

# Final Evaluation of Joint Programme of MDG-F in Mozambique: Culture and Development



Conducted by:



January 10, 2012



# **Technical Information:**

Document Title:	Final Evaluation of Joint Programme of MDG-F in Mozambique: Culture and Development
Company:	Eurosis – Consultoria e Formação em Gestão, Lda.
Date:	January 10, 2012
Nº of Pages:	104 (excluding Appendices)



# List of Acronyms

Term	Description		
ABRAMUS	Brazilian Association for Music and Arts		
ANARTE	National Association of Artisans		
AMMO	Association of Mozambican Musicians		
ARPAC	Institute for Sociocultural Research (ex-Archive of Cultural Heritage)		
ASARUNA	Association of United Artisans of Nampula		
C&A	Communication and Advocacy		
СВО	Community Based Organisation		
CEDARTE	Centre for the Study and Development of Craft		
DNPIC	National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries		
DaO	Delivering as One		
DPA	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture		
DPEC	Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture		
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization		
FEIMA	Craft, Flowers and Food Fair of Maputo		
FGD	Focus Group Discussion		
GIS	Geographic Information System		
GoM	Government of Mozambique		
ILO	International Labour Organization		
INAR	National Institute of Support for Refugees		
INDE	National Institute for the Development of Education		
INEFP	National Institute of Employment and Professional Training		
INLD	National Institute of Book and Disc		
INTIC	National Institute for Information and Communication Technologies		
ITC	International Trade Centre		
ITS	[Department of] Information Technology and Systems		
IYES	Improve Your Exhibition Skills		
JP	Joint Programme		
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation		
MCT	Ministry of Science and Technology		
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund		
MIC	Ministry of Industry and Commerce		
MICULT	Ministry of Culture		
MINAG			
MINEC	Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation		
	Ministry of Foleign Analys and Cooperation		
MINED MISAU	Ministry of Health		
MITRAB			
MITUR	Ministry of Labour		
	Ministry of Tourism		
MJD	Ministry of Youth and Sport		
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development		
NSC	National Steering Committee		
PARP	Government of Mozambique's Action Plan for Poverty Reduction		
PIREP	Integrated TVET Reform Programme		
PMC	Programme Management Committee		
PPP	Public and Private Partnerships		
SIC-M	Cultural Management Information System - Mozambique		
SOMAS	Mozambican Authors Society		
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health		
SYCB	Start Your Cultural Business		
TOR	Terms of Reference		
UN	United Nations		
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework		
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization		
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund		
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office		
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization		



# List of Tables and Graphs

TABLE 1: INITIAL PROGRAMME DESIGN AND REFORMULATED PROGRAMME DESIGN	19
TABLE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS	74
GRAPH 1: AVERAGE SCORES BY PROVINCE	74
GRAPH 2: DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE SCORES BETWEEN INHAMBANE AND MAPUTO	75
GRAPH 3: DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE SCORES BETWEEN NAMPULA AND MAPUTO	76
GRAPH 4: AVERAGE SCORES BY SECTOR	76
GRAPH 5: DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE SCORES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN RESPONDENTS	77
GRAPH 6: DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE SCORES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN IN MAPUTO	77
GRAPH 7: PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS FAMILIAR WITH CERTAIN CONCEPTS	78



