

# **Papuan Indigenous Peoples Empowerment Program (PIPE)**

## **Final Evaluation Report December 2008**



INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

MULTI-BILATERAL PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION

INDONESIA

**Prepared by: Robert Hewat (Consultant)**





INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

MULTI-BILATERAL PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION

## Papua Indigenous Peoples Empowerment (PIPE) Project

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### PROJECT DATA

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<b>Project Location:</b>	Papua and West Papua Provinces, Indonesia
<b>Project Title:</b>	Papua Indigenous Peoples Empowerment (PIPE) Project: Reducing Poverty and Strengthening Peace and Development Mechanisms involving Indigenous Peoples in Papua and West Papua – Indonesia
<b>Project Code:</b>	INS/04/M01/HSF
<b>Actual Starting Date:</b>	January 2006
<b>Actual Completion Date:</b>	December 2008
<b>Evaluation Period:</b>	January 2006 – December 2008
<b>Executing Agency:</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>Implementing Partners:</b>	<u>National Level:</u> Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry for Underdeveloped Regions. <u>Provincial Level:</u> Relevant partner agencies in the local government and Community Organizations ( <i>Reba A'ling; Dewan Konsultasi Dumtru; Win Hamo and Ventori</i> )
<b>Project Cost:</b>	USD 1,537,965
<b>Type of Evaluation:</b>	Final Evaluation

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## Glossary of Terms & Abbreviations

This list covers terms and abbreviations used frequently in this report. Others used only occasionally are clarified in situ.

<b>AMAN</b>	<i>Asosiasi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara / Association of Indigenous People of the Archipelago</i>
<b>BPMD</b>	<i>Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa – Village Empowerment Body</i>
<b>C.169</b>	ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous & Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
<b>CBO</b>	Community-based Organization
<b>CDF</b>	Community development facilitator
<b>CDPD</b>	Community-driven participatory development
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organization
<b>DAP</b>	<i>Dewan Adat Papua – Papuan Customary Council</i>
<b>Dinsos</b>	<i>Dinas Sosial – Social Services Department</i>
<b>DKD</b>	<i>Dewan Konsultasi Dumtru – An IPO established through PIPE to represent indigenous communities in Kemtuk Gresi &amp; Gresi Selatan Districts, Jayapura Regency</i>
<b>GOI</b>	Government of Indonesia
<b>GOPP</b>	Government of Papua Province
<b>GOWP</b>	Government of West Papua Province
<b>IDWCP</b>	Indonesia Decent Work Country Program
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>INDISCO</b>	ILO's Interregional Programme to Promote Self-reliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples through Cooperatives and Similar Self-help Organizations
<b>IPs</b>	Indigenous peoples
<b>IPO</b>	Indigenous peoples' organization
<b>IPRs</b>	Indigenous peoples' rights
<b>MRP</b>	<i>Majelis Rakyat Papua / Papuan People's Council</i>
<b>NPDS</b>	New Papua Development Strategy
<b>P2KM</b>	<i>Pengembangan Partisipatif Kemandirian Masyarakat</i> The Indonesian acronym for CDPD
<b>PIPE</b>	Papuan Indigenous Peoples Empowerment (Program)
<b>PNPM Mandiri</b>	<i>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri</i> National Program for Community Empowerment and Self-Reliance
<b>otsus</b>	Papuan Special Autonomy Law
<b>RESPEK</b>	<i>Rencana Strategi Pembangunan Kampung – Strategic Plan for Village Development</i> (The Governor of Papua Province's medium term development plan).
<b>Reba A'ling</b>	An IPO established through PIPE to represent indigenous communities in Muara Tami District, Jayapura Town
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNTFHS</b>	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
<b>Ventori</b>	<i>LP4MA Ventori – An IPO established through PIPE to represent indigenous communities in Kebar and Senopi Districts, Tambrauw Regency</i>
<b>Win Hamo</b>	An IPO established through PIPE to represent indigenous communities in Tanah Rubuh District, Manokwari Regency
<b>WPIA / WPIO</b>	West Papua Interest Association / West Papuan Indigenous Organization - ???



Please note, throughout this text, the words Papua and Papua region refer to the entire Indonesian area on the western half of the island of New Guinea. Although the program is implemented in the two (2) provinces that make up this area, they are only referred to specifically when it is pertinent to distinguish between them (see map in Annex 1). The names Irian Barat (West Irian), which was used in the 1960s, and Irian Jaya, which was used from the 1970s-1999, are used in their historical context.

## Acknowledgements

This mid-term evaluation was aided by the supportive cooperation and participation of many people, including:


1. ILO Jakarta Office:
  - Mr. Tauvik Muhamad – Program Officer responsible for backstopping the PIPE Program;
  - Mr. Kee Beom Kim – Senior Technical Officer
  - Mr. Arif Sapril - Technical Assistant
  - Ms. Kurniasih Susilawati - Administrative Secretary
2. Current and former members of the PIPE team including:
  - Mr. Domingo Nahayagan - Chief Technical Advisor (CTA);
  - Mrs. Jenny Samakori – Program Assistant in Jayapura (2007-2008);
  - Mrs. Suzan Burdam - Former Program Assistant in Manokwari (2006-mid-2008)
  - Mr. Didi Wiryono - Program Officer (2008);
  - Mr. Sahat Saragih – Program Officer (2008);
  - Ms. Wahid Nurul Khomariyah - Administrative Secretary
  - Mr. Ketut Sandiasa – Driver.
3. Community development facilitators (CDF) and other community leaders and members from Muari Tami, Kemtuk Gresi, Tanah Rubuh and Kebar districts including:
  - *Didimus Wabia* - CDF in Kebar & Senopi Districts
  - *Paskalina Baru* - CDF in Kebar & Senopi Districts
  - *Paulus Ajembuani* - CDF in Kebar & Senopi Districts
  - *Yakobus Sedik* - CDF in Kebar & Senopi Districts
  - *John Jambuani* - Head of LP4MA-Venturi
  - *Yakobus Anari* – Head of Jandarau Village
  - *Yulianus Anari* – Head of Anjai Village
  - *Thomas Baru* - Head of the Community Cooperative in Kebar-Senopi
  - *Abner Anari & Esau Auri* – Managers of the sub-cooperative in Jandarau Village
  - *Yunus Howay* - Head of Kebar District
  - *Kornelis Mabuai* (CDF in Tanah Rubuh District)
  - *Yohanes Sayori* – Warkapi Village, Tanah Rubuh District
  - *Pilipus Sayori* – Tanah Rubuh District
  - *Benyamin Sayori* - Tanah Rubuh District
  - *Nathaniel Saroi* – community member, Warnyeti Village, Tanah Rubuh District
  - *Yunus Baransano* –Community member - Tanah Rubuh District
  - *John Lensru* – CDF and Head of the Dewan Konsultasi Dumtru in Kemtuk Gresi District.
  - *Ferdinand Irab* – CDF in Kemtuk Gresi District
  - *Immanuel Elly* – Community Member, Kemtuk Gresi
  - *Ibu Nerlince Retto* – CDF & head of the LA in Muara Tami
  - *Hans Mallo* – Community Member, Muara Tami District
  - *Pdt. Hiskia Rollo* - Community Member, Muara Tami District
  - Various other community members.



4. Other Consultants who gave previous inputs towards the PIPE Program including:
  - Soleman Imbiri, lecturer from the State University of Papua and former PIPE consultant.
  - Lucy Mitchell – PIPE Mid-Term Evaluator.
5. The evaluation also benefited by the inputs of a number leaders of civil society organizations in Jayapura and Manokwari including:
  - *Septer Manufandu* – Executive Secretary of the Papuan NGO Forum;
  - *Peter Pelamonia* – Paradisea Foundation & WWF
  - *Decky Rumaropen* – Executive Director of the Papuan Rural Development Foundation (YPMD);
  - *Grace Papare* – Director of the Community Credit Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat - BPR) in Jayapura
  - *Decky Rumbiak* – Head of the Tambrau Regency Formation (Pemekaran) Team.
  - *Semuel Yensenem* – Manokwari Legal Aid and Empowerment Foundation (LP3BH)
  - *Mathias Awoitaw* – Association of Participatory Planning Facilitators (AFP3)
  - *Herman Warmettan* – UNGKAP Association
  - *Sena Bagus* – Mnuwar Productions
  - *Andi Saragih & Mujianto* – PERDU Association
  - *Ibu Anike Sabami* – Papuan Women’s Partners Foundation (Mitra Perempuan Papua or MP2) & Member of the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP).
  - *Prof. Frans Wanggai* - Former Rector State University of Papua (UNIPA) and current head of the Bank of Papua.
  - *Yunus Abdullah* – Research Centre for Regional Economic and Fiscal Development, State University of Papua (UNIPA-P3FED)
6. UN agencies and local government, who shared their insights related to the communities involved in PIPE, as well as regarding the program itself.
  - *Agus Sumule* – Senior Pro-Poor Development Advisor to the Governor of Papua
  - *August Rumansara* – Senior Pro-Poor Development Advisor to the Governor of Papua
  - *Eddy Ohoiwutun* - Senior UNDP Advisor
  - *Robert Mandosir* – Senior UNDP Advisor

I would like to thank all of these people, and many more I met along the way, for their time, hospitality and constructive inputs towards this evaluation. I wish them well with their dedication to support sustainable economic development, indigenous and gender empowerment and peace building in Papua.

The images used throughout this report are from photographs of indigenous Papuan artworks from the author’s private collection.



# 1 Executive Summary

The PIPE Program was a pilot project implemented by the ILO in collaboration with the Government of Indonesia between January 2006 and December 2008. The project aimed to promote the institutionalization of the rights of indigenous people, reduce poverty, mainstream gender issues and promote sustainable peace through a rights-based approach to local development called Community Driven Participatory Development (CDPD). An independent final evaluation was conducted in December 2008, reviewing the project's strategic relevance, design and implementation, and evaluating the probable short and medium term outcomes. The final evaluation also assessed the implementation of the recommendations of the independent mid-term evaluation and provided recommendations regarding necessary follow-up actions to ensure sustainability of outcomes, build upon progress made to date and to ensure that the most important lessons to be learned from the project are captured and analysed. The evaluations key findings and recommendations are summarised as follows.

**Overall Relevance & Strategic Fit** - The evaluation concluded that whilst PIPE appears quite unconventional compared to other programs being implemented by the ILO in Indonesia, it remained consistent with and supportive of the goals of the Indonesia Decent Work Country Program and the advancement of the international agenda of establishing indigenous people's rights through the adoption and enactment of ILO Convention No. 169 & UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous. Moreover, PIPE was highly relevant to the emerging national and provincial development agendas as they related to the rights of indigenous Papuans, and very timely, as it emerged at a time when the processes of democratization, decentralization and rapid acceleration of development and resource exploitation created political space address such issues whilst heightening the level of threat of indigenous marginalization and potential for inter-ethnic conflict.

**Validity of Program Design** – The underlying project logic, focusing on conflict mitigation through increased community participation in development processes, poverty alleviation and gender mainstreaming, was highly sound and entirely appropriate. Weaknesses lay, however, in a lack of adaptation of the project's design to local needs and conditions. The policy of deferring engagement with most local stakeholders until phase II undermined the effectiveness of project implementation. It created a situation whereby the project remained poorly informed regarding their working context, and lessons learned from similar interventions in the past, and also compromised capacity for subsequent engagement with many of these organizations. Most notably, failure to effectively engage with the newly formed Papuan Representative Council (MRP) represents a lost opportunity to develop the relevance and capacity of this vital indigenous representative body from its infancy.

**M&E / performance indicators** – PIPE's M&E system was in many respects, deficient. A major problem stemmed from the lack of a quality baseline study, which was compounded by the low quality of several subsequent studies on gender and peace building mechanisms. Furthermore, M&E tools lacked transparency, many of the selected indicators were ambiguous and most of the claimed achievements of the PIPE Program could not be substantiated. It is difficult to determine which changes occurred as a result of the ILO-PIPE's interventions, and what social, political and economic changes were occurring in communities regardless of PIPE. Given that PIPE was a demonstrative pilot program, a much greater effort should have been invested in planning, developing and documenting innovative approaches to M&E.

**Implementation – Challenges, Progress and Effectiveness** – PIPE faced numerous and complex socio-cultural, political and economic challenges. The most evident included the paucity of interest from local government partners, lack of suitable indigenous people's organizations (IPOs) with which to partner, and attempts by a group of indigenous elites to position themselves as intermediaries between PIPE and the participating communities. Less apparent, yet arguably more obdurate challenges included extremely low education levels, deeply entrenched hand-out and mentality and attitudes towards gender, as well as high levels of intra-communal competition and conflict.

At the conclusion of the project, PIPE could demonstrate a reasonable level of progress in terms of establishing new IPOs, encouraging self-reliance, supporting technical and entrepreneurial skills training and improved livelihoods, and addressing gender issues in at least 3 of the 4 target areas. However, most achievements remained fragile and conditional upon continued facilitative support for at least another 2-3 years.

PIPE also achieved limited success in terms of generating support for the adoption of CDPD by local government. Specifically, the head of the Village Empowerment Body (BPMD) had shown strong interest in adopting elements of the CDPD approach and GET Ahead entrepreneurship training tools into their programs. However, this support base remained quite narrow.



It was also concluded that effective implementation was undermined by a combination of under-resourcing and overly rapid implementation during the first 12 months, resulting in poor communication of the projects intentions and modality to partners and participants. Towards the end of the project there was also a spike in material assistance from the project, which, in at least some cases, caused tensions within the communities and arguably undermining gains made in terms of promoting self-reliance.

This implies that the community-driven approach espoused by PIPE was often compromised / subjugated to managerial imperatives such as the need to meet pre-planned schedules and the pursuit of outputs. Project implementation would have flowed better, miscommunication could have been minimised, the cognitive transition for program participants from a hand-out to a self-help attitude could have been strengthened, and a similar or even greater number of outputs which would lead to a more sustainable outcome could have been achieved if a greater amount of time and resources had been invested into establishing strong foundations for action at the outset.

**Application of mid-term evaluation results** – Following the mid-term evaluation a range of actions were taken in response to some of the findings and recommendation of the mid-term evaluation. Most notably, PIPE was able to strengthen their core team sufficiently to facilitate much more effective communications and capacity building support. However, other recommendations were either disregarded or were only partially applied. For example there was no improvement in the quality of the baseline survey documents or subsequent reports, there was little improvement in M&E processes, and most significantly, the recommendations relating to the need to build strategic networks were not internalized by PIPE’s management.

**Resourcing & Management** – The mode of implementation, whereby the PIPE team was directly responsible for project implementation at the grass roots level, whilst sub-contracting specific short term elements to local consultants, was considered less than optimal. Instead - the establishment of long-term sub-granting arrangements with several credible local organizations, is not only likely to have proved a more cost effective approach, but would also have increased the project’s capacity for adaptation and innovation, whilst also supporting improvement in capacity of local organizations and building a support base for the promotion of the CDPD approach, gender mainstreaming, indigenous rights and peace. This situation was exacerbated by under resourcing, primarily insufficient allocation of human resources and funding to support effective field facilitation particularly in West Papua. During 2008 there was marked improvement in the level of supervision of field activities as a result of the recruitment of additional human resources and increased allocation of funds for travel to the field.

The selection, supervision and quality control functions in relation to short-term consultant inputs was also generally poor, as evidenced by the low quality and extremely low utility of major study reports.

**Exit strategy** - PIPE’s exit strategy was formulated in the last six months of the program, as it became apparent that a smooth progression to the planned phase II would not be achievable. The mainstay of PIPE’s exit strategy was the provision of US\$110,000 block grant to two micro-finance institutions in Jayapura and Manokwari to support micro-lending for livelihoods activities, as well as training and supervisory services to the IPOs for a period of approximately six months. This was a highly positive step, but they should have been involved in the process much earlier, and there should have been a smoother progression from GET Ahead Training, via micro-savings activities before making micro-loans available. Ultimately it seems unlikely that an additional 6 months of access to micro-credit and facilitative support services from these MFIs will prove sufficient to ensure sustainability of the IPOs and livelihoods outcomes.

**Sustainability & Scaling-up** – The sustainability of project outcomes remains highly questionable. In the face of future government hand-outs, it is doubtful that project recipients will be motivated to take on the principles of participatory development and CDPD. As such it is crucial that PIPE build the sustainability of what it has already achieved, prior to any major scaling-up. This is unless PIPE is willing to change the implementation modality and develop an approach involving a far broader range of stakeholders in program design, implementation and evaluation.

**Key Recommendations** - In conclusion the evaluation recommends that the ILO should make a long term commitment to continued pursuit of the vision and goals of PIPE in Papua, and even expand their role to enable them to influence broader changes relating to the human resources crisis, market access constraints, land and resource rights, socio-political change, the impacts of resource exploitation, REDD programs and corporate social responsibility issues.

To achieve this, it is necessary to modify the existing approach in a number of ways. First and foremost, the ILO should conduct a Participatory Program Review Workshop and Strategy Planning Process prior to embarking upon phase II.

The ILO also needs to focus upon applying its key areas of expertise, by seeking ways to employ their strengths in facilitating multi-sectoral social dialogue, capacity building, legal drafting, education / training methodologies and microfinance and SME development. All of these will maximise the chances of supporting the development of sustainable democratic institutions which respect indigenous rights. A range of other recommendations are also provided relating to issues including:

- Enhancing M&E and project documentation processes to make them more participatory, transparent, relevant and include gender disaggregated data;
- Developing, trialling and promoting participatory technical skills training methodologies including adaptation of the GET Ahead materials, farmer field schools and participatory action research approaches;
- Strengthening the focus on gender mainstreaming by taking affirmative action to increase women's participation;
- Facilitating greater opportunities for technology transfer through generating opportunities for cross visits between pilot program and Papuan communities where valuable lessons could be learned;
- Reviewing staffing arrangements, including effort to recruit a greater number of indigenous Papuans, particularly in managerial roles;
- Upwards revision of the budgetary and resource allocations to better reflect the true cost of project implementation for PIPE Phase II;
- Ensuring that they are maintaining high HSE standards by clearly establishing HSE standards and instituting HSE compliance reviews as part of the village development planning process.

## 2. The PIPE Program - Background and Logic



The PIPE Program emerged from ILO's Cooperatives Branch (INDISCO) experience of implementing innovative pilot programs focusing on the development of Indigenous people's cooperatives in the Philippines, India and other countries in Asia, Africa, South and Central America.

Under the title "Promoting Human Security and Reducing Poverty among Indigenous Peoples in Papua, Indonesia", the original project design was developed following a short scoping visit to Papua in 2005 and soon after, went through a series of revisions. These revisions included, rephrasing objectives to accommodate the national government concerns with terms like 'conflict' and 'security', aligning the outputs and indicators to reflect demographic and social factors in Papua and reducing them to reflect the limited resources available to the program; cancelling the goal of including a baseline survey of social, cultural and economic conditions across Papua.

The project's goals were related to poverty reduction, gender mainstreaming and the strengthening of peace and development mechanisms. According to the mid-Term Progress Report (2007), *"at the end of the project implementation period, the indigenous peoples in the selected project sites will be capable of generating sustainable income and engaging in decent employment opportunities through their own institutions and self-help mechanisms; that the employment and educational opportunities of indigenous women and girls will have been significantly improved and gender equality and mainstreaming practices will have been adopted in the community and local development process; and that the capacity of the local government to promote human security and prevent conflict among the indigenous and migrant Papuans with constructive dialogue and favourable policies and programmes will have been strengthened"*.

To reach these goals, the community-driven participatory development (CDPD) model, which was trialled by ILO-INDISCO personnel in the Philippines and India, was selected. According to this approach, IPOs (Indigenous People's Organizations) would plan and implement village development projects. Government technical services and agencies, who had previously taken on the role of IPOs, were instead contracted by the IPOs to provide facilitative, technical and material support services.

PIPE was designed to be implemented in two phases over a period of five years. The first phase, which was implemented between January 2006 and December 2008, cost USD\$1,537,965 and was funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). The Government of Japan was a major contributor to this fund. This phase piloted the CDPD approach in four selected pilot areas or districts. It was intended that the results and strategic lessons learned from this piloting would enable the CDPD model to be revised to adapt to Papuan conditions.

It is planned that phase II, which will run from 2009-2010, will see the program shift to building the capacity of local government to mainstream the Papuan version of the CDPD approach developed in phase one. By working with the relevant government agencies and other institutions, it is hoped that the project will strengthen their capacity to promote human security, peace and development, and gender equality. The approaches, activities and outputs for phase II are not yet finalised.

## Organizational Modality & Implementation Partners

The ILO established an office and a small number of program staff in the Provincial Capital Jayapura, with a sub-office in Manokwari, West Papua Province. These offices, with support from Project Steering Committees (PSCs) in both Provinces, were to be responsible for identifying four suitable districts and Indigenous People's Organizations (IPOs) for participation in the pilot programs. The IPOs in turn would select community development facilitators (CDFs) who would receive formal training in the CDPD approach. IPOs also undertook informal training and facilitation support in the course of applying the CDPD approach, including leading community baseline studies, and planning, implementing and monitoring participatory village development activities.

Provincial level government agencies with an interest in the program included the Provincial Planning Board (BAPPEDA), Manpower Service (Disnaker), Social Affairs Service (*Dinas Sosial*) and the Rural Community Empowerment Body (*Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa* or BPMD). These agencies, which were all represented on Project Steering Committees (PSCs) in Papua and West Papua Provinces, do not seem to have played a highly active role beyond the initial stages of the program. During 2007 and 2008 a number of other government technical services offices including the Fisheries, Agriculture, Estate Crops and Cooperatives Services, were also involved as training service providers to the IPOs.

During the final six months of the program ILO-PIPE began establishing a USD\$110,000 block grant arrangement for local micro-finance institutions. Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) Phidectama in Jayapura, and the Credit Union Mambuin in Manokwari are scheduled to administer a revolving loans scheme in each pilot program district after completion of the program. At the time of the final evaluation these schemes had not been activated.





### 3 PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The terms of reference for the PIPE program Final Evaluation specifies the purposes as to:

1. Help inform future interventions related to economic empowerment of indigenous peoples in Indonesia and elsewhere.
2. To contribute knowledge to building and sharing in the complex field of indigenous peoples' development which is the subject of ILO Convention No. 169 (see box 1) and lately, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The Terms of Reference also specifies that the evaluation contribute to the efforts of the ILO, GOI and other concerned development partners, to promote and implement the rights of indigenous peoples through a particular development approach. More specifically, the scope of the evaluation as laid out in the TOR includes evaluation regarding:

- Application of the mid-term evaluation recommendations;
- Achievements of project results and factors contributing to such achievements;
- The extent to which project interventions have enhanced the institutional capacity of its partners in Papua, including government offices and development organizations, to provide effective employment-support to youth, women, and local community;
- The key areas of institutional capacity needs among PIPE partners that will need to be further supported;
- Challenges in the implementation of PIPE interventions as faced/perceived by PIPE partners and key stakeholders, including the indigenous communities themselves represented by their traditional decision making bodies;
- Critical interventions necessary for a successful replication of PIPE interventions;
- Key challenges and recommendation in gender mainstreaming in PIPE interventions and, when feasible, future replication;
- The extent to which the PIPE project can be said to be a good example of a rights-based approach to local development with indigenous peoples, i.e. based on the principles of C. 169.

The full terms of reference for the final evaluation are included in Annex 2.

While these purposes are somewhat generic, the outcomes are highly specific as it is the goal of this report to offer a detailed review and critique of the entire program. While the evaluator has striven to build upon the findings of the mid-term evaluation, it has often been necessary to 'start at the beginning', to interrogate the assumptions that have led to the program's strengths and its weaknesses. It is hoped that analysing various spheres of the entire project will lead to recommendations to guide a stronger, more focused and locally relevant phase of the PIPE project.

