



Independent Final Evaluation

**Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and
Enterprises in Nahr El Bared**

LEB/08/05M/UNR

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Evaluation Summaries

Evaluation: Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr El Bared

Quick Facts

Countries: *Lebanon*

Final Evaluation: *October-November 2010*

Mode of Evaluation: *Independent*

Technical Area: *Employability/Skills*

Evaluation Management: *Regional Programming Service Unit, ILO ROAS*

Evaluator: *Ziad Moussa*

Project Start: *August 2008*

Project End: *June 2010*

Project Code: *LEB/08/05/UNR*

Donor: *UNRWA Emergency Appeal*

Keywords: *Livelihood recovery, Employment Service Centre, skills development, employment generation*

Background and Context

Summary: Programme Purpose, Logic and Structure

A recent study¹ estimates that two thirds of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in poverty and that the Palestinian refugee labour force in Lebanon is approximately 120,000 individuals;

¹ "Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon", American University of Beirut, December 2010.

20% are living in North Lebanon and 56% are unemployed.

The employment situation was aggravated by the Nahr El Bared conflict in the summer of 2007 which led to a massive displacement within the population, where 93% of the displaced population suffered significant disruption in terms of human, social, physical and economic capital; 79% of the displaced population was found to be unemployed.

In the context of the ILO's mandate and international experience with employment creation and livelihood recovery in post-conflict situations, and its current partnership with the Committee for Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, UNRWA invited ILO to provide specialized assistance on enhancing local employment, skills and enterprises through the project "Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr El Bared and Beddawi Camp".

The Project had the development objective "to reduce poverty amongst Nahr El Bared residents through providing better access to employment, self-employment and training opportunities". This was goal was addressed primarily through the establishment of an Emergency Employment Services Centre (EESC) and conducting Vocational Education Training (VET) sessions.

Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

Following the completion of the first phase of the project, a Senior National Evaluator, Mr.

Ziad Moussa, was recruited to conduct an independent final evaluation for the project, in line with ILO evaluation policies and procedures.

The evaluation ran from 15 October to 15 December 2010, and included a desk review of secondary data provided by various UN agencies, several meetings with key project personnel and institutional counterparts in Beirut and North Lebanon. The Evaluator formed eight (8) Focus Groups drawn from project beneficiaries and carried-out several visits to apprentices in their place of work. As well, the Evaluator facilitated two workshops, an inception workshop and a stakeholder's workshop, to triangulate information received and gather comments and feedback on the draft findings.

The **purpose** of this formative evaluation process was to:

1. Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not.
2. Determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved.
3. Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders.
4. Document lessons learned, success stories, and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained.
5. Examine the UN joint programming management model, with a focus on the coordination between ILO and UNRWA to achieve the common pre-set objectives of the project.

The **primary clients** of the evaluation are the ILO Regional Office for Arab States, UNRWA and CIDA. Secondary clients include other units

within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation (SKILLS, MICROFINANCE, CODEV, and EVAL), as well as project beneficiaries and partners.

The **scope** of the evaluation covered all project activities implemented from August 2008-June 2010. In particular the evaluation examined the quality and impact of project activities on the employability of Palestinian refugees.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation's methodological approach had three phases:

1. A desk review of secondary data provided by ILO ROAS and other UN agencies.
2. Field interviews to collect primary data and validate the compiled information. Interviews were conducted with project beneficiaries and key informants, and field visits were performed to project sites for consultation with partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders.
3. An inception workshop was held at the beginning of the evaluation to grasp stakeholder's main expectations and a Stakeholder Workshop was held during the process to disseminate the findings, triangulate information received from stakeholders, collect comments, feedback and additional information.

Main Findings and Conclusions

The main findings of the evaluation can be summarized as follows:

Although the EESC was initially designed as an immediate relief intervention, it matured into a full-fledged recovery project which is well integrated in the UNRWA structure and able to attract additional donor support. As a result, it is currently being replicated in South Lebanon.

It also managed to catalyze a broader thinking on Palestinian employability in Lebanon and of the ILO/UNRWA strategic partnership.

The evaluation confirmed the **relevance** of the EESC in targeting the employability of Palestinians in general, and in particular the employability within NBC and BC camps following the summer 2007 conflict. A clearer definition of the target groups, or the priority sectors that the project was trying to address, could have possibly led to more focused results.

The **design** of the project was in line with the ILO guidelines for establishing public emergency employment services while taking into account the specifics of the Palestinian Refugee situation in Lebanon. The project's operationalisation could have benefited from a more systematic and transparent application of Project Cycle Management principles such as establishing clear baselines, developing a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy linked to well defined objectives and verifiable indicators, and developing an unambiguous management structure which defines the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders.

In terms of **effectiveness**, the project managed to attract 2,409 applicants over a period of 16 months of effective operations, and placed 18.5% of these applicants in jobs (397 in construction, 123 in other industry codes). Due to the absence of follow-up data, only a tracer study could determine if the placed job seekers were able to keep their jobs for more than a month and – most importantly – the working conditions that were achieved for these job seekers (i.e. contractual conditions, wages, incentives for productivity, working conditions, working hours, occupational safety and health).

The VET component of the project targeted mainly unskilled and semi-skilled job seekers, predominantly aged between 15 and 24 years and managed to place a total of 536 individuals in training, 315 of whom were trained through the VET component of the project (115 referred through the EESC and 200 recruited directly by the VET providers). Another 161 individuals were placed in VET courses not funded by the project and an additional 60 individuals are reported as placed in training though not referred to training by EESC or covered by the VET component of the project. Participants in VET short courses expressed an extremely high satisfaction rate (90%). According to the estimations of the project, around 60% of the trainees were working 2-months after the end of the training courses.

The **efficiency** analysis under the current operational conditions turned-out to be quite complex in light of the special social and political context in which the project is operating, as well as the short life-cycle of the project. The total budget of the project, as per the inter-agency agreement between ILO and UNRWA, was \$650,000 (of which \$151,500 was for contracts with VET providers) with an additional in-kind support from UNRWA of approximately \$150,000. At later stages, if this initiative is to be replicated under comparable socio-economic conditions, it would be important to establish an *indicative cost* per job-seeker and per job-placement achieved over a more representative time period (36 months for example).

Impact could not be clearly determined due to the short life-cycle of the project and due to the absence of adequate qualitative and quantitative data. A series of planned and unplanned outcomes could be determined at the individual and the institutional level which,

taken together, would lead to a deeper understanding of the project impact. In that sense, EESC was found to constitute one of the first comprehensive attempts to address the employability of Palestinians in Lebanon from a *system perspective* and outside the traditional perspective of sector or target-group specificity. The project responded to a real need that goes beyond classical aid delivery. It marks a shift in the mindset of the Camp's population from a total dependence on UNRWA for their livelihoods needs to a win-win partnership where UNRWA is able to play an enabling role with the support of ILO.

Job seekers felt that they were better equipped and more empowered with EESC support. Although not mentioned explicitly in the official literature of the project, this aspect expanded the horizons of the boundary sphere in which NBC and BC camp residents were seeking employment from the camps and their immediate vicinity, reaching as far afield as far as Chekka and Halba. This is a very important outcome which ultimately will help heal the scars left in the collective sub-conscious of both Palestinians and Lebanese by the 2007 military offensive.

The approval for funding a second phase of the project by CIDA, and the ongoing endorsement of the project by UNRWA and ILO, in addition to the launch of a new EESC for South Lebanon are all positive signs of broad ownership of the project and its outcomes. The EESC is the only NBC recovery project that is continuing into a second phase, while most of the projects initiated under the Livelihoods Cluster are gradually phasing out.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

Main Recommendations and Follow-Ups

1. Over the next phase, the EESC should develop a refined set of objectives, measurable performance indicators, and a clearly defined organizational structure.
2. In the future, the EESC should reconsider dealing with the community of Palestinian job-seekers as one homogenous group and should develop sector-specific and stakeholder-specific approaches.
3. The EESC should improve its management and data handling processes by creating a user-friendly Management Information System (MIS) and harmonise the data reporting,
4. It is recommended to designate a "data manager", or introduce a position for a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, in order to improve performance and strengthen accountability and learning.
5. It is highly recommended that an Advisory Board be established for the EESC bringing together ILO, UNRWA, CEP, VET providers, representatives of the education sector, Private Sector representatives and Chambers of Commerce.
6. UNRWA and ILO should play a more proactive role in steering the EESC and in setting its development agenda.
7. The EESC should be able to periodically re-define and adjust its approach and strategic choices based on the results of continuous monitoring.
8. The EESC should enhance its governance mechanisms for institutionalising its work and for a potential replication.

Important Lessons Learned

1. Working along a Logical Framework model makes the project more structured and

monitoring of its achievements more tangible.

2. The coherence of data is critical to understand the profound changes introduced by EESC.
3. Analytical qualitative reporting is as important (perhaps more important) than quantitative reporting.

4. The determination and measurement of outcomes and impacts is as important as the measurement and reporting of outputs.

The lessons learned from this evaluation should contribute to the improvement of the second phase of EESC, as well as the new EESC being implemented in South Lebanon.

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1. Project Background

The number of UNRWA registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is estimated at 425,000 with their vast majority living in 12 camps and 13 “gatherings” across Lebanon. A recent study report published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and UNRWA in 2011² bring down the number to 260,000-280,000 of those residing in Lebanon and estimates that two third of these refugees live in poverty.

According to a legal study commissioned by the Committee for the Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (CEP) “... All legislation issued to date (by the Government of Lebanon) has not adequately addressed the civil, economic and social rights of Palestinian refugees. Nor was their access to work the subject of specific regulations, as was the case with their residency... This matter created a legislative vacuum and introduced a certain inequality between the Palestinians and all other foreigners (present on the Lebanese territories)”³

Another study by ILO and CEP (2010)⁴ reveals that “...the majority of Palestinians (in Lebanon) work in the informal economy, predominantly in the agriculture, construction and trade sectors. **Decent work conditions and job security are absent for the majority of these Palestinian workers**, who are often employed without work permits, on temporary jobs, and without access to social security, leading to a significantly increasing proportion in vulnerable employment, and therefore poverty.

The ILO-CEP study also notes that the number of work permits granted to Palestinians by the Lebanese government decreased by 82% since 1979 despite the growing number of the Palestinian working force. For example, only 278 out of 109,379 work permits given to non-Lebanese were granted to Palestinians in 2005 and just 99 permits in 2009. This proportion does not exceed 0.25% of the yearly permits over the last decade and is in total mismatch with the number of Palestinians refugees living in Lebanon.

The AUB-UNRWA study estimates the Palestinian refugees’ potential labor force at 120,000, 20% of whom are living in North Lebanon and 56% of whom are jobless⁵. The simple mathematics of the study suggest that the active population seeking employment in North Lebanon is approximately 13,500 individuals with a strong gender variance (87% unemployment among women compared to 35% amongst men). The study also confirms the tendency of Palestinian refugees to work in the informal sector, as only 7% of employed refugees were found to be working with a contract. **Table 1** below sheds light on the some of the disincentives that are increasingly pushing away Palestinians from the formal sector.

	Wage Earners	Self-Employed
Formal Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work permits fees • Income tax • Registration fees without benefits from NSSF services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership restrictions in major professional syndicates • Income tax • Registration fees without benefits

² Chaaban, J. et al (2010), “Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon”, Report published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

³ CEP (2009) Legal Texts Governing the Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon pp7

⁴ ILO & CEP (2010) Review of Studies on the Employability of Palestinian Refugees in the Lebanese Labor Market

⁵ Jobless is defined in the study as the ratio of persons of working age who are not studying, pregnant or ill

		from the NSSF services
Informal Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of employment within the NGO sector • No income tax • No work permits fees • No NSSF registration fees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benefit from micro-credit and incubator services • No income tax • No work permits fees • No NSSF registration fees

Table 1: Comparison of opportunities for Palestinian employment between the formal & informal sectors (source: ILO & CEP 2010)

In May 2007 fierce clashes between the radical group Fatah al Islam and the Lebanese Army erupted in Tripoli and quickly spread to the nearby Nahr El-Bared Camp (NBC). Due to the fighting, over 30,000 Palestine refugees fled their homes in and around NBC, most of them taking refuge in the neighboring Beddawi Camp (BC) which saw its population increase from 16,000 to more than 30,000 inhabitants. The hostilities officially ended in September 2007, leaving NBC almost totally destroyed and BC overburdened by the massive inflow of refugees.

In August 2007 and as the conflict was ending, ILO and UNRWA commissioned a rapid socio-economic survey study⁶ which concluded that 93% of the displaced population has suffered significant disruption in terms of human, social, physical and economic capital and 79% declared themselves unemployed. The lack of employment and income for the majority of the displaced presented a potential threat not only to the security and stability of NBC, but also to the region as a whole.

In the context of the ILO’s mandate and international experience with employment creation and livelihood recovery in post conflict situations and its current partnership in the Committee for Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, UNRWA invited ILO to provide specialized assistance on enhancing local employment, skills and enterprises through the project “**Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr El Bared and Beddawi Camp**”.

The inter-agency agreement between UNRWA and ILO was signed on June 25th 2008 and the project kicked-off effectively in August 2008. In February 2009, a public launching ceremony was organized. An ILO international trainer spent 5 weeks in April-May to provide on-the-job training and backstopping for the EESC staff. The initial duration of the project was foreseen to be 12 months (January to December 2009) but was later extended until June 2010. The project is continuing today under the leadership of UNRWA through a second phase of 2 years (July 2010 – June 2012) with funding from the Canadian CIDA.

EESC had as development objective “to reduce poverty amongst Nahr El Bared residents through providing better access to employment, self-employment and training opportunities” with three specific objectives:

- a) Emergency Employment Services are established and are operating with well trained staff able to provide specific advisory and labor market services to targeted groups of job seekers in NBC
- b) Employment and training opportunities are identified and job seekers referred to employment with major projects, private sector employers and other employment options.

⁶ ILO and UNRWA (2007) Socio-economic characteristics of displaced Palestinian refugees from Nahr El-Bared Refugee camp.