# Table of Contents

1.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
2.	INTRODUCTION	. 18
3.	BACKGROUND ON THE JOINT PROGRAMME	-
	3.2. Programme's Goal and Coverage	
		-
4.		
	4.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION	
	4.2. METHODOLOGY USED IN THE EVALUATION	
	4.3. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION	
	4.4. COMPLEXITY OF THE JP TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION	. 29
5.	LEVEL OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS	. 31
	5.1. COMPONENT 1: CULTURE AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES' CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL AND ECONO	
	DEVELOPMENT PROMOTED	. 32
	Outcome 1.1: The enabling environment supporting the development of the cultural	<b>.</b>
	and creative industries strengthened and enforced	. 32
	Output 1.1.1: Revised legal framework and policy development for the sustainable growth of the creative industries	22
	Output 1.1.2: Establishment of a Mozambican Cultural Management Information System	
	Output 1.1.3: Mozambican copyright and intellectual property protection harmonized to internation	
	standards	36
	Output 1.1.4: Increased awareness raising and dissemination of key issues and results identified for	
	securing sustainable growth for the creative industries	39
	Outcome 1.2: Improved products and services for the cultural tourism market	
	destinations in Inhambane, Nampula and Maputo City	
	Output 1.2.1: Artisans better able to manage their creative business	
	Output 1.2.2: Improved national Vocational Curriculum for the craft sector Output 1.2.3: Improved market access for artisans	
	Output 1.2.3: Improved tourist access to high-potential cultural assets	
	The Cultural Component Assessed	
	5.2. Component 2: Inclusion of social and cultural aspects in development policies an	
	STRATEGIES ENSURED	
	<i>Output 2.1: Socio cultural elements integrated in planning processes and local</i>	
		. 55
	Output 2.1.1: Improved livelihoods through the identification and promotion of traditional knowled	
	in forestry and agriculture in select communities	-
	Output 2.1.2: Inter-cultural dialogue between refugees and host community promoted and refugees	
	knowledge to the culture of origin valued in local development plans	
	Output 2.1.3: Model for socio-cultural profiles developed and disseminated for use in the elaboration	
	of district development plans better adapted to the local context	63
	Output 2.1.4: Socio-cultural practices, norms and beliefs taken into consideration in health programmes in the selected districts	65
	The Cultural Component Assessed	
_		
6.	FINDINGS IN THE LEVELS AND CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS	
	6.1. ANALYSIS OF THE QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTED	
	6.2. CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS	
	Relevance	
	Ownership	
	Efficiency Effectiveness	
	Sustainability	



7. THE JP'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDAF, THE MDG-F THEMATIC WINDOW OF CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT AND "DELIVERING AS ONE"					
7.1. JP CONTRIBUTION AND ALIGNMENT IN RELATION TO THE EXTENSION OF THE UN DEVEL	OPMENT				
Assistance Framework in Mozambique 2010-2011					
Pillar 1 – Governance					
Pillar 4 – Economic Development	90				
7.2. JP AND THE MDG-F THEMATIC WINDOW ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT					
7.3. JP AND "DELIVERING AS ONE"					
7.3.1 Delivery, Results and Impact	95				
7.3.2 Coordination	96				
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS					
8.1. Best Practices and positive aspects					
8.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND ASPECTS TO BE IMPROVED IN THE FUTURE					
8.3. General Conclusions	101				
8.4. Recommendations	102				
9. REFERENCES	104				
10. APPENDICES	105				
APPENDIX 1A – INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	106				
APPENDIX 1B – FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED	108				
Appendix 1C – Questionnaire Respondents					
Appendix 2A – On-line Questionnaire					
APPENDIX 2B – FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE					
Appendix 2C – Interview Guide for Higher Officials					



# **1. Executive Summary**

#### Introduction

This report represents the final evaluation of the Joint Programme (JP) on Culture and Development for Mozambique, also known as the Joint Programme on Strengthening Cultural and Creative Industries and Inclusive Policies in Mozambique. It was initially a three year programme for 2008-2011, financed by the Spanish Government through the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) with a \$5 million budget. In June 2010, immediately following the mid-term evaluation, the programme was reformulated from its original ambitious scope from two components and six outcomes to two components and three outcomes. It was also extended for five months (to February 2012).

The JP counted on six United Nations (UN) agencies and ten Government of Mozambique (GoM) ministries in its implementation. The programme covered 6 areas: Maputo City, Zavala District, Inhambane City, Mossuril District, Ilha de Moçambique District and Nampula City (including Maratane Refugee Camp, on the outskirts of Nampula).

#### Methodology of the Final Evaluation

The final evaluation was carried out based on the reformulated programme and the respective log frame of June 2010 and it responds to the TOR prepared by the MDG-F Secretariat and adapted by the Evaluation Reference Group in Mozambique.

