



Report of the independent final evaluation of the project
Local Socio-Economic Recovery in War-Affected Areas
of South Lebanon

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Agency: International Labour Organisation
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Location: Bint Jbeil caza, South-Lebanon

Final report

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Quick Facts

- **Country:** Lebanon
- **Final Evaluation:** November-December 2008
- **Mode of Evaluation:** Independent
- **Technical Area:** Socio-Economic Recovery
- **Evaluation Management:** Regional Programming Services unit, ILO Regional Office for Arab States
- **Evaluation Team:** Roel Hakemulder and Hala Dakhil,
- **Project Start:** 1 August 2007
- **Project End:** 31 December 2008
- **Project Code:** LEB/07/01M/UND
- **Donor(s):** Lebanon Recovery Fund, International Labour Organization
- **Keywords:** Local Economic and Social Recovery, Participatory Value Chain Analysis, Livelihood Recovery, Micro-finance

▪ Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure

The project "Local Socio-Economic Recovery in War-affected Areas of South Lebanon" was launched in August 2007, in response to the July-August 2006 war. It aimed at rapid livelihood recovery using a participatory approach, through direct assistance to those affected. At the same time it intended to build the capacity of local stakeholders to identify priorities and deliver assistance. The project focused on the caza of Bint Jbeil.

The Participatory Value Chain Analysis (PVCA) methodology was central to the project's approach. It enabled relevant stakeholders to jointly analyse a value chain (the system of enterprises that produces specific products or services and delivers them to the market), identify constraints and design and prioritise proposals that address the latter.

Two priority value chains, Olive Oil and

Beekeeping, were selected in consultation with local stakeholders. Both are important in Bint Jbeil's largely agricultural economy and are among the most war-affected. PVCAs were conducted on each of these value chains, with facilitators from local organisations trained by the project.

The project funded local partners to implement some of the proposals that came out of the PVCAs. The seven main interventions to recover and rehabilitate livelihoods in these value chains that came out of the PVCA include: rehabilitation of olive plantations, training on pruning of olive trees, distribution of pruning tools and olive oil storage devices, training of beekeepers (new and existing) and providing them with equipment, and expansion of beekeeping pastures by planting trees. In addition, oregano plantation was promoted as an alternative source of income to tobacco, and to increase pastures for beekeeping.

Other proposals that resulted from the PVCAs will be funded and carried out by local organisations themselves or have been included in requests submitted to donors. In the Beekeeping sector a Forum was established that facilitated the implementation of proposals and coordinates development of the value chain. Such a Forum is foreseen for the Olive Oil sector as well.

Loans and business training were provided to people in these as well as other value chains. Project support enabled Al Majmouaa, a national microfinance provider to open an office in Bint Jbeil, which is improving access to micro-finance well beyond the project's immediate beneficiaries and will have an impact far beyond its duration. A separate activity was developed to support people with special needs. This included skills and vocational training, as well as access to loans and complementary grants.

Background & Context

▪ Purpose, scope and clients of evaluation

The purpose of the final evaluation was to:

- determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- document lessons learned, success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;
- Examine whether or not guidance provided by the Regional Office was effectively taken into account in project implementation; and if so, explain the increased impact that the support provided had on the project

The evaluation was guided by the following core evaluation questions:

- (i) the relevance of the project to the national priorities and the mandate of the Lebanese Recovery Fund,
- (ii) the coherence between the design of the project focus, the integration of ILO instruments in support of program objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors;
- (iii) the efficiency measured both in terms of

- administrative costs and timeliness of execution;
- (iv) the effectiveness of interventions with particular attention devoted to investigating the sustainability of results and the contribution of the project to the institutional development of the local partners.

The evaluation also put a specific focus on the role of ILO constituents in the implementation of the project and the integration of the gender dimension.

In particular the evaluation evaluated the quality and impact of project activities on the target groups, including:

- Needs assessments process and reports and their use by the project and its stakeholders;
- Stakeholder understanding and capacity to address local economic development needs;
- Quality and use of the materials developed by the project;
- Management of the project, its staff and the services it has provided;
- Project sustainability plan, if any: Are project activities/ improvements likely to be sustained after project completion, and by whom?;
- Presence of a monitoring system for collecting performance data was appropriate for systematically measuring impact of project performance;
- Value of the project in the context of other LED activities in South Lebanon;
- Linkage with other activities: Are there overlaps or duplication of effort? Has the project been able to effectively link with other projects implemented in South Lebanon;
- Level of stakeholder commitment to the project and the effectiveness

of the project in fostering constituents' involvement and in promoting social dialogue;

- Sectors targeted for assistance: Why were they chosen? Was the project able to meet the needs of the different sectors effectively?;
- Synergies with other socio-economic recovery efforts: Has the project approach and its results been internalized and/or expanded within other ongoing socio-economic recovery efforts in South Lebanon?;
- Choice of partners: Has the choice of partners been strategic in implementing the strategy?;
- Gender: How has the project addressed gender issues?

The primary clients for this evaluation was the ILO regional management, ILO constituents, respective donors, the project management team, local and national partners. Secondary clients are the ILO HQ technical departments (CRISIS, SEED, SOCIAL FINANCE, COOP, CODEV, EVAL) and UN agencies collaborating with the ILO in the south.

▪ **Methodology of evaluation**

The evaluation was expected to address five groups of questions, concerning:

- Relevance and strategic fit;
- Validity of project design;
- Achievements (implementation and effectiveness);
- Management and use of resources;
- Impact orientation and sustainability.

The evaluation team opted for a participatory approach to assess the project against these groups of questions, for the following reasons:

- A participatory approach strengthens the reliability and relevance of the findings, enhances learning by the

clients of the evaluation and increases the chance that recommendations will be followed up.

- A participatory approach does not preclude technical inputs from the evaluators.
- This specific project took a participatory approach to developing and implementing its interventions.

Given the project's focus on rapid implementation, there was a significant need for additional data collection, which could only be met by taking a participatory approach.

Within this framework, the main sources of information the evaluation has drawn include:

- Documentation – specifically related to the project, and related to the context;
- The ILO Regional Office and relevant ILO Headquarters departments;
- The project team;
- Stakeholders at the national level;
- Stakeholders at the local level, specifically those directly involved in implementation, and those the project was to coordinate or collaborate with;
- Target groups and beneficiaries.

Main findings & conclusions

- The project has largely achieved its objectives, especially when judged based on its strategy and progress towards its objectives. Direct and relevant assistance has been delivered to beneficiaries to support them in regaining and improving their livelihoods. Nearly 1,000 people benefited directly, more than double the number of 400 households the project document set as target. The large majority of beneficiaries were in

the target group of the poor and vulnerable. Those included a small percentage of women (5% of direct beneficiaries), as well as people with special needs.

- Nearly all the assistance provided was found to be relevant and of high quality. However, some inefficiencies occurred due to the initially short (10 months) duration of the project. Since this was too brief to include the full agricultural cycle, it forced the project to provide some of the assistance when it was not the best season to do so.
- Given the agricultural nature of the value chains assisted, it will take time for the full impact of the interventions to be realised. However, the evaluation found that livelihoods have been recovered or improved by many and are in the process of being recovered or improved by the majority of beneficiaries. It is likely that most of these will prove sustainable. In addition, implementation of the interventions generated temporary work for around 200 people, which has provided immediate relief to those involved, though for a brief period of time. The livelihood impact for people with special needs has been small, as most have not taken up (self-) employment in the skills they were trained on. Better matching of training with the needs and aspirations of these beneficiaries could have increased the impact beyond the gains in self-confidence that have been achieved.

A local capacity has been built to use the PVCA methodology among local organisations including cooperatives, trade unions, chambers of commerce, development NGOs, and municipalities. The methodology created a framework that offered opportunities for an integrated

approach, i.e. mutually reinforcing interventions. The project exploited many, though not all, such opportunities. There are indications that the approach has been experienced as empowering, has created local ownership of resulting interventions, initiated a dialogue among stakeholders where none existed before, and developed and strengthened networks including those between organisations and individuals from different communities. However, even though stakeholders are enthusiastic, their capacity is not yet adequate to conduct PVCA exercises independently. Further capacity building and training will be required to achieve this.

Recommendations & Lessons Learned

Main recommendations and follow-up:

- The evaluation recommends a new project to follow the current one, which will be completed on 31 March 2009 (following two extensions). Such a new project should continue its focus on Bint Jbeil caza, where the need is still great and where the project has built social capital and experience that will allow for high levels of effectiveness and efficiency.
- The Project should further strengthen the capacities of local stakeholders in Bint Jbeil to be engaged in Local Economic Recovery and Development, especially the PVCA approach.
- The Project should support implementation of interventions higher up the Olive Oil and Beekeeping value chains (supporting services, processing, marketing), to

- ensure sustainability of what has been achieved and increase the scope of outreach.
- Support at least two more PVCAs if the stakeholders agree there is potential. This should be for oregano production, where the project has provided support without doing a PVCA, and where marketing constraints are likely to arise in the near future. In new value chains, production level interventions should be implemented only if this is required to establish the credibility of the process.
 - The project should promote and support the use of the PVCA approach beyond Bint Jbeil, targeting two other most war-affected cazas. The Project, however, should refrain from involvement in implementation of the proposals that result from the PVCAs. This should be left to local and international development partners with a capacity in the cazas in question.
 - UNDP and the ILO need to enhance collaboration to build on the achievements of the current project, UNDP, and ART Gold, so as to ensure that one instead of two parallel approaches to Local Economic Development is being developed and promoted. There are considerable opportunities for and benefits to collaboration, and it would be unfortunate if these are missed. This includes linking sectoral Forums, such as those promoted under the current project, to the planned Local Economic Development Agency in Tyre, and this and other such agencies adopting PVCA as one of their methodologies. In the current project, the joint implementation foreseen between ILO, UNDP, FAO and UNIDO did not happen, though exchange of information, experience and other collaboration did take place, especially between UNDP, UNDP ART Gold and ILO.
 - The project's results confirm the ILO's experience that effectiveness of livelihood recovery, and its sustainability, benefit from a participatory approach. Participation, when done well, in a structured and result-oriented process, can be achieved relatively quickly and results in greater relevance of the assistance provided and greater ownership among recipients and stakeholders. It has therefore both short and long-term benefits – it delivers relevant assistance, and it lays the basis for the transition from recovery to development.
 - Livelihood recovery projects should have a minimum duration of 24 months. The project was originally designed to have a duration of 18 months, which was reduced to 10 months before project start, and increased to 17 and then 20 months when it was operational (the last with additional ILO funding) . One of the main lessons to be learned from this evaluation is that a duration of 10 months is too short for a livelihood recovery project that aims at relevance and therefore impact. Forcing such a project into a time frame that short does not make livelihood recovery more “rapid”, but is likely to result, rather, in inefficiencies, especially, but not only, in the context of a largely agricultural economy.

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Acronyms

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LEDA	Local Economic Development Agency
LRF	Lebanon Recovery Fund
LSER	Local Socio-Economic Recovery in War-Affected Areas of South Lebanon project
PVCA	Participatory Value Chain Analysis
SDC	Social Development Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

1. Background

The results of Israel's July–August 2006 attack on Lebanon and the subsequent hostilities all over the country have now been well documented and often reported. Nearly 1,200 people were killed and 4,400 injured, while an estimated 1 million were displaced. Essential infrastructure was destroyed and services disrupted. The economic consequences were immediate and disastrous. Tens of thousands of people lost their livelihoods, including an estimated 40,000 in agriculture and 5,000 in fisheries. The damage was greatest in the South. In Bint Jbeil caza, on the border with Israel, as many as 30,000 are thought to have lost their livelihoods, mainly in agriculture and services.

On 31 August, two weeks after a cease fire had come into effect, the Government of Lebanon launched the recovery process by presenting its plans for long term reconstruction at the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon's Recovery¹. This included initiatives for livelihood recovery in agriculture, small and medium enterprises and industry. In order to coordinate some of the incoming funds, the UN Development Group assisted the Government to establish and administrate the Lebanon Recovery Fund (LRF), in which donors were invited to pool their contributions. The fund, which was originally to be accessed by UN agencies only, supported a variety of recovery projects, the majority of which aimed at livelihoods recovery.

The ILO conducted its own assessment in September 2006, which resulted in a proposed Post-War Decent Work Programme for Lebanon. The programme included proposed assistance to micro and small enterprises as well as cooperatives as a means to livelihood recovery. It was not until April 2007, though, that a livelihood recovery proposal was finalised and submitted to the LRF. The proposal was approved and the Local Socio-Economic Recovery project started in August 2007. It aimed at rapid livelihood recovery using a participatory approach, through direct assistance to those affected while at the same time building the capacity of local stakeholders to identify the priorities for and deliver such assistance.

The project as designed focussed on Bint Jbeil caza, which was one of the four poorest cazas in the country before the war, and one of the worst affected. A fifth of those killed were in Bint Jbeil. The main town, Bint Jbeil, was largely destroyed. Many other villages were heavily damaged. It is estimated that some 70% of the agricultural land was affected. The worst affected sectors included olive and tobacco plantations, as well as honey production, given the destruction of pastures. Much of the caza's livestock was lost as well. It is estimated that nearly 90% of commercial establishments were destroyed or damaged. Assistance to Bint Jbeil thus had high priority.

The original project design foresaw a duration of 18 months, which was brought back to 10 months when the LRF requested the ILO to reduce the budget. Subsequently, it was extended again, to 17 months, to enable the project to complete its activities. Again, the ILO made available additional funds for a further extension by 3 months, as a bridging period to a possible new project. An independent evaluation was foreseen in the project document and is, commendably, standard for LRF funded projects. This is the report of that evaluation, for which the fieldwork took place between 10 and 20 November 2008.

The comprehensive and, in the evaluation team's view, very well-designed Terms of Reference for this evaluation is attached as Annex 4. We have tried to cover most of the key questions included, leaving some because we considered them less relevant (e.g. which project component was more or less successful than others), and making clear for some that our judgements are based largely on expectations because it is too

1 "Setting the stage for long term reconstruction: The national early recovery process", Government of Lebanon, August 2006

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early for anything more than that (related for instance to sustainability).

The report outline included in the TOR provides just two headings to report on the evaluation's findings. We have given some more structure to the document, considering first achievements against outputs, then immediate objectives, and then the development objective, using "progress markers" (see below) at each level. Next we look at issues related to management and efficiency, how the project "fits" into the broader development framework, and issues related to communication, replication and increasing the project's scope. This is followed by conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned presented separately.

First, however, we present the evaluation process, an assessment of the project design and then of the strategy or approach as it evolved and was actually implemented.

2. Evaluation framework and process

2.1 Sources and approach

The reasons for and purpose of this independent evaluation are set out comprehensively in the Terms of reference, which is attached in Annex 4. The evaluation's scope and proposed analytical framework are also well-explained there, and the evaluation team has seen little need to add to this.

The evaluation was expected to address five groups of questions, concerning:

- Relevance and strategic fit
- Project design
- Achievements
- Management and use of resources
- Impact orientation and sustainability

The evaluation team opted for a participatory approach to assess the project against these groups of questions, for the following reasons:

- In principle we believe a participatory approach is always to be preferred over others as it strengthens the reliability and relevance of the findings, enhances learning by the clients of the evaluation and increases the chance that recommendations will be followed up.
- A participatory approach does not preclude technical inputs from the evaluators.
- This specific project took a participatory approach to developing and implementing its interventions. Assessing these interventions in another manner would have been inappropriate.
- Given the project's focus on rapid implementation, there was a significant need for additional data collection, which could only be met by taking a participatory approach.