- c) Relevant and up-to-date advice and assistance on micro-finance, business development services and self-employment opportunities available in the local labor market is provided to targeted jobseekers.

These objectives were to be achieved using employment intensive methods in view of the planned reconstruction efforts of the Nahr El Bared camp; yet, in view in the long delays to start the reconstruction, these methods were to provide scope and flexibility to generate **both short-term immediate employment** through repair, rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure, **and long-term sustainable employment** through the productive use of the same infrastructure. The two main activities of the project were the establishment of an Emergency Employment Services Center (EESC) and conducting Vocational Education Training sessions to complement EESC activities.

On the operational side EESC worked (and still works) according to an open-door policy and targets a wide range of job seekers (JS), from the basic unskilled laborer to the holder of an advanced university degree. Some Lebanese and few Syrians living in NBC, BC or the surroundings also approached the center and benefited from its services.

EESC comprises two offices, one in NBC and one in BC. Each office is supposed to have three permanent staff (although the BC office operated with only 2 staff persons for most of the duration of the project)

- i) **A counselor** who is in charge of interviewing JS and referring them to identified job opportunities when suitable. The Counselor also assists JS in preparing their CVs, provides advice on how to approach employers during a job interview, refers JS to training when suitable, etc..
- ii) **An outreach officer** who is in charge of analyzing labor market and identifying suitable job opportunities to which JS can be referred including active research and meeting employers, businesses, chambers of commerce, et...
- iii) **A registration clerk** who is in charge of data entry as well as administrative and secretarial jobs (booking of appointments, collection of data, logistical arrangements, etc...)

Both centers are managed by a **project supervisor** appointed by UNRWA and who is also in charge of the liaison with ILO. From the ILO side, EESC involves 3 key personnel:

- iv) **A national coordinator** who is in charge of the technical and administrative coordination of the project within ILO and the liaison with UNRWA
- v) **A national Vocational Education Training (VET) specialist** who manage specifically the VET component of the project
- vi) **A Chief Technical Advisor** who is in charge of providing managing the overall project and providing the required technical guidance throughout its implementation.”

2. Evaluation Background

Following the completion of the first phase of the project, a Senior National Evaluator – Mr. Ziad Moussa – was recruited to conduct an independent final evaluation for the project, in line with ILO policies and procedures on evaluations. Ms. Laetitia Weibel, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor at the ILO Regional Office for Arab States acted as the evaluation manager. Mr. Moussa was assisted by Ms Layal Dandash, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer at the Environment and Sustainable

Development Unit of the American University of Beirut and Mr. Mohammad Safieddine, a graduate student majoring in International Development.

The **Purpose** of the evaluation as per the TORs was to:

- **Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives** and explain why/why not;
- **Determine the impact of the project** in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- **Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project** and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- **Document lessons learned, success stories, and good practices** in order to maximize the experiences gained.
- **Examine the UN joint programming management model** mainly the coordination between ILO and UNRWA to achieve the common pre-set objectives of the project.

The **Scope** of the evaluation anticipated to look at all activities implemented from August 2008-June 2010. In particular the evaluation intended to examine the quality and impact of project activities on the employability of Palestinian refugees, including:

- **Development effectiveness:** The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives and intended results were achieved;
- **Resource Efficiency:** The extent with which resources were economically converted into results, including mention of alternative more cost-effective strategies when applicable;
- **Impact:** Positive and negative, intended and unintended long-term effects;
- **Relevance:** The extent to which the development intervention meets beneficiary requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies;
- **Sustainability:** The continuation of benefits and probability of continued long-term benefits after the project has been completed.
- **Partnerships:** The extent to which the project contributed to capacity development of UNRWA, the effectiveness of the ILO-UNRWA partnership and implications on potential future national and regional partnerships;
- **Lessons learned and good practice:** Good practices identified by the project, key lessons learned from programme implementation, and recommendations for similar programmes/projects.

The detailed TORs of the Evaluation are provided in [Annex 1](#) of this report

The evaluation ran between October 15th and December 15th 2010 and included several meetings with key project personnel and institutional counterparts in Beirut and North Lebanon, 8 Focus Groups with the project beneficiaries, several visits to apprentices in their place of work as well as a kickoff stakeholders’ workshop.

Table 2 below gives the details of the field activities that were carried in preparation of this evaluation, while the guiding questions for these Focus Groups are provided in [Annex 2](#).

Stakeholders	Date (2010)	Location
ILO Regional M&E Officer & UNRWA Program	October 19 th	ILO Hamra

support office		
UNRWA EESC Supervisor & EESC Outreach Officer	October 21 st	UNRWA Tripoli
ILO Chief Technical Officer and ILO National Coordinator	October 27 th	ILO Badaro
FG1: JS placed in construction (1) Visit of apprentices in their place of work	November 3 rd	EESC BC Tripoli, Abdeh
Kick-off Stakeholders Workshop	November 4 th	ILO Hamra
FG2: VET Graduates who are working FG3: female-only group Visit of some JS in their workplace	November 10 th	EESC BC EESC NBC Akkar
UNRWA Program support Office	November 15 th	UNRWA Bir Hasan
FG4: JS paced in jobs (non-construction) FG5: JS placed in construction (2) Visit of an apprentice in his place of work	November 23 rd	EESC NBC EESC NBC Tripoli market
FG6: registered JS who did not yet find a job FG7: Construction craftsmen working independently from EESC	November 24 th	EESC NBC EESC NBC
Meeting with CEP Coordinator	November 25 th	CEP @ UNRWA Bir Hasan
FG8: Employers (construction and others) who were served by EESC	November 29 th	Quality Inn hotel – Tripoli
Presentation & discussion of evaluation results	December 17 th	UNESCWA


Table 2: Meetings and Focus Groups organized for the purpose of the evaluation

3. Methodology

The TORs foresee a strictly external and independent evaluation, which is in complete compliance with the Lead Evaluator’s profile as he did not get in previous work with neither ILO nor UNRWA.

The spirit along which the evaluation was conducted fell – to the greatest extent possible – under the **“Developmental Evaluation”** paradigm which encourages engaging the project management, partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the evaluation. Technically speaking, and although the TORs did foresee a final evaluation, we conducted a **“formative final evaluation”**⁷ which leads to results that could feed into the second phase of the project (and which is in fact underway since July 2010)

The key intellectual challenge in a developmental evaluation resides in the subtle art of balancing accountability vs. institutional learning, both of which



⁷ As opposed to “summative evaluation” which simply takes stock of what has been achieved and puts a stronger focus on accountability

seemed clearly needed in this evaluation. On one hand the evaluation has to examine the assumptions based on which the project was identified and designed and benchmark it vis à vis the actual performance of the project, and on the other hand assess the broader outcomes/impacts attained, while acknowledging the post-conflict emergency response nature of the intervention. ...

The TORs clearly suggested to follow a Cartesian framework for examining relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, with particular emphasis on the project design and the institutional synergies that were/should have been mobilized (Section 4 of the TORs: suggested analytical framework). **A potential setback of this framework is that many of the questions it poses would/should have been better addressed at the beginning or mid-way through the project's life**, as there is little to do at this point if (point 4.2 d of the TORs for example: “objectives of the project (were) clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)...”

Another concern is **the absence of basic Project Cycle Management (PCM) tools with associated indicators** which lend themselves to this type of analytical framework, the most obvious of which being a Logical Framework with an acceptable disaggregation of the outputs of the project and which is clearly linked to the baseline situation that the project is trying to address.

We hence tied to respect the proposed standard framework, while articulating the inquiry questions in a way that privileges learning.

With respect to evaluation tools, we applied a “mixed methods” approach, departing from relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact but looking also for “change stories” (Most Significant Change), A-Ha moments (Appreciative Inquiry) and “contribution rather than attribution and shared credit for the attainment of the development objectives” (Outcome Mapping). This proved to be particularly useful while conducting the Focus Groups. **Table 3** provides an exhaustive summary of the linkages between evaluation criteria, the questions expressed by ILO and UNRWA in the TORs as well as the possible data sources which were consulted, whether these sources were provided by the project or sought after by the consultant

Evaluation criteria	Performance Indicators as per Project documents	Inquiry leads	Possible data sources	Possible performance indicators
Relevance	<p>Most performance indicators in the log-frame of the project are expressed abstract percentages, many of which cannot be attributed to the sole contribution of the project (such as overall poverty reduction, increase in income or increase in employability)</p> <p><u>We asked to project team to take a retrospective view on the performance indicators set and we will discuss the results with them to see what can be attributed to the project and what cannot</u></p>	<p>How was the project identified and conceptualized? (genesis, mobilization of funds, identification of partnerships, ...)</p> <p>Were some of the key assumptions behind the project valid? (labor intensive employment intra-NBC, decent work, gender equity, ...)</p> <p>The project provided an “easy solution” response? Did it manage to address clear needs gap that was not addressed by other interventions of other actors?</p> <p>Was there a clear identification of the stakeholders from the beginning? Or the project assumed it will be NBC at large?</p> <p>Was there any clear added value form the project that is likely to remain sustained? (backward looking...)</p>	<p>Interviews with project staff and ILO/UNRWA key informants.</p> <p>Triangulation of information from various stakeholders (management, beneficiaries, employers, ...)</p> <p>Employability improvement data disaggregated to the maximum extend possible</p> <p>Discussions with UNRWA and ILO team who was in charge of the project</p> <p>Comparison of data until June 2010 and passed 2010</p>	<p>Pooled EESC data for the duration of the project (applications received, placements done, ...) disaggregated by age, gender, educational level and employment category</p> <p># of successful placements vs. requests received</p> <p># of candidates who found jobs after being redirected to VET or SME training</p> <p>Evolution of the turnover of the project from inception until Sep 2010</p>
Design	<p>No baseline except the rapid NBC socio-economic survey</p> <p>One of the shortcomings in the secondary data is the assumption of working with NBC at large</p> <p>No clear indicators relative to decent work</p> <p>Gender is a strong point in the approach and performance indicators are acceptable</p>	<p>Examination of the overall coherence of the project determination of the linkages between inputs – outputs – outcomes</p> <p>Examination of the management structure and resources allocation in the light of the needs/results/outcomes</p> <p>Examination of the gender-specific aspects in the design and the activities</p> <p>Examination of the decent work specific aspects in the design and the activities</p> <p>Examination of the internal M&E systems their role in organizational learning, communication and quality assurance</p>	<p>Exhaustive secondary data review and interviews with the project team to determine possible linkages</p> <p>Cross-checking resources allocation vs. intended results</p> <p>Examination & interpretation of gender disaggregated data</p> <p>Perceptions of all interviews about decent work</p> <p>AUB/UNRWA Survey on</p>	<p>Poverty reduction figures if any (contribution not attribution)</p> <p>Improvement in income of target groups if available & <u>determination of which groups benefited the most comparatively</u></p> <p>% women involved in various components and % success achieved</p> <p><u>Comparison of salaries & work conditions with and without the project</u></p>

			Palestinian refugees	
Effectiveness	In the absence of a well established baseline, all percentages provided in the LogFrame cannot be decisively attributed to the project but will be carefully examined for <u>trend analysis</u>	<p>To which degree development objectives were achieved in the three areas of intervention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Better access to employment ○ VET ○ SMEs <p>How risks and assumptions were identified and factored in the design?</p> <p>The project was executed in a timely manner or delayed? What were the constraints?</p> <p>The resources mobilized for the project were adequate? Was would have been done differently or better?</p> <p>What were the best moments and A-HA moments of the project?</p> <p>Was there a clear strategy for communication, visibility and dissemination? Is there evidence that it worked?</p> <p>Did the project manage to mainstream the concept of decent work or it operated a simple placement service?</p> <p>Was the project successful in mainstreaming gender equity? What can we learn from the process?</p>	<p>Examination of M&E data at hand (monitoring records, training evaluation sheets, material produced, reports, etc...)</p> <p>Examination of the re-design process following the delay in NBC construction</p> <p>Adherence to the initial time frame, and how the extended period was optimized</p> <p>Capturing the perceptions of stakeholders</p> <p>Examination of the outreach and visibility strategy</p> <p>Triangulation of the perceptions of stakeholders and benchmarking to UNRWA and ILO expectations</p> <p>Flagging the perceptions and recommendations of female beneficiaries</p>	<p>Success rate disaggregated to the maximum extend possible (gender, construction vs. non-construction, VET trainees placed, micro-credit distributed, performance of businesses sustained or newly established, etc...)</p> <p>Progress report and other project literature</p> <p>Project literature on success stories and key learning (if any)</p> <p>Literature, press-clippings, flyers, AV support (if any)</p> <p>Comparison of worker conditions (when possible)</p> <p>Disaggregated M&E data by gender</p>
Efficiency	<p>Baseline documentation of existing employment services, VET and SMEs would have been key in judging efficiency.</p> <p>We will have to follow a deductive model based on the data collected through</p>	<p>Would it have been possible to reach the same results with fewer costs?</p> <p>What was the added value from having two “heavy weights” (ILO and UNRWA) teaming up for the project? were other possible synergies adequately identified and factored in?</p> <p>What is the degree of institutional ownership of</p>	<p>Cross-checking resources allocation vs. results achieved</p> <p>Estimation of the cost of “alternative mechanisms”</p> <p>Analysis of the synergies and contributions outside the ILO/UNRWA tandem</p> <p>Documentation & analysis of</p>	<p>Comparative analysis of project spending</p> <p>Benchmarking costs to other mechanisms in place for employment placement, VET and SME provision</p> <p>Project documents and ongoing projects (Saida for</p>

	field work	ILO and UNRWA of the project?	future collaboration prospects	example) between ILO and UNRWA
Impact		<p>What lasting changes did the project bring to the employment scene in NBC</p> <p>Did the project contribute towards breaking the psychological barriers confining the NBC population to “their” camp</p> <p>How the project influenced the attainment of decent work in all sectors and all areas of activities? Are these achievements sustained 4 months after the project ended?</p> <p>What changes in the behaviors/attitudes of participating institutions took place?</p>	<p>How (well) the project is functioning after ILO handover? Did it gain momentum?</p> <p>Outreach processes beyond the camp (and geographic radius covered)</p> <p>Degree of awareness and application of various stakeholders of decent work</p> <p>Institutional endorsement of decent work principles, other programs being prepared or implemented in that direction</p>	<p>Quarterly report of UNRWA July-Sep 2010</p> <p>Number of workers placed in the camp vs outside and what are their perceptions</p> <p>Other projects on decent work being prepared or implemented (UNRWA and others)</p> <p>Perceptions of decent work amidst VET and micro-credit providers in the camps</p>
Lessons Learned	The narrative reports contain some interesting “leads” which should be explored further in the evaluation inquiry	<p>What lessons can be drawn from the EESC experience in terms of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increasing employability of Palestinians ○ Linking employment market to VET ○ Promoting employability through SME support ○ Achievement of decent work principles in the area of intervention ○ Improving the integration of Palestinian women in the labor market ○ Achieving a better integration of the Palestinian workforce in the economy of North Lebanon ○ Lessons which can benefit the 	This question will be asked across the board for all stakeholders and will be compiled from the various answers provided during the Focus Groups.	<p>Improved remuneration and/or working conditions and/or safety nets provided to workers</p> <p>Repayment rate of micro-credit loans</p> <p>Profitability of small businesses initiated with SME support</p> <p>Number of businesses still operating after the project ended</p> <p>Number of successful reconversions thanks to VET training</p> <p>Number of successful work placements outside the camps</p>