This evaluation was conducted from mid October 2011 to mid January 2012. The team collected information over a six-week period (in October and November of 2011). The evaluation team collected data from primary and secondary sources, and used mixed methods aiming at gathering both quantitative and qualitative information. The methodology used in the evaluation comprised the following steps:

- 1. Collection and analysis of key documents
- 2. Development of assessment tools
- 3. Field visits
- 4. Administration of a questionnaire
- 5. Interviews with key stakeholders (PMC Members, Ministries, UN and Output Related Staff in Provinces)
- 6. Focus Group Discussions with Implementers/Beneficiaries

The questionnaire was developed to gather quantitative data. A web-based version was also used for its administration (in addition to a paper based version), allowing for a further collection of responses. A total of 46 individuals filled in the questionnaire and 32 of these were interviewed (in all 6 implementation areas of the JP) for further collection of qualitative data. In addition, 16 focus group discussions were conducted, involving more than 60 individuals.

In line with the TORs, the evaluation team collected data and information on two levels: firstly, an analysis on the basis of the performance of each of the Programme's 12 specific outputs; and secondly, an analysis of the performance of the JP on the basis of five criteria: relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Therefore, this report presents findings on these two levels.



#### **Complexity of the Joint Programme**

Before presenting the results of this evaluation, the evaluation team finds it relevant to first consider a number of aspects around the JP's design, planning and implementation that were recurrently mentioned during interviews, especially by the JP coordination team. These are:

*Design*: The JP called on the active participation of six UN agencies, ten ministries, various implementing organisations and short-term consultants in its implementation. The JP entailed thus a complex coordination, management and implementation structure, composed of many institutions, each with their respective expectations, objectives, needs and priorities. The amount and quality of coordination necessary to ensure that all institutions are aligned and in unison should not be taken lightly.

*Deliverables*: The quantity and scope of outcomes, outputs and their respective activities remained highly ambitious, even after the reformulation of the JP and the decrease from 6 to 3 outcomes and 18 to 12 outputs. Complexity increases with the vast geographical dispersion of the locations where these outputs were supposed to occur, ranging from Maputo to Ilha de Moçambique.

*Planning*: The JP remained largely "idle" during the first eight months of year one. This resulted in procurement and contracting processes initiating much later than expected, resulting in further time loss.

*Timeframe*: After the reformulation in June 2010, the remaining time available to successfully implement activities and conclude all the outputs was extremely short, as many of the activities were linked to each other and a delay in the first activity under a certain output implied that all the remaining activities would also be implemented later than planned. Another important aspect to take into consideration in terms of time is that the JP also aimed to change the mind-frame of its stakeholders in relation to what culture entails. This is not an easy task to accomplish in such a small period of time.

To conclude, as recurrently mentioned by stakeholders involved in this evaluation, even if the JP would have had a full three years to implement, the expectations for the outputs were set unattainably high. The JP as a programme was an ambitious undertaking from its start and was confronted with various challenges.

#### Level of accomplishment of Outcomes and Outputs

Chapter 5 of this report presents the results of the evaluation of each of the 12 outputs that comprise the Joint Programme. This evaluation is based on the revised log-frame produced as part of the reformulation of the Joint Programme half-way through its lifetime.

The evaluation team found that, despite the little time for implementation, many outputs were achieved. Below are highlights of the findings per output.



