonged crisis. The Minister is also supportive of the project and would like to see it extended and also applied to street children who are also a cause of concern. Good appraisal from the Minister regarding the IPEC project staff in

Burundi. From the NCDR the IPEC project is quite welcome as it fills a gap by working with different age groups from 15 to 21 years of age for boys and up to 25 years of age for girls. This is different from the MDPR funding through Unicef and SNES where the target group starts at 12 years up to 18 years of age, with apparently according to SNES some flexibility on the cut off point which can go up to 19 years of age. Therefore it is important to ensure close coordination between the NCDR and the IPEC project. SNES funding finishes at the end of June 2006 and the structure will be placed directly under the NCDR for the future. Therefore IPEC coordination should be continued with NCDR as synergies are likely to take place. The target beneficiary groups can be outlined as follows :



In fact in all four countries the target group for women was extended up to 25 years of age for two reasons : 1) because of the difficulty in finding the numbers of that specific target group, 2) become former girl soldiers are stigmatised and will not easily accept to be singled out as a former girl soldier. By extending the age limit this allows the project to encompass some of the former girl soldiers and reach a larger proportion of ex girl soldiers.

B)Overall findings

95. Burundi has now finally just started on two of the A.P.s. It is also urgent that the third A.P. is finalised and implemented as soon as possible. As in RoC some of the activities are seasonal and further delays will negatively impact on A.P. implementation.
96. The changing structure for child soldiers (e.g. the SNES was created by Unicef with MDPR funding before the NCDR existed, but SNES will now come under the NCDR) will facilitate closer coordination between the government actors dealing with former child soldiers. There remains large uncovered needs for successful economic reintegration. As in other countries, IPEC has taken a specific and targeted focus on economic reintegration of child soldiers. It is therefore a pilot which raises interest at many levels. In Burundi there is also another ILO project for micro-finance, which has been building linkages with the on-going IPEC project, in particular a training of trainers for IPEC partners in order to explain the principles of micro-finance to the beneficiaries.
97. One of the key issues is to ensure that after having spent so much time into designing documents, the project is well executed. It needs to be stated that A.P. partners have a difficult time understanding the ILO/IPEC system. One partner spent two nights in the office trying to figure out how to make the proposal in the right terms. However it is of

paramount importance that the implementation follows the established rules. During the beneficiary interviews the evaluation verified the selection criteria for beneficiaries. This is particularly important (in all countries) to avoid jealousy and resentment and show a professional targeting of beneficiaries. As mentioned above, the age is one of the criterion with a cut-off point at 21 for boys and 25 for girls. But one of the boys in St-Luc was 26 years old, while two boys at Musaga were 25 and 27 years old respectively, bringing the total of out of age beneficiaries to 3. Out of the sample of 16 beneficiaries interviewed in the two places, the percentage of beneficiaries not fulfilling the criteria was therefore 19%. This was thoroughly discussed with the A.P. partner and the CNP as close monitoring of the target groups needs to be ensured. And this also shows why the evaluation strongly recommends more focus on the monitoring of the project.

98. In addition to the APs, Burundi also commissioned a database and studies as follows : 1) on the setting up of a specific database for the project (PROSYS); 2) for the adaptation of the national legal framework to deal with WFCL, particularly child soldiers (CADHRO); 3) study on training and employment opportunities in specific provinces (SOBEC). All three studies experienced a number of difficulties which seriously limited, even if it did not invalidate, the work accomplished.

- 1) The PROSYS database development was approved on July 1, 2005 and by October 05 a working module had been created, expected to be used by the IPEC Project for its monitoring needs. This contract was broken given the introduction of the IPEC DBMR, which also led to break the contract with the DRC consultancy database. The full reasons are explained in the CTA letter “reply IPEC DBMR 29/01/06” and are self-explanatory. The evaluation notes the poor information and communication between IPEC Geneva and the Project Office over the DBMR introduction.⁸
- 2) The CADHRO research study proved difficult for various reasons. It took 4 months to obtain the first payment once the study was approved, but it was difficult to find documentation in Burundi regarding the ILO convention 182 given it was recent legislation and there was little in-country expertise among Burundi jurists. One of the consultants dropped out given the delay in obtaining the first payment. The actual expenses incurred were higher than the first 25% payment, as field work is the most costly part. One of the reported findings is that Child Labour is considered as normal from a customary perspective. The study report is currently being finalised.⁹
- 3) The SOBEC study on training and employment opportunities was initially approved in mid-June 2005. Again funds only arrived on 25.10.05, four months after the initial approval and in the midst of the elections. As a result field work was not undertaken in the most conducive environment.

It is important to indicate the reasons for these delays, as they had nothing to do with IPEC or project delays, but with the functioning of the Citybank, (and, incidentally, the ILO office Kinshasa) as it took the Citybank Kinshasa **several months**, in spite of nearly daily follow up by the administrative and finance assistant of the project, to

⁸This DBMR is meant to support new IPEC projects in the designing of a database for monitoring purposes. The problems with the Guidelines is that this is the first project dealing with child soldiers being implemented by IPEC and therefore many adjustments to the DB had to be done in order to fulfil the project's needs. However it should be noted that this DB will be used not only by this project but by any new IPEC's project targeting at child soldiers

⁹ The Project Team makes the remark that there may have been some biases in the interview, as the fact that child labour is a customary practice is a banality everywhere in developing countries and can hardly be considered as a main finding.

figure out that the money had been...sent back to them by Citybank New York because of erroneous or missing transfer codes! Malfunctioning of banks, including the US-based Citybank, is certainly one major obstacle to adequate project implementation in DRC. – As regards the ILO office, it might be fair to add (and well known to IPEC) that the ILO office Kinshasa went through like most external ILO offices from the considerable disturbances caused by the introduction of a new financial and administrative system (IRIS) ILO-wide during the second half of 2006.

99. As in Rwanda, this again shows that studies which are undertaken in a fluid environment within a political transition or reform process may not be able to reach the intended objectives, particularly if four months are needed to send the first payment after approving the study contract.

DRC

100. DRC is both the country with the highest number of estimated needs, the most difficult country of the four given its size, structure, and the most fragile governing structure. It is also a divided country, with the Eastern part of the country living through over a decade of continuing warfare. All indicators for Eastern DRC show that the population is being decimated by a combination of war casualties, abuse, exactions, insecurity, widespread rape (as a war tool) and HIV, poverty, malnutrition, repeated and chronic displacement. In DRC this duality between East and West has required a specific project structure, as well as the appointment of a Technical Advisor in the East, with a clear division of responsibilities between the Western part, under supervision of the Kinshasa CNP, and a separate office, initially established in Goma, moved to Bukavu for security reasons in October 2005, in charge of all the Eastern part – which is where the highest needs are.
101. Furthermore in December 2005 the head of the IPEC office died in Bukavu in an accident and the assistant became acting head since, with a substantial workload ahead and very difficult working conditions as the project office was just being installed in Bukavu.
102. At the time the evaluation was taking place, four A.P.s had formally started, one A.P. was just approved on 30.1.06, and one A.P. remained in the pipeline, as per details hereunder :

IPEC partner	Start date	Reint.	Prev.	Length Months	Sub total	Location
BICE	5.09.05	210	150	15	360	Kasai oriental, occidental, Kins.
AASD	9.12.05	500	0	14	500	South Ouibangui, Equator
APEE	1.12.05	450	0	14	450	North Ouibangui, Equator
Group1/FSH	3.10.05	200	150	15+12	350	Bukavu, Eastern DRC
GAV	30.1.06*	450	600	??	1050	South Kivu, Eastern DRC
ITURI	pipeline	300	300	??	600	Ituri

*date of approval

103. The evaluation was able to carry out field work in the two regions, more particularly in Kananga (Kasai) and in Bukavu (South Kivu). Given the tight time-frame only rapid interviews were possible in Bukavu. The interviews in Kananga were on average 45 minutes, while the rapid group interviews in Bukavu were limited to an average of 15-20 minutes. Substantial discussion time was given with the A.P. partners both in Kananga and Bukavu.

104. The number of interviews and beneficiaries are as follows :

A.P. partner	location	Name of centre	# of children	girl	boy	Type of training	Remarks
BICE	Kananga	Mbango	3	0	3	carpentry	3 vulnerable
BICE	Kananga	farm	1	0	1	farming	1 boy demob 2004
BICE	Kananga	Bondock	1	0	1	mechanic	Referred from CONADER
BICE	Kananga	Michel	1	0	1	Photo lab	former child soldier
BICE	Kananga	Tabulakayi	2	2	0	sewing	Vulnerable
BICE	Kananga	Bakayi	12	12	0	Sewing & bakery	4 mothers with lactating infants
Subtot		6 interv.	20	12	8		
G1/Fsh	Bukavu	Rapid int.	32	18	14	soap	Mixed vuln.+ child soldiers
G1/Fsh	Bukavu	Rapid int. Kapa	22	4	18	Leather tanning, welding, sewing	Mixed child soldiers and Vulnerable
G1/Fsh	Bukavu	Rapid int. FSH	24	23	1	mechanic	All child soldiers 8 demob 2004, 9 in 2003, 2 in 2002, 2 in 2005, 2 no answer
Sub-tot	Bukavu	3 rapid int.	78	45	33		
Total		9 interv.	98	57	41		

105. Unlike the field interviews in Burundi or in Bukavu, the BICE A.P. started earlier and it was therefore possible to obtain feedback from beneficiaries who were near the completion of the training cycle. In Bukavu the activities had just started and therefore beneficiaries were only at the beginning of the training cycle.

106. The results of these different interviews, three of which were individual, are :

The good points – strengths	The bad points – weaknesses
1. The training allows the children to learn a specific profession. All expect to be able to earn a living as a result of the training. Some are happy about the short training period (e.g. 6 months for sewing).	a) All are hungry and expect to be fed during the training. No food is being provided while they are on training (although an agreement has been made with WFP to supply FFT, it has not yet become operational). In Bukavu WFP confirmed food would be available first week of Feb.
2. It is a job that can be done individually (carpentry) and will lead to economic independence	b) Worry about those who become wounded or fall ill during the training, as they have no coverage. Request soap to wash.
3. Grand parents are happy to see their grand children learn a profession rather than staying home and do informal jobs such as carriers	c) Problem of insufficient inputs to produce the goods (i.e. when products are sold a part should be reinvested into buying materials for future production)
4. Training leads to knowledge and helps children with their self-confidence and respect	d) Request that the end of training kits be of better quality.
5. Some of the children are already producing products, and this has lead to a	e) Problem of distance to attend the training – in one case of girl walking daily 10 km

change of perception from their families – who see them now as active workers	(one way) to reach the training centre. Request support to pay the rent for those orphans.
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107. In addition to these points, there have also been some interesting comments made directly by beneficiaries. Hereunder a selection of quotes from the interviews :

- “When I was in the armed group I did things which were not right; now I learn how to behave as a responsible individual” . “Now people consider me just like any other civilian”. “I have greater self-confidence and in what I can achieve. Before I had the military frame of mind, something which made coexistence (with civilians) difficult” – 18 year old former child soldier, Kananga
- “The mechanics training received contributed to having others respect me. Training contributes to knowledge, so I have more respect and self-confidence” 21 year old former child soldier, Kananga
- “the project has brought an important change : before the training our social circle did not have any consideration for us, now we are considered as useful and we have a lot more self-esteem as we have acquired a profession” 2 girls 17 and 18 years old, vulnerable, sewing training, Kananga

108. In addition to these interviews, in Kananga a sample of 5 parents (4 mothers and one father) having their sons (4) and daughters (2) as beneficiaries were also interviewed. (One mother had both a son and a daughter as former child soldiers in different training). 3 of the parents interviewed were child soldiers’ parents, 3 were vulnerable children’s parents. The interview contents are equally positive about the training being provided through the IPEC project. Hereunder some quotes from the parents’ interviewed :

- “Its really a good job because it allows the children to obtain a profession”
- “It is good for my daughter to learn a profession”
- “Since my child has started the training he doesn’t just stay home and takes the study seriously. As we do not have to pay the training costs it is good for us”
- “Thanks to the project we now see the child making small things at home and helping out in repairs” (carpentry training)
- “I am happy because my child (married) is becoming self-sufficient with the little home production (bakery training) and doesn’t ask his father for money any more”

A) Feedback from the government

109. In Kananga very good feedback was received by the different government authorities, from the town Mayor to the CONADER, including from the Social Welfare and Labour Provincial Inspectors. Specifically the CONADER assistant in charge of former child soldiers stated that “without the IPEC/BICE project, it would have been a disaster as children were constantly coming to complain to the CONADER office”. The appraisal of the work of BICE was very positive from all levels, including from other UN agencies (such as UNICEF) and the relationship in the network of actors created on the child soldiers issue. Again a recognition that the project is quite unique, as no other actor concentrates only on economic reintegration of the former child soldiers. In Bukavu the government officials were equally supportive of the project and of the importance of its

objectives, although there was a request from the social welfare department that more information be communicated to the provincial authorities (although the project was officially inaugurated on September 2005 by the provincial authorities). It needs to be recalled that the CTS (Comité Technique de Suivi, or Project Technical Monitoring Team) is composed of government representatives from the central levels only, in each of the project countries. In Kinshasa the government was also supportive of the IPEC project, but as in many countries also criticised the “rigidity” of the project and the delays in making the funds available.

B) Overall results regarding beneficiaries

110. At the time the evaluation was undertaken, the target beneficiaries planned in the country annexes versus the actual numbers of beneficiaries according to A.P.s already started (and therefore not counting those in the pipeline or the GAV A.P. in DRC) were as follows :

Planned versus actual target beneficiaries in all four countries based on country annexes

Country	Planned IPEC Reint.	Planned IPEC Prev.	Planned IPEC Total	Actual figures based on A.P.s	overall difference	coverage in % of total target
Rwanda	200	600	800	196 R, 600 P	4 R, 0	100%
RoCongo	200	500	700	215 R, 400 P	+15 R, 100 P	88%
DRC	2000	2000	4000	1360 R, 300 P	640 R, 1700 P	42%
Burundi	1440	1000	2440	650 R, 150 P	790 R, 850 P	33%

111. In addition a new A.P. has just been approved on 30.1.06 (but not yet started) in DRC with GAV, for an additional 450 R and 600 P. Three other A.P.s remain in the pipeline : in Ituri (DRC) for 300 R and 300 P, in Burundi for 165 R and 235 P, and in RoC for 100 P. If these figures are included the table shows a very different coverage, according to the following details :

Planned versus A.P. target beneficiaries (incl. pipeline) based on country annexes

Country	Planned IPEC Reint.	Planned IPEC Prev.	Planned IPEC Total	Actual figures based on A.P.s	overall difference	coverage in % of total target
Rwanda	200	600	800	196 R, 600 P	4 R, 0	100%
RoCongo	200	500	700	215 R, 500 P	+15 R	102%
DRC	2000	2000	4000	2110 R, 1200 P	+110 R, 800 P	83%
Burundi	1440	1000	2440	815 R, 385 P	625 R, 615 P	49%
<i>total</i>	<i>3840</i>	<i>4100</i>	<i>7940</i>	<i>3336 R, 2675 P</i>	<i>504 R, 1425 P</i>	<i>76%</i>

112. Except for Rwanda for which the target groups objectives have already been met, the other countries need the time and the funding to implement the four A.P.s which have not yet started. This will lead towards an acceptable percentage of coverage of 76% overall, with the exception of Burundi which will remain under the 50% mark, indicating that less than half of the anticipated target beneficiaries will be covered by the project.

113. Reasons for the actual coverage results are a complicated mix of different factors. Some have to do with the high number of constraints and delays, which required setting of priorities and considering that the shift to include the prevention component within the reintegration activities resulted in a much higher cost, some of the activities had to be dropped. However the actual decisions which appear to favor RoC and Rwanda as compared to Burundi and DRC should be asked to the project management team. There did not appear to the evaluation to have a deliberate choice to exclude any country from reaching its target group, but the choices were made to allocated the limited resources under the existing constraints. It should be noted that changes of CNPs in both Burundi and DRC have also contributed to slowing the project implementation process and may be one of the factors involved. In addition in Burundi the United Nations security rules further limit access to field work.

Partners feedback

114. All partners complained about the difficulty of getting the A.P.s accepted, which entailed substantial re-writing, up to six times for one partner, and the corresponding delays to their implementation. However they all recognised having received strong support from the IPEC project staff, something that was highly necessary and appreciated by partners as it was difficult for them to understand the IPEC *modus operandi*. Only one NGO thought such a stringent requirement was actually useful as a capacity building exercise to develop their skills in proposal writing. The other partners did not as they were or are all used to get funding much more easily from other donors. As regards to the delays there were two major concerns : the first was the delay in obtaining the official approval of the A.P., but also the delay in obtaining the first payment. As mentioned previously, the average time between the two dates was 97 days, something clearly constraining for partners and pushing their A.P. into a compressed mode to reach objectives within the project allocated time-frame, something which is highly unlikely given the existing constraints.
115. Yet another concern (and a lesson to be learned) is that –in the case of the research studies- a number of partners actually spent more than they received as first payment (25%). It was repeatedly mentioned in RoC and DRC that the identification of the target groups for the A.P.s was pre-financed on the basis of the partners' own funds, both because of the late receipt of funds and because of the insufficient provision by IPEC to cover some of the incurred expenses (particular in RoC).
116. A number of target beneficiaries did change as a result of the delay between the primary identification phase and the subsequent start of the A.P.s, in one case after 14 months. This had two negative effects on the project :
- 1) the first is that high hopes were created when the project started (something also shared by government officials in all countries). The delays in the actual implementation led to some shattered hopes and frustration. Among other reasons and as an example given by the ONEMO in RoC, sometimes a certain number of those target beneficiaries identified for the project were over-aged by the time the A.P. started and no longer met the selection criteria (same as was mentioned by Asoferwa in Rwanda). As a consequence often at least two beneficiary identification campaign had to be undertaken, something which was

neither foreseen nor budgeted for. The evaluation was unable to verify this given the constraints of the evaluation field work.

2) The second is a lesson learned by most partners that in future IPEC collaboration beneficiary identification will not be undertaken until funding has been received, in order to avoid the consequences mentioned under point 1).

117. The strategic planning exercise using elements of SPIF was really a mixed blessing for A.P. partners. In most cases they were unfamiliar with IPEC and did not really understand what was requested from them and the intricate IPEC administrative and financial procedures. The SPIF helped clarify somewhat the IPEC objectives, but it was certainly not sufficient for partners to fully grasp the project approach and understand the IPEC procedures. IPEC should compare its planning tools with the reference framework for all DDR in the region, the MDRP, so that the methodology used in the project planning is supportive of the overall framework. In the end the methodological tools are only a means to an end and do not constitute an objective by itself; they are only as good as the use that can be made of them.¹⁰

As regards to the three project objectives

- 118. “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict”.***

119. As mentioned in three of the four countries there is a reform or political process under way, which means that government institutions have many priorities in addition to the application of the ILO convention 182. Nonetheless the importance and objectives of the project have been recognised and are supported by each country's government. But some political stability is needed to talk of institutionalising the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflict. The fragile political processes are plagued with uncertainties (DRC, Rwanda) or difficulties (Burundi). The creation of an enabling environment must be coupled with some stability and continuation of existing government's policies. This is not within the IPEC project's capacity, and therefore there are many external factors that may influence positively or negatively the evolution of the situation as regards to children involved in armed conflict. In the current context IPEC's efforts to contribute to an enabling environment can only have a limited impact.

120. “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income”.

121. This is probably the one element where IPEC should concentrate its efforts, as it will be the direct result of the A.P.s implemented by partners as well as from the support given by the project staff to the partners. This is where the IPEC project can become a model to be replicated, provided it is able to address the strategic and technical points mentioned in

¹⁰ Kindly refer to the report « analysis of quality management tools in the humanitarian sector » commissioned by ECHO and written by C. Bugnion, 2002, for details.

major outstanding issues hereunder. This is also where IPEC has a comparative advantage, as other actors have a wider approach to former child soldiers, rather than the IPEC focus of economic reintegration – something which is strongly needed.

122. “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited into armed conflict in the targeted countries”.
123. As discussed in the report the shift from prevention through awareness raising to prevention through economic reintegration was well founded and justified. This shift was operated by the project team on its own initiative, and was not the initial concept of the project document, showing the project team’s ability to grasp emerging opportunities and adapting to the evolution of the context on the basis of experience and learning. Differentiation between I/O 2 and 3 is done on the basis of the target group label : the first (reintegrated) are all former ex child soldiers, while the second group label (vulnerable) are those at risk of recruitment (and likely a part of the girl soldiers who do not want to declare themselves as such). But in fact the activities and support provided are identical in both cases.
124. At the political level, most countries could not see the usefulness of awareness campaigns while a growing number of former child soldiers were being unemployed. In terms of state security and safety it was therefore a priority to provide economic reintegration also as a deterrent to join the armed groups.
125. Another interesting and positive aspect of this shift is that under the label of “vulnerable” more girls were able to be targeted (given the extreme difficulties in identifying former girl soldiers, as demonstrated by the very high stigmatisation of this target group). In the project “vulnerable” are those individuals who are considered as prevented, whereas those “former child soldiers” identified as such are considered to be reintegrated.
126. As seen from a security perspective, the former child soldiers *and* street children (also considered as “vulnerable”) are both a threat to law and order and public security. The inclusion of these two categories in the project was a positive outcome of the lessons learned by the project staff through their experience with this project since its inception.
127. While there is no baseline on the number of the children recruited into armed conflict (and therefore it is impossible to sustain the statement regarding “fewer children will be recruited”), the effect of the project, if it can be successfully completed, will certainly contribute to fewer children being recruited *in those areas where the A.P.s have taken place*. Since the project only covers a fraction of the needs, it is exceedingly ambitious to expect to have an impact nationwide. Nonetheless a positive impact in the project areas would likely lead to replication of the project approach by other actors.

Major outstanding issues

128. Some major issues remain to be addressed if the success of the project objectives 2 and 3, which are the ones where IPEC is likely to have a more direct impact, are to be reached.

a) The sustainability of the employment provided

129. Former child soldiers are not being rewarded for good behaviour by receiving a job's training. They are being kept from becoming a security hazard, which would most certainly be the case if they find no legal source of income. However past experience shows that sustainability of the income source often drops with time. In order to really be able to appraise whether or not the former child soldiers are able to continue their professional occupation after the end of the project, a specific monitoring plan must be designed. Prior experience from the trainers interviewed indicate that some 60% of the apprentices are still able to make a living from their activity after two years, while some other sources indicate that the figure drops as low as 10% after four to five years.¹¹ The fact is that 100% of the target beneficiaries will not be able to become independent in economic terms. This raises three questions :

1. How must "sustainable income" be defined? A clear time frame must be determined to measure whether these children still are making a living from their activity, and can be considered as "successfully reintegrated". A two year time-frame after the end of the project could be an adequate measure, but for practical reasons a shorter one year time-frame may be necessary.
2. Since it is impossible for 100% of the children to be successfully economically reintegrated, what is the success criteria for the project? Based on previous experience and with a 1 year time-frame to measure results the figure of 70% appears as reasonable.
3. But the 30% who may not have become economically independent run the risk of being again a threat to public security. What needs to be done with those children who are not able to become economically self-sufficient? If the project is unable to provide any further assistance, who will be responsible for this target group, and what are the measures that will be taken? Up to now no project seriously contemplates the group that fails.¹² Yet it is the group which is the most dangerous both in terms of re-recruitment and in terms of public security. How should they be treated and by whom?

b) The number of children targeted by the project

130. 70% of the planned overall target group is substantially lower than 100% of the initial estimates. Using the estimates under point a), this means that 30% of the funding has not been able to accomplish its anticipated results. In a best-case scenario out of 7940 targeted former child soldiers (if all had been included in the A.P.s) the success benchmark would be 5558. If the project's initial target group is meant to represent those

¹¹ The first figure is from a « maître artisan » in DRC and also matches the evaluator's findings of previous adult DDR economic reintegration in RoC (UNDP evaluation). The 10% figure is from RoC government officials for child soldiers demobilised in 2002-2003.

¹² APROPOL in Rwanda has taken into consideration this group, by intending to provide assistance for installation in secondary services/productions (vegetable , fruit production etc. for the restaurants and hotels) for those who fail the training for jobs in the restaurant and hotel branch

successfully reintegrated in economic terms, then for any future extension of this type of project the numbers must include a provision for those who will not succeed. In other words, if the 7940 were meant to be successfully reintegrated in economic terms, the actual target group (considering 70% of successful reintegration) should have been 11342.

131. Another key issue is that prevention through reintegration is more expensive than sensibilisation campaigns, and this needs to be officially recognized by IPEC and USDOL and a budget allowance to make up for this shift should be included in the project budget.

c) On the technical side, the project needs to establish clear drop out and abandon rates.

132. These rates were not included in the A.P.s. How many days can a child be ill or simply miss class before he/she is considered as an abandon or to have dropped out? This technical aspect is very important because it can give some indication of the difficulties encountered by the children during the training. The evaluation has collected evidence of low drop out rates from different project sites, but in the absence of a standard criteria regarding attendance they are not relevant and therefore not presented. But there still remains a need for a standard.

d) Kits to be given at the end of the training period

133. Another technical issue has to do with the kits that former child soldiers receive at the end of the training. Previous experience (including in the earlier 2001-2003 ILO/WB pilot project) has shown that some of the kits are sold by the children, which obviously doesn't allow them to become economically independent. There are several ways to counter this practice. One is to make the child responsible for the kit received, and to involve the family (if any) as guarantee or collateral (*cautionnement solidaire*) in case the kit is sold. All five parents interviewed said they would sign an official document accepting responsibility to refund the value of the kit should their child sell the equipment received at the end of the training. An alternative is to find a group of guarantors (family or friends) to reimburse the costs in case of sale. While some concerns were raised about the quality of the kit, additional options include the supply of a better quality kit (the equipment provided is reportedly of rather low standard given the limited funding available), provided the child is able through its work to pay back gradually the difference in costs. But this requires a sufficiently long time period as monthly paybacks cannot be very high for start-up activities.

e) Management culture of the training centres

134. Most of the training centres in Kananga have shown to lack basic management skills. The lack of inputs in order to be able to produce goods was a repeated problem raised by the training centres independently of the activity, whether it was a carpentry, mechanics, sewing or even bakery. While it is clear to some extent that the structures that have accepted the children are also trying to obtain more funds from the IPEC project (an expatriate evaluator is equated with additional US\$\$\$), there is a point which is worth noting. Most of the children do not have even a clear idea of basic management concepts such as profit or cash flow. But most of the structures do not seem to have a business plan or management plan either. One exception is in Bukavu where two partners G1 and FSH

have joined efforts as G1 will also provide a management training to target beneficiaries. However the point here is that basic management training should already take place at the training site. The children are working and producing goods by the end of the training, and these goods have a value. How this is managed by the training structure could also provide good grounds for a basic grass roots management training to the children. But given the existing capacity within the training structures, the first step might be for IPEC to provide training in management skills to those centres where the project beneficiaries are referred.

f) The concept of cost per beneficiary

135. There have been many discussions amongst the DDR actors regarding the cost per person in this type of project. Considering the fact that series of diverse professional training are being provided, some being short cycles of 3 months and others spreading over a 9 months period, without counting the subsequent follow-up and monitoring necessary, the evaluation considers that it is not possible to determine a standard cost per person in this context. It is clearly normal that each training type incurs different costs, based on a series of factors – length of training, technical inputs necessary including machinery and tools, learning ability of the child, value of the end of training kit given, etc. What is important is that the child is able to earn an income with the professional skills acquired, so that he/she will be no longer a security risk. A seamstress will not earn the same income as a mechanic or a carpenter, so naturally training costs also partly reflect the difference with the expected income of the chosen profession. The evaluation recommends that the focus be placed on the child's economic self-sufficiency through the exercise of the newly acquired professional skills, rather than looking at a standard cost for each child across the countries. Within the four countries the cost of living is very different (even within the country) and more budgetary flexibility is necessary to adapt the costs related to the project target beneficiaries. The focus should be the number of successful target beneficiaries, and full flexibility to allocate budgets, in so far as possible within existing ILO regulations and rules should exist to support this objective.

IV. Conclusions

136. The objectives of the IPEC project fill both a gap and a need. The project is rather unique in its focus to address specifically the economic reintegration of child soldiers. It is therefore a potential model for economic reintegration. However there are numerous challenges and constraints which have negatively impacted and continue to impact the project and enormous delays in the actual implementation of the project components. It is impossible to successfully operate under the current conditions of the project countries without more programmatic and budgetary flexibility and an extended time-frame. Given the numerous constraints results simply cannot be reached within the envisaged project deadline and without some additional budgetary support for monitoring the partners' work in the field.

V. Recommendations

137. *At the strategic level*

1. USDOL needs to give greater flexibility to the child soldiers project, both in programmatic and in funding terms. Budget revision 3 was only approved on 24 February 2006 while it was sent on 21 December 2005. The evaluation witnessed how landlords, security companies and other project contractors repeatedly requested payment of their arrears. It is important that payments be streamlined from all sides (USDOL and IPEC Geneva and ILO Director in Kinshasa) and expedited given the very high internal constraints affecting project execution.
2. Flexibility is key in the current environment in the Great Lakes. Other actors access funds more rapidly and show much more flexibility. There is a real risk that partners may end up doing the same activities, which are clearly necessary, but with different funding sources given the constraints linked to IPEC procedures.
3. USDOL and IPEC should review carefully the procedures. It is simply impossible to work in such a difficult environment when it takes an average of 97 days to obtain the first funding once an A.P. is officially submitted.
4. The enormous delays in implementation are not giving time to reach the stated results within the anticipated project time-frame. For all countries an extension of the project until July 2007 is necessary to reach results. But in Rwanda and RoC there may no longer be a need for an additional phase, while in DRC and Burundi (and a possible extension into Uganda) a continuation over a two-year time-frame is necessary in view of the uncovered needs.
5. USDOL should participate as observer in the end of project evaluation.
6. The potential success of the project covers essentially I/O 2, which is the provision of reintegration assistance to allow former child soldiers above the minimum working age to acquire decent work and achieve sustainable income. Therefore further efforts must be placed on the capacity of the children to reach this stage, rather than focusing on ensuring vocational training assistance, which is only a first stage.
7. Thus longer-term support is necessary after the training so that A.P. partners and the project staff can support and monitor the evolution of the graduates and provide the

monitoring data necessary to report on the actual results regarding the sustainability of the reintegration process.

8. Criteria for the success of the project need to be established. While quantitative indicators have been identified, there is no indication of how many beneficiaries should be economically independent as a result of the training and support received. The evaluator recommends a 70% success rate after one year as a success indicator (e.g. children still able to earn a living with the training/skills provided by the project one year after they have completed the training).
9. In order to minimise the difficulties, the evaluation recommends to balance a little more the approach with some flexibility for corrections during project implementation; more focus on the actual result of the project, which is to raise capacity of the child to earn a living (not just to be taken into vocational training) and on the monitoring of project partners at field level, with a little less demand on the quality of the A.P. design.

138. At project management level

1. The agreements with WFP in all countries should be updated immediately so that effective provision of food for training can be done as soon as possible in all project countries
2. Systematic field monitoring of the A.P.s need to be done by the project staff, together with the corresponding monitoring plan. This requires an increased budget for monitoring and additional staff with specific monitoring skills.
3. Project beneficiaries' have made a number of requests for material assistance. From those points mentioned, the evaluator recommends ensuring that the promised food is indeed given, the provision of soap as a basic hygiene concern (which can also be requested from WFP) and that the project develops a comprehensive toolkit strategy for vocational training graduates. More efforts to facilitate beneficiary access to micro-finance are necessary to ensure their capacity to earn a living, as most have no basic management skills.
4. It is also recommended that training centres where project beneficiaries are placed are somewhat trained in basic management skills, as an example which will familiarise beneficiaries with the basics of management
5. More decision making power should be given to the CTA. The particular project structure is not rational given the specifics of the intervention mode in the seven countries. Further decision making must be allocated to the CTA and Project Management Team.
6. Success and abandon criteria must be established for all project countries and must be the same across the countries. Likewise a maximum amount of days of absence needs to be determined before a child is considered to have dropped out of the training.
7. To avoid problems the project must ensure timely payments to partners and suppliers, effective decentralisation of programmatic decision making and budget, increase funds for oversight functions (field monitoring of implementation and results), and shifting one expatriate IPEC staff to be based in Bukavu.



IPEC Evaluación

Prevención y reintegración de niños
involucrados en conflictos armados
El caso de Colombia

(P340 03 900 052 - INT/03/P52/USA)

Una evaluación intermedia independiente

Programa Inter Regional: Africa, Colombia, Filipinas, Sri Lanka

Diciembre 2005

NOTA SOBRE EL PROCESO DE EVALUACIÓN

La realización de esta evaluación fue coordinada por la Sección de Diseño, Evaluación y Documentación (DED) del IPEC siguiendo un abordaje participativo, por el cual las principales partes interesadas en el proyecto son consultadas e informadas durante todas las etapas del proceso evaluativo. DED se ocupa asimismo de garantizar la independencia de la evaluación.

La evaluación ha sido preparada por una equipo de consultora externa al diseño, planificación y gestión del proyecto.*

La misión en el terreno fue realizada en Octubre. Las opiniones y recomendaciones incluidas en el informe corresponden a su autora y no comprometen a la OIT o a otras organizaciones involucradas en el proyecto.

Esta evaluación fue financiada por el Departamento de Trabajo de los Estados Unidos. El informe no refleja necesariamente las opiniones o políticas del Departamento de Trabajo y las menciones de marcas, productos comerciales u organizaciones no implica apoyo por parte del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

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GLOSARIO DE TERMINOS

- Desarme: es la dejación de armas que puede darse tanto de manera individual como colectiva.
- Desmovilización: es el proceso por el cual un movimiento subversivo o individuo se rinde o se desvincula voluntariamente de su grupo armado¹³.
- Reinsertado: re inserción se relaciona con la aplicación de programas de compensación monetaria, entrenamiento, capacitación, generación de ingresos y otros beneficios, que buscan garantizar la re inserción social y económica de los excombatientes y de sus familias¹⁴. Se es reinsertado cuando el CODA lo certifica.
- Certificado del CODA: Es el documento que expide el Comité Operativo para la Dejación de las Armas, dando cuenta de la pertenencia del desmovilizado a una organización armada al margen de la ley y de su voluntad de abandonarla.
- Desmovilización individual: es la desvinculación de un miembro del grupo de manera particular.
- Desmovilización colectiva: se asocia a la desvinculación de varios combatientes o la totalidad de un grupo mediante acuerdos de paz.
- Delitos políticos: Es aquel acto que tiende a quebrantar, por hechos ilícitos, el orden jurídico y social establecido, atentando contra la seguridad del Estado, contra los poderes y autoridades del mismo o contra la Constitución o principios del régimen imperante¹⁵.
- Víctimas de violencia política: “aquellas personas de la población civil que sufran perjuicios en su vida, o grave deterioro en su integridad personal o en sus bienes, por razón de atentados terroristas, combates, secuestros, ataques y masacres en el marco del conflicto armado interno.”
- Paramilitarismo y Autodefensas: El paramilitarismo se “refiere a la acción armada a la sombra del militarismo estatal” (como el caso de los pájaros de la violencia en los 50’2); y las autodefensas son grupos armados de la sociedad civil que se conforman para defenderse de un enemigo común, en este caso las guerrillas”¹⁶.

¹³ PINTO BORRERO Maria Eugenia, VERGARA BALLEEN Andrés y LAHUERTA PERCIPIANO Yilberto. Diagnóstico del programa de re inserción en Colombia: mecanismos para incentivar la desmovilización voluntaria individual. Archivos de Economía. Departamento de planeación Nacional. Documento #211. Noviembre de 2002. Pág. 2

¹⁴ Informe Planeación Nacional

¹⁵ Glosario de términos jurídicos; en http://www.fac.mil.co/pag_interiores/provisionales/glosario

¹⁶ MANRIQUE ALEJANDRO. ¿Por qué un caso de estudio? La desmovilización de las autodefensas: un caso de estudio. Cátedra Konrad Adenauer de Comunicación y democracia. Año 2004. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana y la Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Pág. 9

LISTA DE ABREVIACIONES

ACJ: Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes
AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CA : Conflicto armado
CAE : Centro de Atención Especializado
COMETIN: Comité interinstitucional de erradicación de trabajo infantil
CODA: Comité Operativo de para la dejación de Armas.
COSUDE: Agencia Suiza para el desarrollo y la Ayuda Humanitaria
CV: Fundación Cedavida
DOFA: Debilidades, Oportunidades, Fortalezas y Amenazas
ELN : Ejército de Liberación Nacional
ESCI: Explotación sexual y comercial infantil
ETI: Erradicación de Trabajo
FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FRB: Fundación Restrepo Barco
GTZ: Agencia de Cooperación Alemana
ICBF : Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar
NNJ: Niños, niñas y jóvenes.
NNJDCA: Niñas, niños, jóvenes desvinculados del conflicto armado.
OG: Organización gubernamental
OIN: Organización Internacional de las Migraciones.
ONG: Organización no gubernamental
PA: Plan de Acción
PFTI: Peores formas de Trabajo Infantil
POETI: Plan operativo erradicación de trabajo infantil
SENA: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
TID: Trabajo infantil doméstico

I. Resumen Ejecutivo

1. El proyecto “Prevención y reintegración de niños involucrados en conflictos armados en Colombia”, ha logrado insertarse con firmeza dentro del marco institucional nacional adecuado para el tema. Para su formulación se tuvieron en cuenta los principales antecedentes y avances que se registran en el país y su diseño se corresponde con las necesidades propias de la población que busca atender. Y en su forma de acción, ha mantenido claridad sobre por qué, cómo, con quiénes realizar sus acciones.
2. El proyecto ha mantenido la decisión de aportar al fortalecimiento del Estado colombiano, en los aspectos relacionados con la asunción de su responsabilidad sobre prevención y la atención a esta población. Para su accionar cuenta con la inserción en el Comité Interinstitucional de Erradicación de Trabajo infantil y ha logrado concretar compromisos en los Planes Operativos de Erradicación de trabajo infantil, POETI. Desde allí viene aportando al fortalecimiento institucional del tema y a la creación de una red social funcional a sus objetivos.
3. Para la realización de sus acciones, el proyecto tiene actualmente en marcha cinco Programas de Acción, PA, y un conjunto de miniprogramas y acciones todos ellos conducentes a la obtención de los objetivos trazados. A nivel operativo, estos PA son ejecutados por ONG colombianas todas ellas competentes y con experiencia en el tema. Estos PA están actualmente en ejecución en las cuatro primeras ciudades de acogida de los NNJ desmovilizados: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali y Bucaramanga.
4. Las principales fortalezas que el proyecto presenta a la fecha se pueden resumir en:
 - a) Su capacidad de incidir de manera significativa en la ubicación del tema desde una perspectiva de derechos dentro de la concepción de que es una de las peores formas de trabajo infantil, PFTI y en los aportes para la construcción de políticas públicas sobre el tema;
 - b) La voluntad de fortalecer al Estado para el cumplimiento de sus responsabilidades y aportar asesoría técnica en los asuntos de su competencia;
 - c) El despliegue de capacidad para trabajar en equipo incluyendo participación gubernamental y no gubernamental, en los espacios adecuados como el Comité interinstitucional para el caso;
 - d) La participación en el “Plan conjunto para prevenir la vinculación de los NNJ a los grupos armados irregulares y fortalecer la inserción socio laboral de los desvinculados”, con una duración entre Junio 2005 y Junio 2007.¹⁷;

¹⁷ En el mismo participan: ICBF, UNICEF, IPEC/OIT, OIM, GTZ.

- e) La elaboración y puesta en marcha de cinco Programas de Acción, PA, en los componentes de prevención ¹⁸, fortalecimiento institucional, comunicación formativa;
 - f) Los aportes a las adecuaciones del sistema educativo y al componente de apoyo psicosocial, actualmente en proceso de formulación.
5. Entre los aspectos que se podrían mejorar, algunos corresponden directamente con el proyecto IPEC/OIT y otros se refieren a acciones de incidencia sobre el ICBF como socio natural del proyecto. Dentro del primer grupo de aspectos encontramos los siguientes:
- a) Mayor capacidad de incidencia sobre el Estado a fin de que se tomen las medidas para hacer más efectiva la prevención de la vinculación de NNJ a los conflictos armados.
 - b) La agilización de procedimientos administrativos y de toma de decisiones a nivel internacional;
 - c) Búsqueda de mayor frecuencia, claridad y agilidad en las comunicaciones con todos los actores incluidos, especialmente con los comités interinstitucionales donde aún algunos de ellos no comprenden la necesidad de posicionar el tema, ni la estructura de funcionamiento de IPEC/OIT.
 - d) Apoyo a las condiciones logísticas de los operadores a fin de facilitar comunicaciones más fluidas, frecuentes y ágiles.

Dentro del segundo grupo, es decir, las acciones a cargo del programa de atención a NNJDCA que realiza el ICBF pero que requieren una mayor incidencia de parte de IPEC/OIT, se identifican:

- a) Actualización del diagnóstico para incluir necesidades de capacitación del personal directivo y operativo al servicio del programa de atención que desarrolla el ICBF tanto en el nivel nacional, como regional y zonal;
- b) Mayor incidencia en la etapa prelaboral y en la fase de reinserción económica del programa que desarrolla el ICBF a fin de que este aspecto se afiance más en el programa;
- c) Las actividades de monitoreo y evaluación del proceso de cada una de las etapas que se llevan a cabo en el programa de atención del ICBF, deben ser de forma más sistemática;
- d) Sería necesario ejercer mayor incidencia sobre el ICBF a fin de que identifique con mayor claridad y afine los procedimientos relacionados con las alternativas para la generación de ingresos de los NNJ.

¹⁸ Prevención: Ejecutados por ACJ, Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco; Acciones conjuntas con organizaciones de Trabajadores: Confederación General de Trabajadores; Fortalecimiento de instituciones del Estado y de empleadores, ejecutados por Cedavida, Andi y en el tema de la Comunicabilidad, ejecutado por Rep Grey.

6. La mayor amenaza que actualmente pesa sobre el proyecto es que es de tipo coyuntural y debe realizarse en medio del conflicto, lo cual tiene implicaciones sobre la seguridad de los NNJ y los mismos operadores del programa ICBF; esa misma condición de estarse realizando en medio del conflicto, no facilita el control sobre el proyecto en el sentido de que es posible que algunos de los desmovilizados puedan ser reclutados nuevamente por los grupos armados al margen de la ley.
7. Otra de las amenazas que se identifican para la realización del proyecto tiene que ver con la estigmatización que de manera bastante generalizada la sociedad hace de la población desmovilizada. A nivel urbano se sienten como una amenaza a la seguridad y un traslado del conflicto a las ciudades.
8. La inestabilidad y la alta rotación de los servidores públicos, afectan de manera negativa el proceso del proyecto; igual importancia tiene este aspecto en las ONG que prestan sus servicios como operadores y vinculan para el efecto personal transitorio.
9. En cuanto al manejo de los recursos, la evaluación observa que el presupuesto sigue de manera rigurosa los parámetros establecidos y que los gastos realizados y las previsiones comprometidas son proporcionadas y ajustadas a las necesidades y a la realidad nacional. No obstante, una revisión sobre este aspecto se hace necesaria para lograr adecuados ajustes sobre la disminución del valor del dólar en relación con el peso colombiano.
10. Técnicamente, se podría afirmar que el proyecto, en su corto recorrido, ha logrado colocar bases seguras que harían previsible su sostenibilidad: cuenta con un marco normativo internacional y nacional sólido, apoyo decidido de la Cooperación internacional, lineamientos políticos y metodológicos adecuados, amplia convocatoria institucional, inclusión del tema en algunos Planes de Desarrollo territoriales, se cuenta con directivos y operativos del proyecto capacitados, estructura institucional gubernamental bien definida, apoyos no gubernamentales y va ganando espacio en el sentido de apropiación del tema por parte de los actores comprometidos.
11. Esta consultoría puede concluir con base en los hallazgos realizados que el proyecto ha logrado avances significativos relacionados con su adecuada inserción institucional, el posicionamiento en el medio, la aplicación de las estrategias y la contribución a los objetivos a partir de la realización de los Programas de Acción.
12. Durante el proceso de ejecución se han hecho aprendizajes importantes relacionados con el aprovechamiento normativo e institucional, la introducción cautelosa de aportes en la construcción de políticas públicas, el trabajo en equipo especialmente con las ONG ejecutoras, el establecimiento de alianzas gubernamentales y no gubernamentales; igualmente, hay aprendizajes importantes en el sentido de crear alternativas para actuar en medio del conflicto y el desarrollo de la capacidad de convertir las incertidumbres en posibilidades para ser altamente creativos y asertivos en el manejo de los riesgos.

13. Finalmente, esta evaluación recomienda al IPEC/OIT fortalecer el proyecto con ajustes en el manejo menos centralizado y más ágil desde el nivel internacional, revisión de los aspectos económicos necesarios por la devaluación del dólar y un apoyo técnico adicional a fin de facilitar el seguimiento en la etapa siguiente de plena ejecución de los PA. A nivel nacional, es preciso estar atentos a las dinámicas del conflicto a fin de observar oportunamente las necesidades de hacer modificaciones o ajustes según las tendencias que se reconozcan. Igualmente, mayor capacidad de incidencia ante el Estado para que refuerce sus estrategias, especialmente las relacionadas con la prevención del reclutamiento de menores de edad y la mayor exigencia de entrega de los que aún son víctimas de estos abusos de la guerra.

II. BREVE INTRODUCCION, CONTEXTO DE LA EVALUACIÓN

14. Se lleva a cabo esta evaluación de término medio, diez y seis meses después¹⁹ del inicio formal del proceso de integración del tema de los Niños, niñas y jóvenes, NNJ desvinculados del conflicto armado, dentro del marco general de Erradicación de las peores formas del Trabajo Infantil²⁰ PFTI, y trece meses antes de que culmine la presente fase, prevista hasta diciembre de 2006.