	<p>The project literature is quite “shy” in that regard, we will try to complement it through field observations and dialogue with stakeholders</p>	<p>newly established Employment Service Center in Saida?</p> <p>Were there different responses/strategies between Beddawi and NBC? Were there different successes and/or shortcomings?</p>	<p>We will have Focus Groups in NBC and Beddawi to get both sides of the reality</p>	<p>Activity of EESC past June 2010</p> <p>Disaggregated data by location</p>
<p>Partnerships</p>		<p>How did the project contribute to capacity development of UNRWA on labor issues</p> <p>the effectiveness of the ILO-UNRWA partnership and implications on potential future national and regional partnerships</p> <p>Was the project able to catalyze synergies and partnerships beyond the ILO-UNRWA tandem or whether partnerships and coordination were limited to information sharing</p> <p>Complementarities and synergies with the following key programs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Livelihoods cluster ○ Committee for the Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (CEP) ○ Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LDC) 	<p>Interviews with key informants at UNRWA and EESC staff</p> <p>Review of related documentation on employment and promotion of economic opportunities in the Palestinian camps</p> <p>Interviews with key informants from the “Livelihood Cluster”, CEP and LPDC</p>	

Table 3: Linkages between evaluation criteria, inquiry leads and data sources

4. Main Findings

The first question we ask ourselves before embarking on detailing the main findings of this evaluation is **what would have been the alternatives to Palestinian employability in BC and NBC should the project did not exist?**

Taken from this perspective, EESC constitutes a breakthrough as it managed to lay the cornerstone for a systematic attempt to address Palestinian employability in these two camps and which could potentially serve as a showcase across Lebanon but also other MENA countries where Palestinian refugees are scattered. The experience presents three novelties which could be noted:

- 1- Although EESC was initially designed as an immediate relief intervention, it matured into a full-fledged recovery project which is well integrated in the UNRWA structure and which was able to attract additional donor support (at least for the coming two years)
- 2- The conceptual design of the project addressed not only employment match-making but also the VET skills and entrepreneurial skills of the target group, both of which are highly needed and essential pre-requisites for a sustainable improvement of the employability perspectives of Palestinians
- 3- Last but not least, the project managed to catalyze a broader thinking on Palestinian employability, especially that a similar center is being currently implemented in Saida to cater for the Palestinians residing in the camps and across South Lebanon and which involves ILO and UNRWA, and – most importantly – seems to have influenced the maturation of a comprehensive framework on employment from the UNRWA side which is still in preparation⁸

The second overarching concern relates to the **nature of the project** itself, especially that **the design and subsequently the evaluation of an Emergency Employment Center differs from a classical project design** (along PCM/LFA guidelines for example or Results Based Management, Balanced Scorecard and other...) since the achievement of (decent) employment as a development objective depends on a multitude of factors often external to the project and which influence to a great extent the results set. We have incorporated this factor into our analysis, and used the principles imbedded in the UN Policy Paper for Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Settings⁹ (coherent and comprehensive, conflict sensitive, aiming at sustainability and promoting gender equality) as a benchmark. We also tried to re-examine some of the assumptions and the outputs of the project from a PCM perspective in order to draw lessons for improvement.

A third question we ask ourselves is whether **the project should be evaluated from a post-conflict relief angle or whether it should be considered as part of a rights-based approach of ILO and UNRWA to address the right for decent work of Palestinians in Lebanon?** This question was extensively debated during a multi-stakeholders meeting that

⁸ Personal communication from Ms Celine Calve on 15/11/2010, see subsequent sections of the report for further details

⁹ UN System Wide Policy Paper on Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Setting (May 2008)

was held at the ILO premises on November 4th 2010 during which the post-conflict emergency nature of the project as the departing point for the evaluation was stressed. The ILO literature we consulted converges in the same direction, with the evaluation component being the least developed component in the ILO guidelines for establishing this type of centers. **We believe however that what differentiates EESC from other projects executed by local and international NGOs in NBC and BC is the presence of two “heavyweights” UN agencies behind it: ILO who is the main international reference in employment and UNRWA who is the largest international provider of assistance and relief services to the Palestinian population.** It is clear to us that the presence of ILO and UNRWA puts additional expectations on the project, even if we assume that it was conceived as a relief one. **Furthermore the available ILO literature suggests that ad hoc “light” employment centers which perform basic operations can be gradually transformed into fuller and more permanent structures,** which seems to be the case of the current project under evaluation¹⁰.

4.1 Relevance

The ILO-UNRWA NBC Rapid Socio-economic Survey undertaken in September 2007¹¹ demonstrated that 93 per cent of the displaced population has suffered significant disruption in terms of human, social, physical and economic capital and that 79% declared themselves unemployed, which provides ample justification for the relevance of a project addressing employment issues and needs of the NBC and BC population.

Furthermore, a recent study conducted by ILO and the Committee for the Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (CEP)¹² reveals that **Palestinian Refugees consider unemployment as the single most important problem.** The same study highlights that the majority of Palestinians work in the informal economy, predominantly in agriculture, construction and trade.

The project had as development objective “to reduce poverty amongst Nahr El Bared residents through providing better access to employment, self-employment and training opportunities” with three specific objectives:

- i) Emergency Employment Services are established and are operating with well trained staff able to provide specific advisory and labor market services to targeted groups of job seekers in NBC
- ii) Employment and training opportunities are identified and job seekers referred to employment with major projects, private sector employers and other employment options.
- iii) Relevant and up-to-date advice and assistance on micro-finance, business development services and self employment opportunities available in the local labor market is provided to targeted jobseekers.

¹⁰ ILO (2003) Guidelines for establishing Emergency Public Employment Services pp4

¹¹ ILO & UNRWA (2007) Socio-Economic Characteristics of Displaced Palestinian Refugees for the Nahr El Bared Refugee Camp

¹² CEP & ILO (2010) Review of Studies on the Employability of Palestinian Refugees in the Lebanese Labor Market

These objectives were to be achieved using employment intensive methods, yet these methods were to provide scope and flexibility to generate **both short-term immediate employment** through repair, rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure, **and long-term sustainable employment** through the productive use of the same infrastructure. A wide range of beneficiaries could be hence covered ranging from basic unskilled and uneducated labor-force to skilled and educated work-force.

The delay in launching the reconstruction works inside the camp led in our opinion to one of the best unplanned positive outcomes in the project:

- a) On one hand the project management and staff had to adapt to this constraint and look beyond immediate reconstruction-related job opportunities and;
- b) The project had to expand beyond the immediate vicinity of NBC and BC, breaking hence the psychological barriers that became entrenched in the collective conscience of the Lebanese counterparts in particular.¹³

In the meantime, it was becoming clear that the funding available would only cover two out of the three components of the project, namely the Employment Service Center and VET, especially that another EU-funded project executed by UNRWA, the NBC Small Businesses Reactivation which ran almost concurrently to the project (ended in March 2010) was working along the same line¹⁴. Rather than dedicating funds for the reactivation of small and medium size businesses, the project opted to a referral system to the EU-UNRWA project. According to the ILO National Coordinator of the project, EESC "... preferred to help UNRWA in studying the beneficiaries' files and approving on the loans given. This contribution allowed the EESC to know about all businesses in NBC, of course we couldn't do much with the small businesses because of their familial aspect, but with some of the medium enterprises that restarted their businesses in NBC, we had their names and it was easy for the outreach person to double check and see if he had visited them before and the possibility of having relevant vacancies in their enterprises..."¹⁵

While we would agree about the relevance of any state-of-the-art intervention targeting the employability of Palestinians in Lebanon in general and in NBC and BC following the summer 2007 conflict in particular, **we believe that a clearer definition of the target groups or the priority sectors that the project was trying to address could have possibly led to more focused results.** But at the same time, we acknowledge that the changing circumstances under which the project operated and the adaptive nature through which the project addressed the implementation constraints make of it a full-scale pilot study which could provide very valuable lessons for the phase II of EESC (underway since July 2010) and for the new employment center that is implemented by ILO, UNRWA, CEP and the Joint Christian Committee for Social Services in Lebanon (JCC) in South Lebanon (officially inaugurated in April 2010)

¹³ Although there is no empirical reference to this "psychological barrier" it was mentioned repeatedly during the Focus Groups, ie the perception that the Palestinian community was supportive of Fath Al Islam and protected them

¹⁴ The NBC Small Business Reactivation Program supported around 750 business reactivation grants, 553 of which targeted small size enterprises and 197 medium size enterprises

¹⁵ E-mail exchange with Dr. Roy Abu Jawdeh, EESC National Project Coordinator

We also think that the integration and coordination with the NBC small business reactivation project on the SME component was an appropriate choice, taking into consideration the overlap between the two projects, although we could not find direct evidence on how concretely this integration was taking place (ie referral data, statistics on the implementation progress achieved, etc....)

4.2 Design

The initial post-conflict emergency response scope of the project was to promote labor-intensive employment inside the camp, mainly by facilitating the hiring of Palestinian manpower in the anticipated reconstruction works, and by helping in the restoration of the small businesses that were destroyed or forced to stop their activities, as well as the provision of VET. All three components are identified as essential pre-requisites for the success of an emergency public employment intervention in the relevant ILO literature and were applied by ILO and its partners in similar post-conflict setting around the world (East Timor, Sri Lanka, Liberia, etc...)¹⁶.

The design document relies mainly on the findings of the rapid survey conducted by ILO and UNRWA in the aftermath of the armed conflict in NBC¹⁷ in trying to address the employment issue.

The organizational chart of the project is provided in **Figure 1** below and shows that UNRWA was responsible of the direct field activities while ILO was responsible of the intellectual and technical guidance on EESC and VET, in close consultation with the UNRWA-appointed project supervisor. The third component described in the project document (promotion of micro and small enterprises) does not appear within this organizational structure since it was linked to the availability of additional funding as per the agreement signed between ILO and UNRWA¹⁸

¹⁶ Same as 4

¹⁷ ILO & UNRWA (2007) Socio-Economic Characteristics of Displaced Palestinian Refugees for the Nahr El Bared Refugee Camp

¹⁸ Interagency agreement between ILO and UNRWA signed on 25/6/2008




Figure 1: organizational structure of EESC (source: personal communication with the CTA)

In our opinion, the design of the project was in line with the ILO guidelines for establishing public emergency employment services¹⁹ (while taking into consideration the specificities of the Palestinian Refugee situation in Lebanon), and we acknowledge that the project was operating in post-conflict emergency circumstances, which puts pressure on achieving immediate and visible delivery of services/results.

We think however that the operationalization of the project could have benefited from a more systematic and transparent application of Project Cycle Management principles. From an evaluation perspective, the non-application of sound PCM principles in the design of the project leads to two main shortcomings:

- **The absence of a clear Monitoring and Evaluation strategy linked to indicators and assumptions²⁰ makes it very difficult to measure the progress towards the attainment of the planned development objectives,** and most importantly the capitalization on the institutional learning and the lessons from the field as the project unfolds. The need for an M&E strategy appears clearly in the ILO guideline for emergency employment services which stipulate that “... if a small office is being piloted, then target groups should be defined and specific objectives should be set that are achievable with the staff available and that do not create unrealistic expectations²¹ ...”

¹⁹ ILO (2003) Guidelines for establishing Emergency Public Employment Services

²⁰ A very basic logical framework was provided to the evaluator during the initial stocktaking meetings, however it had several fundamental deficiencies, the most important being the absence of any quantifiable targets in the indicators which could measure performance and the mixing between internal and external conditions in the assumptions.

²¹ Same as 19, pp8

- **The absence of horizontal and vertical command-and-control linkages in the chart provided in figure 1 makes it difficult to assess the power dynamics governing the project**, the influence and accountability of each of the stakeholders and – most importantly – their effectiveness especially in terms of inter-agency cooperation as it was initially foreseen in the TORs.

We hence very strongly recommend to address these shortcomings in the new phase of EESC as well as any similar project.

Using the PCM logic (transition from problem to objective and from means to end) we feel that the design of the VET component could have been better integrated within the EESC component in order to achieve more synergies between the two components. Although the project design documents is not particularly explicit on whether VET should serve EESC (and vice-versa) or whether it was planned as a standalone activity, the ILO guidelines in that regard clearly suggest though that VET should be organically integrated within the broader EESC umbrella²²

At a more conceptual level, the project should have acknowledged/articulated how it intended to deal with the informal vs. formal economy dilemma and whether its strategic choice for labor intensive job placements should have been coupled with more concrete measures to alleviate the adverse effects for placing workers in the informal economy (like having contracts for JS placed in the construction sector for example), or – even better - balancing formal vs. informal economy placements for example. **The same applies to defining strategic choices with respect to gender, decent work, youth and persons with disabilities**, though all of issues were addressed at various phases of the project but without a clear definition of targets and milestones.