Within this framework, the main sources of information the evaluation could draw on were:

- Documentation – specifically related to the project, and related to the context
- The ILO Regional Office and relevant ILO Headquarters departments
- The project team
- Stakeholders at the national level
- Stakeholders at the local level, specifically those directly involved in implementation, and those the project was to coordinate or collaborate with
- Target groups, beneficiaries

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We focussed on different sources of information for answering different groups of questions, although of course there was significant overlap.

Documentation

Project and other relevant documentation was consulted for all groups of questions. An initial review indicated that documentation was weakest in relation to impact and sustainability questions, which therefore justified some extra effort on new data collection.

ILO Regional Office and Headquarters

Here the focus was on questions of strategic fit (in relation to Government of Lebanon and ILO priorities), design and management, backstopping, and use of resources. The main methodologies to obtain this information were briefings and individual interviews. At ILO Headquarters feedback on the findings and recommendations was obtained from the CRISIS unit. Other units had not been closely involved in implementation.

The project team

The project team was the prime source of information on questions of:

- design (in particular how realistic it was, how useful the project document was)
- achievements – here it was particularly important to get a clear overview of what the project approach turned out to be (as distinct from how it was planned to be), what tools were used, what the project team considered as the main achievements in relation to capacity building and support to socio-economic activities, and what the main constraints have been.
- management and use of resources – management and implementation structure, planning, monitoring and evaluation
- impact and sustainability orientation – the extent to which these were taken into account in project implementation

The evaluation team received a comprehensive briefing by the project team on its first full day in the field , and has kept drawing on the team's knowledge and experience throughout the assessment. In addition we had individual interviews with the project coordinator and other members of the team.

Stakeholders at the national level

Here we expected our focus to be on relevance and strategic fit, as well as questions of coordination and collaboration with other agencies. However, a meeting with the Lebanon Recovery Fund could not take place and other stakeholders at the national level had played no significant role in the project. We therefore made use of available documentation. In the event the evaluation team only met the national level leadership of one of the project's implementing partners, where the discussion focussed more on implementation issues and sustainability.

Stakeholders at the local level

With implementation partners the focus was on questions of:

- relevance to local needs
- achievements, in particular with regard to capacity building, how partners have been involved

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- impact orientation and sustainability

With organisations the project was expected to coordinate and collaborate with, the focus was on questions of:

- relevance and strategic fit
- achievements – in particular with respect to collaboration and partnership questions, and how the project was or was not integrated into ongoing and other new work in the same field
- impact orientation and sustainability – questions of integration into existing work and use of existing or developing institutions

The questions for the unstructured interviews with local stakeholders are attached in Annex 6. The majority (ten) of the local partners were interviewed. The evaluation team also held a discussion with facilitators involved in the project's Participatory Value Chain Analysis exercises.

Beneficiaries

The focus was on questions related to:

- relevance – the extent to which what the project provided was actually required
- achievements – to what extent was the approach participatory, transparent, what was the quality of the assistance provided
- impact and sustainability – what were or are expected to be the effects in terms of income generation and jobs, are these likely to last

Two methodologies were used:

- a mini-survey of two groups of participants in project interventions of which by now some impact could have been expected (introducing oregano and rehabilitating olive plantations)
- focus group discussions with six groups of participants in project interventions – nearly all the interventions were covered

The questions for both are included in Annex 6. The results were analysed systematically using a framework reflected in the detailed review of interventions attached in Annex 1.

2.2 Process

The evaluation included the following steps, which are also reflected in the team's programme, attached in Annex 5. The intention was to move from broad questions on strategic fit, design and overall achievements to more specific questions related to individual interventions, impact and sustainability, as well as technical aspects of the project's methodology.

- Review of documents. This continued throughout the assignment as more became available.
- Briefing by and interviews with ILO Regional Office in Beirut
- Briefing by the project team.
- Interviews with local implementing partners.
- Focus group discussions with beneficiaries.
- Mini-survey of beneficiaries of two interventions.
- Group discussion with some of the facilitators who took part in the project's Participatory Value Chain Analysis exercises.
- Group discussion with the local Beekeeping Forum the project facilitates.

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- Individual interviews with the project coordinator and other staff to address issues that had come up as well as technical aspects of the project's approach.
- Analysis.
- Presentations, to the project team, to the implementing partners (through a stakeholders workshop), to the ILO Regional Office and Headquarters (through video link-up), and feedback
- Drafting of the report.

Comments on the report were provided in December and early January. This was followed by further discussions at the ILO Regional Office, and meetings with the LRF and UNDP, which have contributed to the present, final, report.

The evaluation team has been impressed by everyone's cooperation and the access to information it has been given. In itself, the high participation in focus group discussions and the availability of stakeholders for interviews and meetings indicates that the project has been appreciated.

2.3 Assessment framework

As we will see under the section on project design, the project's logical framework suffered from several weaknesses, including inadequate indicators. The project team and the responsible specialist at the ILO Regional Office have tried to address this by revising it, but these changes have not been approved by the ILO or the LRF. They have therefore no official status, although they do appear in project progress reports. The proposed indicators seem more appropriate, but add little to what the outputs state already and still include some, especially for the immediate objectives, that are not useful.

The evaluation team did not consider its task was to redesign the logical framework just for the evaluation. We have therefore developed a set of "progress markers" against which to evaluate processes and achievements. Progress markers are similar to indicators, with the difference that indicators are individually observed and do not in themselves show how important they are compared to each other. Progress markers on the other hand form a comprehensive and progressive set of markers: progress markers advance from necessary markers (the "need to see" markers), via desired markers (the "like to see" markers), to markers of success and sustainability (the "love to see" markers). The markers used in this report are based on elements of the outputs and objectives, as well as the key questions included in the evaluation's Terms of Reference. Efficiency has been treated separately, i.e. not as one of the markers, because, as usual in project documents, no indicators have been included in the logical framework that relate to it. It is considered in the section on project management and related issues.

Most markers are at the level of the outputs, where progress can be assessed most unambiguously. Adequate information was available or obtained from documentation, and interviews with the project and local stakeholders.

Several markers have been included regarding impact at the level of the immediate objectives, including recovery and improvement of livelihoods. Since it was asked to do so, in its progress reports the project team has provided figures on jobs created and livelihoods regained. This was largely done on the basis of expectations (e.g. someone whose olive plantation has been rehabilitated has regained his/her livelihood) rather than fact (e.g. that person has gained an income from this). The evaluation team believes that at this stage, after just 16 months of operation, little can be said with certainty about such impact. It takes time to be realised, especially in an economy where the main sectors are agricultural. Assistance provided in one year is likely to show impact only the next, and full impact may be visible several years later only. Moreover,

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given that the project is taking a participatory approach that focuses on value chains which employ many, the final impact is likely to be much greater than can be gauged from the figures the project team was asked to provide. The demands from donors or implementing agencies for such “hard” data after such a brief period of time are unrealistic and may obscure a project’s true impact.

However, in order to be able to say whether it is likely at least that beneficiaries are regaining or improving their livelihoods, and establish any “first signs of impact”, as indicated above the evaluation team had considerable interaction with beneficiaries, mostly through focus group discussions. These also provided valuable information on the process of delivery of the assistance. The mini-survey of beneficiaries of two of the interventions, was meant to see whether this more quantitative information would confirm focus group findings. This proved to be the case.

3. Project design

The project document was written over two periods in 2007 lasting a total of two weeks. This included a re-write under time pressure when the LRF requested the budget to be significantly reduced, and the the planned duration was brought back to just ten months. The authors had little access to concrete information on livelihoods and enterprise in the South, other than the generally available data on the destruction wrought by the war.

Under these imperfect conditions a document was produced that has considerable strengths as well as weaknesses. The intention of the project was clear. It was to:

- “Contribute to the local economic recovery of Bint Jbeil caza through the rapid implementation of integrated socio-economic activities (micro and small enterprise recovery, employment and income generation revival)”. (Immediate objective 2)

It was to do so by providing assistance through local partners. In order to ensure that this would be effective and to make a contribution to the partners being empowered to participate in the socio-economic development of the caza, the project would:

- “Enhance implementation capacities of local stakeholders (municipalities, private and civil society stakeholders) in identifying and providing direct services to recover sustainable livelihoods”. (Immediate objective 1)

The goal of the project, however, went further than economic recovery and related capacities. It was to:

- “Promote social equity and local stakeholders empowerment through local employment recovery and livelihood opportunities projects in communities of war-affected areas of South Lebanon”. (Development objective)

The project was therefore meant to have a strong social aspect. This is reflected in its strategy, of which the main thrust was clear as well. The project was to take a participatory approach that would give stakeholders and beneficiaries a voice in decisions that affected their livelihoods. This would enhance relevance and ownership and so make for greater impact and sustainability. It would also contribute to empowerment, which was a goal in its own right. Interventions for recovery would be implemented by local stakeholders, of which it was assumed they were there and would be willing, though little specific information was available. The strategy was not specific on sectors in which assistance would be provided, and what the assistance would comprise. This was appropriate, since these were to be decided on through participatory

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processes. Any lack of consensus that might exist among stakeholders in this regard would be addressed through their working together on data collection, analysis and prioritisation of needs and possible interventions. However, the document did specify the assistance would include credit and business management training. Although especially the first is a relatively safe assumption in a post-war situation, this could have detracted from the project's flexibility to respond to the needs identified.

Wisely, given the 10 months planned duration, the logical framework did not include sustainability of the developed capacity. However, the document did briefly explain that embedding the project activities in those of the stakeholders, and having stakeholders participate in the project at all levels, would improve sustainability. The evaluation mission considers that these are indeed conditions under which sustainability at the stakeholder level can be achieved, but that this did not constitute a sufficient sustainability strategy. The logical framework did include, correctly, the sustainability of the livelihoods that would be recovered. Taking a participatory approach to ensure ownership and relevance of the assistance to the local economy and the needs of households was expected to be the main the way to achieve this.

The logical framework and concrete strategies that operationalized these main principles suffered, however, from some confusion. A few examples will have to suffice to demonstrate this:

- Immediate objectives, outputs and activities are hard to distinguish, e.g. the immediate objective concerning capacity building is basically the same as output 1.3 under this objective, and activity 2.3.1 on communities recovering income generating activities could have been the objective of output 2.2 on micro projects for livelihood recovery being implemented.
- Outputs 2.4 and 2.5 include capacity building, which belongs under objective 1.
- Outputs 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 largely cover the same or at least overlapping ground – 2.3, which concerns beneficiaries receiving support is actually a result of 2.2, which covers implementation of micro projects, and 2.4 seems to restate 2.2 and 2.3.
- Indicators are often inadequate and at the wrong level. E.g. a training evaluation report cannot serve as an indicator for the immediate objective to enhance capacities of stakeholders, and number of grants provided can at most be an indicator at the output level, not for the immediate and development objectives (it is now used for all three levels).
- There are no targets for the indicators. The only target appears on the cover page, i.e. 400 households benefit directly, 1,000 indirectly.

These weaknesses are not merely an inappropriate use of logical framework terminology. They resulted in a lack of clarity about what the project was actually meant to achieve, what activities it was to implement and how these related to each other. To a significant extent it was left to the project team to work this out.

As for the strategy, the evaluation team believes that an approach that starts on an integrated basis, i.e. a participatory identification by local stakeholders of priority interventions to be supported, should not have continued with three different “components”, on vocational training, business development, and employment intensive activities, of which the first two have several things in common (e.g. microfinance). These components coincide with departmental structures at the ILO, but reflecting them at the project level does not contribute to the integrated conceptualisation of the project strategy. The same holds true for business management training and microfinance, as well as grants and equipment, which were conceptualised as separate from the implementation of micro projects to recover livelihoods. Finance, grants, business and skills training and others should have been conceptualised and included as *possible* micro projects, depending on identified and prioritised needs.

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The confusion that results from an approach that starts with participatory design of recovery strategies and projects and continues with pre-established components that overlap to a significant extent is reflected in the diagram which represents the project strategy (see Annex 3). The evaluation team has been unable to fully understand how the different activities presented in this diagram were meant to relate to each other. This lack of clarity is also reflected, as we have seen above, in the logical framework. As we will see later, these weaknesses in conceptualising the project strategy have detracted from the integrated planning and implementation that the project concept aimed at.

With regard to resources and time available, the project design was evidently not realistic, since the project duration had to be extended from 10 to 17 months to enable the project to complete its outputs. A second extension, with additional ILO funds, was meant to further contribute to this, as well as to enable the project to develop a sustainability strategy. The need to extend is hardly surprising in a situation where the ILO had to reduce the originally planned budget at the request of the LRF, and still wanted to deliver something substantial. However, the fact that the project could be extended by 7 months without additional funds indicates that the approved budget would have been sufficient for a longer project. Ten months, the evaluation mission believes, is unrealistic for any livelihood recovery project that goes beyond mere distribution of goods to those willing to receive them. Though it is commendable that the ILO did not opt for that approach, better initial planning of the use of the funds available might have avoided the project being implemented at first on the basis of a 10 months duration. It is fortunate that the LRF eventually approved an extension to a more realistic duration. As we will see later, with this extension much of what was included in the document has been achieved.

There are, however, some exceptions, which could have been avoided at the design stage. The documents' authors were apparently not aware that introduction of the Start and Improve Your Business Programme would be too costly given the limited funds. Whether the project could have built the capacity of microfinance institutions to upgrade and introduce new services, even within the 17 months, is also doubtful. This usually requires more time, funding, and specialised expertise. The "employment intensive component" was to link up with a construction project, for which it was to identify economic infrastructure to be rehabilitated. That project was delayed, and this component therefore did not happen. Its inclusion may have been over-optimistic.

The project document identified one major risk to successful implementation: Possible deterioration of the "volatile political and security situation in the country". That this was a realistic assessment was demonstrated by the political unrest in the country which in May 2008 forced the project to stop operations for a week and disrupted some of its activities. The long-term effect on the project was fortunately minimal. The project designers seem to have been confident that there were no risks to the collaboration foreseen between ILO, UNDP, FAO and UNIDO. As we will see the collaboration did not actually happen as planned, though some did take place. This did, however, not have a significant impact on the project's achievements, and the project document therefore proved correct in not identifying this as a risk.

In conclusion, the project design suffered from a number of weaknesses, of which the most important are confusion in the logical framework, a project strategy that aimed to be integrated but comprised pre-established components, and an unrealistic duration. It has, though, provided a good framework in which the project team, supported by the ILO Regional Office, could develop an effective approach.


4. Implementation

4.1 The project's approach

Once the project became operational and more informed about the actual recovery needs and institutional situation in Bint Jbeil, a more straightforward approach evolved than the one set out in the project document. This is illustrated below. The Participatory Value Chain Analysis² methodology was central to this approach. This methodology enables relevant stakeholders to jointly analyse a value chain, identify constraints on its development and prioritise proposals that address these. The methodology is based on the Participatory Appraisal of Competitive Advantages (PACA) tool for developing local economies, designed and promoted by the consultancy firm Mesopartner. The project has adapted it to value chain development and the recovery context in Bint Jbeil, using ILO experience in similar situations. Among other things this has meant shortening the process of training, data collection and analysis, and ensuring that the different levels in the value chains are considered separately. The analytical tools are, however, not specific to value chain analysis and the methodology could benefit from adopting these.

Two PVCAs were conducted, with facilitators from local organisations trained by the project. This was preceded by selection of two priority sectors, Olive Oil and Beekeeping, in consultation with local stakeholders, including a workshop. The project did not wait with this until the “Rapid Territorial Socio-Economic Diagnosis and Institutional Mapping” foreseen in the project document was completed. This was an appropriate strategic choice since such exercises usually last many months and the project needed to start delivering fast.