Output	Indicator	Target	Level of Completion	Brief comments
	Identification of incentives for the reduction of fiscal barriers in the Music and Craft Industry	2011 - proposal for the reduction of fiscal barriers elaborated	75%	Proposals for fiscal incentives are contained in several reports produced, but there is no evidence of these reports being used for further action.
1.1.1: Revised legal framework	Strategic plan for the National Crafts Council	2011 - Strategic plan approved	-	This indicator was removed from the JP by approval of the PMC.
and policy development for the sustainable growth of the creative industries	Action Plan for Creative Industries	2011 - Action Plan drafted, harmonized and approved	-	As proposed by the PMC and MICULT, this indicator was changed. A Policy and Strategy for the Cultural and Creative Industries was drafted instead. This is seen to be an important tool for the newly created DNPIC.
	• .	ed result from this ( I Industries (DNPIC)	at the MICULT	creation of the National Directorate for the , stimulated by the JP. This was an excellent ative Industries
1.1.2:	Cultural Information System designed	2010 - SIC-M designed	100%	Fully designed.
Establishment of a Mozambican Cultural Management Information System	SIC-M updated and functioning	2011- SIC-M functioning at central level and in Nampula	40%	As of this evaluation, the public website for SIC-M was not publicly accessible. The introduction of new information and the correction of existing data were still on- going. The SIC-M was not functioning in Nampula at the time of the evaluation
	SOMAS develops its Strategic Plan through 2015 and initiates implementation	Strategic Plan elaborated, approved and in implementation	80%	Strategic Plan has been elaborated, but not approved. SOMAS lack funds to start implementation. Funds should be raised
1.1.3: Mozambican copyright and	# of new organizations (media, bars, hotels, etc.) paying royalties to SOMAS	2010 - + 4 organizations 2011 - + 8 organizations	0%	from new organizations paying royalties – thus ensuring sustainability. This was not accomplished.
intellectual property protection harmonized to	Mozambican copyright law regulation harmonized to international standards	2010 - drafted and in approval stage	100%	The targets have been successfully accomplished. MICULT has now the challenge to ensure timely approval and
international standards	Regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment revised	2011 - drafted and in approval stage	100%	promote impact of these legal tools.
	# of regional public- private agreements signed for supporting the enhancement of copyright protection mechanisms	2011 - + 3 new partnerships	0%	-
1.1.4: Increased awareness raising and	# of advocacy events or actions for the promotion of authors rights realized	2011 - 10	80%	Too early to measure any impact.
dissemination of key issues and results identified for securing sustainable growth for the creative industries	Public institutions and organisations with solid knowledge about copyright law and its application	2011 - 12	Not possible to determine at this stage	The JP anti-piracy Campaign was prepared and was supposed to be launched in a single week during September. A few activities were carried out (concert, distribution of communication materials); however, the video and audio campaigns are only expected to be launched in 2012.



Output	Indicator	Target	Level of Completion	Brief comments
	# Trained Artisans	Total: 400 trained	390 trained (97,5%)	Through trainings, artisans have increased their portfolio and developed market- driven products. More than 500 artisans were linked to local, national and interpretional markets.
1.2.1: Artisans better able to manage their creative business	# Artisans demonstrating readiness for the presence in fairs and markets	Total: 130 women and 110 youth	Women: Over 100%; Youth: no information	international markets. Once market research studies on sales and market acceptance for new product lines are concluded it will be easier to verify the actual impact of the activities under this output
	# Selected Associations managing and operating "Wood Bank"	2 associations	1 Association (50%)	A big success of the JP was the establishment of the Wood Bank for the craft association ASARUNA in Nampula. This has given artisans secure access to raw materials for their products.
	# Trainers certified in IYES	20 certified trainers	Over 100%	Having trained 21 trainers, the JP has ensured potential for trainings to continue after the end of the JP.
1.2.2: Improved national Vocational	New National vocational training curriculum in the area of craft validated and respond to the sector's needs	1 validated curriculum	80%	The curriculum, although very advanced, is still not in its final form to be officially submitted to PIREP for final approval. Its approval is expected in early 2012.
Curriculum for the craft sector	INEFP applies new national curriculum in vocational training in the area of crafts	At least 1 course using the new curriculum, tested	0%	-
	Increase craft sales for artisans that received technical assistance / training (% Woman / % Youth)	2011 - increase of 10%	Cannot be reported at this point.	No sales figures available yet, but experience at FEIMA indicates an increase.
1.2.3: Improved	# new lines of craft products created and accept by the market	26 lines created, 60% with market acceptance	52 lines created (200% of target)	Market accepted part of lines, but no exact sales figures are available yet
market access for artisans	# Artisans (Men, women and youth) that received assistance in the development of products, report improve sales	18 artisans report improved sales	Cannot be reported at this point	Market accepted part of lines, but no sales figures are available yet.
	Key Government bodies develop strategies that support the growth of the craft sector, at central and provincial level	2011 - 1	Still under development	-
	Improved coordination in the promotion and development of Cultural Tourism amongst key government institutions and relevant private sector institutions	1 Coordination unit identified	100%	Improved relationship between Government and private sector; delay in this indicator resulted in delays in the implementation phase.
1.2.4: Improved tourist access to high-potential cultural assets	Model for the development of Touristic packages developed	1 model developed and tested	100%	A model for the development of Touristic packages was developed and 4 cultural tours have been designed and piloted, two in Ilha de Moçambique and two in Inhambane City.
	Cultural Tourism Packages/itineraries, based on newly developed models, operationalized	A maximum of 2 touristic packages per province	75% 4 pilot cultural tourism tour packages defined	While the impact of this output has the potential to be very positive, an evaluation of this is not possible, as the tours had not yet been launched at time of visit by evaluation team. If this model proves to be successful it can be used for replication in other parts of the country.