4.3 Effectiveness

Employment difficultly lends itself to linear analysis of effectiveness as it encompasses a broad range of variables; modeling is often used to understand the complex relationships between these variables which can range from the macro and micro economic context of a country or a region, to instruments and programs which regulate the employment sector, to supply and demand for labor and the complex dynamics between both, etc....²³. **Our analysis of effectiveness is hence mainly process related in view of determining lessons learned** and which could help us understand better the outcomes.

4.3.1 Recap of the 5 main outputs of the project

The project design document describes 5 major outputs of the project: which are inter-related to its 3 immediate objectives:

- **Output 1:** The establishment and efficient functioning of the UNRWA Emergency Employment Services Centre (EESC) that will coordinate recruitment, orientation and other related activities including skills-training, decent work conditions and wage setting.

²² ILO (2003) Guidelines for establishing Emergency Public Employment Services pp127 (section A7.3 viii)

²³ Schmid,G. O'Reilly, J. and Schomann K (1996) International Handbook of Labor Market Policy and Evaluation (accessed on google book on Dec 5 2010)

- **Output 2:** 120,000 work days of employment generated for NBC residents within the execution and implementation of the overall emergency program
- **Output 3:** A network between EESC, private sector representatives and vocational training providers is established and begins to have an impact on the skills development and employment situation of Nahr El Bared residents.
- **Output 4:** The delivery of a rapid skills enhancement program for 400 beneficiaries. The programme will address the identified skills shortages through 20 short-term and demand-driven vocational training courses, each comprising of 20 trainees.
- **Output 5:** Identification of self-employment opportunities and the delivery of advisory, counseling and referral services to self-employment opportunities to 200 beneficiaries.

We decided to **perform a global analysis of data and activities in this section**, then in light of this analysis revisit the achievements of the outputs. We also highlights that the discussion of the results is linked only to outputs 1, 2 and 4 since outputs 3 and 5 were not dealt with due to funding constraints. We did not find any written explanation or documentation (addendum, rider, etc...) which made this strategic decision official.

4.3.2 General observations on data

Effectiveness analysis implies access to properly disaggregated databases in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Our general remarks about the EESC data are:

- **The job seekers registration process is aligned with the ILO employment registration system**, though it needs frequent updating which seemed to have taken place in an *ad-hoc* rather than a systematic manner.
- **The reporting on results and outcomes is far less aligned than the registration process** and despite the goodwill and cooperation showed by all stakeholders during the course of this evaluation, we got access to rather inhomogeneous data sets (some in word format, others in excel, different recording and reporting formats by the field officers, etc..). **Disaggregation of data is limited to gender**, while other variables such as the age of JS, their education level, their current employment situation, their work in formal or informal economy, etc... would have been very useful in understanding the context in which EESC is operating and would have triggered a wealth of additional insights for this evaluation.
- We also noticed a **trend to communicate cumulative data** which highlights quantitative achievements but lacks minimum alignment with more qualitative parameters, which leads us to question the ability to draw conclusions from this data and suggest corrections/improvements as the project was unfolding.
- We observed that the most informative data sets to which we got access were prepared by the field officers (counselors and outreach officer) while the **quarterly and annual reports** (prepared by the management) **lack substantial discussion on the qualitative aspects of the data**. Even if we assume that this qualitative analysis is subject to multiple variables beyond the control of the project, we would have liked to see in the report an indication if EESC should continue accepting

applications under industry code “Media” (58 applicants, 1 placement) and what could be possibly done to assist the 58 job seekers with a background in media who approached the center, or a meta-analysis of performance in the light of the profile of the job seekers and the opportunities provided by EESC to them.

In the light of our observations, we believe that **data should have been given much more attention and that it should have been exploited in a more comprehensive manner** for preparing for a second phase of EESC North Lebanon **and** for feeding the implementation of EESC South Lebanon.

4.3.3 General Remarks on Project Performance

Table 4 below summarizes the aggregated performance of EESC until the end of June 2010 as it was provided to us by the project management. It reveals that the project managed to attract 2,409 applicants over a period of 16 months of effective operations, referred almost 80% of the applicants to employment and placed 18.5% of these applicants in jobs.

A quick analysis of the figures in table 4 reveal the following:

- **It is unclear from the figures if the initial quantitative targets set in the project document are met or not** (1,000 construction workers assisted and 120,000 job days secured). We will touch on these figures separately in subsequent sections of the report
- **The referral rate (which appears in the Table 4 as close to 80%) needs to be recorded differently**, since it suggests that referral to jobs was done automatically rather than on a case by base basis and upon a careful examination of the applicant’s profile. In fact the project management highlighted that a single individual was referred to job opportunities more than one time and hence the ratio of actual referrals is much lower (but raises additional questions on how many JS were referred and how many were simply recorded without being referred...)
- **The mention of training (referred and placed) might suggest that training was completely integrated in EESC** while in practice VET operated in a relatively autonomous manner but with significant overlap with EESC (as it will be discussed in the VET section below)
- **The table does not take into account job opportunities created through VET**, despite these opportunities are quite considerable quantitatively (also discussed in the VET section)
- **The table lacks essential data on the number of EESC clients who kept their job within 3 months after being placed and whether these jobs were long term or short term/seasonal.**

	NBC			BC			Total
	m	f	Total	m	f	Total	
Interviewed Registered	1133	268	1401	661	347	1008	2409
Referred to Employment	692	247	939	585	*383	968	1907
Referred to Training	31	70	101	82	93	169	276

Placed in Employment	314	26	343	72	30	102	445
Placed in Training	126	152	278	111	147	258	536

*: 40 jobseekers have been referred to more than one vacancy

Table 4: Aggregated Performance of EESC until June 2010

(Source: ESC monthly report for June 2010)

Looking at the sector of activity, we had only access to the total non-disaggregated number of placements by Industry Code of September 2010, while it would have been more methodologically sound to compare it with the June 2010 data²⁴. Nevertheless, **our objective from this exercise is to analyze trends rather than track quantitative achievements and hence the data below can be considered representative**, especially that the summer months (during which fell also the month of Ramadan) did not witness substantial activity of EESC. **Table 5** summarizes the registered vacancies by industry code until September 2010

Industry Code	Registered Vacancies	Filled Vacancies
Construction	128	387
Customer Services & restaurants	57	10
Education	84	45
Banking & Finance	6	3
Government/Administration	4	2
Health care	41	11
IT/Telecom	17	4
Manufacturing & Production	159	31
Media	54	1
Non Profit	24	11
Sales/distribution	32	5
Supply Chain/Logistics	8	0

Table 5: Registered vs. Filled vacancies by Industry Code until September 2010 (Source: the UNRWA EESC Supervisor)

When we inquired about the difference between filled vacancies and registered vacancies in the construction sector, the EESC management informed us that a job opening such as “8 unskilled laborers” was registered as a single vacancy, which obviously **impedes any objective analysis unless a proper disaggregation level of data was obtained** and confirms our assumption that this data is only indicative

²⁴ Several direct requests to obtain this data set addressed to UNRWA and ILO concerned stakeholders remained unanswered.

4.3.4 Female employability


Out of the 2,409 applicants who approached EESC over the past 16 months, we find 1,794 male applicants versus 615 females. **Although females constitute only 25% of the total applicants, this can be considered as a potential indication suggesting that initiative such as EESC could represent an interesting entry point for improving the employability of Palestinian women in Lebanon** which was found not to be exceeding 20% according to the ILO/CEP study (2010), around 16% in the NBC rapid socio-economic survey and 13% in the AUB-UNRWA study (2011)

Nevertheless, the project managed to place 56 women in jobs (12.5% of total placements, but around **44% of placements in the non-construction sector**), predominantly as teachers, nurses, social workers, clerical and secretarial jobs and housekeepers. It is also interesting to note that females represent 75% of the total labor force currently engaged in health, education and social work according to the ILO/CEP study

We are extremely cautious about this conclusion though, because we have no indication on whether the females that were placed in jobs maintained their jobs for more than one day and whether these jobs fit the “decent work” pre-requisites.

4.3.5 Construction as the main industry sector

**Total Placements EESC
March 2009 - September 2010**



As anticipated in the project design document, construction was the sector of activity with the highest number of recorded job vacancies (21% of the registered vacancies, 76% of the total placements). **The target set in the project design document to assist as many as 1,000 construction workers in finding a job placement²⁵ was not fully met judging by the figures.** The EESC centers in BC and NBC recorded well over 1,000 job applicants in the construction sector (around 1,300 as per table 5), but the actual placements in construction were 387 by September 2010 (3 months after the completion of the project cycle under evaluation). **This is mainly due to the delay in the reconstruction of the old NBC camp** (Package I started in November 2010, Package II

in the spring of 2010) and because the total available positions on site in the camp are well below 1,000 according to our personal perception (evaluated at around 500 by the representatives of the construction companies during the Focus Group held with the employers²⁶).

²⁵ NBC summary project outline page 3

²⁶ An in-depth focus group was conducted with business owners in Quality Inn hotel on Monday November 29th 2010 and was attended by representatives from EBKO Bitar, Al Danash and Al Sarout.

Employers acknowledged however that the EESC input was instrumental in increasing the number of Palestinian workers involved in the reconstruction through improved and targeted recruitment and that EESC umbrella facilitated the acquisition of work permits to access the premises of the old camp.

Employers also acknowledged that EESC lobbied for a higher and equal pay for workers within a specific skills category (though not always successful), that it incited the companies to contract insurance against accidents (though it was left to the injured worker himself to make the claim according to our informal chats with workers) and that the 8 hours working day was strictly reinforced (6 hours during the Ramadan) with the overtime hour paid as 1.5 hours. Employers that we met currently estimate the number of Palestinian workers at 70-80% because some key skills related mainly to plastering and woodworks (among others) cannot be found easily amongst Palestinians.


4.3.6 Understanding the complexity of placement patterns

It would be fair to assume though that in its first 18 months of operation EESC relied on the existing enabling factors, mainly the reconstruction of NBC (76% of the placements). Since there seem to be a genuine concern from both UNRWA and ILO in sustaining and expanding EESC operations, a detailed tracer study on the placements outside NBC reconstruction would provide a reality check on the real impact of EESC.

The Focus Groups we carried with the beneficiaries demonstrate that construction placements are predominantly short to medium term with some tasks related to office work (clerical, administrative and technical such as AutoCAD and field supervision) being more of a medium to longer term depending on the capacity and motivation of the concerned individuals.

If we leave construction aside, the project managed to secure 123 positions as per the attached chart. From the focus group interviews, the situation in these sectors is slightly better than in the construction sector in terms of achieving “decent work” though the overall conditions are still far from being satisfactory (more on decent work in the impacts section)

**EESC Job Placements by Industry Code (excluding construction)
March 2009 – September 2010**



Information that a tracer study on EESC placed job seekers could provide
* Bio-statistics (age, gender, marital status, level of education, living inside or outside)

camps,...)

* Did they stay in their jobs, reasons for leaving...

* Are they happy in their job and why?

* Is their job in the camp or outside the camp? (if outside the camp average distance travelled daily, main difficulties, perceived advantages or added value, ...)

* Do they work for a Palestinian or Lebanese employer? How do they compare their working conditions to other Lebanese employees?

* Do they have a short, medium or long-term contract?

* What type of safety nets they have access to in their job?

*

4.3.7 A brief analysis of EESC contribution beyond the construction sector

A sector-by-sector analysis of the conditions under which employment of Palestinians is taking place would require a study of its own. Figure 2 below shows the correlation between the job opportunities identified per industry sector and the number of placements which actually took place. We stress again here that **these figures provide more of a trend analysis rather than factual data, unless it is coupled with a follow-up study** to assess how many of the individuals placed are still in the job after 3 months and **another study to understand the specific driving forces in the market within each industry code**. It is possible though to determine from the charts that significant opportunities could be identified in Manufacturing & Production and Education and to a lesser extent Customer Services & Restaurants, Media and Health Care.

As EESC embarks on a new phase and is getting replicated in Saida, it would be useful to review if a sector-specific approach would be of relevance and how EESC can influence and/or help in creating a better enabling environment for promoting Palestinian employability in specific promising sectors.

The various insights we gathered in the Focus Groups and during our one-on-one interaction with the participants (often more conclusive than the Focus Groups) enables us to suggest few remarks and ideas concerning 4 of these sectors:

- Hospitality and restaurants: the sector has a definite potential, at least in terms of securing job opportunities, and Palestinians are easily competing with Syrian workers on many posts. There are however a number of social and cultural hindrances (“serving” at tables, handling alcohol, often night-shifts which present commuting problems with the restrictions in entering and exiting the camps, ...) as well as technical constraints (no vocational training as waiters, cooks or assistant cooks, etc...) in addition – of course – to long working hours and low pay.
- Education: opportunities exist both in UNRWA and non-UNRWA schools, however the poor French skills restrict the choice of Palestinian applicants to English speaking schools, and often the poor English skills of these applicants (vocabulary and pronunciation) represent an additional limiting factor. The quality of training provided to teachers was also mentioned as another constraint. There is a clear niche for math, science and social-related subject matters, with less demand for Arabic and history.