Proposals for interventions that resulted from the PVCAs were prioritised by the stakeholders and divided into those that were short, medium and longer term. The project funded the implementation of some of the proposals, by local Implementing Partners. A few will be funded and carried out by local organisations themselves or were included in proposals they submitted to donors. In the Beekeeping sector a Forum was established that facilitates the implementation of proposals and coordinates development of the value chain.



² Over the project's duration the methodology has been called LACA (for Local Appraisal of Competitive Advantages) as well as PVCA. Since PVCA is more precise and the project eventually decided on this name, it will be used in this report.

Loans and business management training were part of the support provided to the two value chains, as planned in the project document. That is, some olive farmers and beekeepers took loans and training. This support should not have been considered as a separate “component” (as conceptualised in the project document) since it fulfilled the same function as other assistance that was provided: strengthening producers in the value chain. However, loans and business training were also provided to enterprises outside these value chains, in sectors that the project and stakeholders considered to be important for livelihood recovery, such as construction. To that extent this assistance was distinct from the core of the project’s approach.

A separate activity was developed to support people with special needs, as planned in the project document. This included skills and management training, as well as access to loans and complementary grants. The skills were not related to the two priority value chains, but were decided on separately. A degree of integration with the core of the project was achieved by including people with special needs in assistance provided in beekeeping and olive oil.

Overall, this approach has proven suitable to a project that aims at quick interventions to recover livelihoods as well as participation of stakeholders, relevance, and ownership. The main weakness is the separation of part of the credit and business training from the project’s core. Focussing this assistance on the same value chains could have contributed to greater impact there.

The project has not developed a strategy for the sustainability of its approach, or decided on what it expects to become sustainable and what not. This needs to be addressed.

4.2 What was realised per output

This section is based on project progress reports, discussions with and briefings by the project team, review of documentation, including those mentioned in the outputs, and interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries.

Output 1.1

Comprehensive mapping of stakeholders and economic sectors specificities at local level executed and local key stakeholders identified (in collaboration with UNDP ART Gold programme).

Progress

To make possible an early start of concrete recovery activities, the project selected its focus sectors through individual consultations (including with UNDP and ART Gold) and a workshop with local stakeholders as well as review of available material, rather than through a comprehensive mapping. It could thus proceed quickly with identification and implementation of interventions. The comprehensive mapping was, however, still carried out. The project contracted the American University of Beirut to conduct a Territorial Diagnosis and Institutional Mapping of Bint Jbeil. This became available in November 2008, too late to affect the work of the present project.

However, the study is of good quality and contains information and recommendations that should be useful to those working on recovery and development in Bint Jbeil. The project plans to disseminate it widely to

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stakeholders, and the study can therefore still make a contribution to their capacity to assist in the recovery of livelihoods (immediate objective 1), though not during the present project period.

ART Gold did not initially foresee a similar study in Bint Jbeil, and there was therefore no collaboration on the study itself. The project did make use of relevant data collected by UNDP. ART Gold later started work on inventories of economic resources of each of the country's four regions. It will make use of the project's study.

Output 1.2

Local stakeholders have enhanced capacities in networking with caza/municipalities, public and private and social recovery service providers (in collaboration with UNDP ART Gold programme).

Progress

The project conducted two PVCA exercises, which included training on the methodology for relevant stakeholders. The evaluation team found that the exercises brought together organisations that had no relations before and that some of these contacts have continued. In the beekeeping sector a Beekeeping Forum has been established. Networks have therefore been built. The Beekeeping Forum is a clear instance of such networks enhancing capacity to assist in livelihood recovery. The Forum has guided the implementation of proposals that came out of the beekeeping PVCA, including providing technical inputs into the design of training programmes.

No forum was established for the olive oil value chain to avoid duplication with plans of UNDP, which have however not yet been realised. The project decided to work with sectoral groups instead of the ART Gold supported Municipal Working Groups as was foreseen in the project document, since these focussed on infrastructure and social services.

Output 1.3

Local stakeholders have enhanced capacities in socio-economic project prioritisation and project cycle skills and are enabled to design, lobby, run and monitor livelihoods recovery programs (in collaboration with UNDP ART Gold programme).

Progress

On the basis of ILO experience elsewhere and the PACA methodology (see 4.1), the project developed a Participatory Value Chain Analysis (PVCA) methodology on which it trained local stakeholders. This is the main capacity building the project has done in relation to this output. The stakeholders much appreciated the PVCA training and the methodology. Review of the training materials indicates the training was thorough and of high quality.

Some of the stakeholders were contracted to carry out priority proposals that resulted from the PVCA exercises. The project provided short training sessions in relation to these contracts, to enable partners to select beneficiaries according to specified criteria, monitor progress and report. It has also provided on-the-job guidance on project proposal writing, monitoring, reporting and accounting, and lobbying. These and PVCA are important skills relevant to this output and the objectives. They have been used by the stakeholders and have therefore contributed to achievements under both immediate objectives.

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The collaboration with ART Gold did not happen as planned due to its focus on other aspects of recovery. UNDP project staff have, however, been included in the training on PVCA and have contributed to the exercises.

Output 1.4

Social Development Centres of the MoSA will be capacitated at mainstreaming Social concerns within Local Socio-Economic Recovery programs.

Progress

The project collaborated with the SDC in Bint Jbeil, and training was provided as for other Implementing Partners. Participation in PVCA exercises gave the SDC an opportunity to mainstream social concerns into this process, but there is no evidence that this has happened. This output has not contributed to achievement of the project's objectives in another way than foreseen for other stakeholders (Outputs 1.2 and 1.3).

Output 1.5

LESR (Local Economic and Social Recovery) methodology integrated and synergized with FAO, UNIDO and UNDP methodologies, fully adapted to the local context, and ready to be replicated elsewhere.

Progress

Meetings have been held frequently with FAO and especially UNDP, and information, experience and training have been shared. This has included participation of the project in relevant forums set up by UNDP ART Gold. In the evaluation team's assessment the project has made great efforts to come to more collaboration. However, this has not resulted in an integrated or synergized methodology. FAO does not use anything similar to the PVCA approach. The potential for integration was therefore limited. Implementation of UNDP ART Gold had initially progressed insufficiently for collaboration and focussed on other aspects of recovery than livelihoods. It is now developing its own guidelines on Local Economic Development for the country in general. UNIDO has not been significantly present in the South.

However, the PVCA methodology developed by the project, which should be considered as the main component of the LESR methodology mentioned in the output, can and does lead to integrated programmes, has been adapted to the local context and could be replicated. Although the collaboration foreseen in the project document did not take place, the work done under this output has therefore made achievement of the project objectives possible.

For easy replication and use by others, the methodology still needs to be brought together in an easily accessible manual or guide, and to be placed in a context of steps to be taken prior and subsequently to the exercises themselves. At present what exists is the material used for the PVCA training, on a CD-ROM that does not guide the user through the different documents.

Output 2.1

Local forums rapidly identified activities for rapid local livelihoods recovery.

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Progress

Activities for rapid livelihood recovery, as well as more strategic medium and long term interventions were identified through two PVCA exercises, on the Olive Oil and the Beekeeping sectors. These exercises involved a wide range of stakeholders, including other projects, who in collaboration identified and prioritised proposals to develop these value chains and so recover livelihoods. A Beekeeping Forum was formed following the beekeeping PVCA. The Forum has facilitated and guided the implementation of proposals that came out of the exercise. Its members are engaged in identifying funds to implement interventions not funded by the ILO. In one case a comprehensive proposal has been submitted to a donor. This output has been largely achieved and has contributed to the project's objectives as foreseen in the project document.

Output 2.2

Implementation strategy established and integrated micro projects for livelihoods recovery implemented by community actors.

Progress

The PVCA exercises resulted in implementation strategies for the Beekeeping and Olive Oil sectors. Stakeholders have been contracted by the project to implement some of the proposals ("micro projects") that formed part of the strategies. These were generally the short-term proposals that could be expected to have a relatively quick impact on livelihoods. Two interventions are expected to be funded and implemented by other stakeholders. UNDP has supported interventions in the same value chains, which are likely to contribute to their development.

Projects were also implemented to promote oregano cultivation. No PVCA was done for this sector, as the project considered this to be related to beekeeping (increasing pastures for bees). This means that constraints in the value chain other than at the production level, e.g. in relation to marketing, have not been identified and analysed. This may be a threat to the sustainability of this work.

A total of 7 value chain interventions were implemented, some through multiple partners, reaching directly a total of about 900 households (the last 5 interventions in the table below are covered by other outputs). Most have suffered from some implementation challenges. These included for instance having to promote oregano planting outside the planting season, planting trees when there was not enough water, and Implementing Partners not always providing complementary assistance (e.g. toolkits and training) to the same people. The project has generally been able to take corrective action quickly and appropriately. However, the loss of significant numbers of trees and oregano plants could not be avoided. Also, further assistance may be required for some of the interventions to have an impact. E.g. farmers who were trained on pruning olive trees but did not practice it because it was not the right season, may require refreshing their knowledge and further guidance.

The interventions are reviewed in detail in Annex 1, which also includes detailed recommendations on follow-up to each. The extent to which they (including those covered by other outputs) contributed to livelihood recovery will be assessed when the achievement of immediate objective 2 is considered (section 5.1).

Table 1 – Interventions and numbers of beneficiaries (November 2008)

Intervention	Number of direct beneficiaries
Distribution of olive oil storage devices	349
Rehabilitation of olive plantations	114
Training on pruning of olive trees	124
Distribution of olive tree pruning tools	277
Planting oregano fields	112
Expansion of beekeeping pastures(6,000 trees on public land)	N.A.
Training of new beekeepers	40
Training of old beekeepers	38
Training food preparation, catering, people with special needs	20
Training computer repair, people with special needs	22
Grants people with special needs	8
Business management training	117
Loans	101
Total (excluding overlaps)	985

Output 2.3

Selected beneficiaries (most vulnerable population, micro enterprises, women business associations) receive concrete skills and financial support (also through existing microfinance organizations) to recover socio-economic activities.

Progress

This output is not substantially different from Output 2.2, since the micro projects that were implemented included skills training and grants in kind (e.g. olive oil containers, tree trimming tools). Microfinance was provided through a selected Implementing Partner (Al Majmouaa) but not only in the Beekeeping or Olive Oil value chains. Loans also went to other sectors considered important for recovery, including construction, and to the particularly vulnerable group of people with special needs. In the latter case loans went together with grants in equipment provided directly by the project.

Business Management Training was made compulsory for credit clients. The training was provided by Al Majmouaa, which also provided the loans. Due to the need to disburse before project end, most credit clients received the training after the loans, while training would have helped them to plan the loans' use. So far 101 have received loans (of which 37 are women) and 117 have been trained (of which 37 are women).

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More training is planned. The training is reported to have been practical and participatory. Participants commented positively, although, as usual with business training for small entrepreneurs, some found it hard to participate full-time.

Al Majmouaa does not usually make business training a precondition to providing credit. The evaluation team believes that doing so is not in accordance with current good practice in microfinance and business training, especially (but not only) where it concerns those with business experience. Providing business training is costly, and therefore not sustainable for most microfinance providers. In addition, forcing people to take training generally does not result in optimal learning taking place.

Output 2.4

Locally selected strategic economic sectors, enterprises, and Micro Finance Institutions are recovered and capacitated; key socio-economic infrastructures and vocational skills are identified.

Progress

This output is covered by the preceding ones, apart from the capacitating of microfinance institutions, which properly belongs under objective 1. The project granting Al Majmouaa US\$ 130,000 for loans has been instrumental in the organisation's decision to open an office in Bint Jbeil town. The grant increased the loan portfolio to such an extent that it made such an office financially viable. This has facilitated access to loans to the project's beneficiaries and is likely to have a broader and longer-term impact on access to finance in the caza. The ILO Regional Office also granted some equipment and furniture to the office (not from the project budget). Its quality reportedly left something to be desired but it is being used.

To support the credit assistance the project developed a basic business management training course, since introduction of the ILO Start and Improve Your Business programme was judged too costly by the ILO Regional Office. It also trained 14 trainers (4 women). However, only two trainers of the training provider, Al Majmouaa, participated. In the subsequent training of entrepreneurs Al Majmouaa made use of some of the materials provided at the training of trainers, as well as of some of the training techniques introduced. However, it largely used its own material. Although the business training was provided, the project's investment in developing it was therefore mostly in vain.

Output 2.5

Local NGOs working with disabled people have been capacitated and specific integrated programs (skills, access to finance, entrepreneurship recovery) have been provided to the disabled people.

Progress

The project selected people with special needs to receive vocational training in close collaboration with INTERSOS, the Social Development Centre (SDC), and the Hicham Fahes Institute for Vocational Training. The topics for training were selected in consultation with these organisations and the selected people. Training was conducted on computer maintenance (SDC) and catering and food preparation (Hicham Fahes). A total of 42 people were trained (40% women). The training is reported to have been of high quality, and participants commented very positively.

The project's strategy to organise special programmes for people with special needs had a significant positive effect on their self-confidence, which is important. However, it limited the number of courses that could be offered and therefore resulted in people being trained on skills they had no aspiration to use.

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The capacity building for the Implementing Partners has been limited to regular monitoring and guidance, and advice on the training design and materials. This has been useful.

The integration between the activity for people with special needs and Al Majmouaa's credit and training was good, with loans and training being provided to those who applied. In addition a few loans were provided to people with special needs in the two value chains (beekeeping, olive oil).

4.3 Assessment against progress markers

In the assessment below, the “need to see” markers are those that are essential for achieving the immediate objectives, as formulated in the project document, and should be “visible” now, while the others are not. For instance, integration and speed of delivery are included in the objectives, and are reflected in “need to see” markers. There is no mention in the outputs or objectives of women benefiting, which is therefore reflected in “like to see” markers. Consolidated Guidelines for Local Economic and Social Recovery are one of the outputs, and are desirable, but not essential for achieving livelihood recovery. They are therefore reflected in a “love to see” marker.

Need to see markers

Stakeholders were trained on a participatory methodology to identify, prioritise, and plan livelihood recovery activities	Achieved. Fifteen people (one woman) were trained on the PVCA methodology, which is participatory and includes identification, prioritising and planning.
Stakeholders were trained or otherwise supported to increase delivery of livelihood recovery activities including services	Mostly achieved ³ . Some on the job training was provided on aspects of project cycle management. A grant to Al Majmouaa made possible the opening of a branch office in Bint Jbeil, for providing credit. Funding enabled local organisations to temporarily increase their delivery of assistance.
Stakeholders and potential beneficiaries participated in identifying and planning livelihood recovery activities	Achieved. Representatives of local organisations conducted PVCA exercises, which included consultations (workshops, interviews) with other organisations and concerned local people. Nearly 200 people participated.
Women participated in a manner that ensured their voice was heard	Partly achieved. Just over 20% of participants in the PVCA were women. This is relatively high given the socio-cultural situation in the caza. However, also given that situation, it could have been helpful to consult women separately, as a group, to ensure that their specific concerns were heard. Advice on this issue of a gender specialist would have been useful.

³ The evaluation team has used qualitative terms where assessments are not based on numbers, and percentages where they are. It is not useful to express words like “mostly” in percentages. To avoid confusion, the following is the continuum on which the qualitative terms should be placed, from least to most achieved: Not achieved, partly, mostly, largely, nearly, achieved.