Contexto político, institucional y legal


15. Durante el período analizado, el contexto político nacional dentro del cual se desarrolla el proyecto sigue siendo de conflicto armado interno, uno de cuyos graves efectos es el reclutamiento y la utilización de menores de edad por parte de los grupos armados ilegales y la violación de sus principales derechos. En este escenario concurren grupos armados ilegales tanto de izquierda como de derecha. Los avances del actual gobierno del Presidente Alvaro Uribe, se enmarcan en las negociaciones con los grupos de derecha, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC, para lograr su desmovilización, habiendo dejado las armas cerca de 9.000 combatientes en el transcurso de los dos últimos años. Por otro lado, la situación con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FARC, y con el Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN, la más fuerte y tradicional oposición armada en el país, es mucho más compleja: la confrontación se ha realizado en los espacios militares, siendo el espacio político el de menor incidencia. Con la autorización del actual gobierno, hay discretas mediaciones de la Iglesia Católica y se adelantan conversaciones encaminadas a favorecer el escenario de los intercambios humanitarios como antecedente posible para abrir espacios posteriores de diálogo.
16. En relación con la situación de los menores de edad excombatientes, según las fuentes oficiales del Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF, durante

¹⁹ Se toma como fecha de referencia el inicio de las actividades de coordinación a partir de la vinculación de la Oficial de Proyectos para el tema NNJ desvinculados del conflicto armado, en el mes de Julio de 2004.

²⁰ Promovido por el Programa Internacional para la Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil IPEC de la Organización Internacional para el Trabajo –OIT-, en el país, a partir de la ratificación del Convenio 182, según la Ley 704/01.

los últimos dos años, hasta 30 de Noviembre de 2005, fueron recibidos 1.128²¹ menores²². Las niñas y niños desvinculados son aquellos que salen de las guerrillas o los grupos paramilitares en alguna de las siguientes modalidades: a) han abandonado el grupo armado voluntariamente, b) el grupo armado al que pertenecían los ha entregado a las autoridades del Estado, c) han sido aprehendidos por alguno de los organismos de seguridad del Estado. El proyecto entonces, se centra en la etapa de prevención para evitar que se vinculen y en la etapa posterior para propiciar su atención integral.

17. A nivel institucional, la responsabilidad del tema corresponde al Estado Colombiano, bajo la dirección y los lineamientos del Ministerio de Protección Social y el ente descentralizado encargado de la atención de los menores de edad, el ICBF. Alrededor de estas instancias centrales, con funciones subsidiarias de asesoría técnica, cofinanciación y acompañamiento jurídico, concurre la Cooperación Internacional (OIM, OIT/IPEC, GTZ, UNICEF); con funciones de responsabilidades afines y conexas, convergen también en el ámbito gubernamental nacional los Ministerios de Educación y de Comunicaciones y en el orden de las entidades descentralizadas, el Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA. Los aportes no gubernamentales se reúnen en organizaciones internacionales como Save de Children, Tierra de Hombres Alemania; y a nivel nacional, se identifican ONG como Copartes en diversas acciones como la investigación, la prevención y la acción directa, como Cedavida, Fundación Restrepo Barco, Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes, Alotropía y Puntos Cardinales. A nivel nacional, el organigrama se podría recoger de la siguiente manera:



²¹ Datos oficiales del ICBF, 1 diciembre de 2005.

²² Desde el año 1999 cuando fueron recibidos los 10 primeros adolescentes, hasta 31 de octubre de 2005, el ICBF ha recibido 2.525 menores de edad. Aproximadamente la mitad salieron de las filas de las FARC, el 30% de las AUC y el resto de otros grupos ilegales.

18. A partir del contexto normativo internacional, el marco jurídico nacional se centra en la ley 704 de 2001, mediante la cual se aprueba el Convenio 182 sobre la prohibición de las peores formas de trabajo infantil, PFTI, y la acción inmediata para su eliminación. Dentro de estas peores formas, el reclutamiento y la utilización de menores de edad en los conflictos armados, es una de las más relevantes. Posteriormente, se cuenta también con la Ley 782/2002 donde se determina que todo menor de edad no solo debe ser entregado al ICBF para su rehabilitación sino que se considera víctima de la violencia política. De manera más reciente, en el mes de julio del presente año, se aprobó la Ley 975, de Justicia y Paz, mediante la cual se hace explícita la condición de que el acceso a los beneficios para los grupos armados desvinculados, requiere la entrega al ICBF de la totalidad de los menores de edad que tengan reclutados. Este marco jurídico representa un avance significativo en cuanto sitúa la concepción del tema y sus procedimientos conducentes desde la perspectiva de los derechos de los niños y de las niñas y los ubica como víctimas de los conflictos armados, de los cuales el Estado está en obligación de protegerlos.

Propósito, alcance y objetivos de la evaluación

19. Los propósitos generales de la evaluación son los siguientes:
- a. Revisar la ejecución del proyecto hasta la fecha en Colombia y considerar cambios en la estrategia con base en la experiencia, recomendando los ajustes que sean necesarios. Como se mencionó ya, el período observado va desde el mes de julio de 2004 hasta el 30 de Noviembre de 2005.
 - b. Examinar las actividades realizadas y su contribución a la estrategia y los objetivos.
 - c. Revisar el marco institucional del proyecto y la capacidad de ejecución.
 - d. Analizar el potencial existente para integrar el proyecto con otras iniciativas a ser desarrolladas en Colombia.
20. En cuanto a los objetivos, se establecen los siguientes:
- a. Rendir cuentas a las partes interesadas, incluyendo las agencias gubernamentales y los interlocutores sociales en los países meta, las organizaciones asociadas y el donante, de lo que ha sido realizado y lo que se ha logrado hasta la fecha, y
 - b. El aprendizaje de la experiencia considerando cómo el proyecto progresa en relación con sus objetivos, con la finalidad de planificar actividades futuras y, de ser necesario, recomendar un re-diseño apropiado.

21. Teniendo en cuenta el momento en el cual se realiza la evaluación, ésta ha centrado la mirada sobre los avances en el PA “Inserción social de 560 NNJ desvinculados del CA”²³ dentro del componente de fortalecimiento institucional y los adelantos en la formulación de los Programas de “Prevención integral contra las PFTI, especialmente TID, ESCI y vinculación de NNJ al conflicto armado”²⁴, previsto para iniciar acciones en el próximo mes de Enero de 2006; y el de “Fortalecimiento de la política local para la prevención integral de vinculación de NNJ a la ESCI, al TID y a los grupos armados irregulares”²⁵, previsto para iniciar acciones en Enero de 2006. Igualmente, se ha hecho una revisión de los avances en los proyectos que ejecutan actualmente la Andi y la CGT.

Metodología de la Evaluación, restricciones

22. Para el desarrollo de la evaluación, teniendo en cuenta su carácter de intermedia, la mirada central estuvo enfocada en el reconocimiento de los aprendizajes para desprender de allí la sugerencia de mejoras. Para el efecto, a lo largo del trabajo, se tuvieron en cuenta las siguientes preguntas: ¿Qué componentes y aspectos funcionaron y por qué?; ¿Qué componentes o aspectos precisan mejoras? ¿Cómo afectó la evolución del contexto a las hipótesis de diseño y estrategia?
23. En sus aspectos instrumentales, se aplicaron las consultas y los diálogos directos siempre que fue posible. En la primera etapa se tuvo acceso a amplia información de orden conceptual, metodológico y normativo sobre el tema, como bagaje inicial para formar la concepción general sobre el trabajo a abordar. Posteriormente, se diseñó y se aplicó un formulario con cuatro grupos de preguntas básicas relacionadas con el diseño y la estrategia del proyecto, la gerencia del mismo, las actividades realizadas y los resultados alcanzados y una última relacionada con las previsiones de sostenibilidad del proyecto. Este instrumento se aplicó en un 80% de manera presencial y en un 20% mediante motivación escrita y telefónica y respuesta por correo electrónico. Fueron entrevistadas 37 personas para un total de 28 formularios; 15 entrevistas fueron realizadas a representantes de entidades oficiales y 13 entrevistas fueron atendidas por personas de los espacios no gubernamentales. El conjunto de estas entrevistas fue debidamente codificado, tabulado, asociado y a partir de ellas se levantaron los ejercicios DOFA –Debilidades, Fortalezas, Oportunidades y Amenazas- que se encuentran en el Anexo d)
24. Se realizaron visitas de campo a las cuatro ciudades de cobertura del proyecto: Bogotá, en la localidad de Kennedy; Medellín, Bucaramanga y Cali. En todas las ciudades se tuvo la oportunidad de intercambiar directamente con personas que representan entidades que pertenecen a los comités técnicos o a los Comités de erradicación de trabajo infantil, CETI, en sus respectivos órdenes territoriales.

²³ Ejecutado por Cedavida, duración 20 meses. Inicio 3 de mayo de 2005, va hasta 3 Enero de 2007. Por valor de US\$250.000.

²⁴ Elaborado por Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes ACJ y previsto para ser ejecutado por la misma Organización, por valor de US\$107.000

²⁵ Elaborado por la Fundación Restrepo Barco, FRB y previsto para ser ejecutado por la misma ONG, por valor de US\$30.000.

En todas las ciudades, salvo la ciudad de Bogotá, se tuvo la oportunidad de hacer ejercicios grupales de reflexión que arrojaron como resultado la matriz DOFA a partir de los cuales se levantó el ejercicio grupal consolidado DOFA que se encuentra en el Anexo e).

25. Igualmente, se tuvo la oportunidad de contar con la retroalimentación, sobre todo en la primera parte del trabajo, de la oficial de proyecto respectivo en la sede de la OIT/IPEC, Colombia. El borrador del presente informe fue presentado y comentado con el equipo de la OIT; a partir de las observaciones y sugerencias allí recibidas, se realizaron algunos ajustes que se recogen en la presente versión final.
26. La utilización de la matriz DOFA constituye un elemento ordenador de importancia para la organización y el análisis de la información; no obstante, en un momento dado del proceso, es al mismo tiempo una limitación en tanto que la realidad y lo expresado en varias entrevistas, excede muchas veces las fronteras de esta matriz. Para superar esta restricción, en el capítulo de los hallazgos se recogen casi en su totalidad todos los elementos encontrados, algunos de los cuales no son visibles en los DOFA, pero sí están representados en las entrevistas individuales o ejercicios grupales.
27. Otra limitación encontrada se relaciona con el análisis solicitado en el formulario 3, para hacer un ejercicio comparativo entre el documento inter-regional y el anexo país. El documento base se encuentra solamente en inglés y es bastante voluminoso. Además, en los términos de referencia no se encuentra establecido el tiempo necesario para hacer esta labor, que en tales condiciones, podría significar al menos tres días de trabajo adicional.

Formación y experiencia de quien realiza la evaluación

28. Licenciada en Ciencias del Trabajo en la Universidad Católica de Lovaina, Bélgica. Especialista en Países en desarrollo de la misma Universidad y Especialista en Derechos Humanos de la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, ESAP, de Colombia. Amplia experiencia en monitoreo y evaluación de proyectos de Acción humanitaria y de Derechos Humanos con: a) la Embajada de Suiza/COSUDE, b) la Unión Europea evaluando proyectos de cooperación internacional- Movimondo y Solidaridad Internacional; c) el Centro Estratégico de Pensamiento internacional, CEPEI, evaluación de las formas solidarias del programa Familias Guardabosques. Docente universitaria en Gerencia Social: formulación, evaluación de proyectos sociales y humanitarios, en todas sus fases, con el enfoque de marco lógico (Universidades de La Salle, Minuto de Dios y Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, ESAP).

III. HALLAZGOS DE LA EVALUACION

Diseño y estrategia

29. El proyecto “Prevención y reintegración de niños involucrados en conflictos armados en Colombia”, se ha cimentado en el marco normativo internacional ratificado por Colombia y en las propias leyes nacionales establecidas para el fin, como se ha mostrado en un capítulo anterior. Su diseño se ha venido estableciendo sobre la solidez que ofrece este marco jurídico y conceptualmente se ubica desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos, como una de las PFTI, que identifica a los menores de edad como víctimas de los conflictos armados, donde son reclutados y utilizados para los fines perversos de la guerra. La introducción de este tema como una de las PFTI, ha ampliado positivamente la visión y otorga nuevas perspectivas para su manejo.
30. En general, el diseño del anexo país, es coherente con las necesidades visibles en el momento de ser elaborado (febrero de 2004). De igual manera, los PA que se desarrollan actualmente son adecuados a las necesidades detectadas y a los requerimientos identificados a nivel institucional y siguen los lineamientos y los parámetros establecidos en el Tercer Plan Nacional para la Erradicación del Trabajo infantil. Las estrategias establecidas para prevenir y para llevar a cabo las acciones directas conducentes a la atención de los menores de edad desvinculados, son adecuadas al marco institucional vigente bajo la responsabilidad del Estado Colombiano. En su momento, no se contó con las condiciones adecuadas, ni por el nivel institucional ni por el grado de madurez del proceso, para que los beneficiarios (NNJ) participaran en el diseño del proyecto.
31. En general, para el diseño, se tuvieron en cuenta ejercicios anteriores como el proceso de formulación participativa del III Plan de ETI, 2003-2006, los resultados del Taller de planificación del proyecto de prevención y erradicación del uso de NN en el conflicto armado, de diciembre de 2003 y la investigación sobre el tema del Observatorio sobre infancia de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
32. Los cinco Programas de Acción, PA, que han sido elaborados hasta el momento son:
 - a) “Inserción social de 560 NNJ desvinculados del conflicto armado”, elaborado y actualmente en ejecución por Cedavida.
 - b) “Prevención integral contra las PFTI, especialmente TID, ESCI y vinculación de NNJ al conflicto armado”, elaborado y próximo a ser ejecutado por la Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes, ACJ.
 - c) “Fortalecimiento de la política local para la prevención integral de vinculación de niños y niñas a la explotación sexual comercial infantil, al

TID y a los grupos armados irregulares”, elaborado y próximo a ser ejecutado por la Fundación Restrepo Barco, FRB.

- d) Prevención y erradicación del trabajo infantil en la localidad de ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá y el municipio de Facatativa, Cundinamarca, elaborado y ejecutado por la Confederación General de Trabajadores, CGT.
- e) Fortalecimiento de las Organizaciones de Empleadores en Colombia para contribuir a la Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil, en particular en sus Peores Formas, actualmente en ejecución, por la ANDI.

Estos Programas fueron elaborados por los respectivos oferentes de servicios con alta participación de las entidades públicas y no gubernamentales concernidas y la constante asesoría de IPEC/OIT. Adicionalmente, hay una estrategia de formación, en el tema de las comunicaciones encaminada a sensibilizar y prevenir, incidiendo sobre los patrones culturales que inducen a los reclutamientos, según los estudios elaborados para tal fin por el mismo Proyecto²⁶.

- 33. En cuanto a la etapa de avance de los PA, actualmente están en realización el ejecutado por Cedavida, con una duración de 20 meses; el ejecutado por la CGT, con una duración de doce meses; y el realizado por la Andi, con una duración de once meses. Y están previstos para iniciar en Enero de 2006: el ejecutado por la FRB con una duración de 14 meses y el que está a cargo de la ACJ, con una duración de 24 meses.
- 34. En la revisión documental, se registra que los tiempos internacionales sucedidos para asuntos de trámites administrativos y financieros de estos PA, fueron bastante largos, especialmente el de fortalecimiento de la inserción social a NNJ desvinculados del CA, -en promedio cerca de un semestre-; estos tiempos de espera ponen en riesgo tanto la motivación, como la programación de quienes tienen la expectativa de la operación.
- 35. Otro aspecto relacionado con los tiempos tiene que ver con la edad límite de los NNJ que ingresan al proyecto; la inmensa mayoría ingresan hacia los 17 años y teóricamente quedarían por fuera de este proyecto al cumplir la mayoría de edad y pasarían al programa de reinsertados adultos. No obstante, el proyecto ha logrado establecer una etapa intermedia a fin de que sea tenida en cuenta la edad con la cual entran al programa, de tal manera que puedan culminar con el componente de generación de ingresos que hace parte del reintegro a la sociedad.
- 36. Tanto el diseño del proyecto en general como de los PA particulares, guardan una concordancia clara con las necesidades detectadas y también con el tipo de intervención que desde el año 2000 ha venido identificando el ICBF; los mismos representan una contribución importante a los avances que esta entidad viene

²⁶ Alotropia. OIT/IPEC. “Estudio exploratorio de patrones culturales que contribuyen a la vinculación de niños, niñas y jóvenes a los grupos armados irregulares en Colombia”- Versión Agosto 2005

aplicando como modelo de acción y son expresión de sinergia por la sumatoria y cualificación de esfuerzos entre varios aportantes.

37. Adicionalmente, OIT/IPEC participa en el “Plan conjunto para prevenir la vinculación de los NNJ a los grupos armados irregulares y fortalecer la inserción socio laboral de los desvinculados”, con una duración entre Junio 2005 y Junio 2007. En el mismo participan: ICBF, UNICEF, IPEC/OIT, OIM, GTZ .
38. En sus niveles de acción, teniendo en cuenta la complejidad y la constante dinámica de cambio del conflicto armado colombiano, el diseño del proyecto debe tener la suficiente flexibilidad para incluir modificaciones siempre que se vea necesario y debe tener una disponibilidad de revisión constante. En tal sentido, serían necesarios ajustes en el componente de Fortalecimiento institucional, toda vez que mayores esfuerzos en la capacitación y formación del personal público y privado, al servicio del programa que ejecuta el ICBF, se ve necesario.
39. Durante el período analizado, las acciones se han centrado básicamente en la incidencia sobre las políticas públicas sobre el tema, en la consolidación del marco institucional integrado por Organizaciones gubernamentales, OG, y No gubernamentales, ONG, y en la construcción del tejido social necesario para la integración y el funcionamiento de la estructura básica necesaria.
40. Por las razones anteriores, el ejercicio de la evaluación no se ha extendido hasta los beneficiarios finales que son los NNJ, sino que se ha centrado en la etapa de inicio y puesta en marcha de sus espacios y niveles para el funcionamiento.
41. Ante el Gobierno nacional es preciso promover realizaciones más directas tendientes al establecimiento de políticas y lineamientos más claros y contundentes, especialmente relacionadas con la prevención y la preparación de los servidores públicos para el manejo adecuado del tema. El problema es de tipo circular: se atienden jóvenes que salen, pero la capacidad de control sobre los jóvenes que pueden ser reclutados, es casi nula.
42. El proyecto guarda una estructura demasiado centralizada, desde los niveles internacionales mismos teniendo la toma de decisiones aún de aspectos operativos menores en cabeza de Ginebra y Lima; a nivel nacional, se repite la misma estructura, dejando muy escasa movilidad y capacidad de decisiones a los niveles operativos. La capacidad de participación, de enriquecimiento del proyecto a partir de las iniciativas regionales, resultan disminuídas por esta centralización.
43. Sería conveniente que el ICBF pudiera reunir todos los elementos del programa en un solo documento, especie de paquete pedagógico para propiciar la unidad conceptual y operativa, como una especie de modelo o ruta general, donde al tiempo que se sensibilice más a la sociedad y a los servidores públicos, logre un objetivo unificador.

Objetivos

44. Los dos objetivos fijados para Colombia: a) Al finalizar el proyecto 500 niños, niñas y jóvenes menores de 18 años en zonas de riesgo han sido prevenidos de vincularse al conflicto armado; y b) Al finalizar el proyecto 560 niños, niñas y jóvenes desvinculados de los grupos armados ilegales reintegrados al tejido social:
45. Son claros porque su formulación no deja ninguna duda. A pesar de reconocer los cambios que provoca la dinámica del conflicto, podrían ser medibles y guardan proporción con el volumen de la población de NNJDCA que los hacen realistas.
46. El proyecto abarca dos momentos del problema: antes y después del reclutamiento de los NNJ. El momento anterior se atiende con un objetivo de Prevención y el momento posterior, con un objetivo de Atención integral. El problema anterior de prevención es un problema poco asible, complejo, en tanto que tiene que ver con aspectos estructurales de la capacidad por parte del Estado para cubrir todo el país con políticas y programas sociales incluyentes e integrales y con la dinámica misma del conflicto armado interno que escapa a todo control y previsión²⁷.
47. De ahí que el objetivo a) aunque no fue focalizado en el diseño del Anexo país, sí ha venido buscando su concreción en las focalizaciones que se han hecho ya en el Programas de Acción ya comprometidos y en ejecución con ONG nacionales. Para el efecto, se han realizado ejercicios de levantamiento de mapas de riesgo, a partir de los cuales, se está en proceso de concertar las focalizaciones sobre las poblaciones que se advierten más vulnerables y proclives a que los NNJ sean reclutados por los actores armados al margen de la ley.
48. En cuanto al objetivo b) el objetivo fue realista al momento de plantearlo y tuvo en cuenta las cifras de los NNJ que llegaban al programa. Hoy, según el ICBF la tendencia de los NNJ acogidos al programa actualmente van en descenso desde 2003, de la siguiente manera:

Año 2000	Año 2001	Año 2002	Año 2003	Año 2004	Año 2005
100	196	394	726	684	444

Queda claro entonces que debido a la dinámica del conflicto, es posible que algunos NNJ no sean entregados oficialmente sino que regresan a sus hogares o

²⁷ Según el Departamento Nacional de Planeación, DNP, en Colombia hay cerca de 15 millones de menores de edad, de los cuales, el 60% vive por debajo de la línea de pobreza y el 9% en situación de miseria. Cerca de 3 millones de niñas y niños en edad escolar están fuera del sistema educativo, de éstos, aproximadamente 1.6 millones son niñas. Adicionalmente, entre 20 y 30 mil niñas y niños son habitantes de la calle Presidencia de la República, Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP).

a otros espacios y que habría otras razones no conocidas que explicarían la disminución.

49. No obstante, estos hechos no afectan las metas establecidas en el objetivo b) en tanto que los NNJ a ser atendidos por el proyecto ya están establecidos, según un sistema rotatorio de los cupos.

Indicadores


50. A pesar de que los indicadores previstos para medir el objetivo de prevención, tienen las dificultades propias de la complejidad del tema, tal como están planteados y según los procesos de focalización establecidos, pueden ser parecen realistas y prácticos.
51. Los indicadores relacionados con la Atención en la etapa de reintegración, son realistas y pertinentes: miran aspectos claros relacionados con la cantidad de NNJ atendidos, su vinculación al sistema educativo y su participación en aspectos de formación para el trabajo. Los medios de verificación establecidos facilitan el monitoreo y el seguimiento de las acciones del proyecto.

Modalidad de ejecución


52. El proyecto se ejecuta en el marco del Tercer Plan Nacional para la erradicación del trabajo infantil y la protección del trabajo juvenil, 2003-2006. Para su desarrollo, organiza las acciones a partir de las siguientes líneas de acción:
 - a) Investigativa, mediante la cual se busca entre otras acciones: sistematizar la información sobre el trabajo referido a los jóvenes trabajadores, estudiar las ocupaciones y trabajos riesgosos, elaborar investigaciones sobre TI, elaboración de variables de seguimiento al riesgo y a las condiciones de trabajo de los menores de edad e indagaciones sobre la situación de los NNJ utilizados en el conflicto armado y la explotación y abuso sexual de los menores de edad.
 - b) En políticas públicas. Para el establecimiento de lineamientos y políticas desde la perspectiva de derechos, referidas a la salud, la educación, el empleo, el uso del tiempo libre, y los ingresos y el fortalecimiento institucional en todos los niveles territoriales para la adecuada implementación de los respectivos comités interinstitucionales.
 - c) Línea de acción formativa. Con el fin de garantizar mayores niveles de coherencia y correspondencia entre la oferta de formación educativa y la demanda laboral productiva; y para sensibilizar y transformar patrones culturales.
 - d) Línea de acción normativa. A fin de incidir sobre las gestiones y los procesos encaminados a contar con reglamentaciones protectoras y

preventivas coherentes con los principios de una perspectiva de derechos de la infancia.

53. El proyecto tiene claridad sobre qué, con quiénes y cómo llevar a la práctica sus acciones. Su modalidad de ejecución se mueve entre evitar el riesgo del reclutamiento y atender la desvinculación, y combina las acciones directas de los Programas de Acción, PA, ejecutados por ONG, como extensiones de la OIT/IPEC, en las líneas de acción ya mencionadas. Su esquema de operación podría graficarse así:



54. Se observa una estrecha vinculación del proyecto con los otros dos componentes que integran el modelo de atención por parte de IPEC/OIT, dentro del contexto más amplio de erradicación de Trabajo Infantil. Dicha vinculación, ha sido graficada de la siguiente manera por IPEC/OIT:



55. Las realizaciones del proyecto hasta el momento, han sido claras y firmes, pero demasiado lentas, en tanto que debe asumir los tiempos gubernamentales. Hay avances importantes en cuanto al reconocimiento de los derechos básicos a la educación y la salud, pero aún es incipiente la adecuación de la educación formal a las necesidades y posibilidades reales de los beneficiarios. La capacitación prelaboral debe ser más desarrollada lo mismo que las actividades relacionadas con la reinserción económica. Es posible que la alta rotación de funcionarios públicos del área esté incidiendo en el retraso de estas etapas.
56. Por la naturaleza misma del proyecto cuya responsabilidad reposa en el Estado Colombiano, y por el carácter de cooperación técnica de la OIT/IPEC, su modalidad de ejecución es y debe ser mediada por las relaciones y concertaciones con las Organizaciones gubernamentales que tienen compromisos en el tema. Este hecho constituye una riqueza en cuanto a solidez y perspectivas de sostenibilidad, pero es al mismo tiempo, ocasión de menor agilidad, a veces hasta de inacción y de la lentitud de los procesos, que no se sincronizan con la velocidad de las necesidades y las urgencias de los escenarios sociales y políticos del país.
57. El modelo de atención diseñado y puesto en marcha por el ICBF para atender NNJDCA tiene los siguientes momentos: En la primera fase se reciben en un hogar transitorio los menores de edad que han sido remitidos por un juez o por un Defensor de Familia. En este periodo que no puede ser superior a 45 días se hace la valoración y el diagnóstico para lograr identificar su perfil. Este estudio permite determinar su traslado para la continuidad del proceso de reinserción social en un Centro de Atención Especializado (CAE). En estas casas se inicia el aprendizaje para la vida productiva y social que luego desarrollaran los jóvenes y dura entre 8 meses y un año. El (CAE) ofrece: atención médica, actividades recreativas, pedagógicas y apoyo psicoterapéutico. De igual forma se desarrollan

actividades de educación formal, no formal e informal y capacitación laboral. A los jóvenes también se les proporciona: Alojamiento, alimento (desayuno, almuerzo comida y dos refrigerios), implementos de aseo e higiene personal²⁸. Luego se traslada al joven a una casa juvenil donde se ponen en práctica las herramientas adquiridas y se continúa su proceso de aprendizaje. Esta tercera fase puede durar hasta un año según los avances que vaya adquiriendo el desmovilizado. Cuando el adolescente ya ha terminado el proceso se escoge una de las siguientes tres alternativas: a) Atención en medio Sociofamiliar: el adolescente se traslada a una familia seleccionada por el ICBF que decida voluntariamente acoger a desmovilizados. Cabe aclarar que el ICBF sigue prestando ayuda psicosocial mediante sus funcionarios y se establece un periodo de dos años; b) Reintegro familiar: es un proceso que el ICBF acompaña mediante el continuo seguimiento de las condiciones del joven en el “nuevo” ambiente familiar; c) Reintegro familiar con subsidio condicionado: se le presta la ayuda a la familia mediante un subsidio económico cuyo límite de tiempo es de un año²⁹. Si el menor de edad durante el transcurso del programa cumple los 18 años, el ICBF debe transferirlo al programa del Ministerio del Interior.

58. El papel asumido por el proyecto, es claramente apoyar el modelo anterior y ofrecer los refuerzos necesarios, debidamente concertados, para su mayor optimización. En este sentido, el proyecto IPEC/OIT ha estado atento a fortalecer los aspectos que se ven necesarios y oportunos: en educación y atención psicosocial viene adelantando aportes importantes para la adecuación de las metodologías y de la pedagogía a las necesidades reales y la línea de base que presentan los beneficiarios; en salud, se facilitan los contactos para la inclusión por derecho propio en el sistema nacional de atención básica; actualmente, se está en la fase de elaboración de los lineamientos para ofrecer un apoyo psicosocial adecuado a las necesidades de los beneficiarios; además, se están abriendo los espacios para introducir el componente relacionado con recreación y manejo creativo del tiempo libre.
59. El tema del proyecto ha logrado insertarse adecuadamente en los comités territoriales creados sobre el concepto más amplio de las PFTI y su prioridad se ve reflejada en los Planes Operativos de erradicación de Trabajo infantil, POETI; es el “ágora” del proyecto adonde concurren las entidades del Estado responsables del tema, las ONG operadoras y los gremios y representantes del trabajo, también comprometidos con el impulso del tema. Allí se concentran decisiones y se ubican las prioridades que se establecen. Allí, también se vienen logrando los mejores niveles de trabajo en equipo y se consolida la red institucional que acoge el proyecto.
60. No obstante, la sociedad colombiana en general, aún hoy, tiene muy poco conocimiento sobre el tema y sí cuenta con elementos para promover la estigmatización y la desconfianza frente a esta población.³⁰ De manera casi generalizada, podría afirmarse que el tema no es tan visible ni reconocido como

²⁸ Programa de atención a jóvenes desvinculados y amenazados por el conflicto armado del ICBF, en: <http://www.icbf.gov.co>

²⁹ Programa de atención a jóvenes desvinculados y amenazados por el conflicto armado del ICBF, en: <http://www.icbf.gov.co>

³⁰ Ver: Periódico El Tiempo, viernes 04 de Noviembre de 2005: Centros de reinserción para niños, zonas de guerra?

debería serlo en el momento actual, teniendo en cuenta la evidencia y la gravedad del tema.

61. La mayor amenaza que pesa para la buena inserción del tema y su accionar total, se relaciona con que el proyecto se lleva a cabo en simultaneidad con el conflicto armado, hecho que resta seguridad al proceso y mantiene la amenaza del reintegro de los niños, niñas y jóvenes, NNJ, a algunos de los actores armados.
62. Los servidores públicos y también los operadores de ONG que atienden esta población, deben contar con espacios más profundos y extensos para su conocimiento y formación en los aspectos relacionados con la atención a este tipo específico de población, se observan vacíos en este aspecto. De igual forma, es necesario considerar las condiciones de precariedad en las que trabajan la mayoría y hacer previsiones para ofrecer un apoyo en aspectos logísticos, especialmente en informática y comunicaciones.
63. La inestabilidad y la alta rotación de los servidores públicos, afectan de manera negativa el proceso del proyecto; igual importancia tiene este aspecto en las ONG que prestan sus servicios como operadores del Programa de Atención del ICBF y vinculan para el efecto personal transitorio.
64. El proyecto debe ganar mucho más arraigo y apropiación por parte de quienes ejecutan las acciones tanto formativas como directas; para lograrlo, es preciso mejorar y ampliar las comunicaciones inter e intra instituciones.
65. Las actividades de monitoreo y evaluación del proceso a cargo del programa de atención del ICBF, deben ser de forma más sistemática y deben incluir una frecuente socialización entre los mismos jóvenes para conocer sus avances en el proceso de reintegración social y económica.

Marco institucional - Estructura de gestión

66. El proyecto cuenta con el apoyo, los lineamientos y los aportes de la estructura misma del IPEC/OIT para su gestión: se identifica como una de las PFTI, junto con Trabajo infantil doméstico, TID, la Explotación sexual y comercial infantil, ESCI; y cuenta desde allí con todo el marco normativo e institucional para articularse de manera acertada. Parte además, de enfocar su acción hacia el fortalecimiento institucional estatal como propósito claro desde la cooperación técnica. Para su accionar, forma equipo con las ONG que desarrollan Programas de Acción en prevención integral y en Fortalecimiento Institucional y con quienes hacen aportes en investigación y en comunicación. Esta estructura de gestión parece adecuada y apropiada para el logro de los resultados esperados.
67. Concretamente, como se muestra en el mapa ubicado en la primera parte del presente documento, el proyecto se está ejecutando en las cuatro primeras ciudades de acogida de los NNJ desvinculados: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali y Bucaramanga, según los reportes oficiales del ICBF. En tal sentido, esta evaluación confirma una focalización adecuada a la realidad.

68. La estructura de gestión, ofrece la ventaja de la firmeza de los pasos que se avanzan; pero presenta dificultades relacionadas con asincronías para los tiempos de ejecución en tanto que cada decisión tarda demasiado tiempo hasta llegar a la ejecución y reduce la capacidad de eficiencia de la estructura nacional de gestión. Por otro lado, algunas organizaciones ejecutoras quisieran contar con la autonomía técnica que puede ofrecer la cooperación que financia proyectos y tienen algún grado de dificultad para aceptar los niveles de dependencia que se establecen en el esquema de cooperación técnica que caracteriza al IPEC/OIT.
69. Como ya se ha explicado anteriormente, en Colombia, la estructura de gestión del proyecto disfruta del apoyo y la cobertura más amplia del programa que se desarrolla en el país desde 1996; para su funcionamiento cuenta con el Comité Interinstitucional para la Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil y la Protección del Joven Trabajador, presidido por el Ministerio de Protección Social e integrado por 22 organizaciones de gobierno, empleadores y trabajadores; y con la Secretaría Técnica, integrada por el Ministerio de Protección Social y el Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar. Se mantiene una participación alta y activa de los participantes en estos espacios.
70. Con los recursos financieros del proyecto se han logrado desarrollar las siguientes acciones:

ACCIONES DEL PROYECTO que implican ejecución de recursos financieros a Noviembre 30, 2005	ESTADO DEL PROCESO		
	Formu- lación	Aproba- ción	Opera- ción
Programa de Acción de Inserción Social de 560 NNJ desvinculados del conflicto armado. (20 meses)	X	X	X
Contrato de Servicios para Comunicación Educativa	X		
Programa de Acción de Prevención Integral contra las PFTI, especialmente TID, ESCI y vinculación de NNJ al conflicto armado. (2005)	X	X	
Programa de Acción Fortalecimiento de la política local para la prevención integral de vinculación de niños y niñas a la explotación sexual comercial infantil, al trabajo infantil doméstico y a los grupos armados irregulares.	X	X	
Taller para el lanzamiento regional de la Iniciativa para Prevenir la Vinculación de la Niñez en el Conflicto Armado en Bogotá y en Cali.	X	X	X
Taller Nacional sobre lineamientos de prevención integral en PFTI, especialmente TID, ESCI y vinculación de NNJ al conflicto armado.	X	X	X

ACCIONES DEL PROYECTO que implican ejecución de recursos financieros a Noviembre 30, 2005	ESTADO DEL PROCESO		
	Formu- lación	Aproba- ción	Opera- ción
Taller de formulación de programas de acción para la prevención de las peores formas de trabajo infantil, específicamente vinculación de niños, niñas al conflicto armado, y gestiones para la adopción de planes operativos anuales de erradicación del trabajo infantil en Medellín.	X	X	X
Taller de formulación de programas de acción para la prevención de las peores formas de trabajo infantil, específicamente vinculación de niños, niñas al conflicto armado, y gestiones para la adopción de planes operativos anuales de erradicación del trabajo infantil en Bucaramanga	X	X	X
Mini Programa “Estado del Arte sobre niñez y conflicto armado: Patrones culturales que contribuyen a la vinculación de NNJ al conflicto armado en Colombia” (10 semanas)	X	X	X
Mini Programa “Encuentro con NNJ desvinculados del conflicto armado para la exploración y validación de los patrones culturales que contribuyen a su vinculación a la guerra en Colombia” (9 semanas)	X	X	X
Mini Programa Concierto “Un canto nuestro” (Nov.-Dic. 2004)	X	X	X
Evento Red de Investigadores	X	X	X
Taller capacitación técnica y financiera a contrapartes	X	X	X
Taller de Inducción PA de inserción social.	X	X	X
Programa de Acción con empleadores ANDI	X	X	X
Programa de Acción con trabajadores CGT	X	X	X
Taller de Fortalecimiento a la gestión interinstitucional local de la Política Nacional de Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Colombia con énfasis en peores formas - Bucaramanga	X	X	X
Taller de Fortalecimiento a la gestión interinstitucional local de la Política Nacional de Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Colombia con énfasis en peores formas - Medellín	X	X	X
Taller de Fortalecimiento a la gestión interinstitucional local de la Política Nacional de Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Colombia con énfasis en peores formas - Cali	X	X	X
Colext No. 097 de 2005 María Clara Melguizo. Sistematización evento Red de Investigadores	X	X	X
Colext No. 137 de 2005 Rosa Cristina Parra. Apoyo en el área de Comunicaciones.	X	X	X
Miniprograma “Diseño de un plan estratégico de comunicación para el fortalecimiento de la política nacional y local contra las peores formas de trabajo infantil; prevención del uso de niñas, niños y jóvenes en el conflicto armado”.	X	X	X
Taller de articulación de oferta institucional en el área de salud integral para los niños, niñas y jóvenes desvinculados del conflicto armado.	X	X	X

ACCIONES DEL PROYECTO que implican ejecución de recursos financieros a Noviembre 30, 2005	ESTADO DEL PROCESO		
	Formu- lación	Aproba- ción	Opera- ción
Taller nacional de intercambio de experiencias para mejorar la calidad de la atención educativa a niños, niñas y jóvenes desvinculados de los grupos armados irregulares. 18-19-20 octubre	X	X	X

71. Debido a la naturaleza y al carácter específico del trabajo, las ONG operadoras de los PA, fueron seleccionadas por invitación restringida de parte de IPEC-OIT, teniendo en cuenta su especialidad y la limitada oferta presente en el país sobre el tema. En estas circunstancias, esta forma de selección, es la más asertiva. Según el conocimiento de esta consultoría, hay la evidencia de que las ONG seleccionadas para elaborar las propuestas y ejecutarlas, son las más adecuadas y competentes en el tema, a nivel nacional.
72. Las acciones, la constante interlocución interinstitucional y la acertada asesoría técnica que constantemente ofrece IPEC/OIT a los ejecutores del proyecto, han logrado en relativamente corto tiempo un nivel de inserción adecuado y eficiente dentro de todos los espacios institucionales donde el tema es competente. No obstante, aún son necesarias más estrategias para sensibilizar y dar a conocer con mayor amplitud el proyecto a los directivos y operativos del mismo, teniendo en cuenta la complejidad del tema y de su estructura de funcionamiento.
73. Esta evaluación pudo contrastar los documentos que dan cuenta de los costos de las acciones con las actividades realizadas y teniendo conocimiento del medio donde se realizaron o realizan, y del alcance de las mismas, se considera que son adecuados y proporcionados en todas sus partes, a las necesidades que satisfacen.
74. En Febrero de 2004 el presupuesto aprobado para el proyecto fue por un valor de US\$546.000, de los cuales, el mayor porcentaje, el 72% está destinado a cubrir los Programas de Acción y el resto, se ha distribuido de manera razonable entre los miniprogramas y otras actividades que el proyecto ejecuta o tiene comprometidos. A la fecha actual (Octubre 30 de 2005) el proyecto tiene comprometidos US\$537.853.95. Es importante anotar que el descenso significativo que ha tenido el valor del dólar en el país, está influyendo de manera negativa en la ejecución, ya que cada vez se obtienen menos pesos por la misma cantidad de dólares. En este sentido, sería necesario que se hicieran los reajustes necesarios ya que este hecho significa una amenaza para la estabilidad financiera del proyecto.
75. En sus formas de operación, una de las mayores fortalezas del proyecto es la capacidad que ha desarrollado para trabajar en equipo tanto con instituciones gubernamentales como con organismos no gubernamentales, incluyendo también a representantes de los gremios económicos y de las organizaciones de trabajadores. A través de las entrevistas se pudo detectar un alto nivel de compromiso de los representantes con el proyecto.

76. Para asumir las responsabilidades directas que se desprenden del proyecto, el IPEC/OIT cuenta solamente con una persona, oficial del programa. Teniendo en cuenta las múltiples ocupaciones y la necesidad de presencia frecuente en todos los espacios de interlocución, dentro y fuera de la ciudad capital, lo mismo que las funciones de monitoreo y seguimiento, sería pertinente revisar la posibilidad de contar con al menos otra persona de apoyo, especialmente para realizar el seguimiento más frecuente de las acciones.
77. Desde los niveles internacionales, el proyecto es bastante centralizado y esa estructura se refleja en todos los niveles de acción: representa seguridad y unidad conceptual, administrativa, técnica y operativa, pero también representa dilaciones en el tiempo, asincronías con las necesidades inmediatas que demanda el tema, desmotivación en quienes están comprometidos con las realizaciones..., particularmente en las regiones, últimos escalones del sistema, donde no se logran aprovechar todas las capacidades y las iniciativas que se despliegan por estar en contacto directo con el conocimiento y las necesidades de los beneficiarios.
78. Se hace evidente que habría que agilizar los niveles de comunicación, la claridad de los mensajes entre todas las partes y los procesos de toma de decisiones. Particularmente, es necesario promover espacios de comunicaciones más fluidas y directas con los niveles operativos.
79. En cuanto a las relaciones del proyecto con otras ofertas de cooperación internacional afines, hay esfuerzos de coordinación en las acciones que son importantes, en función del cumplimiento de los objetivos comunes. Sin embargo, hay diferencias de fondo en el modo de operación con la OIM, agencia que venía avanzando en el tema desde el año 2000; estas diferencias presentan dificultades en algunos momentos operativos especialmente porque logran levantar expectativas de apoyos financieros que escapan a la forma de acción de IPEC/OIT.

Estrategia de sostenibilidad

80. Esta consultoría comprende la sostenibilidad como el conjunto de condiciones que garantizan que los objetivos e impactos positivos de un proyecto perduren de forma duradera, después de la fecha de su conclusión.
81. Técnicamente, se podría afirmar que el proyecto, en su corto recorrido, ha logrado colocar bases seguras que harían previsible su sostenibilidad: cuenta con un marco normativo internacional y nacional sólido, apoyo decidido de la Cooperación internacional, lineamientos políticos y metodológicos adecuados, amplia convocatoria institucional, inclusión del tema en algunos Planes de Desarrollo territoriales, se cuenta ya con personal de directivos y operativos del proyecto debidamente capacitados, hay una estructura institucional gubernamental bien definida, se cuenta con apoyos no gubernamentales y va ganando espacio en el sentido de apropiación del tema por parte de los actores comprometidos.

82. No obstante, la amenaza mayor para que esta estructura sea realmente sostenible radica en la persistencia, la impredeción y la complejidad del conflicto armado en el país. Esta realidad torna vulnerables todos los espacios y podría dejar sin piso las acciones del proyecto. Igualmente, la capacidad real del Estado es bastante precaria para dar respuesta adecuada al problema, sobre todo en su componente de prevención.
83. Hasta ahora, bien podría afirmarse, que todas las acciones adelantadas por el proyecto se encaminan a hacerlo sostenible, pero la variable política establece determinantes que quedan por fuera del control del proyecto.

IV. Conclusiones

Diseño y estrategia

84. El proyecto “Prevención y reintegración de niños involucrados en conflictos armados en Colombia” promovido por IPEC/OIT, se ha logrado introducir de manera firme y progresiva, en los espacios institucionales adecuados para lograr sus fines y propender por la propia sostenibilidad en el futuro.
85. Conceptualmente, hace el abordaje el tema desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos de los NNJ que han sido reclutados y utilizados en distintas tareas dentro del conflicto armado colombiano y lo ubica como una de las PFTI; dicha concepción, abre positivamente las posibilidades para un manejo más adecuado del proyecto.
86. El proyecto hace el mejor aprovechamiento del marco normativo internacional y nacional sobre el tema y de la estructura institucional pertinente, de donde deviene la solidez; y mantiene en la práctica la decisión de abordar la cooperación como apoyo y asesoría técnica al Estado Colombiano, a través de las instituciones pertinentes, de manera concertada y adecuada a sus necesidades.
87. El diseño del anexo país y los Programas de acción guardan coherencia con las necesidades que se detectan en el diagnóstico y sus objetivos se orientan a fortalecer las políticas oficiales y el accionar institucional bajo la responsabilidad del Estado colombiano.
88. La elaboración de este diseño hizo aprovechamiento de antecedentes importantes como el Tercer plan nacional para la erradicación del trabajo infantil y un ejercicio de planeación participativa sobre el mismo tema, lo mismo que de estudios y aportes investigativos anteriores.
89. Hay desfases en los tiempos internacionales de orden administrativo y financiero y para la toma de decisiones que restan agilidad a las acciones y a los resultados del proyecto. Estos desfases tienen efectos negativos sobre el proyecto que se relacionan con las programaciones y también con la motivación de los operadores; logran comprometer en algún momento la credibilidad del proyecto mismo.
90. El componente de Fortalecimiento institucional requiere ajustes orientados a fortalecer la capacitación y la formación del personal público y privado, al servicio del programa que desarrolla el ICBF y afianzar el establecimiento de políticas públicas, especialmente en el componente de prevención.
91. El esquema centralizado que tiene el proyecto, desde los niveles internacionales, reduce posibilidades de participación nacional y local y disminuye la agilidad y la eficacia de las acciones.

92. Aunque existe una ruta de atención a los NNJ, el programa desarrollado por el ICBF no cuenta aún con un modelo integral de tipo metodológico y pedagógico donde se logre concentrar toda la ruta y sirva al mismo tiempo de sensibilización y apoyo técnico tanto para directivos como para operativos. Este documento sería de utilidad para recoger en uno solo los conceptos y el marco normativo, el marco institucional apropiado, las líneas de acción y los procedimientos adecuados. Sus destinatarios serían los servidores de entidades públicas y privadas y la misma población de los NNJDCA.

Objetivos

93. Los dos objetivos que establece el proyecto tienen que ver con la prevención y con la atención a los NNJ desmovilizados; son claros y pueden ser medibles y alcanzables, gracias al proceso de focalización y los mapas de riesgo que se han avanzado.