- Health Care: Palestinian nurses and paramedics are highly praised, and often the ones relying on EESC to find jobs are the less qualified and/or skilled ones, so maybe remedial courses or an updating of capacities and knowledge could be of help.
- IT & Telecom: there is also a clear niche whether inside the camps or in the surrounding areas in this sector (mobile telephony, computer networks, PC repair and maintenance, low-cost telephone shops, ...) yet skills acquired through VET seem not to be adequate and up to date (multi-level VET training was suggested where trainees gradually build-up their skills)

All four sectors described above might potentially encourage a shift in employment from the purely informal sector to a more formal one. **We encourage ILO and UNRWA to conduct a more in-depth analysis in this direction, such an investigation might inspire a restructuring of the education curricula and VET that UNRWA is currently engaged in.**

4.3.8 How the “Decent Work” paradigm was addressed by the project

Although the term “decent work” is mentioned only twice in the project design document, the document explicitly states that “...the approach and methodologies proposed are encompassing the multiple dimensions of decent work in a post crisis context. These include - in addition to employment creation - issues related to fair determination of wages, incentives for productivity, working conditions, working hours, occupational safety and health and support to women’s workers participation...”²⁷

We would have hoped to see the achievement of Decent Work appearing discussed and analyzed in the project literature (internal reporting and quarterly/annual reports) as this constitutes one of the most important added values from having ILO and UNRWA teaming-up in EESC, most notably some kind of reporting on the type of placement achieved by EESC (short, medium or long term) as well as the institutional arrangements (presence and type of contract, incentives, safety nets provided...). However, the nature of the project itself Emergency Employment Center, operating under an emergency agenda made it difficult. It is very much recommended as a focus area for next phase.

From the interviews with the project team and the focus groups with the beneficiaries, we could determine that the project lobbied for a better and equal pay for job seekers (though these lobbying efforts are shaped/limited to a great extent by the power dynamics of supply and demand as well as a multitude of other external contextual factors), that it gave particular attention to safety and health hazards especially in the construction sector and that it encouraged – when possible – to formalize work agreements through contracts. Unfortunately, this is not documented clearly in the project literature and remains an assumption in the absence of empirical data which confirms it.

The most tangible achievements are probably the strict reinforcement of child labor prevention (job seekers between the ages of 15 and 18 were directed to VET or apprenticeship) and the strict reinforcement of the 8 hours working day in the construction sector.

²⁷ NBC summary project outline page 2

In the future, we strongly recommend to give the attainment of decent work a more prominent and visible place in both the monitoring and the reporting of the project, in order to capitalize on the learning that can be derived from the process.

4.3.9 Can we talk about an excessive (or non-selective) referral?

As mentioned earlier, we felt that 1,907 referrals to 2,409 registered job seekers was somehow excessive. Upon investigating deeper in the EESC records for EESC Beddawi, we found that what is quantified as “referral” is in fact the number of individuals contacted about a specific job rather than the number of individuals who were provided with a referral letter to apply for a certain job.

The project management also highlighted in the process of reviewing the first draft of this report that “... if there were 1907 referrals, it does not mean 1907 different job seekers, well qualified individual job seekers were probably referred many times so the number of referred individuals is smaller...” **which makes the referral data unusable** as it becomes impossible to determine the actual number of individuals referred and what is their proportion with regards to the total registered job seekers, and and what was the added value of EESC to those who registered but were never referred and what can be done in the future to boost their chances of benefiting from EESC support.

We tried to highlight in **Table 6** below some randomly selected cases where names of job seekers were changes to JS1, JS2 etc... This table gives us a closer look at EESC “in action” where situations differ significantly depending on the type of job opening and the behavior of the target group. We believe that **for the sake of accuracy it would have been more advisable to separate the “matched” individuals** who are supposedly contacted by the counselor **from the “referred” job seekers** who expressed their interest and willingness to apply for the job and were provided with a referral letter from EESC (and avoiding the multiple counting of the same individual). **Still the table shows that considerable effort has been displayed by EESC for placing job seekers in the identified job openings**

Industry Code (month)	Position	Matched &/or referred job seekers	Job seekers placed	Remarks
Education (May 2009)	Teachers for all levels	26 job seekers referred to interview	Results were not know	24 job seekers could actually be contacted
Evaluation remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This is a remarkable example on how EESC can link job seekers to markets ○ We could not find in the June through September reports information if some of these job seekers were placed or not (although the scholastic year would have started by then...) ○ Understanding the reasons why job seekers were not placed and linking it with a specially tailored training program would definitely help in improving employability perspectives 			
Administration (July 2009)	Administrative assistant, with good English language	JS1 JS2 JS3	JS1	She stopped after three days because she found out that the time is not proper

				for her.
Evaluation remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The position appears as a placement in the statistics (July 2009) ○ The position does not reappear in the August 2009 statistics ○ We don't know if JS2 and JS3 got a second chance after JS1 left 			
Administration (July 2009)	Secretary	JS4 JS5 JS6 JS7	None	JS5: didn't reply JS6: her current job is better JS7: she has been married since a month
Evaluation remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ We have no information on JS4 ○ Possibly other suitable candidates could have been identified ○ Maybe the job opportunity was/could have been referred to NBC 			
Manufacturing & Production (December 2009)	2 Furniture Carpenters (25\$-30\$/day)	JS8 JS9 JS10 JS11 JS12	None	JS8 & JS9 Accepted but did not apply for the job JS10 His work is with same salary & this opportunity will need transportation 3\$ per day to Al Mina. JS11 Deleted the interest of Carpentry.
Evaluation remarks	This is an example of a fairly interesting opportunity and EESC did its work in identifying and refereeing job seekers, yet it would be interesting to understand why JS8 and JS9 did not apply!			
Construction (December 2009)	Semi-skilled laborer for a subcontractor in NBC (13\$ per 100 concrete stones produced)	JS13 JS14 JS15 JS16 JS17 JS18	JS13	JS13 stopped working after the first day. Pay too low as he needs to commute between BC & NBC JS14 personality problems JS15 was not granted entry permit to NBC JS16 planned on having an assistant working with him but could not secure such an assistant JS18 has political problem preventing him from working out the camp.
Evaluation Remarks	This is a typical sample of the problems encountered in the construction sector which appeared repeatedly in the focus group. The job is basic and the pay is basic but still it is better than nothing ☺ Several problems are			

beyond the control of EESC

Table 6: A random analysis of some cases of referral by EESC Beddawi
(source: forwarded data by the UNRWA Operations Support Office)

4.3.10 A closer look at the Vocational Education and Training (VET) component

According to the VET National Officer of the project, the VET component targeted mainly unskilled and semi-skilled job seekers, predominantly aged between 15 and 24 years. Topics for VET training were identified through a participatory rapid appraisal which included VET providers operating in the region, employers and chambers of commerce, prospective beneficiaries, EESC staff etc...

Although VET functioned as a standalone component within the project, it managed still to place 115²⁸ job seekers who approached EESC in the VET trainings funded by the project (42% of all job seekers referred to training by EESC) The remaining participants were recruited through the VET providers themselves.

According to the official data of the project for June 2010, a total of 536 individuals were placed in training and are divided as follows:

- 315 trained through the VET component of the project, 115 of whom were referred through EESC and the remaining 200 recruited directly by the VET providers
- 161 individuals were placed in VET courses not funded by the project
- 60 individuals are reported as placed in training though not referred to training by EESC nor covered by the VET component of the project. Despite our numerous attempts to trace how these individuals were reported as placed in training, we could not get a satisfactory answer from the project management.

Table 7 summarizes the VET activities of the project, which were divided between 15 specialized short-term courses ranging from 4 to 9 months of training, as well as 3 intensive short-term courses for teachers and a pilot apprenticeship program which targeted 12 young men.

Type of VET	Total # trainees	Topics	Duration	Trainees Gender		Total
				M	F	
		2D & 3D studio	9 months	31	10	41
		Accounting		0	12	12
		Refrigeration & Air conditioning		15	0	15
		Industrial electricity		14	0	14
		X-ray technician		7	9	16
		Medical Secretary		0	15	15

²⁸ Personal communication Mr. Ousama Yasine, UNRWA Project Supervisor for EESC

VET Training	258	Accounting & IT	6 months	10	10	20
		AutoCAD		12	3	15
		Computer Maintenance		10	3	13
		ICDL		4	20	24
		Graphic Design		17	1	18
		Photo-Montage	4 months	0	10	10
		Painting & Gypsum Design		21	0	21
		General Electricity		9	0	9
		PC Maintenance & A+		15	0	15
Sub-total			165	93	258	
Intensive Teacher Training	45	Intensive ToT & teacher training	15 days each	7	38	45
Apprenticeship	12		6 months	12	0	12
Grand Total						315

Table 7: Summary of the VET Activities of the project
(source: documentation provided by the VET National Coordinator of the project)

The literature of the project relays only the numbers of people trained, without any documented follow-up on the satisfaction or the job placements which resulted from the VET training (at least the part funded directly by the project). According to an internal report of the National VET Coordinator²⁹, the VET training component succeeded in placing 187 individuals in jobs (around 60% of the total number of trainees) within 2 months from ending the classes, as detailed in **Table 8** below, **but we don't have any empirical data to support this affirmation** (such as details on the types of jobs found or created, age and gender, self-employment or employee, etc...) or if these individuals sustained their micro-enterprise or stayed in their jobs for 3 months or longer.

Type of VET training	Total # of trainees	% employment rate achieved after 2 months	Total # of VET trainees who found a job
Short Courses	258	57%	147
Teachers TOT	45	73%	33
Apprenticeship	12	58%	7
Total	315	59.3%	187

Table 8: Estimation of the number of jobs created through VET

²⁹ Personal Communication Ms Abir Atmah, ILO VET Coordinator, November 2nd 2010

(Source: personal analysis based on placement percentages provided by the VET Coordinator)

However and in order to give justice to the achievements of the project, we were provided with an unpublished set of raw data provided in **Table 9** below and which we compiled by sorting 208 final evaluation questionnaires by the participants in the short term courses provided by VET³⁰. **The results reveal an overall satisfaction rate close to 90% from the participants in these courses**, which should be not only a source of satisfaction for the team but should also trigger a broader thinking around the strategic importance of VET and how it could possibly consolidate the work of EESC.

Score (1= least satisfied, 5= extremely satisfied)	1	2	3	4	5
Content of the training	--	2%	6%	28%	54%
Adequacy of training methods		1%	8%	51%	40%
Organization of the training	--	--	10%	34%	56%
Evaluation of the trainer		1%	5%	24%	70%
Overall satisfaction	--	--	5%	31%	65%
Compound average score 4.5 or 90%					

Table 9: Client Satisfaction Survey of the VET short training course participants
(Source: documentation provided by the VET National Coordinator of the project)

Looking at the overall effectiveness of the VET program, the initial target of 400 individuals trained through 20 courses would have been hence indirectly met through 315 opportunities provided through the VET component in addition to 161 (or 221 depending on the way we validate the data) placements in VET training not funded by the project

The 187 jobs induced through VET should be also taken into consideration when trying to determine how close the project got to its initial target of creating 120,000 workdays over the duration of the project by adding them to the 445 placements achieved through EESC

4.4 Efficiency

The classical question raised in efficiency analysis is **whether it would have been possible to reach the same results with fewer costs and how efficiently resources were converted to results.**

The efficiency analysis of EESC is probably the most difficult component of this evaluation because of the complex nature of the services provided and the special social and political context in which the project is operating, which both induce indirect cost bearings that might not necessarily appear in the project design. The absence of baseline and quantifiable indicators adds another level of difficulty/complexity. Finally the novelty of the approach and the **absence of comparable initiatives in the region operating under a similar geo-political context makes any comparison even more difficult.**

³⁰ These questionnaires were collected systematically following the completion of every short course but were not analyzed or used in reporting despite their impressive results and their value in assessing the way VET training was conducted

It is clear however that the project managed to establish the foundations for an approach towards enhancing the employability of Palestinians in Lebanon that spills well beyond the 18 months of the project which are under the scope of this evaluation and which should be factored in the efficiency analysis.

The total budget of the project as per the inter-agency agreement between ILO and UNRWA was \$650,000 with an additional in-kind support from UNRWA of about \$150,000. The budget is provided in **Table 10** below

Category	Allocation	Expenditures	Allocation balance
1. Personnel(Project staff and consultants)	\$ 294,526	\$ 294,526	
2. Contracts	\$ 154,331	\$ 154,329	2
3. Training	\$ 74,500	\$ 74,500	
4. Equipment	\$ 43,797	\$ 43,797	
5. Travel / Transport	\$ 5,652	\$ 5,652	
6. Evaluation	\$ 14,981		14,981
7. Miscellaneous	\$ 19,671	\$ 19,671	0.48
8. Agency Management Support	\$ 42,522	\$ 41,459.2	1,062.8
TOTAL	\$ 649,980	\$ 633,933.68	16,046.28

Table 10: Resources used in the project until June 2010

(source: EESC Final report June 2010)

Establishing the cost per job seeker registered and per placement in employment achieved would definitely need more time than the 18 months period of the present study as well as a more reliable set of data than the one that is currently at hand. A benchmark figure for the cost per registered job seeker which is developed based on the EESC experience makes it possible to give an approximation of the investment cost needed (under comparable conditions) to establish similar centers in the future, although **present figures suggest that it is in the range of \$200/applicant during the start-up phase**, but is likely to decrease as more applicants approach the center.

The cost per placement is far more complex and depends on placement conditions (formal/informal, long/short term, self-employment, micro/SME, how long the applicant stays in the job, etc...) **Under the present status of the data we cannot have a conclusive figure in that regard.**

Coming back to the issue of 120,000 work-days created through the project, if we add the number of placements through EESC operations (445 placements) to those induced by VET training (187 opportunities, though they took place towards the end of the period under evaluation), it reveals that each job seeker placed through the project should have worked an average of 190 days or 34.5 weeks (assuming a working week of 5.5 days) to be able to meet this target. **It is impossible to have any conclusive stance in this regard under the present status of the data as neither EESC or VET are in possession of data that feeds into this type of analysis.**

4.5 *Effectiveness of the Management Arrangements*

As highlighted earlier, the presence of two “heavy weight” actors like ILO and UNRWA puts additional pressure on achieving results but creates a more complex administrative environment than if the project was executed by one agency alone or sub-granted to an NGO.

Generally speaking the synergies between ILO and UNRWA resulted in a more effective and broader outreach throughout NBC and BC (UNRWA) and access to state-of-the-art technical expertise on employment in post conflict situations (ILO) both of which are well beyond the reach of a single “conventional” beneficiary.