As per the TOR, the evaluator's recommendations have been written so that the PIPE program may resonate, and even contribute to on-going initiatives in Papua such as:

- Strengthening the GOI-GOPP-WB RESPEK (Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung) program. In particular the need to promote greater economic self-reliance among indigenous Papuans, individually and collectively, through *adat*-based community organizations;
- The on-going government initiative to formulate and implement a sound human resource strategy for Papua;
- The ILO Education and Skills Training for Youth Employment Project (EAST);
- Preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS infection at the village level; and
- The emerging UN Joint Programme for the Highlands.

## 3.2 Clients & Audience of the Evaluation

The key clients of this evaluation include:

- The PIPE team in Papua, who had primary responsibility for planning, implementing, adapting and managing the PIPE program. It is hoped that they will be able to use the results of the evaluation as a catalyst for an even more in-depth self-evaluation of PIPE's impacts and outcomes, as well as using the results as an input towards forward planning;
- Staff of the ILO Jakarta with the responsibility for backstopping the PIPE program and ensuring overall relevance and alignment with the Decent Work Country Program;
- The ILO's Education and Skills Training for Youth (EAST) project team in Papua and other parts of Indonesia;
- National, Provincial and Regency level government agencies who were involved in the program, either as partners responsible for overseeing the program's direction, or technical training service providers;
- Staff and donors of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, in particular the Government of Japan, and the ILO's INDISCO team in Geneva.

The audience of this evaluation may include other organizations with an interest in indigenous rights, sustainable economic development, peace building and gender mainstreaming in Papua, Indonesia and beyond such as:

- The ILOs tripartite partners at the national, provincial and regional level;
- Provincial and Regency level government and agencies in Papua;
- Other UN agencies such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Volunteers (UNV), UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF);
- The World Bank Support Office for Eastern Indonesia (WB SOEI);
- UN REDD and various other organizations planning to implement Reduced Emissions through Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) programs in areas of Indonesia inhabited by indigenous peoples;
- Major donor organizations with an interest in Papua such as USAID (USA), AusAID (Australia), DFID (Great Britain), NZAID (New Zealand), CIDA (Canada), JICA (Japan), SIDA (Sweden), the Royal Dutch Embassy, Global Fund, the Clinton Foundation, as well as their grantees and contractors;
- Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs) in Papua and Nationally, including the Papuan People's Council (MRP), Papuan Customary Council (DAP), the Association of Indigenous People of the Archipelago (AMAN), amongst others;
- Local and international civil society organizations (CSOs) working in Papua who also have an interest in the PIPE Program, particularly in terms of the lessons learned from pilot activities with indigenous communities. It is intended that the major findings of this report will be translated into Bahasa Indonesia.

It is for people unfamiliar with the workings of the ILO and the PIPE project that contextual material in boxes throughout the report be included.

## 3.3 Approach and methods

This evaluation was conducted using a consultative approach, that is, it used methods that privileged dialogue with people involved in the project. During research for this report, the author heeded local perspectives about the successes, shortcomings and likely outcomes of the program. Through conversations in the field, the consultant encouraged reflection and analysis of peoples' roles in the project. It is hoped that the conclusions contained within this report can in turn, be fed back to participants to become a stimulus towards further reflection and analysis.

Methods used to gather and verify data for this evaluation include:

- Reviewing PIPE project documents such as the original and revised program design documents, annual and final program reports, training materials, activity reports prepared by CDFs, community/IPO proposals, monitoring reports, etc;

- Field visits and community meetings in nine villages in the four districts where PIPE's pilot activities were implemented;
- Interviews / discussions with current and former staff and consultants of the ILO-PIPE Program;
- Interviews with identified key persons in government, civil society and communities;
- Semi-structured interviews and informal dialogues with community members, selected at random, and;
- Integrative analyses and focus group discussions for verification and reflection.

Two further literature reviews were required:

- The first contextualised the project in light of the rapid rate of socio-political change in Papua. To this extent, the consultant reviewed a number of secondary sources as well as conducted informal interviews and discussions about the contemporary socio-political situation in Papua. Given that the ILO hope their projects will develop or support other programs in Papua, it was necessary to do this review. In particular, it was important to comprehend such topics as national and local government policies *vis-à-vis* indigenous people in Papua, existing or planned development programs of the Government, WB, UN and bilateral aid agencies, and the development programs of local and international NGOs.
- A literature review of the ILO itself was required so that recommendations could be framed within the ILOs interests and operating realities. To this end, a range of secondary sources relating to the history, policies, programs, and organizational structure of the ILO was reviewed. These materials have been summarized and included in section 4 of this report to facilitate ease of comprehension by readers who have little understanding of the ILO system.

A summary of the meetings, discussions and field visits conducted as part of the field work for this evaluation is included in annex 3, whereas a complete list of PIPE Project Documents, as well as other documentary sources reviewed in the process of this evaluation is provided in annex 4.

### 3.4 About the Evaluator

Robert Hewat is an independent consultant who has worked with indigenous communities in Papua and West Papua Provinces since 1993. He has worked with local and international NGOs, local government, aid projects and multinational corporations. Robert's strengths are in participatory development models which he uses to approach capacity building, conservation and community-based natural resource management, sustainable social & economic development, and conflict mitigation in Indonesian Papua, Eastern Indonesia and PNG.

### 3.5 Constraints and Bias'

While the consultant's past experiences and understanding of the development context of Papua went a long way towards strengthening the validity of the data produced to create this report, there were a number of factors which undermined data validity. For instance:

1. Although the ILO's evaluation guidelines (ILO Evaluation Guidance: Considering Gender in Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects. ILO 2007), and the UN's Evaluation standards (2005) requires that: *"The composition of evaluation teams should be gender balanced, geographically diverse and include professionals from the countries or regions concerned"* and the assignment's TOR stated the evaluation be conducted by two independent consultants, Robert Hewat was the only consultant enlisted for this evaluation. The mid-term evaluation was conducted by a team of two evaluators including an Australian woman and a local consultant, both of whom had extensive experience working in Papua. but not the final evaluation.

This final evaluation would have benefited greatly from the involvement of a local evaluator and especially if that evaluator was an indigenous Papuan and/or a woman. With a second evaluator, not only would we have had extra inputs and a different perspective to enrich this evaluation, a local counterpart would, no doubt, have accessed other social groups so as to better represent marginal/underrepresented voices.

The involvement of an evaluator from a strategic Papuan stakeholder organization, such as the MRP's indigenous or women's work groups, or a number of other Papuan organizations, could have built local confidence in the ILO. For one, willingness to be open to local scrutiny would have communicated the ILO's commitment to transparency while working with someone from such an organisation could have served the longer term goal of building local networks. For another, a local counterpart would have

communicated the ILOs commitment to indigenous and gender empowerment through demonstrating employment creation. Involving Papuans and women at every possible stage of the program cycle would not only have made a strong statement about the ILOs integrity; offering work experience to a local would have genuinely contributed to capacity building.

2. The second major constraint relates to the briefness of the assignment relative to the expectations of the evaluation. Allowing the consultant eight days in Papua and one day in Jakarta was too brief for the aims of the TOR. Given the broad geographical spread of the pilot program areas, the social complexity of the program and the need to evaluate the qualitative dimensions of organizational, attitudinal and behavioural changes, the evaluation period was overly tight. This timeframe contradicted the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation which states that the final evaluation take place over a period of two weeks duration so as to allow adequate time for consultation with a broader range of PIPE personnel, consultants, IPOs, CDFs and other strategic stakeholders.

In practise, covering four regions in eight days involved a demanding schedule of back-to-back travel by air and overland, and by dividing the remaining time between visits and meetings in nine villages as well as meetings with program personnel and various stakeholders in Jayapura and Manokwari. Given that the time in meetings, discussions and observation in most of the locations averaged 3-6 hours, it was difficult for the observer to more than glimpse the situation. Given the gender, race and status barriers within communities, the short duration of visits made it extremely difficult for the evaluator to engage women or other marginals from the pilot program areas in meaningful discussion. Only a handful of women attended any of the group discussions, and mostly, the men dominated such discussions anyway.

3. The timing of the evaluation was problematic in three respects. Firstly, fieldwork coincided with the Christmas and New Years Eve holiday period. This does not seem to have had a major effect on field work in the pilot program areas<sup>1</sup>. It did mean though that the evaluator was unable to meet with key people within the ILO Jakarta Office, which made it difficult to gauge the broader interests of the ILO in Papua and Indonesia. It also made it extremely difficult to arrange meetings with most government personnel involved in the PIPE Program.

Secondly, taking place in the last few days of the PIPE Program, we can presume that critical responses were minimised on the basis that program personnel, CDFs and other active program participants were motivated to secure funding to continue the program. This motivation, when intersecting with the brevity of visits, can only assume to have lead to the situation where only the most vocal were heard. Those whose opinion may have been more nuanced, such as those more marginal to the project, were less often heard. Whilst clearly little can be done to obviate such a constraint, it is important to be mindful of such bias.

Thirdly, since the evaluation was done so soon after phase I of PIPE, it is not possible to determine with any degree of certainty the degree of sustainability of the IPOs, cooperatives, activities or socio-economic innovations supported by the program. Only follow-up evaluations 6 or 12 months after the completion of the program is likely to determine whether after the withdrawal of program funding and facilitation support, the organizations established are sustainable, or whether they have collapsed.

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<sup>1</sup> Although some meetings had to be scheduled around religious activities and meetings with a number of senior advisors to the Governor of Papua, NGO leaders and other stakeholders were arranged despite the holiday season.



## 4. THE PIPE PROGRAM IN CONTEXT

### 4.1 The ILO, Indigenous Rights and Indigenous Empowerment

Since its establishment in 1919, the ILO has been a leading advocate for the rights of indigenous people. As decolonization progressed in the aftermath of WWII, the ILO have been instrumental in mainstreaming indigenous rights issues and establishing the international legal policy framework on indigenous peoples rights through Convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations (1957), which was subsequently revised by Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1993). Up until the creation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 2007, these conventions were the primary legal reference relating to indigenous rights and were frequently used by other UN Agencies, the World Bank, and others. Within this declaration, convention No. 169 (see Box 1) is significant insofar as its principles are foundational to the PIPE project. Convention 169 considers the preservation of indigenous and tribal peoples' culture and ways of life as imperative and requires that ratifying countries respect this. It further encourages indigenous and tribal peoples and their organizations to participate in the planning and implementation of development projects that affect them.

Since the 1950s the ILO's Cooperatives Branch has worked with indigenous communities in a number of developing countries. Since 1993, the ILO, through the INDISCO Program has also been involved in a range of technical assistance programmes which seek to improve indigenous and tribal peoples' social and economic conditions through demonstrative pilot projects and dissemination of best practices for policy improvement. Behind this development objective has been the goal of raising the capacity of indigenous cooperatives and self-help organisations to plan and manage development activities, these programs have visualized examples of practical partnerships in the field of sustainable development with the specific objectives of:

- Strengthening indigenous communities through cooperatives and other self-help organizations;
- Ancestral domain management;
- Advancement of the status of indigenous and tribal women;
- Preserving and promoting indigenous knowledge systems and practices;
- Capacity-building for indigenous and tribal extension workers;
- Environment and natural resource management.
- Strengthening of local organizations.
- Strengthening indigenous mechanisms for building and maintaining peace.

#### **Box 1. Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries**

The following provides a summary of some of the key provisions of ILO Convention 169 Concerning indigenous & tribal peoples in independent countries. For the sake of brevity Indigenous and Tribal peoples are referred to by the abbreviation IPs. The full text of the ILO Convention No. 169 can be found on the ILO web site: [www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org).

##### **PART I GENERAL POLICY**

**Article 1:** Establishes definitions of "indigenous" and "tribal" people, applying the principle of self-identification as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of the Convention apply.

**Article 3:** Establishes that the full measure of human rights and all provisions of the Convention shall be applied without discrimination to both indigenous men and women.

**Article 4:** Requires ratifying States to adopt special measures for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of IPs.

**Article 5:** Establishes that, ratifying States must recognize and protect the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values of indigenous and tribal peoples, and respect the integrity of their values, practices and institutions.

**Article 6:** Requires that governments consult indigenous peoples through appropriate procedures, particularly through their representative institutions, when legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect them are being considered, and provides that States should establish means for the peoples concerned to develop their own institutions

**Article 7:** Establishes the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to decide their own priorities for the process of development and to exercise control over their own economic, social and cultural development, as well as the obligation of ratifying States to take measures to protect and preserve their environment and territories.

**Article 8:** Requires States to take indigenous custom and customary law into account when applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned.

## **PART II LAND**

Article 13: Requires governments to respect the special importance to the cultures and spiritual values of indigenous and tribal peoples of their relationship with the lands or territories that they occupy.

Article 14: Establishes that ratifying States shall recognize the land ownership and/or usage rights of IPs over the lands that they traditionally occupy and/or use; and Requires governments to take necessary steps to identify such lands, guarantee protection of such rights, and establish procedures to resolve land claims by IPs.

Article 15: Establishes the rights of IPs to participate in the use, management and conservation of natural resources pertaining to their lands.

## **PART III RECRUITMENT AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT**

Article 20: Requires governments to adopt special measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to recruitment and conditions of employment of indigenous workers, do everything possible to prevent any discrimination between indigenous and other workers and take measures to protect indigenous workers from exploitative, coercive or hazardous employment conditions.

## **PART IV VOCATIONAL TRAINING, HANDICRAFTS AND RURAL INDUSTRIES**

Article 21: Establishes that IPs have the right to enjoy opportunities at least equal to those of other citizens in respect of vocational training measures.

Article 22: Requires that measures shall be taken to promote the voluntary participation of IPs in vocational training programmes, including where necessary, the provision of special training programmes and facilities, and that IPs should be involved in, and progressively assume responsibility for, the organisation and operation of such special training programmes.

Article 23: Establishes that the traditional crafts, industries and activities of IPs are recognised as important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their economic self-reliance and development; and requires governments, with the participation of IPs to ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted.

## **PART V SOCIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH**

Article 24: Requires that social security schemes be extended progressively to cover the peoples concerned, and applied without discrimination.

Article 25: Requires that governments ensure the availability of adequate health services to the peoples concerned, and that as far as possible such health services should be community based and prioritize the training and employment of local community health workers

## **PART VI EDUCATION AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATION**

Article 26: Requires governments to ensure that indigenous people have the opportunity to acquire education at all levels on at least an equal footing with the rest of the national community.

Article 27: Requires that education programmes and services be formulated and implemented in cooperation with indigenous groups to address their special needs, and shall incorporate their histories, knowledge and technologies, value systems and their further social, economic and cultural aspirations.

Article 28: Requires that measures be taken to preserve and promote indigenous languages, including, wherever practicable, the provisions of basic education services in the local indigenous languages, whilst ensuring that indigenous people also have the opportunity to attain fluency in the national language.

Article 30: Requires governments to adopt culturally appropriate measures to inform indigenous peoples about their rights and duties, especially in regard to labour, economic opportunities, education, health, social welfare and C.169.

Article 31: Requires governments to adopt measures to educate all sections of the national community with the aim of eliminating prejudices towards indigenous people.

## **PART VII CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION ACROSS BORDERS**

Article 32: Requires governments to take appropriate measures to facilitate contacts and co-operation between indigenous and tribal peoples across borders, including activities in the economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields.

## **PART VIII ADMINISTRATION**

Article 33: Requires governments to ensure that agencies or other appropriate mechanisms exist to administer the programmes affecting the peoples concerned and ensure that they have the means necessary for the proper fulfilment of the functions assigned to them.

## **PART X FINAL PROVISIONS**

Article 38/39 : Establishes the convention as binding upon ratifying states for a minimum period of 10 years.

## 4.2 ILO Jakarta and the Indonesia Decent Work Country Policy (IDWCP)

The ILO Jakarta Office is currently responsible for the implementation of around a dozen programs and projects in Indonesia, as well as a number of programs in Timor-Leste.

### Box 2 - Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) Indonesia

#### Priority One: Stop Exploitation at Work

##### 1.1 Effective progress on the implementation of the National Plan of Action on Worst Forms of Child Labour.

- Elimination of the worst forms of Child Labour Phase II  
Jakarta, West Java, East Java, East Kalimantan & North Sumatra

##### 1.2 Improved labour migration management for better protection of Indonesian migrant workers.

- Combating Trafficking and Forced Labour of Indonesian Migrant Workers  
2006-2008 National / International
- ILO/Japan Project on Managing Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia  
2006-2010 National / International
- Labour Migration Governance  
National / International

#### Priority Two: Employment Creation for Poverty Reduction and Livelihoods Recovery

##### 2.1 Employment targets in the Indonesian Government's Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM) are underpinned by a set of policies and programmes that emphasise pro-poor employment growth.

- Job Opportunities for Youth (JOY)  
2007-2010 National & East Java

##### 2.2 Effective implementation of employment-intensive and other livelihood programmes for crisis-affected areas, especially Aceh, North Sumatra, and Eastern Indonesia.

- Papua Indigenous Peoples Empowerment (PIPE)  
2006-2008 Papua & West Papua Provinces
- Aceh-Nias Tsunami Response Programme  
2005-2008 Aceh & Nias

##### 2.3 Education and training systems and policies better equip young people for employment and entrepreneurship.

- Education and Skills Training for Youth (EAST)  
2007-2010 Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, South Sulawesi & Aceh

#### Priority Three: Social Dialogue for Economic Growth & Principles and Rights at Work

##### 3.1 Application of labour laws and practices fully in line with fundamental principles and rights at work, including through strengthened labour administration.

- Tripartism Project  
2008 -2010 Jakarta, West Java, East Java & Batam

##### 3.2 Employers and unions through bipartite cooperation achieve results on labour market flexibility and job security.

- Youth Employment and Social Dialogue (YESD)  
2007-2008 Jakarta, West Java, East Java & Batam

#### Priority Four: Conditions at Work

- HIV/AIDS and the World of Work  
2005-2008 Papua & West Papua & 16 other Provinces
- Avian Flu and the Workplace  
2008-2009 West, Central & East Java, Banten & Bali

#### East Timor

Since 2003 the ILO Jakarta Office has also been responsible for managing the ILO's programs in East Timor. These programs primarily focus on

- Youth employment and vocational training programs;
- Micro-enterprise programs for vulnerable women; and
- Policy and capacity building support for good labour market governance.

The PIPE program was quite unique and innovative for, unlike many other ILO projects, it had a modest budget and resources. ILO Jakarta plans and implements projects within the Indonesia Decent Work Country Program (IDWCP) which is a framework which was developed by the ILO in collaboration with the GOI and other tripartite partners. The IDWCP aims to support Indonesia to move towards an integrated development strategy and is built on four strategic pillars: (1) the promotion of fundamental principles and rights at work; (2) employment / enterprise creation and human resource development; (3) social dialogue; and (4) social protection. These pillars correspond to four priorities: (1) Stopping exploitation of child labourers and migrant workers, (2) Employment and enterprise creation and vocational training for poverty reduction, (3) Facilitating social dialogue for economic growth and principles and rights at work, and (4) Improving conditions at work (focusing on workplace training about HIV/AIDs and Avian influenza).

### **4.3 Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Socio-Economic Development in Indonesia**

Indonesia is arguably the most culturally and linguistically nations in the World with its population of around 220 million people belonging to over 500 ethnic groups speaking as many as 600 different languages. In Papua alone there are some 250 different ethno-linguistic groups.

Ever since Indonesia first demanded independence, in the 1920s and 1930s, the project of nation building has aimed at uniting these diverse peoples into a unified cultural identity. Although a national policy of cultural tolerance was explicit in the national slogan 'Unity in Diversity' throughout the era of Sukarno and of Suharto, a program of political centralization and cultural assimilation was central to the state's development agenda. These goals were pursued through systematic and systemic social engineering programs while the expression of customary practises, insofar as they threatened national allegiance, were suppressed and often forcefully.

A central plank of the national programme of cultural integration was the obligatory resettlement of dispersed and isolated communities into large centralised villages under close government supervision. Some of these villages were resettled and then targeted for development by the Social Affairs Department (DEPSOS), while others were inserted into larger transmigration settlements made up of landless settlers from outside Papua. Still others were incorporated as members of the labour force of palm oil and rubber plantations established in 'conversion forests'.

#### **A New Policy for Dealing with 'Indigenous Peoples'**

The fall of the New Order and the *reformasi* period, marks the transition from a centralized and unitary State to a decentralized and pluralistic one. State concerns have shifted from the need for development in the national interest to one that increasingly recognises the need to respect and protect the rights of its citizens, including indigenous people. The collapse of the New Order was turbulent and, in certain places, violent. For instance, there were outbreaks of violence between indigenous communities and migrant populations in Kalimantan, Papua and other areas. In Papua, amongst other areas, this era marked a growth in the number and diversity of customary organizations or IPOs across Indonesia, including the establishment of a national umbrella body, AMAN or The Association of Customary Communities of the Archipelago (*Assosiasi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*).

In 2000 the Indonesian constitution was revised to accommodate decentralization of the State's political administrative structures. Included in these amendments was Article 18 b(2) that states, "The State recognizes and respects the unities of customary (*adat*) law communities and their traditional rights as long as they remain extant and are compatible with social development and the national principles of the Republic of Indonesia". Whilst such amendments are a step forward, the caveat that Indigenous Rights are subservient to national interests undermines indigenous rights. After all, this caveat could be used to justify the appropriation of customary land for infrastructure, resource exploitation, or other macro-development projects in the 'national interest'. The same constitutional review process also produced Article 28.I (3), which stipulates the "cultural identity and rights of traditional communities are to be respected, in line with their evolution in time and civilization". Again, true respect is undermined by the assumption that certain ethnic groups are lower in the 'natural order'.

The main government agency responsible for indigenous people in Indonesia is the Social Affairs Department's Directorate for Empowerment of Remote Communities Governed by Custom (*Direktorat*



*Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil* or DPKAT). In practise, the Department of Home Affairs' (Depdagri) Rural Community Empowerment Body (BPMD) often plays a more substantial role, though its focus is not specific to indigenous communities. Over the last decade, the official operational guidelines of these organizations have increasingly focused on enhancing local self-reliance through the application of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and other participatory techniques. However, although these new approaches are designed to be progressive, such as by espousing empowerment, incorporating participatory methods and devolving planning and implementation functions to local government initiative, local government officials have not been retrained in order to adapt to these new ideas.

What can be found then is far from operational guidelines. Departmental budgets remain centralized and agencies pay lip service to participatory methods which tend to be used as data gathering tools. Any participation does not actually facilitate empowerment or self-reliance for it remains at the level of consultation, or else people participate in reward for material incentives, or at best functional participation (see also Pretty 1994). This impotence to change reflects the broader trend where rethinking and implementing changes to national policy has faltered due to deeply entrenched prejudices and considerations of national political and economic interests. In many cases, the energy and ability to change has been halted by social unrest and the processes of democratization, political decentralization and institutional reshuffling in the capital and provinces.

In 2006 Indonesia was one of 30 nations who participated in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. This group lobbied hard in support of the UN Declaration on the rights of Indigenous People which led to adoption by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2006. Indonesia was amongst 143 nations which voted in favour of the declaration during the plenary session of the 61<sup>st</sup> UN General Assembly in September 2007<sup>2</sup>.

Unfortunately, despite efforts by the Indonesian National Secretariat on Indigenous Peoples and other national organizations to promote ratification of ILO Convention No.169, Indonesia has not yet become a signatory to ILO Convention 169. Yet the need to translate national commitment into action has never been greater. In December 2008 the deputy chairman of the National Commission on Human Rights, Ridha Saleh, urged Indonesia to strengthen the rights of indigenous people who are marginalized by rapid development. In a discussion on the empowerment of indigenous peoples, she states that "During the last three decades, there were 1,877 conflicts on land ownership and natural resources. These conflicts were marred by human rights violations" (Nurhayati, 2008).