Output	Indicator	Target	Level of Completion	Brief comments
	Traditional forestry resources better valued by the communities	2 communities in Nampula and 5 in Inhambane actively participating in Forestry fiscalization; 1 exchange visit in each province	100%	Interviews with communities in Zavala and Mossuril showed that there is greater awareness of forestry resources through the work of the JP.
2.1.1: Improved livelihoods through the	Knowledge of beneficiary communities about participatory natural resource management increased	1 Training seminar in Mossuril and 1 in Zavala; 2 exchange visits between CBO per district	50%	Knowledge seems to have increased in Zavala but little has been done in Mossuril.
identification and promotion of traditional	Community forest areas increased	At least 5 ha of community forest planted	100%	Community forests were planted in Zavala and Mossuril.
knowledge in forestry and agriculture in select communities	Interest groups of economic activities identified and capacitated	1 interest group identified in Mossuril; 1 bee production group trained per district	50%	Despite failing to reach the target, it was possible to see that the mussiro CBOs in Mossuril has had a slight improvement of quality of life through the production of mussiro. Unable to visit the beekeeping group in Zavala.
	Improved used of traditional knowledge regarding agriculture	Study on traditional practices in production and protection of crops performed in Zavala	50%	A cassava local variety demonstration area was established in Mossuril.– difficult to assess impact of this activity based on monitoring reports.
		2 fairs on Local Knowledge carried out per district	1 fair in Zavala (25%)	One Local Knowledge fair took place in Zavala in September 2011.
	Cultural mapping of the Maratane Refugees' Centre in Nampula	2010 - Report	100%	Cultural mapping was done on time, but the report was approved much later than planned
	# and types of intergenerational cultural exchanges	TOTAL: 22 events	8 events (36%)	-
2.1.2: Inter- cultural dialogue between	# and gender of children attending inter- generational exchanges	TOTAL: 1,200 children	740 children (62%)	-
refugees and host community promoted and refugees' knowledge to	# of events to promote cultural exchanges between refugees and local Mozambican communities	TOTAL: 22 events	8 events (36%)	-
the culture of origin valued in local development	# of refugees and local residents participating in the above cultural events; and % of men	Directly: 6,000	6 242 (over 100%)	-
plans	# of refugees and Mozambicans responsible for cultural activities	TOTAL: 70	16 (23%)	-
	# of newsletters produced annually; circulation; and % of cultural topics included	60 editions 12 new journalists trained	44 editions (73%) 5 journalists trained (42%)	-