As reported during the interviews, **the signature of the inter-agency agreement was a learning process by itself**, resulting in a partnership and joint ownership between the two agencies rather than UNRWA sub-granting the project to ILO alone. The interagency agreement was signed on June 15th 2008, around 10 months following the end of the hostilities while activities effectively took-off in January 2009 which suggests that the institutional set-up took an additional 6 months to be completed.

It is important to highlight in this regard that the project which was initially designed to operate with 2 outreach officers, 2 counselors and 2 data entry clerks evenly distributed between BC and NBC ended up operating with only one outreach officer for most of the duration of the project³¹. It was the responsibility of the outreach officer to identify job vacancies, to establish contact with prospective employers, to find adequate apprenticeship placements, to liaise with chambers of commerce and business associations, etc... **The failure to identify and recruit this second outreach officer throughout the project’s life, and despite the crucial role that this outreach officer plays had a definite impact on the efficiency of execution.** We can fairly assume that this person would have helped in identifying additional business opportunities, in making EESC more widely known and gave more proactive assistance for securing work-permits for the construction workers. **We leave it to ILO and UNRWA to examine critically why this second officer could not be hired/replaced on time and draw lessons from that in the future.** Our personal position is that regard is that it is rather a paradox that a project striving to resolve employment-related issues was not able to hire its own staff or to negotiate/anticipate/mitigate the problem resulting from the non-recruitment of the second outreach officer for 14 out of the 18 months of operation of the project.

The gender proportions in terms of registration (615 females, 25% of total applicants) or in terms of placements (12.5% of the total placements, but 44% of the placements outside the construction sector) are in line with the general trends on employability of Palestinian females and even significantly on the upper side when we look beyond the construction sector. The two outreach officers for NBC and BC were both females (and rather well-known and well-connected in the camps) which helped overcome some possible socio-cultural constraints for the most conservative category of the population where a female job seeker would definitely feel more comfortable approaching a female outreach officer than male one.

³¹ A second outreach officer was recruited and trained but left the project within 4 months from joining to a better opportunity within UNRWA

The organizational chart of the project (figure 1 on page 19 of this report) is in line with the foreseen management arrangements where UNRWA provided in-kind support through the provision of staff and required office space for the ESCs, while the ILO project management team provided overall advisory services to UNRWA on skills development and employment issues. **The project is not very well documented when it comes to determining the effectiveness of management arrangements and joint ownership**, with – for example – outputs 3³² and 5³³ disappearing from the implementation plan without a single explanatory note or addendum indicating that this was debated and agreed upon between UNRWA and ILO. The same applies when it comes to written evidence that regular progress and review evaluation meetings were taking place between ILO and UNRWA as the project was unfolding. Furthermore, the absence of a basic M&E system made the monthly reporting of the project restricted to relaying quantitative achievements and overlooking the core qualitative aspects related to organizational learning.

The same pattern is observed with respect to the contribution and impact of ILO and UNRWA's participation in the Livelihoods Cluster Group³⁴ where – for example – EESC was represented at the grants committee of the NBC small business reactivation program but without any documented report (needs analysis, referral of cases, update on progress) from EESC to this committee.

To sum it, **our objective opinion is that EESC had the right key players in place for such an important project (ILO and UNRWA) but the management, follow-up and M&E could have been much more geared towards both accountability and learning.** We reflect on this observation more in the lessons learned section.

4.6 Impact

Eighteen months are relatively a short project cycle period to be able to determine impact in the broad sense of the term, yet we could determine a series of outcomes at the individual and the institutional level which – taken together – constitute a step in the right direction:

- 4.6.1 First and foremost, **EESC represents one of the first comprehensive attempts to address the employability of Palestinians in Lebanon from a system perspective** and outside the traditional sector-specific or target-group specific responses.
- 4.6.2 At the job-seekers level, it responded to a **real-felt need that goes beyond classical aid delivery**. A good metaphor to illustrate this observation is that it took few months to make the population in the camps aware that EESC is not a recruitment center for working with UNRWA but an enabling mechanism put in place by UNRWA and ILO to help the Camp's population in finding employment.

³² **Output 3:** a network between EESC, private sector representatives and vocational training providers is established and begins to have an impact on the skills development and employment situation of Nahr El Bared residents

³³ **Output 5:** Identification of self-employment opportunities and the delivery of advisory, counseling and referral services to self-employment opportunities to 200 beneficiaries.

³⁴ An ad-hoc working group bringing together international agencies and CSOs to coordinate aid delivery post NBC war and exchange opportunities for networking and for achieving synergies

- 4.6.3 Building on the previous metaphor, **EESC marks a shift in the mindset of the Camp's population from a total dependence on UNRWA for their livelihoods needs** (education, health, financial assistance, etc...) **to a win-win partnership** where UNRWA is able to play an enabling role but where the concerned individuals have their share of responsibility as well as their share of success: (decent) employment.
- 4.6.4 According to EESC staff, the centers in NBC and BC became a meeting point for job seekers, not only to apply for a potential vacancy but also to seek advice on career choices, seek assistance in writing a CV, or seek a placement in a VET training or an on-the-job training. Credit should be given in that regard to the two Counselors who managed to mainstream EESC within the camp's intricate social tissue and to the outreach officer who had to wear double and triple hats (yet all under the EESC umbrella) to make things moving in the right direction.
- 4.6.5 **Job seekers** who got a referral letter from EESC also informed us that they **felt that they were better equipped and more empowered** by having a referral with the letterhead of UNRWA and ILO, regardless of the outcomes of the job interview.
- 4.6.6 Although not mentioned explicitly in the official literature of the project, we believe that EESC expanded the horizons of the boundary sphere in which NBC and BC camp residents were seeking employment from the camps and their immediate vicinity to reach as far as Chekka and Halba. This is a very important outcome which can help in **healing the scars left by the summer 2007 military offensive in the sub-consciousness of both Palestinians and Lebanese**
- 4.6.7 The approval for funding a second phase of the project by CIDA and the ongoing endorsement of the project by UNRWA and ILO, in addition to the launch of a new EESC for South Lebanon are all positive signs of **ownership of the project and its outcomes**.
- 4.6.8 Building on the previous comment and according to the best of our knowledge, **EESC is the only NBC recovery project that is continuing through a second phase**, while most of the projects initiated under the Livelihoods Cluster are gradually phasing out
- 4.6.9 At ILO level, the idea of a decent work strategy for Palestinian in Lebanon was repeatedly mentioned during our interview although it did not materialize yet into a full-fledged approach, but the lessons learned from the EESC experience(s) could potentially build-up momentum in that direction.
- 4.6.10 At the UNRWA level, we have elements confirming that the EESC experience has **triggered a broader thinking pattern about the need to address employability from a recovery perspective**, in line with the profound changes that the organization has been witnessing the last two years. A new project is currently in the pipeline whereby vocational training schools, the scholarships program, the right to work program and the counseling program for fresh graduates will be all integrated under the same umbrella in order to secure optimize resources and tackle employment from a holistic perspective
- 4.6.11 The Committee for the Employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (CEP) has been doing a remarkable work on the legal issues and the right to work of

Palestinians in Lebanon, which present high and complementary synergies with the work undertaken by ILO and UNRWA under EESC.

4.6.12 Last but not least, the smooth partnership between ILO and UNRWA and which we could sense throughout this assignment (no “bossy” attitude from one side or another, sharing of available information, upscaling the existing initiative in partnership rather than in competition) all converge towards the positive impact direction.

5. Conclusions

Looking back at the past 18 months of EESC life, **we believe that that the project has managed to create a new positive dynamic in tackling the (very) complex issue of Palestinian employment in Lebanon.** All of its planned outputs might have not been achieved over the previous phase, but the project has succeeded in laying down an adequate infrastructure which will enable it to go well beyond its initial scope if it manages to frame in a more concrete and transparent way what it is set to achieve.

The continuing support and collaboration between UNRWA and ILO on the issue of Palestinian employability can be considered by itself a predicament for success. Although this collaboration started under an emergency situation, EESC has been so far a catalyst and a privileged tool in that sense.

We firmly believe that any project, regardless of its size or the circumstances in which it is operating, should follow sound Project Cycle Management guidelines which reinforce its accountability and learning dimensions. **The performance of EESC could have been significantly strengthened and this evaluation process far more appreciative if it would have been possible to benchmark the numerous achievements and outcomes of EESC against better defined objectives, pre-set performance indicators with reliable means of verification (through a LogFrame).** For the future, we strongly encourage its two key stakeholders (ILO and UNRWA) to conduct periodic review and evaluation of its performance.

6. Recommendations

In the section below, we provide some of the key recommendations in view of improving the next phase of EESC in North Lebanon and which can be of relevance to the new EESC serving South Lebanon.

On the performance level

6.1 EESC should develop clearly set objectives, measurable performance indicators and a clearly defined organizational chart over the next phase

If we want to embrace the “relief to recovery” principle, there should be underlying objectives to achieve and against which the performance of the project can be measured. As mentioned in the previous sections, employment is a complex issue but it is still possible amidst this complexity to determine what EESC is set to achieve and how it is going to achieve it. Although EESC can still operate under an open-door policy mode, it should set realistic but quantifiable targets it aims to achieve and develop appropriate strategies for that, as well associated performance indicators.

With the AUB-UNRWA study bringing down the number of individuals seeking employment or better opportunities in North Lebanon to 13,500, the 2,400 applicants who approached EESC are roughly 18% of all job seekers according to this study which is not negligible at all, and EESC should question the added value it brought to these job seekers and how it can serve them better in future phases.

Results Based Management (RBM) is being increasingly mainstreamed in the UN system as an enhanced PCM tool that embraces complexity, while Outcome Mapping (OM) has proven its utility in complexity prone environments and both methodologies could prove useful to EESC if needed.

6.2 EESC cannot continue dealing with the Palestinian job seekers community as one homogenous group and should develop sector-specific and stakeholders-specific targets and approaches in the near future

There is a growing need for EESC now that the operational systems are in place to start looking beyond “providing VET skills to 400 persons” or “creating 120,000 work days” as youth, women, older workers, female headed households, persons with disabilities and many others have specific needs and specific work niches which EESC could help in identifying and matching.

6.3 EESC should improve its data handling and management processes by making its Management Information System (MIS) more user-friendly and by harmonizing its data reporting processes

It will not be possible to sustain EESC if different data collection and recording systems continue being applied (in the absence of a reliable MIS system, data is scattered and retrievable at the individual level rather than on the corporate/management level). Urgent attention needs to be given to strengthen the capacity of EESC staff to use the Microsoft Access MIS system that was initially developed for EESC and which is proving to be difficult to use by the EESC staff³⁵. If needed, the interface of this system should be reviewed and made more user-friendly for the staff.

The data collected through EESC could also help in building an empirical and cumulative database on Palestinian employment in Lebanon, as most existing studies are articulated around non-exhaustive data samples while the data collected through EESC is factual and demand driven

6.4 It is recommended to clearly designate a “data manager” or introduce a position for an M&E officer in order to improve performance and strengthen instructional learning processes

The presence of an M&E officer or data manager would have had facilitated access to data (single mandated interlocutor) and would have improved the overall qualitative reporting at the project level. The natural person to take this role would be the UNRWA appointed Project Manager.

6.5 It is highly recommended to establish an Advisory Board for EESC bringing together ILO, UNRWA, CEP, VET providers, representatives of the

³⁵ An ACCESS-based MIS was initially planned and designed but proved to be difficult to use by the EESC staff. The data on the servers on NBC and BC is difficult to synchronize due to connectivity problems.

education sector, Private Sector representatives and Chambers of Commerce among others

Such an Advisory Board might have been embedded in output 3 of the current project (A network between EESC, private sector representatives and vocational training providers is established and begins to have an impact on the skills development and employment situation of NBC residents) and the conditions for operationalizing it are now more mature.

On the Program level

6.6 UNRWA and ILO are invited to play a more proactive role in the steering of the EESC and in setting its developmental agenda

We recommend launching an ILO-UNRWA dynamics for reviewing the findings of this external evaluation and using it as a starting point for discussions, in order to help the management and the staff of EESC in setting milestones and targets for the new phase, especially in the light of the findings of the AUB-UNRWA study which bring the number of Palestinian job seekers to a manageable scale

6.7 EESC should be able to periodically re-define its approach and strategic choices based on the results of continuous monitoring

This evaluation clearly mentions the novelty of the EESC approach in Lebanon and probably the MENA context, which makes it difficult to benchmark its performance vis-à-vis other similar initiatives under comparable conditions of execution. Systematic monitoring based on empirical evidence should be hence embedded in the *modus operandi* of EESC in order to establish a body of knowledge and re-design and/or improve performance based on the analysis of the gathered data.

For example EESC should analyze if the placements it has managed to achieve fall close to “decent work” and what is its added value in the process? How long job seekers are staying in their placed jobs and what to do if they are staying less than three months? Is construction the best industry sector to focus on or EESC should have a strategy targeting other specific promising industry sectors? How to increase synergies with VET and should VET reinvent itself in order to fit more adequately the job market?....

6.8 EESC should work on developing its own governance mechanisms

Building on the previous conclusions, we feel that it is high time to develop internal governance mechanisms for EESC which would facilitate its replication across Lebanon and possibly in other MENA countries where Palestinian refugees are scattered (such as – for example – policies and procedures, staff appraisal mechanism, operational manuals, ...)

7. Lessons Learned

The lessons that can be learned from the EESC experience are numerous but can be summarized into 5 key points:

7.1 Working along a Logical Framework model makes the project more framed and its achievements more tangible: An example of the difficulty we faced in the current evaluation was to “gauge evidence” on how close EESC got to the 120,000 working days foreseen in Output 2. An alignment of indicators and their associated

means of verification should have enabled the project (and subsequently the evaluator) to provide evidence on how long job seekers were staying in their jobs and would have captured along the process invaluable data on the types of jobs provided, the satisfaction of job seekers from these jobs, etc... On one hand this would have put a higher accountability pressure on the staff to “prove” that the achievement of this output was actually taking place and then to suggest “improvement” if there was an observed high turnover or if the job seekers were not satisfied by the opportunities provided.