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Identification of livelihood recovery activities has been rapid	Achieved. The PVCA methodology as adapted by the project took just two weeks. In the evaluation team's experience, this is as rapid as possible for exercises that aim at relevance and developing ownership as well as identifying recovery activities.
Livelihood recovery activities have been implemented	Achieved. In total 7 value chain development activities have been implemented. In addition, business management training and credit have been provided.
Implementation has been rapid	Achieved. The activities were developed and implemented over a period of time that was short compared to what was achieved. The first PVCA exercise took place only 2 months after project start. The speed with which proposals that resulted from the PVCA exercises could be implemented was among the criteria used for their prioritisation. There was a 3-months interval between the exercises and implementation of proposals, which is acceptable given the need to solicit and screen proposals and issue contracts. Most proposals took about 7 months to complete. This can be confirmed by referring to Annex 2, which presents the actual implementation schedule.
The activities were mutually reinforcing, i.e. integrated	Partly achieved. The interventions were integrated to the extent that most intended to contribute to the development of the selected value chains. In many cases they also benefited the same people or localities. However, more integration would have been possible, for instance by concentrating oregano cultivation and increasing pastures for bees in the localities where beekeepers were trained. This would have increased the productivity and sustainability of beekeeping by those trained. Implementing Partners were often more eager to spread the assistance than to integrate, so that for instance the tools for pruning of olive trees did not always go to the people trained on their use. Microfinance and business training only partly targeted the beekeeping and olive oil value chains, which would have reinforced impact there. Vocational training for people with special needs was well integrated with business training and credit (i.e. those who applied for this assistance received it), but hardly with the value chain work. This might, however, have been hard to achieve, given the need to identify people with special needs in these particular economic activities.
At least 400 people have directly received services and other support	According to project records, nearly 1,000 people have benefited. The project has exceeded this target. Although some of this reflects the fact that some beneficiaries did not receive assistance that was meant to go together (e.g. training and toolkits), the extent to which this happened was limited and it can be safely concluded that at least twice as many were assisted than foreseen.

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The people who benefited were poor and/or vulnerable

Largely achieved. No hard information is available on this marker, but the evaluation mission's meetings with beneficiaries, as well as the project's own monitoring reports, indicate that most but not all beneficiaries appear to have been poor and/or vulnerable, including people with special needs. It is likely that more could have been included if the project had been more directly involved in selection, but it is unlikely this could have been done without more project staff or a longer duration. Including selection criteria in the contracts with Implementing Partners is likely to have motivated partners to apply them and would have facilitated their enforcement.

Like to see markers

Proposals and Implementing Partners were selected in a transparent manner

Largely achieved. Stakeholders were initially contacted and involved on the basis of their presence, activities and experience in Bint Jbeil caza. The project sought to involve organisations from the private, public and NGO sector, including ILO constituents. However, organisations were contacted largely on the basis of existing networks. If an institutional mapping had been done first, more organisations might have been considered, some of which might have been more qualified than those selected. This may have affected transparency as well as effectiveness.

Interventions to address constraints in the selected value chains were prioritised with the stakeholders, at the PVCA exercises. The criteria were whether they could be implemented quickly and with available resources, and would show results after at most 6 months. Only interventions that would recover or improve livelihoods by improving the value chain were considered.

The selection process of possible Implementing Partners to carry out the interventions was thorough, with interviews and screening of proposals based on clear criteria that related to the partners' track record in local economic recovery and development and grassroots programmes, previous collaboration with international or national organisations, capacity to deliver services, being from the South and with activities in Bint Jbeil, an understanding of the local culture, and having no political affiliation. These criteria were set before selection started.

The proposals that partners submitted had to meet requirements with regard to content and structure. I.e. they had to include a background, objectives, methodology, expected outputs, activities, description of the target group, institutional framework, project duration, detailed budget and workplan. Within this framework, proposals were selected on the basis of technical quality, the partner's qualifications with respect to the above criteria, and cost. Proposals were selected by the project, in the case of the beekeeping value chain with the Beekeeping Forum. None of the stakeholders has raised concerns regarding the procedures

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followed.

People who benefited were selected in a transparent manner

Mostly achieved. The project developed selection criteria of which Implementing Partners were informed upon signature of their contracts. These comprised that beneficiaries should be among the most needy, affected by the 2006 conflict, vulnerable (including having special needs, the elderly), and from Bint Jbeil caza. Beneficiaries were to be selected without discrimination with regard to religion, political affiliation or gender, but forty percent were to be women. Although these criteria were not very specific (e.g. income levels for the “most needy” were not set), they were made more concrete during brief training sessions and discussions with the partners. This aimed at defining more concretely what low incomes, vulnerability and conflict affected meant. Partners selected the beneficiaries, often in consultation with municipalities or other stakeholders, while the project monitored. The process was not always well understood by those concerned, since many more people were in need of assistance than could be helped. More communication with those who did not receive anything and more involvement of the project could have been useful.

Women benefited equitably, i.e. to the extent they are involved in priority sectors for recovery

Partly achieved. The project set Implementing Partners a target of 40% for women beneficiaries. However, 5% or less of the direct beneficiaries were women, except for people with special needs (40% women) and those who received credit (35%). This is a small share, which reflects social and economic realities in Bint Jbeil in the selected value chains. It is mostly men in charge of these livelihood activities, and they sign for receipt of the assistance. In addition, in the project’s experience its Implementing Partners were insufficiently aware of the importance of targeting more women directly. In these circumstances the 40% target may have been unrealistic. The project could have benefited from advice from a gender specialist on setting the target and enhancing the number of women beneficiaries. The project is now preparing training on gender awareness for Implementing Partners in an attempt to increase selection of women. This is a good initiative, but should be undertaken with expert advice from the very start.

Social concerns are reflected in the results of the PVCA exercises

Not achieved. There is no evidence that social concerns were in fact mainstreamed as planned in the PVCA process, by SDC or other stakeholders.

ILO, UNDP, FAO, and UNIDO collaborated on the implementation of the project

Not achieved as foreseen. UNDP ART Gold focussed on other aspects of recovery, FAO did not use an approach that facilitated collaboration and UNIDO was not sufficiently present. Coordination, collaboration and exchange of experience and information did take place, especially with UNDP and ART Gold, and was useful. However, this did not take the

form of the “joint implementation” mentioned in the project document (page 13), and did not result in a joint multidisciplinary approach (page 13) and planned joint outputs such as a comprehensive stakeholder and economic mapping (1.1.) and an integrated Local Economic and Social Recovery methodology (1.5).

Love to see markers

Guidelines for Local Social and Economic Recovery have been produced.

Guidelines would present an approach to social and economic recovery from inception to completion and assessment of impact, in clear steps, with suggested methodologies (e.g. PVCA) for each step, and principles to be applied. They would be in an easily accessible format. This has not yet been fully achieved. The project has developed the PVCA methodology, which is laid down in its training material for facilitators, in a format useful to the project itself but not easily accessible to others. For project use this is excellent, but it is not adequate as a guideline for livelihood recovery ready for replication. Neither can the territorial and institutional diagnosis be considered as such, although it contains useful information on Bint Jbeil.

5. Review of objectives – relevance, impact and sustainability

5.1 Immediate objectives

The two immediate objectives of the project concern capacity building among the stakeholders, and contributing to economic recovery in Bint Jbeil caza. The extent to which these have been achieved will be considered below. As explained in the section on the evaluation process, the evaluation team decided not to use the project document’s indicators since they are not adequate at this level in the logical framework. Instead, this review takes progress markers as a starting point that are related to relevance, impact and sustainability.

Immediate objective 1

Enhance implementation capacities of local stakeholders (municipalities, private and civil society stakeholders) in identifying and providing direct services to recover sustainable livelihoods.

Need to see markers

Stakeholders demonstrate an enhanced capacity to identify, prioritise, and plan livelihood recovery activities.

The stakeholders who were trained on the PVCA methodology also participated in the implementation of the exercises themselves. This included conducting interviews and mini-workshops, carrying out the analysis, formulating and prioritising proposals and presenting them to a wider group of stakeholders. These were new skills to them, and the marker can therefore be considered achieved.

Stakeholders demonstrate an enhanced capacity to

The funding the project has made available has enabled stakeholders to provide more services, some of which they had not provided before. On-the-job guidance has reportedly helped some to be more effective than they would otherwise have

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provide services to
recover livelihoods

been. Although most of the project's support has not focussed on more capacity to deliver services other than those the partners had been contracted for, it is likely that skills such as in monitoring, accounting and reporting were improved.

The area where the project has made a real difference is in microfinance. The opening of an Al Majmouaa branch in Bint Jbeil is a clear demonstration of improved capacity to provide services. The branch is operational and provides loans.

Stakeholders
demonstrate an
enhanced capacity to
network

Stakeholders have built new relationships as a result of the PVCA workshops. Some also report that following the training they now regularly consult with other organisations before planning and implementing projects. A Beekeeping Forum meets regularly. These are indications that willingness and capacity to network has been enhanced.

Like to see markers

Stakeholders
demonstrate ability to
independently identify,
prioritise and implement
livelihood recovery
activities

The evaluation team believes that the brief training on and experience with the PVCA methodology has not been sufficient for stakeholders to use it independently. This was confirmed by interviews with those trained as well as project staff. None have so far demonstrated this ability. As for the implementation of livelihood recovery activities, given the funds most partners would probably be able to do so, albeit probably with a lower level of effectiveness and efficiency. Some of the major organisations have also demonstrated that they are able to implement activities independently, as they do so for other projects or donors as well. They did so before the ILO project's assistance as well, though, so it has not made a critical difference. Al Majmouaa is definitely able to provide its services in Bint Jbeil independently, and is already doing so.

Love to see markers

The developed capacity
is sustainable –
stakeholders indicate
they will or have
included similar
activities in their
workplans and budgets

The objective does not mention sustainability, but of course this is always desirable, and the project document does include a brief section on sustainability. Most partners indicated they would like to do PVCAs in the future, and one mentioned a plan to do so. However, given that their capacity to do so independently is inadequate, technical support would be required. The cost is also likely to limit sustainability. Although PVCAs are not very costly, most partners would not have the budget. Given that the methodology is well regarded, one way of addressing this is including PVCAs in proposals to donors or projects. Enhanced capacity to deliver livelihood recovery services is also unlikely to be sustainable without donor or other funding support, except in the case of Al Majmouaa, which is a financially sustainable organisation.

The potential for sustainability may also be weakened by the project's relations being largely limited to single individuals in partner organisations. This reduces the likelihood that its approach will be integrated into workplans and budgets. There is also the risk that the created capacity will be lost when an individual leaves the

organisation.

In conclusion, the prospects for full sustainability are not strong without funding support and further institutionalisation of the project's approach. Moreover, an independent technical capacity to carry out PVCAs has not been achieved yet and this is of course a precondition for sustainability.

Immediate objective 2

Contribute to the local economic recovery of Bint Jbeil caza through the rapid implementation of integrated socio-economic activities (micro and small enterprise recovery, employment and income generation revival).

Here, the evaluation team has considered that actual or expected recovery of livelihoods is a first step towards contributing to economic recovery. We also considered that activities of high relevance to the local economy are more likely to make a contribution to recovery.

Need to see markers

The beneficiaries are recovering their livelihoods – income and work is being created

Most of the project's interventions have been in agriculture (including beekeeping), where the impact of the war was greatest. Generally, interventions in this sector take time to have an effect, given for instance that, obviously, properly pruned olive trees take time to show an increase in production. In addition, since the project's short duration did not allow it to wait for the right seasons, the interventions were often implemented when the year was already too advanced for immediate benefits. For instance, there was training on olive tree pruning when it was not the best season for pruning, and on beekeeping when summer was largely over. Other interventions will bear fruit only later irrespective of the season they were implemented in. For instance, oregano plantations will generate a significant income after a few years only. At this time, little can therefore be said on actual livelihoods recovered, except for the support to rehabilitation of olive plantations, which had an effect already this year. However, the large majority of the project's beneficiaries are using the skills, tools, equipment and plants they have received, or can be expected to do so when the time comes. For a minority this is already having an impact in terms of work (e.g. planting and maintaining oregano) and income (e.g. greater productivity of olive plantations that have been rehabilitated).

In addition it should be noted that the implementation of the project's interventions has created temporary work for nearly 200 people. This has provided immediate relief to those involved, though for a brief period of time (between 1 to 2 months).

Those who are recovering their livelihoods include people with special

A minority of the beneficiaries with special needs (8 of 42) planned to start or expand a micro business following the training they received, and applied for loans and business management training, complemented by grants in kind. Most of these have been provided, others are being processed. A significant share were, however,

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needs

not for enterprises based on the skills they had been trained on. Some trainees have become employed, by the training institutes, but again not in relevant professions. On the other hand, some of these who received assistance in the beekeeping, olive oil or oregano interventions were people with special needs. It can be concluded that those recovering their livelihoods do include people with special needs, but this number could have been greater if the project had followed a strategy that would have allowed people to be trained on skills they aspired to work with.

The sectors in which livelihoods are being recovered are of high relevance to the local economy

The evaluation mission has reviewed each of the interventions in some detail and has concluded that they were all relevant to the recovery needs of the caza. Both the olive oil and the beekeeping sector have been badly affected by the conflict and have important development needs. Improving beekeeping requires more pastures, to which the oregano fields can contribute. Oregano also has potential to replace tobacco as a cash crop. This is important since Government subsidies to tobacco growers are likely to be phased out and this sector includes child labour. The construction sector, to which most loans were provided initially, was definitely a priority sector at the time whole towns and villages had to be rebuilt.

Like to see markers

Beneficiaries have demonstrated that the recovered livelihoods are sustainable

Although sustainability of livelihoods is not included in Immediate objective 2, it is included in the previous one.

Given that livelihoods are only in the process of being recovered, little can of course be said with certainty about their sustainability, and there has been no time for beneficiaries to demonstrate this sustainability. However, the assistance was provided to some of the main value chains in the caza, and especially beneficiaries involved in olive cultivation and half of those supported in beekeeping were already engaged in these sectors. Overall the evaluation team therefore considers the prospects for sustainability good. However, we have two groups of concerns. Some people have been trained on skills, e.g. olive tree trimming, which they have not used immediately. Others are engaged with a crop they do not know (oregano). Such people may require follow-up assistance for impact to be sustainable.

More important are considerations regarding the value chains concerned. The PVCAs have identified important constraints and proposals to address them at the production, processing and marketing levels, as well as with regard to supporting institutions. The project has supported implementation of proposals at the production level only, which is justifiable when livelihoods have to be recovered. However, for sustainability interventions higher up the chain need now to be implemented. This is especially important for the olive oil chain, where there are considerable quality and marketing constraints. In the case of oregano, the market is still strong, but already several stakeholders warned that this will last a few years only. The quantities produced so far are small, but they will increase over the coming years. Producers do not know market conditions and also do not seem to have market linkages. As no PVCA for oregano has been done, the constraints in this sector have not yet been analysed.

Love to see markers

More households recover their livelihoods than those who benefited directly – income and work is being created for them

This marker is one way to interpret “local economic recovery” in a situation where economic indicators are hard to come by, quite apart from the difficulties in demonstrating an influence of the project.

This is, of course, a small project, from which a major impact on the local economy cannot be expected. However, the title page of the project document does mention a target of 1,000 households benefiting indirectly (without explaining how this was arrived at), compared to 400 directly. To what extent can such a “knock on” effect be anticipated?

The effects through an increase of permanent or casual labour, or backward and forward linkages (i.e. to suppliers, service providers, processors, buyers), is likely to be small. The olive farms targeted are mostly small and their need for permanent or seasonal labour will remain limited. The project estimates that maybe a third of the beneficiaries would engage seasonal labour. Increases in production and productivity are unlikely to have a significant impact on employment and incomes at olive oil mills and retailers, given the small numbers involved. Beekeeping and oregano growing are largely self-employment activities, again with few backward and forward linkages that will generate incomes or jobs.

However, the evaluation team found that a broader effect of the project may be expected from non-beneficiaries copying the successful innovations of beneficiaries. This is indicated by villagers asking those who received oil storage containers where they could buy them, and asking olive farmers to show them how to prune their trees and harvest without breaking branches. If this actually happens more households will benefit from the changes the project has introduced.