#### **4.4 National Development Agenda in Relation to Papua**

According to the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2005 West Papua Province ranked 30<sup>th</sup> poorest out of Indonesia's 33 provinces with a HDI of 64.8. Papua Province ranked the poorest, with a HDI of just 62.1 – compared to the national average of 69.6. Access to employment, income levels, education standards and health conditions of indigenous Papuans lag far behind both the national average and those of most non-indigenous migrants living in Papua. These conditions, combined with the demographic legacy of transmigration, and ongoing tensions over ownership and exploitation of natural resources, lie at the heart of to ongoing low level conflicts and intermittent demands for independence.

Over the past decade the National agenda in Papua, and more specifically the State's response to separatist sentiments in Papua, has fluctuated radically from one President to the next. The collapse of the New Order regime marked the abandonment of its coercively assimilationist and security-based approach to quelling Papuan separatism. It also resulted in the diminishing role of the armed forces although, the 'security' based approach of the New Order period remains a factor in contemporary human rights abuses that occur intermittently and particularly in the Central Highlands region. Furthermore, it gave rise to a new independence movement, the Papua Presidium and Papuan Customary Council (*Dewan Adat Papua - DAP*) which, in the context of the East Timorese referendum and general opening up of social and political life in Indonesia, rapidly gained open and broad based support throughout much of Papuan society.

President Habibie's government attempted to divert the resurgence of separatist sentiments in Papua through enacting a new law (Law No. 45/1999) according to which Irian Jaya (Papua) Province would be

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<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US voted against it.

split into three provinces, East, Central and West Irian Jaya. These moves elicited strong protests from community groups in Papua, which prompted the Provincial parliament to formally reject the new law. The Central Government and National Parliament acceded to this rebuttal by postponing the formation of the new provinces.

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 1999, just two weeks after Law No. 45/1999 was enacted, the Upper House of the Indonesian Parliament, (MPR) passed a resolution as part of the Basic Guidelines of State Policy<sup>3</sup> for 1999-2004, which sowed the seeds for Special Autonomy in Papua. This policy formula stated that:

“...within the framework of developing regional autonomy in the context of the unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia [NKRI], resolving fairly and completely the problems in the regions requires immediate and serious handling and the taking of the following steps: defending national integrity and respecting the variety and diversity of social and cultural life within the community of Irian Jaya, through the stipulation of special regional autonomy, which shall be regulated with a Law...”

However, despite a subsequent resolution by the MPR in 2000 calling for the statutes governing Papuan Special Autonomy to be issued no later than 1 May 2001<sup>4</sup>, no concrete action was taken until the end of 2000, when Jaap Solossa, the newly appointed Governor of Papua Province formed a team to begin drafting the Special Autonomy Bill.

Following his inauguration as the fourth President of Indonesia on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1999, Adurrahman Wahid immediately began instituting a range of policies aimed at appeasing mounting tensions, including changing the province’s name to Papua, authorizing the use of the Morning Star flag, and granting permission for Papuan leaders to assemble for major congresses organized by the Papua Presidium. However, these concessions did little to appease Papuan separatist sentiments and perhaps even resulted in more conflict with police and military personnel. It is likely that Wahid’s conciliatory approach led to his impeachment and the appointment of vice president Megawati in his place in July 2001. Prior to his impeachment, Wahid, at the request of the Papuan Governor Jaap Salossa, had set in motion the process of ratifying the bill on Special Autonomy for Papua Province.

The Papua law, passed in November 2001, changed the name of the provincial legislature to the Papuan People’s Representative Council (DPRP) and established a new representative body, the MRP. The MRP was composed of members of three major components of Papuan society: religious, *adat* (traditional), and women’s leaders. Among other powers, the MRP is to be consulted regarding division of the province, and it reviews candidates for governor and vice governor to ensure they are native Papuans.

The law also stipulated that an increased share of Papua’s natural resource revenues would remain in the province, over and above the decentralization funds already provided to every province under the national policy. Although, these special autonomy funds have sunset provisions phased in between 2021 and 2026. The law provided for a truth, justice, and reconciliation process and required consultation with provincial authorities in a number of important policy areas, such as security arrangements, reserved for the central government under the national decentralization policy. As with most Indonesian laws, Papua’s special autonomy law is vague on many points, leaving details to be determined in implementing regulations, only some of which have been promulgated (see box 3 for the main features of this new law).

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<sup>3</sup> Keputusan MPR No. IV tahun 1999 tentang Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara 1999-2004 [Indonesian People’s Assembly Decision No. 4, 2000 regarding national policy guidelines 1999-2004].

<sup>4</sup> Keputusan MPR No. IV/MPR/2000 tentang Kebijakan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah [Indonesian People’s Assembly Decision No. 4, 2000 regarding policy recommendations for the implementation of Regional Autonomy.

### Box 3 Key Features of Papuan Special Autonomy Law (otsus)

- Establishment of a Papuan People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*, MRP) to strengthen representation of ethnic Papuans, women and religious groups;
- Establishment of Papuan Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua*, DPRP)
- Recognition and protection of customary (*adat*) law;
- Allocation of additional shares from national revenue: Special Autonomy Fund, Additional Shares from Oil and Gas Revenues, and ad-hoc Infrastructure Fund.
- Protection of regional symbol and regional anthem
- Establishment of institutions to protect human rights including a Papuan Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court, and Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- Creation of new regions has to be based on local proposal.
- Allows for affirmative action to raise the levels of Papuan representation in government, parliament, the judiciary and the workforce

Source: *Papuan Special Autonomy Law (UU No.21 / th.2001)*

Whilst Papuan Special Autonomy Law was ratified and passed into law in late 2001, many of Wahid's concessions were revoked as under Megawati, the government was less compromising. In January 2003 Megawati promulgated a decree ordering that the division of Papua into three provinces, as had previously been mandated through Habibie's Law No. 45/1999, be implemented immediately. This decree proved to be highly divisive, as on the one hand it was seen as undermining the newly granted right to special autonomy, on the other it promised local elites in Papua greater possibilities for status and wealth through expansion, localization and Papuanization of the Government services in Papua.

In the short term this decree unleashed a wave of protest and violence in Papua, with the Provincial government rejecting the decree on the grounds that it contradicted the new special autonomy laws and a series of public demonstrations both for and against the division of Papua. In the proposed Central Papua Province it even led to an outbreak of ethnic violence emerged between different Papuan communities, seemingly linked with the leadership aspirations of their elites, which led to the indefinite postponement of the formation of Central Papua Province.

In the medium term it has been a major distraction from the important task of implementing otsus (short for *Otonomi Khusus* or Special Autonomy). Even though the province of West Papua was formed in 2003, the government and parliament of Papua Province refused to recognize the new province's legitimacy for almost three years, during which time this issue dominated political and public debate and delayed the provincial elections until early 2006.

This decree has also fuelled aspirations for *pemekaran*, the further division of Papua into ever smaller administrative units. To date this has resulted in the division of Papua into 42 regencies (*kabupaten*), with over 400 districts (*distrik*) and 4,500 official villages (*kampung*). This represents an almost four fold increase across the three levels of local government since 1999. *Pemekaran*, moreover, is not complete and new regencies, districts and villages are still being planned or formed today. Moreover, there are concerted efforts by different interest groups in Papua and Jakarta for the division of Papua into five or more provinces. Whilst the main justification for *pemekaran* is to accelerate development in Papua and bring the government closer to the people, in practise less ideal motives drive this process. Elite's hunger to control an area, a villages' effort to increase access to natural resources and government aid flows, motivate *pemekaran* and arguing over borders reduces human capacity.

Resources tend to flow into conflicts over marking borders and paying for new offices and salaries. Struggles at the ground level distract from the task of consolidating Special Autonomy and was the reason that the first provincial level election, which was planned for 2004, was delayed for almost two years. According to Brata's (2008) analysis of BPS data, one of the main impacts of *pemekaran* correlates to the decline in the quality of government service delivery and human development. For example the HDI for Jayawijaya Regency in 2002 was 50,5, whereas two years after the regency was split to establish four regencies, the respective HDIs for each of the new regencies had declined significantly. Despite these

costs, *pemekaran* is popular. When the Governor of Papua opposed *pemekaran* in 2006 he was met with such fierce opposition he backed down.

Since President Yudhoyono inauguration in October 2004, the National government's policies towards Papua have demonstrated a measured approach. To its credit, the government have provided constructive support for improving the implementation of otsus and accelerating infrastructure development and economic growth in Papua, whilst strengthening the rule of law through a crackdown on illegal logging and ordering the arrest of some of the most glaringly corrupt government officers in Papua. At the same time, they refuse to entertain further debate about Papuan independence beyond the confines of otsus, and pro-independence symbols such as the Morning Star flag are banned once again.

## **Box 4 - The National Medium-Term Development Plan 2004 – 2009**

### **AGENDA 1 – Creating Indonesia that is secure and peaceful**

- 1.1 Enhancing mutual trust and harmonization among social groups.\*
- 1.2 Development of culture based on noble ancestral values.\*
- 1.3 Enhancing security and order and overcoming crime.\*
- 1.4 Preventing and overcoming separatism.\*
- 1.5 Preventing and overcoming terrorism.
- 1.6 Enhancing the capacity of the state defence.
- 1.7 Consolidating foreign policy and enhancing international cooperation.

### **AGENDA 2 – Creating Indonesia that is just and democratic**

- 2.1 Reform of the legal and political system.
- 2.2 Eradication of discrimination in its various forms.\*
- 2.3 Respect for, acknowledgement and enforcement of the law and basic human rights.\*
- 2.4 Enhancement of the quality of the life and role of women and enhancement of children's well-being and protection.\*
- 2.5 Revitalization of the decentralization and regional autonomy process.\*
- 2.6 Creating clean and credible governance.\*
- 2.7 Realization of increasingly solid democratic institutions.\*

### **AGENDA 3 – Enhancing welfare of the people**

- 3.1 Poverty alleviation.\*
- 3.2 Increasing investment and non-oil/gas exports.
- 3.3 Enhancing competitiveness of the manufacturing industry.
- 3.4 Agriculture revitalization.
- 3.5 Empowerment of cooperatives and micro, small and medium enterprises.\*
- 3.6 Enhancing the management of state-owned enterprises.
- 3.7 Increasing capabilities in science and technology.
- 3.8 Improving manpower.
- 3.9 Consolidation of macro-economic stability.
- 3.10 Rural development.\*
- 3.11 Reducing the imbalanced development among regions.\*
- 3.12 Increasing access of the people to quality education.\*
- 3.13 Improving access of the people to quality health services.\*
- 3.14 Enhancing social security and welfare.
- 3.15 Development of population, quality small families, youth and sports.
- 3.16 Enhancing the quality of religious life.
- 3.17 Improving management of natural resources and conservation of functions of the natural environment.

\* Areas where the PIPE Program has contributed towards the realization of the official National level development agenda.

Source: *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) 2004-2009*

<http://bappenas.go.id/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=2820>



It is worth noting that both President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Yusuf Kalla previously played critical roles in helping resolve several important regional conflicts. Yudhoyono, as chief security minister, supported negotiations for the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in Aceh, over the opposition of the military and several cabinet members. Regarding Papua, in part given Yudhoyono's status as a retired army general, he is expected to be able to bring along the military despite its objections. Kalla, as chief social welfare minister, played the central role in arranging the Malino I and II dialogues that helped break the destructive cycles of communal violence in Ambon (Maluku) and Poso (Central Sulawesi), respectively. As such, there have been high expectations in Papua and internationally of the current regime's ability to break the longstanding deadlock in Papua.

The national medium term development plan 2004-2009 (see box 4) is significant in that PIPE is placed within such priorities, places a very high emphasis peace and security, democratization and human welfare. This development agenda, sounds promising but will likely be undermined by the other national development agendas, namely the expansion of oil palm estates for bio-fuels, encouraging foreign investment in the mining sector, and other macro-infrastructure programs which tend to prove antithetical to the interests and wellbeing of indigenous Papuans. It's worth noting that in the context of upcoming presidential elections and the subsequent national medium-term development planning process, there will likely be another change in national policies towards Papua.

#### **4.5 Papuan Development Agenda**

As has already been discussed, from 2003-2006 the implementation of Special Autonomy law was severely undermined by ongoing debate over the creation of West Papua Province. By the beginning of 2006 the long political deadlock was finally broken, and after a delay of almost two years the first direct elections of provincial governors in Papuan history proceeded in both provinces. Since their election in April 2006, the administration of Barnabas Suebu and Alex Hessegem has begun to consolidate special autonomy in Papua Province including the establishment of the MRP, and drafting numerous special autonomy regulations.

The administration of Abraham Ataruri and Rahimin Katjong in West Papua Province, which as a new province with fewer resources and a less experienced administration, has been faced with a number of additional challenges. Not least of these has been the ongoing uncertainty over West Papua Province's status under otsus. The original otsus bill refers only to Papua Province and to date, no revisions have been made to accommodate the establishment of West Papua Province. Whilst in practice most of the provisions of otsus have already been extended to the new province, this legal grey area has created problematic legal loopholes and delays in the drafting of special autonomy regulations. As such the planning process has tended to lag behind that of Papua Province, and to date much of their development policy agenda and programs have followed the lead set by the Government of Papua Province (GOPP).

The key policy document formally outlining the GOPP's development priorities for 2006-2011 is the Medium Term Development Plan (RPJM). The RPJM lays out Governor Suebu's "New Papua Development Strategy" the NPDS (see box 5). One of the mainstays of the NPDS is the RESPEK or Strategic Plan for Village Development Program. This program, which was designed to deliver a people-centred approach, was jointly designed by the GOPP with assistance a number of UNDP, World Bank and other advisors. It drew heavily from past approaches to participatory planning and village development which were pioneered by Papuan NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s as well as by projects by BP Tangguh and the USAID Perform Project AFP3.

The main elements of the RESPEK program include:

- The provision of block grants of Rp.100 million for every village in Papua Province commencing in 2007, with communities responsible for planning, implementing and managing the use of grants;
- Intensive, effective and continuous facilitation support for village communities;
- Improving village and district level government capacity;
- Development of technical support services programs which are based at the community level with full community participation, and;
- Strong coordination between government, non-government and donor agencies working at the village level.

The national government has supported the RESPEK program, linking it with the national flagship program for poverty reduction, the PNPM Mandiri or National Program for Self-Reliant Community Development, and rolled it out across both provinces. PNPM Mandiri program represents a major scaling-up of the Kecamatan (District) Development Program (KDP), through which the World Bank and the GOI had been trialling what they called a Community-Driven Development of CDD approach to rural infrastructure and livelihoods projects.

The RESPEK-PNPM Mandiri approach, which is funded by a combination of World Bank loans and the Provincial and Regency level government's special autonomy funds, is being implemented in 32 provinces and 363 Regencies. In Papua, it has been trialled in almost 50,000 villages across Papua and West Papua Provinces. Implementation of RESPEK has been patchy, and is proving hardest in the highlands where logistical challenges are the greatest. In particular, there is the problem of safely delivering block grants to remote highland communities where access may involve treacherous journeys by foot, light aircraft or helicopter. More generally RESPEK is encountering difficulties recruiting, training, motivating and supervising a large number of village and district level facilitators. Even though these facilitators have been trained in PRA and other participatory planning tools, the perceived role of the facilitators tends to remain as data gatherers, report writers and ultimately proxies for the communities in the planning process.

There has been considerable critique of RESPEK & PNPM in the press and a review of such documents as well as discussions with key stakeholders would suggest that RESPEK has run into the same troubles that plagued their predecessors, the World Bank KDP and USAID PERFORM project. The patchy performance of KDP and PERFORM, like that of RESPEK, stems from facilitators being recruited from outside the villages, the lack of accountability, from the poor quality training of staff, poor supervision and mentoring, and from PRA methods being largely used as a data collection tool with no analysis, reflective learning and near no community participation. RESPEKs top heavy planning ensures development functions are carried out by Government Technical Service units rather than by district governments and so sectoral interests dominate local interests. RESPEK has also been effected by a lack of planning coordination, both horizontally between government technical services and the Regency Planning Body, and vertically. The project culture itself, where routine service delivery is very poor, is a direct result of travel allowances and profits derived from sub-contracting arrangements and project procurements being an important adjunct to the small salaries of many local government officials.

Furthermore, according to the guidelines of the RESPEK program, the village block grants were to be spent on health, education, economic development and village level infrastructure, but in practice the vast majority was spent on infrastructure and the smallest percentage on education and training or economic development activities. In other words, the village governments display a strong bias towards physical "projects" as opposed to less tangible investments in human resources or improving their means of production. Whilst RESPEK, like other forms of government assistance are designed to help poor communities, they often have the effect of undermining them through accelerating dependency. As rural communities become accustomed to a significantly increased flow of government aid money, in the absence of adequate control mechanisms, these funds become handouts which can often lead to jealousy and conflict in the process.

Beyond RESPEK and the MRP's agendas, development trajectories in Papua are highly diverse and largely incoherent. Just as the national goals of peace, democratization and human welfare are undermined by the government's drive for natural resources, so too are the policies and programs of the Provincial Governors undermined by the lack of planning coordination and competing interests between government agencies, provinces and regencies. This has led to poorly planned and unregulated infrastructure development and a dash to extract resources without thinking through the social and environmental impacts.

## Box 5 – The New Papua Development Strategy

1. **People-centred approach** focusing on building peace and prosperity through delivering tangible improvements in terms of nutrition, health, education, housing, economic development and village water, irrigation, energy, telecommunications & transportation infrastructure to all villages across Papua.
2. **RESPEK** or the Strategic Plan for Village Development – a program designed to deliver the people-centred approach through.
  - The provision of block grants of Rp.100 million for every village in Papua Province commencing in 2007, with communities responsible for planning, implementing and managing the use of grants.
  - Intensive, effective and continuous facilitation support for village communities.
  - Improving village and district level government capacity.
  - Development of technical support services programs which are based at the community level with full community participation.
  - Strong coordination between government, non-government and donor agencies working at the village level.
3. Development and implementation of **sustainable forest resources management** through:
  - Recognizing that all natural forests in Papua belong to the indigenous Papuan people's, not the Indonesian State.
  - Enacting a moratorium on existing commercial forestry licences (HPHs) except companies involved in community-based logging;
  - Enacting a moratorium on the export of logs / round wood from Papua;
  - Development of community-based forest industries.
  - Establishment and development of plantation forests.
  - Development of conservation reserves to maintain environmental services.
  - Strengthening the institutional capacity of the people and the state.
  - Development of non-timber forest products.
4. Creation of an attractive environment for **investment and trade** through:
  - Implementation of a single service point approach to help expedite arrangements by investors;
  - Tax relief / Free trade zones (KAPET);
  - Streamlining of licensing through shortening and simplifying procedures;
  - Ensuring availability of a well educated and appropriately trained local workforce.
  - Cooperation and support from indigenous / customary communities in the form of *equity participation*;
  - Creating security conditions conducive to investment;
  - Pro-active and proportional investment promotions;
  - Formation of Natural Resources Management Body in Papua as a resource and information centre, to coordinate the sustainable exploitation of Papua's natural resources, and to support spatial planning functions so as to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development activities in Papua.
5. **RESPIIM** or the Strategic Plan for Macro-Infrastructure Development, which would develop macro-infrastructure that significantly supports economic development, alleviation of regional isolation, and improvement in quality of life through:
  - Construction of strategic, integrated and high quality land, sea and air transportation infrastructure using a *commodity based and community based strategic infrastructure* approach;
  - Construction of telecommunications infrastructure connecting all parts of Papua with the World – including construction of satellite launching facilities (in Biak);
  - Construction of clean drinking water facilities for all, and irrigation infrastructure to support large scale agricultural production;
  - Construction of a mega (10 terrawat) -hydroelectric scheme on the Mamberamo River;
  - Construction of alternative energy generation facilities – such as hydro-electric, wind, solar and bio-fuels;
  - Construction of major port facilities in Biak (northern region) and Timika (southern region) to function as *export processing zone* and *free-trade zone* for the export and import of goods and services;
  - Construction and development of international airports in Biak, Jayapura and Timika;
  - Positioning of macro-infrastructure development within the context of efforts to develop direct export trade.
6. Creation of **good governance** in Papua Province, through:
  - Promoting clean, professional, democratic, fair and shrewd governance;
  - Orientation of government towards the wellbeing of communities throughout all corners of Papua;
  - Reversal of budgetary structures to become a pyramidal structure with the largest portion allocated for the direct and indirect needs of the people;
  - Reforming bureaucracies to promote professionalism, dedication and the provision of direct services to remote communities;
  - Exposing and eradicating corruption, collusion and nepotism through improving procurement systems, supervision and law enforcement, and the wellbeing and professionalism of government employees.

**Source:** Papua Province Medium Term Development Plan / Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM) Provinsi Papua 2006-2011

Both the expansion of oil palm estates, and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) programs are high on the agenda in Papua. REDD programs are concerned with carbon trading but, from the point of view of many indigenous people, are likely to manifest as a new form of natural resource exploitation and potential indigenous marginalization. A recent review of REDD highlights that while there is a growing recognition among many governments that indigenous peoples and local communities need to

be consulted and their rights addressed, existing intergovernmental proposals on decisions on REDD contain no clear commitments to address rights and equity issues. It is also noted that although new international forest and climate funds like the UN REDD Programme have pledged to uphold the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and to apply a rights-based approach, they seem reluctant to condition REDD funds on rights recognition and they lack effective oversight and accountability mechanisms. Scrutiny of the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility finds that its own rules that require prior consultation with forest peoples have not been applied in its early operations as governments developing REDD plans for the Bank have so far failed to properly involve forest peoples.

## 4.6 Review of Project Implementation

The CDPD process was planned to be implemented according to a linear process involving six stages and 19 steps (see box 6). However, in the course of implementation several steps overlapped whereas others were altered or omitted.

The following section provides an outline of the implementation of the PIPE Program, which has been assembled by the evaluator from various project documents and the accounts of various PIPE personnel and Pilot Program Participants. The main findings regarding the progress and effectiveness of these activities are presented in section 5.3.

### Box 6 Steps of the CDPD Process

#### Stage 1 – Setting the Institutional Framework

- Step 1 - Multi-stakeholder CDPD orientation
- Step 2 – Identification of government and civil society partners
- Step 3 - Selection of partner communities
- Step 4 - Identification of partner community organizations
- Step 5 - Training of community organizations on CDPD
- Step 6 - Selection of community development facilitators
- Step 7 - Training of community development facilitators

#### Stage 2 - Community Baseline Survey

- Step 8 - Community baseline data collection
- Step 9 - Community resource mapping
- Step 10 – Linking baseline data to community needs

#### Stage 3 – Community Action Planning

- Step 11 – Preparation of community action plans for village development and poverty reduction
- Step 12 – Conduct of feasibility studies on specific activities

#### Stage 4 – Implementation of community action plans

- Step 13- Determining counterpart funding arrangements
- Step 14 – Follow-up training of community organizations and facilitators
- Step 15 – Community implementation of planned activities

#### Stage 5 - Participatory self-evaluation and external evaluation

- Step 16 - Community monitoring and self-evaluation
- Step 17 - External evaluation

#### Stage 6 – Linking community experience to the policy level

- Step 18 – Linking community experience to policy and programme development
- Step 19 – Project scaling –up

**Source:** ILO-PIPE Annual Progress Report 2006

## **i. PIPE Program Establishment Phase (January – February 2006)**

### **Establishment of the Legal & Institutional Framework**

At the national level, ILO-PIPE's institutional framework included a National Advisory Committee (NAC) composed of representatives from the State Ministries of Manpower and Transmigration, Accelerated Development of the Poor Regions, and Social Affairs, as well as ILO's traditional non-governmental partners including the National Employers' Association (APINDO) and National Workers' Associations (SPSI/SBSI/KSPI). The intended role of NAC was to provide guidance for the project in terms of policy direction and national development priorities, as well as to facilitate the linking of the experience and lessons learned from the project to national policy development.