Indicadores

94. Tal como están planteados, los indicadores que miran el componente de Prevención, pueden ser realistas y prácticos, a pesar de la complejidad de este tipo de mediciones sobre lo que podría ser posible.
95. Los indicadores relacionados con la Atención en la etapa de reintegración, son realistas y pertinentes y facilitan el monitoreo y el seguimiento de las acciones del proyecto.

Modalidad de ejecución

96. Desde el comienzo, el proyecto ha tenido claridad sobre la forma de llevar a cabo la ejecución y las distintas alianzas y redes desde donde debe operar. Se mueve en esa dirección y sus pasos son firmes y progresivos, según los avances que va mostrando el mismo Estado.
97. Para lograr sus propósitos, el proyecto establece constantes espacios de interlocución y de concertación con las instituciones que representan al Estado y se abstiene de realizar acciones directas con NNJDCA.
98. Básicamente, el proyecto ha establecido sus formas de acción contando con los afines en la Cooperación internacional, en contacto directo con los actores estatales que tienen responsabilidad con el tema, con el sector privado y las organizaciones de trabajadores y el tejido de organizaciones sociales con misión y experiencia en el tema.
99. El tema del proyecto ha logrado insertarse adecuadamente en los comités territoriales creados sobre el concepto más amplio de las PFTI y su prioridad se ve reflejada en los Planes Operativos de erradicación de Trabajo infantil,

POETI. Igualmente, algunos planes de desarrollo municipal vienen incluyendo el tema en sus prioridades.

100. No obstante, el conocimiento del tema aún se mantiene en unos restringidos espacios institucionales y puede afirmarse que es muy poco conocido por la sociedad colombiana en general. Por el contrario, los medios de comunicación refuerzan la estigmatización de este tipo de población y lo asocian de manera negativa con la prolongación de la guerra en las ciudades y el acrecentamiento de los niveles de inseguridad.
101. El proyecto está ofreciendo aportes a la adecuación en el sistema educativo que acoge a los NNJ; está en proceso de aportar lineamientos sobre el componente psicosocial y promueve enlaces para la capacitación prelaboral pero se ha tropezado con la lentitud del Estado en este aspecto, debido a la rotación de personal que impide la continuidad.
102. Los PA puestos en marcha hasta el momento, en desarrollo del proyecto, se orientan a alcanzar los objetivos planteados y sus acciones están contribuyendo claramente al logro de estos propósitos.
103. Uno de los factores que no favorecen el avance del proyecto es la inestabilidad y la alta rotación de los servidores públicos al igual que los colaboradores de las ONG que prestan sus servicios de manera transitoria.
104. Para la fase siguiente de ejecución de los PA, el programa ejecutado por el ICBF debe contar con un sistema de monitoreo y evaluación de manera más sistemática.
105. La acción más fuerte del Estado debe consistir en prevenir el reclutamiento y la utilización de NNJ en la confrontación armada y realizar acciones tendientes a la desvinculación de los grupos armados y garantizar la recuperación integral a los desvinculados.

Marco institucional - Estructura de gestión

106. El marco institucional del proyecto se afianza en la estructura misma del IPEC/OIT y comparte los lineamientos generales de las PFTI, (TID, ESCI) y se articula con los afines de la Cooperación internacional: UNICEF, OIM, GTZ.
107. El proyecto ha logrado establecer las conexiones y alianzas pertinentes y funcionales a sus objetivos. A nivel nacional se liga con los socios naturales del tema: Ministerio de Protección Social y el ICBF. Adicionalmente, con las instituciones que por su naturaleza tienen compromisos con la población como los Ministerios de Educación y de Comunicaciones y con el SENA; y en los espacios privados con los gremios y las organizaciones de trabajadores.

108. El proyecto ha demostrado tener una gran fortaleza en la capacidad de sostener y reafirmar constantemente su marco institucional y las redes sociales que poco a poco ha venido tejiendo.
109. En los niveles operativos el proyecto forma equipo con ONG ejecutoras que cuentan con la competencia y la experiencia necesaria y suficiente para ejecutar los PA.
110. En las cuatro ciudades seleccionadas para desarrollar el proyecto, se hace evidente que hay inducción, motivación e inserción del tema en los niveles y espacios competentes en el asunto.
111. La distribución y el manejo del presupuesto asignado para el proyecto muestran coherencia y proporcionalidad en relación con los gastos del mismo.
112. El manejo del proyecto es bastante centralizado desde los niveles internacionales, hecho que le otorga unidad pero que impide muchas veces que pueda estar acompasado con las necesidades del mismo proyecto, en los diferentes órdenes territoriales.

Estrategia de sostenibilidad

113. En un lapso relativamente corto de menos de dos años, el proyecto ha logrado técnicamente, colocar bases seguras que harían previsible su sostenibilidad más allá del horizonte temporal establecido por IPEC/OIT.
114. Las amenazas que pesan sobre la sostenibilidad son de carácter político, se relacionan con la dinámica del conflicto y están fuera del control del proyecto.

V. Lecciones Aprendidas

115. La comprensión actual del problema ubica más sus causas en los contextos socioculturales y disminuye el énfasis en las causas socio-económicas.
116. Tan importante es el diagnóstico y la línea de la base que muestra la situación de los NNJ como beneficiarios, como el conocimiento de las necesidades de capacitación y de formación de quienes deben hacer la operación del proyecto, desde las entidades sean gubernamentales como no gubernamentales. Ambos temas deben ser considerados a profundidad como base para la formulación de los Programas de Acción.
117. La decisión de trabajar en el fortalecimiento institucional del Estado, es un propósito de la Cooperación internacional que exige constantes adecuaciones y enorme capacidad de concertación, sobre todo para lograr sincronía en los tiempos, pero finalmente conduce a resultados e impactos de mayor duración y solidez.
118. La adecuación de los tiempos institucionales, en todos los niveles, incluido el nivel internacional, es una de las primeras tareas a asumir; esta adecuación debe estar más en consonancia con las necesidades del proyecto en los niveles operativos.
119. La naturaleza de un proyecto como éste, requiere ser concebido y ejecutado de manera inter-institucional y en conformación de redes y alianzas, frente a la certeza de que ninguna institución podría realizarlo de manera individual. En este sentido, las administraciones departamentales y municipales son de alta relevancia.
120. Se viene diseñando una respuesta de carácter integral que poco a poco va superando anteriores esquemas fragmentados y sectoriales; en este sentido, el abordaje de los aspectos psicosociales, es de alta importancia.
121. El trabajo en equipo incluyendo Organizaciones gubernamentales y No gubernamentales y el sector privado y de trabajadores, teniendo en cuenta sus diferentes ritmos, visiones y formas de acción, es uno de los mayores aprendizajes que se visualiza como una gran riqueza
122. De la lección anterior se desprende el aprendizaje de la Flexibilidad para ceder con razones, cuando es necesario, a fin de llegar a un propósito común.
123. Para orientar y ejecutar un proyecto como éste, de carácter tan especializado, es preciso hacer inversiones importantes en la sensibilización, capacitación y formación específica del personal a cargo del Programa de Atención del ICBF, en todos sus niveles: nacional, regional y zonal, así como ONG operadoras.
124. Se ha comprendido que se requiere una metodología específica para atender la población en medio del conflicto, igualmente, es pertinente afinar las

estrategias de prevención en función de fenómenos particulares para NNJ en circunstancias que los han marcado de manera compleja.

125. Se ha comprendido que se atiende un problema circular: se atienden jóvenes que salen, pero no hay capacidad de control sobre los NNJ que ingresan o que podrían ser de nuevo reclutados.

VI. Recomendaciones

Diseño y estrategia

126. Revisar los tiempos institucionales internacionales a fin de adecuarlos mejor a las necesidades de la planeación y de la formulación de los PA nacionales y facilitar la agilidad de las acciones a realizar de manera más acorde con las necesidades propias del proyecto.
127. Teniendo en cuenta la existencia de un margen amplio de imprevisiones de carácter político del proyecto, es necesario que el programa ejecutado por el ICBF pueda flexibilizar las condiciones para que a nivel nacional y según consultas y participación regional, se realicen los ajustes y las adecuaciones siempre que sea necesario y oportuno, a los PA.
128. Ante el Gobierno nacional es preciso promover una mayor capacidad de incidencia a fin de buscar realizaciones más directas tendientes al establecimiento de políticas y lineamientos más claros y contundentes, especialmente relacionadas con la prevención y la preparación de los servidores públicos para el manejo adecuado del tema.
129. Estudiar las condiciones y tomar las decisiones adecuadas para que el proyecto se pueda mover más ágilmente dentro de una estructura menos centralizada, desde los niveles internacionales mismos
130. Sería conveniente estudiar la posibilidad de apoyar al ICBF para la elaboración de un paquete pedagógico, especie de modelo o ruta general, donde al tiempo que se sensibilice más a la sociedad y a los servidores públicos, se logre un objetivo unificador a nivel conceptual, normativo y operativo; el mismo podría tener como destinatarios a los servidores públicos y privados al servicio del proyecto y sería orientador para los NNJDCA.

Objetivos

131. Se observa que los objetivos siguen teniendo la validez y la pertinencia del momento en que fueron formulados.

Indicadores

132. De igual manera, los indicadores previstos permiten una aproximación para medir la consecución de los objetivos y las metas y los impactos posteriores del proyecto.

Modalidad de ejecución

133. Buscar espacios para propiciar una mayor y más activa participación de los operadores de los programas de acción de OIT en las regiones.
134. Se recomienda reforzar las acciones tendientes a hacer más visible el tema a nivel nacional y adelantar estrategias tendientes a la mayor sensibilidad de la sociedad colombiano sobre este fenómeno de la guerra.
135. Se ve necesario igualmente, aumentar esfuerzos en la capacitación y la formación de los servidores públicos y personal no gubernamental comprometido con la ejecución del programa de atención a cargo del ICBF.
136. El proyecto debe ganar mucho más arraigo y apropiación por parte de quienes ejecutan las acciones tanto formativas como directas; para lograrlo, es preciso reforzar, mejorar y ampliar las comunicaciones inter e intra instituciones y la capacidad logística de los mismos.
137. Las actividades de monitoreo y evaluación del proceso, deben ser de forma más sistemática para lo cual se sugiere estudiar las posibilidades de reforzar el equipo del proyecto en IPEC/OIT.

Marco institucional - Estructura de gestión

138. Se hace evidente que habría que agilizar los niveles de comunicación, la claridad de los mensajes entre todas las partes y los procesos de toma de decisiones. Particularmente, es necesario promover espacios de comunicaciones más fluidas y directas con los niveles operativos.

Estrategia de sostenibilidad

139. Se recomienda reforzar las gestiones necesarias para comprometer más a fondo las diferentes entidades territoriales a fin de que incluyan el tema en sus prioridades de los respectivos Planes de desarrollo. Igualmente, se ve necesario motivar una mayor y más decidida incidencia del SENA, en el nivel nacional en los aspectos relacionados con la formación prelaboral y el

planteamiento de proyectos de emprendimiento para la generación de ingresos.³¹

140. Igualmente, se ve importante acrecentar las acciones dirigidas a lograr el sentido de pertenencia y apropiación de parte de los actores locales y regionales, para lo cual una mayor y más frecuente interlocución del IPEC/OIT sería necesaria a fin de ampliar los espacios de participación directa.

³¹ A pesar de múltiples esfuerzos por lograr una entrevista a nivel de la Dirección nacional del SENA para la presente evaluación, no fue posible obtenerla en el nivel nacional. Actualmente, hay un momento de transición para la asunción de esta representancia.

Anexo 1: Terminos de Referencia

ORGANIZACION INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO

PROGRAMA INTERNACIONAL PARA LA ERRADICACIÓN DEL TRABAJO INFANTIL

(OIT-IPEC)

Términos de referencia

Evaluación Intermedia

Prevención y reintegración de niños involucrados en conflictos armados

El caso de Colombia

(P340 03 900 052 - INT/03/P52/USA)

I. Antecedentes y Justificación

1. El propósito del IPEC es la eliminación progresiva del trabajo infantil, dando prioridad a la eliminación urgente de sus peores formas. La voluntad política y el compromiso de los gobiernos en contra del trabajo infantil —en colaboración con organizaciones de trabajadores y de empleadores, organizaciones no gubernamentales y otros actores sociales— es la base para la acción del IPEC. El apoyo que el IPEC proporciona a los países se basa en una estrategia multidisciplinar que se desarrolla por fases. Esta estrategia abarca la sensibilización sobre las consecuencias negativas del trabajo infantil, la promoción de la movilización social contra este fenómeno, el fortalecimiento de las capacidades nacionales para combatir el trabajo infantil y la ejecución de Programas de Acción (PA) de carácter demostrativo para prevenir el trabajo infantil, retirar a niños y niñas trabajadores de ocupaciones nocivas y proporcionarles alternativas adecuadas.
2. En Convenio sobre la prohibición de las peores formas de trabajo infantil y la acción inmediata para su eliminación, 1999 (Nro. 182), define a “*todas las formas de esclavitud o las prácticas análogas a la esclavitud, como la venta y el tráfico de niños, la servidumbre por deudas y la condición de siervo, y el trabajo forzoso u obligatorio, incluido el reclutamiento forzoso u obligatorio de niños para utilizarlos en conflictos armados*” como peores formas de trabajo infantil (Artículo 3a). Los países que ratifican este Convenio asumen la responsabilidad de abolir las peores formas de trabajo infantil como prioridad, consultando instituciones gubernamentales relevantes y a organizaciones de empleadores y trabajadores, y tomando en consideración las opiniones de otros grupos involucrados.

3. El programa interregional para la prevención y reintegración de niños involucrados en conflictos armados es una intervención global con actividades focalizadas en Colombia, Filipinas, Sri Lanka y África (Burundi, Congo, República Democrática del Congo y Ruanda —como países centrales—, así como Costa de Marfil, Uganda, Liberia y Sierra Leona. como países no centrales). Todas estas naciones a excepción de Sierra Leona han ratificado el Convenio Nro. 182. El proyecto tiene un presupuesto total de USD 7.000.000. El donante es el Departamento de Trabajo de los Estados Unidos (USDOL). Este programa fue concebido luego de una fase preparatoria lanzada en octubre de 2001 por el IPEC en colaboración con el Programa de la OIT sobre Crisis, Respuesta y Reconstrucción (IFP-CRISIS). Esta fase ha permitido obtener información (a través de evaluaciones rápidas) sobre las causas del uso de niños soldados, los mecanismos para su reclutamiento, las condiciones de vida en los grupos armados y las circunstancias para su movilización, así como también las perspectivas para su reintegración.³²
4. El programa interregional pretende contribuir a la reducción en la incidencia de niños que sirven en ejércitos y/o grupos armados (objetivo general). Para ello, fueron formulados tres objetivos inmediatos:
 - ✓ O/I 1: “Al final del programa, se habrá desarrollado en cada país un contexto socio-político propicio para prevención, el retiro y la subsiguiente reintegración a la sociedad de los niños involucrados en los conflictos armados”.
 - ✓ O/I 2: “Al final del programa, los niños soldados sobre la edad mínima para trabajar serán asistidos para adquirir un trabajo decente y obtener una retribución digna.
 - ✓ O/I 3: “Al final del programa, se habrá reducido el número de menores incorporados en grupos armados en los países beneficiarios.”
5. El documento de programa general define una serie de estrategias generales a partir de las cuales cada país ha realizado una selección para cubrir sus necesidades particulares, teniendo en consideración las características específicas del contexto nacional. Esta selección se refleja en un “anexo país” con detalles sobre las intervenciones estratégicas y las modalidades de ejecución seleccionadas. El anexo país correspondiente a Colombia será utilizado como documento de referencia para la evaluación de medio término, ya que contiene los detalles relevantes de la situación nacional y el encuadre de intervención, incluyendo los logros esperados. Resumiendo, el anexo país fue preparado sobre las bases de: a) el documento *Prevención y Reintegración de los niños involucrados en el conflicto armado: un Programa Interregional*, de fecha 17 de Septiembre 2003; y b) un proceso de planificación estratégica en el país de acuerdo con la metodología del Marco Estratégico de Impacto (SPIF-*Strategic Programme Impact Framework*, en sus siglas en inglés) desarrollada por el IPEC.³³

³² Fueron preparados un total de cinco informes (no publicados): *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés au Burundi*, Suzane Nsabimana, diciembre de 2002; *Rapport sur l'évaluation rapide de la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République du Congo*, Michael Bitemo and Frédéric Nkeoua, diciembre de 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo*, Modeste Mangola Dukti and Jean-Marie Vianney Mupende Katembo, Kinshasa, octubre de 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo (Goma, Est-RDC)*, François-Xavier Baganda N'Simba, Goma, diciembre de 2002; *Résultats de l'enquête d'évaluation rapide au Rwanda sur la situations des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés*, Prosper Mutijima Nkaka, marzo de 2003.

³³ Siguiendo el abordaje SPIF un taller fue llevado a cabo en diciembre de 2003. Las conclusiones principales de este taller pueden ser encontradas en el anexo país. Para más información concerniente al abordaje SPIF referirse a la guía de mayo de 2002 producida por la sección de Diseño, Evaluación y Documentación del IPEC.

6. Siguiendo los procedimientos regulares de la OIT y según lo acordado con USDOL, el proyecto será objeto una evaluación intermedia independiente en el segundo semestre del 2005. Esta evaluación debe cumplir dos objetivos: a) rendir cuentas a las partes interesadas, incluyendo las agencias gubernamentales y los interlocutores sociales en los países meta, las organizaciones asociadas y el donante, de lo que ha sido realizado y lo que se ha logrado hasta la fecha, y b) el aprendizaje de la experiencia considerando cómo el proyecto progresa en relación con sus objetivos, con la finalidad de planificar actividades futuras y, de ser necesario, recomendar un re-diseño apropiado.
7. La dirección de IPEC y el personal del proyecto utilizarán los resultados de la evaluación para revisar el abordaje y estrategia que se sigue en cada país. De esta forma, la evaluación debe proporcionar una información precisa y creíble que sugiera cómo el proyecto puede mejorar su impacto durante el tiempo restante de ejecución, asegurando la sostenibilidad de los beneficios generados. En consecuencia, **metodologías específicas de evaluación serán utilizadas para ofrecer recomendaciones basadas en evidencias**. Los resultados de la evaluación serán utilizados por socios a cargo de la implementación de actividades en el terreno o que apoyen en los esfuerzos nacionales contra el uso de niños en conflictos armados en el país.

II. Propósitos y fases del proceso de evaluación

8. Los propósitos generales de la evaluación y los objetivos a cumplir por el consultor nacional independiente son los siguientes:
 - Revisar la ejecución del proyecto hasta la fecha en Colombia y considerar cambios en la estrategia en base a la experiencia, recomendando los ajustes que sean necesarios.
 - Examinar las actividades propuestas y asesorar el potencial de su contribución a la estrategia y los objetivos.
 - Revisar el marco institucional del proyecto y la capacidad de ejecución.
 - Analizar el potencial existente para integrar el proyecto con otras iniciativas a ser desarrolladas en Colombia.
9. Esta evaluación nacional es parte de un proceso que continuará con la evaluación independiente de las actividades llevadas a cabo en África y la preparación de un informe final para el proyecto en su conjunto.
10. La evaluación nacional en Colombia será llevada a cabo por un/a consultor/a independiente reclutado/a por el IPEC, que trabajará bajo la supervisión técnica de un evaluador internacional independiente (líder del equipo de evaluación), quien es responsable de la evaluación de las actividades en África y la preparación de un informe final de síntesis. **Estos términos de referencia corresponden exclusivamente a las actividades a ser desarrolladas por el o la consultor/a nacional independiente en Colombia.**

III. Aspectos principales de la evaluación

11. El foco de esta evaluación nacional será el aprendizaje y la sugerencia de mejoras, de acuerdo con la naturaleza formativa y correctiva de las evaluaciones de medio termino. El ejercicio deberá ser articulado alrededor de tres preguntas principales:
 - 1) ¿Qué componentes y aspectos funcionaron y por qué?
 - 2) ¿Qué componentes o aspectos precisan mejoras, por qué y cuáles?

- 3) ¿Cómo afectó la evolución del contexto a las hipótesis de diseño y estrategia?
12. Algunas de las cuestiones específicas a ser analizadas en el contexto de las tres principales preguntas mencionadas anteriormente son las siguientes:
13. Validez del diseño de proyecto y pertinencia de los objetivos: La evaluación deberá analizar el diseño del anexo país (en relación con el documento de programa general), considerando su lógica interna y su coherencia, su calidad y la pertinencia de la estrategia y los objetivos propuestos. Las siguientes son algunas de las preguntas específicas a considerar en el análisis:
- ¿Incluye el documento del proyecto interregional un marco de estrategias apropiado para el logro de los objetivos en el ámbito nacional? Si no, ¿por qué? ¿Cómo fue utilizado el documento de proyecto interregional para la elaboración del anexo país? (El Formulario 3 en el anexo puede ser utilizado para resumir esta información).
 - ¿Son los objetivos definidos para Colombia claros y realistas (a ser logrados durante el marco de tiempo del proyecto, con los recursos existentes y siguiendo el abordaje y la estrategia identificados?)
 - ¿Los objetivos siguen siendo válidos o deben ser reformulados? De ser así, ¿cómo?
 - ¿Cuán coherente y pertinente fue el diseño de anexo país (y sus reformulaciones, de ser el caso) de acuerdo con las condiciones existentes en el momento de su concepción? ¿Deben realizarse cambios en la estrategia del proyecto basados en nueva información emergente sobre necesidades y limitaciones? De ser así, ¿por qué y cómo?
 - ¿Se basó el diseño del proyecto en una investigación adecuada e información de base precisa?
 - ¿Son los indicadores de logro y los medios de verificación pertinentes, claros, realistas y prácticos para la evaluación del desempeño y el impacto del proyecto? Si no, ¿por qué? ¿Cuán efectivas y pertinentes son las estrategias de seguimiento del proyecto? (Explique y proporcione evidencia que apoye sus conclusiones)
 - ¿Participaron los niños y adolescentes en la etapa de diseño del proyecto? Si no, ¿cuáles fueron las dificultades que impidieron su participación? Si participaron, ¿de qué manera lo han hecho? ¿Se identificaron opciones o alternativas para sustituir la participación directa de niños y adolescentes en el diseño de proyecto? ¿Fueron los programas de acción diseñados de manera participativa? Si no, ¿por qué?
 - ¿Son los marcos de tiempo para la implementación del proyecto y la secuencia de actividades lógicos y realistas? Si no, ¿qué cambios se requieren? ¿Fue definida claramente en la etapa del diseño del proyecto la estrategia para la sostenibilidad del impacto? Evalúe la relación entre el proyecto y otras intervenciones relacionadas con la infancia que el IPEC haya apoyado o ejecutadas por otras organizaciones en Colombia ¿Hasta qué punto fueron las sinergias y las economías de escala explotadas en el diseño de proyecto?
 - ¿Cómo se involucraron las estructuras de gerencia locales, como el Comité de Dirección Nacional, en el diseño del proyecto? ¿Hasta qué punto fueron los objetivos del proyecto incorporados en la misión y objetivos de las distintas estructuras de coordinación?
14. Proceso de ejecución, administración y logros: La evaluación deberá presentar información acerca de la ejecución de las actividades del proyecto y sobre la eficacia y eficiencia de las estructuras gerenciales, con el fin de determinar si el proyecto está en curso de lograr los productos esperados y conseguir sus objetivos inmediatos.

En materia de gestión y administración

- a. ¿Son las estructuras organizativas y de gestión del proyecto apropiadas para el logro de los resultados esperados? ¿Son adecuados y útiles los lineamientos técnicos y administrativos así como el apoyo proporcionado por la OIT al proyecto?
- b. ¿Cuáles fueron las fortalezas y debilidades de la administración del proyecto? ¿Qué mejoras gerenciales, si alguna, pueden ser sugeridas para incrementar la eficacia y eficiencia del proyecto? ¿Hay equilibrio y racionalidad en el uso de fondos y recursos? ¿Hay problemas en estos aspectos?
- c. ¿Hubo demoras en la ejecución del plan de trabajo del proyecto? De ser afirmativo, ¿cuáles fueron las consecuencias de estas demoras? ¿Está el proyecto avanzando hacia el alcance de sus objetivos inmediatos? De no ser así, ¿por qué y cómo pueden ser resueltos los problemas?
- d. Por favor analice los procesos de comunicación entre el personal del proyecto en Colombia, la oficina regional de la OIT, la sede de la OIT en Ginebra y el donante.
- e. ¿Cuál es la situación financiera del proyecto? ¿Qué está funcionando bien y cuáles son las dificultades en este ámbito (dé ejemplos concretos)? ¿Cómo pueden ser abordadas estas dificultades con las capacidades existentes?
- f. ¿Fueron los desembolsos realizados en los tiempos previstos en el documento del proyecto, o hubo cambios significativos? Si hubo modificaciones, ¿qué recursos fueron redireccionados a gastos necesarios para asegurar un servicio más eficiente y el alcance de los objetivos? ¿Existen formas más eficientes de gestionar el proyecto para alcanzar mejores resultados con los mismos recursos?
- g. ¿Cuán adecuados son los criterios de selección de regiones y sectores prioritarios? ¿Qué tan eficiente es el proceso de asignación de recursos, revisión y aprobación de propuestas de Programas de Acción (PA)?
- h. ¿Qué procesos fueron utilizados para identificar agencias ejecutoras para los PA? ¿Fue este proceso eficaz? ¿Fueron identificadas las agencias correctas para llevar adelante la ejecución del proyecto?
- i. ¿Fue adecuado el apoyo técnico y administrativo otorgado por el personal del proyecto a las contrapartes nacionales?
- j. ¿Cómo participan las estructuras locales de gestión en la ejecución del programa? ¿Cómo contribuye esta participación en el logro de los objetivos del proyecto? ¿Cuáles son los logros y las limitaciones más importantes?

Logros

- k. ¿Están los resultados del proyecto satisfaciendo las necesidades de los grupos meta? Si no, ¿por qué? ¿Hay alternativas para cubrir esas necesidades? De ser posible, ¿cómo?
- l. ¿Cuán eficaces fueron los programas de acción hasta la fecha? ¿Cómo están contribuyendo los PA a que el proyecto logre sus objetivos inmediatos?
- m. ¿Fue alcanzado el número de beneficiarios que se pretendía? Si no, explique cuáles fueron los motivos.
- n. Valore el cambio de actitud de los beneficiarios con respecto a las habilidades adquiridas para obtener un trabajo decente ¿Cuáles son las perspectivas de los beneficiarios y de las partes interesadas sobre la utilidad de los productos del proyecto? ¿Cuáles son los efectos del proyecto en los beneficiarios hasta la fecha? ¿Qué beneficios han conseguido?
- o. ¿Cuán eficaz ha sido el proyecto en el fortalecimiento de capacidades de las agencias ejecutoras de los PA y del equipo nacional del IPEC?
- p. Evalúe la contribución del proyecto en lo que respecta a la sensibilización acerca de la necesidad de retirar a los niños de grupos armados, incluyendo grupos no gubernamentales.
- q. ¿Se ha fortalecido el compromiso y la capacidad de instituciones públicas y privadas para tomar acciones concretas para prevenir el reclutamiento de niñas y niños en conflictos armados y asistir a aquéllos que son retirados?
- r. ¿Cuán efectivo fue el proyecto en relación a la movilización de recursos adicionales? ¿Qué procesos han sido iniciados para identificar y coordinar la ejecución del proyecto

con otras iniciativas y organizaciones activas en este campo? Valore la visibilidad de la contribución del proyecto financiado por USDOL.

- s. Analice las oportunidades identificadas por el proyecto, incluyendo oportunidades laborales para los beneficiarios y otros apoyos que pudieran favorecerlos en el contexto específico del país.
- t. Determine la calidad de la oferta de formación, incluyendo la capacidad de las organizaciones que se ocupan de ofrecer esta formación. Analice la capacidad de las organizaciones asociadas al proyecto para ofrecer una formación adecuada para los diferentes grupos de edad.
- u. ¿Hasta qué punto están los niños y adolescentes involucrados en la ejecución del proyecto? ¿De qué manera se ha intentado desarrollar las capacidades de los jóvenes para contribuir al objetivo de reducir la participación de niños en conflictos armados? ¿Cuál fue el impacto de estos esfuerzos?
- v. ¿Qué lecciones han sido aprendidas y que posibilidades existen para reproducir los esfuerzos realizados? ¿Hasta qué punto las lecciones aprendidas pueden ser compartidas con otros países? ¿Cómo fueron incorporadas estas lecciones en otras iniciativas de la OIT en el país o en los esfuerzos del IPEC en el ámbito regional?
- w. ¿Justifican los resultados previstos del proyecto la inversión realizada?

15. Sostenibilidad e impacto previsto: La evaluación deberá valorar cómo se entiende la “sostenibilidad” en el contexto de proyecto y el progreso realizado en asegurar la continuación y/o el desarrollo subsiguiente de los beneficios generados por la intervención.

- a. ¿Qué acciones pueden ser llevadas a cabo para promover la sostenibilidad y qué acciones deben ser realizadas en los próximos meses para fortalecer la capacidad de los actores locales e instituciones relacionadas para lograr la sostenibilidad y/o la repetición de la intervención en las zonas beneficiadas?
- b. ¿Cuán efectivo fue el proyecto para promover la apropiación local de las actividades? ¿Se articuló claramente la estrategia de salida del proyecto? ¿Cuáles son los planes de transferencia de los diferentes componentes del proyecto?
- c. ¿Cuál es el compromiso a largo plazo y las capacidades técnicas y financieras de las instituciones locales/nacionales (incluyendo los gobiernos) y los grupos meta para continuar asegurando la prestación de bienes y servicios una vez que finalice el proyecto?

IV. Productos esperados y calendario del proceso de evaluación

16. El calendario de esta evaluación nacional y el numero de días de trabajo para el/la consultor/a nacional están detallados a continuación. El número total previsto de días de trabajo es de veinticinco. Las fechas incluidas en los siguientes párrafos son tentativas. Las fechas finales serán determinadas en consulta con el evaluador:

- Cinco días hábiles (empezando el 22 de agosto de 2005), cubriendo:
 - 2 días de trabajo para la primera revisión de documentos (el documento del proyecto y el anexo país, los informes de progreso, informes de misión, y cualquier otra documentación relevante con respecto programas ejecutados por la OIT y otras organizaciones en el país).
 - 1 día de trabajo para revisar y confirmar la aceptación de los términos de referencia (TdR) y para proveer información al líder del equipo de evaluación acerca de los instrumentos metodológicos (véanse los anexos) que serán empleados para recolectar información de las partes interesadas. El evaluador independiente nacional debe también rever, junto con el Coordinador de proyecto en el país, los instrumentos metodológicos y ajustarlos si fuera necesario. Si los instrumentos de recolección de información incluidos en anexo no son aplicables, el consultor nacional independiente

deberá sugerir la metodología más adecuada para obtener la misma información y proporcionar ejemplos concretos. La información deberá ser entregada al líder del equipo antes del 26 de Agosto del 2005.

- 2 días de trabajo para la preparación de un **informe metodológico preliminar** detallando el calendario de la evaluación, las entrevistas específicas (señalando con quién y dónde) y las visitas planeadas al terreno. Para las visitas al terreno debe haber una clara indicación del criterio y las razones para la selección de los sitios. De ser posible, un mínimo de tres sitios (incluyendo sitios dónde los Programas de Acción puedan ser considerados como exitosos y sitios problemáticos) serán visitados para proveer evidencia y ejemplos de aprendizajes aunque, dependiendo del número total de los Programas de Acción y mini-programas desarrollados en el país, un mayor número de sitios puede ser conveniente. Problemas de logística y dificultades de desplazamiento deben ser considerados en la identificación de sitios a visitar. Las visitas al terreno deben proveer la oportunidad de recoger información de: a) autoridades locales (formales e informales), la comunidad (usando el cuestionario 4 en el anexo), agencias ejecutoras, otras partes interesadas en el tema que no participan del proyecto IPEC, los beneficiarios (usando los cuestionarios 1 y 2), organizaciones de empleadores y de trabajadores, si corresponde. Para las entrevistas con beneficiarios, al menos una entrevista de grupo (cuestionario 2) por sitio visitado debe ser llevada a cabo. De ser posible, el evaluador realizará una entrevista individual (cuestionario 1) con algún beneficiario que no haya participado en la entrevista grupal. Se estima que la entrevista comunitaria requerirá 1 hora, la entrevista grupal de beneficiarios unos 45 minutos y la entrevista individual alrededor de 30 minutos. Otras entrevistas con partes interesadas (autoridades locales formales/informales, grupos armados -de ser accesibles- u otras organizaciones ejecutoras de proyectos similares en el área, agencias ejecutoras del IPEC, organizaciones de empleadores y sindicatos, etc.) deberían llevar una hora por entrevista. Cada entrevista con partes interesadas debe ser realizada separadamente. Particularmente, las entrevistas con beneficiarios no deben incluir a personas ajenas a este grupo por cuestiones de confidencialidad.
- 15 días de trabajo desde el 5 de septiembre de 2005 para
 - Realizar el trabajo de terreno en los sitios identificados, incluyendo las entrevistas con las distintas partes interesadas (incluyendo grupos focales y entrevistas semi-estructuradas con beneficiarios y si es posible no beneficiarios, por motivos de comparación). Tiempo estimado: 8 días de trabajo.
 - Entrevistar otras partes interesadas, incluyendo la contraparte nacional y otras organizaciones en el ámbito provincial o nacional, identificadas en el informe metodológico preliminar, incluyendo las agencias ejecutoras de los Programas de Acción, organizaciones de empleadores y sindicatos, proveedores de servicios (formación), y otras. Tiempo estimado: 4 días de trabajo.
 - Analizar las notas, codificar las respuestas y sintetizar la información y datos recolectados como resultado de las entrevistas y el trabajo de terreno. Tiempo estimado: 3 días de trabajo.

Como resultado el consultor independiente nacional debe producir:

- Un mapa de la región/país detallando dónde fueron ejecutadas las actividades del proyecto.
- Un listado de todos los actores en el país y/o regiones priorizadas que se ocupan del retiro y prevención de la utilización de niños en conflictos armados (usando los formularios 1 y 2).
- Una lista de los Programas de Acción y mini programas incluidos en el anexo país, detallando: a) el monto de su presupuesto en dólares de Estados Unidos (USD), b) las agencias ejecutoras, c) sus objetivos, d) la fecha de inicio, e) la fecha de finalización

- (esperada), usando el formulario incluido en el formato de informe de avance del proyecto.
- Un resumen de la información analizada, codificada y procesada (luego de la triangulación).
 - Cuatro días hábiles, a más tardar hasta el 26 de septiembre de 2005, con el fin de redactar un **informe borrador de evaluación** a ser entregado al líder del equipo de evaluación, incluyendo todos los anexos.
 - Un día de trabajo, a más tardar hasta el 14 de Octubre 2005, para incorporar los aportes y comentarios de las partes interesadas y preparar la **versión final del informe de evaluación**. La sección de Diseño, Evaluación y Documentación del IPEC junto con el líder del equipo de evaluación proveerá comentarios consolidados al informe borrador de evaluación.

V. Consideraciones Metodológicas

17. La evaluación deberá seguir las guías generales de evaluación de la OIT y un abordaje participativo y de consulta. Las consultas con todas las partes interesadas será realizada directamente en el terreno por el consultor nacional. En el último día de misión, se realizará un seminario de restitución de conclusiones, en el que todas las partes interesadas presentes analizarán los hallazgos y recomendaciones preliminares de la evaluación.
18. **Cada hallazgo esencial deberá ser triangulado y documentado** (corroborado por al menos dos fuentes diferentes, tanto documentales como de observación o a través de entrevistas a diferentes partes interesadas), de forma que los hallazgos sean válidos y creíbles. Los juicios valorativos deberán estar basados en evidencias apoyadas por la información recolectada de las diferentes fuentes, y no solamente en información proporcionada por una fuente individual. El consultor nacional independiente deberá indicar los estándares de evaluación que se aplicarán a este ejercicio en el informe metodológico preliminar.
19. Instrumentos de Evaluación como el análisis de fortalezas, oportunidades, debilidades y amenazas (FODA) y los protocolos de los cuestionarios adjuntos serán revisados por el consultor nacional durante la fase inicial y aprobados por el consultor independiente internacional. Cualquier comentario, cambios y sugerencias en relación a los diferentes instrumentos de evaluación serán enviados al consultor internacional (líder del equipo) y a la sección DED para comentarios, usando el modo “track change” de MS Word. Si el consultor nacional, basándose en discusiones con el coordinador de proyecto IPEC en el país, decide que algunos de estos formularios y cuestionarios no son aplicables al contexto, deberá diseñar métodos alternativos para obtener la información necesaria.
20. Durante el curso de la evaluación el consultor nacional recibirá apoyo técnico del consultor internacional líder del equipo de evaluación, tanto por correo electrónico como por teléfono de ser necesario. Sumado a esto, el oficial de evaluación designado en DED proveerá apoyo si este fuese necesario.
21. La principal fuente de información para esta evaluación serán los beneficiarios mismos, niños y niñas, como también las comunidades beneficiadas. El consultor independiente nacional deberá tomar las entrevistas a los beneficiarios con sensibilidad y conociendo el bagaje cultural de las comunidades en las que trabajará. Es de esperar que los niños beneficiados y no beneficiados (niños y niñas, que deberán ser parte de grupos específicos en las entrevistas de ser posible) serán entrevistados a través de una combinación de formatos, a decir grupos focales semi-estructurados usando el cuestionario 2, entrevistas

individuales usando el cuestionario 1, y entrevistas a grupos no beneficiarios utilizando el cuestionario 3. Los cuestionarios ayudarán a obtener evidencia sobre las preguntas claves de evaluación de los principales beneficiarios del proyecto. Al mismo tiempo preguntas específicas acerca de los cambios en las actitudes y el comportamiento (antes y después de la intervención) serán incluidos de forma de obtener la información cualitativa adicional. El cuestionario 4 ayudará a recolectar las opiniones del proyecto en el seno de la comunidad.

22. El IPEC, a través de DED, seleccionará el consultor nacional independiente a cargo del estudio nacional. El consultor internacional, líder del equipo, será informado de los candidatos antes del final de la selección y tendrá la posibilidad de expresar sus opiniones a DED.
23. Todos los documentos producidos durante esta evaluación serán preparados de acuerdo con un enfoque de género. Siempre que sea posible las entrevistas a beneficiarios serán realizadas en grupos de género separadamente (masculino/femenino).

VI. Recursos necesarios para la evaluación nacional

24. La evaluación nacional será llevada a cabo por un consultor nacional independiente con experiencia en evaluación de intervenciones de desarrollo, humanitarias o sociales, preferentemente incluyendo experiencia práctica en situaciones de conflicto. La experiencia de trabajo en Colombia es imprescindible. Experiencia previa en trabajo infantil o en proyectos con niños involucrados en conflictos armados será una ventaja, así como la experiencia previa en la realización de evaluaciones para el sistema de Naciones Unidas. Experiencia en el uso de metodologías de recolección de información, actitudes y prácticas serán consideradas. El consultor debe contar con un diploma de al menos magíster en ciencias sociales, economía o similar y una formación específica en teoría y métodos de evaluación. Todas las entrevistas llevadas a cabo en el terreno, particularmente las entrevistas comunitarias y a los beneficiarios, serán llevadas a cabo bajo estricta confidencialidad y de forma anónima.
25. Los recursos necesarios para este ejercicio son los siguientes:
 - ✓ Honorarios para un consultor nacional durante 25 días de trabajo
 - ✓ Dietas para las visitas de terreno.
 - ✓ Los recursos para viajes serán proporcionados directamente por el IPEC.
26. El pago de los honorarios será de la siguiente forma:
 - ✓ 20% de los honorarios a la recepción del informe metodológico preliminar
 - ✓ 30% de los honorarios luego de la recepción del informe borrador de evaluación
 - ✓ 50% de los honorarios una vez recibido y aceptado el informe final de evaluación por el consultor líder del equipo y DED
27. Esta evaluación independiente será administrada por DED, en colaboración con la sección de la OIT-IPEC de grupos vulnerables (responsable del programa).

VII. Formato y contenido del informe de evaluación.

28. Como fue mencionado anteriormente, el producto principal de esta consultoría será un **informe de evaluación**. El informe será escrito en lenguaje sucinto y directo, en fuente Times New Roman 12, y tendrá un máximo de 40 (cuarenta) páginas excluyendo anexos e

incluyendo un resumen ejecutivo. Cada párrafo será numerado y el primer párrafo deberá corresponder al primer párrafo del resumen ejecutivo.

29. La estructura del informe será la siguiente:

- Una pagina de carátula, indicando el titulo del proyecto, el tipo de evaluación, los días de la evaluación, la fecha del informe, el nombre del autor e incluyendo la mención “Este informe refleja las opiniones del autor y no necesariamente las opiniones de la OIT”.
- Tabla de contenidos con numeración de páginas.
- Un mapa detallando las localidades afectadas por el proyecto (incluyendo todos los Programas de Acción y mini-programas).
- Un glosario de la terminología utilizada
- Una lista de abreviaciones
- Un resumen ejecutivo de no más de cuatro páginas sintetizando los principales hallazgos, conclusiones y recomendaciones. La página 1 del informe será la primera página del resumen ejecutivo.
- Una breve introducción de no mas de tres páginas explicando el contexto de la evaluación, su propósito, alcance y objetivos, los usuarios principales, así como una breve descripción de la metodología de evaluación, restricciones y desviaciones, y una breve descripción de la formación del consultor nacional independiente.
- Hallazgos de la evaluación organizados alrededor de las principales cuestiones de evaluación, incluyendo toda la información recolectada, así como los resultados de los análisis con los beneficiarios/comunidad y los resultados del FODA. *Se sugiere estructurar los hallazgos temáticamente alrededor de los puntos 1 a 9 del formulario 3 (ver anexo,) usando cada punto como título de sección.*
- Una sección corta de conclusiones, que debe fluir de los hallazgos y no poseer ningún elemento nuevo que no haya sido mencionado anteriormente.
- Una sección con lecciones aprendidas de la ejecución (experiencias positivas o negativas en la ejecución de las actividades, que deben ser consideradas durante el resto de la implementación y que podrían ser útiles a otros países).
- Recomendaciones basadas en los hallazgos y las conclusiones, ordenadas por orden de importancia/prioridad. Las recomendaciones deben ser divididas por tipo (por Ej. diseño, objetivos, estrategia, gerencia, recursos, etc.) y deben hacer referencia a párrafos específicos del informe principal.
- Anexos: a) Términos de Referencia, b) Bibliografía (incluyendo la documentación y otras fuentes secundarias revisadas), c) lista de personas entrevistadas incluyendo, de ser posible, fecha de la entrevista, edad, sexo, lugar, función/puesto (por Ej. beneficiario, líder comunitario, miembro de gobierno, miembro de ONG, socio implementador, etc.), d) una muestra de cuestionario y una tabla FODA para cada grupo y/o temática, e) material adjunto (resultados codificados de las entrevistas) resumiendo los resultados de todas las tablas FODA y cuestionarios utilizados, f) CV del consultor.

A. ANALISIS FODA

Las temáticas a ser consideradas son las siguientes:

- El formato a utilizar es el siguiente:

- | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|
| ACTOR / PARTE INTERESADA: | | FECHA DE LA ENTREVISTA: | |
| TEMÁTICA: (1 a 5) | | | |
| FORTALEZAS | | DEBILIDADES | |
| | | | |
| OPORTUNIDADES | | AMENAZAS | |
| | | | |

- | TEMÁTICA: (1 a 5) | |
|--|--------------------|
| FORTALEZAS | DEBILIDADES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - aaa (mencionado por las partes interesadas 1, 2 y 5) - bbb (parte interesada 3) - ccc (parte interesada 4) - etc. | |

OPORTUNIDADES

AMENAZAS

B. FORMULARIO PARA PRESENTAR INFORMACION RELEVANTE

Formulario 1: Lista de organizaciones en el país/región en el campo de prevención y reintegración de niños en conflictos armados

ACTORES / ORGANIZACIONES				
Nombre de la organización	Tipo de organización (agencia gubernamental, organización internacional, ONG, sindicato, organización de empleadores, otros)	Principal área de intervención (prevención, rehabilitación, otra)	Presupuesto anual estimado (indique el año)	Cobertura geográfica
1.				
2.				
3.				
etc....				

Formulario 2: Lista de proyectos en el país / región en el terreno de prevención y reintegración de niños en conflictos armados

Nombre del proyecto	Agencia / organización ejecutora	Presupuesto (en US\$)	Breve descripción de los objetivos y estrategia	Fecha de comienzo y fin del proyecto (mes/año)	Agencia(s) donante(s) / financiadora(s)	Cobertura Geográfica
1.						
2.						
3.						
etc....						

Formulario 3: Comparación entre el documento del programa interregional y el anexo país (a ser completado en consulta con el coordinador nacional del proyecto)

Indicar si lo afirmado en el documento de programa general y el anexo país es idéntico, similar o diferente. Si no es idéntico, por favor llena las dos ultimas columnas describiendo las diferencias del documento del programa y el anexo país.

Área	Comparación (idéntica, similar, o diferente)	Documento de Programa	Anexo País
1. Diseño y estrategia			
2. Objetivos			
3. Indicadores			
4. Grupos Meta/ Beneficiarios			
5. Modalidad de ejecución			
6. Estructura de gestión			
7. Marco institucional			
8. Estrategia de sostenibilidad			
9. Otros aspectos (especifique)			

C. CUESTIONARIOS SUGERIDOS

Cuestionario 1: Entrevista individual con beneficiario

Edad:	Sexo: M / F
Beneficiario de:	Retiro / Prevención (explique la definición)
Lugar de la entrevista/área/región (de acuerdo a la unidad administrativa):	
Lugar de nacimiento del beneficiario:	
Estado actual: desempleado / aprendiz / en la escuela / en formación vocacional / otros (especifique)	
Viviendo con: familiar directo / pariente lejano / solo / amigos / colegio / calle / hogar de recepción / Centro de tránsito / otros (especifique)	

Introducción al beneficiario: explique quién es usted y las razones de la entrevista. Mencione lo siguiente: “Estas preguntas son estrictamente confidenciales y la anonimidad será preservada. El objetivo es ayudarnos a mejorar el proyecto para asegurar que podamos asistirlo más eficazmente. Gracias por su apreciada colaboración y su tiempo.”