A small innovation like the olive harvesting machines that were introduced will also benefit more than just those who were directly engaged with the project.

Finally, the establishment of an Al Majmouaa branch in Bint Jbeil, to which the project contributed, will benefit many more households than those served during the project period. In the first place, the funds the project contributed will continue to revolve. Secondly, Al Majmouaa is also lending from its own capital.

In conclusion, there is likely to be some knock-on effect, but further study would be required, later, to determine its scale.

5.2 Development objective

Promote social equity and local stakeholders empowerment through local employment recovery and livelihood opportunities projects in communities of war-affected areas of South Lebanon

It is often impossible to assess impact at the level of the development objective, and many agencies no

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longer attempt to do so. Moreover, “social equity” and “local stakeholders empowerment” are not easy to assess. The remainder of the objective has been dealt with already under outputs or immediate objectives.

However, while most development objectives read “contribute to”, the current one reads “promote”, so the question could be asked, is what the project has done likely to have promoted social equity and local stakeholders empowerment? This is then also the right place to consider the extent to which the project and its approach have contributed to the ILO’s decent work agenda, which is one aspect of social equity. We can also consider whether the approach could contribute to greater social cohesion, which is a concern in situations where communities are divided along lines of religion and political affiliation.

In order to avoid difficult choices about which aspects of social equity are the most important or should have priority, the evaluation team has not used the need to, like to and love to see designations here.

Markers

The project has promoted employment and better incomes for the poor and vulnerable	Yes, we have seen above that the project has done so, although it has not always been successful at only targeting the poor and vulnerable. It has promoted employment and better incomes for people with special needs though not very effectively.
The project has promoted dialogue between actors representing various social and economic interests	The PVCA exercises have demonstrated to constitute a temporary forum for dialogue and consensus building. Most of those who participated had not had any dialogue with the other participants before. The exercises included local trade unions, cooperatives, the Chambers of Commerce, NGOs, municipalities and UN agencies. As several participants stated, they came with different points of view and left with a “unified vision”. Some organisations have maintained contacts made, others are more often consulting with beneficiaries and stakeholders in formulating and implementing their interventions. The Beekeeping Forum is a more lasting expression of dialogue.
The project has promoted freedom from discrimination, from child labour, from forced labour and freedom of association	In all its contracts with partners the project has stated principles of non-discrimination on any basis. The evaluation team has not found evidence that these have not been applied. The project has attempted to ensure women benefiting equitably, but has not been able to achieve this, as noted and explained earlier. The promotion of oregano cultivation as an alternative to tobacco is likely to reduce child labour. Stakeholders and beneficiaries agreed that growing oregano has good potential to replace tobacco. Cultivating oregano is more profitable and less labour intensive than tobacco, and therefore less likely to attract child labour. The project has trade unions among its implementing partners, and has so shown recognition of workers organisations and enabled them to deliver concrete, useful services. Forced labour is not an issue in Bint Jbeil.
The project has promoted safety and health at work and social security	Neither of these is explicitly addressed in the PVCA analytical framework, with the result that related constraints have not been identified. It must be said, though, that in the sectors in which the project works they are probably hard to address.

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The project has promoted empowerment	The project has included local stakeholders and beneficiaries in making decisions that affect their lives, and spent its funds on that basis. This is a beginning of the process of empowerment.
The project has promoted greater social cohesion	The dialogue the project has initiated and supported potentially promotes social cohesion, especially, as seems to have been the case, where it contributes to consensus building. In addition, beneficiaries from different villages and communities have come together for training, e.g. beekeepers from different areas being trained together and exchanging experience. A further step could be to also have implementing partners undertake joint activities rather than contracting them singly. Promoting a “culture of working together” is a powerful way of overcoming divisions along lines of religion, political affiliation and gender.

6. Management, backstopping, relations and efficiency

The project was approved mid-June and started on 1 August 2007. This is remarkably fast. The ILO allocating some funds of its own and giving high priority to the project made this possible. The project has been managed by a National Coordinator, supported by the Socio-Economic Recovery Specialist in the ILO Regional Office, whose involvement has been strong and important, including in the field. Four specialists and community mobilisers, a driver and an administrative assistant make up the rest of the small team. They are located at the UN office in Tyre.

On the basis of the systems that are in place and interviews with project staff, as well as the results that have been achieved, the evaluation mission considers the project to have been professionally managed and implemented. There are frequent team meetings (including two retreats). Clear workplans and budgets have been developed and used, especially during the later part of the project, when its approach and interventions had become more clearly defined. Responsibilities have been allocated clearly, but staff support one another in their work when necessary. The level of commitment and motivation is obviously very high. Some of the staff, all young apart from the coordinator, could benefit from more upgrading of their technical skills than the project has been able to provide so far. This could include, for instance, their gaining deeper insight into good practices for business development and financial services, approaches to market development and local economic development. However, in the current project weaknesses in this regard have been compensated to a significant extent by the inputs and guidance of the specialist from the ILO Regional Office.

The project did intensive monitoring of the activities conducted by its Implementing Partners, especially once it became clear that this was required to ensure transparency and effectiveness. Records were kept of this, including of all who received assistance. Though records were adequate, the system could have benefited from being more closely linked to reporting requirements, including the need for gender specific reporting. This is partly due to the weak design of indicators. The project reported regularly (every quarter) to the LRF. These reports are informative and useful.

Backstopping from the ILO Regional Office has played an important role in development of the project's approach, planning and implementation, in the first place through the Socio-Economic Recovery Specialist.

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Backstopping by the programming section has also been more intensive than usual, on a regular as well as a trouble shooting basis. The Enterprise Development and Vocational Rehabilitation Specialists have contributed as well.

However, the evaluation team believes that the project could have benefited from more coordinated and substantive technical backstopping by the office's team of specialists, including in the areas of enterprise development, vocational rehabilitation, gender, and relations with workers' and employers' organisations. Closer involvement of the specialists could have enhanced the effectiveness of credit and business management training, in particular its integration into the core of the project, and have led to a strategy for people with special needs that had a greater impact on livelihoods. Involvement of workers' and employers' specialists could have avoided perceptions that the project was not involving the social partners and strengthened the effectiveness of this involvement, especially with regard to linkages to the national level. The gender specialist could have contributed to setting realistic targets for numbers of women to be reached and developing approaches to have more women benefit. As it happened, the immediately responsible specialist was generally called upon to provide the multi-disciplinary approach the project document promised, and the project was seen to be "his". This does not seem to be in accordance with the way the Regional Office's team of specialists is meant to work.

Finance and administrative support from the Regional Office has been good, and, to the extent the evaluation team can judge, prompt. Training was provided to the project's administrative assistant to ensure that the project could be implemented in accordance with ILO procedures. These are, however, quite stringent and there have been occasions where better immediate compliance would have facilitated speedy processing of project requests. The evaluation team believes that compliance with procedures is not just the responsibility of the administrative assistant, but of other team members as well, the project coordinator in the first place. Training should therefore be provided to the entire team on the most common requirements.

Given the central role of the Socio-Economic Recovery Specialist, communication between the project and the Regional Office has generally been through him. Communication on administrative and financial matters has largely been directly between the staff most immediately concerned. Generally, this has worked well, but there have been occasions where reporting lines have been unclear, which has resulted in misunderstandings and strained relations. The Office should address this by clarifying the roles of all Regional Office and project staff involved, as well as lines of communication between them. This should be put in writing and agreed on by all concerned.

Backstopping by ILO Geneva was provided on demand, through support to the specialist in the Regional Office and a mission that selected Al Majmouaa as Implementing Partner for microfinance.

Relations between the project and local stakeholders appear to be very good. The project is well respected for its approach and the way it is being implemented. Stakeholders compared this favourably with some of the other projects in the region. The PVCA methodology has been a revelation for most. Appreciation was expressed for the relatively intensive monitoring and guidance. Relations with partners do, however, seem to be largely confined to specific individuals within these organisations, which could pose a risk to the sustainability of the project's approach. If such individuals depart from their organisation, the relationship and the capacity are lost.

The governance structure foreseen in the project document included a comprehensive Project Advisory Committee made up of key stakeholders, largely at the national level. It was to meet quarterly to advise on

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strategic issues and ensure cooperation among stakeholders. The Committee has never been set up. This was reportedly due to time constraints and because the project worked with local stakeholders while the presence and involvement of national level institutions in Bint Jbeil was weak. An advisory committee made up of key local level stakeholders could, however, been useful, to enhance local ownership and for strategic guidance on issues such as sustainability. It could also have contributed to an institutional deepening of the relations between the project and its partners beyond specific individuals, which would have strengthened sustainability.

At this stage, now the project is fully operational and well-established locally, developing stronger linkages to the national level is important as well. This would enhance the project's potential to have its approach replicated and its good practices spread more widely. It would also contribute to an institutional deepening of relations with partners that have a presence at the national level, including in the Government, the chambers of commerce, and unions.

The project's location at the UN Office in Tyre has facilitated frequent interaction and coordination with other international agencies and organisations. As was noted earlier, the project has actively contributed to forums and workshops organised by other agencies, UNDP ART Gold in particular. It has also invited participation of others in its own activities, for instance the PVCA exercises. Relations with other agencies, ART Gold in particular, are good. This has, however, not yet led to joint activities, due to different priorities and approaches.

To the extent that the evaluation team is in the position to judge, the project's resources appear to have been allocated to priority activities and used efficiently. Most funds have been spent on delivery of direct services and other assistance that aimed at livelihood recovery by beneficiaries. This is in line with the project document and the need for a quick recovery. The costs of the different mini projects through which services were provided appear reasonable. Quotations were called from several providers and screened by the project as well as the ILO Regional Office. In some cases the project reportedly managed to reduce costs below going market rates. The project has also invested significantly in capacity development, in particular through the PVCA exercises, but also in terms of use of staff time and the grant to Al Majmouaa. This is, again, in line with what was required given the project's approach.

In spite of this, there have, however, been some inefficiencies in the delivery of direct assistance to beneficiaries. These concern especially the oregano and pastures for bees projects, which were implemented in the dry season, which was not the right time. This resulted in plants dying and the project having to provide water for irrigation. Given the short project duration, there was, however, little that could have been done differently, apart from not going through with these activities. Inefficiencies may also result from training on pruning olive trees having been given when it was not the best season. Since farmers therefore did not immediately practice their new skills, they may now need additional assistance to refresh them.

The main inefficiency in capacity building concerns the development of business management training materials and training of trainers to deliver it. The training provider, Al Majmouaa, used its own training package, and sent only two trainers to the training of trainers. They used only some of what they learned there, and some of the materials that were provided. Several of the other participants reported they have used their new skills in their own organisation, though not for training of entrepreneurs. Much of the investment in this activity, which was to a large extent managed by the Regional Office, has therefore been in vain. This could easily have been avoided by a better assessment of Al Majmouaa's capabilities and better communication between Al Majmouaa and the ILO.

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Overall, though, a high level of efficiency is indicated by the number of beneficiaries, which is more than double that targeted. The assistance was therefore provided more efficiently than foreseen.

7. The project's "fit" with broader recovery and development objectives

The Government of Lebanon's strategy document "Setting the stage for long term construction: The national early recovery process" (August, 2006) included recovery of livelihoods in micro and small enterprise as well as agriculture in South Lebanon among its priority initiatives. The type of assistance foreseen included grants, microfinance and advice. The project is fully in line with this. However, it has given more emphasis to capacity building for beneficiaries and partners, participation and building ownership than the recovery strategy may have foreseen. The evaluation mission believes this has only served to strengthen its contribution to the overall goal of local livelihood recovery, given that it has ensured relevance of the assistance provided. Moreover, it has laid a sound basis on which to make the transition from recovery to development in the sectors in which it has been active.

The project has also contributed towards the goals of the Government's Social Action Plan (2006), which envisages an emphasis on reducing regional disparities through promotion of local development, including through micro enterprise. Mechanisms have been set in place (PVCA, Forums) that can be further used to make progress in this respect.

The recovery of sustainable livelihoods which the project aims at, in one of the poorest and most war affected cazas of the country, contributes to the attainment in Lebanon of the first Millennium Development Goal, "Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger". In the evaluation team's assessment it has, however, done little to contribute to the third Goal, "Promote gender equality and empower women", although the project document stated the intention to do so "through association of women in all project activities and decision-making". Women could have benefited more directly and could have been more prominently involved in the PVCA exercises.

The extent to which the project is in line with the ILO's strategy to promote decent work was already reviewed under the assessment of its contribution to its development objective. Its most significant contributions are in the areas of employment and income creation and promotion of dialogue.

8. Communication, replication and increasing scope

Given the need to deliver services to beneficiaries and the project's brief duration, the ILO's and the project's team priority has understandably been to implement rather than to communicate strategies and results to a wider audience and promote its approach beyond the circle of local stakeholders. However, the project has made some efforts in this direction already, through briefings at the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Labour at the national level, and participation in various forums, regional and sectoral, established under the UNDP ART Gold programme. It has also published and disseminated leaflets on the PVCAs and a more extensive brochure on the results of the olive oil exercise. A similar brochure is under preparation on the beekeeping PVCA.

The evaluation team has not had the opportunity to meet those targeted by such communication and is therefore not in a position to judge how effective it has been. Given its limited scale, it can be expected,

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though, that awareness of the project's successes is still low among those who have not been directly involved.

It would be worthwhile to change this now that the project is starting to show results, since the evaluation team believes there is considerable scope for replication. This concerns in particular the PVCA methodology and the establishment of sectoral forums to guide and facilitate the implementation of proposals that result from the exercises. The methodology has demonstrated to be appropriate and effective in Bint Jbeil. Similar approaches have shown the same in other countries and contexts. The potential for replication within Lebanon was demonstrated by a PVCA on the construction sector conducted in North Lebanon. This was a joint undertaking of ILO, UNDP, and UNHABITAT. It would be unfortunate if other organisations supporting Local Economic Recovery and Development in Lebanon would not make use of the approach, the available expertise and experience gained, and proceed with introducing their own methodologies.

The evaluation team considers especially the potential for collaboration with UNDP ART Gold, and conversely the risk of a missed opportunity, to be high. Under the current project for various reasons little has come of the joint implementation between ILO, UNDP, UNIDO and FAO foreseen in the project document. Over the coming year or two, though, there are no valid reasons not to establish a close collaboration between ILO and UNDP ART Gold. The latter programme is supporting the establishment of Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs) throughout the country. One is planned to be located in Tyre, and may become operational by mid-2009. PVCA should be one of the methodologies promoted and used by this and other LEDAs. The LEDAs should also be linked to the sectoral forums that may result from PVCAs. This would enhance the forums' effectiveness and sustainability while at the same time providing LEDAs with a focus and entry point for upgrading of value chains.

The scope of the project has so far been limited, i.e. it has a relatively small number of direct beneficiaries (though more than expected) and the number of households that have benefited indirectly can also be expected to be small. This is in the nature of the focus of the recovery process, i.e. providing direct assistance for recovery of livelihoods. The project has, however, used a methodology, i.e. value chain development, that offers opportunities for interventions that affect many more people than those involved directly. Improvements in processing, supporting services, and marketing in value chains mean better opportunities for most or all producers rather than the limited number that can be reached directly. For instance, setting and communicating quality standards, introducing quality testing, improving oil production, and branding and labelling, are interventions that could improve the market for olive oil from South Lebanon, and so improve the livelihoods of thousands of farmers. In the oregano value chain, which has not been analysed yet, grading, branding and establishing marketing channels could be among such interventions. Now the project has demonstrated the effectiveness of its approach, and made a direct contribution to the recovery of livelihoods, the time is ripe to increase its scope by supporting and promoting such improvements higher up the value chains.