At the provincial level ILO-PIPE's legal and policy framework was outlined through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Provincial Government of Papua in November 2005. This MOU referred specifically to Papuan Special Autonomy Law and its emphasis on the importance of active participation of indigenous communities in the village development process. According to the original project design, the project would be implemented under the ownership and responsibility of two Project Steering Committees<sup>5</sup> (PSC) in Papua (Jayapura) and West Papua (Manokwari), and these would consist of representatives of the Provincial and regency governments as well as indigenous organizations, including at least one indigenous woman representative on each of the PSCs, though due to the paucity of detailed documentary evidence, I am unable to determine whether this requirement was fulfilled.

The PSC's role was to facilitate project implementation activities however, with the exception of several people within the BPMD who maintained an active interest in ILO-PIPE throughout the 3 years, most of these stakeholders did not maintain their interest in the program for long. Beyond early activities such as the selection of pilot project sites, selecting CDF's, and negotiating ILO-Local Government co-funding arrangements for additional community development facilitators (CDFs), the consultant was informed that interest in PIPE from most parties waned.

The PIPE team in Papua were also provided backstopping support on financial and administrative aspects of project management by staff in ILO's Jakarta Office.

### **Establishment of the Project Implementation Team & Office**

Having made the initial decision that the ILO-PIPE Program team would directly implement the project, it was originally envisaged that the program staff would consist of four professional staff, including an international expert (Chief Technical Adviser/CTA), an administrative secretary and a driver based in Jayapura and a Provincial Project Coordinator (PPC) to be based in Manokwari. After delays in the recruitment of the PPC, it was decided that this position would be split into two Program Assistant (PA) positions, with one based in each province, although the PA in West Papua Province was only able to work on a part time basis. In 2008, based upon the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation, additional human resources including the reinstatement of the PPC role in West Papua Province, and the addition of a Training Advisor in Papua, were added to strengthen PIPE's capacity to provide adequate facilitative support in West Papua Province, and to strengthen efforts to promote the CDPD methodology to a broader audience.

This core team was to be supported by a number of local consultants including lecturers from UNIPA, UNCEN and local CSOs, who were contracted on a short term basis (up to six months) to provide local expertise in facilitating training and skills development activities, conducting PRA, anthropological and gender analysis studies, and even providing direct field facilitation support.

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<sup>5</sup> In Papua and West Papua Provinces, the Project Steering Committees (PSCs) were made up of members from the Provincial Planning Board (BAPPEDA), Provincial Manpower Service (Disnaker), Provincial Social Affairs Service (*Dinas Sosial*), the Rural Community Empowerment Body (BPMD), the Papuan Branch of the National Employers' Association (APINDO), the Papuan Chamber of Commerce (KADIN-Papua), and the local branch of the national trade union (SPSI-Papua).



The original program design also included four pilot project managers who would support program activities in each of four pilot districts, and a total of twenty extension workers or CDFs (five in each of the 4 pilot districts), with at least two extension workers (40%) in each pilot project area to be women.

As it eventuated, the social affairs services in Manokwari Regency and Jayapura Municipality funded the inclusion of an additional 16 CDFs in Kebar/Senopi, Tanah Rubuh and Muara Tami Districts, whereas the four pilot program manager positions were combined with the CDF positions, with one CDF in each target area being nominated as CDF team leader. The total number of female CDFs was only seven, or slightly less than 20%, falling well short of the original target of 40% female CDFs.

## **ii. Setting Up the PIPE Program in Target Communities (February – March 2006)**

### **Selecting Pilot Areas**

The PIPE Program planned to establish demonstrative pilot programs in four districts, and work through existing IPOs. PIPE gave control of the pilot program area selection to the PSC, and while PIPE suggested the PSC base the selection of pilot program districts on the basis of accessibility, tribal composition, level of poverty and economic potential, and most importantly the existence of local IPOs, the basis of the final selection is unclear. Most notably, despite the proliferation of IPOs in Papua over the last 15 years, none of the selected pilot program areas had existing IPOs, or at least not ones which conformed with PIPE's pre-determined vision of working with IPOs representing indigenous communities at the level of the administrative district. This suggests that either the aims of PIPE and the criteria for selection of pilot program areas was not adequately conveyed, or that members of the PSC based their selection on other priorities which may not have been aligned with PIPE's intentions.

### **Socialization Visits**

Once the pilot program districts had been selected by the PSCs, PIPE's CTA made brief visits to each of the four pilot program areas. This was done with the purpose of socializing the CDPD approach, and to facilitate the initial formation of IPOs and selection of CDFs.

### **Formation of Indigenous Peoples' Organizations (IPOs)**

Whilst PIPE intended to work with established IPOs, when it was discovered that no IPOs which suited PIPE's vision existed in the selected target areas, a decision was made to instigate the establishment of IPOs. These IPOs were based on existing tribal structures and customary institutions, but the formalization of hitherto informal institutions based on oral traditions is by no means a straightforward task, and as within any community, the establishment of such organisations will no doubt exclude certain segments or members of the community and could potentially lead to unhealthy competition or conflict with other existing organizations. Furthermore, a number community member's, including some who were very actively involved in the formation of these organizations, referred to their own IPOs as *Lembaga Adat ILO* (the ILO's customary organisation). Being identified with the ILO, this term implies that communities felt a limited sense of ownership of these IPOs.

### **Selection of community development facilitators (CDFs)**

The selection of the 20 CDFs funded by PIPE was in the hands of the IPOs, whereas the additional 16 CDFs were selected by the social affairs services. It was planned that CDFs would be selected according to a set of criteria provided by the CTA including a minimum senior high school level of education and that they should come from, and wish to serve, their respective communities. PIPE funded stipends for five CDFs in each pilot program area whereas the regency level Social Affairs Services funded an additional five CDFs in Tanah Rubuh and Muara Tami and 6 additional CDFs in Kebar. According to interviews with CDFs and other community members, we can conclude that while facilitators remained on the books, by the third year about 75% of facilitators had become inactive. Of the seven female CDFs at least three (slightly under 50%) were active until the end, whereas the drop out rate of males was higher.

## **iii. Basic Training of CDFs & Consultants (Late March 2006)**

Once the tasks of selecting pilot program districts, partner IPOs and CDFs had been accomplished, the project saw the intensive preliminary training on the community-driven participatory development

approach to poverty reduction and village level development. Two initial training workshops were held in Jayapura (20-25 March 2006) and Manokwari (27 March – 01 April 2006). These were attended by 36 CDFs as well as four university lecturers (who would supervise the community baseline surveys), and several representatives from local government services. A review of the training materials indicates that this training was quite theoretical and didactic, and with materials covered including eleven modules spread across 26 sessions, each of 1-2 hours duration, the workload and learning curve was probably too heavy for most participants. Most of the training materials were delivered by the CTA, with the aid of translators, whereas the gender mainstreaming topic was delivered by Ms. Yvonne de Quelyoe, a gender specialist from UNCEN, and in the Jayapura training the topic on culture and development was delivered by Mr. Max Mirino, a senior indigenous Papuan professional.

#### **iv. Community Baseline Surveys (April - June 2006)**

Upon completing their initial training in the CDPD approach, the CDFs, under the supervision of consultants from UNIPA and UNCEN, returned to their villages with the task of conducting community baseline surveys. The community baseline surveys were intended to be a participatory activity, whereby the CDFs would seek to engage a broad cross-section of members of the pilot program communities to participate in applying PRA tools in order to collect required data for community action planning and monitoring purposes. This process was also intended as an on-the-job learning process for the CDFs and the initial step in the reflective learning process for the broader community. This process is said to have taken about three months to complete, and the final baseline survey reports were not submitted until 2007. However, there is a lack of documentation of the baseline survey process, or any subsequent evaluations thereof, and the only extremely brief account from the reports of the CDF Team Leader in Kebar / Senopi indicate that only 3 or 4 days were actually dedicated to baseline survey activities during this period and that far more time and effort was spent on socializing the program and the CDPD approach, and community action planning, though presumably there was a high degree of overlap between these activities.

As the mid-term evaluation pointed out, the outputs of the community baseline surveys were, “..of average quality by local standards, lacked vital socio-economic, cultural and historical data and did not consider gender or conflict issues. As such they were deemed unusable for monitoring purposes, and clearly were not used as a tool in a process of collective learning which is central to the CDPD approach.” The PIPE CTA also freely admitted that these, and other consultant reports, were not adequate for PIPE’s intended purposes, and that program staff and CDFs were forced to fill in the gaps as the program proceeded.

#### **Community Resource Mapping**

Participatory resource mapping was originally planned as part of the community baseline studies, but there was no evidence of either detailed resource mapping or PRA sketch mapping activities in the project documents viewed by the evaluator. Furthermore, the significant gaps and paucity of detail in the baseline survey data relating to local resources suggests that if mapping activities were undertaken at all, they did not effectively focus on the identification of the communities’ resource potential.

Security of resource tenure was identified as a crucial aspect of indigenous rights and conflict mitigation in Papua, and early project documents indicate an intention for PIPE to address resource tenure and natural resource management issues. However, by the mid-point of the program it was considered that detailed resource tenure mapping, such as using accurate topographical base maps, GPS and extensive community consensus building processes, was too large and sensitive an undertaking to be addressed within the context of PIPE.

#### **v. Community Action Planning**

Program documents indicate that community action planning was planned and implemented as a separate stage of the CDPD process following on from the completion of the baseline surveys. However, as indicated above the community baseline and action planning processes overlapped, with more effort apparently being invested in the action planning process rather than the baseline survey. At this stage of the process the CDFs, under the supervision of consultants, guided other community members through a participatory analysis and interpretation of the baseline data in order to identify development problems and possible actions which could be taken to overcome them. Among the important objectives of the activity was to

help the community members develop the capacity to recognize opportunities for poverty reduction and village level development in the variety of resources found within their traditional lands. Based on these analyses a community action plan was developed by each of the partner IPOs according to a planning matrix supplied by PIPE.

It is important to note that whereas PIPE conducted community action planning through the IPOs at the district level, most government and NGO participatory planning methodologies develop action plans at the village level, with some seeking to integrate village plans into district, regency or tribal level planning processes.

## **vi. Prioritization, Preparation & Review of Specific Proposals**

Once the community action plans had been completed, processes were conducted to select priority activities and develop more detailed plans and proposals for specific activities. At this stage of the process major problems emerged, due to confusion over the guidelines and procedures for the development and review of proposals. Whilst PIPE attempted to establish a clear guidelines for proposals and procedures for their review by the PIPE PAs and Admin Secretary, many community members pre-empted this stage by developing their own proposals, which were usually incompatible with PIPE's focus (ie. they largely focused on material assistance and infrastructure development rather than training and livelihoods) and usually entailed unrealistically large budgets.

There was the expectation that, as with many government programs, PIPE would provide development assistance in the form of direct cash payments instead of the training, equipment and materials that PIPE had intended. In Kebar and Tanah Rubuh, an organization called the West Papua Interest Association<sup>6</sup> (WPIA), are reported to have played a major role in this miscommunication. It was reported that the WPIA informed community members of PIPE's intention to give cash to those with a good proposal and for a fee, the WPIA were willing to help people develop proposals. In response, PIPE suspended the proposal review and funding process until they were able to resolve the misunderstanding and reorientate peoples' perceptions.

When it became clear that PIPE would not be willing to fund these proposals, there was anger on the part of the community who had paid membership fees and admin fees to the WPIA in the belief their efforts and fees would be rewarded in the form of ILO funds. At first the WPIA seem to have been able to capitalize on this, by revealing the size of PIPE's entire budget (information which they had been able to access via the internet), claiming that this money had actually been promised to their organization during a preliminary meeting with the ILO and NHCR in 2001, and asserting that PIPE was misappropriating money intended for the communities. However, through a series of meetings PIPE personnel were able to clarify the situation and after several months delay, the process of reviewing and implementing proposals could resume on the basis of a clearer understanding of the programs intentions and procedures.

Similar issues also arose in Papua Province, but due to the fact that PIPE maintained a more continuous and intensive field presence in Papua Province, these problems do not appear to have been as acute and program personnel could resolve the impasse more easily.

## **vii. Livelihoods Skills Training**

Throughout late 2007 and early 2008 PIPE, through the partner IPOs, funded a range of livelihoods training activities in the pilot program areas. The training topics were based upon the needs identified through the community action planning process and included training on improved production of agricultural crops (including vegetables, bananas, peanuts, rice, cocoa and coffee), freshwater aquaculture and off-shore

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<sup>6</sup> The WPIA was formed by a group former Papuan separatists and refugees, led by Karel Waromi and John Jambuani, who were repatriated from PNG through the agencies of the UNHCR in 2000. In 2001 representatives of the WPIA meet with ILO personnel during the initial planning mission to Papua, and statements made during this meeting seem to have been taken as promises, which ultimately led to the problems encountered by PIPE during 2007. At one point it was claimed that the WPIA's membership included around 30,000 people, including many of the people in Kebar and Tanah Rubuh and some members in the target areas in Jayapura as well. This organization was later renamed the West Papua Indigenous Organization or WPIO and on their web site they claim to have a special relationship with the ILO and other UN Agencies.

fishing techniques, animal husbandry, post-harvest processing skills (such as coconut oil and palm sugar production and cooking) as well as training in entrepreneurship and cooperatives management.

In most cases the skills training activities were delivered by local government services personnel (including the agriculture, estate crops, fisheries and cooperatives services), usually over a brief period of just one or two days. The Government services delivering these training activities considered their approach as participatory yet in practice, they used a didactic extensions approach, whereby farmers were expected to receive and adopt generalized recommendations that had been formulated by specialists from outside the community. In a few cases, the IPOs identified local experts from within their own communities and gave them the opportunity to apply their skills in the training of others.

According to the ILO-PIPE final project report over 2000 community members across the four pilot program areas attended these training activities, however, based upon the data supplied (see box 7), and considering that many individuals attended more than one training activity, the actual number of participants is likely to be lower.

### Box 7 Livelihood skills Training Activities conducted by the PIPE Program

Livelihood Skills Training Activities	Pilot Project Districts / Number of Training Participants									
	Muara Tami		Kemtuk Gresik & Gresik Selatan		Tanah Rubuh		Kebar & Senopi		Total	
	Tot.	Female	Tot.	Female	Tot.	Female	Tot.	Female	Total	Female
1. Improved agriculture production (Vegetables, Bananas, Peanuts, rice)	152	19 (12.5%)	-	-	45	2 (4.5%)	39	12 (31%)	236	33 (14%)
2. Improved inland/deep sea fishing	27	-	-	-	110	4 (4%)	-	-	137	4 (3%)
3. Improved animal husbandry ( hogs, cows)	20	-	-	-	23	14 (52%)	-	-	43	14 (33%)
4. Improved fruit/food processing (coconut oil, native delicacies)	-	-	-	-	61	61 (100%)	-	-	61	61 (100%)
5. Improved fruit production (cocoa, coffee, etc.)	-	-	829	34 (4%)	74	4 (5%)	-	-	903	38 (4%)
6. Improved cooperatives management and entrepreneurship (consumer, production and marketing)	51	26 (51%)	-	-	232	27 (12%)	397	70 (18%)	680	123 (18%)
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>45 (18%)</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>34 (4%)</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>112 (21%)</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>82 (19%)</b>	<b>2,060</b>	<b>273 (13%)</b>

Source: ILO-PIPE Annual Progress Report 2007.

The PIPE Final Progress Report claims that: “Out of these training activities, participants have created for themselves a corresponding number of improved self-employment opportunities, which *have in turn provided many of them greater income and potential for getting out of poverty*. Direct beneficiaries have demonstrated how, on the basis of the programme interventions, they have increased their income by an average 35% using their pre-programme income as baseline.” Such a large increase in incomes is found to be unlikely given that the program did not effect any changes to the market chain. Whilst program participants reported a range of benefits in the form of new skills, organizational capacity, material assistance, it was not suggested that the program had impacted significantly on their incomes.

### viii. Material Support for Livelihoods Activities

Whilst it has become common practice for government services to pay community members for attendance of training activities, in the case of activities funded through PIPE, cash incentives were not provided. Instead packages of equipment and materials were provided as a form of incentive to encourage community members to participate in training and other activities. This included planting materials, hand tools, grass cutters, chainsaws, drying facilities, post harvest processing and cooking utensils, rice hullers, coconut grinders, fishing equipment, several boats and outboard motors, a small pick-up truck, and in Kemtuk Gresik PIPE even partially funded the construction of an office building for the *Dewan Konsltasi Dumtru*.

These material inputs were all provided on the basis of sound economic arguments and on the premise that these items would be managed as common property through the IPOs, thereby serving “as a means of reviving the traditional concepts of common facility and strengthening collective self-reliance”. However, despite efforts to establish adequate mechanisms to manage the new resources on a collective basis, in some cases (most notably Tanah Rubuh) the tools, and especially the most valuable items such as chainsaws, quickly passed into the “care” of individuals and this led to jealousy. Of greatest concern was the provision of a pick-up truck for the Tanah Rubuh community. By the end of the project, community members had not been able to decide who should have responsibility for this vehicle and as a means of diffusing conflict, had requested that the PIPE officer in Manokwari manage the vehicle on their behalf on an interim basis.

### ix. Organizational Capacity Building

During late 2007 and 2008 PIPE also conducted a range of formal and informal training activities aimed at establishing and developing the capacity of community based organizations in the target areas, including the four partner IPOs, as well as a community cooperative and three branches thereof in Kebar/Senopi, a women’s association in Kemtuk Gresik, and a number of other women’s, farmer’s and fishermen’s self-help groups. According to project documents, these organizations were all formed upon the initiative of the local communities rather than that of PIPE, but as has been mentioned above, there were strong indications that at least some community members viewed these organizations as vessels for channelling material aid from the ILO rather than the self-help organizations they were intended to be.

### x. Entrepreneurship Training

Entrepreneurship training activities were conducted based on the ILO’s Gender and Entrepreneurship Together (GET Ahead) materials. This process commenced with an entrepreneurship training of trainers (TOT) which was conducted in Jayapura, in April 2007 and was attended by eighteen participants coming from local government, NGOs, Universities and PIPE’s partner IPOs. Upon completion of this training, the new trainers, were given the opportunity to apply what they learned through conducting three consecutive Training of Entrepreneurs (TOEs) workshops, each of four days duration, for active and potential micro-entrepreneurs in the Muara Tami, Kemtuk Gresi and Tanah Rubuh.

#### Box 8 GET AHEAD Training of Trainers (TOT) & Entrepreneurs (TOE)

No	Activity	Location	Total Number of Participants	Number of Female Participants
1	Orientation of TOT GET AHEAD	Jayapura	26	13 (50%)
2	TOT GET AHEAD	Jayapura	20	8 (40%)
3	TOE GET AHEAD	Jagrang, Kemtuk Gresi	27	11 (40%)
4	TOE GET AHEAD	Skouw Mabo, Muara Tami	22	14 (63%)
5	TOE GET AHEAD	Tanah Rubuh, Manokwari	26	13 (50%)
<b>Total Participants Enrolled in Entrepreneurship Trainings</b>			<b>121</b>	<b>59 (50%)</b>

Source: ILO-PIPE Annual Progress Report 2007.

During the first two TOEs, the new trainers were guided by an experienced entrepreneurship consultant and trainer, whereas during the third TOE, which was held in Tanah Rubuh, the training was conducted by the local trainers with very limited supervision or support from the consultant. Participatory evaluations conducted at the conclusion of the trainings indicated that the participants were generally satisfied with this training.

#### **xi. Gender Mainstreaming Activities**

PIPE sought to test an approach to gender mainstreaming through strengthening the economic productivity of women and thereby raise their status within the existing social structures. As such there were few formal training or awareness raising activities, instead opportunities were sought to facilitate informal dialogue on the gendered aspects of development throughout the CDPD process. Notwithstanding this approach, the community baseline and Indigenous Peace Building Mechanism studies conducted by PIPE consultants and CDFs, lacked information or analysis about gender issues. Whilst the key gender issues were presumably covered in the gender analysis studies that were conducted in Papua and West Papua Provinces by the gender expert from UNCEN<sup>7</sup> in late 2007, based on the finding that gender was not seriously accounted for in other key studies suggests that PIPE's focus on gender mainstreaming was quite patchy.

#### **xii. Peace building mechanisms**

Whilst peace building was one of the programs major objectives, PIPE displayed, no doubt due to political sensibilities, a high degree of caution in relation to this aspect of the program. As such, peace building activities largely focused on strengthening customary institutions through the organizational structure of the IPOs. In late 2007 and early 2008, PIPE funded a team of social scientists from UNCEN to conduct research into indigenous peace building mechanisms in each of the four target areas. Unfortunately this research was not conducted in a participatory manner, the results were not integrated back into community or government level processes, and the outcomes have limited practicality. In the case of Tanah Rubuh for instance, the key recommendation that constructing new customary meeting houses will resolve the persistent problems of sorcery and pay-back killings is simplistic in the extreme.

#### **xiii. Establishing Post-Program Micro-Finance Support for the IPOs**

During the final six months of the program ILO-PIPE began establishing a USD\$110,000 block grant arrangement for local micro-finance institutions. Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) Phidectama in Jayapura, and the Credit Union Mambuin in Manokwari are scheduled to administer a revolving loans scheme in each pilot program district after completion of the program. At the time of the final evaluation these schemes had not been activated.

#### **xiv. Promotion of CDPD in the context of Papua**

The planned approach to promote the adoption of the CDPD approach in village development programs throughout Papua involved trialling the approach under Papuan conditions throughout PIPE Phase I, before mainstreaming the CDPD approach, as well as expected innovations in Gender mainstreaming and peace mechanisms, with government and civil society organizations during PIPE Phase II.

The mid-term evaluation questioned the efficacy of this approach and urged PIPE to avail itself of opportunities to promote CDPD and build an important political support base for taking the CDPD approach further by effectively engaging with a much wider range of government and non-government stakeholders.

During 2008 PIPE was successful in building stronger relationships with the Village Empowerment Office (BPMD), who are responsible for managing the RESPEK-PNPM Program. This has created opportunities for

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<sup>7</sup> I did not have access to the report from this study



promoting CDPD and GET AHEAD training tools through short training seminars for the facilitators in the RESPEK-PNPM Program.

PIPE also strengthened relations with the UNDP, which has similarly created opportunities from promoting the CDPD approach through planned involvement in the training of UNV facilitators as part of the UN Joint Program in the Central Highlands in 2009.

Furthermore, in late 2008 PIPE personnel and consultants conducted a rapid assessment of human resource development in Papua as the first stage in the formulation of a Papua Human Resource Development Strategy on behalf of the Government of Papua Province. It is envisaged that the development of this HRD strategy will provide further opportunities to promote CDPD, gender mainstreaming and human security issues on the Papuan development agenda.

On the other hand PIPE's engagement with Papuan NGOs, the MRP and other stakeholders who could play a very important role in adapting / improving and promoting CDPD in the context of Papua, remains limited. The PIPE CTA has met with leaders of the MRP and a number of key civil society leaders, but in most cases there was little follow-up on these meetings.