1. ¿Cambió el proyecto algo en tu vida? Si/No/No sé
Si cambió, ¿Qué? Si no cambió, ¿Por qué no?
2. Si hubo cambios, ¿fueron para mejor o fueron negativos?
Por favor explica:
3. ¿Que has obtenido del proyecto (incluyendo material de apoyo y/o servicios, como información, orientación, formación, etc.)? (en palabras del beneficiario):
4. ¿Sientes que el apoyo brindado por el proyecto es beneficioso para tí?: Si/No, ¿Por qué?
5. ¿Necesitas las mismas cosas hoy que al comienzo del proyecto?: Si/No/No sé – si “No” o “No sé”, ¿Cuáles son tus necesidades?
6. ¿Has participado en el diseño o preparación del proyecto?: Si/No/No sé – si lo has hecho, ¿en qué forma?
7. ¿Has participado en la ejecución del proyecto? (por ej. en alguna de las actividades) Si/No/No sé – si lo has hecho, ¿en cuáles?
8. ¿Has participado en otros proyectos? Si/No/No sé
Si lo has hecho, ¿en cuál? (menciona el título, la organización ejecutora y los beneficios recibidos)
9. ¿Sientes un cambio en la forma en que la gente te trata desde que ha comenzado el proyecto? Si/No/No sé – si hay un cambio, ¿Cuál es?
10. ¿Ha mejorado tu situación en términos de condiciones de vida y finanzas a la fecha en comparación al comienzo del proyecto? Mejor/Peor/ Similar/No lo sé– Explica en qué sentido es tu situación mejor o peor.
11. ¿Sientes que el proyecto te aporta algo útil para tu futuro profesional? Si/No/No sé – Si lo hace, ¿en qué sentido?
12. ¿Crees que el proyecto te está ayudando a asegurarte un ingreso? Si/No/No sé
13. ¿Es la vida para ti más fácil hoy que al comienzo del proyecto? Si/No/No sé
14. ¿Te ha ayudado el proyecto a mejorar tu autoestima? Si / No / No sé
15. ¿Puede mejorar el proyecto? Si / No / No sé– Si puede, ¿cómo?
16. ¿Cómo percibe tu contexto (familia, amigos, compañeros, etc.) tu participación en el proyecto? Bueno/Malo/Indiferente/No lo sé – si bueno o malo, explica cómo
17. ¿Considerarías unirte (si ha sido prevenido) o volver (en caso de retirado) a un grupo armado? Si/No/No sé – Si “sí” o “no”, ¿por qué?

Cuestionario 2: Entrevista de grupo con beneficiarios

Este cuestionario debería ser aplicado a un grupo de beneficiarios.

Número total de participantes en el grupo:

Para cada participante en la entrevista del grupo por favor complete la siguiente información:

Edad:	Sexo: M / F
Beneficiario de:	Retiro / Prevención (explique la definición)
Lugar de la entrevista/área/región (de acuerdo a la unidad administrativa):	
Lugar de nacimiento del beneficiario:	
Estado actual: desempleado / aprendiz / en la escuela / en formación vocacional / otros (especifique)	
Viviendo con: familiar directo / pariente lejano / solo / amigos / colegio / calle / hogar de recepción / Centro de tránsito / otros (especifique)	

Introducción al grupo: explique quién es usted y por qué está haciendo una entrevista grupal. Mencione lo siguiente: “Estas preguntas serán estrictamente confidenciales y vuestra anonimidad será preservada. El objetivo es ayudarnos a mejorar el proyecto y a asegurar que el mismo pueda asistirlos más efectivamente. Muchas gracias por vuestra gran colaboración y vuestro tiempo.”

Haga las siguientes preguntas y numere el número de respuestas en cada categoría, así como los ejemplos y clarificaciones proveídas por los participantes (en sus propias palabras).

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Cite comentarios y explicaciones en palabras de los participantes, incluyendo detalles de la situación de las niñas
1. ¿Ha cambiado el proyecto algo en sus vidas?	Si		
	No		
	No sé		
2. Si hubo un cambio, ¿fue para mejor, o fue negativo?	Para mejor		
	Negativo		
3. ¿Qué han obtenido del proyecto? (respuestas múltiples son aceptadas)	Material de apoyo		
	Información		
	Orientación		
	Formación		
	Otro (especifique)		
	Otro (especifique)		
4. ¿Sienten que el	Sí		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Cite comentarios y explicaciones en palabras de los participantes, incluyendo detalles de la situación de las niñas
apoyo recibido del proyecto fue útil para ustedes?	No No sé		
5. ¿Tienen las mismas necesidades que al comienzo del proyecto?	Sí No No sé		(Descripción de algunas necesidades)
6. ¿Han participado en el diseño o preparación del proyecto?	Sí No No sé		
7. ¿Han participado en la ejecución del proyecto?	Sí No No sé		
8. ¿Han participado de otro proyecto?	Sí No No sé		(Mencione título, organización ejecutora y beneficios otorgados)
9. ¿Sienten un cambio en el trato que les otorgan las personas desde que comenzó el proyecto?	Sí No No sé		
10. ¿Ha mejorado su situación en términos de condiciones de vida y finanzas desde el comienzo del proyecto?	Mejor Peor No sé		
11. ¿Sienten que el proyecto les aporta para su futuro profesional?	Sí No No sé		
12. ¿Sienten que el proyecto les ayuda a asegurar un	Sí No No sé		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Cite comentarios y explicaciones en palabras de los participantes, incluyendo detalles de la situación de las niñas
ingreso?			
13. ¿Es su vida más fácil hoy en comparación con los comienzos del proyecto?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
14. ¿Les ha ayudado el proyecto a mejorar la autoestima?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
15. ¿Puede mejorar el proyecto?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
16. ¿Que piensan a su alrededor (familia, amigos, compañeros, etc.) de su participación en el proyecto?	Bueno		
	Malo		
	Indiferente		
	No sé		
17. ¿Considerarían unirse (si han sido prevenidos) o volver (en caso de haber sido retirados) a un grupo armado?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		

Cuestionario 3: Entrevista grupal con niños que no han sido beneficiarios directos del proyecto

Este cuestionario debe ser aplicado a un grupo de niños que no han sido beneficiarios directos del proyecto. Si el grupo no puede ser establecido, es posible usar la siguiente tabla para sumar respuestas de las entrevistas individuales.

Numero total de participantes en el grupo / Numero total de no beneficiarios entrevistados:

Para cada participante en el grupo / entrevistado, por favor tome nota de la siguiente información:

Edad:	Sexo: M / F
Lugar de la entrevista/área/región (de acuerdo a la unidad administrativa):	
Lugar de nacimiento del beneficiario:	
Estado actual: desempleado / aprendiz / en la escuela / en formación vocacional / otros (especifique)	
Viviendo con: familiar directo / pariente lejano / solo / amigos / colegio / calle / hogar de recepción / Centro de tránsito / otros (especifique)	

Introducción al grupo/ o al beneficiario: explique cuáles son los principales objetivos de la evaluación. Mencione lo siguiente: “Las respuestas a estas preguntas serán estrictamente confidenciales y vuestra anonimidad será preservada. La información será sintetizada de un numero de grupos y de entrevistados en los que preguntas similares serán realizadas para extraer lecciones de forma de mejorar los servicios que se proveen a los niños que han sido parte de grupos armados.”

Haga las siguientes preguntas y enumere el número de respuestas en cada categoría, así como también los ejemplos y clarificaciones provenientes de los participantes (en sus propias palabras).

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
Introduciendo a los niños en la temática de conflictos armados			
1. ¿Es fácil para un niño pertenecer o ser reclutado por un grupo armado?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
2. ¿Son vistos en la comunidad como un problema los niños que se suman a grupos armados, o se lo ve normal en la vida cotidiana, o como algo	Problema		
	Normal		
	Positivo		
	No sé		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
positivo?			
3. Cuando un niño se suma a un grupo armado, ¿crea un ejemplo a seguir?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
4. ¿Es posible para un niño salir libremente de un grupo armado?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
5. Cuando un niño deja un grupo armado ¿crea un ejemplo a seguir por otros?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
6. ¿Quién está más inclinado a participar de un grupo armado?	Niños		
	Niñas		
	Irrelevante		
	No sé		
7. ¿Ven positivo el pertenecer a un grupo armado?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
Determinación de necesidades y apoyo proveídas fuera del proyecto IPEC, si es el caso.			
8. ¿Han recibido o están recibiendo ayuda de alguna organización (excluyendo tu familia)?	Sí		Especifique de quién, el tipo de apoyo, las fechas de inicio y fin y el objetivo de la ayuda
	No		Omita la pregunta 9
	No sé		Omita la pregunta 9
9. ¿Esta ayuda ha generado un cambio positivo en ustedes?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
10. ¿Cuáles son sus mayores necesidades a la fecha?	Dinero		
	Formación		
	Educación		
	Empleo		
	Otro		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
	(especifique)		
11. ¿Se sienten seguros para hacerse cargo de ustedes mismos en la vida civil, fuera del grupo armado?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé		
12. ¿Se sienten preparados para encontrar una fuente estable de ingreso?	Sí		
	No		Explique qué es en lo que la persona necesita prepararse
	No sé		

Cuestionario 4: Entrevista de grupo con miembros de la comunidad

Este cuestionario puede ser aplicado a un grupo de miembros de la comunidad. Si dicho grupo no puede ser formado, es posible usar la siguiente tabla y agregar las respuestas de entrevistas individuales.

Numero total de participantes en el grupo/ Numero total de personas entrevistadas:
Lugar y área/región donde se encuentra la comunidad (listar de menor a mayor las unidades administrativas):
Tipo de beneficiarios en la comunidad: en su mayoría niños prevenidos/ o mayoría de niños retirados (a ser completado en consulta con coordinador del proyecto y la agencia ejecutora)

Para cada participante en el grupo / entrevistado, por favor complete la siguiente información:

Edad: _____ Sexo: M / F _____
Perfil: Autoridad local / líder informal de comunidad / maestro/a / líder religioso / médico / otro (especifique) _____

Introducción al grupo / al entrevistado: explique quién es usted y cuál es el objetivo principal de la evaluación. Mencione lo siguiente: “Muchas gracias por vuestra apreciada colaboración y su tiempo. La información que usted provea será estrictamente confidencial y su anonimidad será preservada. La información será sintetizada con otras investigaciones similares que están siendo llevadas a cabo a fin de extraer lecciones para mejorar el actual proyecto. Gracias por su ayuda.”

Determine con el grupo o el entrevistado el tipo de comunidad:

1. Especifique qué antigüedad tiene la comunidad: (fecha de creación / reconocimiento de la comunidad, si se recuerda. Alternativamente consiga con las autoridades locales la fecha de creación de la unidad administrativa).
2. Bagaje étnico y religioso de los habitantes.
3. Numero estimado de los habitantes de la comunidad.
4. ¿Hubo movimientos importantes en la comunidad desde Octubre del 2003? Sí/No
5. Si los hubo, ¿dejaron habitantes la comunidad? Si lo hicieron, ¿como resultado de qué? ¿Llegaron personas nuevas a la comunidad? Sí/No. Si lo hicieron, ¿como resultado de qué?
6. Número aproximado de las personas que han dejado la comunidad (explique las razones de la emigración)
7. Numero aproximado de las personas que llegaron (explique las razones de la inmigración)

Haga las siguientes preguntas y tome nota del número de respuestas en cada categoría, así como ejemplos y clarificaciones provenientes de los participantes (en sus propias palabras)

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
Introducción del tema (niños/as en conflictos armados)			
1. ¿Hay conciencia de que existen niños	Sí		
	No		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
pertenecientes a grupos armados en esta comunidad?	No sé o no responde		
2. Para la comunidad, ¿es visto como un problema los niños que son reclutados por los grupos armados o es parte de la vida cotidiana?	Problema		
	Normal (rutina diaria)		
	No sé / No responde		
3. ¿Es el hecho que los niños se sumen a grupos armados, incluso los no combatientes y para servicios de ayuda, visto como un hecho positivo o negativo?	Positivo		
	Negativo		
	No sé / No responde		
4. ¿Esta situación concierne a más niños o a niñas? (indique si es posible la proporción)	Niños		
	Niñas		
	No sé / No responde		
5. ¿Deben los niños continuar perteneciendo a grupos armados?	Sí		¿Por qué?
	No		
	No sé / No responde		
Definiendo el proyecto IPEC : antes de hacer las siguientes preguntas explique brevemente los componentes del proyecto que han sido realizados en la comunidad			
6. ¿Ha cambiado el proyecto algo en la comunidad?	Sí		¿Qué?
	No		¿Por qué no?
	No sé / No responde		
7. Si hubo algún cambio, ¿fue este para mejor, o fue negativo?	Para mejor		Explique por qué
	Negativo		Explique por qué
	No sé / No responde		
8. ¿Que obtuvieron	Material de		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuesta	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
los niños beneficiarios del proyecto en la comunidad? (múltiples respuestas son aceptadas)	ayuda		
	Información		
	Orientación		
	Formación		
	Otro (especifique)		
	Otro (especifique)		
9. ¿Sienten que el proyecto está ayudando a los niños beneficiarios a obtener una fuente de ingreso?	Sí		
	No		
	No sé / No responde		
10. ¿Sienten que la ayuda proporcionada por el proyecto ayudará a los beneficiarios a encontrar una mejor fuente de ingreso en el futuro?	Mejor		
	Peor		
	No sé / No responde		
11. ¿Contribuye el proyecto a que los niños eviten el querer ser reclutados por grupo(s) armados?	Sí		
	No		Omita la pregunta 12
	No sé / No responde		Omita la pregunta 12
12. ¿Es esto algo positivo?	Sí		¿Por qué?
	No		¿Por qué?
	No sé / No responde		
13. ¿Siente que el apoyo brindado por el proyecto es de utilidad para los niños beneficiarios?	Sí		¿Por qué?
	No		¿Por qué?
	No sé / No responde		
14. ¿Fue el criterio de selección (las razones) para la selección de los	Sí		
	No		¿Por qué?
	No sé / No		

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
beneficiarios claro para la comunidad?	responde		
15. ¿Fueron los niños mas necesitados de ayuda los seleccionados como beneficiarios?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>
16. ¿Hay en la comunidad niños en situaciones similares que no hayan sido seleccionados como beneficiarios del proyecto?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>¿Por qué y cuantos?</div> <div></div> <div></div>
17. ¿Hay en la comunidad otros proyectos que también tomen como objetivo a niños involucrados en conflictos armados?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>Indique organizaciones ejecutoras, tipos de servicios /ayuda otorgada y el numero de beneficiarios de ser posible</div> <div></div> <div></div>
18. ¿Necesitan los beneficiarios las mismas cosas que necesitaban al comienzo del proyecto?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>¿Qué necesitarían hoy?</div> <div></div>
19. ¿Participó la comunidad en el diseño y preparación del proyecto?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>¿De qué forma?</div> <div></div> <div></div>
20. ¿Participó o participa la comunidad en la ejecución del proyecto (por ej. en algunas de las	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>Indique las actividades</div> <div></div> <div></div>

Pregunta	Categoría	Número de respuestas	Mencione comentarios y explicaciones de los participantes en palabras de los mismos, incluyendo especificaciones de la situación de las niñas
actividades como la campaña de información?)			
21. ¿Sienten ustedes un cambio en la forma en que la gente en la comunidad habla o trata a los niños involucrados en conflictos armados desde que comenzó el proyecto?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>¿Cuál fue el cambio?</div> <div></div> <div></div>
22. ¿Ayudó el proyecto a los beneficiarios a sentirse mejor acerca de ellos mismos?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>
23. ¿Puede el proyecto ser mejorado?	<div>Sí</div> <div>No</div> <div>No sé / No responde</div>	<div></div> <div></div> <div></div>	<div>¿Cómo?</div> <div></div> <div></div>



International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)



International
Labour
Office

IPEC Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict. An Inter-Regional Program PHILIPPINES (INT/03/P52/USA)

**An independent mid-term evaluation by a team of external
consultants**

Inter Regional Program: Africa, Colombia, Phillipines, Sri lanka

November 2005

This document has not been professionally edited.

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.


The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants³⁴. The field mission took place in March 2006. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such serve as an important contribution to learning and planning without necessarily constituting the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

Funding for this project evaluation was provided by the United States Department of Labor. This report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Department of Labor nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government.

³⁴ ***Eva Marie F. Famador***

Abbreviations

ILO	International Labour Organization
IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor
NCLC	National Child Labor Committee
DOLE	Department of Labor
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
ARMM	Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
TESDA	Technical Education and Science Development Authority
BLE	Bureau of Labor Employment
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
DOH	Department of Health
LGU	Local Government Unit
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
US	United States



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Around the world wars are increasingly fought within the borders of a single country. In these wars, unarmed civilians comprised the greater number of casualties. An equally disturbing fact is that children now have become participants in the armed conflict. The Philippines is no exception to this growing reality.
2. In 2003, the ILO-IPEC initiated a global response to prevent recruitment of child soldiers and support the reintegration in the society of children who have been members of the armed groups. The Philippines is one of the countries chosen for the proposed programme implementation. The ILO-IPEC in the Philippines chose Central Mindanao as the area focus - the location of major camps of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, one of the foremost insurgent groups in the country.
3. To ensure that children are no longer participating in armed conflict, the Philippine programme adopts a set of interventions with the following components: 1) strengthening enabling environment for ensuring that children are not affected by armed conflict, 2) prevention of children's entry into armed conflict, and 3) the reintegration of children withdrawn from and traumatized by armed conflict into the mainstream society. The Philippines carried out a national stakeholders' workshop leading to an in-country strategic plans for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
4. As part of the accountability to the donor, the United States Department of Labor, and other stakeholders, including the government agencies, social partner, and partner organizations, a mid-term evaluation was required. The evaluation aimed to elicit learnings in implementation and identify areas for improvement or adjustments.
5. At the time of evaluation, the programme had two initiatives: One was the conduct of research to improve the knowledge base for formulation of policies and action addressing the needs of children in armed conflict. The other was the Salaam action programme which provided educational assistance and employment opportunities both for children who are at-risk of getting recruited to work as soldiers and for children withdrawn from being soldiers.
6. The evaluation covered the period from February 2004 to September 2005. The study employed interviews and focused groups discussions among 94 children and youth participants and 29 program implementers, non-government organizations, and local stakeholders. The study also reviewed program documents and a number of existing reference materials on child soldier in the region.

Highlights of the Findings

7. Project design and strategies

- a) There is a high number of part-time child soldiers. Communities living in conflict zones reported 50% of children population participating as child soldiers. Those schools located farther from the camps of armed group reported 20% of children population. The minimum engagement of children is participating in military training which runs for 45 days, and children are also on call for “tours of duty.” The Saalam project does not have extensive profile of children, (i.e., part-time soldier, past or present) and a corresponding specific monitoring mechanism.
- b) Formal education tends to influence children not to join armed groups. But parental influence and living in conflict zones can push children to get involved.
- c) Opportunities to provide income-generating activities like vocational skills training were found to be attractive alternatives for the out-of-school youth from involving with the armed units.
- d) The need for the strategy of awareness-raising among children and youth, in-school and out-of-school is underscored by the rising phenomenon of part-time soldiers. There is a need for information drive on child soldiering as one of the worst forms of child labour and its negative consequences on the well-being of children. Peace education among youth is needed to help them process their experience in growing up in a war-torn environment and to expose them to non-violent means of advocating for change and resolving conflicts.

8. Project Management and Institutional Framework

- a) The focal coordinating body specific to the implementation of the inter-regional project was initially established through the Regional Council for the Welfare of Children by the DOLE-ARMM. But this was not operating for sometime.
- b) The existing inter-agency management of Salaam has yet to establish a regular planning, monitoring and assessment of the action programme. Communication among various agencies needs enhancement. Communicating about the project to other groups needs to be improved.
- c) The implementation of the project suffered delays attributed to several factors namely: recruitment of key staff took time, political instability, special election in the ARMM region, and difficulty in generating common ground for cooperation from various agencies.
- d) The Salaam action programme experience depicted the difficulties in groundworking for an inter-agency approach of responding to child soldier project. This led to the delay in the implementation of the project. Coming to an agreement among agencies required more patience, energy, and time.

9. Project Resources and Fund Management

- a) Salaam project fund was assessed to be inadequate in meeting education and training needs of beneficiaries. Some budgetary assumptions were not able to

factor in realities such as distance of residence and the educational/training center, requirements in school, and price increase.

- b) Salaam project fund releases were delayed for two reasons: 1) The members were not able to fulfill some reporting requirements and 2) were not able to prepare liquidation report before the fund is fully expended.

10. Project Results and Achievements

- a) The Salaam action programme reported initial positive outcome among beneficiaries. One major change in the beneficiaries is the value given to the educational assistance as demonstrated in their diligence in their studies. The college students, particularly, exhibited self-confidence, and were more emotionally secured. This is believed to be brought about by their distance from the environment of conflict. Those in vocational training courses have boosted self-esteem because they have become productive in the use of time and have new- found knowledge and skills. Some were excited to venture in self-employment activities. The beneficiaries have become hopeful about their future.
- b) The organization of an interagency effort is an achievement in spite of the odds that were encountered.

11. Project Sustainability

- a) There is no specific plan for sustainability formulated yet at the level of the Salaam interagency committee as well as ILO-IPEC together with NCLC.
- b) The project faces a big threat of losing the initial gains if there is no funding after this project term. The only aspect that may be sustained are the graduates of vocational training courses which may be followed up by DOLE's existing programs.

Recommendations

12. Project Design and Strategies

- a) ILO-IPEC needs to be more deliberate and purposive in weaving together of several action programmes that would integrate various strategies in the existing area of operation. It needs to sharpen its specific design that addresses the phenomenon of part-time soldiers in contrast with the full-time child soldiers.
- b) Project data management and indicators for success have to be reviewed in the light of specific design to address the part-time soldier phenomenon.
- c) To ensure success in vocational skills training that would generate income, an increase of fund allocation that would include provision of tools and start-up capital should be considered. Specific subjects on bookkeeping and marketing of products and services should be integrated in the vocational courses.
- d) In capacity building strategy, there is a need to specifically prepare the psychosocial component skills training among the service providers most especially when full-time child soldiers start to be mainstreamed. This can be done by collaborating with DSWD and UNICEF or other agencies that provide this type of training.

- e) There has to be peace education to complement the strategy of providing formal education among in-school children and youth. This will help curb the increase of part-time child soldier phenomenon. Peace education among the out-of-school youth will help them see their situation in a wider perspective with several options to take other than armed struggle.
- f) Muslim religious leaders who have become peace advocates may be tapped to support the programme activities considering that *Jihad* is one motivational factor for youth and adults to join the war. Muslim religious leaders They have participated in inter-faith dialogue, peace seminars by Grassroots Peace Learning Center and Mindanao Peace Institute based in Davao City, Mindanao.
- g) While the advocacy component is intended to operate in national scale, there has to be programmed activities that cater to the existing towns where there are Salaam beneficiaries. This would track down impact at the community level.

13. Project Management and Institutional Framework

- a) The Salaam interagency group has to establish regular meetings, formulate specific plans for the year, and assess their activities. Meetings would update member agencies on project implementation details as well as address operational issues and concerns.
- b) The revival of a focal coordinating body specific to child soldier has to be facilitated soon for collaboration and mobilization among various sectors in stopping the involvement of children in armed conflict. This body need not be limited to government organizations but also groups representing other sectors.

14. Project resources and fund management

The Salaam action programme needs to realign their unutilized fund in literacy to increase the needed fund in vocational skills training courses.

15. Project sustainability

- a) There is a need to draft specific sustainability plan before the project term ends.
- b) The ILO-IPEC has to be more aggressive in networking with other concerned groups to pursue convergence of resources.
- c) There is a need to widen the base of sources of fund for the project to be sustainable.

Introduction

I. Background of the Evaluation

16. The Philippines is one of the countries participating in the ILO-IPEC's global intervention of preventing and reintegrating children in armed conflict. This inter-regional programme was conceived after obtaining information on the causes of the use of child soldier, the mechanism for recruitment, the living conditions while in the armed groups, and the circumstances surrounding their mobilization and their perspective for reintegration.
17. The overall framework that guides each country, entitled Prevention and Reintegration of Children involved in Armed Conflict: an Inter-Regional Programme, was formulated in September 2003. The Philippines correspondingly carried out a national stakeholders' workshop leading to in-country strategic plans for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor. The first action programme of ILO-IPEC is located in Central Mindanao where major MILF camps are nestled in Muslim communities.
18. As part of the accountability to the donor, the United States Department of Labor, and other stakeholders, including the government agencies, social partner, and partner organizations, a mid-term evaluation was required. The evaluation aimed to elicit learnings in implementation and identify areas for improvement or adjustments.
19. Specifically, the over-all purposes of the evaluation are:
 - a) to review the implementation of the project in the country and consider any changes in the strategies done on the basis of emerging experiences and recommend adjustments where necessary;
 - b) to examine current proposed activities and make assessment of their potential contribution to the implementation strategy;
 - c) to review the existing institutional set-up and implementation capacity; and
 - d) to assess the existing as well as potential linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed in the target countries.

II. Evaluation Methodologies

20. Data Collection Method. The evaluation study utilized several methods in collecting data:

- a) **Document review.** Relevant documents were examined to gain a better understanding of the project. Researches, studies, and other reference materials related to child soldiers were also reviewed.
- b) **Briefing.** A briefing session with the key staff/implementors of Salaam Action programme was held as part of the preliminary activities of the study. The session served as a venue for clarifying the intentions of the evaluation as well as generating more background information about the action programme to refine some aspects of the evaluation instruments. The evaluator also asked to be briefed on the details about the processes, mechanics, issues, and problems encountered.
- c) **Interviews.** The evaluator conducted interviews with the representatives of national and regional government agencies, local stakeholders (teachers, social worker, media person, local researcher, non-government organizations), and ILO-IPEC Country Programme Coordinator.
- d) **Focused Group Discussions (FGD).** The focused group discussions with children started out with a validation of their understanding on the project. The children were also asked about the benefits received; the adequacy and usefulness of allowances; reaction of family and friends regarding the programme; changes in their personal lives; participation of children in armed conflict; and suggestions to improve the programme. Likewise, the teachers or social worker were asked about their understanding of the project, the changes that occurred in the lives of children and participation of children in armed conflict. Asking the same set of questions to local stakeholders and children on separate occasions served as a test of the consistency in their responses.

Focused group discussion was also conducted among the staff/implementers to know their perspectives on the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities of the action programme.

The table below summarizes the number of participants in the evaluation.

Table 1: Participants of the Evaluation

Municipality	Respondents		Total
	Male	Female	
Datu Piang			
▪ Elementary	4	7	11
▪ High school		5	5
▪ Non-beneficiaries	1	11	12
▪ Local stakeholders	5	1	6
Sub-Total	10	24	34
Pagalungan			
▪ Elementary	5	4	9
▪ High School	1	5	6
▪ Non-beneficiaries	7	-	7
▪ Local stakeholders	1	1	2
Sub-Total	14	10	24
Montawan			
▪ Elementary	3	2	5
▪ High School	3	4	7
▪ Graduates of skills training (baking)	-	6	6
▪ Non-beneficiaries	8	-	8
▪ Local stakeholders	1	1	2
Sub-Total	15	13	28
Cotabato City			
▪ College students	1	5	6
▪ Current trainees of skills training (Electronics)	15	1	16
▪ Local stakeholders	5	1	6
Sub-Total	21	7	28
Agency representatives			
DOLE Region 12 & ARMM	3	2	5
TESDA ARMM	2	-	2
DOLE-BLE	2	1	3
ILO-IPEC	1	2	3
NCLC		1	1
Amnesty International	1	-	1
UNICEF	1	-	1
Sub-Total	10	6	16
Sum Total	70	60	130

21. Selection of Respondents. From the list of beneficiaries in each selected town, three groups of children/youth were interviewed - those who are in elementary, high school, and college and vocational students. The evaluator provided guideline that six to eight individuals would participate in the focused group discussion to provide a more meaningful interaction with them. However, the key contacts (teachers) of each town invited all the beneficiaries. Therefore, there were more participation in the FGD.

22. For the younger children the large number in the discussion group did not affect much on the depth of interaction since the type of questions asked were more on enumerating their benefits, asking on their needs. The high number of participants that affected the quality of interaction was with the vocational skills trainees in Cotabato City. More depth of information could have been elicited if the group was smaller. The evaluator could not split the group into two due to lack of time.
23. For the non-beneficiaries, similar age groupings were represented. Some are in-school while others are out-of-school youth as well as applicants to the vocational training.
24. Constraints and biases. The study would have aimed for the coverage of seven municipalities where the action programme operates but upon consultation with the project implementers, field research for this study was conducted only in three out of seven towns in Maguindanao province, particularly Datu Piang, Datu Montawal, and Pagalungan (See map on p.iv). These sites were selected because the other towns had some recent incidence of infightings and therefore considered not safe for field work. The second consideration was that these are the more accessible areas, which are along the national highway. The field work was done within a week period.
25. Representatives from other towns were drawn in Cotabato City, the center of educational institutions and training centers in the province, where the beneficiary-students are residing while studying. However, during the evaluation, most college students were undertaking examinations, hence, a smaller number of participants participated in the focused group discussions.
26. The evaluator utilized focused group discussions more among children rather than the interviews because of two considerations. One was that Filipino children, most especially in rural areas, are painfully shy. They are not comfortable to be interviewed individually. The evaluator would gather less information compared to group interviews. Second, part of the inquiry was about the children in armed conflict rendering the situation delicate. Conducting individual interview among children and youth would make them feel isolated, more fearful, and suspicious. This was proven right during the inquiry where some youth started to clam up or show a hard facial expression when the question on armed conflict was raised.
27. During the group discussion with children beneficiaries, no adults or authority figures were present except in Datu Piang when an adult, went around the group encouraged the young children to speak up but did not stay with the group. This did not materially affect the result, girl children still hardly spoke. It took along time for the evaluator and the translator to elicit response from children.

Evaluation Findings

28. The “Inter-Regional Programme on the Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict” Country Annex sets the following objectives
- Development Objective To contribute to the elimination of the worst forms of child labour through the reduction of children’s entry and participation in armed conflict in the Philippines
- Immediate objective 1 At the end of the program, partners capacities to ensure that children will not be recruited in the armed conflict will have been strengthened.
- Immediate objective 2 At the end of the program, the entry of children into armed conflict will have been prevented.
- Immediate objective 3 At the end of the program, children withdrawn from and traumatized by armed conflict will have been reintegrated into the mainstream of society.
29. At the time of the evaluation, most components of the programme were not yet implemented except three. (Please refer to Table 3). One component is the conduct of research on children in armed conflict which was on going but not yet completed as of September 2005. The other two components are operating under the Salaam action programme - the provision of educational opportunities for children at risk of getting recruited to work as child soldiers and the provision of livelihood opportunities for older children. Most of the findings, therefore, relate to the Salaam activities, though, not necessarily confined to this action programme.

Project Design and Strategies

30. CONTEXT. Mindanao is the second largest island and is located in the southern part of the Philippine archipelago. For many decades, Mindanao has been characterized as an underdeveloped economy. The roots of its underdevelopment can be attributed to four factors 1) its relegation to the role of supplier of raw materials and food for the country 2) neglect of infrastructure needs, 3) the previous bias against agriculture in favor of industry and 4) the peace and order problem.
31. The interplay of these factors resulted in vicious cycle of underdevelopment. The lack of employment and economic opportunities led to declining income. The extreme limited demand resulted in less jobs and greater poverty. High unemployment and poverty incidence fuelled political unrest. The political

instability further discouraged investments that create economic opportunities and jobs for the people in Mindanao. Only in 1990's that strategic interventions from government broke this vicious cycle.

32. Among the profusion of ethnic groups in Mindanao, only the Moro saw the need to assert themselves as Bangsamoro (the Moro nation) as distinct from Filipino nation. The conflict in Mindanao has its roots in centuries-old claim for territory and sovereignty. The conflict has grown complex and multi-faceted as Moro saw themselves as victims of economic dispossession, political insubordination and religious discrimination. The global Islamic resurgence, that gives the Muslims a renewed sense of community and direction, further pushed them left to self-rule. Since the Moro rebellion broke out in the 70's, several Mindanao provinces have never known sustained peace.
33. RELEVANCE. The relevance of the project objectives hinges on the characteristics of target group – the children. The design of the Inter-Regional Project identified two types of children: 1) those who are engaged in soldiering activities and 2) those who are at-risk. Those who have become child soldiers, the basic aim is to demobilize or to withdraw them from participating in armed conflict. On the other hand, children who are at risk should be prevented from joining the armed group.
34. The focused group discussions with children and local stakeholders reveal some characteristics that need consideration for sharpening the strategies of the action programme in the Philippines. Although this profile of children comes from the actual beneficiaries of Salaam action programme in selected towns, this information is consistent with the findings of Rapid Appraisal Assessment of Cagoco-Guam.
35. a) Living in conflict zones. There are children and youth beneficiaries who actually reside in the campsite of the armed group. Such location makes them not only at risk of losing life and security but also make them vulnerable to participation in armed conflict in various forms. In situation when the infightings between government troops and the rebel groups in the campsite, girl-children become indirectly involved while the boy-children will be engaged in foot patrol or carrying arms. In Montawan, some students shared that they had no choice but be part of it because they are practically residing in the area where the armed group is based. The girls usually evacuate or sometimes carry supply, prepare food, or act as paramedics.
36. Schools located in or within the vicinity of these areas report a higher number of children participation in armed group. Fifty percent (50%) of students are said to be not attending class and nowhere to be found when a conflict breaks out or when a 45-day military training is scheduled. Schools located far from camps have at least 20% of students participating in conflict. This information was estimated by the youth beneficiaries (high school and college) during the focused group discussions. They claim that they do not see half of the number of their classmates (the average

size of a class 35 students) when there is incidence of conflict or when there is military training.

37. b) "Part-time Soldiers." Part-time soldiers means children who joined the armed groups do not necessarily stop going to school, unless they are asked to go on "tours of duty" that last anywhere between 10 to 90 days. The tour of duty may mean taking part in activities such as foot patrol, guard or medical team duties, act as spies, and doing chores such as preparing food and carrying supplies. These activities are usually undertaken during times of armed conflict with government forces. When the incidence of conflict quiets down, the children can go back to their daily normal activities such as going to school.
38. Those who have participated in tours of duty, as related by some youth beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, did not receive any form of payment for such services. They said they can stop their involvement without going through stringent procedures. They just inform the leaders of their decision. They are not forced to join or stay with the armed group.
39. Another occasion for "part-time soldiering" is the military training where interested children are called to participate and consequently disrupts their education. This training lasts for weeks. From the MILF perspective, children have to undergo military training and defend themselves in times when the government forces attack their camps. This is deemed most needed in cases where the MILF camps are nestled in Muslim communities. Other children participate in the training because of parental influence or sympathetic to the cause of MILF.
40. According to a story of a high school teacher in Datu Piang, they received a letter from the MILF commander requesting to give consideration to the students' absences. When the students come back from training or fighting, the teachers give special quizzes so the students will not drop out of school. In this sense, children are integrated in usual community activities except during MILF military training or in times of conflict. The children's participation in military training and being on "tour of duty" is common across Datu Piang, Montawan, and Pagalangan. A resident in Cotabato City also affirmed that this phenomenon of "part-time soldier" holds true among students based in the said city.
41. c) Influenced by parents. Youth and adult respondents considered parental influence as a critical factor why children participate in armed conflict. Suffering from poverty, parents join the armed group. With parents being a member of MILF or sympathetic to the armed group, children's participation becomes a natural order of things. But when parents prohibit their children to join the armed group, the children simply obey. In the word of the respondents, "*depende na lang sa mga magulang*" (It all depends on the parents).

42. Given the above-mentioned characteristics of children in armed conflict, the concepts of “*withdrawn*,” “*reintegration*” and “*mainstream*” as desired change of the project is hereby challenged. To a certain extent, the children are actually integrated in community life – living with family and being in school. It is not an absolute case of staying full-time in the camp that they are deprived of education. In fact, there were a few male respondents who thought that going to school and participating in armed group activities could go together. Making the enrollment to a school therefore as an indicator of the project does not guarantee that the child or youth has actually withdrawn from the armed conflict unless they are enrolled far from the vicinity of conflict areas (i.e. Cotabato City, other cities outside the ARMM region). The distance may not guarantee a full withdrawal but this will lessen their vulnerability to join the armed group. This was expressed by college students and vocational skills trainees who were happy in the city studying and learning not only because of the opportunity to learn but also they are far from areas of conflict “*Malayo sa gulo.*”
43. In the case of child soldiers wanting to stop their involvement but with parents who are members of the armed group, reintegration or returning to parents becomes an inappropriate intervention. In the same manner, those living in the vicinity of the campsite of the armed group, if not members of MILF, may have to choose to resettle in safe areas, a move which some families of beneficiaries did. Or, explore the possibility of pursuing that their community be declared as a “peace zone area.”
44. Appropriate project strategies can be designed that are in consonant to major characteristics of children in a given area. Below is an assessment of the initial strategies implemented.

STRATEGIES

45. a) Education – The relevance of this strategy is validated by the experiences of the Salaam Action Programme. As some youth articulated, “*Walang mapala sa giyera*” (There’s nothing to benefit from war.). Even the very young children expressed they do not want to join the war. Many were saying, “*Mag-aral na lang po kami kaysa sumama sa giyera. Nakakatakot po ang giyera*” (We would rather study than join the war. War is scary).
46. The significance of the statement of children reflects on their lack of opportunity of to go to school due to poverty. In the ARMM region, for every 100 children who start elementary school only 34 are able to finish. People in the community see education as a way out of poverty that grips the region. Children beneficiaries, elementary to college, see education as a path to a better future. Based on the interview with Cagoco-Guam, the baseline study is currently attempting to probe on the interest of child soldiers in the military camp to pursue studies.

47. The poverty situation is one factor which fuels political unrest in the region. Those who have not gone to school and hence unproductive are more vulnerable to recruitment to join the armed group. Studies have shown that children who have become child soldiers come from impoverished and marginalized rural communities.
48. The value of Salaam education project, therefore, is one way of preventing children from participating in the armed struggle. The teachers in the local areas have witnessed children one batch after another, in-school and have gone out-of-school. One high school teacher who observed his students, he saw that those students doing well in class are the ones who do not want to join the armed group. Sometimes they themselves advised their classmates not to join the war.
49. In a focused group discussion, one head teacher underscores the relevance of education vis-a-vis participation in armed conflict. He shared his experience that being a college graduate made him open-minded and learned to weigh options from a wider perspective. He learned to critically think before making a decision such as joining the armed group. The less educated, he claimed, tend to resort to armed group or violence when they become victim of oppression or experience any negative incidence in their lives.
50. In Montawan, the local social development worker estimated that 50% of those who participated in the armed group did it for lack of alternative. She is convinced that educational assistance is a very attractive alternative for these young people.
51. b) **Livelihood/Income-generating Activities** – The Salaam Action programme offers vocational-technical training which could lead to microenterprise development and creation of opportunities for livelihood and income generation. This has been offered to young people ages 15 to 21 years old.
52. Interviews with teachers in the three towns revealed that the male out-of-school youth are the most vulnerable to recruitment as soldiers. Given their poverty situation and lack of meaningful activities to get involved in, soldiering becomes a natural course to take. The vocational skills training become a positive alternative for these youth. Enrolling in vocational courses give them hope that they can do something productive in their lives.
53. The Salaam action programme only allocated P1,800/beneficiary enough to shoulder food and accommodation. But there was no allocation for acquisition of tools. The regional programme implementors commented that lack of tools would prevent beneficiaries to practice what they learned after the training. For those who would venture into self-employment, the lack of tools is not the only concern but also the lack of capital to start their own business. These two elements are necessary to ensure that the graduates would have gainful and productive endeavor after the training. Also, bookkeeping and marketing of product or services are not taught but are necessary for those who would prefer self-employment.

54. c) **Literacy** – The original design of Salaam Action Programme included literacy as a project component. This aimed to prepare the intended beneficiaries to be mainstreamed into formal education or other alternative learning scheme. The local implementers, however, did not carry out the literacy component because all beneficiaries can read and write. If their education is disrupted by the conflict, they usually enroll right away when normalcy is regained. Literacy was not an issue among the children beneficiaries also because they performed well in school but had to stop due to war or due to poverty.
55. d) **Counseling/Psychosocial Services** – This project component was part of the original design of Salaam action programme intended primarily for demobilized children. Crisis counseling would relate to recent tragedies. Developmental counseling provides focused and positive approach to help the children gain self-confidence. Therapeutic counseling is part of the healing process of children and youth.
56. These counseling sessions, however, were not adopted. The local implementers think that these services only apply for traumatized victims in the evacuation centers and would be conducted by DOH and DSWD. Their project beneficiaries mainly come from communities affected by armed conflict. Besides, the design of the project endorses the DepEd and CHED-ARMM to implement these activities which may not be feasible or may be burdensome on the part of the teachers.
57. But during the focused group discussions among younger children they articulated their fear of war. The young and old alike experienced evacuating and fleeing for their lives. A few beneficiaries lost a parent. These children have not gone to any counseling or processing to help them understand more on what they have gone through.
58. e) **Awareness-raising and Advocacy**– The need for awareness-raising as a strategy is validated by several factors. First, the conflict situation in Mindanao is quite complex. Cultural prejudice, religious discrimination and experiences of injustices influence individuals to participate in the armed conflict. With such kind of motivations, the sponsorship of formal education as a strategy is not fully sufficient in preventing involvement in armed group.
59. The Salaam action programme design only provides formal education but does not provide venue for discussion on understanding on the causes and effects of conflict in Mindanao and advocating for peaceful resolution to conflict over armed struggle. Salaam action programme does not shed light on the rights of the child, the issue of child labor, specifically the problems and negative consequences of children's involvement in armed group. Without this component, the action programme may be successful in producing graduates and yet remain ignorant on the rights of children and issues of child soldier.

60. Second, in the group discussions with the youth beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, some participants admitted that it is possible to go to school and join in the armed group at the same time. The phenomenon of child soldier means awareness-raising is very much needed. At this point, awareness-raising component, though a part of the project design, is not yet implemented in the child soldier project
61. Third, the participation of children and youth in armed group is fairly known to the community. Interviews with stakeholders and group discussions with the youth disclosed that parents exercise influence over their children to participate or not in the armed group. Usually, when parents are members of the armed group, the children become automatically involved. This situation confirms the need to raise the awareness of parents and youth in the communities about the issues and problems of child soldiers.
62. Fourth, based on the Rapid Appraisal Assessment of Cagoco-Guam, there is no formal path to recruitment in being a soldier. During the focused group discussions, the youth confirmed that there is no stringent process in joining and quitting the armed group. Since they are volunteers, they are still free to decide to leave. As much as this is still a loose process, there is still a chance for awareness-raising as a strategy to effectively persuade and prevent the increase of child soldiers.
63. Fifth, it can be noted that at this early stage of the implementation, the local government's participation in the action programme is minimal, which is, the identification of potential beneficiaries. With intensive awareness-raising and advocacy, the role of local government units may be expanded like giving counterpart fund to support the vocational skills training, formulating resolutions or measures to solve child soldier issue and to lessen the effects of war.
64. Sixth, study of Cagoco-Guam revealed that *Jihad*, a call for religious war, is one motivational factor for youth and adults to join the armed group. But there are Muslim religious leaders who are peace advocates. They have participated in inter-faith dialogue, peace seminars by Grassroots Peace Learning Center and Mindanao Peace Institute based in Davao City, Mindanao. They are potential resource in awareness-raising and advocacy against child soldiers.
65. In this context, pursuing an awareness-raising campaign will be a challenging thing to do. The awareness-raising means covering addressing various groups with different slant of messages. Awareness-raising for parents and communities would appeal on the heart for their children's welfare and that they should not be deprived of education and expose them of danger. Awareness-raising among local government units will give emphasis on the legal framework and commitment of the national government to the international laws.

66. f) **Capacity-building** - The design of the Inter-Regional Project in building capacities of partners emphasizes on the role of information and education as a stepping stone toward appropriate action programme design, harmonizing legal framework, formulation of advocacy materials, and mobilization. The child soldier project aims to reach national and local authorities, employers, workers, media, parents, children, communities, Muslim and other religious leaders.
67. This is a component of the project that has not yet been undertaken except for the commissioned research. At the time of evaluation, three proposals for action programme were submitted to ILO-IPEC Manila for fund support and about to be deliberated. The two proposals focused on advocacy with one proponent focusing on media campaign for communities and the general public. The other proponent focused on policy advocacy. The third proposal pertains to the provision of vocational-skills training to prevent as well as mainstream youth who would cease their involvement in the armed groups.
68. So far, there is no action programme proposal that consolidates the capacity building of partners in the aspect of counseling and other psychosocial services. This project strategy is very critical especially when it aimed to reach 200 children to withdraw from the armed groups and 50 to prevent children from participating in armed conflict. If the 200 would refer to child combatants and not just the part-time soldiers, these individuals would have undergone indoctrination and hence would need much processing about their experiences and immediate goals in life. Since they would undergo a phase of transition in life, implementers need to be equipped to provide such services.
69. **FEASIBILITY.** The sequence of project activities is found to be theoretically logical but less realistic given the time frame of three years. There were factors that were not considered in planning the activities but were and, still are, pivotal to the implementation.
70. First is the peace and order situation of the area which slows down if not threaten the very existence of the project. Every time there is incidence of conflict in an area, the field staff cannot simply visit for monitoring. Project activities have to be rescheduled, hence cause the delay. Future action programmes can learn from this by giving allowance in the aspect of setting time frame for the activities.
71. Second, the institutional framework requires coordination between national agencies, regional and down to the local government level. Given the bureaucratic nature of government, it has taken longer time to coordinate with various offices.
72. Third, the topography of project sites has effects on the beneficiaries. Maguindanao, specifically, is traversed by rivers. The beneficiaries have to travel far. College students and vocational trainees come from different towns while the colleges and universities and training centers are in Cotabato City. Those who live far spend their

allowance more on transportation instead of school needs. If they could not find any other sources to meet their school needs, it poses a threat to continuity and quality of their education.