7.2 The coherence of data is key for understanding the profound changes introduced by EESC: The project has probably done a remarkable job in refereeing candidates to suitable job positions but the random recording of referral data diluted the impact that these referrals had since the number at hand (1,907) does not really tell if a minority of qualified individuals were constantly referred or if 10 individuals contacted by phone about the same position without having all of them applying are actually counted as referrals.

7.3 Analytical qualitative reporting is as important (if not more important) than quantitative reporting: One of the major added values of analytical reporting is that it allows the systematization of organizational learning. To give justice to EESC, we could identify various best practices which emerged during the implementation process but are not captured anywhere in the project literature. For example, the communication strategy followed during the project does not appear anywhere in the project literature (whether external or internal) and despite the fact that it constitutes – in our opinion – a versatile, adaptive, innovative and context-specific approach to making EESC known and which ultimately led to getting 2,400+ applicants register in EESC. The ability to capitalize on the elements of the local context is also a proxy indicator on the (positive) attitude of the team and their ability to “localize” EESC practices.

Some of the Communication and Outreach tools used by EESC in NBC and BC

- ◆ Distribution of simple information flyers (at early stages of the project, then as a reminder and/or in areas where not enough applicants contacted the Center
- ◆ Word to mouth using “key informants” such as local leaders and persons of moral authority
- ◆ Using “snow-ball” communication, ie relaying the information to NGO’s, mosques, popular committees, UNRWA dispensaries and services centers which would in turn propagate the news
- ◆ Liaising closely with the Imams of the mosques who would make public announcements after the Friday prayer
- ◆ Using the TV networks of the satellite TV providers to achieve optimal penetration at the household level
- ◆ Posting vacancies in specific strategic points of BC and NBC and relaying these same vacancies by e-mail and fax to other NGOs and services centers
- ◆ Posting vacancies in the weekly newsletter of UNRWA

7.4 The determination and measurement of outcomes and impacts is as important as the measurement and reporting on outputs: from the comments of

the reviewers of the first draft of this report, it appeared clearly that the impacts/outcomes (section 4.6) was highly appreciated and judged particularly important. Apart from a broad “contribution to the reduction of poverty in NBC” the impacts of EESC are not framed in a way that enables an objective assessment of the contribution of the project towards their attainment, while from a development perspective the changes in attitudes and behaviors that the project brings is as important than the number of referrals or placements that it is actually managing to achieve.

- 7.5 The lessons learned from this evaluation should contribute to the improvement of the second phase of EESC as well as the new EESC which is being implemented for South Lebanon:** as we clearly highlight in the methodology, we conducted this evaluation as a formative learning exercise that is backward looking and forward looking at the same time, with the aim of feeding the learning derived from it into other similar initiatives. We hope that this report will positively influence the second phase of EESC North Lebanon and will provide useful insights for EESC South Lebanon that is currently underway.



Annex 1: TORs of the Evaluation

Independent Final Evaluation

Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr El Bared

LEB/08/05M/UNR

Terms of Reference

1. Introduction and rationale for the independent evaluation

Subsequent to the 2007 Nahr El Bared crisis, it is estimated that 30,000 refugees were displaced while 5,000 families lost their main source of livelihood. The unemployment rate right after the crisis verged on 80%, where up to 2,000 refugees lost their jobs. In an emergency response, the United Nations Works and Relief Agency (UNRWA) launched an Emergency Appeal in September 2007 calling for international assistance to meet the needs of the affected population of Nahr El-Bared Camp (NBC).

Under the framework of the UNRWA Emergency Appeal for Nahr El Bared and in the context of ILO's mandate and its current participation in the Committee for Employability of Palestinian Refugees (CEP) in Lebanon, UNRWA requested that the ILO provide specialised assistance to promote the employability of Palestinian refugees.

Accordingly, the ILO provided advisory technical support to UNRWA in the area of livelihood recovery within the Emergency Response framework. Through this joint collaboration, the ILO sought to enhance the employability of Palestinian refugees through:

- The creation of Emergency Employment Service Centres (ESCs) in Nahr El Bared and Beddawi (which were originally designed to operate in close collaboration with labour based reconstruction programmes predominantly catering to the reconstruction of the Old Camp);
- The provision of vocational education and training;
- The promotion of micro and small enterprises.

The above initiatives are closely linked to the broader objective of creating employment and income generation opportunities using employment intensive methods. It was originally envisioned that the "ILO technical support would assist as many as 1,000 construction workers and will create additional job opportunities for the residents of NBC who are currently seriously restricted from working in the formal Lebanese

economy.³⁶ The initiative would also facilitate the delivery of short-term demand-driven technical vocational education and training (TVET) courses for up to 400 NBC residents.

Several obstacles, chiefly political will and availability of funding, impeded the reconstruction of NBC as planned³⁷. The project strategically broadened its ESC mandate in response, opening to job referrals in all sectors inside and outside the Camps, instead of exclusively restricting itself to construction in NBC, as originally envisioned.

The ESCs officially opened their doors to jobseekers in February 2009. By May 2010, 1,305 job seekers had been referred to employment and 239 placed in jobs. As part of the TVET component, another 316 job seekers were placed in trainings to develop their skills for future employment. The trainees, 41% of whom were women, took part in 6-9 months trainings in a wide variety of courses including accounting, specialized IT courses, electricity, photomontage and graphic design.

To promote SMEs, the third component of the Project, the ESCs collected the necessary data from existing SME support services, enabling them to advise job seekers on opportunities in those areas. The ESCs are also represented at the grants committee of UNRWA where decisions are taken regarding the provision of grants to SMEs seeking to reactivate in NBC.

While ILO technical assistance to this project officially ends in June 2010, UNRWA is committed to continue with the provision of employment services as part of its employment and livelihood strategy for Palestinian refugees. It is expected that the reconstruction of the old camp will continue at a larger scale reinforcing the need for employment services to ensure that the maximum number of Palestinian labour is engaged in the reconstruction process.

UNRWA has further requested additional ILO support to extend this employment service to Palestinian refugees in South Lebanon. To this end, and with the technical leadership of the ILO, an Employment Service Center was formally launched in Saida in May 2010, building upon the NBC experience.

This independent final evaluation will now be undertaken at the end of the NBC project in line with ILO policies and procedures on evaluations. It will be conducted by a senior

³⁶ Summary Project Outline, page 3.

³⁷ Even today construction is still at package 1.

national external evaluator, and managed by the Monitoring and Evaluation advisor at the ILO Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS).

The performance of the project will be reviewed with regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The evaluation is expected to:

- Provide lessons learnt and recommendations to support ILO's strategy and initiatives on promoting employability in crisis situations based on the assessment of the key success factors, best practices and constraints faced by the project.
- Assess preliminary impact and sustainability of activities undertaken and evidence of pathways towards longer term impact.

2. Brief background on project

The project to Enhance Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr El-Bared was approved in June 2008 as part of an interagency collaboration between the ILO and UNRWA with a total budget of \$650,000. This collaboration was governed by a Letter of Agreement between the two UN Agencies. Under this agreement, UNRWA would fund the project and provide in-kind support including staff and office space for the ESCs, while ILO would take the technical lead in project management and implementation. The project became effectively operational in August 2008, for an initial duration of 12 months. It was subsequently extended until June 2010 in order to complete implementation of remaining activities.

Development Objective:

To reduce poverty among NBC resident through providing better access to employment, self-employment and training opportunities.

Key outcomes:

1. Advisory services are provided by the ILO Project Management Team to UNRWA on skills development and employment issues and, together with UNRWA, regular chairmanship of the livelihood cluster group;
2. Emergency Employment Services are established and are operating with well-trained staff able to provide specific advisory and labour market services to targeted groups of job seekers in NBC;
3. Employment and training opportunities are identified and job seekers referred to employment with major projects, private sector employers and other employment options;

4. Relevant and up-to-date advice and assistance on micro-finance, business development services and self-employment opportunities available in the local labour market is provided to targeted jobseekers.

ILO's chief partner in this collaboration is UNRWA. Secondary partners include other UN agencies (most significantly UNDP and HABITAT), TVET institutes and CSOs in the North, in addition to local and international non-governmental organizations working on livelihood interventions in NBC. The ILO maintained regular communication with all project partners and stakeholders through the Livelihood Cluster which convened on a bi-weekly basis, bringing together UN agencies and local and international NGOs providing livelihood assistance.

Project management arrangements:

The ILO established a project management team comprising a Chief Technical Advisor on ILO/UNRWA collaboration, alongside two national officers for employment services and technical vocational education and training respectively. All positions within the employment services (UNRWA) and the management unit (ILO) were filled during 2009. The ESCs became operational in February 2009 with two registration clerks, two counsellors, one outreach officer and a supervisor, all UNRWA staff.

The collaboration was such that UNRWA provided in-kind support through the provision of staff and required office space for the ESCs, while the ILO project management team provided overall advisory services to UNRWA on skills development and employment issues. ILO together with UNRWA led the Livelihood Cluster Group. The Livelihood Cluster was regularly updated on the progress of ESCs operation. It in turn provided feedback to the ILO team on required assistance and emerging needs on employment and vocational training issues.

3. Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- Determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;

- Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- Document lessons learned, success stories, and good practice in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;
- Examine the UN joint programming management model mainly the coordination between ILO and UNRWA to achieve the common pre-set objectives of the project.

Scope

The evaluation will look at all activities implemented from August 2008-June 2010. In particular the evaluation will examine the quality and impact of project activities on the employability of Palestinian refugees, including:

- **Development effectiveness:** The extent to which the development intervention's objectives and intended results were achieved;
- **Resource Efficiency:** The extent with which resources were economically converted into results, including mention of alternative more cost-effective strategies when applicable;
- **Impact:** Positive and negative, intended and unintended long-term effects;
- **Relevance:** The extent to which the development intervention meets beneficiary requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies;
- **Sustainability:** The continuation of benefits and probability of continued long-term benefits after the project has been completed.
- **Partnerships:** The extent to which the project contributed to capacity development of UNRWA, the effectiveness of the ILO-UNRWA partnership and implications on potential future national and regional partnerships;
- **Lessons learned and good practice:** Good practices identified by the project, key lessons learned from programme implementation, and recommendations for similar programmes/projects.

Clients of Evaluation

The primary clients of the evaluation are the ILO Regional Office for Arab States, UNRWA and CIDA. Secondary clients include other units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation, as well as project beneficiaries and partners.

4. Suggested Analytical Framework

4.1 Relevance and strategic fit

- a. How did the project contribute to national priorities as identified in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)? How did the project contribute to UNRWA's emergency response priorities and capacity development needs?
- b. Does the project respond to the real needs of the Palestinian refugees in North Lebanon, including men, women, youth and marginalized population groups?
- c. How well did the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address the employability of Palestinian refugees and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? (Synergies with existing UNRWA and non UNRWA services targeting employability) Did the project's original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions have not addressed?

4.2. Validity of the design

- a. What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established? Was a gender analysis carried out?
- b. Does the project document take into account the gendered nature of employment, describing the project's strategy to address these in design and implementation?
- c. Was the intervention logic coherent and realistic? Do outputs causally link to outcomes, which in turn contribute to the broader development objective of the project?
- d. Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- e. How strategic has the partnership with UNRWA been in terms of influence, capacities and commitment?
- f. On which risks and assumptions did the project build? How crucial were they for the success of the project?
- g. Were risk mitigation strategies developed in the design phase of the project?
- h. How appropriate and useful were the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? Were the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- i. Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes how? Was the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?

4.3. Project progress and effectiveness

- a. Has the project made sufficient progress towards its planned outputs and activities? Do the benefits accrue equally to men and women?
- b. Which components of the project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? How can the project build or expand on these achievements?
- c. In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- d. How effective was the collaboration with UNRWA and what has been the added value of this collaboration? How has the project developed the capacities of UNRWA to promote the employability of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? What are some of the lessons learned from this partnership?
- e. What alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the Project's objectives?
- f. How did the project's outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's chief goal of promoting decent work for all? How did the project address the challenge of promoting decent work in an informal camp economy?
- g. How did the ILO integrate the principles of decent work in its employment services provision? Were beneficiaries satisfied with the quality of jobs they were placed in?
- h. Were the technical vocational education and training (TVET) courses responsive to labour market demand? Were beneficiaries satisfied with the quality of trainings they were placed in? How many of the trainees were then successfully placed in employment? Which trades should be strengthened?
- i. How efficient has the project been in communicating its results, disseminating success stories and enhancing visibility inside the Camps to beneficiaries, and outside the Camp to other stakeholders?
- j. How have factors outside of the control of the project affected project implementation and how did the project deal with these external factors?

4.4. Efficiency of resource use

- a. Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- b. Have resources been used efficiently? Has the implementation of activities been cost-effective? Will the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results have been attained with fewer resources?

- c. Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner? Were there any major delays? What were the reasons, and how did the project deal with this delay in work plan?

4.5 Effectiveness of management arrangements

- a. Were management capacities adequate? Did the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between UNRWA and the ILO?
- b. Has relevant gender expertise been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized in the employment services, TVET and SME components of the project?
- c. How effective was the communication between project team, regional office, and responsible technical department?
- d. How effectively did the project management monitor performance and results? What M&E system were put in place, and how effective was it? Was relevant data systematically being collected and analyzed to document progress and inform management decisions?
- e. Has the project made strategic use of coordination and collaboration with other ILO projects and with other donors in Lebanon to ensure synergies and increase effectiveness and impact?

4.6. Impact orientation and sustainability

- a. What observed changes in attitudes, capacities and institutions etc. can be causally linked to the project's interventions? Are these results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable?
- b. What are the realistic long-term effects of the project on the poverty level and decent work conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon?
- c. How effectively has the project built the necessary capacity of UNRWA to plan, initiate, implement and monitor Employment Services Centres catering to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon?
- d. How effective and realistic is the project's exit strategy? Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Is the project gradually being handed over to UNRWA? Has the capacity of UNRWA sufficiently been developed to

enable it to sustain and replicate this initiative to different segments of Palestinian refugees?