9. Conclusions

The evaluation team considers the Local Socio-Economic Recovery project a successful project. We recognise that the project has not delivered on all that was foreseen in the project document. However, in terms of intended objectives and strategy it has done as well as could be expected in a complex situation.

The project's **main successes** have been:

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- Direct and relevant assistance has been delivered to beneficiaries to support them in regaining and improving their livelihoods. More than double the targeted number of households was reached.
- The large majority, though not all, of the beneficiaries were in the target group of the poor and vulnerable. They included people with special needs.
- Assistance was provided in sectors that were badly affected by the war and were very relevant to the local economy.
- Livelihoods have been recovered or improved by some and are in the process of being recovered or improved by the majority of beneficiaries. It is likely that most of these will prove sustainable, though further support will be required for long-term sustainability.
- With PVCA, a methodology was introduced that enables stakeholders to jointly analyse a value chain, identify constraints and proposals to address them, and decide together on which priority proposals should be implemented.
- The PVCA methodology created a framework that offered opportunities for an integrated approach, i.e. mutually reinforcing interventions. The project exploited many though not all such opportunities.
- A local capacity has been built to use the PVCA methodology. Stakeholders are enthusiastic about the approach.
- There are indications that the project's approach has been experienced as empowering, that it has created ownership of the interventions that have resulted, that it has created a dialogue among stakeholders where none existed before, and that it has created and strengthened networks, including between organisations and individuals from different communities.
- At least one important service, microfinance, has become more available in Bint Jbeil caza on a sustainable basis.
- The project is well-regarded and respected by its stakeholders and beneficiaries.
- These achievements were possible due to a well-managed and committed project team, significant technical and programming support from the ILO Regional Office, and local stakeholders who in majority demonstrated considerable competence and commitment.

The project's **main challenges** have been:

- Cutting the project's duration back to ten months called into question the extent to which immediate and sustainable results at the beneficiary level could be achieved. Bint Jbeil is largely agricultural, and 10 months do not cover the full agricultural cycle for its main crops. This disjunction between project duration and the economic realities in the caza made it difficult for the project to provide its assistance at the right moment of the production cycle and to so ensure its efficiency as well as effectiveness. This has been only partly made up for by the first extension, to 17 months.
- More integration among the different interventions could have been achieved. This includes some of the activities that resulted from the PVCA's, where for instance there could have been more concertation between support to beekeepers and expanding pastures and oregano plantations. Focussing microfinance on the selected value chains could also have enhanced impact there.
- Women have benefited directly to only a limited extent. Although this is understandable given socio-

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cultural conditions in Bint Jbeil, and women are likely to have benefited indirectly from most interventions, specialist advice on gender could have increased women's direct involvement.

- Not all of those who benefited directly were poor or vulnerable. More involvement of the project in their selection could have reduced this number.
- The project's strategy to organise vocational training exclusively for people with special needs resulted in important gains in self confidence but also in their being trained on skills they had no aspiration to use. The livelihood impact was therefore small.
- The capacity among stakeholders to conduct PVCAs is as yet insufficient to do so independently. Most are also unlikely to be able to fund such exercises without support. More assistance is therefore required to institutionalise the approach.
- No forum was established for the Olive Oil sector, in expectation that this would be done by UNDP ART Gold.
- The collaboration, or joint implementation even, foreseen between ILO, UNDP, FAO and UNIDO did not happen as foreseen in the project document, though exchange of information and experience did take place, especially between UNDP, ART Gold and ILO. ART Gold's focus was on aspects of recovery other than livelihoods, FAO's approach was incompatible with the project's, and UNIDO had no significant presence in the South.

10. Recommendations

The evaluation team's **main recommendation, to the ILO and the LRF**, is to follow the current project, which will be completed by 31 March 2009, by a second project that builds on the achievements realised and experience gained.

This follow-up project should, however, be different from the current one in several important respects, in line with the conclusions of this evaluation and the need to make the transition from recovery to development.

The following are the recommended **main features of a follow-up project**.

- The geographical focus of the project's support to livelihood recovery and improvement should remain limited to Bint Jbeil caza, for the following reasons:
 - The project has considerable experience in and expertise on Bint Jbeil.
 - It has strong networks and "social capital", among stakeholders as well as beneficiaries.
 - It has built a capacity on its approach there which, however, needs strengthening to become adequate and sustainable.
 - It has initiated work on the development of value chains which requires further assistance to enhance scope and sustainability.
 - Bint Jbeil remains one of the poorest and most war-affected cazas in the country, in great need of assistance to recover and improve livelihoods.
 - Spreading the implementation to other cazas would involve building partnerships and credibility from scratch, and becoming closely involved in delivery of assistance to beneficiaries again. Now the approach has demonstrated its usefulness, it is time to move beyond this level of implementation.

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- Unless the available budget is quadrupled or more, expanding into other cazas would spread the project too thin to make a significant difference.
- In Bint Jbeil caza the project should:
 - Through Implementing Partners, provide follow-up assistance to direct beneficiaries of the current project, to ensure sustainability of what has been achieved. Such follow-up assistance is specified in the review of interventions in Annex 1.
 - Support implementation of interventions higher up the Olive Oil and Beekeeping value chains, to increase their competitiveness and therefore sustainability as well as the scope of impact. This should take the form of promotion of such interventions to those who can fund and/or implement them, (part) funding them where necessary, facilitation and guidance.
 - Support at least two more PVCAs if stakeholders agree there is potential. This should include oregano production, where the project has provided support without doing a PVCA. In new value chains the project could support direct assistance to livelihood activities to establish the credibility of the process.
 - Facilitate the establishment of Forums in the Olive Oil sector as well as for other value chains, and provide support to enhance their sustainability. This could include developing a clear Terms of Reference, institutional formalisation, drawing up statutes, training on how to run an effective Forum, making the Forums a partner in the planned Local Economic Development Agency for South Lebanon, and linking them to national level bodies that are relevant to their sector.
 - Encourage and fund collaboration of stakeholders to jointly carry out activities, to initiate a culture of working together as a way of reducing divisions along lines of religion, political affiliation and gender.
 - Conduct more training to stakeholders to enable them to conduct PVCAs independently. Such training should, among other things, place PVCA in a broader context of Local Economic Development and market development approaches. The project should aim at developing a body of professional facilitators who can be called upon by other agencies in Bint Jbeil or elsewhere.
 - Contract new PVCA exercises out to stakeholders, to facilitate the development of an independent PVCA capacity. The project should not itself manage new PVCA exercises but limit its role to providing technical guidance and support.
 - Fully integrate microfinance and business management training into the support to value chain development, i.e. focus this assistance on enterprises/self employed in the value chains that are being supported.
 - Seek advice from a gender specialist to enhance the number of women who benefit directly from interventions supported by the project and its partners. Activities could include the awareness training for partners the project is already planning.
 - Continue assistance to people with special needs, but provide advice and support to vocational training providers to enable them to cater for this group in their ongoing courses. This will enable people to be trained on skills they plan to use.
- Given, however, the scope for replication of the project's approach, it should promote and support its use beyond Bint Jbeil caza, without becoming involved in implementation of livelihood interventions. The evaluation team advises that this should be limited to the two other most war-affected cazas in South Lebanon. This should be undertaken under the auspices of and in close

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association with the planned Local Economic Development Agency in Tyre, but should not wait for this to be established. The assistance could include:

- Promotion of the approach among organisations in other cazas, through publications and stakeholders workshops.
 - Training on the PVCA methodology.
 - Guidance and if necessary funding for PVCA exercises.
 - Facilitation of the establishment of Forums for the value chains concerned.
 - Ensuring linkages between the Forums and the Local Economic Development Agency, and between Forums for the same value chain in different cazas.
- The project should communicate its results to a broad audience, in South Lebanon as well as nationally, through publications, participation in forums and conferences, and media coverage.
 - The project should have a concrete sustainability strategy from the start, outlining which elements of the project approach are expected to become or not become sustainable, why and how (see also below).
 - The project should have a longer time frame, two years at least. As we have seen, the very short planned duration of the current project has reduced its success.

The evaluation team has the following technical **recommendations for consideration of the project team and the Socio-Economic Recovery Specialist at the Regional Office:**

- Review the PVCA methodology on the extent to which it is effective at identifying constraints on the competitiveness of value chains as a system rather than on just the individual levels of the chains. In particular, the project should consider including tools to analyse system integration, that is, the cooperation within and between different levels in the value chain. Interventions in system integration can, for instance, result in development of business associations, product bulking and other common services, buyers or suppliers providing producers with information on market conditions or embedded services to improve quality. ILO and other manuals on value chain development can be drawn on.
- Explicitly include consideration of working conditions in the PVCA methodology, not only to ensure mainstreaming of social concerns, but also as a way to enhance value chain competitiveness.
- Bring together the various materials developed and used for the PVCA methodology in an easy to use manual or guide, which also places the methodology in the context of preparatory and follow-up activities. Capacity building on and replication of the approach would greatly benefit from such a guide, which should be available in Arabic as well as English. This as well as other documents should give due recognition to the fact that the approach makes use of concepts and processes of Mesopartner's PACA methodology.
- Consider dropping business management training as a pre-condition for loans, especially when people have business experience already. This is not Al Majmouaa's normal practice, and forcing people to take business training is not in line with current good practice in either microfinance or training. The impact is usually very small while the cost is high. This is not to say that the training is not useful for people who *want* rather than are forced to take it, and that it should not continue to be promoted and offered to credit clients.

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- Design a database for monitoring of project implementation that allows for easier extraction of information for reports, including gender specific reporting.
- For new interventions, consider commissioning small baseline surveys of intended beneficiaries, so that at the end of a possible new project impact can be assessed with some certainty. The project should make use of specialised expertise to design such mini-surveys or other impact assessment studies. Impact assessment is a profession. The project should plan for impact assessment from the start.
- Start developing a sustainability strategy *now*. For each of its methodologies and approaches (e.g. PVCA, Forums, business management training) the project should consider and decide whether they should and could become sustainable and map out pathways by which this could be achieved. The strategy should be discussed with and validated by stakeholders, preferably in a workshop. Stakeholders and the project should jointly commit to implementation of the strategy.

The following recommendations are for the **ILO Regional Office**:

- Constitute a small group made up of relevant specialists from the office to support the Socio-Economic Recovery Specialist in backstopping a new project. While the latter should remain the project's technical point of contact in the office, a new project would and should benefit from the multi-disciplinary expertise the office has at its disposal. The group could meet on a monthly basis, and would constitute the sole agency of technical backstopping. It should also meet with the project team (not only the coordinator) on a regular basis and carry out field visits. Meetings could be chaired, at least initially, by a management-level official from the Office.
- Provide training on the main financial and administrative procedures and requirements to the entire project team, and ensure that the project coordinator takes responsibility for supervising their implementation. In addition, the administrative assistant as well as the project coordinator should meet with the HR, administration and finance staff at the Regional Office on a frequent and regular basis.
- Clarify the roles of all Regional Office and project staff concerned with implementation of the project, and the communication lines between them. This should be put in writing and agreed on by all concerned.
- Invest in the further development of the project team, in areas such as good practices for business development and financial services, approaches to market development and local economic development, and gender. This should include participation of project staff in training events under a new project, but also enabling staff to take short courses elsewhere, for instance at the ILO's International Training Centre in Turin.
- Establish a governance structure for the project comprising a local and a national level Steering Committee. These should be relatively small in size in order to be effective. Members of the local Committee should be selected in a transparent manner, preferably by stakeholders themselves. The local and the national Committee should be linked by representatives of each being on the other. The Committees should have a clear Terms of Reference. Twice-yearly meetings are probably sufficient.

Finally, the evaluation team has the following recommendation to the **ILO and UNDP in Lebanon**:

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- The UNDP ART Gold programme and the LSER project offer, at present, excellent opportunities for collaboration, as suggested under the recommendations on a new project. Given the high priority that collaboration among UN agencies has, at the UN itself as well as among major donors, it would be very unfortunate if such opportunities were not made use of. Relations between ART Gold and the project in South Lebanon are excellent, and both are poised for genuine collaboration. We recommend that the UNDP and ILO meet as soon as possible at the highest level to take decisions on collaboration and that such decisions are laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. UNDP and ILO should meet on a quarterly basis to monitor and ensure implementation of the MOU.

11. Lessons learned

Many lessons could be learned from the LSER project. We will focus on the most important, in the hope that they *will* be learned.

- The effectiveness of livelihood recovery, and its sustainability, benefits from a participatory approach, though simply handing out goods to those willing to receive them may seem more “rapid” and result in more impressive “numbers”. Participation, when done well, in a structured and result-oriented process, can be developed and implemented relatively quickly and result in greater relevance of the assistance provided and greater ownership among recipients and stakeholders. It has therefore both short and long-term benefits – it delivers relevant assistance, and it lays the basis for the transition from recovery to development.
- Participatory approaches to livelihood recovery result in better networks and dialogue involving stakeholders and members of communities divided along lines of religion and political affiliation, and can so contribute to strengthening social cohesion in the long term.
- A comprehensive institutional and territorial mapping is likely to take too long to be of benefit to livelihood recovery projects. At the start of such projects approaches such as informal consultations and workshops with stakeholders may suffice to collect enough information to take the most urgent strategic and implementation decisions and to ensure stakeholder participation.
- A duration of 10 months is too short for a livelihood recovery project that aims at relevance and therefore impact. Forcing such a project into a time frame that short does not make livelihood recovery more “rapid”, but is likely to result, rather, in inefficiencies and reduced impact, especially but not only in the context of a largely agricultural economy. Livelihood recovery projects should have a minimum duration of 24 months.

Annex 1 – Detailed review of interventions

OLIVE PLANTATION PROJECT

Summary of main achievements

- 115 farmers had/will have their olive plantations rehabilitated (still on-going)
- 280 farmers received toolkits
- 360 farmers received olive oil stainless steel containers
- 124 farmers received trainings
- Two harvesting machines were distributed

Relevance to needs

The olive sector is a key economic sector in Bint Jbeil that needs improvement and that has been conflict affected. Improving the olive sector contributes to keeping people in their villages.

Selection of beneficiaries

Some beneficiaries were not poor, few were women⁴ and the project's coverage of a large number of villages with relatively limited funds led to the selection of a limited number of beneficiaries per village compared to the total number of needy people per village.

Main implementation successes

- The project did an in depth analysis (PVCA) of the olive sector which was the first of its kind in Bint Jbeil region.
 - The trainings and equipment that were delivered were very practical and of very high quality.

Main challenges

- Activities within the same project (e.g. distribution of olive oil stainless steel containers, training on pruning, and distribution of pruning toolkits) were sometimes not provided to the same people.

Integration

- Interventions (different activities within the same project) could reinforce each other but were not always provided together to the same beneficiary.
- Beneficiaries from the olive sector need more awareness on the micro-credit activity.

Impact

- A tangible change in the farmers' mentality regarding olive pruning and other cultural practices was noted i.e. farmers are convinced of the pruning benefits which will result in an increase in production. Others who did not attend the training are requesting for similar trainings.
- There were noticeable signs of an increased production for the coming season (in the fields where pruning was done). However the majority will prune in February 2009. They may need some

⁴ It is important to note that although the majority of the direct beneficiaries were males, all family members including the females were benefiting indirectly from LSER activities. It is in the culture of the region that all the family is involved in agricultural practices.

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additional technical assistance.

- Awareness has been raised on the benefits of storing olive oil in stainless steel containers. Benefits include healthier produce with better quality resulting in an improved income. Non-beneficiaries are seeking to buy similar containers.
- The distributed harvesting machines are very practical such that they increase the olive trees' productivity and decrease the cost of production.