73. Fourth, the ARMM region has been perceived by some government, non-government organizations and funding agencies to have problems with transparency and accountability in governance. Donor agencies and even national agencies have reservation of simply giving fund for programs in the fear of ending up with ghost projects. This general perception was partly reflected between DOLE national and regional offices which became the tension point in deciding about the fund conduit. BLE detailed an officer to provide guidance and ensure smooth implementation of the activities. Furthermore, it is not a common undertaking for regional offices to work together in a project in ARMM. But the current collaboration between DOLE, TESDA, DepED and local government units through Salaam action programme proved the feasibility of an inter-agency effort. Programme implementers claimed extreme difficulty of starting a meaningful action through collaboration in the region.
74. Fifth, since the project is a new initiative, it means that implementers have to grapple with understanding of the local culture, social context of communities, communicating with leaders of armed groups and government, and identifying stakeholders and possible key players. Being a new initiative, capacity building takes more time. It does not simply happen in one or two learning moments. Moreover, given the nature of bureaucratic processes and the time needed to find a partner organization and deliberating and agreeing over the design of project will consume much time and delay the implementation. The objectives of the project could not be reached in three years.
75. Sixth, the Salaam action programme sponsored children in their primary and secondary education and yet the project duration is only three years. No meaningful result will be seen if the children and youth stop going to school after project term. In a three-year time frame, the project could have achieved meaningful achievements if they have given priority to sponsorship of college students who are in their sophomore, junior or senior years and sponsorship for vocational training,
76. YOUTH PARTICIPATION. Children and youth were not given the opportunity to participate in the design stage of the project. The most that was done was conducting interviews with children to understand their needs and situation.

Project Management and Institutional Framework

77. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE. The comprehensive programme for preventing and reintegrating children in armed conflict adopts a collaborative approach among various agencies. Collaboration was put to test through the Salaam action

programme. The Salaam programme was spearheaded by the DOLE national office and the promotion to the regional level turned out to be full of difficulties. Coming into agreement on the scope of responsibilities and the conduit of fund tested the DOLE national agency and the ILO-IPEC to negotiate and facilitate the organization of interagency team. Getting the signatures of heads of regional agencies took months. But this eventually pulled through.

78. Over time, the field staff of TESDA, DepEd, and DOLE claimed that they learned to trust other. They coordinated the activities. Each agency is fulfilling its commitment to the project. They have learned to work as a team, sharing common norms and goals for the project. Cognizant of the one-man staff of DOLE ARMM, the new regional director of DOLE Region 12 articulated her willingness to commit her staff to help DOLE ARMM implement the Salaam programme.
79. The regional offices take pride in their committed staff and management. The young staff are aggressive and have been working long hours. TESDA and DOLE have supportive regional directors that direct the Salaam Project in fulfilling its goals. The field staff expressed their appreciation to the presence and support of the Country Programme Coordinator who provided technical input.
80. Through the Salaam action programme, a networking relationship between the regional offices and local government units and concerned barangays is established. The regional offices shared with the LGUs about the issue of child soldier and the initiatives to be undertaken. In turn, the selected LGUs promoted the project in their communities and helped in identifying prospective beneficiaries. The LGUs through their social worker or other staff helped in monitoring the children beneficiaries. But beyond these efforts, the interagency committee has yet to generate more participation from the LGUs in addressing the issue of child soldier.
81. As a young interagency committee, they recognized the need to meet regularly for planning, monitoring, and internal evaluation. An idea of institutionalizing the inter-agency effort is a direction they hope to work on. They conceded that they have to strengthen the convergence.
82. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. At a wider scale, ILO-IPEC has yet to facilitate for the revival of an interagency collaboration with existing players in the field of soldiers. The DOLE-ARMM was able to establish the Regional Council for Welfare of Children, an inter-agency structure responding to the plight of children. But this structure was not operating for some time. Initially, the Country Programme Coordinator thought of organizing executive committee but retracted due to a learning from UNDP which the said agency adopted the executive committee concept but gathering representatives from various agencies to make decisions slowed down their project.

83. At the national level, the Philippine component of the “Inter-Regional Programme on the Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict” was presented during the Stakeholder Consultation and Planning Workshop for the Philippine Time Bound Programme. In doing this, the issue of child soldier was recognized as one of the priority sectors of worst form of child labor. The overall strategic framework of the Philippine Time Bound Programme now includes the strategic goal of ensuring that children are no longer affected by armed conflict.
84. At the program level, there are prospects for ILO-IPEC to work with. Various agencies are responding to the child soldier issue such as Amnesty International-Pilipinas Section, Balay Integrated Rehabilitation Center for Total Human Development, Foundation, Philippine Human Rights Information Center, UP CIDS Psychosocial Trauma and Human Rights Program. These agencies are part of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Children as Soldiers.
85. Other agencies respond more on the plight of children caught in armed conflict, not specific to child soldiers, like UNICEF and Save the Children. Save the Children provides relief services for children during emergency situation. UNICEF provided training for caregivers from non-government organizations on basic psychosocial help to children in situations of armed conflict and sponsored research project on Children Caught in Armed Conflict.
86. The United Nation Country Team created a mechanism called Conflict Prevention and Peace Building which is intended to coordinate similar efforts related to child soldiers. Unfortunately, as revealed in an interview with a UNICEF representative, the mechanism is not functioning that well and that they have yet to pursue coordination with other organizations.
87. With the above-mentioned players, the Country Program Coordinator has not yet actively pursued towards establishing networking relationship with organizations concerned with child soldiers. So far, a contact was made with Save the Children but no exploratory meeting was pursued yet.
88. If networking will be intensively pursued, opportunities to converge resources – fund, personnel, expertise – can go a long way to address the issue of child soldier. Experiences of others can help enrich prospective action programmes and cut short the learning loop. Another advantage of working together, each agency can adopt approaches (demobilization, prevention, withdrawal, rehabilitation) according to their strength. The idea of pursuing peace zones may be facilitated by an inter-agency effort. However, to pursue networking means more meetings to come up with agreements, parameters and mechanism which may slow down the implementation of the project. If ILO-IPEC chooses to operate without the involvement of UN agencies, it has to give focus on specific and limited geographic area and provide support for a long term in order to produce impact.

COMMUNICATION

89. Inter-office Communication. Efforts are made to foster communication between the national and regional offices. On the part of the DOLE Bureau of Labor Employment, though the Salaam action programme is an add-on to their regular load, the new director deployed, for a certain duration, one of its staff to be based in ARMM region to facilitate coordination between the regional and national office. Between the national and the field office, consultation on the specific project strategies and budget formulation was not fully made which affected the execution of the activities.
90. Across agencies, they still need to work on their communication lines. They need to level off in articulating their expectations on project details. This was experienced in communicating a point of criteria and selection process for TESDA's training courses. Miscommunication who will assess the trainees in the electronic course led to the accommodation of non-high school graduates. The instructor had to make extra effort in teaching Math to these non-high school graduates.
91. Also, updating the agencies on some development and progress of the project is an area that should be worked on. When the field staff submit report not in line with the requirement of the national office and ILO-IPEC means that the report have to be rewritten. This means delay of fund release.
92. Communication about the project. Group discussions with the beneficiaries indicate that their understanding of the Salaam action programme is mainly scholarship for the needy children. Only few saw it as educational assistance for those affected by armed conflict. They have not linked the issue of peace and that the education project intended to prevent child participation in armed conflict. Yet, in spite of this lack of explanation children are actually prevented from joining the armed group. Providing educational sponsorship addresses one cause of joining armed group which is poverty.
93. The advantage of not being explicit in communicating about education as a strategy of preventing child soldier is giving protection to the local implementers to the possible reaction of MILF in the decreasing number of their members or manpower. The disadvantage of this lack of information is to regard the project as mere educational project without deep appreciation on the problem and issues of child soldier.
94. Furthermore, interviews with some teachers reveal that they had difficulty explaining to the community about the basis for selection. Community people usually ask why their children could not be part of it and why only educational assistance is available. There is no brochure about the project that would indicate

its purpose, the criteria, the process of selecting the beneficiaries, and the benefits or allowances. The staff only verbally explained the project to the local government units and beneficiaries. Apparently, this approach gives much space for misunderstanding or miscommunication in relaying the information in the community.

95. **SELECTION CRITERIA AND PROCESS.** In selecting the Salaam beneficiaries, the following criteria was established: a) beneficiaries should be within the age range of 9 to 24 years old, 2) the youth must be considered out-of-school at the time of application, 3) the applicant should be resident of war-affected area, and 4) the family could not afford school education.

Table 2 –Profile of beneficiaries, according to Age

Age Category	Number	Percent
7- 10	6	5%
11 – 14	56	47%
15 - 18	30	25%
19 - 21	22	19%
Not indicated	5	4%
Total	119	100%

96. It can be noted that there are youth beneficiaries who are above 18 years old. These are youth who are in their junior and senior years in college. Many beneficiaries are older than their classmates since their schooling was interrupted either because of poverty or conflict situation.
97. This was generally observed except in Datu Piang where the teachers did not pick up out-of-school youth. They picked up those who are indigent, good academic standing, and are currently enrolled.
98. Focused group discussions with beneficiaries of vocational skills training revealed two things which have implication on the selection process. Those who attended the baking course enrolled because of interest in baking but only one out of the eight FGD participants expressed interest in pursuing it for business purposes. Furthermore, non-beneficiaries expressed their interest in one course but are persuaded to enroll in another since the quota of preferred course was already filled up. This may be part of the explanation when the electronics instructor observed that around 40% demonstrated lack of interest in the course which had bearing on their performance.
99. The delays in the drafting and signing of the MOA led to a major constraint on the screening process. On the vocational courses, the training needs assessment was not put to use because TESDA depended much on its partner organization, DOLE, to conduct the screening. In this aspect, they have not communicated to each other their specific criteria.
100. The project staff also needs to review the criteria for selection particularly in the electronics course. The standard criteria of TESDA require – a) a high school graduate, b) interest of the trainee, and c) if possible, should be tested if using prohibited drugs. Some applicants were not high school graduates which resulted to their difficulty in understanding the course. Considering the lack of access to education of beneficiaries, the project may have to offer remedial course before sending the trainees to the course or they simply get high school graduates.
101. Moreover, skills training applicants tend to imitate or gravitate toward a popular course. When such popular course is filled up, the staff tried to make the applicants

see other course offerings which the applicants may consider. There is a tendency for applicants taking up course which was not their primary interest. The staff doing the screening had to probe deeper on the interests of the trainees.

102. At the country-level project, the selection of proponents for the action programme which will implement other components of the project is mainly based on their track record of competence and experience in a specific field.
103. **EFFICIENCY.** The child soldier project suffered delay due to several factors. (See Table 2) First, the child soldier project did not start as planned because the process of recruitment took time. Finding difficulty in looking for a qualified person, ILO-IPEC was able to hire the Programme Country Coordinator only in the middle of 2004. Also, the consultant to be contracted for research and baseline study was not available at the preferred schedule of the action programme. The research and baseline only started in July 2005, an output critical to the design of other action programmes, the media campaign and policy advocacy. Furthermore, identifying, selecting qualified, prospective action programme implementers and firming up of design of action programme is a long process from the level of Country Programme Coordinator then to the ILO-IPEC office.
104. Second, political instability characterized by infighting in some areas of the ARMM also contributed to the slow implementation.
105. Third, given the special election in the ARMM region last September 2005, ILO-IPEC had to wait for the new set of political leaders before embarking on a regional inter-agency collaboration. However, networking with agencies whose base is in Metro Manila could have been pursued while preparation for the special election was going on. Ground working with various agencies could have been done which would pave way for collaborative effort after the special election.
106. Given such pace, the immediate objectives as indicated in Table 2 could not all be attained in the remaining project term. Specifically, the immediate objective of strengthening capacities of partners will be delayed. More stakeholders and partners are yet to be identified. So far, only government agencies are involved through the salaam action programme. Intensive awareness-raising has to be conducted before active participation has to occur. Specific capacity building activities have to be designed and implemented before stakeholders take action.
107. One action programme that may be implemented during the remainder of project term will be the provision of vocational skills training by TESDA. Consequently, not all of project funds for the period will be utilized.

Table 3 Status of Implementation

Immediate Objectives	Status of Implementation As of September 2005
<p><i>Immediate objective 1- At the end of the program, partner capacities to ensure that children will not be recruited in the armed conflict will have been strengthened.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. research available for use in designing targeted interventions b. different sectors manifest strong support and active participation to programme activities c. existing legal framework are reviewed and harmonized d. improved local capacity to plan, develop and participate in taking action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. research on going b. government agencies involved in Salaam project c. no initiatives yet. Proposed action programme still being deliberated d. no initiatives yet.
<p><u><i>Immediate objective 2- At the end of the program, the entry of children into armed conflict will have been prevented</i></u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Communities exposed to conflict identified and oriented on the issue of children in armed conflict</u> b. <u>provide educational opportunities for children at risk of getting recruited to work as soldiers</u> c. <u>provide employment/livelihood opportunities for older children and their families</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. some communities identified, given educational opportunities but not oriented on the issue of children in armed conflict b. 120 children provided educational assistance (Salaam action programme) c. 64 youth for vocational training (Salaam programme)
<p><u><i>Immediate objective 3- At the end of the program, the children withdrawn from and traumatized by armed conflict will have been reintegrated into the mainstream of society.</i></u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>children working as soldiers located and identified</u> b. <u>children provided with education services and employment opportunities to facilitate their reintegration into the mainstream of society</u> c. <u>families of children engaged in armed conflict provided with livelihood and income-generating opportunities</u> d. <u>rescued children monitored and provided with appropriate rehabilitation services</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. partially done, through the research b. no initiatives yet c. no initiatives yet d. no initiatives yet

108. In the case of Salaam action programme, it was conceptualized as early as February 2004 and the proposal was submitted to ILO-IPEC in June 2004. But the drafting of the agreement took time since it had to be revised from the national level then at the ILO-IPEC. Though approved by ILO-IPEC in December 2004, the implementation started only after the agreement was signed in May 2005.

109. The first fund release was in January 2005 with the aim of launching the project and signing of the agreement on February 2005. But this did not materialize because the draft of the agreement had to be passed around to each concerned agency for approval and signing. Given the process, the agreement was signed by the ARMM Governor and the Secretary of DOLE in May 2005. Barely a month away from the

start of the school year, the Salaam action programme staff rushed for the enrollment of the beneficiaries.

110. The baseline survey for salaam action programme was not conducted, partly due to upcoming school enrollment and partly due to relying on previous information during the Salaam phase one action programme. Although the enrollees were a bit late, the schools nevertheless admitted them. However, in not doing a baseline of all beneficiaries, the project has no record identifying which beneficiaries previously engaged in part-time soldiering. In the focused group discussions, older beneficiaries and prospective beneficiaries mentioned that some of them have to a certain extent had experienced soldiering activities. Not explicitly identifying these beneficiaries hinders tracking whether they have reverted back or totally stopped child soldiering.
111. On the part of the voc-tech, the training needs assessment was not conducted. Usually, TESDA conduct a rapid community assessment to determine the priority skills training, available local materials, demand of the course in the area, and the infrastructure. The project implementers were in a hurry, trying to meet targets defined in specific period of time. This resulted to TESDA's experience of handling trainees who are not fully interested with the course.

Project Resources and Fund Management

112. 112. FUND RELEASE. The project encountered delay in the release of fund. One factor that contributed to the delay was the report submitted from the field did not follow the ILO-IPEC format. So this had to be revised. Implementers submitted financial report only when the fund for the period was fully exhausted. Hence, there is a long waiting time for the release of fund. This affected the release of educational assistance to children and youth. Some college students claimed that the delay caused stress in fulfilling school requirements and not eating meals. (i.e., payment before taking exam, purchase). The negative repercussion was averted by TESDA's willingness to shoulder the initial project costs of the vocational-technical component. Some colleges were also willing to accept the promissory note from DOLE for the college students to be allowed to take exams.
113. PROJECT FUND. The direct educational services provided by Salaam action program vary according to levels. Each child in elementary and high school received monthly allowance worth P500.00/month for tuition fees and P500/year for book allowances. Those in college received P2,000 a month and a book allowance of P500/sem. The education fund is released through the schools.

114. In the case of college students, there were more requirements such as special projects, thesis requirements, photocopying of manual, and transportation costs. Since the colleges/universities are in Cotabato City while they come from the different towns of Maguindanao province, the allowances for these students and trainees were used for food and transportation. This could have been avoided if there was consultation with local implementers during the writing of the proposal, particularly in the budget preparation.
115. Most of the elementary pupils used the allowance for school supplies, uniform, shoes/slippers. A few of them use their allowance to buy clothes/food for other sibling. Though they say the allowance was sufficient, later they express that there are other expenses/needs unmet. The book allowance was used to meet other school needs instead of buying books. Those living far from schools, transportation took much of their allowance.
116. Focused group discussions with beneficiaries revealed that the fund was not adequate to meet their educational needs. This is most particularly true in college students and voc-tech trainees.
117. For the vocational skills training, the budget was only P 1,800 per trainee. TESDA provided counterpart by shouldering the lodging and providing the cost of trainer. Even this allocation, it was not enough since the beneficiaries come from remote barangays and had to cross rivers, making the transportation cost high.
118. Besides, the Salaam project proposal was drafted in May 2004 so by the time implementation came, the prices increased due to the oil price hike. Hence, the project fund allocation was not adequate. There were no estimates for budget shortfalls. An estimate for contingencies or unexpected expenses could have been made.

Project Results and Achievements

119. Targets vs. Actual. The Salaam action programme targeted 300 children beneficiaries from the depressed barangays of seven towns of Maguindanao province. All these beneficiaries are classified as “prevented.” The actual profile of beneficiaries, as of Sept. 2005, is indicated in the table below.

Table 4 Profile of Beneficiaries, according to educational level

Education level	Target	Actual
Elementary	50	50
High school	50	50
College	20	20
Vocational training		
▪ Baking		23
▪ Electronics		22

▪ Food processing (yet to be implemented)	180	19
▪ Courses yet to be identified		-
Total	300	184

120. Changes among the beneficiaries. When the children were asked about any change in their life because of the Salaam action programme, they all chorused “*Masaya po kami*” (We are happy). Offhand, this seemed a very casual statement. But probing into the response shed light about their plight- living in poverty, there are no educational assistance existing in the area. Having someone sponsored their education meant not to worry anymore where to get money for educational needs. It means they just have to focus on doing well in their studies.
121. Even the parents are said to be happy about the opportunity. The children said their parents encouraged them to study hard because it is a rare opportunity. They should value it by studying very hard. All children claimed that they studied doubly hard so as to maintain the scholarship. These claims were attested by their teachers and the social worker.
122. When they were asked about their suggestions to strengthen the action programme, their responses were only two- a) that the scholarship continues till they graduate in college, and b) that more children would benefit from this educational assistance.
123. The college students and vocational trainees are also happy about the opportunity given them to study. It was noted that the college students, who stayed away from their communities to study in Cotabato City, exhibited self-confidence. They did not hesitate to express their views especially in the topic regarding armed group. Unlike those who are in the towns who became subdued and reserved when the topic on participation to armed group was broached. The college students shared that they felt more secure in the city where it is peaceful compared to their life in the rural area where their life is in constant threat. Being in the city oriented them on the amenities and pace of urban living.
124. Those in vocational training courses are happy because they feel more productive in their time. Sometimes they used to help in the farm. But most of the times they just sit idle. As one described his life before where there was not much to do that he could count the posts and trees in the community. It was also mentioned that being on training meant less time for vices because their hands are full. To some of the trainees their excitement of going back to their community and apply their training was quite visible. Their new found learning was like *eureka* experience, hence, boosted their self-esteem.

Project Sustainability

125. The Philippine component of the inter-regional project conceives sustainability in several aspects. One facet of sustainability is the integration of the children in armed conflict sector in the Philippine Time-bound Programme which is coordinated by the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC). Consequently, NCLC is committed to monitor and coordinate its implementation in close collaboration with the ILO-IPEC in Manila.
126. Another aspect of sustainability is the stakeholders' commitment on the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflict. On the side of DOLE, since the Salaam action programme was spearheaded by the Secretary is a guarantee that the agency would pursue the issue of child soldier. The DOLE regional staff plans to give follow through services for the graduates of vocational training courses. Through regular DOLE programs, access to capital can be facilitated, organizing of graduates into cooperatives for livelihood or microenterprise could be pursued. Advocacy on children involved in armed conflict can be integrated in their labor education program.
127. Sustaining the educational assistance at a very long time is quite challenging but not impossible. It would mean going into fund raising which the interagency effort may not have a full-time personnel to implement or the structure and mechanics to carry it out.
128. If the fund ceases after two years, the country programme faces the risk of unsustained operation since a large bulk of the resources come from USDOL. This means the children and youth would stop going to school unless their parents are able to generate other source of fund. The vocational-skills training beneficiaries would just have graduated but there is no mechanism yet of following them technically and financially if they pursue self-employment. Any initial gain would be lost.
129. For the past months, the implementers' attention is directed to the operational details such as recruitment of staff, identifying partners to implement action programmes, and learning the ropes in interagency collaboration. The implementers have yet to sit down and come up with specific sustainability plan for the project--how to raise more funds and specifying long-term commitments of various groups to carry out services after the two year fund from US Department of Labor. The action programme implementers need time to explore more how they can converge their resources, identify more stakeholders and supporters to sustain the efforts addressing child soldier issue.

Conclusions

130. The Philippine experience of Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict is still in the early stage of implementation. Mainly undertaking groundwork activities, the project had only implemented the Salaam action programme and the research on children in armed conflict. At the early phase in the implementation, the project has possesses some strengths and weaknesses. The project encountered threats as well as opportunities that influence the project development.

131. The pace of the project was influenced by various external factors – political instability, peace and order situation, special election in the region, and change of leadership. Among the implementing agencies, coming to an agreement about scope of responsibilities and commitments took much time. Meeting the reporting requirement also slowed down the implementation.

132. *Strengths*

The action programme is relevant and well received by the communities.

Educational assistance and vocational-technical training are relevant.

Inter-agency cooperation is effectively sharing its resources and responsibilities in implementing the project

The project is highly supported by DOLE top management, BLE director, regional directors of TESDA, DOLE-ARMM, DOLE region 12, and their staff

There are initial positive outcomes – promoted self-esteem, sense of hope for bright future, increased knowledge and skills in vocational skills - in the early phase of the implementation

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133. *Weakness/Challenges*

Program design needs sharpening to address specific characteristics of target groups.

The phenomenon of part-time soldiers and children living in conflict zones requires specific strategies to prevent participation in child soldiering activities.

Processing of past and traumatic experiences is needed for the current beneficiaries. But counseling was not provided because the implementers did not warrant that it is needed by the beneficiaries.

- a. One gap of the project is peace education which provides a deeper understanding on the conflict in Mindanao and various ways of resolving it.

There is a need for community sessions to tackle discussion on a common dream and not just focusing on a conflict-ridden life.

- b. In the absence of baseline study for Salaam, not extensive profile of beneficiaries (part-time soldiers (previous or present) is made. This poses difficulty in monitoring or tracking the development of beneficiaries.
- c. Delay in reporting and releasing of fund is a usual occurrence.
- d. There was no sufficient consultation in budget formulation and project design formulation.
- e. Some unrealistic budgetary assumptions lead to inadequacy of fund in some programme components. For vocational-technical courses, no provision was made for tools and capital for self-employment. Geographic factor is not considered in formulating the allowances for children
- f. Inter-office communication and promotion of the project need to be strengthened. To avoid misunderstanding about the project, printing of brochure is needed to clearly communicate the project.
- g. The Salaam action programme needs to review their selection process in the vocational course trainees. The staff doing the screening had to probe deeper on the interests of the trainees. It is a challenge of the staff to balance by helping applicants see the demand of the course and marketability and their interest in pursuing it.

134. *Threats*

- a. Peace and order situation in the area serves as a constraining factor and a threat to existence of the project.
- b. It is possible for MILF to negatively react to project objectives of curbing children participation in armed group.
- c. The change of leadership in ARMM region might affect the commitment to and direction of the project.
- d. The delay of release of fund caused stress on the beneficiaries to the possibility of missing examinations, not fulfilling requirements, not eating meals.
- e. No regular fund from agencies to support the child soldier project after three years.

135. *Opportunities*

- a. The cooperation among agencies leads the way of convergence of resources for the project.
- b. There are still other players in the field addressing the issue of child soldier which the ILO-IPEC has not yet tapped.

Lessons Learned

136. *On project design*

The education and vocational skills training are responsive to needs of individuals and therefore easy to sell to communities.

More people should be involved in the conceptualization of the project.

- a) For a more realistic and appropriate activities and budget, consultation between the representatives of national agency and the local implementers are necessary.
- b) It is easy for children to be recruited in armed group but also easy to get out from the group.
- c) The role of parents in following up children in school is important in ensuring success.

137. *On project Implementation*

- a) The project staff realized that familiarity with the culture and needs of the people is a necessary requirement in programme implementation.
- b) One lesson for the implementers to look at was on budget formulation of the Salaam project. The increase in the cost of living was not factored in, hazard pay for the field staff in critical area was not included. In some aspects, it was too detailed that that it lacked flexibility and to a certain degree hindered the project implementation.
- c) Even if confronted with the negative perceptions about the ARMM region's problem of transparency and accountability in governance, the DOLE realized interagency effort in the region is possible and challenges can be hurdled.
- d) DOLE realized that it is capable of handling this type of project.
- e) It would have been easier if the project has been implemented by the regional office rather than the central office.

- f) Acceptance of the project among the local leaders is essential for the project to take off and to become sustainable.

Recommendations

138. Project Design and Strategies

- a) ILO-IPEC has to be more deliberate and purposive in weaving together the several action programmes that would integrate various strategies in the existing area of operation. It needs to sharpen its specific design to address the phenomenon of part-time soldiers in contrast to the fulltime child soldiers.
- b) Project indicators for success have to be reviewed in the light of specific design to address the part-time soldier phenomenon.
- c) To ensure success in vocational skills training that would generate income, an increase of fund allocation that would include provision of tools and start-up capital is necessary. Specific subjects on bookkeeping and marketing of products and services should be integrated in the vocational courses.
- d) In capacity building strategy, there is a need to specifically prepare the psychosocial component skills training among the service providers most especially when full-time child soldiers start to be mainstreamed. This can be done by collaborating with DSWD, UNICEF or other agencies which provided this type of training.
- e) Peace education is important to complement the strategy of providing formal education among in-school children and youth. This may help curb the increase of part-time child soldier phenomenon. Peace education among the out-of-school may help them see their situation in a wider perspective with some options to take other than armed struggle.
- f) Muslim religious leaders who have become peace advocates may be tapped to support the programme activities considering that *Jihad* is one motivational factor for youth and adults to join the war. Muslim religious leaders They have participated in inter-faith dialogue, peace seminars by Grassroots Peace Learning Center and Mindanao Peace Institute based in Davao City, Mindanao.
- g) While the advocacy component is intended to operate in national scale, there has to be programmed activities that cater to the existing towns where there are Salaam beneficiaries. This would track down impact at the community level.

139. Project Management and Institutional Framework

- a) The Salaam inter-agency group has to establish regular meetings, formulate specific plans for the year, and assess their activities. Meetings would update member agencies on project implementation details as well as address operational issues and concerns.

- b) The revival of the focal coordinating body, Regional Council for the Welfare of Children, has to be facilitated soon for collaboration and mobilization among various sectors in stopping the involvement of children in armed conflict. This body need not be limited to government organizations but also groups representing other sectors.

140. Project resources and fund management

The Salaam action project needs to realign their unutilized fund in literacy for the increase of needed fund in vocational skills training courses.

141. Project sustainability

- a) There is a need to draft specific sustainability plan before the project term ends.
- b) The ILO-IPEC has to be more aggressive in networking with other concerned groups to pursue convergence of resources.
- c) There is a need to widen the base of sources of fund for the project to be sustainable.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR

(ILO-IPEC)

Terms of Reference

Mid-term Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict: an Inter-Regional Programme

National Assessment: The Philippines

(P340 03 900 052 - INT/03/P52/USA)

I. Background and justification

30. The aim of ILO-IPEC is the progressive elimination of child labour, especially in its worst forms. The political will and commitment of individual governments to address child labour—in cooperation with employers' organizations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and other relevant parties in society—is the basis for ILO-IPEC action. ILO-IPEC's strategy includes raising awareness on the negative consequences of child labour, promoting social mobilization against it, strengthening national capacities to deal with this issue and implementing demonstrative direct action programmes (AP) to prevent children from child labour and remove child labourers from hazardous work and provide them with appropriate alternatives.
31. The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (N. 182) categorizes "all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict" as worst forms of child labour (Article 3a). Each country ratifying this Convention is committed to implementing programmes of action to eliminate the worst forms of child labour as a matter of priority, in consultation with relevant government institutions and employers' and workers' organizations, and taking into consideration the views of other concerned groups.
32. The inter-regional programme for the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts is a global intervention with focused activities in Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda—core countries—, and Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone—non core countries).

All these countries except Sierra Leone have ratified Convention 182. The project has a total budget of USD 7,000,000. The donor is the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). This programme was conceived after a preparatory phase launched in October 2001 by ILO-IPEC in collaboration with the ILO-In focus Programme on Crises Response and Reconstruction (IFP-CRISIS). This phase served the purpose of obtaining information (through rapid assessments) on the causes of the use of child soldiers, the mechanisms for recruitment, the living conditions while in the armed groups and the circumstances surrounding their demobilisation and the perspective for their reintegration.³⁵

33. The programme intends to contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups (development objective). In order to do so, three immediate objectives have been formulated:
 - ✓ I/O 1: “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”
 - ✓ I/O 2: “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”
 - ✓ I/O 3: “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in targeted countries.”
34. The overall programme document sets the framework under which each country has made the relevant choices to suit its particular needs, always taking into consideration the specific in-country context. These national choices are reflected in a “country annex” which details the particulars of the intervention strategy and the implementation modality for each country. The country annex corresponding to the Philippines is therefore to be used as the reference document for this mid-term evaluation as it contains the relevant details of the national situation and intervention approach, including indicators and the expected outcomes. In summary, the country annex has been prepared on the basis of: a) the overall IPEC programme on *Prevention and Reintegration of Children involved in Armed Conflict : an Inter-Regional Programme* project document, dated 17 September 2003; and b) an in-country strategic planning process as part of the overall efforts to design a national time bound programme for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour in the Philippines.³⁶
35. According to ILO regular procedures and as agreed with USDOL, the project is due for a mandatory independent mid-term evaluation in the second half of 2005. This evaluation should serve two basic purposes: a) accountability to the main stakeholders, including government agencies and social partners in the targeted countries, partner organizations and

³⁵ A total of five reports (unpublished) were prepared: *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés au Burundi*, Suzane Nsabimana, December 2002; *Rapport sur l'évaluation rapide de la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République du Congo*, Michael Bitemo and Frédéric Nkeoua, December 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo*, Modeste Mangola Dukti and Jean-Marie Vianney Mupende Katembo, Kinshasa, October 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo (Goma, Est-RDC)*, François-Xavier Baganda N'Simba, Goma, December 2002; *Résultats de l'enquête d'évaluation rapide au Rwanda sur la situations des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés*, Prosper Mutijima Nkaka, March 2003.

³⁶ A national stakeholders' workshop following the SPIF approach was carried out in February 2004. The main outcomes of this workshop as related to the child soldiers problem can be found in the Country Annex. More information concerning the SPIF approach can be found in ILO-IPEC's Guidelines on SPIF of May 2002 (produced by the Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section).

the donor, on what has been done and achieved so far; and b) learning from the experience to analyze how the project is progressing towards achieving its objectives, plan for the future and, where necessary, to recommend appropriate re-designing.

36. IPEC management and the project staff will use the evaluation results to revise the approach and strategy that is being followed in each country, as appropriate. Therefore, the evaluation should provide credible and reliable information in order to suggest how the project could enhance its impact during the remaining time of implementation, ensuring the sustainability of the benefits that have been or will be generated. In order to do so, **specific evaluation methodologies will be used to ensure evidence based recommendations**. The evaluation results will also be used by partners in charge of implementing activities in the field or that support the national efforts against the use of children in armed conflicts in the region.

II. Purposes and phasing of the evaluation process

37. The overall purposes of the evaluation and the tasks to be carried out by the independent national consultant include the following:
1. To review the implementation of the project so far in the country and consider any changes in strategy on the basis of emerging experiences, recommending adjustments where necessary.
 2. To examine current proposed activities and make an assessment of their potential contribution to the implementation strategy.
 3. To review the existing institutional set up and implementation capacity.
 4. To assess the existing as well as potential linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed in the targeted countries.
38. This national assessment is part of a process which will continue with an independent evaluation of the activities carried out in Africa and the preparation of a final report for the whole project.
39. The national assessment in the Philippines will be conducted by an independent consultant identified locally, under the supervision of an international independent consultant as evaluation team leader, who will also be responsible for the analysis of the activities in Africa and the preparation of the final report. **These Terms of Reference correspond exclusively to the activities to be developed by the national independent consultant in the Philippines.**

III. Main aspects to be addressed by the evaluation

40. The focus of this national assessment will be on learning and improvement. Taking into consideration the corrective and formative nature of mid-term evaluations, this exercise should be articulated around three main questions:
- 4) What has worked, and why?
 - 5) What needs further improvement, and why?
 - 6) Has the evolution of the situation in any way affected the original design and strategy assumptions, and if so, in what way?
41. The specific issues to be analysed by the national consultant under the above three main questions should at least cover, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

42. Validity of the project design and relevance of objectives: The assessment should analyse the original design of the country annex (in relation with the overall programme document), considering its internal logic and coherence, its inherent quality and the relevance of the proposed objectives and strategies. The following are some of the specific questions to be considered in the analysis:
- j. Does the design of the overall programme document provide an effective framework and appropriate methodologies for the achievement of the objectives at the national level? If not, why? What has been the interaction between the elaboration of the interregional project document and the country specific annex? (Form 3 in annex can be used to summarize this information).
 - k. Are the project objectives for the country clear and realistic (likely to be met during the time frame of the project, with the current resources and following the identified approach and strategy)?
 - l. Are the objectives still valid today or must they be revised and possibly reformulated? If so, how?
 - m. How coherent and relevant was the original project design (and its reformulations, if appropriate) according to the prevailing conditions at the time of its inception? Should changes currently be made to the general project strategy based on newly emerging needs and constraints? If so, why and how?
 - n. Is the project based on adequate research and baseline data?
 - o. Are project indicators and means of verification relevant, clear, realistic and useful in terms of measuring the project's performance and impact? If not, why? How effectively are strategies for monitoring being implemented? Are they the right strategies? (Explain with supporting evidence).
 - p. Did the children and youth targeted as beneficiaries participate in the design stage of the project? If not, what were the difficulties? If they did participate, how so? Were there alternative options identified as substitute to their direct participation in the project design? Were participatory approaches applied in the design of the Action Programmes (AP)? If not, why?
 - q. Are the time frame for project implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic? If not, what changes are needed? Has the strategy for sustainability of impact been defined clearly at the design stage of the project?
 - r. Assess the relation between the project and other child –focused interventions supported by IPEC or implemented by other organisations in the same country. To what extent were synergies exploited and economies of scale created in designing the project?
 - s. How were local management structures, such as National Child Labour Steering Committees, involved in the project design? To what extent were the objectives of this project incorporated within the mission and objectives of these various structures?
43. Process of implementation, management and achievements: The evaluation should assess how the project activities have been implemented and the effectiveness and efficiency of the management structures in place, with a focus on determining if the project is on course to delivering the expected outputs and achieving its immediate objectives.

Administrative and management related- matters

- x. Are the existing organisational and management structures of the project appropriate for achieving the expected results? Are the technical and administrative guidance and support provided by ILO to the project adequate and helpful?
- y. What have been the strengths and weaknesses of project management? What management improvements, if any, could be suggested to enhance project efficiency and effectiveness? Is there balance and rationality in the use of funds and resources? Is

- there transparency in the project resource management? Are there any problems in this aspect?
- z. What has been the effect of delays in carrying out the project work plan? Is the project advancing at a pace which will allow reaching the project objectives by its date of completion? If not, why and how can problems be solved?
 - aa. Please analyze the communication processes between the field office, the regional office, headquarters and the donor.
 - bb. What is the financial and management status of the project? What is currently working well and what are the difficulties at that level (concrete examples)? How can these difficulties be addressed based on the existing capacities?
 - cc. Were disbursements made according to the project document's planned time-frame, or were there significant changes? If changes occurred, which resources were re-directed to expenses necessary to ensure an efficient service delivery and reaching project objectives? Are there more efficient manners to disburse funds while reaching better results with the same resources?
 - dd. How appropriate are the criteria used for selecting Action Programmes (AP) regions and sectors? How efficient is the process by which AP proposal are reviewed and approved and resources ultimately allocated?
 - ee. What processes have been used to identify implementing agencies? Was this an effective process? Have the correct agencies been identified to undertake service delivery under this project?
 - ff. Was the administrative and technical support given by project staff to the national counterparts adequate?
 - gg. How are local management structures participating in programme implementation? How is this participation contributing to progress toward project's objectives? What are the major achievements and/or drawbacks encountered?

Achievements

- hh. Are project results so far meeting the needs of the target groups? If not, why? Are there alternative ways to meeting those needs? If so, how?
- ii. How effective are Action Programmes to date, and how are they contributing to the project meeting its immediate objectives?
- jj. Have the number/type of beneficiaries been reached according to plan? If not explain the rationale for the changes of plans.
- kk. Appraise the changing attitude of the beneficiaries towards acquiring of skills for decent work. What are the views of the beneficiaries and stakeholders regarding the usefulness of the outputs of the project? What are the effects of the project on the situation of the target beneficiaries so far? What benefits have the target beneficiaries gained so far?
- ll. How effective has the project been in building the capacity of national IPEC and implementing agencies' staff?
- mm. Assess the contribution of the project to raising awareness on the need to withdraw children from armed units, including from non-government groups.
- nn. Has the commitment and capacity of public and private institutions been strengthened in order to undertake concrete actions to prevent recruitment of children (boys and girls) in armed conflicts and to assist those withdrawn?
- oo. How effective has the project been in terms of leveraging resources? What process is being undertaken by the project to identify and coordinate implementation with other initiatives and organisations? Assess the visibility of the contribution of the USDOL funded project.
- pp. Assess work opportunities identified by the project, including placements and other supportive inputs in the current country specific context.
- qq. Determine the quality of the training offer, including training providers' capacity in the current context. Assess the capacity and the ability of the implementing partners to deliver suitable training for the different age groups.

- rr. To what extent are children and youth involved in project implementation? In what ways has the project sought to develop the capacity of young people to contribute to the goal of reducing the incidence of children involved in armed conflict? What has been the impact of such efforts?
 - ss. What lessons have been learned and what possibilities are there for effective replication of efforts? To what extent have lessons learned been shared with other targeted countries? How have these lessons been incorporated into other ILO initiatives in targeted countries as well as in IPEC regional efforts?
 - tt. Do the anticipated project results justify the costs incurred?
44. Sustainability and anticipated impact: The evaluation should assess the meaning of “sustainability” within the context of the project and the progress made in ensuring continuation and/or further development of the benefits generated by the intervention.
- d. Which actions were taken to promote the sustainability and which actions must be undertaken in the coming months to strengthen the capacity of local actors or related institutions in order to ensure the sustainability and/or scaling up of interventions in the targeted zones?
 - e. How effective has the project been in terms of promoting local ownership of project activities and promoting long-term sustainability? Has the idea of a phase-out strategy for the project been clearly articulated and progress made towards this goal? What are the hand-over plans for the different components of the project?
 - f. What is the long-term commitment and the technical and financial capacity of local/national institutions (including governments) and the target groups to continue delivering goods and services begun under the project once it ends?

IV. Expected outputs and timeline of the evaluation process

45. The timeline for this national assessment and the number of working days for the national consultant are detailed hereunder, up to a total of twenty five working days (the dates included are tentative; final dates will be determined in consultation with the evaluator):
- Five working days (beginning 22 August 2005), covering:
 - 2 working days for an initial desk review of documents (project document and country annex, progress reports, mission reports, plus documentation on other current relevant programmes implemented by ILO and other organizations in the country).
 - 1 working day to review and confirm acceptance of the TOR and to review and provide feedback to the evaluation team leader on methodological instruments (see annex to these terms of reference), which will be used to gather stakeholder information. The independent national evaluator must also review together with IPEC’s Country Project Coordinator (CPC) the methodological instruments and provide adjustments as/if necessary. If the instruments for data collection included in the annex for any reason do not appear to be applicable, the national independent consultant will suggest alternative methodologies in order to obtain the same information and provide a concrete example. Information should be provided to the independent evaluation team-leader latest by August 26, 2005.
 - 2 working days to preparation of an inception report detailing the evaluation time-frame with the specific meetings (specifying with whom and where) and field visits planned. For field visits there should be an indication of the criteria/reasons for choosing the project sites. If possible, a minimum of three project sites (including both successful and problematic action programmes) should be visited to provide evidence and learning examples, although depending on the number of AP and mini-programmes a larger number of project sites could be desirable. Logistical constraints should be

considered in the number of identified project sites, as well as the following issues. Project sites should provide the opportunity of collecting information from : a) local authorities (formal or non-formal), the community (using questionnaire 4 in annex), implementing partners, other actors working on the same issue at field level but outside the IPEC project, the beneficiaries (using questionnaires 1 and 2), employers' organisations and trade unions, if any. For beneficiary interviews, at least one group interview (questionnaire 2) per project site should be undertaken, and if possible one individual beneficiary interview (questionnaire 1) from someone who has not participated in the group interview. For planning purposes it is estimated that the community interview will take up to one hour, the beneficiary group interview some 45 minutes, while individual interviews with beneficiaries should last not longer than 30 minutes. Other interviews with stakeholders (local formal and/or non-formal authorities, armed groups if accessible, other actors implementing similar projects in the area, IPEC implementing partners, employers' organisations, trade unions, etc.), should take one hour per interview. Each stakeholder group should be interviewed separately. In particular beneficiary group interviews should have no one outside the group of beneficiary children assisting, as a question of confidentiality.

- Fifteen working days from 5 September 2005 in order to
 - Undertake the field work to project target sites, interviews with the different stakeholders (primary stakeholders identified, including focus groups and semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries and if possible non-beneficiaries for comparison purposes) in the field. Estimated time: eight working days.
 - Hold interview with all stakeholders, including interviews with the National Counterpart and other identified stakeholders at provincial and/or national level, as they appear in the inception report, including: the identified implementing agencies, government institutions and others engaged in the project, employers' organisation and trade unions, service providers (for training), institutional relations. Estimated time: four working days.
 - Analyse notes and code and synthesise the information and data collected as a result of all interviews and of field work. Estimated time: three working days.

As a result the independent national evaluator must produce:

- A map of the country/region detailing where the project activities are taking place.
 - A mapping of all actors in the country and/or project region in the field of withdrawal and prevention of children in armed conflict (using forms 1 and 2).
 - A list of the Action Programmes and mini-programmes included in the country annex, detailing : a) the amount in USD, b) the implementing partner, c) the objectives, d) the start date, e) the (expected) completion date (using the form included in the project's progress report format).
 - A summary of analyzed, coded and processed information (after triangulation).
- Four working days, latest by 26 September 2005, in order to write a **draft evaluation report** to be submitted to the independent evaluation team leader, according to the format and contents described in section V hereunder, including all annexes.
 - One working day, latest by 14 October 2005, to incorporate inputs and comments and any factual corrections from stakeholders to the **edited final evaluation report**. ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) together with the evaluation team leader will provide consolidated comments on the draft evaluation report.

V. Methodological considerations

46. For the national assessments, the general ILO-IPEC guidelines on evaluation and a consultative and participatory approach will be followed. Consultation with all stakeholders will be done directly in the field by the national consultant. On the last day of the mission work, a restitution seminar with all stakeholders able to attend should present the tentative conclusions and recommendations.
47. **Each key evaluation finding should be triangulated and documented** (e.g. corroborated by at least two different sources, either documentary or observational or through interviews of various/different stakeholders), in order for findings to be credible and valid. The evaluation judgement will be evidence-based, grounded on the concrete information gathered from the different sources, triangulated and not based on a single unchecked information source. The independent national consultants should indicate the evaluation standards that they will apply to this exercise in their inception report.
48. Evaluation instruments, such as the SWOT analysis matrix and questionnaire interview protocols attached will be reviewed by the national consultants during the inception phase and approved by the independent international consultant. Any comments, changes or suggestions regarding the different evaluation instruments should be sent to the international consultant (team leader) and DED for comments, using the “track change” function of MS Word. If the national consultant, based on discussions with the IPEC Country Project Coordinator, decides that some of these forms and questionnaires are not applicable in the current context, alternative and concrete means of obtaining the necessary information should be designed and provided to the team leader.
49. During the course of the evaluation the national consultants will receive technical support from the international consultant and evaluation team leader, either by e-mail or by phone as necessary. In addition, the assigned evaluation officer in DED will provide further support if and as necessary.
50. A major information source for the purpose of the evaluation will be the beneficiaries themselves, boys and girls, as well as beneficiaries’ communities. The independent national consultant should undertake the beneficiary interviews with the required sensitivity, cultural knowledge and knowing the specific approach to be used in dealing with the different types of interviewees. It is expected that beneficiary and non-beneficiary children (both male and female, including gender specific group interviews where possible) will be interviewed through a combination of formats, namely focus and/or semi-structured groups using questionnaire 2, individual interviews using questionnaire 1, and non-beneficiary group interviews using questionnaire 3. The questionnaires will allow obtaining evidence on key evaluation questions from the primary beneficiaries of the project. At the same time specific questions entailing attitudinal and behavioural change (before and after the intervention) are included in order to obtain qualitative information over and beyond the quantitative data available regarding the numbers of beneficiaries. Questionnaire 4 will allow collecting some feedback on the project from the communities themselves.
51. ILO-IPEC, through DED, will select the independent national consultants in charge of the national studies. The international consultant as team leader will be informed of the candidates before the final selection is made and will have the possibility of expressing his or her opinions to DED.
52. All documents produced during this assignment should be gender sensitive. Wherever possible beneficiary interviews should hold separate gender youth groups (female/male).