#### **xv. Raising Awareness and Facilitating Social Dialogue on Indigenous Rights**

Through the PIPE Program the ILO also facilitated the participation of a number of indigenous and government leaders in international fora on indigenous peoples rights and development issues. This included:

- i) One CDF attended the 2006 conference of the UN Permanent on Indigenous Issues in New York;
- ii) A representative of Governor of Papua's office attended a workshop on ILO Local Economic Development in Thailand in 2006;
- iii) Several representatives from key partner agencies in the government (e.g. Ministry of Labor and Transmigration, Department of Social Welfare, Commission on Human Rights, etc. have attended a workshop on ILO Convention No.169 in Turin, Italy in 2007;
- iv) An indigenous professional from UNCEN (UPT Loka Budaya) Papua attended a workshop on ILO Convention No. 169 in Geneva in 2008; and
- v) Another indigenous leader from Papua attended a workshop on indigenous peoples' rights in Geneva in 2008.

## 5. Findings of the Final Evaluation

The principle findings from the evaluation presented here are based on information reviewed, and observations and communications throughout the evaluation period, but represent the opinion of the evaluator.

### 5.1 Overall Relevance & Strategic Fit

**i. Decent Work Country Programme** - In what way has the project, as designed, contributed to the realization of Indonesia's Decent Work Country Programme, particularly Priorities 2: Employment Creation for Poverty Reduction and livelihood Recovery?

The PIPE Program was one of around a dozen projects managed by the ILO Jakarta Office (as well as a number of programs in East Timor), which were planned and implemented within the Indonesia Decent Work Country Program (IDWCP). As mentioned in section 4.1, this framework was developed by the ILO in collaboration with the GOI and other tripartite partners and is centred around supporting Indonesia to move towards to an integrated development strategy built on four strategic pillars. In geographical terms the IDWCP also displays four main focus areas:

- *National / international* level programs, primarily labour law reform and enforcement programs, particularly relating to child labour and labour migration issues;
- High population areas in *Java and Indonesia's inner provinces* including Jakarta, East Java, West Java, Banten, Bali, etc., where social dialogue, youth employment and training, avian influenza and HIV/AIDS programs are the main focus;
- Tsunami affected (and conflict afflicted) areas in *Aceh and North Sumatera Provinces*, where the ILO has been involved in a major labour intensive infrastructure development project, as well as Education and Skills Training for Youth (EAST);
- Poor and conflict afflicted areas in *Eastern Indonesia*, primarily Papua and West Papua Provinces, which has been the sole focus of the PIPE Program, but also including East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and South Sulawesi, where the EAST & HIV/AIDS programs have also been implemented.

The ILO's prioritization of Papua and West Papua Provinces is highly consistent with the national development agenda (see below) and the stated priorities of the IDWCP. It is also consistent with the evidence that Papua is one of the most impoverished, conflict-prone, and HIV/AIDS effected regions in Indonesia. Moreover, with its incredible degree of indigenous diversity and complex political-economic challenges to indigenous rights, Papua should clearly remain a key focus area for the ILO in Indonesia.

Notwithstanding the high relevance of PIPE to Indonesia's Decent Work Country Programme, its application in the context of the conditions of Papua is less clear. The educational, geographic and socio-economic circumstances of the majority of indigenous Papuan, offers few opportunities for productive employment beyond their own, largely subsistence orientated enterprises and as such, precludes efforts to achieve the DWCP priorities. For instance, priority one, which relates to labour exploitation, is of limited relevance since that child labour and labour migration are very minor issues in Papua. For most indigenous Papuans, labour exploitation remains a minor issue as very few Papuans have employment in either the formal or informal sectors. For the most, paid employment opportunities are almost entirely restricted to low paid, and usually casual or temporary, work in the extractive industries (logging, mining, non-timber forest products, etc.). The exception here lies with government services, where labour conditions are already reasonably well regulated. The ILO then faces certain difficulties translating the IDCWP within the context of indigenous Papua.

Whilst PIPE did contribute to the realization of the priorities around 'Employment Creation for Poverty Reduction and livelihood Recovery', given the aforementioned labour market realities, PIPE's apparent potential to contribute to the DWCP is very modest, and especially if considered in quantitative terms. The very small size of the population, the limited relevance of many of the priorities, and the cultural and geographical constraints to market access all challenge meeting the goals of the DWCP. In order for a program such as PIPE to have any appreciable impact on employment creation in the rural sector (including most indigenous communities) it needs to be more focused on the development of key market sectors,

develop greater technical capacity in relation to those sectors and advocate policies that will support greater market access and participation for indigenous people.

For instance, to better meet priority 2 on Employment Creation for Poverty Reduction & Livelihoods Recovery, entry points need to be key local commodities that have both significant economic potential and reasonably stable market conditions such as cacao, coffee, copra, and nutmeg. The ILO also need to link programs in Papua with a body that can analyse and resolve market, infrastructure and policy constraints to market access and socio-economic development amongst indigenous people.

If priority 3, which relates to Social Dialogue for Economic Growth & Principles and Rights at Work, was to be addressed it would need to look beyond the labour contexts more familiar to the ILO. Considering natural resource extraction is still the biggest contributor to Papua's economy, strengthening indigenous rights would involve working major companies operating in the mining, oil and gas, forestry and fisheries sectors. In Papua, it would be productive for the ILO to facilitate improvement in community development programs, employment, training and entrepreneurship programs for indigenous Papuans through strengthening best practices of corporate social responsibility of multi-national and national corporations.

*ii.* **ILO Convention No. 169 & UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples** - How well did the project link up to a broader emerging national interest to address the rights and welfare of indigenous people in Indonesia in line with ILO Convention No. 169 on indigenous peoples and tribal peoples and with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?

In line with the philosophical underpinnings of the program<sup>8</sup>, PIPE contained a number of core elements to advance the key issues facing indigenous people in Papua and Indonesia. For example, PIPE focused:

- on Gender mainstreaming Article 3 – regarding the equality of rights of indigenous men and women;
- on strengthening of IPOs supported the realization of Article 6 - that the ratifying states should establish means for the peoples concerned to develop their own institutions;
- on village-based vocational and entrepreneurship training programs , supported the realization of Article 22 - regarding special measures to promote voluntary participation of indigenous people in vocational training programmes, including the participation of indigenous peoples in the organisation and operation of special training programmes and facilities suited to their own needs;
- Through its primary methodology (CDPD), which focused on identifying, utilizing and developing existing potential at the village level, PIPE supported the realization of Article 23 - relating to recognition, strengthening and promotion of the traditional crafts, industries and activities as important factors in the maintenance of indigenous cultures and in their economic self-reliance and development;
- Through its focus on building dialog and understanding between indigenous and migrant communities it also supported the realization of Articles 30 & 31 – relating to the need to inform indigenous peoples about their rights and duties and educate the broader community, and particularly those living in close proximity to indigenous communities, with the object of eliminating prejudices that they may harbour in respect of these peoples.
- Through the proposed government capacity building interventions, which were largely scheduled to occur during Phase II (2009-2010) the program also intended to support measures towards the realization of Article 33, which requires governments to ensure that agencies or other appropriate mechanisms exist to administer the programmes affecting the peoples concerned and ensure that they have the means necessary for the proper fulfilment of the functions assigned to them.
- Through the planned development of micro and small enterprises and the establishment of cooperatives and other self-help groups the program aimed to generate alternative employment and income generation opportunities for indigenous peoples, which would contribute towards the

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<sup>8</sup> The PIPE Program is clearly and firmly founded on the principles, established through article 7 of the ILO Convention 169, that indigenous peoples have the right “to decide their own priorities for the process of development and to exercise control over their own economic, social and cultural development”. This article corresponds to Article 32 of the UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous people, which calls for the participation of indigenous peoples during all stages of development planning “to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources”.

realization of Article 20 – regarding recruitment opportunities and employment conditions for indigenous people.

The above list highlights how thoroughly PIPE planned its activities to advance the interest of indigenous rights and wellbeing. Through the PIPE Program the ILO has acted as an advocate of the rights of indigenous Papuans, and indigenous people in general. PIPE can also be seen as spearheading efforts to develop appropriate mechanisms to accommodate such rights within the government system for planning and delivering village development services.

Yet still, despite addressing key issues in relation to the emerging indigenous peoples' rights agenda in Papua and Indonesia, as has been stated in various sections of this report, the discrepancy between the goal and the output was vast. In sum, these discrepancies are due to PIPE staff not taking into account the lessons learned from pre-existing experiences in community development projects, underestimating the geographical, transportation and market access constraints in Papua and the way they undermine a project's positive impact on employment creation, or else stem from weak planning assumptions, under-resourcing etc.. Implementation limitations aside, PIPE remains valuable insofar as it remains the only development assistance program in Papua with an explicit focus on indigenous empowerment.

**iii. Relevance to the Papuan development agenda** - Has the project's planned strategy been responsive to the overall development agenda of Papua and West Papua defined by national and local governments?

The PIPE Program was highly compatible with the emerging national and provincial policy focus on the empowerment of indigenous people within the context of decentralization and accelerated regional economic growth. The PIPE intervention was also timely in the sense that it supported the strengthening of OTSUs during a window of opportunity, when the national government was highly supportive, thus making it harder for future governments to roll-back the right to self-determination / self-governance encapsulated within OTSUs, and other advancements in rights achieved since 1999.

Besides PIPE's strong linkages with the emerging Papuan agenda relating to the rights of indigenous people (described in the previous sub-section), PIPE's approach, objectives and principle methodology were also highly compatible with and supportive of key elements of the broader development agenda in Papua as defined by national and provincial government policies. PIPE's focus accords with the President's requirement that efforts to develop Papua be redoubled, whereas the program's immediate objectives relating to: a) Reducing poverty; b) Promoting gender equality; and c) Strengthening existing peace and development mechanisms involving indigenous peoples, resonate with the National Development Agenda. Furthermore, the overall approach and methodology applied can be seen as contributing to the realization of over half (or 17 of the 31) development priorities as defined in the National Medium-Term Development Plan.

PIPE's aims were relevant to the national and local agenda's for development in Papua insofar as they demonstrated the importance of ground up development through community organizations (IPOs or CBOs), sought to maximize participation of women through reduced gender barriers, utilized local knowledge and the provision of high quality and ongoing facilitative support services, and they sought to target key areas of weakness in the government and WB approaches. Indeed, by working from the margins of the mainstream government / WB development programs, the PIPE program had the potential to develop valuable tools, lessons and success stories for use in addressing key weaknesses in the larger and less easily adaptable programs.

## 5.2 Validity of Program Design

i. **Adaptation to local conditions** - Were the project's objectives and outputs relevant and realistic relative to the situation on the ground? Did revisions to the project's objectives and outputs help adapt it to the actual socio-economic, cultural and political condition in the project sites? Were the revised objectives and outputs relevant and realistic project deliverables?

The original design for the PIPE Program was developed following a short scoping visit to Papua in 2001 and 2005 and was largely based on experience gained and lessons learned from ILO-INDISCO programs in the Philippines. The underlying project logic, focusing on conflict mitigation through increased community participation in development processes, poverty alleviation and gender mainstreaming, was highly sound. As has been mentioned, the intervention was both strategic and timely.

At the same time, the original design was extremely ambitious. The goal of impacting dramatically on local livelihoods, including creating over 100 small enterprises and 100 cooperatives, thousands of jobs, increasing local incomes by 25%, and improved health care facilities in 100 villages is not feasible in Papua. Such livelihood targets are quite achievable in more densely populated and economically developed areas such as Java and parts of the Philippines, in Papua a low population density, the high costs of project implementation, and the limited availability of resources for the program render it unrealistic to expect such change.

Furthermore, the program design foresaw changes in attitudes and behaviour regarding gender and race, the establishment of effective gender mainstreaming and peace building mechanisms and their incorporation into government programs and village life through training programs involving thousands of government officers and indigenous and non-indigenous community members. Given that attitudes relating to gender and race are amongst the most deeply rooted in human populations, and given the low success rate of other organisations and programs who have tried to change cultural ways of thinking, such qualitative goals and especially in the short timeframe are unrealistic.

The objectives and outputs laid out in the original document were recognised to be overly ambitious and during 2006 the program design went through a series of revisions<sup>9</sup>. The majority of these revisions were superficial in nature, including the rewording of outputs and objectives<sup>10</sup>. Other, more substantive changes included the revision of outputs and indicators. This included the scaling back of most quantitative indicators by approximately 50% and the reworking certain indicators, such as “gender discrimination is eliminated”, to make them clearer or more realistic.

The greatest number of changes was made to objective 3, “*Strengthening mechanisms for peace and development*”. This objective was almost entirely rephrased and the overly ambitious outputs and indicators scaled-back. However, there do not appear to have been any changes to the overall approach to meet this objective and, furthermore, these activities were to occur in the planned Phase II, which has been planned from the outset of the program but as yet remains unfunded. Therefore, such changes have not had a significant impact on project implementation to date.

On the other hand, there are three minor revisions which have had a significant impact on the programs implementation. The first of these relates to the reduction of human resources as indicated by the removal of the 4 pilot project managers, which according to the original program design, were to be trained in CDPD and then be responsible for overseeing pilot program activities in the four pilot program areas. These positions were rolled into the CDF positions, with one CDF per district nominated as the CDF Team Leader. While the decision to delete these roles from the program design was presumably driven by cost considerations and in the belief that these roles could be covered by the other program personnel, consultants and the CDFs, this proved to be a poor decision because lack of adequately qualified and continuing facilitation support for the CDFs was an issue which seriously affected project implementation up until late 2007 (particularly in West Papua Province).

The second significant change was the decision to combine the proposed preliminary PRA survey activities, with the community baseline surveys and participatory needs assessments to be conducted as part of the village level CDPD process in each of the four pilot program areas. Whilst the actual intent of the preliminary PRA survey activities is not clear, these should have been kept as separate activities with different objectives.

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<sup>9</sup> Refer to Annex 6 for a comparison of the PIPE Program’s original and revised outputs and indicators.

<sup>10</sup> So as to deflect Indonesian government concerns about terms such as ‘conflict’ and ‘security’. Also the word ‘project’ was replaced with ‘program’ because of the concern that Papuans strongly associate ‘projects’ with handouts of material goods and money.

The preliminary survey was important to orient the core team and guide them in adapting the approach and training materials, selecting pilot program areas, identifying suitable partner organizations and facilitating the selection of CDF's. The community-baseline studies on the other hand, were important to collect data for community action planning, monitoring of activities at the community level and as an adaptive learning process for participating community members. The decision to conflate the exploratory phase surveys and community-baseline surveys resulted in the PIPE team not having a solid basis of understanding of local conditions on which to base adaptations.

The third significant change was the inclusion, alongside improvements in village based health services (Output 1.4), of participatory development of village education services. Given that the low quality of basic and lifelong education services in Papua is one of the key constraints of development in remote and indigenous communities this inclusion, even if only as a sub-output, made the project design more robust/wholistic. Indeed, this inclusion is so significant that the ILO should consider adapting PIPE to focus more on community-based education and training. In doing this they would facilitate the community to focus more on core issues and as such, mitigate the distractions and conflicts which emerged as community members demanded that PIPE fund inappropriate and expensive activities. In contrast to this opinion, the PIPE team, based upon the conclusions that the health and education services available at the village level were adequate, decided on not pursuing this stream of activities.

Deferred engagement with most stakeholders until the second phase of the program was a significant oversight. Although the CDPD approach was envisaged to have been adequately tested and adapted to Papuan conditions by phase 2, forging relations with stakeholders was crucial so that there was a support base from which to promote the program in phase two. Another important omission was that the program design did not specifically identify the importance of networking at the national, provincial and local (community) levels. There was no mention of networking with existing IPOs, local community development and human rights foundations, and other relevant organizations, which should have been key informants and potential proponents of the CDPD approach.

Similarly, it was regrettable that cross-evaluation visits between communities were not planned. Given that isolation has always been one of the greatest constraints to technology transfer and therefore development in Papua, active measures to help alleviate such isolation should be prioritized. Cross-evaluation visits between the four pilot program areas would have served to generate a range of invaluable learning opportunities for both visitors and hosts, facilitated the direct transfer of knowledge and technology, and could have served to build practical networks (such as for the ongoing exchange of information and resources between communities or collaborative efforts to address common goals). They would also motivate quality in programmes by spurring healthy competition between communities. Whilst effective networking requires considerable effort and some level of resources to maintain, it is important to recognize the potential multiplier effects of strategically managed engagement with and networking between key stakeholders. Networking is crucial if the broad goals of facilitating social dialogue on indigenous, gender and workers rights and human security issues are to be achieved.

### **Weak Assumptions**

The project was weakened by basing the design on a number of assumptions about the socio-economic, political and cultural conditions in Papua. For instance:

- The belief that the project would be able to recruit appropriately skilled local staff and consultants was based on the assumption that surplus labour in this field existed. Yet Papua is actually experiencing a human resources crisis as the expanding bureaucracy, aid programs and private enterprise absorb skilled community development practitioners. This demand gives the handful of skilled community development practitioners in Papua bargaining power to choose from a wide range of employment and consulting options in government, private enterprise, aid programs and politics. This faulty assumption not only effected project implementation in the sense that program participants deferred to other programs or organizations, it represented a missed opportunity to build HR. If the PIPE design was adjusted to train a much larger group of men and women, the CDPD approach could have been disseminated in a more organic and osmotic manner.



- The project rested on the assumptions that communities were fairly united and consensus would be achievable. These characteristics, more akin to SE Asian communities, are rare in Papuan communities which tend to be less hierarchal and more individualistic. Moreover, the rate of attitudinal, behavioural and organizational changes is less dependent on the program and more on the Papuan community targeted as some communities have cultural mechanisms that lead them to be more open to change than others.
- The project assumed that new IPOs were desirable when, at the time of the evaluation, many observers remained concerned about PIPE's decision to establish new IPOs in a context where an explosion of such organizations was already proving problematic in many respects.
- The project assumed local government had the will to change. The Governors stated vision of creating a new Papua by revolutionizing approaches to government service delivery were, in practise, not shared and supported by people throughout the government services.
- Finally, the assumption that funding for phase 2 would be forthcoming or could be secured with relative ease seems to have led to a hasty exit strategy during the last few months of the program. It even involved the support from two MFIs which had not previously been involved in implementing the CDPD approach.

ii. **Utilization of local expertise** - How were stakeholders at various levels (national, provincial and community), who may already have expertise on or knowledge of community development issues concerning indigenous peoples, involved in the project design and implementation process?

Many of the weakness of the PIPE Program stemmed from the lack of inputs of local expertise, particularly during the planning and early stages of the program. Instead of engaging with other interested organizations, PIPE deferred effective engagement with most stakeholders, including Papuan civil society organizations as well as the MRP and most other organizations other than the Provincial Steering Committees, UNCEN and UNIPA, until phase II of the program. This cut PIPE from valuable information about their working context, it compromised their capacity to engage with many of these organizations as some stakeholders appear to feel that they had been ignored or alienated by PIPE. In the case of the MRP, the policy of delayed engagement represents a lost opportunity and wasted time, which could have been spent developing the institutions and capacity of this vital indigenous representative body from its infancy.

This weakness was highlighted by the mid-term evaluation, and a number of recommendations were made to the effect that PIPE should take urgent measures to build strategic networks and increase access to high quality local expertise, but implementation of these recommendations was largely limited to a few one off meetings with organizations such as the MRP and FOKER, and by increasing the level of cooperation with UNDP and RESPEK.

This error appears to be repeated in the planning of PIPE Phase II. The existing proposals for PIPE Phase II appears to have been prepared by the management of PIPE with a low level of input from the government agencies represented in the PSC, as well as the CDF's and heads of the four IPOs. However, there is seemingly still no consultation and even less direct input from the MRP or major civil society organizations, whose support will undoubtedly prove crucial if the goal of adapting and mainstreaming CDPD to Papuan is to be achieved.

iii. **Participation of Customary Orgs in Program Design** - To what extent were the indigenous peoples representative organizations included in the project design?

As indicated above, no customary organizations were involved in the design of PIPE Phase I, and there does not appear to be any significant input from customary organizations in the design document for PIPE Phase II.

iv. **M&E / performance indicators** - Did the project have clear (M&E) indicators against which the project's contribution and impact at the community and individual levels can be assessed, in relation to the stated objectives?

The Mid-Term Evaluators found that PIPE's monitoring and evaluation (monev) systems, or at least its documentation was weak. It stated:

Periodic internal monitoring by the CTA has taken place timed around key activities, namely the conduct of community baselines and the implementation of livelihood-related activities. On-going implementation of activities by the CDFs and ILO program staff does involve continuous review and reflection (aspects of monitoring), however there has been minimal documentation per the specific outputs and indicators.

Based upon the materials I was able to review, I too found the PIPE Programs monev system wanting. Given that PIPE was intended to serve as a demonstrative development model, the monev system was vital not only to test assumptions, prove achievements and adaptively manage the program in a transparent and convincing manner, but in the more general sense of the need to mainstreaming new approaches.

A series of participatory studies were undertaken including the community baseline studies and peace building mechanism (as well as gender analysis studies) and these should have provided much of the data required for program monitoring, evaluation and adaptation purposes. However, these reports only provided generic data, they failed to identify critical issues, and barely mentioned contemporary issues affecting local communities. Aside from the gender analysis study, the reports appear to have overlooked gender issues and the role of women and lack gender disaggregated data. These reports were not suitable for use as a baseline, and whilst the PIPE team claims they were able to make up for these deficiencies as the project progressed, no suitable set of consolidated and gender disaggregated data appears to have been compiled.

### **Box 9 PIPE Monitoring and evaluation plan**

**Reporting** - for submission to UNTFHS and Government of Indonesia.

- Annual progress reports, including a summary of activities carried out by the Program and in each of the pilot projects, self-assessment of impacts and an updated annual work plan;
- Regular reports and end-of-assignment reports prepared by each individual consultant;
- Program completion report – summarizing all activities made by the pilot projects, self-assessment of impacts as well as lessons learned and recommendations for the Government on grassroots as well as policy-level follow-up actions\*.

#### **Monitoring**

- A continuous review, planning and monitoring system for the pilot projects will be established, and the pilot project managers will be trained on the operations of the system.
- The project will produce an overall work plan at the end of the first month which will be forwarded to UNTFHS and Government of Indonesia. The work plan will reflect the activities to be carried out by the pilot projects and it will be updated regularly according to the individual work plans of the pilot projects.
- The Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) will provide guidance to the local Project Managers and assess the achievements of the pilot projects through regular monitoring missions to the pilot projects.

#### **Evaluation**

- Participatory self-evaluation - Once every year, in each each pilot project - using the INDISCO Guidelines "Our Project".
- The CTA will finalize all self-evaluation reports, including the assessment on the activities undertaken at the regional level, to be printed and disseminated. A copy will be attached to the annual report to be submitted to UNTFHS.
- Mid-term evaluation – originally planned as a tripartite evaluation (UNTFHS, GOI and ILO), but changed to an independent / external evaluation, to analyze the progress of the program and the 4 pilot projects on the basis of the indicators and targets set out in the project document. The final report will be printed and disseminated among the evaluating partners (UNTFHS, Government of Indonesia and ILO) and the project partners.
- Final external evaluation - A similar mission will be fielded towards the end of the project period for the purpose of conducting a terminal independent evaluation.

\* Some CDFs also prepared quite detailed report, but this was not actually required.

**Source:** ILO-PIPE Program Design Document.

A major problem stemmed from the lack of a quality baseline study. At the outset, the program seemed to rely on the UNDP Papua Needs Assessment for most of their provincial level data. The data from this assessment furthermore, was not cross-checked or interrogated, PIPE staff did not seek the opinions of recognized local experts, develop their own synopses of relevant documentary data, or conduct research to confirm / orientate their team members prior to embarking upon field level activities.



Another issue was the lack of clarification regarding monitoring tools. A monitoring and evaluation plan was provided in the project design document (see box 9) but this did not provide details of methods or tools. The program logframe did not provide any details of the means of verification attached to outputs and indicators. Similarly, the description of monitoring tools provided in the annual progress reports was very general. It included regular participatory monitoring activities using common tools such as interviews, focus group discussions/meetings, observation trips and reports, as well as community self-evaluation and independent mid-term and final evaluation.