Output	Indicator	Target	Level of Completion	Brief comments
2.1.3: Model for socio-cultural profiles developed and	Model for the elaboration of socio-cultural profiles elaborated	2011 - Model elaborated with the participation of stakeholders	100%	The model was used in local planning in 4 districts
disseminated for use in the elaboration of district development plans better adapted to the local context	Model and Guidelines for the elaboration of socio- cultural profiles disseminated in selected districts	2011- Model and guidelines disseminated	50%	Too early to measure impact.
2.1.4: Socio-	Increase in the rate of coverage for clinical deliveries in the districts of Zavala and Mossuril	No information	Current data does not exist to reflect the activities th took place in 2011. These data will be introduced in th final report of the Programme. Current data does not exist to reflect the activities th took place in 2011. These data will be introduced in th final report of the Programme.	
cultural practices, norms and beliefs taken into	Increase in the coverage rate of family planning in the districts of Zavala and Mossuril	No information		
consideration in health programmes in the selected districts	Socio-cultural aspects incorporated in the design and implementation of activities in Sexual and Reproductive Health activities, in selected districts	2011 - 3 districts incorporate socio-cultural aspects	100%	Manuals developed; leaders with changing behaviour; Agencies and Ministries changing approaches and forging partnerships.

# Performance in the five criteria: relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability

**Relevance**: The evaluation team has heard from all interviewed sectors, ranging from top government officials to final beneficiaries how the JP has helped them understand how vast the concept of culture is. In particular, the JP's committed effort for creative industries to be taken seriously as a sector that can stimulate innovation, create jobs, improve income levels, raise living standards and provide a boost to the country's GNP has succeeded, as evidenced by government officials recognizing during interviews that this sector has largely been ignored in the past but now urgently needs concrete policies and strategies in order to maximize its potential.

**Ownership**: Judging from interviews with focal points of the JP, the overall level of Government ownership of the JP has arguably been one of its greatest weaknesses. Primarily, this is because government officials don't see the value of the JP in terms of their own objectives and did not know clearly from the start what roles and responsibilities the JP expected of its focal points. Almost all interviewed focal points expressed to have a very poor understanding on a personal level regarding what their role actually was, even as late as two years after the start of the JP. Not understanding their role resulted in focal points quickly becoming disillusioned and losing motivation to participate and take an active involvement in the Programme.

*Efficiency*: In order to function efficiently, JPs fundamentally require its multiple stakeholders to not only assume active engagement but also promote excellent coordination between themselves in order to jointly work towards achieving the defined results. With ownership running low on the part of the Government, the implications on the level of efficiency were several: weak contribution to PMC meetings, low level of commitment and willingness to cooperate and act as facilitators within JP activities, and reporting from



government institutions taking longer than expected as government officials prefer to prioritize internal tasks given to them by their government superiors. A further aspect that has affected efficiency negatively within the JP is the coordination between UN agencies themselves. The fact that different UN agencies pursue vastly different goals and objectives and have different work methodologies has naturally resulted in a certain level of miscommunication and differences in expectations.

*Effectiveness*: It is clear that despite the difficulties related to efficiency, the JP has at least delivered. It is, however, very difficult for the evaluators to judge the quality and impact of the results, due to the fact that many of the expected results of the JP had not been implemented by September 2011 as planned. A critical aspect raised was that collaboration between different sectors has a greater potential to show impact where there exist natural linkages between the different sectors in regard to the challenge faced, e.g. the SRH output where three sectors combined their expertise and experience in order to create a holistic approach towards a common challenge, and proved to be highly effective.

*Sustainability*: The sustainability of the JP can be evaluated in three aspects:

- 1. Whether there exists *genuine interest* in continuing the work commenced under the JP: The interviewees agree that the fundamental concept here is "seeing is believing" in order to accept and adopt new approaches and strategies that differ from current praxis, the stakeholders need to first see the positive effects before they are able to fully understand the benefits.
- 2. Whether there is sufficient *technical capacity* to continue the activities: focal points and beneficiaries spoke of good quality but insufficient amount of trainings with a lack of continuous follow-up. Focal points suggest using cheaper local consultants who are then able to provide follow-up workshops over time. Presently, technical capacity is still lacking.
- 3. Whether there is sufficient *financial capacity* to continue the activities: There is consensus here that the GoM lacks the financial ability to fund the JP activities after the end of the JP. According to the focal points, the vast majority of the JP activities are at considerable risk of being abandoned once the JP ends.