VI. Resources needed for the national assessment

53. The national assessment will be carried out by an independent national consultant with extensive experience in evaluation of development, humanitarian or social interventions, preferably including practical experience in conflict situations. Previous in-country experience is compulsory. Previous evaluation experience of child labour or children in armed conflict interventions and is a definite advantage, as well as previous experience in doing evaluations for agencies in the UN system. Experience in using knowledge, attitudes and practices methodologies will be considered. The consultant should have an advanced degree in social sciences, economics or similar and specific training on evaluation theory and methods. Full command of the local language(s) is compulsory to conduct beneficiary and non-beneficiary interviews and focus groups. All interviews conducted at field level, particularly the community and beneficiary interviews, will be undertaken in strict confidentiality, and in an anonymous manner.
54. The resources needed for this exercise are the following:
- ✓ Fees for national consultant for 25 working days
 - ✓ Per diem for field visits outside the consultant's home town
 - ✓ Travel arrangements to be provided locally by the IPEC staff
55. The payment of fees will be made as follows:
- ✓ 20% of fees upon receipt of the inception report
 - ✓ 30% of fees after reception of the draft evaluation report by the team leader and DED
 - ✓ 50% of fees after reception and acceptance of the final evaluation report by the team leader and DED
56. This independent evaluation will be managed by DED, in collaboration with ILO-IPEC's Unit on Vulnerable Groups (responsible for managing and backstopping the programme).

VII. Evaluation Report: format and contents

57. As mentioned before, the primary output of the consultancy will be an **evaluation report**. The report will be written in a straightforward language, in Times New Roman font 12, and will have a maximum of 40 (forty) pages excluding annexes and including an executive summary. Each paragraph should be numbered and the first numbered paragraph shall correspond to the first paragraph of the executive summary.
58. The report structure shall be the following:
- A cover page, indicating the project title, the type of evaluation, the dates of the evaluation, the date of the report, the name of the author(s) and including the mention "This report reflects the views of the author and not necessarily the views of the commissioning agency".
 - Table of contents with page numbers.
 - A map detailing the project location(s) (including all action programmes and mini-programmes).
 - A glossary of the terms used
 - A list of abbreviations

- An executive summary of no more than four pages, synthesising the main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The first page of the report will be the first page of the executive summary.
- A brief introduction of no more than three pages explaining the background to the evaluation, its purpose, scope and objectives, the primary users, as well as a brief description of the evaluation methodology, constraints and biases, and a brief background of the independent national evaluator.
- Evaluation findings organised around the main questions of the evaluation, including all collected information, as well as beneficiary/community assessments results and results of the various SWOT analysis. *It is suggested that the finding be structured thematically around points 1 to 9 of form 2 using each point as section title.*
- A short conclusions section, which must flow from the findings and not contain any new elements which have not previously been covered.
- A section with lessons learned from implementation (positive or negative experiences in executing the activities, that should be considered during the rest of implementation and that could be useful for other countries).
- Recommendations, based on the findings and the conclusions, ranked by order of importance/priority. Recommendations should be divided by type (e.g. design, objectives, strategic, management, resources, etc.) and should refer to specific paragraphs of the main body of the report.
- Annexes : a) TOR, b) bibliography (including documentary review and secondary sources), c) list of people interviewed indicating, if possible, date of the interview, ages, sex, place, function/post (e.g. beneficiary, community leader, government member, NGO member, implementing partner, etc.), d) one unfilled sample questionnaire and SWOT table for each group and / or issue, e) collated material (coded results table) synthesising results of all SWOT forms and questionnaires used, f) CV of the consultant.

ANNEX: FORMS AND QUESTIONNAIRES TO BE USED IN THE EVALUATION

A. SWOT ANALYSIS

The independent national consultant should use a SWOT format for recording the information provided by actors and stakeholders on the different issues to be assessed. It is suggested to use the formats to document outcomes of individual interviews and to prepare later a consolidated SWOT analysis including the opinions of different stakeholders on the issues.

The issues to be considered are the following:

6. Project design and strategy
7. Project management and institutional framework
8. Project resources and fund management
9. Project results and achievements to date
10. Projects perspectives of sustainability

The format to be used is the following:

- For individual interviews

ACTOR / STAKEHOLDER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

ISSUE: (1 to 5)

WEAKNESSES

STRENGTHS

OPPORTUNITIES

THREATS

- For presentation of consolidated results

ISSUE: (1 to 5)

WEAKNESSES

STRENGTHS

- aaa (mentioned by stakeholders 1, 2 and 5)
- bbb (stakeholder 3)
- ccc (stakeholder 4)
- etc.

OPPORTUNITIES

THREATS

B. FORMS TO PRESENT RELEVANT INFORMATION

Form 1: List of organisations in the country / region in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

ACTORS / ORGANIZATIONS				
Name of organisation	Type of organisation (government agency, international organization, NGO, trade union, employers' organization, other)	Main area of intervention (prevention, rehabilitation, other)	Estimated annual budget (indicate year)	Geographic coverage
1.				
2.				
3.				
Etc...				

Form 2: List of projects in the country / region in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

Name of project	Implementing agency / organization	Budget (in US\$)	Brief description of objectives and support provided	Project start and end date (mm/yy)	Funding / donor agency(ies)	Geographic coverage
1.						
2.						
3.						
Etc...						

Form 3: Comparison between the overall programme document and the country annex (to be completed in consultation with the CPC)

Indicate if what is stated in the overall programme document and the country annex is identical, similar or different. If not identical, please fill the last two columns describing what the differences between the programme document and the country annex.

Area	Comparison (identical, similar, different)	Programme Document	Country annex
1. Objectives			
2. Indicators			
3. Beneficiaries			
4. Implementation modality			
5. Management structure			
6. Institutional framework			
7. Sustainability strategy			
8. Other aspects (specify)			

C. SUGGESTED QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaire 1: Individual interview with beneficiary

Age:	Sex : M / F
Beneficiary targeted for:	Withdrawal / Prevention (explain the definition)
Interview site/area/region (according to administrative unit):	
Place of birth of beneficiary:	
Current status: unemployed / apprentice / in school / vocational training / other (specify)	
Living with: direct family / distant relative / alone / friends / school / street / reception home / placement / transit centre / other (specify)	

Introduction to the beneficiary: explain who you are and why you interview her/him. State the following: "These questions will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity preserved. The objective is to help us improve the project to ensure it can assist you most effectively. Thank you for your precious collaboration and your time."

18. Has the project changed anything in your life? Yes / No / don't know
If yes, what? If not, why not?
19. If there was a change, was it for the better, or was it negative?
Please explain:
20. What did you obtain from the project (including material support and/or services provided, such as information, orientation, training, etc... in beneficiary's own words):
21. Do you feel the support received from the project is useful to you: Yes / No / Don't know - If yes or no, why?
22. Do you still need the same things today as when the project started: Yes / No / Don't know – If not or don't know, what are your new needs?
23. Did you participate in the design or preparation of the project : Yes / No / Don't know
If yes, in which way?
24. Do you participate in the implementation of the project (e.g. in some of the activities):
Yes / No / Don't know – if yes, which ones
25. Do you also participate in another project: Yes / No / Don't know
If yes, which one (mention title, implementing organization and benefits)
26. Do you feel a change in the way people treat you since the project started? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, what is the change?
27. Is your situation in terms of living conditions and finances today better than at the start of the project : Better / Worse / Similar / don't know – Explain in what sense the situation is better or worse.
28. Do you feel the project is bringing you something useful for your professional future?
Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, in which way?
29. Do you believe the project is helping you to secure an income? Yes / No / Don't know
30. Is life easier for you today than at the beginning of the project? Yes / No / Don't know
31. Has the project helped you increase your self-esteem? Yes / No / Don't know
32. Could the project be improved? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, how?
33. How does your environment (family, friends, peers, etc.) perceive your participation in this project? Good / Bad / Indifferent / Don't know – If good or bad, explain why
34. Would you consider joining (if prevented) or going back (if withdrawn) to an armed group? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes or no, why?

Questionnaire 2: Group interview with beneficiaries

This questionnaire should be applied to a group of beneficiaries.

Total number of participants in the group:
--

For each participant in the group interview please record the following information:

Age:	Sex: M / F
Beneficiary targeted for:	Withdrawal / Prevention (explain the definition)
Interview site/area/region (according to administrative unit):	
Place of birth of beneficiary:	
Current status: unemployed / apprentice / in school / vocational training / other (specify)	
Living with: direct family / distant relative / alone / friends / school / street / reception home / placement / transit centre / other (specify)	

Introduction to the group: explain who you are and why you are making the group interview. State the following: "These questions will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity preserved. The objective is to help us improve the project to ensure it can assist you most effectively. Thank you for your precious collaboration and your time."

Make the following questions and record the number of responses in each category, as well as the examples and clarifications provided by the participants (in their own words)

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
18. Has the project changed anything in your life?	Yes No Don't know		
19. If there was a change, was it for the better, or was it negative	For the better Negative		
20. What did you obtain from the project (multiple answers allowed)	Material support Information Orientation Training Other (specify) Other (specify)		
21. Do you feel the support received from the project is useful to you	Yes No Don't know		
22. Do you still need the same things today as when the project started	Yes No Don't know		(Description of new needs)
23. Did you participate in	Yes No		

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
the design or preparation of the project	Don't know		
24. Do you participate in the implementation of the project?	Yes No Don't know		
25. Do you also participate in another project?	Yes No Don't know		(State title, implementing organization and benefits provided)
26. Do you feel a change in the way people treat you since the project started?	Yes No Don't know		
27. Is your situation in terms of living conditions and finances today better than at the start of the project?	Better Worse Don't know		
28. Do you feel the project is bringing you something useful for your professional future?	Yes No Don't know		
29. Do you believe the project is helping you to secure an income?	Yes No Don't know		
30. Is life easier for you today than at the beginning of the project?	Yes No Don't know		
31. Has the project helped you increase your self-esteem?	Yes No Don't know		
32. Could the project be improved?	Yes No Don't know		
33. How does your environment (family, friends, peers, etc.) perceive your participation in this project?	Good Bad Indifferent Don't know		
34. Would you consider joining (if prevented) or going back (if withdrawn) to an	Yes No Don't know		

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
armed group?			

Questionnaire 3: Group interview with children who do not benefit directly from the project

This questionnaire should be applied to a group of children who have not benefited from the project. If such a group cannot be gathered, it is possible to use the following table to aggregate the responses from individual interviews.

Total number of participants in the group / Total number of non beneficiaries interviewed:
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For each participant in the group / interviewee, please record the following information:

Age:	Sex: M / F
Interview site/area/region (according to administrative unit):	
Place of birth of beneficiary:	
Current status: unemployed / apprentice / in school / vocational training / other (specify)	
Living with: direct family / distant relative / alone / friends / school / street / reception home / placement / transit centre / other (specify)	

Introduction to the group / to the beneficiary: explain who you are and the main purposes of the evaluation. State the following: "These questions will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity preserved. The information will be synthesised from a number of groups and interviews where similar questions are being asked in order to extract lessons to improve the services we provide to children who used to be in armed forces."

Make the following questions and record the number of responses in each category, as well as the examples and clarifications provided by the participants (in their own words).

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
<i>Introducing the children in armed conflict theme</i>			
13. Is it easy for a child to belong to or enrol into an armed group?	Yes No Don't know		
14. Are children joining the armed group(s) seen as a problem for the community, or is it seen as normal in your everyday life, or even as something positive?	Problem Normal Positive Don't know		
15. When a child joins an armed group does it create an example for other children to follow?	Yes No Don't know		
16. Is it possible for a child to leave freely an armed group?	Yes No Don't know Yes		

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
17. When a child leaves an armed group does it also create an example for other children to follow?	Yes No Don't know		
18. Who is more prone to participate in an armed group?	Boys Girls Irrelevant Don't know		
19. Do you see it as positive to belong to armed group(s)?	Yes No Don't know		
<i>Determining needs and support provided outside the IPEC project, if any</i>			
20. Have you received / are you receiving material support from any organization (excluding own family)?	Yes No Don't know		Specify from whom, type of support, dates of start and end and objective of support Skip question 9 Skip question 9
21. Did this support entail a positive change for you?	Yes No Don't know		
22. What are your major needs at this moment?	Money Training Education Employment Other (specify)		
23. Do you feel confident that you are able to take care of yourself in civilian life, outside the armed group?	Yes No Don't know		
24. Do you feel prepared to find a stable source of income?	Yes No Don't know		Explain what would the person need to be prepared

Questionnaire 4: Group interview with members of the community

This questionnaire should be applied to a group of community members. If such a group cannot be gathered, it is possible to use the following table to aggregate the responses from individual interviews.

Total number of participants in the group / Total number people interviewed:
Location and area/region where the community is located (list from smaller to larger administrative units):
Type of beneficiaries in the community: mostly children prevented / mostly children withdrawn (to be completed in consultation with CPC and implementing agency)

For each participant in the group / interviewee, please record the following information:

Age: _____ Sex: M / F _____
Profile: local authority / informal community leader / teacher / religious leader / doctor / other (specify) _____

Introduction to the group / to the interviewee: explain who you are and the main purposes of the evaluation. State the following: “Thank you very much for your precious collaboration and your time. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity preserved. The information will be synthesised with other similar surveys that are being undertaken in order to extract lessons to improve our current project. Thank you for your help.”

Determine with the group or the interviewee the community’s type of anthropological and social fabric:

8. Specify how old the community is: (date of creation/recognition of the community if remembered. Alternatively check with local authorities for date of creation of the administrative unit)
9. Ethnic and religious background of inhabitants:
10. Estimated total number of inhabitants in the community :
11. Have there been important population movements in the community since October 2003? Yes / No
12. If yes, did people leave the community: Yes / No – If yes, as a result of what? Did people arrive in the community: Yes / No – If yes, as a result of what?
13. Approximate number of people who left :
14. Approximate number of people who arrived.

Make the following questions and record the number of responses in each category, as well as the examples and clarifications provided by the participants (in their own words)

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants’ own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
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Introduction of the issue (children in armed forces)

24. Is there awareness about children belonging to armed group(s) in this	Yes No Don’t know or no answer		
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Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
community?			
25. Are children joining the armed group(s) seen as a problem for the community, or is it part of your everyday life?	Problem Normal (everyday life) Don't know / NA		
26. Is the fact that children have joined or are joining armed groups, even as non combatants and for support services only, seen by the community as something rather positive or negative?	Positive Negative Don't know / NA		
27. Does this situation concern more boys or girls (if possible, indicate approximate proportion as ratio)?	Boys Girls Don't know / NA		(Description of new needs)
28. Should children continue to join or belong to armed group(s)?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Why?
<i>Defining the IPEC project: before making the following questions explain briefly the project components which are undertaken in the community</i>			
29. Has the project changed anything in the community?	Yes No Don't know / NA		What? Why not?
30. If there was a change, was it for the better, or was it negative?	For the better Negative Don't know / NA		Explain change Explain change
31. What did beneficiary children in the community obtain from the project?(multiple answers allowed)	Material support Information Orientation Training Other (specify) Other (specify)		
32. Do you feel the support supplied by the project is helping beneficiary children to obtain a source of income?	Yes No Don't know / NA		
33. Do you feel the support supplied by	Better		

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
the project will help the beneficiary children in the future to find a source of income?	Worse Don't know / NA		
34. Does the project contribute to children wanting to avoid belonging to armed group(s)?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Skip question 12 Skip question 12
35. Is this something positive?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Why?
36. Do you feel the support received from the project is useful to the beneficiary children?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Why? Why?
37. Was the selection criteria (e.g. reasons) for the choice of beneficiaries clear to the community?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Why?
38. Were the children selected as beneficiary those who most needed support?	Yes No Don't know / NA		
39. Is there in the community children in similar situations who have not been selected as project beneficiaries?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Why and how many?
40. Are there other projects which also target children in armed group(s) in your community?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Indicate implementing organizations, types of services / support provided and number of beneficiaries, if known
41. Do beneficiary children need the same things today as when the project started?	Yes No Don't know / NA		What would they need today?
42. Did the community participate in the design or preparation	Yes No Don't know / NA		In which way? Why?

Question	Categories	Number of responses	State comments and explanations in the participants' own words, including specifics on the situation of the girl child
of the project 43. Did or does your community participate in the implementation of the project (e.g. in some of the activities such as dissemination/information campaign)?	Yes No Don't know / NA		Indicate activities
44. Do you feel a change in the way community people talk about or treat children belonging to armed group(s) since the project started?	Yes No Don't know / NA		What is the change?
45. Has the project helped beneficiary children to feel better about them?	Yes No Don't know / NA		
46. Could the project be improved?	Yes No Don't know / NA		How?



International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)



International
Labour
Office

IPEC Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict. An Inter-Regional Program SRI LANKA (INT/03/P52/USA)

**An independent mid-term evaluation by a team of external
consultants**

Inter Regional Program: Africa, Colombia, Phillipines, Sri lanka

March 2006

This document has not been professionally edited.

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.

The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants³⁷. The field mission took place in March 2006. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such serve as an important contribution to learning and planning without necessarily constituting the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

Funding for this project evaluation was provided by the United States Department of Labor. This report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Department of Labor nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government.

³⁷ **Mohamed Ghani Razaak**

Abbreviations

ADB-	Asian Development Bank
Aus-AID-	Australian Agency for International Development
CBO-	Community Based Organization
CWRD –	Center for Women and Rural Development
CBT-	Community Based Training
CIDA-	Canadian Agency for International Development
DFID-	Development Fund for International Development-UK
GTZ, -	German Technical Cooperation
ICTAD –	Institute for Construction, Training and Development
IPEC-	International Programme for Elimination of Child labor
ODW -	(Norway)-Operation Day Work
LTTE-	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
INSGD-	Institute for Social and Gender development
SCSL-	Save the Children Sri Lanka
SIDA-	Swedish International Development Agency
NORAD-	Norway International S Agency for Development
TVEC-	Training and Vocational Education Canter
SLVTA-	Sri Lanka Vocational Training Authority
VTRP-	Vocational Training Resource Persons
NAITA-	National Authority for Industrial Training
NITESL-	National Institute for technical Education Sri Lanka
PPDRO-	Poraithivu Paththu Development and Rehabilitation organization
USDOL-	United States Department of Labor
UNICEF-	United Nations Children Education Fund
UR -	Underage Recruits
UNEG. -	United nations Evaluation Guidelines
UNDP-	United Nations Development Programme
WUSC-	World University Service of Canada
Sarvodaya-	A large Non Governmental Organization of Sri Lanka
Save the Children-	National NGO for Child welfare
FORUT-UK	based Norwegian NGO. FOR-UT(Ut-Witling) means Organization for development

Glossary and Definitions of the Terms

Action Plan; Action Plan is a national level umbrella programme that has been designed to address various issues related to the children affected by the war (CAW) including child soldiers. There are 10 technical areas identified in the Action Plan and the provision of VT is one of these support areas. ILO –IPEC has given the overall coordination responsibility for the vocational training component. Other areas of technical support for CAW include awareness and education, psychosocial support, income generation, micro credit and health and nutrition. Thus the Action Plan becomes the guideline and principle document for implementation and review of the activities under various projects and programmes for CAW in 8 districts of the Northeast Province.

Action Project/programme: Action Projects or Programmes are programme supported VT courses. There are two types of programmes implemented by the ILO-IPEC through USDOL funds in three districts in the Northeast conflict affected area: Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Action projects are relatively long term VT training courses that accommodate both UR and Vulnerable children for period ranging from 3 to 6 months. Mini Projects is the second type of courses which are mostly orientation programmes that accommodate more number of beneficiaries and provide short term training. The action programmes funded by the Project include VT on Carpentry, Welding, Cement Brick making, sewing, so on.

CAW VT Projects : Under the Action Plan, ILO IPEC targeted technical support for ex-child soldiers and vulnerable children through the project entitled ‘Vocational training and Skills Development for CAW’. This project has several funding sources including the USDOL. Other key donors for the CAW are AusAID and NORAD.

Referral Process: Referral Process is the method of forwarding ex-child soldiers to various psychosocial and career development programmes implemented by the projects. When rebel groups released child soldiers, they were kept in a Transit centre for a while. Under the UNICEF guidance, the Save the Children of Sri Lanka (INGO) provides counselling and involve in identifying suitable reintegration method for each child soldier. Social workers of SCSL supposed to provide such service and then they refer child soldiers for various projects and programmes for rehabilitation and reintegration. ILO-IPEC depend on this process to get UR to recruit for its VT action programmes. Transit Centers become defunct during 2005 in places where it was constructed due to many reasons and it affected the implementation of the project.

Partner Agencies: Partner agencies refer agencies that are responsible for implementing action projects under the USDOL funds. This assessment includes activities of five partner agencies: Patrician Institute (Jaffna) INSGD (Jaffna) Department of Industries (Trincomalee); CWDR (Batticaloa and Trincomalee) and PPDRO (Batticaloa)

Movement- This is the widely used local terms by people and youth of the Tamil community in the North and East to refer the LTTE.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1. Purpose and the Background:** Prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflict is an inter-regional programme supported by the USDOL under the ILO International Programme for the Elimination of Child labour. Sri Lanka is one of the core countries supported by this program, and a series of reintegration and social support projects have been implemented by the IPEC National Office through a number of partner organizations. This report presents the findings of the mid- term evaluation of the Sri Lanka country program implemented during the past eighteen months (March 2004 to October 2005). The emphasis of this national assessment is learning and improvement. It revolves around three main questions: 1.1) what has worked well and why? 1.2) what needs further improvement? And 1.3) what lessons could be learned from the initial experience?
- 2. The Methodology:** The assessment process included four types of interviews: *individual interviews* with beneficiaries; *group interviews* with beneficiaries; *interviews with non beneficiary* children, and **interviews with parents**. There were several constraints and limitations that delayed the assessment process. Field work in some locations was constrained by political and security uncertainties on several occasions.
- 3. Country Policy:** Sri Lanka is unique in responding to and addressing the issues of Children affected by the War (CAW). Action Plan is a country programme designed to address specific problems related to the children affected by war and their reintegration in to national development. Under the Action Plan, ILO -IPEC skill development and VT programmes are channeled through public and NGO training providers. USDOL is one funding source for IPEC's VT interventions related to the Action Plan
- 4. Comparison between the Overall programme document and the Country annex:** The assessment found that stated objectives and indicators in the Overall Programme document were identical with Country Annex. Also, the target beneficiaries and implementation modalities are more or less similar in both documents. However, a number of differences were identified in areas such as management structure, institutional framework and sustainability strategy.
- 5. Main Constraints for the Project:** The Overall Programme document of the Project includes most of the key elements in the Action Plan for the CAW. Thus it provides an effective framework and modalities to achieve the overall project objective under the Action Plan. However, the smooth implementation of the USDOL action projects (VT) has been disturbed and delayed for two major reasons. First the tsunami that devastated most of the coastal belt of the North and East of the country, and Second, the split in the LTTE movement in the eastern province in 2004. On the other hand, the weaknesses in the referral process in referring URs for VT under the project made it necessary for the project to adopt an alternative strategy by selecting more vulnerable children for the action projects. Thus there was a period (April 2004

to beginning of 2005) which show a slow progress in the achieving targets of the project..

- 6. Referral process & Transit centres:** The original project design assumed that relevant where the transit centres were the hub of the whole process. URs were referred to VT training after they had been provided a basic social orientation at the transit centres. Transit centres were established with the hope of providing counselling and guiding child soldiers to find better life options and career development training to reintegrate into the society. But today, no transit center seems to be functioning and agencies have been ineffective in activating the referral process. For these reasons, the re-integration process was very slow during the first year of operation (March 2004 to April 2005). As result, action projects had to focus more on vulnerable children during the first phase.
- 7. Validity of the project objectives:** All the stakeholders including ILO-IPEC staff found that the project objectives were valid and realistic even in the context of political and security uncertainties in some districts. But the long term objectives of the project are still not well understood by some partner organizations of IPEC who implement VT projects. Though all the project's partner agencies have been provided with orientation training on project objectives at the beginning, they focused their efforts mostly on providing training and guidance to the beneficiaries. But placement and follow up to find employment or proper income generation livelihood opportunities for trainees are far beyond their capacities. Also the project objectives lead to more field level operations including technical backstopping for partner agencies. But llimited financial and other resources, IPEC field level operations and technical backstopping for partner agencies to support past trainees, were adversely affected.
- 8. Project Design:** Field staff and partner agencies found that there is a need for reformulation of the project design considering the continuous return of UR under various circumstances during the first phase. Although the programme supported action projects included a significant number of URs in all of its project areas, it had to focus on individual children and not on their families as the target group, when URs return their homes there is no proper social and economic atmosphere to re-start their life. LTTE also expressed this view and they are critical about the projects that are implemented under the Action Plan.
- 9. Project indicators and means of verifications** are relevant and useful in terms of measuring the project performance and progress. But there is little evidence to indicate that they have been used systematically by the project staff and partner organizations.
- 10. Centre-based Vs Community -based training:** There are conflicting views among partners and stakeholders on the modality of vocational training. Some stakeholders believe that the Centre- based training is for more disciplined, better organized so that beneficiaries could gain thorough training. Others including small-scale partner

agencies and community members feel that Community- based training is much more effective and beneficial for children from a security and social protection point of view. It is suggested that VT interventions need to have a proper balance of centre-based and community-based training depending on the target group, trades selected and infrastructure availability. At present, only one out of six locations visited has the community based training under the USDOL funds. ILO-IPEC is in the process of identifying the most appropriate type of training for each location. A market analysis contracted to an organization and the results will be incorporated in designing action projects for the second phase. It has been mentioned that USDOL funding for the second half of the project will support more community- based training through partner agencies.

- 11. Selection of Partner Agencies:** At the initial stage, selection of partner organizations was hampered by lack of structured data on CBOs in the post conflict situation. As a result of the decades long civil war, the once strong training network of the north and east was severely weakened. Thus selection of partner agencies was done mostly on the recommendation of other INGOs and review of records of their past experiences.
- 12. Selection of beneficiaries:** This on the other hand is rather haphazard, because the project depended on the slow UR referral process. Although an economic Opportunities survey was done with AusAid funds, the Action Plan recommended that children be placed in vocational training of their own choosing. Thus it was difficult to adopt any participatory process in selecting beneficiaries. It is the view of key stakeholders and the project staff that the time frame for action programmes should be confined mostly to implementation allowing no room for conducting participatory procedures or follow up activities.
- 13. Link with other projects and VT Providers:** At present, several INGOs, including international agencies such as UN are involved in the prevention of child I activity in armed conflict and their reintegration into society. Has maintained good relations with all the child focus VT programmes supported by other donors. IPEC national office actively involved in supporting several children focus orientation, life skill training and counselling programmes which are well integrated with other donor supported and INGO programmes in all three districts the project is in operation.
- 14. Project management Structure:** The existing ILO-IPEC organizational structure at country level includes a three member technical staff including the country coordinator. The programme provides only partial funding for the country coordinator. Compared to the expected results and outcomes of the project, existing management structure is inadequate to carry out the planned activities. One of the key elements in the project management structure is its centralized decision making and the lack of opportunities for field staff micro level decision making. Most of the technical decisions are taken by the PMU in Colombo. Field staffs are much more dependent on PMU and its technical guidance. The fund management of PMU is transparent and partner organizations are aware of fund allocations. Financial management of ILO-


IPEC projects including USDOL funds is systematic and is reviewed periodically by the PC.

- 15. Drop out rates:** There is a 10-20% drop out rate in each action projects implemented so far. Drop outs are due to various reasons. Some beneficiaries selected do not have basic literacy and some others have no conducive family background and support on account of poverty, Some URs have dropped out due to security risks involved in travelling to urban training centres.
- 16. Targeted and Achieved progress:** Overall, in all the three locations, action projects implemented so far have met the target number of 75 even more in each district. The Project was able to reach the target of 342 by October 2005. This was well above the target set for the first half of the project. However, there is a major difference in the plan of action of the project. Though programme document suggested focusing more on former child soldiers or UR in VT provision, most of the project beneficiaries were chosen from vulnerable children and youth. This is mainly because of a weak referral process and the poor performance of agencies involved in referring URs to USDOL VT projects. According to the action plan modality, IPEC has to wait till the agencies responsible for the referral process provide suitable URs for VT.
- 17. Post Training support:** The Project is less effective in identifying work opportunities including placement of passed out trainees. However, during the past few months, a number of supportive inputs and initiatives have been made by field staff in providing post training job placement and technical guidance. Some partner organizations were able to arrange extra career guidance advice and counseling services to the beneficiaries. In addition IPEC has arranged life skill training with the support of AUSAID to develop work abilities and capacities of the individual beneficiary.
- 18. Strengths and Weaknesses:** According to SWOT analysis project has number of strengths and weaknesses. Management and administrative capacity are very strong at the national level. Maintenance of linkages with UN agencies, INGOs and government agencies is commendable. The leadership of the country programme coordinator is a key factor for most of joint and collaborative programmes. The weakest aspect however is the field level management structure, which has still not gained enough recognition and capacity to manage resources and action projects without guidance from the head office. Some of the stakeholders especially government sector agencies are critical of the performance of partner organizations associated with the programme VT projects. Some of the weaknesses identified by the different stakeholders are: a) The VT provided has limited impact as far as providing an additional income for trainees, b) Selection of trainees is done on an ad-hoc basis and not based on proper selection criteria c) Follow-up is weak and most of the trained children are still unemployed d) Trainees have not provided with micro-finance support for a business start up e) No proper methods adopted in selecting partner NGOs for project implementation; f) lack of information and records available to government sector agencies on where and what programs are going on at

district level and g). The training given is not standard and recognized island wide, therefore it is difficult for graduate trainees to find employment in recognised firms

- 19. Toolkit Strategy:** One of the other critical aspects of the action projects funded by the the programme is a lack of comprehensive toolkit strategy at the time of the assessment. Only sewing machine and carpentry trainees received assistance and toolkits to start up self employment and income generating activities. But other trainees such as welders need proper post training support including toolkits or micro-finance packages. However, at the time of assessment, the IPEC Country coordinator was working on a toolkit strategy for all types of trainees assisted by the project.
- 20. Impact on Beneficiaries:** The most successful aspect of the project is the positive improvement it has created in the beneficiary children's personalities, building confidence and better attitudes towards acquiring vocational skills and knowledge. However, most of the trainees find it difficult to engage in decent work and employment soon after the training. Girls who have received non- traditional training such as cement brick making were very enthusiastic to engage in such trades and to break out of the social practices that do not support women in traditional Tamil society.
- 21. Conclusion:** Overall, the project has to a great extent achieved its objectives in reintegrating children into society and supporting them to overcome their problems by providing life skills and vocational training. None of the trainees interviewed wanted to join with armed groups as they now see potential avenues to improve their lives. Though vocational training not found as the sustainable solution to the multi faceted problems faced by ex-child soldiers and vulnerable children, such exposure has given them confidence and hopes to plan their future more productive and useful not only for them but also their families.
- 22. Recommendations:** Based on the above findings, several recommendations are made to improve the quality and effectiveness of the project for the second phase. Capacity of national IPEC should be strengthened with additional human resources and funds to expand its role and functions in the field. Additional baseline data requirements and research on economic opportunities and tracer studies must be carried out to guide the project to suitable strategies and VT needs. Project design should be modified to suit the current field conditions. Capacity-building of selected partners is an essential need of the next phase of the project. Post training assistance process must be streamlined with proper toolkit strategies and linked to micro-credit for income generation and placement with employers.

Map: Project Locations in Sri Lanka



Note: Places indicated by arrows are the locations and names of the local partner organizations

INTRODUCTION

23. Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict is an Inter-Regional Program of ILO-IPEC. This is a UN initiative to eliminate use of child labor in civil wars by armed groups and forces around the world. The programme aimed at implementing specific activities to prevent abuse of children under armed conflict situations and reintegrate vulnerable children into main society in the counties that are experiencing civil wars in Asia and Africa³⁸. Sri Lanka is one of the core countries supported by this program and a series of reintegration and social support projects have been implemented by the IPEC local office through a number of partner organizations. This program is financed mainly by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). The explicit development objective of the program is *to contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups. The program aims at creating an environment that enables prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration of children involved in armed conflict into society*. Ultimately the program helps former child soldiers above the minimum working age to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income so that fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in future.
24. Sri Lanka country project supported by the programme started in 2004. Compared to other participating countries this was a late start. The first planning mission was in March 2004. However the ILO DED office decided to carry out a mid term evaluation of all USDOL supported projects in participating countries in September 2005. This report presents the findings of the mid term evaluation of the Sri Lanka country program carried out between October to December 2005. The mid-term evaluation aims to achieve two basic purposes: a) accountability to the main stakeholders, including the government agencies and the partner organizations in Sri Lanka and the donor, on what has been done and achieved so far; and b) Learning from the experience to analyze how the project is progressing towards achieving its objectives, to plan for the future and, where necessary, to recommend appropriate re-designing.


CONTEXT OF THE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

25. Sri Lanka is unique in responding and addressing the issues of Children affected by the War (CAW). After signing the MoU for a ceasefire to hold armed confrontation between the GoSL and the LTTE, the country has returned to a 'no war situation'. However such a situation does not guarantee a complete halt to of aggression by parties involved in armed conflict nor does it present a sustainable peace situation. Therefore the activities aimed at supporting children from getting involved in armed groups and reintegrating child soldiers into the society in Sri Lanka is not as smooth as in the countries that have stopped war completely and entered into the democratic process. The political and security situation is volatile in certain places during the period and that affected the progress of reconstruction and reintegration activities in the conflict affected areas including the provision of systematic VT.

³⁸ **Core countries:** Central Africa, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Colombia, Philippines and Sri Lanka. **Non Core countries:** Uganda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

- 26.** Action Plan is an umbrella programme that has been designed to address the various issues related to children affected by the war (CAW) including child soldiers. Action Plan for CAW is a holistic approach of the UN, the donors and the INGOs in Sri Lanka. It included all key aspects of child development and care including prevention of children involving in armed conflicts and actions for reintegration of child soldiers into main society through various activities. The Action Plan for CAW is the outcome of the agreement between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka in July 2003. This collaborative effort came into effect since the middle of 2003. UNICEF is the lead and coordinating agency of this Action Plan. Action Plan covers both released underage recruits and vulnerable groups of CAW. There are 10 technical areas identified in the Action Plan and the provision of VT is one these support areas. ILO –IPEC has the mandate for vocational training. Other areas of support for CAW include awareness and education, psychosocial support, income generation, micro credit and health and nutrition. Thus the Action Plan becomes the guideline and principle document for implementation and review of the activities for CAW in 8 districts of the Northeast region.
- 27.** Under the Action Plan, ILO IPEC targeted technical support through the project entitled ‘Vocational training and Skills Development for CAW’ and it aimed at the withdrawal from the armed groups and prevention of entry of children into child labor through employment oriented training programmes. ILO –IPEC is also the coordinating agency for the VT provision for war affected children in the northeast and there are number of key agencies such as WUSC, NORAD and GTZ involved in the VT provision with ILO-IPEC. The skill development and VT programmes channeled through where possible the local public, private and NGO training providers. USDOL is one funding source contributed to IPEC’s interventions related to Action Plan under its overall vocational training and skills development for CAW. Thus review of the progress or achievements of the USDOL supported VT projects of ILO-IPEC inevitably linked with the ‘Action Plan’. It should be also mentioned that the USDOL supported child soldier project in Sri Lanka started much later than some other countries.
- 28.** In brief, Action Plan is a country programme designed to address a specific problem related to children affected by the war and their reintegration to national development. Under Action Plan, different agencies were brought together to orientate their programmes to achieve action plan objectives. USDOL is one funding source contributing to IPEC interventions related to Action Plan.(See figure 1.1)

Figure 1: Project in the Overall Country Context




OBJECTIVE AND THE SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

29. The overall objective of the evaluation includes the following:

5. To review the implementation of the project so far in the country and consider any changes in strategy on the basis of emerging experiences, recommending adjustments where necessary.
6. To examine current and proposed activities and make an assessment of their potential contribution to the implementation strategy.
7. To review the existing institutional set up and implementation capacity.
8. To assess the existing as well as potential linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed locally.

30. The scope of the assessment focuses on three major aspects of the program. The following figure illustrates the key aspects and issues to be addressed in the evaluation.

Figure 2: Scope of the study



APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

31. In carrying out the assessments, the general ILO-IPEC guidelines on evaluation and a consultative and participatory approach have been followed. A series of consultations with stakeholders, project implementation partners and staff of the IPEC have been conducted directly in the field. After completing the field work, the observations and preliminary findings are presented at a restitution seminar to the stakeholders to get their views and comments in order draw tentative conclusions and recommendations.

32. The assessment process included both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. The key methods adopted for collecting data and to generate information are as follows

Literature/Desk Review

33. The evaluation process began with a desk review of secondary information and data available with IPEC country office. Some of the documents reviewed are the project document and country annex, progress reports, mission reports, documentation on other current relevant programs implemented by other organizations in the country.

Field visits/Stakeholder Meetings

34. This assessment covers USDOL-funded activities under the ILO-IPEC child soldiers' project. The programme supported action projects are operating in only three districts of the war affected region: Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Jaffna. There are two types of projects funded by the USDOL; Action projects and Mini Projects. According to the progress reports some of the action projects are now conducted and some are still in progress. The following table provides information about the selected districts, the partner organizations and the reasons for selection. *It includes both well executed action projects as well as the ones which are constrained for various reasons.* In each districts two projects have been selected for the field study. Only action projects have been selected for the assessment. Mini-projects which are relatively small in scale and have limited impacts were not selected for this assessment.

Table 1 Selected field locations and Implementation Partners for the evaluation

Field site/District	Partner Organizations/Stakeholders	Reasons for selection
Jaffna	Institute of Nursery and Gender Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Women centered NGO</u> • <u>A large number of girl children are benefiting by the project.</u> • <u>Initiatives have been made to provide on the job training support and guidance for the trainees.</u> • <u>Considered as an active partner organization</u>
	Patrician Institute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Focus mainly on boys who have withdrawn and vulnerable</u> • <u>More organized and center based VT provision</u> • <u>Job placement network</u> • <u>Comparatively an urban VT center and less rural beneficiaries</u> • <u>Considered as moderately performing partner organization</u>

Trincomalee Department of Industries

CWDR

Batticaloa PPDRO

CWDR

- Center based Training provider
- The only government sector VT that provides training for CAW in the district
- Large number of beneficiaries
- Implementation of action projects constrained by various factors
- Urban centered and offered well designed VT courses
- Pioneer in Community based Training for CAW
- Active in Non traditional VT provision
- Experiences difficulties in implementing action projects
- Focus more on girl child soldiers
- Rural and Community based training provider
- Major focus on Underage recruits
- Active in local area development
- Managed by Local youth and community
- A less performing partner agency
- Faces difficulties in implementation of projects
- Heavy focus on UR and vulnerable girl children

c) Interviews

35. The key data collection instrument suggested is the interview. Interview guides and instruments have been prepared before the field work by the team leader and reviewed by the national consultant. The assessment process includes four types of interviews as follows:

Individual interview with beneficiary

36. The individual interviews are aimed at capturing extent to which the life of the beneficiary has changed due to the project interventions. The main objective of this interview is to identify the change of attitudes, knowledge and skills of the beneficiary and his/her overall life aspirations in the context of the conflict situation.

Group interview with beneficiaries

37. Group interviews are aimed at collecting information from youth targeted for prevention and withdrawal from the armed groups. Three (3) group interviews in each district have been conducted. Although there were difficulties in conducting focus group interviews as four separate groups as specified in the TOR an attempt is made to cover the issues related to prevention and withdrawal of boys and girls from armed conflict

Interview with non- beneficiary children

38. Apart from the beneficiaries; children in the project locations who do not benefit directly from the project also have been interviewed. These interviews were conducted only in locations that are conducive to such interviews. These interviews

are mainly to understand the conditions that promote or discourage children to join with armed groups under conflict situations. Especially, such interviews were aimed at getting the views of children about their fellow counterparts who have joined or withdrawn from the armed groups. These group interviews were organized in the afternoons allowing school children to take part in the discussion.

Interview with members of the community

39. These group interviews are aimed at obtaining the views of the community on the impact of the project as well as to ascertain the role of the community in preventing children joining the armed groups. These interviews covered not only the ordinary members of the community but also community leaders such as religion leaders and other socially respected members. Following table summarizes the number persons interviewed through different interviews.

Table 2: Persons interviewed type of interviews and by project locations

Location	Individual Interviews with beneficiary children	Group Interviews with beneficiary Children	Group Interviews with Non beneficiary Children	Interviews with Community Members
Trincomalee	4(Male) 3 (female)	7 (female)	6 (Female)	8 persons
Batticaloa	3 (male) 7 (Female)	16 (Female) 6 (Male)	12 (female)	12 persons
Jaffna	4 (male) 6 (Female)	6 (Male) 15 (female)	(Not Conducted)	8 Persons

SWOT Analysis

40. SWOT analysis is an additional method which has been used to gather information from Partner Organizations, IAs and other stakeholders such as the GAs and officials supporting the project. The main objective of the SWOT analysis is to obtain the views of the stakeholders and partner organizations on five main aspects/issues of the project. The issues to be considered in the analysis are the following: a) Project design and strategy b) Project management and institutional framework c) Project resources and fund management d) Project results and achievements to date and e) Projects perspectives of sustainability. SWOT analysis carried out by synthesizing individual stakeholder interviews. Although a stakeholder workshop was arranged to verify findings of the assessment it has been postponed several times and finally the idea has been dropped due to time constrains. Key stakeholders interviewed are

UNICEF, Save the Children, WUSC, Ministry of Social Welfare, Department of Industries, LTTE Planning and Development Secretariat, TRO, District Secretaries (Jaffna, Batticaloa) Divisional Secretaries, Sarvodaya (Batticaloa), and some VT providers at project areas.

Case Studies

41. This is an additional data collection instrument adopted to get more qualitative data to substantiate the data and information collected through interviews and discussions. This is rather an anthropological survey instrument that narrates the real process of reintegration and rehabilitation of child soldiers into the society. Three case studies were conducted with beneficiaries who have reintegrated through training and counseling process by AP and MPs. These case studies illustrate three phases of the life of the former child soldiers: status of the child prior to becoming a child soldier, situation where he/she served in an armed group and former child soldier situation or the condition after the project support for reintegration. Since this is a sensitive area and one needs skills to uncover information through participant observations, some trained graduates in social anthropology from each district have been deployed for to stay one week in the locality and collect such information.
42. Overall, in the assessment process a special emphasis has been given to gender sensitivity in conducting the field work and analysis. Wherever possible beneficiary interviews have been conducted for separate gender youth groups. The assessment process has seven steps. Figure 1.1 in the annex presents each step, specific tasks and expected outputs under each task under the assessment.

DATA ANALYSIS

43. As indicated in the TOR, the evaluation findings were triangulated and documented to ensure their credibility and validity. Basically the findings are compared with at least two different sources. Information gathered from the different sources checked through comparisons and verification discussions. For example, information from beneficiary interviews has been cross checked by interviews with POs and documentary evidence in the project office. It is the view of the consultant that the observations, interviews with the beneficiaries and stakeholders in the field are the most reliable and useful data sources of the assessment. Figure 1.2 annex A explains the triangulation method.

Evaluation Standard

44. In conducting the assessment the consultant has followed the required evaluation standard specified in the UNEG. Particularly the standards such as competencies and ethics (2.1) designing of conducting the evaluation (Standard 3.1 to 3.16), and preparation of evaluation reports (Standards 4.1 to 4.18) have been strictly followed. Furthermore analysis is based on triangulated data which are compared with at least

the two data sources. Finally verification meetings with the key stakeholders and sharing of field observations through emails have been carried out.

Constraints and Limitations

45. There were several constraints and limitations that delayed the assessment process. Field work in the districts were constrained by political and security uncertainties on several occasions. Especially, in Trincomalee which is the center of most of the current problems between the government and the armed forces, field work had to be postponed on the several occasions. Thus consultant was compelled to change the field work schedule and limit the number of discussions and interviews due to inability to organize the necessary field arrangements. Also focus group discussions with different type of beneficiaries were not always possible. Only in Jaffna and Batticaloa the beneficiaries were interviewed as groups. In Trincomalee only individual interviews were conducted.
46. Analysis of field data through triangulation was not possible on certain issues. As some stakeholders were not able to contribute to the assessment because there was a continuous change of the officials as well as lack of understanding on the ILO IPEC activities in the district. Thus the consultant attempted to meet more than one official in some key agencies to obtain the information and it took more time than was expected.
47. SWOT analysis could not be properly conducted due to difficulties on collecting information specific issues of form A. Many stakeholders commented on the project in general. Very few had fair knowledge to assess the SWOT of the project on separate issues.
48. It was not possible to collect information for the form C which aimed at finding out the fund allocation or budget estimates of other projects and donors engage in child soldier reintegration and prevention of children involve in armed conflict. Though an attempt was made to get such information most agencies do not wish to share such detail as they are unable to disclose all funding sources and amount used for different projects. Overall, it was difficult to get information to all of the questions listed under 13 to 15 of the TOR within the time frame allocated for the assignment.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

49. The overall programme document of USDOL supported ILO-IPEC on the elimination of child labour provides a clear guidance and direction for the implementation of country specific activities. Stated objectives and indicators in the overall programme document are very much identical with country annex. Also the target beneficiaries and implementation modalities are more or less similar in both documents. However, a number of differences are identified in areas such as management structure, institutional framework and sustainability strategy. Following table compares the differences and similarities between overall programme document and the country annex of the project.