- e. Can the project approach or results be replicated or scaled up by national partners and cover other Palestinian refugee camps? How successfully has ILO replicated experiences gained in the North into the sister project in the South? What are some of the lessons learned?
- f. Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project's interventions? How can the project strategy be adjusted to minimize negative effects for the remaining duration of the project?

5. Methodology to be followed

The evaluation will be conducted by a senior national evaluator named evaluation consultant. The evaluation consultant will be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. This will need to be approved by the evaluation manager.

The project team will be responsible for providing all logistical support to facilitate the evaluation process. The evaluation will be carried out using a desk review, field visits to project sites for consultations with project staff, partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. Upon completion, the evaluation consultant will conduct a stakeholder workshop for the dissemination of initial findings.

While the evaluation will be strictly external and independent in nature, the evaluation will seek to be participatory to the extent possible, engaging project management, partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The evaluation will include but will not be restricted to:

- a) A desk review conducted in home-country of project documents and materials provided by the evaluation manager to the evaluation consultant;
- b) Presentations /inductions with available project staff and key stakeholders and partners to the project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation;
- c) Interviews with project staff (ILO and UNRWA), project partners, and key project stakeholders;
- d) Phone Interviews with ILO HQ, and meetings with relevant focal points in the ILO Regional Office for Arab States and UNRWA ;

- e) Presentation of findings and recommendations to selected stakeholders and partners upon completion of the Evaluation Report.

6. Main outputs

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluation consultant are:

- a) A desk review;
- b) An evaluation plan (including instruments and methodology) prepared by the evaluation consultant;
- c) Stakeholder workshops facilitated by the evaluation consultant;
- d) Draft evaluation report including stakeholder workshop proceedings and findings from field visits by evaluation consultant;
- e) Final Evaluation Report and Cover page with key project and evaluation data³⁸:
following th structure of the final report:
 1. Executive Summary
 2. Description of the project
 3. Purpose, scope and clients of evaluation
 4. Methodology employed
 5. Review of implementation
 6. Clearly identified findings for each criterion
 7. Conclusions
 8. Recommendations (including tracking table with relevant follow-up responsibilities)
 9. Lessons learned and good practices and effective models of intervention drafted in user-friendly language for publication and circulation to wide audiences;
 10. Summary of potential areas for further investigation and implications for global/regional strategies
 11. Annexes, including TORs, persons contacted etc.
 12. Standard evaluation instrument matrix.

The final report will be circulated to key stakeholders (those participants present at stakeholder evaluation workshop will be considered key stakeholders) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the evaluation manager at the Regional Office for Arab States and provided to the evaluation consultant. In preparing the final report the evaluation consultant should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

³⁸ The template will be provided by the M&E advisor in the ROAS.

7. Management arrangements, work plan and timeframe

The evaluation will be managed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor at ROAS Beirut who will operate as evaluation manager. The evaluation consultant will have to report exclusively to the evaluation manager.

Evaluation Team and responsibilities

The evaluation team will consist of a national evaluation consultant. The evaluation consultant is responsible for conducting the final evaluation, as per the terms of reference. The appointed consultant shall:

- Review the TOR and provide input, as necessary;
- Review project documents and materials;
- Develop the evaluation methodology, instruments and plan
- Reserve two week for field mission including induction and interviews with direct and indirect stakeholders, and other methodological component the evaluation consultant might chose to apply
- Conduct debriefing on findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the evaluation with Key stakeholders in the form of a workshop ;
- Draft evaluation report and finalize it based on comments from stakeholders.

The Evaluation manager (EM) is responsible for:

- Drafting the final evaluation TOR;
- Finalizing and approving the TOR with input from the stakeholders and the evaluators
- Ensuring proper stakeholder involvement;
- Providing project background materials and information;
- Providing logistical and practical support, as needed;
- Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission;
- Assist in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings;
- Coordinating exchanges of comments of the evaluation team with the partners during the evaluation;
- Circulate draft and final report to stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments of the evaluation report;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation;
- Ensure follow- up to the evaluation recommendations.

The Chief Technical Advisor is responsible for:

- Reviewing the TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the draft evaluation report.

Estimated duration

The expected starting date of the evaluation is estimated October 2010. The latest expected submission of the final report date is end October 2010.

The timetable and schedule is as follows:

Responsible person	Tasks	Timeline
Evaluation consultant	Desk review of project documents. Submission of evaluation methodology and instruments based on desk review	3 days
Evaluation consultant with the project staff logistical support.	1 day briefing and meetings with ILO in Beirut 1 day briefing and meetings with UNRWA Beirut, including CEP and LPDC officials 1 day briefing and meeting with UNRWA and ILO offices in the North 1 day in ILO-UNRWA employment centre, 1 day in UNRWA Vocational training centre in the North, and UNRWA Women Programme Centre 1 day to meet indirect stakeholders in the north active in livelihood, including members of livelihood cluster group 5 days for consultation with beneficiaries who have been employed and have not been employed but benefited from training centres through (interviews, focus groups, etc..)	10 days
Evaluation consultant	Drafting report	5 days
EM	Circulate draft report to key stakeholders Consolidate comments of stakeholders and send to team leader	5 days

Evaluation consultant	Integration of comments and finalization of the report.	2 days
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8. Qualifications

The evaluation consultant shall have:

- Relevant background in employment and skills development in post-conflict settings;
- At least 10 years experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects;
- Experience in evaluations in the UN system, preferably as team leader;
- Relevant regional experience preferably working on Palestinian refugee issues in Lebanon;
- Fluency in spoken and written English and strong editorial skills in English are necessary, fluency in Arabic is recommended;
- Experience in facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

Annex 2: Questions of the Focus Groups

Focus Group 1: Employment Seekers who found a job through EESC/BC	
Location	BC, either at EESC premises or preferably in a “neutral” place
Recommended time	120 minutes (30 minutes for each axis of discussion)
Attendees	A group of 5-8 job seekers (preferably males and females) residing in BC who found jobs through EESC. Areas of specialty <u>non-construction</u>
Lead Questions	<p>I- Deciding to approach EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? (flyers, announcements, word to mouth, ...) ○ Was it easy to decide to seek help from EESC? You felt comfortable pushing the door and coming in? ○ Were you unemployed or you wanted to get a better job? <p>II- EESC’s contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did EESC help you build capacities? (writing CV? Counseling? Re-orientation to VET, ...) ○ How do you describe the attitude of EESC staff? (concerned? Doing their job? Friendly? Distant? Overwhelmed?) ○ How long did it take between the time you applied and the time EESC found you a placement ○ Did you accept the first work proposition or declined waiting for better opportunities <p>III- Job profile</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Is your job in BC/NBC or outside the camp? ○ If outside the camp, are you comfortable with the location? Any problems to report? Any added value? ○ Is your employer Lebanese or Palestinian? Do you feel that the NBC war scars are behind us now? Any problems to report? Any added value? <p>IV- Impact achieved by EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Do you think that the recommendation letter provided by EESC empowered you more than if you were applying on your own? ○ Do you believe that EESC negotiated better working conditions for you? (better pay? Fewer working hours? Social security or safety nets? Less hardship at work?) ○ What were your alternatives should EESC did not exist? What are your recommendations?

Focus Group 2: Employment Seekers who found a job through EESC/NBC	
Location	NBC, either at EESC premises or preferably in a “neutral” place
Recommended time	120 minutes (30 minutes for each axis of discussion)
Attendees	A group of 5-8 job seekers (preferably males and females) residing in NBC who found jobs through EESC. Areas of specialty <u>non-construction</u>
Lead Questions	<p>I- Deciding to approach EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? (flyers, announcements, word to mouth, ...) ○ Was it easy to decide to seek help from EESC? You felt comfortable pushing the door and coming in? ○ Were you unemployed or you wanted to get a better job? <p>II- EESC’s contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did EESC help you build capacities? (writing CV? Counseling? Re-orientation to VET, ...) ○ How do you describe the attitude of EESC staff? (concerned? Doing their job? Friendly? Distant? Overwhelmed?) ○ How long did it take between the time you applied and the time EESC found you a placement ○ Did you accept the first work proposition or declined waiting for better opportunities <p>III- Job profile</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Is your job in BC/NBC or outside the camp? ○ If outside the camp, are you comfortable with the location? Any problems to report? Any added value? ○ Is your employer Lebanese or Palestinian? Do you feel that the NBC war scars are behind us now? Any problems to report? Any added value? <p>IV- Impact achieved by EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Do you think that the recommendation letter provided by EESC empowered you more than if you were applying on your own? ○ Do you believe that EESC negotiated better working conditions for you? (better pay? Fewer working hours? Social security or safety nets? Less hardship at work?) ○ What were your alternatives should EESC did not exist? What are your recommendations?

Focus Group 3: Construction who found a job through EESC	
Location	NBC, EESC premises (lunch on the house)
Recommended time	60 minutes (lunch break time of workers)
Attendees	A group of 5-8 construction workers, of different specialty levels (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled) and preferably residing in NBC and BC
Lead Questions	<p>I- Deciding to approach EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? (flyers, announcements, word to mouth, ...) ○ Were you unemployed or you wanted to participate in the rebuilding of the camp? <p>II- EESC's contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How long did it take between the time you applied and the time EESC found you a placement? What were you doing in the meantime? ○ Did EESC find you the position you wanted? <p>III- Working conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How do you compare the conditions for working on the reconstruction of NBC vs. working in the construction sector outside the camp? What improvements in the working conditions you can report? ○ Is the pay for your skill level less/same/higher than outside? ○ What will you do when NBC construction is over? <p>IV- Impact achieved by EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Do you believe that EESC negotiated better working conditions for you? What could have been done better? ○ What were your alternatives should EESC did not exist? What are your recommendations?

Focus Group 4: Employment Seekers who are still waiting for placement BC and NBC	
Location	BC or NBC depending on the preference/convenience of the UNRWA staff. Could be either at EESC premises or preferably in a “neutral” place
Recommended time	90 minutes (30 minutes for each axis of discussion)
Attendees	A group of 5-8 job seekers (preferably males and females) residing in BC or NBC and who are still waiting for placement. A mix of backgrounds and specialties is highly recommended.
Lead Questions	<p>I- Deciding to approach EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? (flyers, announcements, word to mouth, ...) ○ Was it easy to decide to seek help from EESC? You felt comfortable pushing the door and coming in? <p>II- EESC’s contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did EESC help you build capacities? (writing CV? Counseling? Re-orientation to VET, ...) ○ How do you describe the attitude of EESC staff? (concerned? Doing their job? Friendly? Distant? Overwhelmed?) ○ How are you filling your time while waiting for placement? ○ How are you catering for your personal/family expenses? ○ Would you consider registering for a VET session in the meantime? (and why you did not register yet?) <p>III- Reasons for delay</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Do you believe that EESC staff is doing all what they can to find you a placement? ○ Do you prefer to work in the camps or outside the camps and why? ○ Do you prefer to work with a Lebanese or Palestinian employer and why? ○ Are you actively seeking employment in parallel to your registration at EESC? Please describe

Focus Group 5: Women-only FG to investigate further gender aspects of the project BC and NBC	
Location	BC or NBC depending on the preference/convenience of the UNRWA staff. Could be either at EESC premises or preferably in a “neutral” place. It is highly recommended if UNRWA/ILO can provide transportation to the meeting place for those coming from the other camp
Recommended time	120 minutes (30 minutes for each axis of discussion)
Attendees	A group of 5-8 women who found jobs through EESC residing in BC or NBC. A mix of backgrounds and specialties is highly recommended.
Lead Questions	<p>I- Deciding to approach EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? (flyers, announcements, word to mouth, ...) ○ Was it easy to decide to seek help from EESC? You felt comfortable pushing the door and coming in? ○ Was your family supportive of your move? (husband and children for married, extended family for non-married) <p>II- EESC’s contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did EESC help you build capacities? (writing CV? Counseling? Re-orientation to VET, ...) ○ How do you describe the attitude of EESC staff? Were they supportive/encouraging because you are a woman? ○ Anything can be done in the EESC environment to encourage more women applicants? ○ How long did it take between the time you applied and the time EESC found you a placement? Do you think it was easier or – on the contrary – took more time because you are a woman? <p>III- Job profile</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Is your job in BC/NBC or outside the camp? ○ If outside the camp, are you comfortable with the location? Any problems to report? Any added value? ○ Are you happy in your job? Do you think that a male in the same position would have gotten better conditions? <p>IV- Impact achieved by EESC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Do you think that the recommendation letter provided by EESC empowered you more than if you were applying on your own? ○ Do you believe that EESC negotiated better working conditions for you, especially that you are a woman? (better pay? Fewer working hours? Social security or safety nets? Less hardship at work?) ○ What were your alternatives should EESC did not exist? What are your recommendations?

Focus Group 6: Interview with employers (both who found staff through EESC or offered positions that could not be met by EESC)	
Location	Tripoli might be a suitable middle point for this target group, so maybe an afternoon tea in Quality-Inn would be most appropriate
Recommended time	90 minutes
Attendees	A group of 5-8 business owners (4-5 who hired NBC applicants, 2-3 who did not find profiles they are looking for). If we could have Palestinian and Lebanese business owners present it would be ideal!
Lead Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did you know about the EESC? Through the outreach officer or through other means? How did you feel towards the idea of an employment service center in North Lebanon? ○ Did EESC deal professionally with your requests? Did the candidates sent for interview match the profile your were seeking? ○ Did EESC negotiate better working conditions for their potential candidates? Do you think that this fact is encouraging or discouraging for hiring through EESC? ○ How do you normally recruit workers? (Al Wasset, classified adds, walk-in candidates, others....) ○ How do you compare the on-the-job performance of EESC-recruited staff vs. staff that is not recruited through EESC? ○ Is your business located in the camps or outside the camps? Do you think that being located outside the camp is less appealing to Palestinian workers? ○ Do you prefer to hire Lebanese or Palestinian workers? Is the assumption that Palestinian workers are less socially cumbersome because they don't need to be registered in NSSF true? ○ What do you consider as the major added value of EESC? What do you suggest to improve its future performance?