Sustainability

- The project resulted in improved networks among the different players of the olive sector. However, an olive local forum was not established.
- Marketing constraints due to low quality and weak linkages along the value chain remain an issue.
- The olive sector is one of the main sources of income. People will keep working in this sector.

Future needs

- More capacity building is needed on olive pest control management.
- Plowing machines are wanting.
- Additional technical support is needed during the coming pruning season.
- More awareness and guidance need to be provided on the proper selection of olive tree varieties (prior to olive plantation).
- Interventions further up the value chain (i.e. in quality and marketing) are vital for this sector.

BEEKEEPING (INCLUDING NEW BEEKEEPERS AND OLD BEEKEEPERS)

Summary of main achievements

- 38 existing (old) beekeepers benefited from specialized trainings and equipments
- 40 new beekeepers benefited from trainings, beehives and beekeepers' clothes

Relevance to needs

The beekeeping sector is a conflict affected sector that needs improvement. It has a good market as well as it is a good source of income. It is important to note that this sector is also appropriate for farmers who do not own land.

Selection of beneficiaries

Some beneficiaries were not poor, few were women⁵ and the project's coverage of a large number of villages with relatively limited funds led to the selection of a limited number of beneficiaries per village compared to the total number of needy people per village.

Main implementation successes

- The project did an in depth analysis (PVCA) of the beekeeping sector which was the first of its kind in Bint Jbeil region.

⁵ It is important to note that although the majority of the direct beneficiaries were males, all family members including the females were benefiting indirectly from LSER activities. It is in the culture of the region that all the family is involved in agricultural practices.

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- A local beekeeping forum was formed resulting in experience sharing and a more unified vision.
- Experience sharing between the beekeepers of the different villages was a tangible result.
- Trainings were very practical and of very high quality.
- Trainees were informed about the equipment grant only toward the end of the training, and equipment was provided only after a test, which contributed to ensuring that the attendees were dedicated to improving/establishing their business technically regardless of in-kind donations.
- The distributed equipment were relevant and of very high quality (except in a few cases).

Main challenges

The implementation of the project was in a season that is too late for immediate impact. Hence impact cannot be measured at this current stage.

Integration

- Some beneficiaries took loans
- This project is linked with the oregano pastures and tree planting project.

Impact

- Specialized trainings contributed to higher productivity at lower cost (breeding local queen bees instead of imported queen bees).
- 40 new beekeepers started a new business i.e. this project opened new horizons for the selected beneficiaries.
- Beekeepers received an identity beekeeping card which will enable them to have better access to medicine.

Sustainability

- Among the beekeeping PVCA workshop's suggested proposals, three were already used by other organizations.
- A local beekeeping forum was established.

Future needs

- Proposals further up the value chain (related to medicine, wax, exhibitions/marketing, queen rearing centers) need to be considered.
- Beekeeping pastures need to be expanded.
- The local beekeeping forum still needs formalization and additional support.

SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE – OREGANO, AND EXPANDING BEEKEEPING PASTURES

Summary of main achievements

- 112 farmers planted oregano as well as received an irrigation system and water.
- 6,000 trees were planted mostly on public land.

Relevance to needs

This is a conflict affected sector and complements the beekeeping sector. Oregano plantation has a big potential to replace tobacco. It is less labour intensive and more profitable compared to tobacco plantation.

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Selection of beneficiaries

Some beneficiaries were not poor (majority were land owners), few were women⁶ and the project's coverage of a large number of villages with relatively limited funds led to the selection of a limited number of beneficiaries per village compared to the total number of needy people per village.

Main implementation successes

Tobacco growers perceive oregano plantation as an alternative agriculture.

Main challenges

- Oregano plantation season was not correct. Most plantation took place in the driest season of the year, hence requiring an intensive provision of water.
- Limited provision of water for trees.
- High mortality rate of both the oregano and tree plantation.
- Insufficient ownership of municipalities to the planted trees.
- Training and guidance was provided but not all farmers followed the instructions.
- Oregano supply problems (demand versus supply)
- Not all of the lands were planted with the specified quantity of oregano.
- Implementing Partners' point persons signed on the behalf of beneficiaries for the receipt of equipment.

Integration

Some beneficiaries benefited from both the oregano and beekeeping interventions. In general the activity supports the development of the beekeeping sector.

Impact

- Impact of oregano plantation on income cannot be measured before 2–3 years.
- This intervention contributed to more pastures for honeybees.
- This intervention as well as the above mentioned may increase memberships within the Implementing Partners (since not all beneficiaries were members).
- Oregano plantation may contribute to reducing child labour.

Sustainability

- Oregano plants can live up to and more than 7 years.
- Market is good now (limited quantities) but may become a problem in the future when production increases.

Future needs

- A PVCA for oregano is suggested.
- More focus is required on oregano processing and on setting quality standards.

⁶ It is important to note that although the majority of the direct beneficiaries were males, all family members including the females were benefiting indirectly from LSER activities. It is in the culture of the region that all the family is involved in agricultural practices.

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BUSINESS MANAGEMENT TRAINING (BMT) AND MICRO-FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES) IN BINT JBEIL

Summary of main achievements

- 101 beneficiaries were granted loan approval
- 117 beneficiaries were trained on BMT

Relevance to needs

This intervention responds to the credit needs of the targeted region especially since Al Majmouaa was not based in Bint Jbeil prior to the LSER project.

Selection of beneficiaries

The majority of the loans were provided to the construction sector which did not support the core activities of the whole project (i.e. beekeeping and olive plantation).

Main implementation successes

- Al Majmouaa opened an office in Bint Jbeil.
- Repayment periods increased from one year to two years.
- For the majority of the beneficiaries it was the first time that they got a loan.
- Business management skills were used directly by the Implementing Partners (though not for training of enterprises as per the original intention).
- Quality of ToE was good.

Main challenges

- Al Majmouaa made little use of the training of trainers and training material.
- ToE often came after loan provision
- No comprehensive written material was provided for future referral.
- Banks for repayments are too far away (Banks are located either in Bint Jbeil city or in Tyre).
- Delays in signing the contract with Al Majmouaa delayed the implementation of this intervention.
- The implementation period was not within the productive season of the targeted sectors resulting in a low number of loans in both the olive and beekeeping sectors.
- The agriculture sector is used to in-kind grants and prefers to wait for them and perceives loans as risky⁷.

Integration

Integration with the the work on beekeeping and olive oil was insufficient although there was some referral of beekeepers and olive growers to Al Majmouaa. There was a good referral to loans in the intervention for people with special needs.

Impact

- There was a general increase to loan access in Bint Jbeil Caza.
- Jobs and consequently income were either created, improved or expanded.

⁷ Agriculture is subject to uncontrollable external factors such as bad weather ... which explains their perception to loans as a risky endeavour.

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- 35% of beneficiaries were women.

Sustainability

Al Majmouaa will stay in the region.

Future needs

- Assigning higher⁸ repayments in the agricultural productive seasons will encourage farmers to access loans.
- More focus should be on youth⁹ accessing loans.

VOCATIONAL TRAININGS FOR PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

Main summary of achievements

- 42 people with special needs benefited from skills training either in computer repair or in food preparation and catering.
- 12 benefited from ToEs.
- 6 were granted loans (3 more are in the process) and matching equipment grants.

Relevance to needs

People with special needs have limited support that aims at integrating them in their communities. They also have a right for decent productive work.

Selection of beneficiaries

- a) Not all of the trainees planned to work with the offered skills.
- b) 40% of beneficiaries were women.

Main implementation successes

The trainings were of very high quality.

Main challenges

- There was an insufficient number of computers during the practical training sessions.
- Few knew how to use a computer.
- Not all of the trainees planned to work with the offered skills.
- The evaluation team perceives that a more in-depth analysis is needed for Bint Jbeil's market demand for computer repair.

Integration

Some loans were provided to people with special needs who were also involved in the beekeeping and olive plantation sectors.

Impact

⁸ Al Majmouaa has already included this suggestion in their work plan.

⁹ Al Majmouaa aims at focusing on youth in their future work.

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- 8 beneficiaries either improved or started a new business.
- Some found employment in the place they had been trained.
- Few took loans or found employment with the skills they learned.
- The most important gains were in self confidence and motivation.

Sustainability

The provided loans along with the trainees who benefited and applied the learned skills are early sign indicators of a probable sustainable impact.

Future needs


- More support is needed to find employment for people with special needs.
- Capacity building is needed for the partners to mainstream trainings i.e. to integrate people with special needs in regular courses, and to support their aspirations through relevant trainings.

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Annex 2 – Project activity schedule as implemented

Activity	2007					2008											
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
PVCA Workshop (Olive oil Sector)																	
PVCA Workshop (Beekeeping Sector)																	
Olive Plantations Rehabilitation																	
Olive Oil Storage devices																	
Vocational Training for Disabled People																	
Olive Trees Trimming Tool Kits																	
Oregano plantations																	
Training for Beekeepers																	
Business management training																	
Credit																	
Increasing Beekeeping Pastures																	

Annex 3 – Diagram illustrating the project strategy in the project document



Annex 4 – Evaluation Terms of Reference



Terms of reference Independent final evaluation

Local Socio-Economic Recovery in War-Affected Areas of South Lebanon LEB/07/01M/UND

1. Introduction and rationale for the independent final evaluation

The project “*Local Socio-Economic Recovery in War-Affected Areas of South Lebanon*” was approved by the Lebanon Recovery Fund (LRF) steering committee in July 2007 with a total budget of US\$ 1.298.108 (including an ILO seed funds contribution of 115.000 US\$) for an initial 10 months duration. The project is part of the integrated recovery strategy that the ILO is implementing in Lebanon following the July 2006 hostilities. Its main focus is the implementation of socio-economic recovery activities targeting employment generation and the enhancement of capacities of local institutions in the district of Bint Jbeil. The project was extended until the end of 2008 in order to ensure full implementation of all activities.

The final independent evaluation of the project will be undertaken in line with ILO policies and procedures on evaluations. It will be conducted by an external evaluation team and managed by the ILO Regional Office for the Arab States.

The performance of the project will be reviewed with regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The following outcomes are expected:

- Provide lessons learnt and recommendations to support ILO’s expansion of its local economic recovery activities in Lebanon based on the assessment of the key success factors, best practices and constraints faced by the project.
- Contribute to knowledge development and inform national and local stakeholders, including the LRF steering committee and other participating UN agencies, on local economic recovery strategies that can be replicated within the Lebanese context.
- Assess preliminary impact and sustainability of the local economic recovery projects and activities undertaken and evidence of pathways towards longer term impact, taking into consideration that the project is not yet completed.

2. Background and Project Context

The final project proposal is the result of an iterative process between the ILO and the LRF steering committee which started in April 2007, involving the participation of various UN agencies (UNDP, UNESCO, UNIDO, FAO) through peer reviews and project appraisal meetings. Due to budgetary

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constraints, several agencies, including the ILO, were requested to resubmit their proposal with a reduced budget and timeframe. The project started on the 1st of August 2007 through the recruitment of the core project staff and implemented its first activities in September 2007, following receipt of funds by the LRF.

The project works with and supports socio economic recovery efforts of governmental bodies, local institutions, employers' and workers' organizations and civil society groups present in South Lebanon. It builds upon and complements work undertaken by the UNDP ART Gold Regional and Municipal Working Groups which supports the economic and planning capacities of local communities in playing a facilitative role in the development of locally planned and implemented livelihoods recovery projects for Bint Jbeil. A three-week series of Participatory Value Chain Analysis workshops were held in October 2007 and February 2008, during which stakeholders identified 19 short and medium-term project proposals in various fields, including business management training, vocational training for the disabled, access to micro-credit and loans, cooperative development and the development of agricultural sectors such as olive oil, beekeeping and thyme cultivation.

Logic structure of the project

Development Objective:

Promote social equity and local stakeholders empowerment through local employment recovery and livelihood opportunities projects in of war-affected Bintjbeil municipalities.

Immediate Objectives (outcomes):

Contribute to the local economic recovery of Bintj beil caza through the rapid implementation of integrated socio-economic activities (with a focus on micro and small enterprise recovery, employment and income generation revival).

Enhance implementation capacities of local stakeholders (municipalities, private and civil society stakeholders) in identifying and providing direct services to recover sustainable livelihoods.

Key performance indicators:

- Number of local (public, Private and civil society) stakeholders trained in Local Socio-Economic recovery Methodology.
- Number of infrastructure rehabilitated and socio-economic projects implemented with the support and supervision of local stakeholders
- Number of municipal projects funded and facilitated through the project and external sources
- Number of vulnerable households which regained their main source of income.
- Number of grants allocated to local entrepreneurs
- Number of local micro-finance institutions supported by the project
- Number of municipal sub-projects approved
- Number of entrepreneurial activities supported with recovered livelihoods

Project partners

- The programme partnered with the following local institutions to implement local economic recovery initiatives:

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- Social Development Center of the Ministry of Social Affairs of Bint Jbeil
- Agricultural Cooperative of Bint Jbeil
- Regional Cooperative Union in South Lebanon
- Cooperative Union for Development in the South (ARD)
- Chamber of Commerce of Saida
- Syndicate of Agricultural Laborers in South Lebanon
- Labor Union for the Syndicates of the Employees and Laborers of the South
- Lebanese Association for Development, Rehabilitation and Care (LADRC)
- Cooperative of Agriculture and Beekeeping in Maroun Ar-Ras
- Hicham Fahes Institute for Vocational Training
- the Cooperative of Tobacco Planting and its Productivity Enhancement in the South
- Rmeich Cooperative for Agricultural and Livestock Development
- Municipalities of Ein Ebel, and Ayta As-Shaab
- Jihad Al Binaa Development Association
- Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria

Project management set up and location

The project team is composed of a national project coordinator, a SME specialist, a vocational rehabilitation specialist, two community workers, one administrative assistant and a driver (all national staff). The project was technically backstopped by the Socio-economic recovery specialist of the Regional Office for Arab States in Beirut with the support of additional technical specialists for specific project components (SME, vocational rehabilitation, etc.). Programmatic and administrative support were provided by the Regional Programming Services and the Admin/Finance unit. Technical inputs were also provided by the following departments in ILO Geneva: CRISIS, SOCIAL FINANCE and COOP (cooperatives).

The project team is based at the UN house in Tyr.

Key project reported achievements

According to the last project report (October 2008), the following results were achieved since August 2007:

- 270 vulnerable households have regained their main source of income
- one local economic forum (beekeeping) was created
- Two sectoral local economic recovery strategies were developed by local economic fora
- 148 permanent jobs and 184 temporary jobs were created
- 120 entrepreneurial activities have been supported
- 10 grants for future activities have been allocated to local entrepreneurs
- 3 microfinance institutions have been supported
- 54 loans thus far provided, with 80-100 estimated in the near future
- 6 public, 43 private and 32 civil institutions have been trained in LSER methodology
- 2 municipal sub-projects have been approved
- 40 people with disabilities have received a combination of skills and business management

3. Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

Purpose

The purpose of the final evaluation is to:

- determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- document lessons learned, success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;
- Examine whether or not guidance provided by the Regional Office was effectively taken into account in project implementation; and if so, explain the increased impact that the support provided had on the project

The evaluation will be guided by the following core evaluation questions:

- (v) the relevance of the project to the national priorities and the mandate of the Lebanese Recovery Fund,
- (vi) the coherence between the design of the project focus, the integration of ILO instruments in support of program objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors,
- (vii) the efficiency measured both in terms of administrative costs and timeliness of execution;
- (viii) the effectiveness of interventions with particular attention devoted to investigating the sustainability of results and the contribution of the project to the institutional development of the local partners.

Scope

The evaluation will look at the entire project duration and at all activities implemented to date in the district of Bint Jbeil. The evaluation will also have to put a specific focus on the role of ILO constituents in the implementation of the project and the integration of the gender dimension.