As a result many of the selected indicators remain ambiguous and most of the claimed achievements of the PIPE Program cannot be substantiated. It is difficult to determine which changes occurred as a result of the ILO-PIPE's interventions, and what social, political and economic changes were occurring in communities regardless of PIPE.

This is not to mention the quality of data that was used. Statements such as PIPE was "the first 'real' form of assistance that the people have ever received or been a part of" (Mid-Term Evaluation Report and 2008 Final Progress Report) was incorrect. Another shortcoming was the lack of community participation in the evaluation of the overall program. Participatory monev activities were conducted in each pilot program area, but there does not appear to have been any opportunities for communities to participate in cross visits to evaluate the progress of activities in other pilot program areas, and community representatives do not seem to have been involved in participatory evaluation of the program at the provincial level.

Given that PIPE was a demonstrative pilot program, a much greater effort should have been invested in planning, developing and documenting innovative approaches to M&E.

### 5.3 Implementation - Progress and Effectiveness

- **Implementation** - To what extent have the project activities been implemented, and has the means of implementation been appropriate and had expected results?
- **Outputs** - Is the quantity and quality of the outputs produced satisfactory? Have adjustments made with regards to the project approach, target outputs and indicators been relevant and effective?

In the mid-term evaluation report it was pointed-out that whilst PIPE's progress and achievements during the first 18 months of implementation appeared quite modest, this is necessary when applying participatory development approaches. In the case of CDPD, the pursuit of pre-planned schedules and targets (as opposed to working at the communities' pace) is a key factor that undermines the 'sustainability' of many participatory development projects.

It is clear from project documents that during the first few months, implementation activities proceeded rapidly. Within three months of start-up, PIPE had managed to establish a team, office facilities and institutional frameworks, revise the project design, select pilot program districts, conduct initial program socialization visits, select CDFs, prepare CDF training materials, recruited gender and culture training specialists and community baseline study managers from UNIPA and UNCEN, and conduct two, week-long basic training courses for the CDFs and consultants. During the early and closing stages of the project, PIPE pursued targets at the expense of quality of process.

Program progress slowed between the 12<sup>th</sup> and 18th month which is consistent with the often observed phenomena whereby levels of enthusiasm wane and participants can drop out especially when they realize there are few material hand-outs. After this mid project drop in momentum, a smaller kernel of enthusiastic participants tend to emerge, and this group come to be motivated by non-material benefits and so momentum builds in a more concentrated way. Anecdotal evidence from community / village informants / participants indicated that community attitudes towards PIPE followed this recognizable pattern. Evidence suggests that the weak establishment of foundations during the first three months of 2006 however made these phases more protracted.

Towards the end of the project there appeared to be a spike in material assistance from the project. At this time, a number of highly valued items were allocated. This includes rice hullers, coconut grinders, several boats and outboard motors, a small pick-up truck in Tanah Rubuh and the partial construction of office facilities for the DKD in Kemtuk Gresi. Whilst from a livelihoods perspective there was a reasonably strong justification for providing such assistance (and the communal management of such inputs had been planned over time) it seems that in at least some cases, such as in Tanah Rubuh where inputs including chainsaws, motor boats and a motor vehicle, these items caused tensions within the communities. Given that inputs tended to coincide with the impending closure of the project, it seems that the imperative to spend the budget overshadowed the consideration of appropriateness of timing. By appropriate timing, it is meant when the organizational capacity of the communities had reached a point where the provision of such inputs could be effectively managed to provide benefits for the community.

In conclusion, program implementation would have flowed better, miscommunication could have been minimised, the cognitive transition for program participants from a hand-out to a self-help attitude could have been strengthened, and a similar or even greater number of outputs which would lead to a more sustainable outcome could have been achieved if a greater amount of time and resources had been invested into establishing strong foundations for action. It is all too easy for implementers, managers and donors of participatory development projects to lose sight of the need to give more time and resources at the beginning of a project.

In conclusion, during the early stages of any participatory project, and particularly if establishing a presence from scratch, as was the case with ILO-PIPE, it is vital to take time to establish a knowledge base, put the right human resources in place, establish useful and reliable networks, adapt existing approaches and materials, and to clearly communicate the intent and approach to key stakeholders. Failure to establish strong foundations for action prior to pursuing any major development objectives is likely to result in the achievement of fewer outputs in the medium term and less sustainable outcomes overall. In other words it

is extremely important to resist managerialistic pressures that encourage the pursuit of results at the expense of strong foundations for action.

- **Challenges** - What problems/ challenges have been encountered, why, and how were they addressed?

PIPE faced many challenges relating to the complexity of the socio-cultural and economic situation, the rapid rate of political and administrative change, and deeply entrenched attitudes and behaviour patterns.

Probably the greatest challenge encountered arose from the West Papua Interest Association which, as described on page 39, managed to appropriate the goals of PIPE in the eyes of the community. This kind of challenge is not unique to PIPE and Melanesian societies in general can present community development practitioners with complex and challenging socio-cultural and economic environment. In particular, many Melanesian societies display acculturative tendencies (though others display a range of conservative tendencies) which have regularly manifested as cargo cults, also referred to as cargoism, or messianic or millenarianism movements.

Cargoism refers to a range of social movements, whereby Melanesian societies have attempted to mediate cultural, social and economic change to reduce the inequalities in wealth between themselves and foreigners. To outside eyes, these attempts are often performed through what appears as irrational procedures but to a critical eye, can be seen to have a cultural logic. The activities of the WPIA can be seen as falling under the umbrella of cargoism as it attempted to redress “unjust” imbalances in power, with the disparity in material wealth serving as an indicator of power. It is necessary to say that the ILO, as a United Nations agency, has a particular symbolic association in Papua which contributes to its all-powerful status. Having played a pivotal role in the transfer of Papuan sovereignty to Indonesia, the subsequent development of Papua and the repatriation of Papuan refugees, the UN and its agencies display mythical qualities in the Papuan imaginary and this, no doubt, presents unique challenges to any agency associated with the UN.

No discussion or analysis of the WPIA’s role appears throughout the PIPE Program documents, which is unfortunate because this experience and the process whereby it was overcome might have provided a rich source of lessons learned.

- **Application of mid-term evaluation results** - To what extent were the findings of the mid-term evaluation applied?

The mid-term evaluators identified a number of critical issues which PIPE needed to address, including:

- The low quality of community baseline surveys and processes of actively-facilitated reflection and self-analysis with the partner communities;
- Human resources constraints, in particular the use of established local expertise and the improvement of communications with partner communities;
- The types of capacity building provided to all partners, from CDFs to local consultants and partner agencies;
- Networking with a broader range of local institutions to support promotion of the CDPD approach and as the foundation for building social dialogue on indigenous rights, gender, sustainable livelihoods and human security in Papua; and
- Monitoring, evaluation and documentation of the PIPE Program itself.

PIPE was able to demonstrate that a range of actions had been taken in response to the findings and recommendation of the mid-term evaluation. For example, PIPE was able to strengthen their core team sufficiently to facilitate much more effective communications and there was marked improvement in the level of capacity building support provided to CDFs and IPOs.

However, in overcoming some of the problems identified, recommendations were only partially applied. For example there was no improvement in the quality of the baseline survey documents or the subsequent Indigenous Peace Building Mechanisms reports, which impacted negatively on the selection, training and supervision of local experts. There was also little improvement in terms of monitoring, evaluation and documentation of the process.

Most significantly, the recommendations relating to the need to build strategic networks were not internalized by PIPE's management. There were a number of consultations held with organizations such as the MRP, DAP and the Papuan NGOs forum, but no significant changes or follow-ups emerged from these. The PIPE CTA indicated that he was sure that the strategy to defer sustained networking or engagement with stakeholders until Phase II was sound.

For a detailed analysis of PIPE's performance in relation to the implementation of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation refer to annex 10.

- **Participation** - To what extent has the project encouraged local government and community participation in planning and implementation of project activities? What were the challenges met in getting the local government and communities involved in the project activities? What steps have been taken to overcome these challenges?

Whilst many alternative typologies of participation exist, Pretty's (1995) typology of participation has been widely accepted as a useful model and can frame the response to questions regarding PIPE's level of participation. This typology consists of seven levels of community participation ranging from manipulation to mobilisation (see box 10). The underlying theme behind these definitions relates to the balance in control of decision-making, information and resources between outsiders and the community, with more involved types of participation requiring local people to take ownership of development activities.

Using Pretty's model to guide, participation of PSC members appears to have been largely by consultation and over time the level of participants of most PSC members declined as they lost interest in the program. Whilst the PSC members were handed some key early decisions relating to the selection of pilot program areas and CDFs, their role in program planning does not appear to have been great, they were not involved in the final evaluation process, and they do not appear to have had a significant input towards the design of PIPE Phase II. The main exception here lies with the head of the BPMD, who is reported to have become a strong proponent of CDPD during 2008.

At the community level PIPE's intention was to facilitate 'interactive participation' through the IPOs and steer them towards self-mobilization during phase II. In practice, the actual level of participation that was achieved throughout most of the program appears to be a mix of participation for material incentives, and functional participation. There were some indications that by the end of the program a more interactive concept of participation had begun to take root amongst some participants in Kemtuk Gresi, Mara Tami and Kebar/Senopi. However, in Tanah Rubuh it was apparent that nearly all program participants remained focused on the material aspects of the program.

In terms of advancing the process to the level of functional participation, it is clearly necessary for projects to pursue and achieve targets, but these targets need be achieved through imposing some level of organizational structure. At the same time, any such structure should be temporary, as a means to facilitate a co-learning process, and can be modified, replaced or discarded once community members have advanced to the level of self-mobilization and can better decide for themselves what organizations and institutions they require.

With regards to material incentives, while they are certainly an important element of projects, for without them it would be very difficult to maintain participation in most Papuan communities, it is important to pay attention to the timing, form and quantity of material assistance. It is also important to carefully communicate the rationale and planning of how new resources will be managed. As such, I believe that PIPE's material assistance in terms of agricultural tools was, but some of the more valuable items most likely diverted attention from common development goals and towards these goods.



## Box 10 Pretty's Typology of Participation

Type of Participation		Description
1	Manipulative participation (Co-option)	Community participation is simply a facade, with people's representatives on official boards who are unelected and have no power.
2	Passive participation (Compliance)	Communities participate by being told what has been decided or already happened. Involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without listening to people's responses. The information belongs only to external professionals.
3	Participation by consultation	Communities participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems and information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4	Participation for material incentives	Communities participate by contributing resources such as labour, in return for material incentives (e.g. food, cash). It is very common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging practices when the incentives end.
5	Functional participation (Cooperation)	Community participation is seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals. People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined project objectives; they may be involved in decision making, but only after major decisions have already been made by external agents.
6	Interactive participation (Co-learning)	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7	Self –mobilisation (Collective action).	People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilisation can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

- **Gender Equality** - How effectively did the project contribute to the promotion of gender equality within the framework of the Papuan culture? At which level (policy, institutional, community and individual) has the contribution been made?

PIPE's culture-bound approach to gender mainstreaming aimed to strengthen indigenous women's economic productivity whilst seeking opportunities to facilitate spontaneous dialogue on gender issues throughout the CDPD process. As such many of the indicators relating to women's empowerment were included under the livelihoods component. However, the only indicator listed under the livelihoods component which targeted women was that, "Indigenous women and girls (should) make up at least 50 per cent of newly literate community members" and this element was not implemented.

### **Box 11 The PIPE Program's Achievements in the Promotion of Gender Equality**

According to the 2008 Final Progress Report PIPE's achievements in relation to Gender mainstreaming and empowerment component of the program included:

- The emergence of self-initiated women groups and organizations
- The emergence of a small but growing number of traditional community leaders, who are openly supportive of the women empowerment process.
- An increase of about 30% in the number of women who are active in socio-economic activities of the program thereby constituting a sector to be reckoned with in terms of the role they can play in the village development process.
- An apparent rise, although in different degrees, in the level of self-confidence of the women in each of the pilot sites.
- The emergence of women leaders who can somehow participate in decision-making processes at the village level.

(Source: ILO-PIPE 2008 Final Progress Report)

In relation to PIPE's stated achievements in relation to gender mainstreaming (see box 11), given the lack of baseline data and poor documentation of monitoring and evaluation processes it is not possible to validate most of these claims. For example, whilst it is not disputed that new women's groups were formed during the course of the program, it should be noted that Papuan women often form self-help groups without the support from development programs and these groups often display greater durability than the groups men set up in response to development assistance projects.

That literacy training and improved management of education and health care facilities did not emerge as development priorities in the community action plans suggests that the community action planning processes were quite male dominated. Considering that adult literacy, education and health tend to be key concerns for Papuan women, dropping planned activities in these areas as PIPE did, suggests that typically masculine development priorities such as infrastructure development activities and the provision of material support for agriculture, fisheries, etc. took precedence.

Furthermore, the fact that gender was not integrated into the community baseline or Indigenous Peace Building Mechanisms studies, and was instead made the subject of a separate study, against the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation, indicates that gender mainstreaming remained a weak internal link (between PIPE's staff and paid consultants) and that its capacity to promote gender mainstreaming through the IPO and government partners or Papuan society in general seems uncertain.

The available quantitative indicators of female participation suggest that the overall levels of female participation in program activities were quite low. For example the total number of female CDFs was only seven, or slightly less than 20%, falling well short of the original target of 40% female CDFs, indicating that gender issues were not adequately mainstreamed in the CDF selection process.

By the end of the program three of the seven female CDFs had distinguished themselves as being amongst the most active and competent CDFs, whereas it was reported that around 80% of the male CDFs had become inactive by the end of the program. This included one woman from Muara Tami who was elected as the head of the Reba A'ling IPO. These were important outcomes, clearly demonstrated the capabilities of Papuan women and validating arguments in favour of greater female participation in development process.

However, it should be noted that these were all women whose special status was tied to their high status male relatives, and who were amongst the most highly educated women in their communities. For example the woman elected as head of Reba A'ling was also the wife of the Ondoafi (Tribal head), whereas the female CDF in Kebar / Senopi was the only woman in the community with a university degree. These

extraneous variables remind us we need to take care when assessing PIPE's role in causing the empowerment of such women.

The number of women participating in livelihoods training activities was also quite low (according to the 2007 progress report less than 20%). This is another indication that gender issues were not adequately mainstreamed through the community action planning process in terms of identifying and prioritizing activities of interest to women, or addressing other constraints to women's participation. On the other hand it may be the case that the women themselves perceived the quality and benefits of such training to be low and therefore preferred to carry on with their routine tasks.

Perhaps the most significant indication of women's empowerment is from the Gender and Entrepreneurship Together or GET Ahead training, where almost 50% of participants were women. This includes eight women who participated in the training of trainers' workshop and who went on to conduct the Training of Entrepreneurs training for other men and women. Had these training activities been followed up with micro-savings activities, as I would have recommended there would have been a consolidation of skills gained through the training. This in turn would have been a valuable stepping stone for community members to progress towards the micro-finance activities established at the close of the program.

Whilst I was not able to review the Gender Analysis Study prepared by UNCEN consultants on behalf of PIPE, the short commentaries on gender issues that are dispersed throughout PIPE Project Documents indicates that PIPE's analysis of gender issues were weak and heavily reliant on the findings of the UNDP Papua Needs Assessment. For example the statement that "The anchored status of women in the area, which is invariably marked by exclusion from decision-making processes and often by wife-beating, is a significant constraint to women empowerment" is overly simplistic and denies the varied responses of women to the process of modernisation.

The project reports also regularly refer to gender issues as being highly sensitive in the context of Papua. This contradicts many observers who find that Papuan societies are generally very open to discussing issues to do with gender. Even when discussing gender becomes heated, this should be seen in the context of Melanesian conversational styles and concerns surrounding culture change and not viewed from a foreigner's lens of polite social styles.

It is acceptable and necessary to institute affirmative action approaches to maximize levels of women's participation and thereby the sustainability of outcomes. For example it is usually necessary to implement measures such as:

- Imposing non-negotiable requirements that half of the community facilitators are female. Whilst men are likely to oppose this on the basis of maximizing their own potential to secure such paid positions, such opposition can be diffused by increasing the total number of facilitators to allow for the recruitment of both male and female facilitators in each village;
- Ensuring that training materials and approaches are attuned to the education levels and learning modalities of women and especially in the central highlands where literacy rates are much lower still;
- Supplying additional resources such as increased levels of supervision, facilitation support, confidence building and even child care support to maximise participation;
- Complement affirmative action with a special effort to communicate with male community members (and especially the husband's of female participants) the social and economic benefits of supporting increased women's participation in development programs.

- **Outcomes and Impacts** - What are the short-term outcomes of the program interventions in each of the target communities in terms of institutional capacity building and direct services and what medium and long term impacts can reasonably be expected amongst the target groups?

As has already been discussed in previous sections of this report, the brevity and timing of the final evaluation, and the paucity of documentation of the process, monitoring and self-evaluations make it difficult to validate the achievements that PIPE claim, and even harder to predict with any degree of accuracy the sustainability of outcomes. As such, the following findings are based in large part based upon impressions and previous experiences. These indicate measurable success rates of PIPE's development interventions as marginal and most innovations introduced through PIPE to have been abandoned with a relatively short space of time.

PIPE's outcomes and impacts will now be discussed in relation to four categories used in the final progress report: improved skills and livelihoods, community organizational capacity, attitudinal changes amongst community members, and attitudinal changes amongst government agencies.

### **Improved Skills and Livelihoods**

The documented achievements of PIPE can at times be contradictory. For example, the PIPE Final Progress Report claims that: "...of these training activities, [over 2,000] participants have created for themselves a corresponding number of improved self-employment opportunities, which have in turn provided many of them greater income and potential for getting out of poverty. Direct beneficiaries have demonstrated how, on the basis of the programme interventions, they have increased their income by an average 35% using their pre-programme income as baseline." However, under the section on impact assessment in the same report it is stated that, "The result of an informal survey of the pilot sites on this subject indicates an average increase in income of direct beneficiaries ranging from 15-35% from a usually low baseline income per family of an average Rp. 300.000. This translates into an overall total of at least 1,000 jobs (self-employment) revitalized or created in the project sites." The former statement not only appears to conflate outputs (number of people trained) with outcomes (number of people who improved their livelihoods as a result of that training), but the size of the increase seems implausibly large given that PIPE did not address market chain constraints. The latter statement neatly, perhaps a bit too neatly, corresponds with PIPE's own targets to create at least 1,000 jobs and self-employment opportunities and at least 25% increase in income of direct beneficiaries. It is unlikely that outcomes would so neatly correspond to targets given the complex factors involved.

If the benefit of the doubt is given, the latter statement represents a median increase from roughly US\$30 to US\$37.50 per month amongst 1,000 families, or about a third of the estimated 3,000 indigenous household in the pilot program areas. If measured across the entire indigenous population of the pilot program areas, this appears to equate to an average increase in cash incomes of approximately S\$0.50 per month. As such, whilst the increased incomes may be meaningful for some individuals or families, and could serve as an example to motivate others, in overall terms, increases in cash incomes were very marginal, and remained well below national and international poverty lines.

Some successes claimed by PIPE are, on closer inspection, likely to have resulted from a confluence of factors. For example it was claimed that in Kemtuk Gresik / Gresik Selatan, "during the programme implementation period, more than 60,000 cacao seedlings were planted in an aggregate total area of 60 hectares. The cacao farmers say every hectare added to their farm size (one thousand seedlings) has the potential of yielding enough seeds in four to five years time to give them an additional income of at least 25-35 percent." It is significant that the local people had in fact been growing cocoa since at least the 1970s, both through development assistance programs and upon their own initiative, and that in 2006 the Government of Jayapura Regency had passed a regulation requiring every household to plant at least one hectare of cocoa. Thus PIPE cannot attribute these achievements to PIPE related interventions.

Even where success seems clear, extraneous complications ensure that sustainability is likely to be short lived. For example, the claimed improvements on the livelihoods of cocoa farmers (particularly in Kemtuk

Gresik / Gresik Selatan) will almost certainly be wiped out by the recent spread of the Cocoa Pod Borer into Jayapura Regency. This pest is believed to have spread from Sulawesi to West Papua Province in the 1990s, where it has caused an estimated 80% loss of livelihoods for smallholder cocoa growers and contributed to the failure of the Cokran commercial cocoa plantation in and the loss of around 2,500 jobs in 2006, despite heavy application of insecticides. A trial of the Farmer Field School approach to pest management in Manokwari Regency in 2002-2004 displayed some promising results and PIPE could have looked at this.

Finally, most home industry activities introduced through PIPE (including production of coconut oil, palm sugar, production of banana and taro chips and baking cakes) have been introduced with limited success to numerous communities throughout Papua. While such training activities are popular, adoption rates are invariably very low because of deeper problems in local capital accumulation and retention. A notable exception here was with coconut oil production in Jandarauw village, Kebar District. People claim this to have been the most practical technical skill learned through PIPE.

### **Community organizing**

One of the key concerns raised by informants from local CSOs, was the prudence, or otherwise, of PIPE's decision to instigate the establishment of IPOs, at a very early point in the project. This was done with no apparent background analysis of the existing IPOs and lessons learned from previous similar experiments.

To be fair, recent trends, whereby many Papuan IPOs have been politicized or come to serve the short-term economic interest of a few elites, mean that it may well be true that working with existing IPOs was not a viable option. But a more thorough survey of the state of the field could have determined what viable Papuan NGO could have been worked with in certain areas.

Even if PIPE had become sure that establishing new IPOs was necessary, a more participatory or organic approach could have been applied. For instance, they could have implemented co-learning approaches through temporary "project" structures until participants were ready to establish organizations based on their own initiative and perceived need. If IPOs were built from the grassroots they would not be seen, as they commonly were, as belonging to or serving as an interface with the ILO. If a participatory approach to building IPO were to compromise perceived efficiency, for such an approach would produce fewer organizational outputs in the short term, greater long term ownership would have compensated for this.

### **Attitudinal Changes amongst community members**

Due to the research constraints described in section 3.4, it was not possible to assess the quality of attitude changes in a meaningful way. PIPE's statements of achievement regarding attitudinal changes relating to gender, peace building mechanisms, development assistance (from a hand-out to a more proactive mentality) and the adoption of CDPD, are not measured against robust categories and are instead, largely anecdotal. It is difficult to determine to what degree PIPE have impacted on attitudes and not just temporary behaviours. For example the final progress report states that:

Although a more in-depth study has yet to be held, it is estimated that at least 2 of 5 traditional community leaders and members have regained or starting to regain their natural sense of self-reliance and pro-active participation in village development activities. .... There are indications e.g. individual initiatives for self-improvement in terms of productivity, increased level of commitment collective development by individual leaders and community facilitators, etc. that at least in some areas in the project sites the trend would continue from here. ILO-PIPE 2008 Terminal Progress Report.

At face value this statement implies that attitudinal change has occurred in about 5,600 cases, or 40% of the 14,000 or so indigenous people living in the four pilot program areas. Given that quantitative project data indicates that only about 2,000-2,500 people were actively involved in the project, this seems highly unlikely. This is not to mention that altering people's attitudes and behaviours is not simply a matter of sending a good educational message. Change is motivated from within a person and what people are willing to do is dependent upon complex perceptions about themselves.

While it is difficult to determine attitudinal change, it is possible that the few key individuals who displayed progressive attitudes amongst the CDFs and other community leaders involved in PIPE may have a flow on

effect in the community. Changes in the attitudes of a few key individuals can affect those of many and this is generally considered an important element of awareness raising and empowerment strategies.