#### The JP's contribution to the Extension of the UNDAF to Mozambique 2010-2011

The JP has contributed chiefly towards Pillar 1 (Governance) and 4 (Economic Development) of the Extension of the UNDAF. A detailed explanation of this is presented in section 7.1 of this report. In brief, in terms of Pillar 1, the JP has contributed to the following UNDAF Outcomes:

**Outcome 1.1** through a development and piloting of a model for an integrated approach for applying culture, gender and human rights into district development planning;

**Outcome 1.2**: through various capacity building trainings to GoM cultural institutions;

**Outcome 1.3**: through support in the elaboration of the Policy and Strategy for Cultural and Creative Industries which will contribute to a future "culture national policy", as expected under this outcome;



**Outcome 1.6**: through capacity building trainings of various associations and CBOs, "training of trainers" in order to strengthen craft associations and artisans (almost 400 artisans have received training through the JP).

In terms of Pillar 4, the JP has contributed to the following UNDAF Outcomes:

**Outcome 4.2:** through the development and piloting of four cultural tours, contributing directly towards supporting local economic development through activities promoting cultural tourism in the provinces of Nampula and Inhambane;

**Outcome 4.3**: by creating awareness regarding the potential of creative industries as a strong contributor towards the national economy as well as all the positive effects on all players involved in the sector; by assisting the transition of businesses from informal to formal sector, enhancing the capacity to solve the constraints from the side of offer, quality certification and capacity of testing the products destined to internal and external markets, as expected under this outcome.

#### JP and the MDG-F thematic window on Culture and Development:

Joint Programmes are not expected to contribute to all intervention lines defined in the Terms of Reference for the MDG-F thematic window on Culture and Development. Nevertheless, the JP Culture and Development in Mozambique has contributed relevantly strongly to the goals: *"Formulate, implement and monitor socially- and culturally-inclusive public policies"* and *"Realize the economic and social potential of the cultural sector and strengthen cultural and creative industries"* and to a lesser extent towards the third goal: *"Generate information, monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of cultural policies"*. A detailed explanation of this is provided under Section 7.2 of this report.

#### JP and "Delivering as One"

The analysis on whether the JP has contributed to "Delivering as One" is discussed in detail in Section 7.3 of this report. However, in short, some positive and negative examples can be highlighted:

- In terms of **Delivery, Results and Impact**: Various outputs faced issues interconnected to various UN Agencies and sectors. When looking at the more successful, (e.g. Output 1.2.1 on training of artisans and training of trainers; Output 2.1.4 on SRH; and Output 1.2.4 on Cultural Tourism) these involved several sectors and it is evident that the success of these outputs required the close collaboration of various UN agencies and GoM sectors in order to guarantee an integrated approach for delivery.
- In terms of **Coordination**: One of the main concerns of the JP was the efficiency of its processes, as many of the processes are tied to UN agencies. In theory, DaO should facilitate and speed up administrative activities such as procurement, financial transactions and reporting. However, as noted through the interviews, the JP suffered in these areas, even after the reformulation of the programme.



#### Conclusions

This section outlines main evaluation findings in terms of best practices (and positive aspects), lessons learned (and aspects to be improved in the future) and other conclusions.

#### **Best Practices**

- Even though the understanding of what is meant by culture is still limited at best and ambiguous at worst, through its inter-sectoral and holistic approach to culture and development, the JP contributed to culture being part of government plans. This should be further promoted in the future.
- The JP has contributed to a much more participatory and integrated approach to planning in three districts. The approach and methodologies used should be leveraged to other districts.
- The JP has shown how cultural tourism can generate income for many different actors. The model that has been developed and tested can, in principle, be used in other districts.
- The integrated approach to health issues of output 2.1.4 was almost unanimously considered the JP's big success.