In particular the evaluation will evaluate the quality and impact of project activities on the target groups, including:

- Needs assessments process and reports and their use by the project and its stakeholders;
- Stakeholder understanding and capacity to address local economic development needs
- Quality and use of the materials developed by the project.
- Evaluate the management of the project, its staff and the services it has provided;
- Evaluate the project's sustainability plan, if any. Are project activities/ improvements likely to be sustained after project completion, and by whom?;
- Assess whether the monitoring system for collecting performance data was appropriate for systematically measuring impact of project performance.

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- Evaluate the value of the project in the context of other LED activities in South Lebanon
- Has the project been able to link with other activities? Are there overlaps or duplication of effort?;
- Assess the level of stakeholder commitment to the project and the effectiveness of the project in fostering constituents' involvement and in promoting social dialogue;
- Assess the sectors targeted for assistance. Why were they chosen? Was the project able to meet the needs of the different sectors effectively?;
- Has the project been able to effectively link with other projects implemented in South Lebanon;
- Assess whether and how the project approach and its results have been internalized and/or expanded within other ongoing socio-economic recovery efforts in South Lebanon;
- Assess how has the choice of partners been strategic in implementing the strategy
- Evaluate how the project has addressed gender issues.

Clients of Evaluation

The primary clients for this evaluation are the ILO regional management, the ILO constituents, the donor, the project management team, the local and national partners. Secondary clients are the ILO HQ technical departments (CRISIS, SEED, SOCIAL FINANCE, COOP, CODEV, EVAL) and UN agencies collaborating with the ILO in the south.

4. Suggested Analytical Framework

4.1 Relevance and strategic fit

- a) To what extent does the project respond to the national priorities, national development plans and to the LRF priorities?
- b) Does the project respond to the real needs of the beneficiaries?
- c) Were the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground?
- d) How well did the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address socio economic recovery and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? Did the project's original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?

4. Validity of design

- a) To what extent does the project respond to the national priorities, national development plans and to the LRF priorities?
- b) Are the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?
- c) Assess whether the project design was logical and coherent in a) taking into account the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders and b) in realistically achieving the planned outcomes.

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- d) Were the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- e) How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- f) To what extent were external factors identified and assumptions identified at the time of design? Were the time frame for programme implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic?
- g) Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project?

4. Achievements (Implementation and Effectiveness)

- a) Assess the achievements of the project against planned outputs and activities. What were the quantity and quality of outputs produced?
- b) Which components of the project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? How can the project build or expand on these achievements?
- c) In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- d) Did the project developed and built on partnerships effectively with relevant organizations active in the south? How effective was the collaboration with other UN agencies (UNDP, FAO, etc.) and what has been the added value of this collaboration?
- e) What alternatives strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- f) How did outputs and outcomes contribute to the ILO 4 strategic objectives, mainstreamed strategies and the Decent Work Agenda?
- a) How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation (Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, Municipalities, NGOs etc.) ? How effective has the project been in establishing ownership?
- b) Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partners institutions.
- c) Assess the effectiveness of the activities implemented by partner institutions and their contribution to the immediate objectives of the project. Assess the lessons learned from these partnerships and the possibilities to replicate them.
- d) How did factors outside of the control of the project affect project implementation and project objectives and how did the project deal with these external factors? How realistic were the critical assumptions identified by the project?
- e) Assess the quality of training and learning materials produced by the project, (LACA workshops, etc.)

4.4. Effectiveness of management arrangements and efficiency of resource use

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- a) Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? Have resources been used efficiently?
- b) Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
- c) Assess the managerial and work efficiency. Were management capacities adequate?
- d) Did project governance facilitate good results and efficient delivery?
- e) Was there adequate technical, programmatic, administrative and financial backstopping for the project from ILO Regional Office for Arab States and the involved HQ departments?
- f) Did the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its local and national partners? Has its collaboration been efficient?
- g) Has relevant gender expertise been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized?
- h) How effectively did the project management monitor project performance and results?
- i) Assess the process for documenting, disseminating and replicating/up-scaling pilot projects.
- j) How efficient was the project in communicating its results?

4.5. Impact orientation and sustainability

- a) In how far did the project make a significant contribution to the local economic recovery of the Bint Jbeil district?
- b) Assess the project achievements in terms of the job created (permanent - short term) and households income recovery.
- c) How effectively has the project built necessary capacity of community level organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor socio economic recovery projects?
- d) To what extent was sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conducting of the project's activities? Assess to what extent a phase out strategy has been defined and what steps have been taken to ensure project sustainability
- e) Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Are results anchored in national institutions and can the partner maintain them financially at end of project?
- f) Can the project approach or results be replicated or scaled up by national partners or the local economic forums created? What would support their replication and scaling up?
- g) Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?

5. Methodology/Approaches to Evaluation

The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. The evaluator will be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. This will need to be approved by the evaluation manager,

The independent external end of project evaluation will be conducted by an International external

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consultant and one national consultant. The project team and ILO ROAS will be responsible for providing all logistical support.

The evaluation will be carried out using a desk review, field visits to project sites for consultations with project staff and project partners and beneficiaries and other key stakeholders and to hold a stakeholder workshop for dissemination of initial findings.

While the evaluation will be strictly external and independent in nature, it is deemed appropriate that it is based on participatory project evaluation principles and methodology, following the nature of the project.

Overall this evaluation will include but will not be restricted to;

- a) A desk review conducted in home-country of project documents and materials provided by the evaluation manager to the evaluation consultant.
- b) Presentation/Induction with project staff and key stakeholders and partners to the project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation.
- c) Key interviews with project staff, project partners, key project stakeholders
- d) Phone Interviews with ILO HQ (CRISIS, SOCIAL FINANCE; SEED), and meetings with ILO Regional Office for Arab States (Technical specialists, Regional Programming Services Unit, Administration and Finance Unit) staff members involved in backstopping the project
- e) Presentation of findings and recommendations and their discussion with the select stakeholders and partners to the project.

6. Deliverables

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluation consultant are:

- A desk review
- An evaluation instrument prepared by the evaluation team
- Field visits to project sites
- Stakeholder workshops facilitated by the evaluation team
- Draft evaluation report including stakeholder workshop proceedings and findings from field visits by evaluation team
- Final Report including:
 - Executive Summary
 - Clearly identified findings
 - Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations
 - Lessons learned and potential good practices and effective models of intervention. This should includes steps that should be undertaken or avoided to ensure results on approaches and recommendations for the 2nd phase of the project (project proposal available)
 - Appropriate Annexes including present TORs
 - Standard evaluation instrument matrix

Structure of the final report:

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Cover page with key project and evaluation data

- Summary (according to ILO Evaluation Summary template)
- Brief background of project and its logic
- Purpose, scope and clients of evaluation
- Methodology employed
- Review of implementation
- Findings regarding project performance
- Conclusions
- Recommendations (including tracking table with relevant follow-up responsibilities)
- Lessons learned
- Summary of potential areas for further investigation and implications for global/regional strategies
- Annexes, including TORs, persons contacted, etc.

The final report will be circulated to key stakeholders (those participants present at stakeholder evaluation workshop will be considered key stakeholders) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the evaluation manager at the Regional Office for Arab States and provided to the team leader. In preparing the final report the team leader should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

7. Management arrangements, work plan and timeframe

The evaluation will be managed by the Chief of Regional Programming Services at ROAS Beirut. The evaluator will have to report exclusively to the evaluation manager.

The evaluation team will consist of an international evaluation consultant and a national evaluation consultant that previously have not been involved in the project. The international consultant will be the team leader.

Evaluation Team and responsibilities

The final evaluation team will be comprised of one independent evaluator contracted by the ILO and one National Consultant.

The Evaluator is responsible for conducting the final evaluation according to the terms of reference (TOR). The evaluator shall:

- Review the TOR and provide input, as necessary;
- Review project documents and materials
- Develop the evaluation methodology, instruments and plan
- Undertake a 2 weeks mission to Lebanon
- Conduct preparatory briefings with ILO, LRF (if necessary) and the National Consultant prior to the evaluation mission;
- Conduct debriefing on findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the evaluation.
- Draft evaluation report and finalize it based on comments from the stakeholders

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The National Consultant is required to:

- Review the project document and the Final Evaluation Terms of Reference in order to become fully familiar with the strategy and objectives of the project;
- Review the documentation prepared by the National Project Manager for the Final Evaluation (FE) Team;
- Accompany the FE Team Leader on all meetings;
- Provide national perspectives in the evaluation process;
- Support and facilitate stakeholder workshop (incl report of the workshop in consultation with the team leader)
- Assist in the formulation of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the mission; and
- Provide inputs to the draft report in consultation with the team leader

The Evaluation manager is responsible for:

- Drafting the final evaluation TOR;
- Finalizing and approving the TOR with input from the stakeholders and the evaluators
- Ensuring proper stakeholder involvement;
- Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission;
- Assist in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings;
- Circulate draft and final report to stakeholders
- Reviewing and providing comments of the evaluation report;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation.
- Ensuring follow up to the evaluation recommendations

The ILO backstopping officer (Socio-economic recovery specialist) and National Project Managers are responsible for:

- Reviewing the TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials and collect information;
- Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission;
- Providing logistical and practical support, as needed;
- Coordinating exchanges of the evaluation team with the partners during the evaluation
- Assist in the implementation of the final evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation.
- Reviewing and providing comments on the draft evaluation report;

Estimated duration

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The total duration of the evaluation process including submission of the final report should be within two months from the end of the field mission.

The team will be engaged for 5 work weeks of which two weeks will be in-country in Lebanon

The timetable and schedule is as follows:

Responsible person	Tasks	Timeline
Evaluation consultant	Distance briefings (with evaluation manager, project team, national consultant, etc) and desk review of project documents. Submission of evaluation methodology and instruments based on desk review	3-7 November
Evaluation consultant with national consultant and logistical support by project	1 day briefing and meetings in Beirut Evaluation mission to South Lebanon 1 day debriefing workshop/meetings (to be confirmed)	10-21 November
Evaluation team	Drafting report	1-5 December
Evaluation manager	Circulate draft report to key stakeholders Consolidate comments of stakeholders and send to team leader	8-19 December
Evaluation consultant	Integration of comments and finalization of the report.	5 days

8. Qualifications

The background of the international evaluation consultant should include:

- Relevant background in social and/or economic development
- At least 10 years experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects, in particular with local development projects.
- Experience in evaluations in the UN system, preferably as team leader
- Relevant regional experience preferably prior working experience in Lebanon
- Experience in the area of Local economic recovery and local economic development
- Experience in the UN system or similar international development experience
- Familiarity with and knowledge of specific thematic areas
- Fluency in English and knowledge of Arabic would be appreciated
- Experience facilitating workshops for evaluation findings

The background of the **national evaluation** consultant should include:

- Relevant background in social and/or economic development

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- Experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects, in particular with local development projects
- Technical knowledge of local economic development or agricultural development projects
- Fluency in Arabic and English
- Experience facilitating workshops for evaluation findings

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Annex 5 – Evaluation programme

<i>Sunday 9 Nov.</i> p.m.	Meeting evaluation team in Beirut
<i>Monday 10 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	Briefing at ILO Regional Office Meeting with specialists Meeting with Al Majmouaa headquarters
<i>Tuesday 11 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	Travel to Tyre Briefing by project team, agree on details of programme and approach
<i>Wednesday 12 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	Interview Labour Union of the Syndicates of the Employees and Labourers of South Lebanon Interview Syndicate of Agricultural Labourers in the South Interview Jihad Al Binaa Interview Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria Discussion with Beekeepers Forum
<i>Thursday 13 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	Travel to Bint Jbeil Interview Hisham Fahess Institute Interview Lebanese Association for Development, Rehabilitation and Care Interview Social Development Centre Interview Al Majmouaa Interview Bint Jbeil Cooperative Interview Ain Ebel Municipality Travel to Tyre
<i>Friday 14 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	Interview with agricultural engineer Interviews project staff Travel to Bint Jbeil Focus group discussion beneficiaries olive plantations Focus group discussion beneficiaries old beekeepers Focus group discussion beneficiaries oregano plantations Travel to Tyre
<i>Saturday 15 Nov.</i> a.m.	Travel to Bint Jbeil

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p.m.	<p>Focus group discussion people with special needs</p> <p>Focus group discussion beneficiaries business management training and credit</p> <p>Focus group discussion new beekeepers</p> <p>Visit to oregano plantation, beekeeper, olive plantation, olive harvester</p> <p>Travel to Tyre</p>
<i>Sunday 16 Nov.</i> a.m., p.m.	Review information, identify gaps
<i>Monday 17 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	<p>Interviews project team</p> <p>Group discussion with PVCA facilitators</p>
<i>Tuesday 18 Nov.</i> a.m., p.m.	Analysis, prepare presentation for stakeholder workshop
<i>Wednesday 19 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	<p>Prepare presentation</p> <p>Stakeholder workshop</p>
<i>Thursday 20 Nov.</i> a.m. p.m.	<p>Prepare debriefing ILO</p> <p>Debriefing ILO Regional Office and Headquarters</p>

Follow-up mission January 2009

<i>Thursday 8 Jan.</i> a.m. p.m.	<p>Meeting Lebanon Recovery Fund</p> <p>Meetings ILO Regional Office</p>
<i>Friday 9 Jan.</i> a.m. p.m.	<p>Meetings ILO Regional Office</p> <p>Meeting UNDP</p>

Annex 6 – Research instruments

1. Unstructured interviews with Implementing Partners

Issues to be covered:

- Background of the organisation (mandate, relevant experience, capacity)
- What did the organisation do for the LSER project?
- How were the beneficiaries of the activity selected?
- Is there any way in which more women could have been involved?
- What were the challenges in implementing the activity?
- How was the relationship with the project? To what extent was the project involved in implementation? To what extent did it monitor?
- Did the project build relevant capacity of the organisation? How?
- Did the organisation use this?
- Did they participate in the PVCA (LACA) workshop? What did they think of it?
- Did the organisation develop new relationships with others working in the same value chain?
- Does the organisation have plans for further involvement in this same value chain?
- Would they consider using the PVCA methodology themselves, for their own work?

2. Focus group questions

General:

- Which changes has the project brought in the way you make a living (compared to just after the war)? Probe for impact on income and work.
- What were the challenges you faced in carrying out the activity (in which the project supported them, e.g. olive tree plantation rehabilitation, beekeeping).
- What challenges do you expect in this activity in the future?

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Additional questions for sub-groups:

- Tobacco growers – Have you/do you plan to replace tobacco growing with thyme cultivation?
- Business management trainees – Are you using what you learned?
- Loans – What were the challenges you faced in obtaining and using the loan?

3. Questionnaire beneficiaries

Before the interview, confirm the respondent is indeed a direct beneficiary of (participated him/herself) one of these activities. If no, do not proceed.

1. Beneficiary of:

1. planting oregano
2. rehabilitation of olive plantations

2. Name of respondent

3. Sex

1. male
2. female

4. What were your household's sources of income before the conflict of 2006? (if more than 5, ask respondent to limit to the 5 most important)

.....

5. Can you rank them from the most to the least important please?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6. Of which of these sources did the income become less due to the conflict?

1.
2.
3.
4.

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5.

7. What are your household's sources of income now (if more than 5, ask respondent to limit to the 5 most important)

.....

8. Can you rank them from the most to the least important please?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

9. Is your household's income now more, less or the same as before the conflict?

1. more
2. less
3. same

10. Do you expect your household's income from oregano/olive cultivation to become more, less, or stay the same over the next year?

1. more
2. less
3. same

11. Why do you think so?

.....

12. (for oregano growers) Do you think oregano can replace tobacco as a crop?

1. Yes
2. No