In future, self-evaluation activities, ideally facilitated by external stakeholders such as local CSOs, conducted some time after the end of the program, are probably the most effective way of gauging PIPE's outcomes and impacts in this regard.

### **Attitudinal changes amongst Government Agencies**

In regards to attitudinal changes amongst government agencies PIPE does not claim to have had a major impact in terms of mainstreaming gender or peace building, as serious engagement with these issues was largely deferred until phase II. In relation to changing government attitudes to development service delivery, PIPE claims that during 2008 there was an increasing interest amongst a number of government agencies, including the Manokwari Regency Social Welfare Service (*Dinas Sosial*), Jayapura Regency Estate Crops Service (*Dinas Perkebunan*) and Women's Empowerment Office (*Badan Pemberdayaan Perempuan*), and the Papua Province Rural Community Empowerment Body (BPMD), either to adopt elements of the CDPD approach and/or to treat the IPOs as development partners. However, the difficulties involved in assessing the quality of attitude changes described above were even more difficult in the case of the government agencies, as the timing of the evaluation precluded the possibility of meeting with them.

### **Outcomes and Impacts in the different Pilot Program Areas**

The nature and relative strength / sustainability of outcomes varied across the four pilot program areas. This reflected a combination of socio-cultural pre-conditions and the level of facilitation support provided by PIPE.

In **Muara Tami**, livelihoods activities focused on improving off-shore fishing skills, coastal vegetable production and home industries and handicraft skills (the processing of bananas and cassava into sellable snacks and the making of handicraft using beads and thread). Improvements in incomes relating to fisheries are dependent upon the collective capacity to manage and maintain the boats and outboard motors. Based on other project experience, there is a good chance that over time these will either fall into disrepair or be appropriated by or entrusted to the care of an individual. In relation to the production of snacks and handicrafts, similar activities in neighbouring areas have tended to cease fairly shortly after project support is withdrawn.

In **Kemtuk Gresi** the main achievements in relation to livelihoods related to improving cocoa farming skills and increased cocoa production. However, as has been stated explained above, the cocoa industry in this area is threatened by the cocoa pod borer, and I would highly recommend working with an NGO to trial the Cocoa-Agroforestry Farmer Field School approaches to improve sustainability of cocoa production throughout Jayapura (and other major cocoa producing areas in Papua).

The customary leadership structures in Muara Tami and Jayapura, known as Ondoafi or Ondofolo systems, are recognized as being more complex and hierarchal in comparison to other Papuan cultures. These are also the Papuan communities with the longest exposure to external influences and greatest access to established markets. In this context, the Reba A'ling and DKD IPOs, and other sub-organizations, are more likely to prove sustainable although there remains a strong possibility that these organizations will become irrelevant, subverted to the short term political or economic interests of a few individuals, or conflict with other existing IPOs claiming to represent the same communities.

Despite the challenges posed by the WPIA, progress in **Kebar / Senopi** appears promising. On one hand this is due to the nature of the communities, who are largely motivated to be involved in development programs. This motivation is heightened by the limited nature of community contact with government and aid programs and facilitated by the cultural formation of Kebar and Senopi which display a high degree of cooperation and inter-group capacity especially in relation to less functional societies.

The people involved in the Ventry IPO and the cooperatives were highly motivated. They reported that training in production of peanuts, vegetables and coconut oil had resulted immediate material benefits and

there was a high level of enthusiasm for further livelihoods skills training activities, especially in the production of cocoa, coffee and other cash crops. However, the people of Kebar and Senopi Districts are facing some serious and imminent challenges. These include the establishment of a new regency capital in Kebar and their first ever regency elections in 2009, rapid expansion and improvement of transportation infrastructure, planned development of a major “Agropolitan” centre in the neighbouring districts of Sidey, Masni and Prafi and the expansion of oil palm estates into Kebar and Senopi. Additionally, one of the greatest impacts of an earthquake which struck Kebar within a few days of my visit is likely to be the proliferation of top-down “disaster relief” approaches. Unless these communities are supported for a number of years to come the confluence of these factors will quickly erode any progress achieved to date.

PIPE’s outcomes and impacts were clearly weakest in **Tanah Rubuh**. This area is not an easy place to work given that Arfak communities, and particularly those re-settled on the coast, are rife with social problems. Pre-contact conditions of sorcery and hired pay-back killers, an ‘in-group’ orientation and intense suspicion of outsiders (particularly other Arfak communities) intersect with frequent demands of compensation from outsiders living on their land and expectations of attaining high levels of development assistance. These are negative conditions for PIPE to work within.

An important factor which project documents overlooked is that Tanah Rubuh is the primary centre for the production of Enou Palm wine, which trade has increased dramatically since a ban on alcohol was introduced in Manokwari Town. Besides the social problems arising from the easy availability of alcohol, it severely undermines motivation to engage in other forms of production. PIPE related activities cannot compete with the ease and lucrative potential of Enou production and the products soporific effects.

What we find in Tanah Rubuh is that a large number of people attended training and yet, the skills acquired through PIPE were being put to good effect. Improved production of bananas was cited as the primary livelihoods achievement in Tanah Rubuh, but transportation and high spoilage rates were identified as a key market chain constraint. This was addressed by meeting the Win Hamo IPO’s request that PIPE provide them with a light truck. The concern about the capacity to manage or maintain these resources undermines the sustainability of livelihoods improvements.

The livelihoods skills training activities in Tanah Rubuh attracted the largest percentage of female participants. This suggests that future work should work more with women as they are the most effective change agents and especially in Highland Papuan societies. Here, women once played a central role in agriculture and animal husbandry which was the economic backbone and today, they are the ones to feel the most displaced from modernisation. In Tanah Rubuh, where men are largely occupied by the production and sale of Enou palm wine, participation in aid projects and rent seeking activities, women are suffering economic marginalization, domestic violence, and accusations of witchcraft and sorcery. At the same time they are more likely to be concerned about the wellbeing and future of their children. As such Arfak women have a particularly strong motivation to change.

Skills-training is not enough. Micro-enterprise and micro-savings approaches, such as the Trickle-Up West Papua Program (1999-2001) have demonstrated particularly promising outcomes amongst highland communities in the central highlands and amongst Arfak communities. In this regard I believe that the GET Ahead Training was a highly valuable input, but stronger follow-up with the establishment of micro-savings groups as an intermediate stepping stone to micro-finance. In sum, whilst progress in Tanah Rubuh has been exceedingly marginal, PIPE is on the right track and that continued application, adaptation and improvement of participatory approaches over a much longer period of time is necessary. However, they need to greatly intensify the focus on working with women and raising their productivity and status, through the provision of higher quality skills training, greater emphasis on micro-enterprise and savings support for women and increased efforts to facilitate dialogue on the cultural and gender issues.



## 5.4 Resourcing & Management

The timing of the final evaluation, which meant that the evaluator was not able to meet with key personnel from the ILO Jakarta Office or members of the NAC and PSCs, makes it difficult to adequately assess the managerial relationships between ILO-PIPE Office in Jayapura, the ILO in Jakarta and Geneva, and the relationships with its national and provincial level partners. Furthermore, the only financial information disclosed to the evaluator was an outline of the re-phased budget in the 2007 Project Progress Report. As such it is difficult to make an adequate assessment of PIPE's resourcing and management arrangements or draw specific conclusions. Notwithstanding this, I will make a few general comments about the resourcing and management of PIPE.

- **Program management** - Were the project's internal management arrangements, roles and responsibilities appropriate and clear to all parties involved?

The current implementation modality whereby ILO is directly executing the PIPE program is far from ideal for a number of reasons including:

- Inefficiency - A much higher level of facilitative support could have been achieved at a lower cost if a collaborative approach had have been adopted;
- PIPE's heavy reliance on short term consultants from local universities and CSOs disrupted local programs and undermined the capacity of local organizations by diverting valuable human resources away from their core programs and into the provision of a short term inputs to PIPE. A more collaborative approach to project implementation could keep human resources in place and developed individual and organizational capacity;
- Limits stakeholder participation to the level of consultation. This in turn limits the programs access to local expertise and its capacity to adapt the CDPD approach and generate Papua specific innovations;
- Severely limits PIPE's capacity to promote the CDPD approach and the ILO's broader goal of building a broad based social dialogue about indigenous rights and peace in Papua and Indonesia.

Two additional comments. Firstly the level of supervision of field activities was weak especially in West Papua Province during 2006-2007 but there was marked improvement in this regard in 2008 as a result of the recruitment of additional human resources. The selection, supervision and quality control functions in relation to short-term consultant inputs was also generally poor, as evidenced by the low quality and extremely low utility of major study reports. Similar concerns exist in relation to many of the participatory processes that were implemented by external consultants.

- **Backstopping Arrangements** - Did the project receive sufficient technical and management support from the ILO backstopping units?

The unique character of the PIPE approach, as compared to other elements of the IDWCP, does not appear to have been well communicated by the PIPE CTA or well understood by most people in the ILO Jakarta Office. As a result pressure for implementation to meet managerial targets (ie. budget burn rates, and scheduled achievement of outputs) would appear to have outweighed consideration of the need for flexible arrangements to allow for adaptive project management.

Backstopping from Jakarta has primarily been administrative and financial, though valuable technical support was provided for the GET Ahead training and Jakarta also made arrangements for a number of people from Papua to attend national and international forums about indigenous peoples' rights.

- **Management of Relations with the NAC and PSCs** – Did the project manage relations with the NAC and PSCs?

Whilst arrangements for managing the relationship between ILO-PIPE and the National Advisory Committee are unclear, if the backstopping units in the ILO Jakarta Office played a major role in managing this relationship, then a lack of adequate understanding about PIPE within these units is also likely to undermined the ILO's capacity to mainstream the issues, experiences and innovations derived from PIPE into national level policy debates.

As the mid-term evaluation pointed out, there is a need to improve communication between PIPE and ILO-Jakarta, and coordination of communication with the NAC and PSCs. This should include creating opportunities to engage a greater number of ILO Jakarta personnel and NAC/PSC members more substantively in learning about indigenous rights issues in Papua and the CDPD approach through seminars, videos, field visits and involvement in evaluation processes.

- **Resourcing** - Did the project have sufficient resources to achieve the designed outcomes, and were they used strategically and effectively? Do the results achieved justify the costs?

The total budget for the PIPE Program was USD\$1,537,965, and almost a third of the budget was allocated for costs associated with the CTA's salary and settlement package (which is by no means an excessive amount, but does represent a very large proportion of the overall budget). This represents a very meagre budget considering that human resources, transportation, materials and other costs related to project implementation are generally much higher in Papua than in other parts of the country. The small budget also precluded the possibility of working in remote areas of the central highlands, southern Papua, or the interior of the Bird's Head as originally planned. This is a problem insofar as these are precisely the areas where the largest numbers of indigenous Papuans live, where poverty and marginalization problems are most chronic, and are a major source of socio-political discontent.

### **Human resources**

Human resources were a key constraint to project implementation. In particular PIPE underestimated the level of field facilitation support that was required and did not allocate sufficient human resources to the development, implementation and documentation of a monitoring and evaluation system. Furthermore, they overestimated the skills and reliability of a number of consultants, and did not allocate sufficient human resources for the selection, training and supervision of thereof.

It should be noted that PIPE was established in the midst of an acute human resources crisis, at a time when the services of skilled community development professionals were in particularly high demand amongst the increasing number of international development agencies and aid programs. As such PIPE's budgetary limitations made it difficult to offer sufficiently attractive remuneration packages to attract the highest calibre candidates.

The West Papua program was particularly under-resourced as for most of the project period there was only one field officer working half-time, there was no project vehicle and low budget allocations made it very difficult to supervise or monitor field activities, especially in Kebar-Senopi.

### **Proposed Budget for PIPE Phase II**

The current proposals for PIPE Phase II, which entails scaling up of the existing approach to cover 12 pilot program areas spread across five regencies in Papua over a period of four years, has a proposed budget of US\$4,538,600. This is equivalent to a budget of just US\$94,554.16 per pilot program area per annum, which represents a 25% decrease in as compared to the budget of PIPE Phase I, which was equivalent to USD\$128,163.75 per pilot program area per annum.

Whilst there are undoubtedly many opportunities for economies of scale and/or resource sharing with ILO-EAST or other ILO Programs, considering the need for additional human resources, and in light of any plans for program expansion, especially into more remote areas where transport and material costs can be several times higher, the currently proposed budget for PIPE Phase II is clearly inadequate.

In particular budgetary consideration needs to be given for:

- Additional human resources, including a recommended one program officer per pilot program area;
- Higher remunerations and possibly resettlement support to attract higher quality personnel;
- Additional vehicles and drivers;
- Additional transportation and material costs and, if working in the central Highlands, possibly as much as a three- or four-fold increase.

- **Budgeting / Cash flows** - Were the funds for PIPE activities delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the inhibiting factors? How could these challenges be overcome in future interventions of similar nature?

The bottle-necks relating to the funding of community activities which occurred during late 2006 and early 2007 do not appear to have been the result of cash flow constraints, but rather due to the poor communication and the circulation of misinformation, which needed to be rectified before activities could commence. Instead, the main issue in relation to cash flows would appear to have been pressures to increase the budget burn rate in order to make up for this lost time, which was detrimental to the programs goals.

- **HSE Issues**

A number of issues relating to health, safety and environmental policy standards were identified. For example, funding training in the use of pesticides does not pay sufficient attention to human and environmental safety concerns. This is not least because women and children tend to do gardening work and use pesticides without protective equipment.

Similarly the distribution of chainsaws to communities living in the buffer zones of the Arfak Mountains Nature Reserve (Tanah Rubuh) and the Tambrauw Utara Nature Reserve (Kebar / Senopi) raises some concerns, and in the absence of documented mechanisms to ensure their use is managed in a safe and environmentally sustainable manner, could potentially draw criticism from government agencies and non-government conservation organizations.

Program personnel and consultants were also exposed to unnecessarily high workloads and safety risks, including the use of air carriers with poor safety standards, and in West Papua, the use of local vehicles and drivers. The HSE standards applied by multinational resource companies and some other international organizations operating in Papua are far more stringent than those evident in the case of PIPE.

The ILO needs ensure that it is setting a high standard in relation to HSE policies in Papua both internally and through their partners. This includes the need to review the content of all training materials for compliance with established HSE standards before sanctioning the delivery of technical training materials, and developing appropriate HSE standards and practices for application in the planning, implementation and evaluation of community level processes.

## 5.5 Impacts & Sustainability:

- **Long term impacts** - What are the realistic long-term effects of the project on sustainable development in Papua? Did the project management steer the project implementation approach towards impact? To what extent has the project contributed to the enabling policy environment for long-term realization of IP's economic empowerment?

Whilst the PIPE Program was based upon sound principles and the timing of the intervention was almost ideal, the go it alone approach, deferment of engagement with key stakeholders and failure to fully accept or implement the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation meant that PIPE's impacts in terms of promoting sustainable development in Papua were marginal and the program had no observable impacts on policy in Papua or at the national level.

Of particular concern is the flawed logic behind PIPE's strategy of deferring engagement, which meant that they missed numerous important opportunities, such as the establishment of the MRP, drafting of special autonomy regulations, opportunities to build partnerships and networks with government, CSOs and opportunities to introduce participatory technical training methodologies. Through timely engagement PIPE could have strengthened local capacity for indigenous and women's political representation, allowed ILO to make direct input in the drafting and review of indigenous rights policies in Papua, and increased the ILO's credibility and leverage on indigenous rights issues in Jakarta. It would also have provided the necessary platform for promoting the adoption of innovations and issues identified through the pilot programs.

On the other hand, I believe that the PIPE team and ILO have gained invaluable experience. So long as they can open themselves to greater participation with government and civil society organizations and reconsider their own approach to project delivery, there is a huge potential for PIPE to have great impact over coming years.

- **Adoption by local government** - Will local and/or national government offices be likely to adopt and pursue the approach promoted by the project after project completion?

“Concerned functionaries in the local government have themselves been slow in recognizing the merits of the CDPD approach. They started showing support for the CDPD process only when community-driven activities became visible on the ground and traditional community leaders and members begun to show signs of change and taking initiatives to improve their socio-economic condition. A number of such agencies are getting interested to partner with the adat-based community organizations in the pilot sites to pursue specific development activities. These agencies include the Social Welfare Office (Dinas Sosial) of Kabupaten Manokwari, Horticulture Office (Dinas Perkebunan) and Women Empowerment Office (Badan Pemberdayaan Perempuan) of Kabupaten Jayapura and the Community Empowerment Office (BPMD) of the Provincial Government of Papua.” ILO-PIPE 2008 Final Progress Report

PIPE’s achievements in relation to promoting the adoption of participatory principles and the CDPD approach by local government agencies have been limited. The final progress report only identifies three regency level government agencies to have shown an interest in partnering with the IPOs, and one provincial level agency, the BPMD, which had shown strong interest in adopting elements of the CDPD approach and GET Ahead entrepreneurship training tools into their programs.

There is no mention of support from provincial government agencies in West Papua Province and considering that over 50 different Provincial and Regency level government agencies, and an even greater number of sub-agencies, play a role in the direct delivery of services to rural communities in the four pilot program areas, this represents a very narrow support base from which to overturn the prevailing culture of top-down or client-patron aid delivery of aid projects.

It is also important to consider that interest in partnering with the IPOs is more likely to relate to functional interests (meeting aid delivery targets) rather than being an expression of enthusiasm for handing over control of aid delivery to IPOs or other CBOs. For example, the interest of the Jayapura Regency Horticulture Service seems to relate to the short term imperative to rapidly expand the area under cultivation to cocoa, as mandated by the Bupati of Jayapura.

As such, I believe that their interest in partnering with the DKD was primarily functional, as a convenient mechanism for rapid aid delivery, rather than a commitment to CDPD or participatory methods and principles. However, such functional interests are extremely valuable as entry points, providing opportunities to introduce participatory methods and mainstream the principles of indigenous and gender empowerment into their programs. However, with the exception of the GET Ahead training tools (discussed below) PIPE failed to capitalize on these opportunities as it did not take serious steps to introduce participatory technical training methodologies, such as Farmer Field School (FFS) approaches to agricultural training or Participatory Action Research (PAR) approaches to improving health and education services.

The interest of the Women’s Empowerment Office in Jayapura Regency presumably relates to the GET Ahead Entrepreneurship Training, which provides them with practical tools for the empowerment of women, as opposed to awareness raising and other WID / GAD approaches. The interest of the Women’s Empowerment Offices could prove highly strategic, because this is one of the few senior administrative roles held by women, and also because they are often headed by the wives of the Regent or other key government officials. In other words, partnering with them may exert authority and influence beyond their technical area of jurisdiction.

The level or nature of the Social Affairs Service in Manokwari Regency’s interest in PIPE or CDPD is not clear. During the early stages of the program they funded the honorariums of an additional 11 CDFs in

Kebar / Senopi and Tanah Rubuh Districts, but they seem to have done little in terms of supervising or participation in program evaluations, and as best as I could determine, their interest in the program seems to have waned over time. Given that the Social Affairs Service is the government agency with primary responsibility for developing remote indigenous communities, and are involved in many of the hand-out approaches eschewed by PIPE, it was important to work with them.

The most significant relationship which PIPE managed to develop during 2008 was with the head of the BPMD, who is reported to have displayed increasing enthusiasm for the CDPD approach. Given that BPMD is responsible for implementing RESPEK / PNPM program, this creates potential for PIPE to influence the way in which this flagship program is implemented and for the mainstreaming of participatory principles and indigenous rights, gender and peace building issues. However, to date PIPE's involvement has been limited to the delivery of a few short introductory seminars about PIPE and the CDPD approach to groups of trainee village and district facilitators involved in the RESPEK / PNPM program.

It is also important to determine exactly which element of CDPD and/or lessons learned from PIPE they are enthusiastic about adopting. If it is the rhetoric and tools which are adopted, the underlying philosophy of 'empowerment through co-learning' is not internalized. The outcome is much the same as other attempt to adapt participatory approaches to government bureaucratic cultures where top-down approaches are fully entrenched (such as RESPEK and PNPM). Furthermore, given that enthusiasm for CDPD seems to be largely invested in the head of the BPMD, and there is no indication that his enthusiasm is widely shared by his counterparts, there is clearly a risk that what support has been achieved could easily evaporate in the next re-shuffle of departmental heads.

Given PIPE's resonance with the provincial policy agenda, it is surprising that it was not able to establish a much broader and stronger support base amongst government agencies. This is particularly the case in Jayapura Regency. Here the Regent of Jayapura was quite actively trying to develop credibility as a leading advocate of community empowerment. This was demonstrated by his funding of publications on community empowerment and cooperatives in 2008. The Vice-Regent, however, was a key civil society leader who had been involved in founding CSOs including pt.PPMA and AFP3 and a pioneer of participatory planning and indigenous empowerment in Papua.

Overall, the element of the program which held the most appeal to government was the GET Ahead entrepreneurship training approach. This leads me to suspect that practical participatory training tools and methodologies, such as GET Ahead, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and Participatory Action Research (PAR) are of greater practical value and will gain much greater acceptance amongst government agencies.

- **Exit Strategy** - What steps have been made by the PIPE, partner communities and concerned local government units to ensure the sustainability of the project interventions?

PIPE's exit strategy appears to have been formulated in the last six months of the program, as it became apparent that a smooth progression to the planned phase II would not be achievable. The mainstay of PIPE's exit strategy was the provision of US\$110,000 block grant to the Community Credit Bank (BPR) Phidectama in Jayapura and the Credit Union (CU) Mambu in Manokwari. This included a small trust fund for ongoing micro-loans for livelihoods activities, as well as operational funding for these MFIs to provide training and supervisory services to the IPOs, and in the case of CU Mambu, technical support to the partner community's micro-entrepreneurs, for a period of approximately six months. It is important to note that neither of these MFIs has previous experience delivering capacity building services to IPOs or CBOs, and the constitution of the BPR Phidectama precluded it from providing technical support directly to entrepreneurs.

I believe that the involvement of local MFIs was a positive step, but they should have been involved in the process much earlier, and there should have been a smoother progression from GET Ahead Training, via micro-savings activities before making micro-loans available. As the founder of the BPR Phidectama pointed out, due to low levels of social capital, loan default rates amongst Papuans are usually very high,

which could cause the collapse, not only of the micro-finance facilities established through PIPE, but could also undermine the IPOs and cooperatives themselves.

In West Papua Province informal arrangements were established between the former PIPE program officer / consultant, CDFs and CSOs based in Manokwari to go on providing support to the IPOs and communities under the umbrella of the existing networks. However, this does not represent a well planned exit strategy, but instead is based on the commitment of the former program officer and their recognition of the fragility of PIPE's outcomes, in Tanah Rubuh and Kebar / Senopi.

- **Sustainability & Scaling-up** - To what extent could (or should) the project interventions be sustained/continued to ensure that sufficient capacity is created at community level?  
Can the project be scaled up and what are the necessary adjustments and conditions to be met?

The ILO-PIPE 2008 Final Progress Report points to five “conditions and mechanisms” put in place through the program to achieve “a reasonable likelihood that the results produced by the programme would be sustained.” These include:

- a) Individual and collective ownership of and responsibility for the programme activities and their results by the direct beneficiaries;
- b) Improved individual and collective mindsets that to some extent now regard development assistance as facilitative support services rather than mere hand-outs;
- c) Availability of community facilities (tools, equipment, micro-finance system) which could serve not only as mechanisms for the delivery of services and for production purposes but also as mechanisms for fostering unity and collective self-help;
- d) Custom (adat)-based community organizations whose basic capacity for CDPD has been enhanced; and
- e) Partner agencies in the government who are willing and able to continue assisting the ada-based community organizations.

As has been discussed in detail throughout the previous sections of this report, key concerns remain in relation to all of these conditions and mechanisms, and therefore the sustainability of PIPE's outcomes remains questionable.