Table: 3 Comparison between the overall programme document and the country annex

Area	Comparison (identical, similar, different)	Programme Document	Country annex
1. Objectives	<u>Identical</u>		
2. Indicators	<u>Identical</u>		
3. Beneficiaries	<u>Similar</u>	The target is very specific and most of the activities are aimed at reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-child soldiers or UR	Target is larger than what is in the PRODOC. Also overall programme document is heavily focus on UR as the main target group but the country annex emphasises more on the war affected vulnerable children as target beneficiaries.
4. Implementation modality	<u>Similar</u>	A range of activities stated under the menu of options. It includes, advocacy, legal actions, child right protection and reintegration and prevention of children involved in armed conflict	.Specific to the reintegration activities in the menu of options/.
5. Management structure	<u>Different</u>	Programme document provide only very small management unit to implement the project. It support only for CPC partly. Implementation of the project required an elaborate management structure	The project required a much larger field level management structure than was originally envisaged. It is managed as a separate project within IPEC Sri Lanka
6. Institutional framework	<u>Different</u>	Implementation of activities under menu of options required national level institutional structure and country wide actions.	The project works within the restrictions of the Action Plan for Children affected by War, which is only operational in the NE/ no national level

			activities are undertaken
7. Sustainability strategy	<u>Different</u>	Sustainability strategy assumes a smooth transfer of management and project assets to the local partner organizations and beneficiaries. No clear exit strategy defined considering the country specific constraints.	Very difficult to introduce in the context of the extreme destruction to all infrastructure and services after more than 2 decades of war, and the continuous unstable security situation.

50. The design of the overall programme document provides the basic guidelines for the country strategy thus it provides an effective framework and modalities to achieve the programme objective at national level. Interviews and field observations revealed that implementation of the respective tasks by partners and stakeholders including the VT component were not adhered to as expected or agreed. Especially, implementation of anticipated tasks under country annex has been disturbed, interrupted and delayed due to two major reasons: the Tsunami and the split in the LTTE movement in the east during 2004.

51. Tsunami that stormed Sri Lanka on 26th December 2004 has had tremendous impacts on the implementation of the project. Especially in eastern and northern coastal areas there were thousands of children left orphaned and later sent to welfare camps. Not only the youth affected by war but also the children in general had to be providing with care and psychosocial support. Thus partner agencies of USDOL action projects had to focus their attention to immediate needs of there areas and wait till the situation return to normal to re-start the training. For example the VT of Department of Industries at Trincomalee could not complete as expected due to the poor attendance of the trainees after the tsunami.

52. The second challenge for the project during 2004 was the split within the LTTE. In April 2004, thousands of UR has fled to interior villages with no idea of future. Thus reintegration process was extremely difficult in the eastern district of Baticaloa. Still there are incidences of grass root level confrontation between armed groups. A huge influx of UR after the clash between fractions within the LTTE led the entire referral and reintegration process into a big dilemma. As referral process could not go ahead as planned, selection of beneficiaries for VT programmes under the programme action projects by respective IAs also got delayed. Most of the local NGOs including the partner agencies of IPEC-USDOL had to prepare immediate plans to find temporary measures to provide counseling and psycho social support for URs.

53. The following observations of one of the field staff of the ILO-IPEC clearly explains the ground situation at that time:

“In Batticaloa, the process got disturbed especially, when the UR children came out of the LTTE camps owing to the internal rift within the LTTE. The Agents who were on the job of protection did not know what to do. Yet, the UN focal points for Action Plan implementation were mainly concerned about their roles but did not take a clear look at the ground situation and were trying to cope up with something which they could not cope up because they did not have trained workers who only reacted as how they understood the process. In the case of ILO/IPEC, the main partners were weak in not having trained workers to make proper assessments. Social Workers who were to assess VST requirements of the beneficiaries were very weak because they did not have a good understanding of their duties in making referrals for VST”.

54. In general, the performances of partner agencies in completing the targets were very slow during the first 18 months of operation. The common problem such as procedural delays in referral process, poor attendance of beneficiaries during post tsunami period has also affected the action projects. Since there is no transit center functioning currently, no proper system to identify and select UR who are in need of vocational training. This situation is continuing and agencies responsible are weak in activating the referral process. On the other hand the government too is reluctant get involve in UR referral process and they play only a responsive role rather than taking an initiative role. This is one of the reasons for include more number of vulnerable children in to USDOL action projects by partner agencies.
55. Despite all of the above constraints and challenge, the project was able achieve the targets set for the first half of the project. Number of children reintegrated through VT and other programmes has increased considerably during latter part of the year 2005. UNICEF, the coordinating agency of all the activities of the Action Plan strongly feels that the achievements by the partner agencies including the ILO –IPEC VT projects are commendable.
56. All the stakeholders including ILO-IPEC staff found that the project objectives are valid and realistic even in the context of political and security uncertainties in some districts. There was a training programmes for all partner organizations, with other funds in September 2004 where the IPEC objectives of elimination of child labour was presented. Despite such orientations, some partner organizations of IPEC who implement VT action projects are still not well understood the long term objectives of the project .However one should aware that, given the security context of the project most people would not be comfortable discussing this issue in detail. They are mostly keen to provide training and guidance to the beneficiaries. Job placements and follow up to find employment or proper income generation livelihood opportunities for trainees sometimes far beyond their capacities.
57. Also the implementation of action projects delayed and some could not meet the time frame. For example, action projects have been delayed and interrupted due to

security constraints for UR to attend centre based training at Trincomalee. Thus such action projects had to provide quick and modified training curricula to adjust to the timeframe and beneficiary needs.

58. Implementation of action projects through government agencies and local NGOs is relevant and justified as there were no established VT provision systems in place in the region at the time of commencement of the project. However the need of careful supervision and monitoring by the IPEC is stressed here very much to realize the objectives of the project against the time frame.
59. According to the country annex and the programme document the project objectives lead to more field level operations including technical backstopping for partner agencies. Due to limitations on allocating funds for providing resources for field operations, the expected intensified supervision got affected. IPEC had only 02 field officers and 01 vehicle to cover all 03 districts at the beginning, whereas other agencies had their field presence in each district. The capacities of the field staff are not fully exercised owing to limited resources. However, the field presence was strengthened as other donors came into the project. Also the capacity of field staff has improved over the past few months as they gain experience. In Trincomalee district, the field activities are looked after by a single junior field officer. In short, it is the view of the consultant that increased work motivating facilities could make project more effective. The total expectations of the programme do not correlate with funds provided for the programme. Especially more funds to field staff to involve in participatory planning and implementing the action projects, monitoring and feed back to partner organizations may lead smooth and systematic progress of the project. The phase two of the project should allow adequate time for planning and implementation of VT giving due consideration for specific field conditions in each district.
60. Field staff and partner agencies found that there is a need for reformulation of the project design considering the continuous return of UR under various circumstances during the first phase. Key stakeholders including the LTTE on the other hand feel that reformulation of objectives of the projects under the “Action Plan” through focusing UR childrens’ families is required. There are a number of “push” and “pull” factors that affect the reintegration of URs. URs could not fully reintegrate only through VT provision. For example security situation was not conducive for UR children to get the necessary rehabilitation support or employment opportunities in the labor market like the other youths. Also some URs are afraid of re-join their families as they do not see a welcome situation at home level due to poverty and social labeling in the neighborhood. The lifestyle that they have undergone during the period they served in the armed group affects the way that they perceive the future.
61. LTTE is critical about the projects implemented under the Action Plan in general. According to the LTTE only an **insignificant** number of were affected children have been reintegrated by various donor supported projects under the Action Plan. Out of

total of 7868 children affected by war (CAW), only around 1692 (less than 25%) were supported or some action taken by the agencies involved in providing relief and reintegration activities during 2004. (TRO Progress report 2004). It is also the view of some partner agencies that funds available are insufficient to provide full and complete VT for beneficiaries to become employable after the training. Field observations revealed that though many URs obtained vocational skill orientation from NGOs including USDOL-CS funded projects, such efforts were not enough to meet the regional standard for such VT requirements.

62. Also for reintegration, the parents of each individual child or the guardian must be considered as a part of the process. It is suggested to reformulate the programme design such a way that the family of UR as a target group and provide additional support to such vulnerable poor through employment opportunity, counselling that will help in the reintegration of children effectively in the longer run. The following response by an ILO-IPEC field staff illustrates the above findings further. *“The long term development objective of the project can stay as far as it is valid today than during the inception period. But the present ground situation is different to the baseline situation at the time programme was designed; there must be a package in readiness or immediate stock taking, to deviate accordingly for smooth onward journey of the project. On this issue of reintegration the parents of each individual child’s or the guardian must be considered. This was lacking in this design of the programme.”*
63. Though the original project design focuses heavily on reintegration of children with their families and this was considered as coherent and relevant at the time of its inception, the process has been delayed and constrained due to various reasons. According to the interviews with partner agencies of the programme action projects and the IPEC field staff, the systematic approach to IPEC’s VT intervention was seriously affected by the referral process of Action Plan and procedural delays in obtaining approval for action programmes. Most of the VT interventions during the Phase I, was addressing the emergency requirements of released UR. The anticipated method of children being kept at transit centres until proper VT options did not work properly. Since transition centres become defunct at the latter part of the first phase, SCSL had to focus UR on an individual and case basis. It took more time than referral of UR as batches. The original project design was relevant where the transit centre was the hub of the whole process. TRO was responsible to construct the transit centre, which did not materialize as expected. Some transit centres were located in the vicinity of the rebel camps and there was no free and calm environment to children and youth to think and work freely. In Batticaloa the normal process got delayed because of this issue and the SCSL was not prepared with the cadre of trained social workers who should have been on board before the children were released. When thousands of children came out of armed groups due to the split in the LTTE, social workers were unable to act fast. Lacking in capacity, skills in counselling and referral activities many young social workers of SCSL were not able to link the VT providers and transit centres.

64. There are conflicting views among partners and stakeholders on the modality of vocational training; one group including the LTTE and the Key government agencies believe that the Centre based training is much more disciplined, organized and beneficiaries could gain thorough training. The other group including small scale partner agencies and community members feel that Community based training is much more effective and beneficial for children from a security and social protection point of view. From the project perspective, both types have merits and limits. For example the centre based training has qualified trainers, accredited VT courses and the beneficiaries have greater opportunities to interact to learn from each other. But it is costly and the beneficiaries especially UR faces problems in attending courses due to travel problems through the army barriers. Also there is no community ownership. On the other hand the community based training has social accountability of local partner organizations, easier for the beneficiaries to attend the programmes, with no security restrictions to travel. But most of the VT courses lacked standard, qualified teachers and there was less employability for trainees in town and urban centres.
65. Thus VT interventions need to have a proper balance of centre-based and community-based training depending on the target group, trades selected and infrastructure availability. In emergency situations, maintaining this balance may not be possible. Provided sufficient time, the project may strike the proper balance which is planned for Phase II of the operations. Out of the total six sites visited by the consultant only one (CWDR) conduct community based VT. However, there are number of CBT projects are in pipeline under the other IPEC ILO projects.
66. Also it is suggested that it would be more beneficial and effective if the project design reformulated considering the community socioeconomic conditions and the degree of vulnerability of households in each community targeted. Thus community vulnerability mapping would be appropriate to identify and target for a coherent and sustainable programme for reintegration and prevent children involving in armed conflicts. However it doesn't mean that the project intervention is not aiming livelihood improvement objectives at the end but such focus will improve the household environment of the vulnerable children to reintegrate with confidence.
67. As far as selection of partner organizations for provision of VT under the project is concerned, the number of difficulties was experienced at the initial stage. As a result of the decades long civil of war the once strong training network of the north and east was severely weakened. Since the capacity of local partner organizations in the conflict area is not as improved in the non affected southern, the NGOs are relatively weak and lack maturity. One of the initial preparatory activities of the project was to undertake a comprehensive mapping of the capacities of all formal, non formal and rural vocational training options including apprenticeships in the districts of the north eastern province of Sri Lanka. Funded by AusAid, a database was created to host all the information obtained. The information collected pertains to 2004 and the CD versions of selected reports were distributed widely to all the project partners to assist in the placement of children referred to vocational training. However there is little evidence in the field to support that the project activities have been planned on proper

baseline data. Only a few partners said that they are provided with some idea of what kind of training is needed. According to the stakeholders, the absence of Economic Development Plan for NE was also a major constraint for VT as well as other activities designed for CAWs

- 68.** According to the IPEC coordinator, though IPEC has its own criteria for selection of partner organizations, none of the NGOs(VT providers) in the project area had the required capacity at the beginning. Thus IPEC selected partner organizations on the recommendations from other UN and NGOs in the area. According to the situation prevailed at that time there was no other alternative but implement the project with organizations that have the capacity to provide VT with limited facilities. However, this might be one reason for the poor performance in achieving targets during first phase by some partner organizations. e.g. CWDR
- 69.** . According to government stakeholders some partner NGOs lack social accountability and are more entrepreneurial and profit oriented. One partner organization in Jaffna (Patrician) performed well in terms of completing the action projects as scheduled. This NGO provides center based training. But it lacks social accountability and mostly cater to the urban and affected communities that have access to its facilities. Another partner agency (CWDR) in Batticaloa and Trincomalee performed poorly in terms of management and administration of action projects. However these partner agencies are now provided with technical backstopping and support to correct and strengthen their capacities.
- 70.** Field officials too found difficulties and faced several constraints in adopting a scientific and methodical selection procedure in selecting partners in the phase I. Due to exigencies of providing training to referrals, the partners were selected based on their flexibility to accommodate 14-18 age groups into their courses, possibility to recruit trainees in the middle of programmes, and ability to organize courses on the choice of the beneficiaries.
- 71.** Selection of beneficiaries on the other hand is rather haphazard because the project could not proceed with the slow process adopted in UR referral process. Thus it has to adopt various strategies to get the beneficiaries. The level of literacy and formal education of beneficiaries and parents is very low. Some have dropped out from the school and parents could not contribute much as they are pressed with economic hardships. Thus it was difficult to adopt any participatory process. Sometimes the beneficiaries were selected through personal contacts. In this context personal contacts means not in a negative form such as nepotism or favoritism but some children who are in need of career guidance but unable to find information on VT opportunities or other prospects in remote villages have been helped by persons known to the partner agencies. Social workers attached NGOs directed few children who are really vulnerable and lack social exposure to get training under the project. Thus it has not created any damage to the project implementation or reputation risk for the ILO-IPEC. However, this situation could have been avoided if project adopted

a participatory process from the beginning which was not possible due to various reasons. Number of persons selected through this method is less than 10. For the community based training however most of the beneficiaries were selected through participatory manner involving, parents, community based organizations and local leaders.

72. The project office has identified these drawbacks in the VT process and it has now been able develop a ***modular Life- Skills training package*** with AusAid funds which includes character building components that will promote the sense of responsibility, motivation and self worth. It is intended to provide them with a set of basic knowledge and skills that will help children from vulnerable situations to become independent and successful. In the context of this project, life skills training are regarded as part of pre-vocational training process. Social workers and social mobilizers from the projects implementing partner organizations were trained in the delivery of the material. The package has been pilot tested and final revisions are currently underway
73. Overall, the phase I (March 2004 to December 2005) had defects in selecting the beneficiaries and partners because there was no choice but to give training for people who have been referred by save the children and selected by partner organizations. It is a learning exercise for the most of the IPEC field staff and partners.
74. Though ILO has completed mapping of existing VT centres in the North East and it will strengthen the database of the Provincial Council of NE, additional baseline data need to be collected for long term sustainability of the project. In this regard ILO has initiated actions by developing the ToR for a capacity building programme for vulnerability research on children affected by human and natural disasters in the NE. Action Plan partners are also planning a resource and vulnerability mapping to be conducted at the end of this year.
75. Project indicators and means of verifications are relevant and useful in terms of measuring the project performance and progress. Although there are child files and information is sent regularly to head office (Colombo) from the field offices to review, there is little evidence to support that such indicators have been used systematically by the project staff and partner organizations. It doesn't mean that project data is not utilized by project staff in an ideal manner but lack exchange of feedback between officials and regular updates by partner agencies. In measuring performance only quantitative aspects are given more emphasis. Most of the evaluation reports contained quantitative data such as the number of participants, number of projects, number of dropouts, number of job placements etc. Project maintains a database and revises periodically. But qualitative indicators are lacking. For example standards or quality of training, capacity of resources persons, changes in the social outlook and personality of trainees etc.
76. In responding to the above critique an IPEC field officials stated as follows: ***“It is correct that qualitative indicators are lacking but the time frame of the phase I***

projects is so limited that even if qualitative indicators are stressed it would be difficult to measure and justify production on ground when the quantum of the input is below the production need of the project. On the other hand, although the monitoring and evaluation of what is done is satisfactory, the project does not provide support for holistic development of the child when VST is completed.”

77. Overall project level, regular progress review meetings with all partner organizations take place to appraise the progress, review obstacles and strategies for improvement. Such review meetings helped the project staff to respond to unexpected challenges caused by tsunami and to the weaknesses in the referral process. The progress monitoring of partner activities from Colombo has been done systematically. Jaffna and Batticaloa offices maintained updated information on the performance of partner NGOs. In addition VT expert and the Technical staff of the IPEC conducted continuous monitoring and auditing of the implementation and field missions to the project area including the action projects. The Chief technical advisor IPEC Asia region too has produced some excellent review reports about the performance of IAs and prospects of the action projects in implementing the project.
78. However, monitoring activities at action projects level are not adequately done. Especially, self evaluation following each action project as specified in the programme document has not been carried out. **Self evaluations process has been started at the time of the mid term assessment.** Though each partner organizations maintain a list of trainees passed out, there is no systematic follow up monitoring to track the beneficiaries and the impact at action project level. VT mapping and labour demand analysis by region is still to be incorporated into the programme level.
79. Although overall programme document and country annexes emphasises a participatory project implementation and monitoring, such efforts are not adequately integrated in the activities of the phase one action programmes. Though there are immense potential and varying degrees of individual capacities among the field staff of IPEC, very little effort has been taken to develop synergies across the districts and exchange of experience between field staff of the three sites of the project. Feedback through dialog between field staff is required to develop better strategies.
80. Overall, children and youth participation is very low in the design and planning of the project. Most of the beneficiaries interviewed for this assessment were unable to explain the way that they have been identified and selected for the training. Parents in few locations said that they were invited for a discussion on designing of the training project for children. Action programmes are designed mostly by IPEC and partners based on the regional experiences. It is mostly a top-down approach and not a participatory approach. However this is not a weakness of the project management but the programme design did not realize the complexity involved in adhering to a participatory approach in the context of “No war –No peace” situation. Thus the project basically attempts to address the needs of Action Plan for the CAW and it is not a participatory process. As far as URs are concerned, a participatory approach

was not possible as the beneficiaries were identified through a referral process adhered to by Save the Children and UNICEF. However, vocational guidance was provided to beneficiaries by partner organizations through their VTRPs. In phase 1 however action projects have been designed in a haphazard manner. It was top down planning since there was no possibility to get the UR children expected to be released to participate in the initial stages of the project. Their participation came in only at the referral point.

81. It is the common view of the field staff of IPEC and the stakeholders that this issue does not seem relevant in assessing the project. They believe that it would have been very difficult to design the project if the beneficiary participation was to be in the process.
82. Action Programme was designed by IPEC and Partners assuming who the beneficiaries are in terms of child welfare related universal conventions. Therefore the suggestion of the stakeholders and project staff is to have a middle path approach in planning and designing the action projects rather than a totally participatory project design.
83. For example, POs and IPEC could prepare a menu of action projects and discuss and consult with the targeted beneficiaries to identify their preferences. Overall, all stakeholders agree that there is a need for greater child participation in the design stage of the next phase. UNICEF has initiated a number of activities such as Children as Zones of Peace. Also children's Peace Poll conducted as part of Action Plan awareness campaign in order to increase children's participation in the peace process and decisions that affect them.
84. It is the view of key stakeholders and the project staff that the time frame for action programmes is confined mostly to implementation allowing no room for conducting participatory procedures or follow up activities of the action programmes. Even VTRPs found difficult to complete some of the training in a given period. VTRPs are hired only for the provision of technical knowledge and skills to the beneficiaries during the six month training period. Some VT beneficiary required further training to become skilled persons in the vocation. It is necessary to have a participatory planning and the design phase at least one month prior to the vocational training and another follow up career guidance period of two months. The VTRPs should be kept for the follow up period to help the POs to job placement and career guidance. Thus action project should have period of preparation and follow up as well as funds to be apportioned according to the impact expectations
85. On the other hand sustainability of the impact of VT training cannot be assessed at this stage. The beneficiaries who have received training in various vocations are at different stages of the income earning and finding employment. The following statement of an IPEC field official clearly explains the reasons for the difficulty to design a strategy for sustainability for project impacts. ***“The absence of time for a project preparatory period was a critical issue. Sequencing was okay. However, follow up after training could not be continued since the Phase I was implemented***

as an emergency measure. It is rather a learning process. The importance of the follow up is realized and time and budget are to be allocated in the Phase II for it”

- 86.** IPEC has maintained good relations between other child focus programmes supported by other donors. IPEC has several child focus orientation, life skill training and counselling programmes which are well integrated with other donor funded VT projects. Partners who are implementing the projects at local level too have child focus mini projects. In Jaffna the local office of IPEC has initiated a number of link projects with local NGOs and INGOs: i.e. Food for Training with the WFP. Further the ILO-IPEC with support of NORAD and other donors supported local NGOs to establish a modern residential VT training centre at Killinochchi. It is an example of coordinated effort to create economies of scale in VT provision in the district.
- 87.** Also IPEC initiated a dialog between other INGOs such as WUSC, GTZ, BAI involved in VT in NE and planned to sign a letter of intent with them. ILO_IPEC is the agency for the coordination of VT provision under the Action Plan. Under the action plan UNICEF, Department of Industries, Ministry of Social Welfare, Vocational Training Authority are closely working with the ILO-IPEC to carry out the VT projects and follow up support for trainees. It was found that in a few locations UNDP has consented to assist through micro credit facilities to a number of beneficiaries to start self employment. Also under some other projects VT trainees are provided with loans and microfinance support. As a result, there is some confusion among the beneficiaries due to the varying inputs for VT given by VT providers. For example, IPEC does not provide stipends to the trainees but many others pay stipends to the trainees.
- 88.** Today, more than 60 organizations including international agencies such as UN are involved in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict. Implementation of child focus programs for prevention is a major activity of local and international agencies while reintegration of child soldiers is a specific task and only a limited number of agencies are involved in it. Following table summarizes the key organizations involved in prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict after signing of MoU between the GOSL and the LTTE in 2002.

Table 4 List of organisations in the country in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

ACTORS / ORGANIZATIONS				
Name of organisation	Type of organisation	Main area of intervention	Estimated annual budget	Geographic coverage
1.UNICEF	International Organization	Prevention/ Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province ³⁹
2.UNDP	International Organization	Rehabilitation/Reconstruction	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
3.UNHCR	International Organization	Prevention/Rehabilitation	Not Known	Northeast districts and Border districts Puttalam, Polnanaruwa and Anuradhapura
4.Save the Children Sri Lanka (SCSL)	I NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
5.Germen Technical Corporation (GTZ)	I NGO	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
6World University Service of Canada (WUSC)	I NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
7.FORUT -UK	I NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
8 Ministry of Social Welfare	Government Organization	Prevention/Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	Northeast districts and Border districts Puttalam, Polnanaruwa and Anuradhapura
Oxfam-UK	I NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
9 Sarvodaya	NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation	Not Known	Northeast districts and Border districts Puttalam, Polnanaruwa and Anuradhapura
10Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO)	NGO	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province
11.BAJ	I NGO	Prevention/Rehabilitation	Not Known	All 8 districts in the

³⁹ Northeast Province consist of eight districts: Jaffna, Mullaithivu, Mannar, Killinochci, Vavunia, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara

				Northeast province
<u>12</u> Department of Industries and Vocational Training Authority of Sri Lanka	Government Organization	Prevention/Rehabilitation /Training	Not Known	Northeast districts and Border districts Puttalam, Polnanaruwa and Anuradhapura
<u>13</u> Sri Lanka Child Rights Protection Authority	Government Organization	Prevention, Rehabilitation, legal protection and child development	Not Known	All Island including all districts of war affected districts in the Northeast.
REERDO	NGO	Prevention, Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	Selected districts in the Northeast province
<u>14</u> Other ⁴⁰	NGOs and CBOs	Prevention/Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Not Known	All 8 districts in the Northeast province

89. As far as projects and programs are concerned, the majority of child focus projects are implemented under the Action Plan for CAW. Also most of these projects are supported by UN agencies and International Donor Agencies. Following list is a summary of major projects and programs aimed at providing various assistance for children to prevent them involving in armed conflict and reintegration of children through training and educational activities.

Table 5 List of projects in the country in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

Name of project	Implementing agency / organization	Budget (in US\$)	Brief description of objectives and support provided	Project start and end date (mm/yy)	Funding donor agency(ies)	Geographic coverage
<u>1.</u> Action Plan for Children affected by War	GOSL, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, ILO and SCSL, TRO	UNICEF (8.3 million) UNDP (4 Million) ILO- (3.900.000)	To provide reintegration services to 50,000 children affected by war, including released under-aged recruits.	May 2003 to May 2005	DFID, USDOL, NORAD, AusAID	ALL 8 districts NE Sri Lanka
<u>2.</u> WFP	FAO	Not Known	To provide food items for children and affected families to restart the schooling and vocational	<u>General</u>	<u>UN</u>	ALL 8 districts NE Sri Lanka

⁴⁰ There are more than 20 local NGOs and Community Based Organizations involved in prevention and rehabilitation of youth involved in armed conflict. See annex- for more detail.

			education			
<u>3.NECO RD</u>	<u>NEPC</u>	Not Known	To provide vocational Training and infrastructure facilities to children affected by WAR	<u>2002-2007</u>	<u>ADB</u>	ALL 8 districts NE Sri Lanka
Vocation al Education for Peace and Reconcili ation	PSO and NGOs	USD 2.3 Million	To assist youth to engage in long term development and lasting peace in the country through job oriented education and involved in peace activities	<u>2004-2008</u>	<u>ODW-Norway</u>	Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Killinoch chci, Badulla and Ampara
Other	NGO					

90. Overall, synergies between the various partners were utilised and provided a unique opportunity to collaborate on broader issues relating to children. Some commendable actions and decisions were taken by the key stakeholders of the Action Plan at the review meeting which was held in October 2005 to incorporate the lessons learned in assisting CAW. ILO-IPEC has made a number of new proposals including capacity building of partner organizations and joint actions to undertake community based training focusing war affected families.

91. According to project progress reports and records, IPEC Colombo staff has conducted a series of discussions and workshops on the project design with National Child Protection Authority, UNICEF and Other key stakeholders. Linkages with govt. agencies such as TVEC, SLVTA, NAITA, ICTAD and NITESL were established to receive support on curriculum development, training manual sharing, training of trainers etc. Ministry of Vocational Training is represented at the Programme Steering Committee of CAW project.

PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION, MANAGEMENT AND ACHIEVEMENTS

92. The existing organizational and management structure of the ILO-IPEC Colombo office includes a three member technical staff including the country coordinator and the field staff. Country coordinator and field staff in Jaffna and Batticaloa look after the action project management. Trincomalee has only a junior field official at the time of the assessment. As far as expected results and outcomes of the project are concerned organizational management structure is inadequate to carry out planned activities. Since the field staff capacity is limited they are restricted to focus on given tasks. There are limited opportunities for innovations and to develop linkages with other stakeholders and interest groups. Field staff often found difficulties in planning and monitoring of action projects. Direct contacts with beneficiaries and feedback by the project staff is very much restricted and limited due to lack of physical and human resources at field level.
93. One of the key elements in the project management structure is its centralized decision making and lack of opportunities for field staff for micro management decision making. Most of the technical decisions have been taken by the PMU in Colombo. Field staff is much more dependent on PMU and its technical guidance. On the other hand, lack of flexibility in adjusting to field realities and emergency situation has impacted the progress of the project at local level.
94. Overall, out of the 8 districts of conflict affected Northeast region, the project has its field operations only in 3 districts. On the other hand even in these three districts most of the logistical and field facilities were provided only recently. Thus until recently ILO presence in the Northeast region has not been prominent compared to other INGOs and UN agencies that provide assistance for CAW.
95. According to the project staff of the PMU, the technical and administrative guidance provided by ILO to the project is adequate and helpful. However, there are difficulties in adhering to the strict monitoring procedures imposed and technical assessments against indicators. Since PMU obtained funds and assistance from various donors, procedures and methodologies of project performance appraisals vary. Simple and realistic assessment indicators are to be developed. Since there is no uniformity in project planning, implementation and monitoring across donor funded VT projects, the ILO_IPEC staffs has to spend considerable time in reporting and preparing various documents. However the PMU has been so far able to manage the workload and maintain good linkages with all donors, partners and stakeholders. One of the common complaints by government sector officials however is the lack of information sharing and poor feedback from the field site staff on their tasks and activities in relation to reintegration and prevention of children in armed conflict
96. It is the view of most of the stakeholders that the project has gained considerable recognition among INGOs and donor agencies during a short period of time in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration of CAW. Especially appreciated is the lead

role played by the project management in VT provision for CAW in the Northeast region. Project management can be divided into two levels broadly. National level (Colombo) and Field level management (at district level). As far as the project management at national level is concerned its technical and administrative capacity is very strong. Maintaining linkages with UN agencies, INGOs and government agencies is commendable. Key officials of stakeholder organizations in Colombo expressed their fullest satisfaction on project management and the leadership of the country programme coordinator. The weakest aspect is however is the field level management structure which has is still not gained enough recognition and capacity to manage resources and action projects without guidance from the head office. Micro level management such as identification of action projects, participation in local development and rehabilitation forums, monitoring and supervision of action projects and partner performance, community level interactions and feed back is inadequate. Following table summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the project management identified by key stakeholders

Table 6 : Strengths and weaknesses of the Project Management

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well motivated /dedicated field staff • Good communication and understanding between staff • Able to maintain a balance between conflicting parties • Transparency in decision making and fund allocation • Strong leadership and decision making • Strong partnerships network • Good synergies between partners to utilize for the broader benefit of children • Efficient management of limited resources and faculties • Able to manage multi-donor supported VT projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor linkages between field staff and community • Lack of interaction among field staff in three locations • Lack opportunity to learn and share experiences • Poor relationship between field staff and government sector stakeholders • Weak data base and research on VT impacts • Limited presence in the field and with NGO partners • Weak supervision of partner VT projects • Poor follow-up and post training technical backstopping

97. Fund management of PMU is transparent and partner organizations are aware of fund allocations. However, many key stakeholders at national level are unaware of fund allocations and distribution of funds among various projects and partners. Financial management of the project is systematic and reviewed bi-annually. As far as fund allocation to field sites and action projects is concerned, it has done through review of the progress and performance of each partner organizations. But selection of partner

organizations and government departments to implement VT projects should be done more carefully. It is necessary to do review of past records and social accountability of partner organizations and criteria to be developed to engage VT providers and VTRPs for the action projects

- 98.** Also decision making of project management need to be decentralized allowing more responsibility and power to the micro level management by the site offices. It is also needed to strengthen the capacity of field officials in locations like Trincomalee. Research and database for planning and monitoring at project level should also be improved
- 99.** The supported action projects have two immediate objectives: a) strengthening selected training providers in NE province through infrastructure rehabilitation, institutional capacity building and establishment of two new training centres and b) enabling war affected children and youths to secure decent work as a result of skill upgrading in vocational and business management skills through apprenticeships and job placement services. (This information obtained from the PC office in Colombo: Need Clarification)
- 100.** According to the progress reports and field observations the action programmes of Phase I did not contribute adequately to capacity development of partner organizations due to the exigency of providing training to referrals. Many partner organizations lack the required capacity and training facilities are yet to be provided to improve the quality and technical standards of their VT. Capacity development of partners too needs attention. Therefore Phase II should give sufficient attention to this component.
- 101.** The action programmes are however, able to meet the second immediate objective to the certain extent. Despite the challenges caused by tsunami and rival confrontations between armed groups in the eastern province action programmes have been well executed in all three locations. Through these action programmes the project has provided VT for war affected children and youths to become productive skilled labourers in various vocations. However only less than one third of the beneficiaries found some sort of Income Avenue after training. This is mainly because of lack of follow up support and inadequate standards of some VT.
- 102.** In general, there is around 10-20% drop outs in each action programme implemented so far. Drop outs are due to various reasons. Some beneficiaries selected do not have basic literacy and some other have no conducive family background and support due to poverty, Some UR have dropped out due to security risks involved in travelling to urban training centres.. Community Based VT is relatively effective compared to centre based ones.
- 103.** Follow up was not so effective due to several reasons. Especially lack of time and funds in action programmes, poor microfinance facilities for self employments for youth, weak economic development activities of the government in the region due to

the discontinuation of peace negotiations are key constraints for securing employments by trainees. .

104. Although it is true that the Action Projects contributed to create livelihood opportunities for the children, such efforts are not sufficient to ensure some of the children to refrain from joining armed groups or action. It was reported that some of the trained youths were engaged in tsunami rehabilitation activities of armed rebels in their respective villages⁴¹. The LTTE also shares the view that the provision of VT is not the only solution to the deeper problems involved in reintegration and prevention of children in armed conflict. It is the view of LTTE that the project including the Action Plan should look into the social and family context of the children and this needs a comprehensive programme that creates a conducive social and family environment for return of UR to their families and also other vulnerable children to find alternative career paths.

105. According to TRO progress reports, the mega project for the CAW implemented in the Northeast have helped only a one fifth of the children to develop their skills or get education and life skills through awareness and VT. There are a large number of children out of the locations supported by the USDOL and other projects who are still to be supported. Thus there is a clear justification for a large scale project for assisting the CAW through VT and other child and youth development programmes (See table).

Table 7. Progress of work under social development work for (CAW) project (2004)

District	Identified effected children	Action taken	Outstanding needs for children in total
Killinochchi	1832	291	1541
Jaffna	1041	275	766
Mannar	812	96	716
Vauniya	608	180	428
Amparai	682	153	529
Batticalao	739	151	588
Mullaitivu	1682	457	1225
Trincomalee	472	89	383
Total	7868	1692	6176

Source: TRO Social Work Progress Report December 2004: Kilinochchi

106. According to the programme document, at the end of the project, a total of 660 URs (former child soldiers) are to be reintegrated and around 100 vulnerable children are to be prevented in involving in armed conflict through provision of VT. It was

⁴¹ This has been revealed by an ex child soldier in a individual interview. This has to be clarified with better sources. Any way a tracer study is planned for the entire ILOIPEC CAW project with other donor funds which will also cover the USDOL project

expected that the project should reintegrate a half of (330) URs during first half of the project. The records available reveal that the project has reached the expected targets by the middle of this year. Following table summarizes the number and type of beneficiaries covered by the project.

Table 8: Number and Type of beneficiaries received VT under USDOL action projects by end of October 2005

Implementing agency	Category		Gender		Drop out	Completed	Duration	District
	UR	Vul	M	F				
INSGD	16	58	50	24	30	74	26/8/04 30/6/05	Jaffna
Patrician Institute Department of industries CWDR	-	68	52	16	37	68	28/8/04 30/6/05	Jaffna
	7	79	38	48	04	86	27/8/04 26/7/05	Trincomalee
	-	31	31	-	Not Known	31	01/12/04 30/4/05	Trincomalee Batticaloa
PPDRO	29	52	60	21		81	01/12/04 30/10/05	Batticaloa
Grace Center	Care	2	-	2	-	2	15/06/04 14/12/04	Jaffna
Total	54	288	233	109	91	342		

Source: Progress Reports IPEC, Colombo

107. Overall, in all the three locations action programmes implemented so far have met the target number of 75 in each and even more. Project was able to reach the target of 342 by end of October 2005. The overall programme document indicated a total of 330 to be covered during the first half of the project (18 months from the beginning of 2004 to mid 2005: page 39) It is well above the target set for the first half of the project. It is the view of partner organizations that if more projects are approved the opportunities are there to meet the planned target and the need for VST will be there for years ahead.

108. However, there is a major difference in the plan of action in the programme document and country programme. Though programme document suggested focusing more on former child soldiers or UR in VT provision, most of the project beneficiaries were chosen from vulnerable children and youth. The main reason for this change in the plan is difficulties to get the required number of URs to implement the scheduled action programmes. Since there is no systematic release or referral process in place, the project could not get adequate number of URs at the time of project planning and preparation. Thus action programmes had to go ahead with selecting beneficiaries from vulnerable children category to achieve the targets. This

experience suggests that more children from the vulnerable category should get greater opportunity for project assistance or the geographical coverage of the project should be expanded to the districts that have been reported to have released more child soldiers by the armed groups.

109. Awareness raising at field level is only a part of IPEC in this project, just that much to propagate the importance of VT for livelihood but the major role was for the other agencies that have field officers at village level to raise awareness. At the beginning of the project however, IPEC was very effective in raising awareness. LTTE believes that IPEC should play a central role in bringing all other stakeholders such as UNDP, UNICEF, SCSL to act on implementation of action plan with necessary modifications. Most stakeholders including UNICEF noted that the project has made considerable contribution during a short period of time in preventing of children joining armed groups and re-integrating URs into main society through VT provision. According to interviews with non beneficiary children in all three locations, project was able to raise awareness among youth to engage in productive work and alternative career paths. Thus at least where the projects are in operation and implemented, children are better equipped with knowledge on opportunities available other than joining in armed groups.

110. In terms of leveraging resources, project has undertaken joint actions and involved in coordination of VT process under the action plan. Project activities are linked with other ILO supported projects and agency initiated VT programmes in the Northeast. Recent initiative to provide residential training for UR and other children at Kilinochchi is an example for this endeavour and it shows the ability of ILO-IPEC to implement integrated and planned intervention in VT programmes in conflict affected area. However government partner agencies do not seem to be quite satisfied with coordination and the project's working arrangements mostly with NGOs in VT provision.

111. Project is less effective in identifying work opportunities including placement of passed out trainees. However, Partner NGOs have made some progress in placing the trained persons in various job providing institutions locally. It is also observed that there are some constraints when placing children on the job training. Service providers are not well aware of the children who are from very remote areas. Though training has been provided on occupation in demand, the job providers have to be satisfied with the character of the child and the family background because of the political situation.

112. During past few months a number of supportive inputs and initiatives have been made by field staff in providing post training job placement and technical guidance. In Jaffna a programme has been arranged with WFP to provide basic supports such as food package to vulnerable and poor beneficiary children to participate in training arranged by the IPEC. This step has reduced the drop out and increased the regular attendance of the poorest children in the training courses. This has been now named as 'Food for training' and will be an integral aspect of the second phase of the project.

- 113.** Partner organizations also arranged extra carrier guidance advice and counseling services to the beneficiaries. Project with Ausaid support arranged life skills training to develop personalities and capacities of the individual beneficiary. But such social skills should be offered prior to the skill development training because most of the children who have been withdrawn or prevented do not have basic skills to manage day to day activities or face challenges in life. According to PMU the main reasons for the delay in offering life skill training is due to unavailability of the 'training package' at the beginning of action projects. However it is necessary to conduct life skill training including work place fir staid and social skills of teamwork etc before the VT.
- 114.** Though UNDP has its own mechanism to support income generation activities to war affected poor households such programmes do no cover the children belonging to age group of 14 to 17. On the other hand its working methodology is through CBOs that registered under the government laws. Since children have no such official institutional entity most places they have been excluded in getting UNDP livelihood support services. Though some places (Jaffna) microfinance has been arranged for a few girls trained on showing machine operations, they have difficulties in repaying the loan because of high interest rates charged by local CBOs in Batticaloa however the field staff arranged a loan scheme through a Children cooperative society.
- 115.** One of the critical aspects of the action programs is the lack of comprehensive toolkit strategy. Only showing machine and carpentry trainee received assistance and toolkits to start up self income activities. But others need proper post training support including toolkits or microfinance programmes arranged by the project to get involved in employment. Thus it is essential to evolve a toolkit strategy to cater to the needs of the passed out trainees. It must be a localized, vocation specific and affordable and useful one. Not all trainees should be considered similar. It is also necessary to find out the level of usage of toolkits by trainees who got such packages.
- 116.** Beneficiaries are quite satisfied with the training they received. However government sector organizations which are responsible for implementing accredited courses found the quality of the VT provided by NGOs not up to the standards. But POs believe that the quality of the VT projects has been improved a lot and the trainees who graduated got various opportunities to involve in self employment and income generation activities locally. However tool kits provided for some training are not properly used for income earning by beneficiaries. In some locations project staff has arrange for additional support for trained children and even microfinance support from other sources to start income generation activities. Some partners however lack internal technical capacity and maturity (CWDR) to manage action projects and some are more entrepreneurial and profit motive NGOs. However there are a number of good partners who have social commitment, moral obligations and responsibility. Partners need good VTRPs. capacity to provide on the job training, post training technical follow-up and so on.

BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR VIEWS ON THE PROJECT IMPACTS

- 117.** The most successful aspect of the project is the positive changes it created among the beneficiary children's personalities in building confidence and attitudes towards acquiring skills and knowledge in various vocations. In all three project locations both parents and beneficiaries evaluated the project as the single and most useful activity during post conflict period that helped the children to get out from the stress and frustration of their life due to war and isolation from state sector services. One of the major changes in the attitude is the feeling of being a productive person in the family and community. However there are differences of opinions among UR and vulnerable children as well as boys and girls on usefulness of the VT. UR found the VT is an opportunity to reintegrate with families and thereby they could support their parents as an income earner of the family. Most of the children who have undergone training and receiving training during the field work were in progress expressed the training is only an entry and guidance to decide the direction of their career. They think more should be done to improve their capacities and skills further in the vocations they trained to find jobs or engage in self income earning activities.
- 118.** According to beneficiaries, skills acquired through VT were founded relevant and provided basic training in various vocations and trades. However most of the trainees find it difficult to engage in decent work and employment soon after the training. According to field observations majority beneficiaries who have obtained skills through VT programmes are unemployed or underemployed still. Only about one third of girls who have received sewing machine training, bakery and food processing skills in Jaffna were able to enter into an income earning self-employment activities. But most of them required advanced and follow- up technical backstopping and guidance to become successful income earners. Majority of the boys who have received carpentry and motor mechanic skill training in Trincomalee are also found unemployed and only about 10% get involved in community level income earning by using the skills gained under the VT with master craftsmen in their respective locality. Girls who have received non-traditional training such as Cement Brick Making face challenges from society. In the traditional Tamil village community, social values and cultural interpretations are not supportive of girls to engage in non traditional jobs. However, the girls who have received such training were very enthusiastic to engage in such trades and want to break the social values that are non supportive for women. However, Cement Brick Making was not thrust on them. It was their choice. Girls who have received such training are optimistic in engaging in such trade and they wanted to start small industrial complex at village level. It is the view of stakeholders too that the success of VT depend on capacity of VT providers to introduce such non traditional VT programmes to the children which have a high demand. One stakeholder has suggested that 40% of VT in future should be given in non-traditional trades as there is a huge demand and as the boys do not appear to be taking interest to train in such vocations.
- 119.** Beneficiary interviews reveal that there are a number of benefits that they have received by the project. Skill training is the direct single benefit they got. In addition, orientation and career guidance from VTRPs, toolkits and life skills, social exposure

and recognition are the major benefits identified by the beneficiaries. Among three USDOL locations Jaffna and Batticaloa performed well in terms of providing various benefits and the beneficiaries expressed their fullest satisfaction. . Beneficiaries in Trincomalee however are not yet fully satisfied with the benefits except skill training (See table .7)

Table 9 Type of benefit of the project: Beneficiaries assessment

Type of benefits	Jaffna	Batticaloa	Trincomalee
Training	100% (Very high)	100%(Very high)	100%(Very high)
Orientation/ career guidance	75% (High)	75% (High)	50% (Moderate)
Life skills	50% (Moderate)	50% (Moderate)	50% (Moderate)
Toolkits/material support	75% (High)	Not yet provided for most trainees	75% (High) Only for some VT
Information	25% (Low)	25% (Low)	25% (Low)
OJT/Placement	50% (Moderate)	Not yet provided for most trainees	25% (Low) Only for some VT

120. In addition to above, there are many indirect benefits to the youth who participated in the projects. They have been exposed to group work, coexistence; compete each other for mastering skills and learning from errors. Individual and group interviews with beneficiaries reveal a tremendous change in the minds and attitudes of the children due to training. Following is a summary of the interview findings in three field locations.

Table 10: Summary of the responses on impacts of the VT by majority of beneficiaries participated in group interviews

Location/ Assessment of Changes Attitudes of beneficiaries	Jaffna	Batticaloa	Trincomalee
	We feel self confident and develop trust on ourselves. Now we are more respected and recognized by our families and community members.	First time we got an opportunity to decide what we want to do in our life. In family or the community we were dependent and no body cared before.	If we had this opportunity before children like us would have been more knowledgeable and independent in making decisions on our future. Lots of children like us want to know what we are doing in this training.
Views on Usefulness of	Very useful to get basic skills. But we	We got skills to do some trades. But we	We learn not only skills but also how to

VT	need some sort of further guidance and advanced training to become fully professional in the trades we learned	don't know whether we can market our products and services once we start self - employment	respond to the challenges and problems in our life
Effects/benefits of the project on target beneficiaries	About one third trainees graduated are involved in self employment through toolkits and machines provided by the project. The group level small shops run by women were found to be more sustainable and encouraging.	Most have just passed out. But confident of getting involved in productive work with local craftsmen. Girls are looking forward to more support from agencies.	Only around 10% got some sort of income to cover their own expenses through the skills they learned. They expect better guidance and job placement from the agencies.

121. As far as stakeholders' opinion on the impacts of the project on children is concerned, project has some weaknesses. Some of the key points raised by different stakeholders are: a) VT provided have limited impact as far as providing decent income for trainees, b) Selection of trainees is done on an ad-hoc basis and not based on proper selection criteria c) Follow-up is weak and most of the trained children are unemployed still d) Trainees need micro finance support to business start up e) project fail to adapt proper methods in select partner NGOs for project implementation; f) lack of information and records available to government sector partners on where and what programs going on at district level and g). Training given is not standard and recognized island wide therefore it is difficult for graduated trainees to find employments in recognised firms.

122. Parents of the beneficiaries however believe the project has helped their children show a positive career path in life. They are quite satisfied with training and they believe children are now ready to face challenges in life with gained skills to engage themselves in productive work.

123. In summary the project has contributed to a great extent in achieving its objectives in reintegrating and supporting children to overcome their problems through giving life skills and vocational training. Following is a view of the UR about the positive impacts of the training on his family and his life.

My mother went abroad to work as a housemaid after we lost our farther during war. I was with the "movement" sometime. Now she came with little money and we are building a small house for us. I received training in carpentry and I am now helping to construct my own house. I never allow my mother to go aboard again or

my younger brother to join with the “movement”. Nor I get back to the movement. I will find work somewhere in this community and I am confident that I can look after my family now. (Sudarsan-(17 years old) -Trincomalee).

124. In all three locations youth and children have played an active role in implementing the project. Partner staff, VTRPs and beneficiaries are committed and dedicated in their tasks. All the beneficiaries, non beneficiary children and youth interviewed strongly believe that the project has contributed in enhancing skills of children and youth in preventing them in involved in armed conflict and therefore helped to reduce such incidents reduced such incidences. Prior to the project there were incidences of children joining with armed groups in the localities where action programmes are in progress or completed? Parents too are in the opinion that the project made some visible impacts among children by producing useful youth through vocational training.

SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES

125. The ILO-IPEC Country office has taken number of actions to promote sustainability of the project impacts and to strengthen the capacity of local actors and related institutions scaling up of interventions in the targeted project sites. In October 2005, a comprehensive review of Action Plan was held and number of areas identified by stakeholders to plan and implement coordinated actions on VT, catch up education, psychosocial and social support for war affected children. Some of the key actions taken are develop capacity building programme for implementing partners and community based and holistic child based programmes that include not only children but also the vulnerable and poor families. The UNDP has committed to find alternative options provide micro finance support for VT trainees who need funds so start self employments. WFP agreed to consider providing a “food package” for poorer beneficiaries to avoid dropouts due to poverty.
126. The ongoing community development and social infrastructure development projects in such as NECORD, NEIAP, NEHRP have been contacted to support passed out trainees in three districts where the project in operation.. TRO on the other hand through its partner network has consented to get involved the trained beneficiaries in ongoing construction and development activities in the region. To ensure the sustainability of this activity, a decision has been taken to gift the database to the North East Provincial Council, Trincomalee
127. There is lot to do in terms of promoting local ownership of project activities and promoting long-term sustainability. As far as sustainability is concerned the project has to do a lot in bringing all stakeholder including government agencies and community representatives to work out an exit strategy and sharing of responsibilities during post training period is essential.
128. The idea of a phase-out strategy for the project is yet to be evolved. This is one of the areas of serious concerns in the next phase of the project. Also there is no clear strategy identified to hand-over the different components of the project to local partners. However, prior to develop a hand our plans or exit strategy a comprehensive capacity development and empowerment of partner organizations should be carried out. It is too early to decide what level of government agencies to

be involved in (provincial or central or some other mechanism) handing over the project components to various agencies.

- 129.** In most locations the community ownership to the project is lacking. Particularly, local ownership of the project activities is not visible in Trincomalee; some parents interviewed are unaware of the reasons for providing training for their children and possible long term impacts. It is noted that the most stakeholders have agreed to pay serious attention on this aspect and develop a community centred action programs for child reintegration and rehabilitation activities at grass root level. ILO has given a task of conducting a vulnerability mapping in this regard. Therefore one could expect that some strategy will be worked out in the next phase of the project to enhance the local ownership of the project in future.

CONCLUSION

- 130.** Action plan considered as one of the best steps taken so far to put all stakeholders and interest groups acting on children affected by war to gather at policy level. But Implementation of the respective tasks by partners is rather weak and not adhered as expected. Though the Action Plan activities are officially over by June 2005. Most of the stakeholders agreed to continue the programmes implemented under the plan and review and reformulate it in early next year.
- 131.** For agencies the action plan was a good entry point. . In general, the re-integration process was very slow during the first year of operation and there were number of obstructions that local agencies acting on it. There are problems in the referral process. Mutual trust and exchange of experience and poor communication among agencies also led the poor achievement regarding the action plan during troubled period between April 2004 to beginning of 2005. At present no transit centers seems to be functioning and there is lack of commitment by responsible agencies to activate the process. On the other hand implementation of action projects has been disturbed, interrupted and delayed due to two major reasons: the Tsunami and the split in the LTTE movement in the east during 2004. The government commitment towards action plan is rather in a lower profile. Lack of funds to implement identified activities under the action plan also inhibited the progress.
- 132.** Programme document of USDOL supported ILO-IPEC on the elimination of child labour provides a clear guidance and direction for the implementation of country specific activities. Stated objectives and indicators in the overall programme document are very much identical with country annex except some differences in management structure, institutional framework and sustainability strategy.
- 133.** Additional baseline data is required for proper planning and implementation of VT and action projects in the next phase. ILO has completed a mapping of existing VT centres in the North East and will provide a database to the Provincial Council of NE. ILO has also developed the ToR for a capacity building programme for vulnerability research on children affected by human and natural disasters in the

project areas. Action Plan partners are also planning a resource and vulnerability mapping to be conducted prior to the second phase of the project.

134. Current project management structure at national level has centralized decision making structure and lack of opportunities for field staff for micro level management decision making. Most of the technical decisions are taken by the PMU in Colombo. Field staff is much more dependent on PMU and its technical guidance
135. Selection of partners and beneficiaries is not systematic. Due to lack of baseline data and difficult evolve a participatory process in selecting children according referral process led this situation.
136. Despite many constraints and obstacles, the project was able to reach the target of reintegration and prevention of children that expected to achieve by first half of the project period. However the more focus has given to prevention of vulnerable children through providing VT rather than reintegration of ex-child soldiers.
137. Project activities are linked with other ILO supported projects and agency initiated VT programmes in the Northeast. Recent initiative to provide residential training for UR and other children at Kilinochchi is an example for this endeavour and it shows the ability of ILO-IPEC to implement integrated and planned intervention in VT programmes in conflict affected area. However government partner agencies do not seem to be quite satisfied with coordination and the project's working arrangements mostly with NGOs in VT provision.
138. Many partner organizations lack the required capacity and training facilities are yet to be provided to improve the quality and technical standards of their VT. Capacity development of partners needs attention.
139. Skills acquired through VT were founded relevant and provided basic training in various vocations and trades. However most of the trainees find it difficult to engage in decent work and employment soon after the training .But most of them required advanced and follow- up technical backstopping, microfinance support and guidance to become successful income earners
140. The idea of a phase-out strategy for the project is yet to be evolved. This is one of the areas of serious concerns in the next phase of the project. Also there is no clear strategy identified to hand-over the different components of the project to local partners. However, prior to develop a handover plans or exit strategy a comprehensive capacity development and empowerment of partner organizations should be carried out.

LESSONS LEARNED

141. Reintegration of child soldiers and prevention vulnerable children becoming involved in the armed conflict need a holistic approach. Such efforts should not focus

only on developing skills among children as specific target groups. Rather children's' needs and aspirations as well as their family environment should be included in the overall programme. Provision of VT alone will not solve the long term objective of the project.

142. Action Plan prepared by the country has many merits. It is the best possible step taken by the agencies involved in assisting vulnerable and war affected children in the northeast region of the country. Such an umbrella policy document has helped various partners to act and work together on a common agenda. But the implementation of the Action Plan required commitment from donors and actors equally to make such efforts successful.
143. *Vocational Training is a process.* It requires systematic planning and implementation. Poor data base for planning and identification of beneficiaries and partner organizations eventually lead to conflicting interest and poor quality impacts of the project. Similarly Follow-up facilitation need carefully thought strategies to provide of micro-finance and toolkits. The lessons learned indicate that the impacts of action projects would have been much more positive if the project design included sufficient funds and other resources for this direction.
144. There is no blue print model for providing training/orientation for children involved in armed conflict. Such orientations should be designed on each situation and should be area specific with room for flexibility for modifications. The design should allow the local agencies and project staff to evolve the programme as a *learning process*. There should be room for adjustment and modification in the process to suit the emergencies and field realities.
145. Participatory planning and project implementation is possible only if agencies and actions coordinated according to time frame. Due to the defects in the referral process beneficiary involvement in the project implementation was not successful. However, complete bottom up planning or complete top down planning will not be successful. There should be a middle path approach for project planning and implementation where beneficiaries and implementing partners could agree and share the responsibilities of project implementation
146. Action programmes should include life skills training before commencing the vocational training. Such initial social skills development will lead to improved participation and making use of vocational training more effectively.
147. Mature and effective public relations skills are essential for implementing projects successfully. Developing a good rapport with all organizations including local government and civil administration agencies is essential for long term sustainability of the project.
148. Quality and impacts of the project greatly depend on local partner organizations. Building the capacities through funds, human resources and technical guidance are essential for them to implement effective action projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for ILO-IPEC

- 149.** VT is a process. It required systematic implementation. If selection is not done properly the entire process will get affected. Also finding good resource persons, placement, follow up technical guidance and backstopping are required for effective VT Provision.
- 150.** Research and database development for the project required more attention. Additional baseline data is required. ILO has completed a mapping of existing VT centres in the North East. It is necessary for a capacity building programme for vulnerability research on children affected by human and natural disasters in the region to plan more realistic action programmes in the second phase. Also tracer studies, economic labour demand surveys, market opportunity analysis for self income generation activities need to be carried out.
- 151.** Reinforcement/capacity-building of selected partners should be the priority for the second phase of the project. Needs assessment for service providers also are necessary. Especially Vocational Training Resource persons attached to partner organizations need to be supported with additional payments should be provided for the use of carrier guidance and technical backstopping for past trainees.
- 152.** Post training assistance process must be well developed with proper toolkit strategy and linked to micro-credit for income generation and placements with employers. Though training has been provided on occupations in demand, the job providers have to be satisfied. Partner Organization should provide additional responsibility and funds to search and find jobs for prospective trainees.
- 153.** Provision of non traditional VT needs careful assessment. Although it is important to provide VT in new trades such projects should be based on proper market analysis. Cultural values and local social structures are not conducive for some non traditional VT for girls.
- 154.** Community centered and vulnerable family focus action programs would be more effective. In this regard initiatives have been made by some stakeholders. ILO –IPEC should give more emphasis on this aspect and find appropriate strategies to involve families of vulnerable children while focusing children as target groups.
- 155.** Need to expand business/industry linked on-the-job and apprenticeship training in the districts to ensure that the type and quality of formal sector training provided also meets the needs of future employers. Some employers are reluctant to recruit ex-child soldiers. Partner organizations should help such trainees to overcome such misunderstandings.

156. Since the slow and ineffective referral process, adequate numbers of URs were not included in the action projects. It is necessary to work out an alternative plan of action to get more URs in phase II with *collaboration* of partners responsible for referral process and prepare *appropriate* action projects accordingly
157. Some Children have insufficient educational qualifications to follow-established courses. Thus need for flexible entry level in providing VT courses

Recommendations for Donors

158. Capacity of national IPEC should be strengthened through further human resources and funds. Partner organizations found they need additional support to keep VTRPs, quality improvement training, facilities for training, follow up backstopping support of trained persons etc Exposure to similar projects to the field staff was not adequate and therefore many actions were part of the learning process for staff. Staff training on project management, VT follows ups, support services, database management and community participatory approach need to be provided.
159. Project design should be modified to the current field conditions. Restrictions on selection of project areas and activities need to be revised in order to accommodate country requirements. More funds to be allocated to expansion of the project.. There are locations outside of these districts where a large number of URs and vulnerable children need assistance.

Recommendations for the CAW projects under the Action Plan

160. It is necessary that UNDP policy on providing micro-finance assistance to vulnerable and poor communities to be changed in favor of children affected by conflict. A policy level mandate to be evolved in the countries under civil war to help a war affected children who have received VT by supporting them to start up income generation activities by their own.
161. Action Plan has to be reviewed and reformulated according to present (Post Tsunami) realities. Since Action Plan become non effective in responding to emergence situation , local NGOs found difficult to support the VT projects. . For example How to increase vocational training opportunities for other categories of vulnerable children
162. It also necessary to strengthen the of district level VT coordination mechanism together with Planning and Development Secretariat ,NGO consortium and Government authorities in the project locations. Key government stakeholders such as District Secretaries lack understanding on how different projects under the Action plan carry out their activities in the districts.. Government stakeholders should be informed about the VT progarmmes and the progress. Coordination of VT needs to happen at two levels: Action Plan linked to the referrals/ broader district level linked to the upgrading of the VT system as a whole
163. Children have different levels of education and needs. VT Projects under the Action Plan should look into children who are out of the present projects and programmes. e.g. Non UR and child headed families.

- 164.** Expansion of community-based training opportunities such as agriculture/animal husbandry, home-enterprises, and micro production/village enterprises is suggested. Also a modular approach to encourage higher level of training will improve the quality of VT
- 165.** Future VT may focus vulnerable girls incorporating females in technical trades that are in demand at local level. In order to avoid social barriers promotion and awareness raising at the community and family level should be carried out
- 166.** Referral Process should be *reviewed* and need to identify ways to streamline the process with stakeholders such *as* SCSL and TRO. The mismatch with identification, long waiting time for appropriate placement, children change their minds on choice.
- 167.** Community based orientation for URs referred to VT package. This should be discussed and finalized by the district level Action Plan VT groups and should include: counseling/psychosocial, basic needs, career guidance, mobile units, females in technical trades, parental support, upgrading basic education, start-up savings for credit, accommodation for protection cases etc.

ANNEXES

Annex: 1

LIST OF THE PEOPLE INTERVIEWED/CONSULTED

1. Mr. Ranagaraja, Chief Secretary, North East provincial Council, Trincomalee
2. Mr. S Ganesh, District Secretary, Jaffna
3. Mr. Zoysa, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Social Welfare, Colombo,
4. Mr. N. Thiyagaraja, Secretary, Political Wing, Planning and Development Secretariat, LTTE, Kilinochchi,
5. Mr. Ireneuss, Director, Secretariat for Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North & east (SIHRN), Kilinochchi
6. Bo Viktor Nylund, Head, Child Protection Section UNICEF Sri Lanka
7. Ms. Gabriellala Elroy, Head of Trincomalee Zone Office, UNICEF
8. Ms. Sanja Sarnovic, Interim Child protection Officer, UNICEF, Batticaloa
9. Mr. Nimalan Selavaraj, Assistant Project officer-Protection. UNICEF, Batticaloa
10. Ms. Carmen Anthony, Partnership Development Manager, Save the Children- Sri Lanka
11. Mr. M Koneswaran, Act. Team Leader (UR) SCSL- Batticaloa
12. Ms. R. Sidharshini, Acting Divisional Secretary. Paddipalai, Batticaloa
13. Mr. S. Viswalingam, Director, Department of Industries, Trincomalee
14. Mr. E.L. A. Careem, District Coordinator, Sarvodaya, Batticaloa
15. Mr. S. Elantaharayan, Social Programme Coordinator, Sarvodaya, Batticaloa
16. Ms. Gowrie Ponnaiah, Country Coordinator, ILO/IPEC Colombo
17. Mr. Sivapragasam, Vocational Training Expert, ILO/IPEC Project Office –Colombo
18. Mr. Handy, Field Coordinator, ILO/IPEC, Batticaloa
19. Mr. C.L.R. Joseph, Field Coordinator, ILO/IPEC, Jaffna
20. Mr. K. Arulthawarajah, Field officer, ILO/IPEC Trincomalee
21. Mr. Dug Graham, Project Director, WUSC, Sri Lanka
22. Ms. Sudrashini, Director CWDR, Kilinochchi
23. Mr. Lorence Thilagar, Director, Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, Kilinochchi
24. Mr. Thansingham, Chairman, Patrician Institute
25. Mr. Jegan, Education and Skill Development Center (ESDC) , Kilinochchi
26. Mr. P. Rajeswaran, INSGD, Moolai, Chulipuram Jaffna
27. Ms. Mangaladevi, INSGD, Araly North, Vaddukodai, Jaffna
28. Mr. Josep Ghanapragasam, Manager, Grace Care Center, Trincomalee
29. Lara Scott, Action Plan Coordination Consultant, UNICEF Sri Lanka
30. Ms. Ummul Zahid, Program Assistant, ILO/IPEC, Colombo

Annex:2

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
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
Annex-3

Flow chart of the Assessment Process



Annexes 4

Triangulation of raw data collected from different methods



MODEL CASE STUDY

Name : Seena Malarsoodi

Age : 17 years old (Girl)

Address: Arasaditivu, Batticaloa

Status of the child prior to becoming a child soldier

I am the eldest of the family. I have three sisters and a brother. All were studying at a local school. But most time we were unable to attend the school because of lack of education materials such as writing books and proper meals. My farther is a wage laborer in neighboring farm fields. His earning was seasonal. My mother always felt sick and I stopped my education at the age of 10 with the intention of helping my mother for household chores. I had a dream of becoming a school teacher but I couldn't get proper education. I thought supporting my sisters and brother to continue their education. Even as a child I found some odd jobs in the village and tried to earn some money for the family. In the middle of year 2001, representatives of the *movement* visited our home several times and force my parents to give a child for the freedom fighting of Tamil nation. My parents were refusing and they have threatened to get some one from us by force. After giving a serious thought, I decided to join with the *movement* on behalf of my sisters and brother. I joined the *movement* on 9th August 2001.

The situation where she served in an armed group

I was asked to help in preparing meals and collecting water for trainee soldiers in a jungle camp. I don't know where this place is but I have traveled around two hours from my home. It was a hard job. I have to work from the morning 5 till the sunset. After some time (about three months) I have been given training on how to fight with guns. There were around 20 girls like me. But I am a small built person and always had troubled in performing hard training. I was given punishment because I failed to complete several trainings on time. Some time I was beaten by commanders. All trainee child soldiers including me had to follow strict rules of the commanders. We were given a time table to do everything. To wash, eat, and even for play games in the afternoon. There were lot of books and pictures about the fighting and killing of soldiers at the battlefield. I took part in ground battle twice. I was not so well trained in firing and not confident to fight. However I couldn't get on with fellow girl soldiers. Most time I felt sick and frustrated. I finally took part in the Vakherai (Armed confrontation between Karuna Fraction and the LTTE) battle in 2004. I got injured and my leg has broken. I couldn't move as a normal person. I was kept few days at the camp and then they handed over me to my family on 9th April 2004. My parents took me to Batticaloa hospital for treatments. I was at the hospital for two months. I came home in July 2004 but I am a disable person now.

Condition after project support for reintegration into society

I came to this training (USDOL Sewing machine operation) with lot of hopes. I came to know about this project from social workers of CWDR. After came to this training I have gained confidence and everybody in this center were very helpful and friendly. I found this training not only providing opportunity for personal skill development but lot of psychosocial support for person like me to improve our confidence and the personality. Now I have good understanding on what went wrong in my life and how to get myself corrected to be a productive and useful person to my family. Now I learned to make children cloths and garments. If I have a sewing machine by my own I can earn money. My only hope is helping my brother to get into university education. He is doing well in his studies. He passed all major examination with higher grades. I do not want to stop him continuing his education. He is the only hope of our family. However I must thank the project and the CWDR for changing my life for a better world.

Annex -7 Terms of Reference

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR

(ILO-IPEC)

Mid-term Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict: an Inter-Regional Programme

National Assessment: Sri Lanka

(P340 03 900 052 - INT/03/P52/USA)

I. Background and justification

59. The aim of ILO-IPEC is the progressive elimination of child labour, especially in its worst forms. The political will and commitment of individual governments to address child labour—in cooperation with employers' organizations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and other relevant parties in society—is the basis for ILO-IPEC action. ILO-IPEC's strategy includes raising awareness on the negative consequences of child labour, promoting social mobilization against it, strengthening national capacities to deal with this issue and implementing demonstrative direct action programmes (AP) to prevent children from child labour and remove child labourers from hazardous work and provide them with appropriate alternatives.
60. The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (N. 182) categorizes "all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict" as worst forms of child labour (Article 3a). Each country ratifying this Convention is committed to implementing programmes of action to eliminate the worst forms of child labour as a matter of priority, in consultation with relevant government institutions and employers' and workers' organizations, and taking into consideration the views of other concerned groups.
61. The inter-regional programme for the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts is a global intervention with focused activities in Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda—core countries—, and Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone—non core countries). All these countries except Sierra

Leone have ratified Convention 182. The project has a total budget of USD 7,000,000. The donor is the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). This programme was conceived after a preparatory phase launched in October 2001 by ILO-IPEC in collaboration with the ILO-In focus Programme on Crises Response and Reconstruction (IFP-CRISIS). This phase served the purpose of obtaining information (through rapid assessments) on the causes of the use of child soldiers, the mechanisms for recruitment, the living conditions while in the armed groups and the circumstances surrounding their demobilisation and the perspective for their reintegration.⁴²

62. The programme intends to contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups (development objective). In order to do so, three immediate objectives have been formulated:
 - ✓ I/O 1: “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”
 - ✓ I/O 2: “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”
 - ✓ I/O 3: “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in targeted countries.”
63. The overall programme document sets the framework under which each country has made the relevant choices to suit its particular needs, always taking into consideration the specific in-country context. These national choices are reflected in a “country annex” which details the particulars of the intervention strategy and the implementation modality for each country. The country annex corresponding to Sri Lanka is therefore to be used as the reference document for this mid-term evaluation as it contains the relevant details of the national situation and intervention approach, including indicators and the expected outcomes. In summary, the country annex has been prepared on the basis of: a) the overall IPEC programme on *Prevention and Reintegration of Children involved in Armed Conflict: an Inter-Regional Programme* project document, dated 17 September 2003; and b) an in-country strategic planning process.
64. According to ILO regular procedures and as agreed with USDOL, the project is due for a mandatory independent mid-term evaluation in the second half of 2005. This evaluation should serve two basic purposes: a) accountability to the main stakeholders, including government agencies and social partners in the targeted countries, partner organizations and the donor, on what has been done and achieved so far; and b) learning from the experience to analyze how the project is progressing towards achieving its objectives, plan for the future and, where necessary, to recommend appropriate re-designing.
65. IPEC management and the project staff will use the evaluation results to revise the approach and strategy that is being followed in each country, as appropriate. Therefore, the evaluation should provide credible and reliable information in order to suggest how the project could enhance its impact during the remaining time of implementation, ensuring the sustainability of the benefits that

⁴² A total of five reports (unpublished) were prepared: *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés au Burundi*, Suzane Nsabimana, December 2002; *Rapport sur l'évaluation rapide de la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République du Congo*, Michael Bitemo and Frédéric Nkeoua, December 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo*, Modeste Mangola Dukti and Jean-Marie Vianney Mupende Katembo, Kinshasa, October 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo (Goma, Est-RDC)*, François-Xavier Baganda N'Simba, Goma, December 2002; *Résultats de l'enquête d'évaluation rapide au Rwanda sur la situations des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés*, Prosper Mutijima Nkaka, March 2003.

have been or will be generated. In order to do so, **specific evaluation methodologies will be used to ensure evidence based recommendations**. The evaluation results will also be used by partners in charge of implementing activities in the field or that support the national efforts against the use of children in armed conflicts in the region.

II. Purposes and phasing of the evaluation process

66. The overall purposes of the evaluation and the tasks to be carried out by the independent national consultant include the following:
9. To review the implementation of the project so far in the country and consider any changes in strategy on the basis of emerging experiences, recommending adjustments where necessary.
 10. To examine current proposed activities and make an assessment of their potential contribution to the implementation strategy.
 11. To review the existing institutional set up and implementation capacity.
 12. To assess the existing as well as potential linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed in the targeted countries.
67. This national assessment is part of a process which will continue with an independent evaluation of the activities carried out in Africa and the preparation of a final report for the whole project.
68. The national assessment in Sri Lanka will be conducted by an independent consultant identified locally, under the supervision of an international independent consultant as evaluation team leader, who will also be responsible for the analysis of the activities in Africa and the preparation of the final report. **These Terms of Reference correspond exclusively to the activities to be developed by the national independent consultant in Sri Lanka.**

III. Main aspects to be addressed by the evaluation

69. The focus of this national assessment will be on learning and improvement. Taking into consideration the corrective and formative nature of mid-term evaluations, this exercise should be articulated around three main questions:
- 7) What has worked, and why
 - 8) What needs further improvement, and why
 - 9) Has the evolution of the situation in any way affected the original design and strategy assumptions, and if so, in what way
70. The specific issues to be analysed by the national consultant under the above three main questions should at least cover, but not necessarily be limited to, the issues and questions included in paragraphs 13 to 15.
71. Validity of the project design and relevance of objectives: The assessment should address the original design of the country annex (in relation with the overall programme document), considering its internal logic and coherence, its inherent quality and the relevance of the proposed objectives and strategies. The following are some of the specific questions to be considered in the analysis:
- t. Does the design of the overall programme document provide an effective framework and appropriate methodologies for the achievement of the objectives at the national level? If not, why? What has been the interaction between the elaboration of the interregional project document and the country specific annex? (Form 3 in annex can be used to summarize this information).

- u. Are the project objectives for the country clear and realistic (likely to be met during the time frame of the project, with the current resources and following the identified approach and strategy)?
- v. Are the objectives still valid today or must they be revised and possibly reformulated? If so, how?
- w. How coherent and relevant was the original project design (and its reformulations, if appropriate) according to the prevailing conditions at the time of its inception? Should changes currently be made to the general project strategy based on newly emerging needs and constraints? If so, why and how?
- x. Is the project based on adequate research and baseline data?
- y. Are project indicators and means of verification relevant, clear, realistic and useful in terms of measuring the project's performance and impact? If not, why? How effectively are strategies for monitoring being implemented? Are they the right strategies? (Explain with supporting evidence).
- z. Did the children and youth targeted as beneficiaries participate in the design stage of the project? If not, what were the difficulties? If they did participate, how so? Were there alternative options identified as substitute to their direct participation in the project design? Were participatory approaches applied in the design of the Action Programmes (AP)? If not, why?
- aa. Are the time frame for project implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic? If not, what changes are needed? Has the strategy for sustainability of impact been defined clearly at the design stage of the project?
- bb. Assess the relation between the project and other child –focused interventions supported by IPEC or implemented by other organisations in the same country. To what extent were synergies exploited and economies of scale created in designing the project?
- cc. How were local management structures, such as National Child Labour Steering Committees, involved in the project design? To what extent were the objectives of this project incorporated within the mission and objectives of these various structures?

72. Process of implementation, management and achievements: The evaluation should assess how the project activities have been implemented and the effectiveness and efficiency of the management structures in place, with a focus on determining if the project is on course to delivering the expected outputs and achieving its immediate objectives.

Administrative and management related- matters

- uu. Are the existing organisational and management structures of the project appropriate for achieving the expected results? Are the technical and administrative guidance and support provided by ILO to the project adequate and helpful?
- vv. What have been the strengths and weaknesses of project management? What management improvements, if any, could be suggested to enhance project efficiency and effectiveness? Is there balance and rationality in the use of funds and resources? Is there transparency in the project resource management? Are there any problems in this aspect?
- ww. What has been the effect of delays in carrying out the project work plan? Is the project advancing at a pace which will allow reaching the project objectives by its date of completion? If not, why and how can problems be solved?
- xx. Please analyze the communication processes between the field office, the regional office, headquarters and the donor.
- yy. What is the financial and management status of the project? What is currently working well and what are the difficulties at that level (concrete examples)? How can these difficulties be addressed based on the existing capacities?
- zz. Were disbursements made according to the project document's planned time-frame, or were there significant changes? If changes occurred, which resources were re-directed to expenses necessary to ensure an efficient service delivery and reaching project objectives? Are there more efficient manners to disburse funds while reaching better results with the same resources?
- aaa. How appropriate are the criteria used for selecting Action Programmes (AP) regions and sectors? How efficient is the process by which AP proposal are reviewed and approved and resources ultimately allocated?

- bbb. What processes have been used to identify implementing agencies? Was this an effective process? Have the correct agencies been identified to undertake service delivery under this project?
- ccc. Was the administrative and technical support given by project staff to the national counterparts adequate?
- ddd. How are local management structures participating in programme implementation? How is this participation contributing to progress toward project's objectives? What are the major achievements and/or drawbacks encountered?

Achievements

- eee. Are project results so far meeting the needs of the target groups? If not, why? Are there alternative ways to meeting those needs? If so, how?
- fff. How effective are Action Programmes to date, and how are they contributing to the project meeting its immediate objectives?
- ggg. Have the number/type of beneficiaries been reached according to plan? If not explain the rationale for the changes of plans.
- hhh. Appraise the changing attitude of the beneficiaries towards acquiring of skills for decent work. What are the views of the beneficiaries and stakeholders regarding the usefulness of the outputs of the project? What are the effects of the project on the situation of the target beneficiaries so far? What benefits have the target beneficiaries gained so far?
- iii. How effective has the project been in building the capacity of national IPEC and implementing agencies' staff?
- jjj. Assess the contribution of the project to raising awareness on the need to withdraw children from armed units, including from non-government groups.
- kkk. Has the commitment and capacity of public and private institutions been strengthened in order to undertake concrete actions to prevent recruitment of children (boys and girls) in armed conflicts and to assist those withdrawn?
- lll. How effective has the project been in terms of leveraging resources? What process is being undertaken by the project to identify and coordinate implementation with other initiatives and organisations? Assess the visibility of the contribution of the USDOL funded project.
- mmm. Assess work opportunities identified by the project, including placements and other supportive inputs in the current country specific context.
- nnn. Determine the quality of the training offer, including training providers' capacity in the current context. Assess the capacity and the ability of the implementing partners to deliver suitable training for the different age groups.
- ooo. To what extent are children and youth involved in project implementation? In what ways has the project sought to develop the capacity of young people to contribute to the goal of reducing the incidence of children involved in armed conflict? What has been the impact of such efforts?
- ppp. What lessons have been learned and what possibilities are there for effective replication of efforts? To what extent have lessons learned been shared with other targeted countries? How have these lessons been incorporated into other ILO initiatives in targeted countries as well as in IPEC regional efforts?
- qqq. Do the anticipated project results justify the costs incurred?

73. Sustainability and anticipated impact: The evaluation should assess the meaning of "sustainability" within the context of the project and the progress made in ensuring continuation and/or further development of the benefits generated by the intervention.

- g. Which actions were taken to promote the sustainability and which actions must be undertaken in the coming months to strengthen the capacity of local actors or related institutions in order to ensure the sustainability and/or scaling up of interventions in the targeted zones?
- h. How effective has the project been in terms of promoting local ownership of project activities and promoting long-term sustainability? Has the idea of a phase-out strategy for the project been

clearly articulated and progress made towards this goal? What are the hand-over plans for the different components of the project?

- i. What are the long-term commitment and the technical and financial capacity of local/national institutions (including governments) and the target groups to continue delivering goods and services begun under the project once it ends?

IV. Expected outputs and timeline of the evaluation process

74. The timeline for this national assessment and the number of working days for the national consultant are detailed hereunder, up to a total of twenty five working days (the dates included are tentative; final dates will be determined in consultation with the evaluator):

- Five working days (beginning 22 August 2005), covering:
 - 2 working days for an initial desk review of documents (project document and country annex, progress reports, mission reports, plus documentation on other current relevant programmes implemented by ILO and other organizations in the country).
 - 1 working day to review and confirm acceptance of the TOR and to review and provide feedback to the evaluation team leader on methodological instruments (see annex to these terms of reference), which will be used to gather stakeholder information. The independent national evaluator must also review together with IPEC's Country Project Coordinator (CPC) the methodological instruments and provide adjustments as/if necessary. If the instruments for data collection included in the annex for any reason do not appear to be applicable, the national independent consultant will suggest alternative methodologies in order to obtain the same information and provide a concrete example. Information should be provided to the independent evaluation team-leader latest by August 26, 2005.
 - 2 working days to preparation of an inception report detailing the evaluation time-frame with the specific meetings (specifying with whom and where) and field visits planned. For field visits there should be an indication of the criteria/reasons for choosing the project sites. If possible, a minimum of three project sites (including both successful and problematic action programmes) should be visited to provide evidence and learning examples, although depending on the number of AP and mini-programmes a larger number of project sites could be desirable. Logistical constraints should be considered in the number of identified project sites, as well as the following issues. Project sites should provide the opportunity of collecting information from : a) local authorities (formal or non-formal), the community (using questionnaire 4 in annex), implementing partners, other actors working on the same issue at field level but outside the IPEC project, the beneficiaries (using questionnaires 1 and 2), employers' organisations and trade unions, if any. For beneficiary interviews, at least one group interview (questionnaire 2) per project site should be undertaken, and if possible one individual beneficiary interview (questionnaire 1) from someone who has not participated in the group interview. For planning purposes it is estimated that the community interview will take up to one hour, the beneficiary group interview some 45 minutes, while individual interviews with beneficiaries should last not longer than 30 minutes. Other interviews with stakeholders (local formal and/or non-formal authorities, armed groups if accessible, other actors implementing similar projects in the area, IPEC implementing partners, employers' organisations, trade unions, etc.), should take one hour per interview. Each stakeholder group should be interviewed separately. In particular beneficiary group interviews should have no one outside the group of beneficiary children assisting, as a question of confidentiality.
- Fifteen working days from 5 September 2005 in order to
 - Undertake the field work to project target sites, interviews with the different stakeholders (primary stakeholders identified, including focus groups and semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries and if possible non-beneficiaries for comparison purposes) in the field. Estimated time: eight working days.

- Hold interview with all stakeholders, including interviews with the National Counterpart and other identified stakeholders at provincial and/or national level, as they appear in the inception report, including: the identified implementing agencies, government institutions and others engaged in the project, employers' organisation and trade unions, service providers (for training), institutional relations. Estimated time: four working days.
- Analyse notes and code and synthesise the information and data collected as a result of all interviews and of field work. Estimated time: three working days.

As a result the independent national evaluator must produce:

- A map of the country/region detailing where the project activities are taking place.
 - A mapping of all actors in the country and/or project region in the field of withdrawal and prevention of children in armed conflict (using forms 1 and 2).
 - A list of the Action Programmes and mini-programmes included in the country annex, detailing : a) the amount in USD, b) the implementing partner, c) the objectives, d) the start date, e) the (expected) completion date (using the form included in the project's progress report format).
 - A summary of analyzed, coded and processed information (after triangulation).
- Four working days, latest by 26 September 2005, in order to write a **draft evaluation report** to be submitted to the independent evaluation team leader, according to the format and contents described in section V hereunder, including all annexes.
- One working day, latest by 14 October 2005, to incorporate inputs and comments and any factual corrections from stakeholders to the **edited final evaluation report**. ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) together with the evaluation team leader will provide consolidated comments on the draft evaluation report.

V. Methodological considerations

75. For the national assessments, the general ILO-IPEC guidelines on evaluation and a consultative and participatory approach will be followed. Consultation with all stakeholders will be done directly in the field by the national consultant. On the last day of the mission work, a restitution seminar with all stakeholders able to attend should present the tentative conclusions and recommendations.
76. **Each key evaluation finding should be triangulated and documented** (e.g. corroborated by at least two different sources, either documentary or observational or through interviews of various/different stakeholders), in order for findings to be credible and valid. The evaluation judgement will be evidence-based, grounded on the concrete information gathered from the different sources, triangulated and not based on a single unchecked information source. The independent national consultants should indicate the evaluation standards that they will apply to this exercise in their inception report.
77. Evaluation instruments, such as the SWOT analysis matrix and questionnaire interview protocols attached will be reviewed by the national consultants during the inception phase and approved by the independent international consultant. Any comments, changes or suggestions regarding the different evaluation instruments should be sent to the international consultant (team leader) and DED for comments, using the "track change" function of MS Word. If the national consultant, based on discussions with the IPEC Country Project Coordinator, decides that some of these forms and questionnaires are not applicable in the current context, alternative and concrete means of obtaining the necessary information should be designed and provided to the team leader.
78. During the course of the evaluation the national consultants will receive technical support from the international consultant and evaluation team leader, either by e-mail or by phone as necessary. In addition, the assigned evaluation officer in DED will provide further support if and as necessary.

79. A major information source for the purpose of the evaluation will be the beneficiaries themselves, boys and girls, as well as beneficiaries' communities. The independent national consultant should undertake the beneficiary interviews with the required sensitivity, cultural knowledge and knowing the specific approach to be used in dealing with the different types of interviewees. It is expected that beneficiary and non-beneficiary children (both male and female, including gender specific group interviews where possible) will be interviewed through a combination of formats, namely focus and/or semi-structured groups using questionnaire 2, individual interviews using questionnaire 1, and non-beneficiary group interviews using questionnaire 3. The questionnaires will allow obtaining evidence on key evaluation questions from the primary beneficiaries of the project. At the same time specific questions entailing attitudinal and behavioural change (before and after the intervention) are included in order to obtain qualitative information over and beyond the quantitative data available regarding the numbers of beneficiaries. Questionnaire 4 will allow collecting some feedback on the project from the communities themselves.
80. ILO-IPEC, through DED, will select the independent national consultants in charge of the national studies. The international consultant as team leader will be informed of the candidates before the final selection is made and will have the possibility of expressing his or her opinions to DED.
81. All documents produced during this assignment should be gender sensitive. Wherever possible beneficiary interviews should hold separate gender youth groups (female/male).

VI. Resources needed for the national assessment

82. The national assessment will be carried out by an independent national consultant with extensive experience in evaluation of development, humanitarian or social interventions, preferably including practical experience in conflict situations. Previous in-country experience is compulsory. Previous evaluation experience of child labour or children in armed conflict interventions and is a definite advantage, as well as previous experience in doing evaluations for agencies in the UN system. Experience in using knowledge, attitudes and practices methodologies will be considered. The consultant should have an advanced degree in social sciences, economics or similar and specific training on evaluation theory and methods. Full command of the local language(s) is compulsory to conduct beneficiary and non-beneficiary interviews and focus groups. All interviews conducted at field level, particularly the community and beneficiary interviews, will be undertaken in strict confidentiality, and in an anonymous manner.
83. The resources needed for this exercise are the following:
- ✓ Fees for national consultant for 25 working days
 - ✓ Per diem for field visits outside the consultant's home town
 - ✓ Travel arrangements to be provided locally by the IPEC staff
84. The payment of fees will be made as follows:
- ✓ 20% of fees upon receipt of the inception report
 - ✓ 30% of fees after reception of the draft evaluation report by the team leader and DED
 - ✓ 50% of fees after reception and acceptance of the final evaluation report by the team leader and DED
85. This independent evaluation will be managed by DED, in collaboration with ILO-IPEC's Unit on Vulnerable Groups (responsible for managing and backstopping the programme).

VII. Evaluation Report: format and contents

86. As mentioned before, the primary output of the consultancy will be an **evaluation report**. The report will be written in a straightforward language, in Times New Roman font 12, and will have a maximum of 40 (forty) pages excluding annexes and including an executive summary. Each paragraph should be numbered and the first numbered paragraph shall correspond to the first paragraph of the executive summary.

87. The report structure shall be the following:

- A cover page, indicating the project title, the type of evaluation, the dates of the evaluation, the date of the report, the name of the author(s) and including the mention “This report reflects the views of the author and not necessarily the views of the commissioning agency”.
- Table of contents with page numbers.
- A map detailing the project location(s) (including all action programmes and mini-programmes).
- A glossary of the terms used
- A list of abbreviations
- An executive summary of no more than four pages, synthesising the main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The first page of the report will be the first page of the executive summary.
- A brief introduction of no more than three pages explaining the background to the evaluation, its purpose, scope and objectives, the primary users, as well as a brief description of the evaluation methodology, constraints and biases, and a brief background of the independent national evaluator.
- Evaluation findings organised around the main questions of the evaluation, including all collected information, as well as beneficiary/community assessments results and results of the various SWOT analysis. *It is suggested that the finding be structured thematically around points 1 to 9 of form 2 using each point as section title.*
- A short conclusions section, which must flow from the findings and not contain any new elements which have not previously been covered.
- A section with lessons learned from implementation (positive or negative experiences in executing the activities, that should be considered during the rest of implementation and that could be useful for other countries).
- Recommendations, based on the findings and the conclusions, ranked by order of importance/priority. Recommendations should be divided by type (e.g. design, objectives, strategic, management, resources, etc.) and should refer to specific paragraphs of the main body of the report.
- Annexes : a) TOR, b) bibliography (including documentary review and secondary sources), c) list of people interviewed indicating, if possible, date of the interview, ages, sex, place, function/post (e.g. beneficiary, community leader, government member, NGO member, implementing partner, etc.), d) one unfilled sample questionnaire and SWOT table for each group and / or issue, e) collated material (coded results table) synthesising results of all SWOT forms and questionnaires used, f) CV of the consultant.
- Case study

FORMS AND QUESTIONNAIRES TO BE USED IN THE EVALUATION

A. SWOT ANALYSIS

The independent national consultant should use a SWOT format for recording the information provided by actors and stakeholders on the different issues to be assessed. It is suggested to use the formats to document outcomes of individual interviews and to prepare later a consolidated SWOT analysis including the opinions of different stakeholders on the issues.

The issues to be considered are the following:

11. Project design and strategy
12. Project management and institutional framework
13. Project resources and fund management
14. Project results and achievements to date
15. Projects perspectives of sustainability

The format to be used is the following:

- **For individual interviews**

ACTOR / STAKEHOLDER:	DATE OF INTERVIEW:
ISSUE: (1 to 5)	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS

- **For presentation of consolidated results**

ISSUE: (1 to 5)	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- aaa (mentioned by stakeholders 1, 2 and 5)- bbb (stakeholder 3)- ccc (stakeholder 4)- etc.	
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS

B. FORMS TO PRESENT RELEVANT INFORMATION

Form 1: List of organisations in the country / region in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

ACTORS / ORGANIZATIONS				
Name of organisation	Type of organisation (government agency, international organization, NGO, trade union, employers' organization, other)	Main area of intervention (prevention, rehabilitation, other)	Estimated annual budget (indicate year)	Geographic coverage
<u>1.</u>				
<u>2.</u>				
<u>3.</u>				
<u>Etc...</u>				

Form 2: List of projects in the country / region in the field of prevention and reintegration of children in armed conflict

Name of project	Implementing agency / organization	Budget (in US\$)	Brief description of objectives and support provided	Project start and end date (mm/yy)	Funding / donor agency(ies)	Geographic coverage
<u>1.</u>						
<u>2.</u>						
<u>3.</u>						
<u>Etc...</u>						

Form 3: Comparison between the overall programme document and the country annex (to be completed in consultation with the CPC)

Indicate if what is stated in the overall programme document and the country annex is identical, similar or different. If not identical, please fill the last two columns describing what the differences between the programme document and the country annex.

Area	Comparison (identical, similar, different)	Programme Document	Country annex
1. Objectives			
2. Indicators			
3. Beneficiaries			
4. Implementation modality			
5. Management structure			
6. Institutional framework			
7. Sustainability strategy			
8. Other aspects (specify)			

C. SUGGESTED QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaire 1: Individual interview with beneficiary

Age:	Sex : M / F
Beneficiary targeted for:	Withdrawal / Prevention (explain the definition)
Interview site/area/region (according to administrative unit):	
Place of birth of beneficiary:	
Current status: unemployed / apprentice / in school / vocational training / other (specify)	
Living with: direct family / distant relative / alone / friends / school / street / reception home / placement / transit centre / other (specify)	

Introduction to the beneficiary: explain who you are and why you interview her/him. State the following: "These questions will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity preserved. The objective is to help us improve the project to ensure it can assist you most effectively. Thank you for your precious collaboration and your time."

35. Has the project changed anything in your life? Yes / No / don't know
If yes, what? If not, why not?
36. If there was a change, was it for the better, or was it negative?
Please explain:
37. What did you obtain from the project (including material support and/or services provided, such as information, orientation, training, etc... in beneficiary's own words):
38. Do you feel the support received from the project is useful to you: Yes / No / Don't know - If yes or no, why?
39. Do you still need the same things today as when the project started: Yes / No / Don't know – If not or don't know, what are your new needs?
40. Did you participate in the design or preparation of the project : Yes / No / Don't know
If yes, in which way?
41. Do you participate in the implementation of the project (e.g. in some of the activities): Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, which ones
42. Do you also participate in another project: Yes / No / Don't know
If yes, which one (mention title, implementing organization and benefits)
43. Do you feel a change in the way people treat you since the project started? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, what is the change?
44. Is your situation in terms of living conditions and finances today better than at the start of the project : Better / Worse / Similar / don't know – Explain in what sense the situation is better or worse.
45. Do you feel the project is bringing you something useful for your professional future? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, in which way?
46. Do you believe the project is helping you to secure an income? Yes / No / Don't know
47. Is life easier for you today than at the beginning of the project? Yes / No / Don't know
48. Has the project helped you increase your self-esteem? Yes / No / Don't know
49. Could the project be improved? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes, how?
50. How does your environment (family, friends, peers, etc.) perceive your participation in this project? Good / Bad / Indifferent / Don't know – If good or bad, explain why
51. Would you consider joining (if prevented) or going back (if withdrawn) to an armed group? Yes / No / Don't know – If yes or no, why?