Livelihoods activities including cocoa, peanut, banana and vegetable production will no doubt continue in the communities that have a decades-long history with such activity and where reasonably stable market conditions exist. It is less convincing that the technical training will result in an upward trend in local incomes, or for that matter, the increased profitability of micro-enterprises attributed to PIPE will be sustainable. This is due to the fact that technical training inputs were of low quality, manifested as extensions approaches rather than co-learning or problem solving approaches, and therefore did not address farmer empowerment and self-reliance.

As has already been discussed, the sustainability of the IPOs and their evolution over time, remains a key question mark, whereas broader policy impacts and the adoption of participatory principles and CDPD remains marginal.

As such it is crucial that PIPE build the sustainability of what it has already achieved, and not perform a major scaling-up (to include the existing four and an additional eight pilot program areas spread across 5 regencies) as the current proposal for PIPE Phase II proposes. This is unless PIPE is willing to change the implementation modality and develop an approach involving a far broader range of stakeholders in program design, implementation and evaluation.

## 6 Recommendations

The following recommendations are based upon the findings presented in section 5 of this report and have been targeted towards the needs and opportunities for further interventions already identified by the ILO PIPE and ILO Jakarta Offices. Indeed, these recommendations would be of relevance to any development organisations seeking to find how economic development can lead towards indigenous and gender empowerment, and peace and harmony.

### 6.1 Relevance & Strategic Fit

#### I. The ILO should make a *long term commitment* to strengthening special autonomy and engaging with indigenous, gender and workers rights, empowerment and human security issues in Papua for at least a decade to come.

All of the informants in this study felt the ILO has an important role to play in Papua and should make a commitment to be present in the provinces for the long term. The evaluator recommends that the ILO commit to Papua for at least a decade since that any real effect of development programs, especially those addressing complex social issues like PIPE, require time. Civil society leaders and government advisors explained two reasons for why such a commitment would benefit Papua. Firstly, they stressed the ability of the ILO to mainstream Papuan indigenous rights issues by placing gender and cultural issues on the local/national government and international development agendas. Secondly informants believed the ILO could deliver support for the consolidation of indigenous rights through developing the capacity for self-determination through indigenous representative and self-help organizations and institutions. And also support of human resources to alleviate development and poverty and build social dialogue for peace and sustainable and equitable development. Peoples' incipient belief in the ILO would be enhanced, and their programs engaged with more seriously if it stood out from other transient development assistance programs by holding a long term presence.

#### II. In order to have a meaningful impact in Papua the ILO needs to seriously consider expansion of its role Papua

Whilst the objectification of indigenous Papuan's in government development planning processes, their marginalization from the market economy and increasing levels of dependency on government development assistance and subsidies are important factors, these are by no means the sole drivers of poverty and causes of conflict in Papua.

A serious approach to indigenous empowerment and conflict mitigation in Papua requires consideration of a broader range of factors including:

- Human resources crisis: The ILO EAST Program has already addressing some vocational training capacity constraints, and the ILO PIPE program had a strong emphasis on livelihoods skills training, but not in a fully concerted / strategic approach (ie. without paying serious attention to the quality of training methods and materials).
- Market access / market chain constraints: This has been identified as a primary cause for the failure of many livelihoods activities in Papua. Many of PIPE's achievements in terms of livelihoods are also likely to prove short lived unless development in terms of transportation, infrastructure, a supportive policy environment etc is instigated. For example, in Jayawijaya government policy has restricted trade in fresh vegetables and the operation of pedi-cabs to the indigenous community, to afford them space to develop small enterprises and self-employment.
- Land and resource rights
- Socio-political change processes including *pemekaran*, establishment of OTSUS – including the establishment and strengthening of OTSUS institutions, drafting of special autonomy regulations,
- The impacts of major resource exploitation and infrastructure development projects, and the potential impacts of REDD projects on indigenous communities, including the quality and enforcement of environmental and social impact assessments and mitigation plans, the impacts of

different forms of compensation payments, and standards of best practice in delivery of corporate social responsibility programs.

Whilst it is clearly beyond the capacity of any single organization to address all of these aspects of social, economic and political marginalization in Papua, the ILO needs to consider engaging directly on certain issues, maintaining close liaison with local and international organizations working on other related issues, and mainstreaming / facilitating the broadest possible social dialogue on issues affecting the rights of indigenous people.

### **III. In planning a broader role for the ILO in Papua, the ILO should build upon its strengths whilst also identifying limitations and seeking complementary relationships to mitigate such limitations.**

- a) **The ILO must utilise its strength as a facilitator of social dialogue.** The key strength of the ILO is its proven capacity to facilitate social dialogue on controversial issues. By capitalising on this ability to push boundaries, the ILO can catalyse dialogue which generates innovations from the development margins. This, in turn, should mainstream innovations onto the UN and broader international agenda. The ILO in Papua then, needs to focus more on stimulating, facilitating and capturing local innovation rather than seeking to be the importer or instigator of innovation. In particular:
- b) **The ILO should raise the awareness of their traditional tripartite partners,** the business association (APINDO) and official labour unions (SPSI and SBSI) about indigenous, gender and workers rights issues in Papua so as to better implement macro-policy change. They should raise their partner's awareness about indigenous rights, gender and peace more generally and how they impact on the stability of the business environment. Given that the major sectors of the Papuan economy where unionized labour is employed are the mining, oil and gas and plantations (oil palm) sectors, it makes sense to engage with companies and workers in these sectors. For instance, if the ILO were to push for best practice policies in worker's rights and corporate social responsibility at BP Tangguh, they would ensure that all of BPs contractors were brought up to standard.
- c) **In addition to the tripartite structure, the ILO needs to seek avenues to open more inclusive round table social dialogues.** The ILO's unique tripartite structure allows it to be able to work with a broader range of government, business and civil society organizations than other multilateral agencies. To be more relevant to the Papuan context, more relevant and representative organizations need to be engaged so that the ILO's triangular table becomes a round table. Most notably, the ILO should seek ways to formally partner with the DPRP, DPRD and MRP. Without the support of agencies like the ILO, the democratization of Papua through building sufficiently robust institutions may be reversed.
- d) **The ILO should utilize its strength in organizational capacity building and policy development to support the development of key otsus institutions such as the MRP.** A significant opportunity to support otsus and advance the agenda of Indigenous Peoples Rights (IPRs) would be to work with the Papuan Peoples Council (*Majelis Rakyat Papua* or MRP)<sup>11</sup>. The MRP is the new parliamentary body established under the provisions of Papuan Special Autonomy Law to represent the interests of indigenous people, religious communities and women in Papua should have been engaged at the outset. As it has a limited power of review and veto over any provincial and regency level laws relating specifically to their constituents, it relates directly to Article 6<sup>12</sup> of C.169. As the success of failure of the MRP is crucial to the cause of IPRs both in Papua and at the National level, the ILO would enhance its outcomes and sustainability by developing the institutions, organizational capacity, and strategic agenda of this fresh and crucial link.

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<sup>11</sup> Formed in 2005, this body, the first of its kind in Indonesia, was mandated under Papuan Special Autonomy Law (otsus). It covers both Papua and West Papua Provinces, and exists alongside the Provincial Parliaments which represent the entire community.

<sup>12</sup> requiring that ratifying States should establish means for the peoples concerned to develop their own representative institutions as a means for consultation between governments and indigenous peoples



- e) **The ILO should also seek to employ its strengths in legal drafting, organizational capacity and formal institution building and macro-economic analysis to strengthen key government agencies, special autonomy institutions, higher education institutions and civil society organizations.** The ILO's proven strengths in these areas correspond to key areas of need on the part of the GOPP and GOWPP, the DPRP / DPRD and the MRP. These organisations are currently struggling with the tasks of institution building, drafting of otsus regulations, indigenous rights, workers rights, pro-poor development, policy development etc.
- f) **The ILO's strengths in appropriate education and training methodologies should also be employed to greater effect.** The ILO could help alleviate the human resource crises in Papua though strengthening local capacity for vocational training, teacher training, training of trainers and other adult education vocational training.
- g) **The ILO should better utilize its strength in micro-finance and micro-enterprise development.** With regards to microfinance, care should be take with replicating foreign models. Rather, the ILO would do well to commission a study looking at local microfinance projects as experienced by YPPWP, BPR, Trickle-Up West Papua, Usahamina Fishing Cooperative in Sorong and various other community models (arisan and self-mobilizing women's groups).

## 6.2 Validity of program design

### I. The ILO should conduct a Participatory Program Review Workshop and Strategy Planning Process.

To rectify the lack of inputs of local expertise during the planning and early stages of the program, and to address key questions which cannot adequately be answered through the current evaluation, the ILO should conduct a Participatory Program Review and Strategy Planning Workshop. The primary outputs of the workshop should include general strategy recommendations to help guide the ILO's interventions in Papua over coming years, as well as the formation of a smaller working group, which would be responsible for refining the workshop recommendations into specific plans, programs and proposals. Such a workshop would not only comply with the UN Evaluation Group (2005) Norms and Standards<sup>13</sup>, it would help inform PIPE of social, political, development planning and other issues emerging in Papua, engage social dialogue around PIPE's intentions to stakeholders in Papua, and, by opening PIPE to peer scrutiny in Papua, build confidence in the program.

This program review and strategy planning workshop should be held over 2-3 days in Jayapura or Manokwari. The workshop should be facilitated by a suitably skilled facilitator with advanced Indonesian language skills, either from within the ILO, or is such capacity is not available, by an independent consultant. The workshop should include a short seminar to inform participants regarding the history and work of the ILO and regarding Convention 169. A participatory review of the underlying assumptions, implementation, achievements, outcomes and lessons derived from PIPE Phase I should be the main focus of this workshop. It could also include a mid-term review of the ILO-EAST Program in Papua and West Papua.

The ILO should identify and invite a wide range of participants representing a balanced cross section of the major institutional stakeholders in the ILO's work in Papua and West Papua Provinces to participate in the Participatory Program Review and Strategy Planning Workshop. Whilst the final selection of participants should be developed through consultation, the evaluator would suggest a preliminary list of participants including:

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<sup>13</sup> Standard 3.11: Stakeholders should be consulted in the planning, design, conduct and follow-up of evaluations. The evaluation approach must consider learning and participation opportunities (e.g. workshops, learning groups, debriefing, participation in the field visits) to ensure that key stakeholders are fully integrated into the evaluation learning process.

- Representatives of ILO Jakarta and/or ILO Geneva
- ILO PIPE Personnel and key (long-term) consultants
- ILO EAST Personnel
- Representatives from each of the PIPE Pilot Programs
- Representatives of the Governors and Parliaments of Papua and West Papua Provinces
- Representatives of the national government – ie. Social Affairs Dept.
- Key local government partners - PSC Members and Service Providers
- The ILO's traditional non-government partners in Papua – ie. the business association APINDO and labour union SPSI.
- The Papuan Peoples Council (MRP)
- Local NGOs with expertise in indigenous empowerment and participatory development approaches in Papua such as the Papuan NGO Forum (FOKER), the Association of Participatory Planning Facilitators (AFP3), the Rural Development Foundation of Papua (YPMD), and others – based upon recommendations from FOKER
- Local NGOs with a focus on women's empowerment such as LP3AP, Humi Inane ....
- Other credible IPOs – such as LEMASA or YAHAMAK, YBAW, YABIMU, DPMA Deponsoro
- Universities (UNCEN & UNIPA and possibly others)
- International Conservation Organization working in Papua (WWF, CII and/or TNC)
- Key representatives of Papuan Churches / Church based organizations – such as Budi Hernawan from the Catholic Churches Peace and Justice Committee, Benny Giay, a prominent anthropologist and preacher within the Kingmi Church, and Herman Saud, head of the GKI Church.
- Community affairs and development specialists working with major resource companies such as BP Tangguh, Freeport, Pertamina, Petrochina

Please note, because they tend to have pro- Papuan independence roots, it would be safer to work with Papua's strong LSM scene and not *dewan adat* organisations (such as the DAP, Papua Presidium, regional and tribal councils or Dewan Adat Suku, and their youth foundation YADUPA). Yet still, the ILO should attempt to hear their opinions and ensure that their positions are clearly represented through engagement with other less controversial organizations such as the MRP, LEMASA and FOKER, where leaders and close affiliates of the DAP are also involved. In particular the project should have made stronger links with pt.PPMA which had been involved in establishing at least 16 organizations in the Jayapura area since the 1990s as well as seeking greater input from organizations including AFP3, FOKER, YPMD, and WWF.

Two final points in relation to such a workshop. Firstly, that ILO should prepare community representatives to be capable of voicing their own views in order to maximize their learning from participation in such a forum. Secondly, that the ILO should review project documents to better reflect their substantiated achievements and remove statements which may be counterproductive.

## **II. PIPE needs to develop M&E and project documentation systems capable of strengthening participation and adaptive management and externally validating project outcomes and capturing relevant lessons learned.**

Innovation in monitoring and evaluation should be a key objective in any follow-up activities. In particular PIPE should:

- Adopt a more participatory approach involving community members and other stakeholders in M&E processes relating to the overall PIPE program, rather than just their own activities at the pilot program level. This should include participation in the process of selecting the criteria and indicators for measuring project progress.
- Ensure that all indicators are relevant, clearly defined and that the means of verification is appropriate and adequately described.
- Ensure that underlying assumptions are identified and tested and issues of bias and validity are properly considered.
- Ensure that adequate and gender disaggregated baseline data is generated as early as possible in the project cycle.

- Strengthen participant observation functions of program field personnel through increasing their level of field exposure and strengthening the reporting and analysis of field observations, rather than just monitoring program inputs and outputs.
- Develop robust money systems and allocate dedicated human resources to ensure adequate documentation.
- Ensure that the lessons learned generated from the program emerge from the experience of the participants and are more specific to the context of Papua.
- Review a broader range of M&E tools and consider trialling and adapting the most promising or relevant elements. This should include quantitative tools such as mini-questionnaires or surveys, and participatory tools including the PRA techniques which have proven useful for impact analysis such as time-lines, well-being and preference ranking, impact flow diagrams and trend analysis, the “perceptions of change” approach, “Barometer of Sustainability”, “outcome mapping” etc.
- Consider the various applications of self-directed video techniques, including as a tool for reflection and self-evaluation, documentation, empowerment and as an extremely strong motivator for participation.

### **6.3 Implementation progress and effectiveness**

#### **I. PIPE should collaborate with strategic local government agencies to develop, trial and promote participatory technical skills training methodologies.**

- Work with BPR Phidectama, CU Mambuin, other government agencies and CSOs on adapting GET Ahead materials and developing a Papua specific package of participatory training tools to help rural women guide other rural women through a staged learning process from basic literacy and numeracy, household budget management, micro-savings, micro-enterprise, micro-finance and beyond. It is extremely important to consider existing tools and approaches that have been trialled in Papua.
- Work with the Estate Crops Service and CSOs on developing Farmer Field School (FFS) methodologies. This should primarily focus on Cocoa-Agroforestry and control of the cocoa pod borer, because this pest represents such a major threat to the livelihoods of many indigenous Papuans, and because a package of training materials has already been trialled in West Papua Province and could easily be adopted and improved. Over should ILO-PIPE should seek to build sufficient local capacity to facilitate the development of new FFS materials and approaches for improving the productivity of other key commodities.
- Participatory Action Research (PAR) approaches for the improvement of community health services or development of local curriculum content might also be developed in collaboration with the education and health services and local CSOs.

#### **II. PIPE must strengthen their focus on gender mainstreaming by taking affirmative action to increase women’s participation.**

Women’s participation is absolutely vital and women’s participation rates must be increased to at least 40% and ideally over 50%. In order to achieve these targets a number of measures will be required including:

- Imposing non-negotiable strict requirements that half of the community facilitators are female.
- Adapting training materials to better suit Papuan women.
- Allocating additional resources to encourage and facilitate women’s participation
- Communicating with male relatives and community members regarding the social and economic benefits of supporting increased women’s participation in development programs.

#### **III. PIPE should fund and facilitate opportunities for cross visits between pilot program participants as well as visits to other Papuan communities where valuable lessons could be learned.**

Cross visits between Papuan communities would help them to overcome isolation factors which act as a constraint to the exchange of knowledge and appropriate technology, and would networking, potential

synergies and encourage healthy competition communities. This should include cross visits to evaluate the progress of activities in other pilot program areas, and visits to other Papuan communities where innovative approaches to community development and empowerment have been developed locally.

#### **IV. PIPE should ensure greater adherence to participatory process, and strategic use of material aid**

PIPE needs to ensure that good process is not sacrificed in the pursuit of pre-planned targets, and ensure that the provision of material assistance is appropriate and is only provided when sufficient capacity exists to ensure such resources can be well management and utilized, and will not generate conflict within or between communities.

### **6.4 Resourcing and Management Arrangements**

#### **I. The PIPE Program should adopt a more participatory implementation modality.**

The ILO might consider establishing a system of sub-grants to fund the implementation of a wider variety of activities by community, government, academic, religious and/or civil society organizations. Within this approach it would need to ensure clear guidelines and a tight monitoring and evaluation system. This system would include a unified learning framework, to help capture innovations, and regular peer review workshops.

The ILO should also investigate options for establishing a volunteer program, perhaps with the help of UNV, to enlist recent graduates from Papuan Universities. These graduates could undertake extended (1-2 years) work placement with local community-based and civil society organizations (CBOs & CSOs). By utilizing the growing pool of unemployed graduates, PIPE could boost the strength of local CBOs and CSOs by developing human resources as well as mitigate the potential for conflict arising from disgruntlement form this demographic. After all, educated but unemployed people are recognized as a significant source of social instability in Papua. A long term benefit of this approach would be to reconnect Papua's educated demographic with the realities of village needs.

#### **II. The ILO should review staffing arrangements**

##### **a. The ILO should attempt to retain existing PIPE program personnel.**

Over the last three years the team have demonstrated dedication, empathy, and surmounted a steep learning curve and some unusual challenges with fairly minimal resources. As such the retention of most or all of the current project personnel is highly advisable as their loss would represent a significant loss of the ILO's collective knowledge and experience regarding indigenous peoples and their empowerment in Papua / Indonesia and even Melanesia.

##### **b. The ILO should conduct performance Evaluations**

Feedback is required on staffing arrangements to ensure the quality of project delivery and the wellbeing of staff. Poor levels of staffing, as PIPE Phase I experienced, compromised the processes, outputs and outcomes of the program as well as exposing program personnel to unnecessary health and safety risks. For example, program personnel were often overworked (in one case community members claimed that a program officer had miscarried as a result of her dedication to duty). Inability to carry the load trickled over as disgruntled individuals or broader community disaffection emerged after delays or communication breakdowns.

##### **c. Increase staff levels**

CDPD and similar participatory empowerment approaches require a high level of facilitation oversight, particularly during the initial stages, but also maintained at as fairly high level for 3-5 years before being wound back over several years thereafter. In West Papua Province in particular it proved extremely difficult for one program officer to establish concurrent programs in Kebar/Senopi and Tanah Rubuh. It should also be noted that all of the pilot program areas were actually relatively accessible from the

Provincial Capitals, with many districts and villages in the central highlands, the interior of the Bird's Head only accessible by light aircraft or by foot, and many island and swamp dwelling communities remaining accessible only by canoes or motor boats.

If the program is to be continued with a similar focus and extent to the PIPE Phase I, then there should be at least a CTA and one program officer assigned to each pilot program district, as well as a monitoring, evaluation and information officer, an administrator and one vehicle and driver in each province. If the program's focus is to be expanded, or if complementary programs are to be instituted, the ILO should consider its overall human resources requirements in Papua, possibly considering some degree of human resource sharing between different programs, and consider reallocation / redescription of roles based upon the identification of the skills and aptitudes of different personnel identified through performance evaluations.

**d. Prioritize the recruitment of highly qualified Indigenous Papuans and women, especially for management roles.**

In seeking to recruit additional staff, serious consideration should be given to the placement of suitably qualified indigenous Papuans, and ideally indigenous Papuan women, into management roles

**e. Reconsider Staff Remunerations and Contracting Arrangements in Papua**

As has already been noted, there is currently an acute shortage of human resources in Papua, and skilled community development professionals in particular find themselves in high demand amongst the increasing number of international development agencies and aid programs. As such the ILO may need to reconsider its approach to remunerations or consider offering longer term contracts or even staff positions if they hope to attract high quality Papuan personnel, or to encourage suitable people to resettle to Papua. This would ensure the ILO is setting the standard for occupational health, safety and environmental policies in Papua.

**III. Take steps to ensure higher quality of consultant inputs**

This would entail constructing clearer TORs, greater supervision by program staff, peer review processes and a more thorough process for identifying potential consultants.

**IV. Revise Upwards the Budgetary and Resource Allocations for PIPE Phase II**

The current proposals for PIPE Phase II, which entails scaling up of the existing approach to cover 12 pilot program areas spread across five regencies in Papua over a period of four years, has a proposed budget of US\$4,538,600. This is equivalent to a budget of just US\$94,554.16 per pilot program area per annum, which represents a 25% decrease in as compared to the budget of PIPE Phase I, which was equivalent to US\$ 128,163.75 per pilot program area per annum.

In light of plans for program expansion, especially into more remote areas where transport and material costs can be several times higher, the budget needs to be expanded. This is especially so in light of my recommendations that additional human resources are needed to improve the quality of program outputs, including additional vehicles and drivers and one program officer per pilot program area. And this is not to mention that higher remunerations and possibly resettlement support will attract higher quality personnel.

**V. The ILO should ensure that they are setting HSE standards by clearly establishing HSE standards and instituting HSE compliance reviews as part of the village development planning process.**

Based on the findings that program staff and consultants in West Papua were regularly exposed to health and safety risks when travelling to field sites using charter vehicles, and that adequate HSE standards were not being applied to technical skills training activities, facilitating the development of HSE standards and monitoring of these standards is a highly appropriate role for any ILO project.

## 6.5 Impact and Sustainability

### I. The ILO should work on building sustainability before scaling up

The current proposal for PIPE Phase II, which entails scaling up to include the existing four and an additional eight pilot program areas spread across 5 regencies is less important than PIPE building the sustainability of what it has already achieved. For instance, given that the IPOs established during PIPE Phase I cannot yet be considered sustainable, the ILO need to provide a high level of capacity building support for the IPOs and self-help groups established through PIPE Phase I.

The ILO has both a responsibility and a need to continue working with the four existing IPOs. Most Papuan development professionals would consider it necessary to support such newly established IPOs for around 7-10 years before they could be considered self-reliant organizations. Therefore, PIPE needs to consider providing a fairly high level of facilitative support to the existing four pilot program areas, for the next 3-4 years and then gradually scale back. Capacity building for IPOs should take a variety of forms including increased opportunities to attend meetings outside the villages, comparative visits to other communities, opportunities to work as consultants or trainers in other communities and strengthening their relationships with district level government.

### III. In the process of engaging with RESPEK / PNPM and the UN Joint Program in Papua, the ILO should maintain an autonomous role and its development objectives should not capitulate to their objectives.

The ILO PIPE team sought complementarily with RESPEK and programs of the World Bank, UNDP and others. Supporting other agencies should be done while maintaining the integrity of the ILOs strengths or else, projects like PIPE could become subsumed by the management and project imperatives of the larger organizations and programs. The ILO should, as was outlined before, build on its strengths and not try to emulate, or become service providers for, other players on the Papuan development scene. In particular they could best engage with these organizations in three ways: One, through stimulating innovations and best practice in facilitation and supervision of participatory village development processes. Secondly, through improving the quality of technical skills training services available to indigenous (and other) communities. Three, PIPE could possibly work towards establishing more formal community development training programs and/or a register of village development experts in collaboration with local universities and NGOs such as FOKER, AFP3.