#### Lessons Learned

- One conclusion that is shared by practically all stakeholders is that too much ambition and too much complexity do not help the implementation of a program like the JP.
- While the conclusion that the programme was overambitious was already reached before the mid-term evaluation, even after the reformulation of 2010 it was still not realistic to expect all the outputs to be finalised by the end of 2011. As a result, even at the end of the programme, many of the activities were being implemented and were therefore not ready for an outcome evaluation.
- Outcome leads were established in late 2010 and installed in early 2011, in response to a recommendation in the mid-term evaluation. Although TORs for the role existed and were divulged, outcome leads remained unclear about their roles and expectations and unable to translate these into concrete management activities. As a result, this did not improve the ownership and leadership in the coordination structure on the part of the Government, as was expected.
- The involvement of several UN agencies in the same output/activity, each with their expectations, own methodology and procedures, specifically financial procedures, very frequently lead to miscommunication and slowed down the implementation of those activities.
- Generally, there has been a lack of synergy between the different outputs of the JP. Each output seems to be a project on its own, working with its own specific subset of beneficiaries. Opportunities were missed for certain activities to benefit from others. Future programmes should put in place strategies to leverage potential synergies among different outputs.
- The JP has experienced a high level of staff turnover, especially within Government institutions. This has naturally had a negative impact on effectiveness.
- In general, the level of commitment on the part of government officials concerning activities related to the JP has been low. While focal points of the JP inside government institutions could have potentially opened doors and facilitated JP



activities that require government intervention, this has only rarely been the case, thus causing delays to JP activities.

- There is a relatively high degree of pessimism about the sustainability of the programme's results, both among Government officials and UN staff, especially because of the lack of financial capacity of the Government and Civil Society Organisations. This also points to the poor ownership amongst the beneficiaries as many initiatives were piloted but not yet fully implemented. Until stakeholders see results more clearly, the likelihood of continuing the path of the Joint Programme is very low.
- Critical issues hampering the viability and sustainability of artisans were not or insufficiently addressed by the JP, such as availability of financial incentives, bank finance, sourcing of raw materials, identification of market demand to guarantee sales, access to funds in general, management tools for associations and technical assistance in producing craft. Although it is acknowledged that some of these were not part of the design or objectives of this JP, this should be considered when designing future programmes.
- No proper instruments for the collection of data for M&E have been developed and used, possibly because the programme did not have an M&E specialist for most of its duration.
- Although the focal points were supposed to actively gather data for M&E, they were never properly trained for that specific task.
- The two different aspects of the JP (the promotion of cultural/creative industries and the role of culture in human development) were not really integrated and coexisted as two separate conceptions of what culture is and what role it can play. The design of the programme did not aim at integrating this. Future programmes should consider whether such different components should be part of the same programme and, if yes, mechanism to leverage potential synergies between them should be put in place.

#### **General Conclusions**

- Despite the little time for implementation, many outputs were achieved.
- The JP has contributed positively to a number of outcomes under Pillars 1 and 4 of the Extension of the UNDAF (Mozambique) 2010-2011.
- The JP has contributed positively to a number of intervention lines defined in the Terms of Reference of the MDG-F Thematic Window on Culture and Development.
- "Delivering as One" has proved to be difficult to put into practice for the UN agencies involved in the Joint Programme, but in those cases where agencies managed to establish fruitful forms of collaboration, this definitely improved programme delivery.
- MDG-F Joint Programmes are supposed to be "nationally owned" and to "improve the ability of the UN to deliver results that support national development outcomes, while placing greater emphasis on government leadership and commitment." (MDG-F Secretariat, February 2011, p. 4). In this JP, however, *ownership* and leadership on the part of the Government has been very weak.
- All stakeholders involved in the JP agree that the Programme has changed their concept of and perspective on culture. The JP has helped to create awareness of the importance of the role of cultural and creative industries, and thereby changed the status of e.g. artisans. However, generally, amongst those who participated in the JP (at several different stakeholder levels) there still is a limited understanding of how to operationalize the contribution of these industries to economic growth and



poverty alleviation, without appropriate technical support. There is no sufficient confidence that those who became more aware of the potential role of culture will be able to transfer this understanding within their own ministries and at the highest level to the extent necessary for it to become a national priority.

• The Government is convinced that some of the outputs can be replicated elsewhere and UN agencies and donors are interested in the replication of several of the activities that are part of the JP.

#### Recommendations

- Many of the positive products and results of the JP only started to make themselves felt towards the very end of the program. It would be very unfortunate if they would get lost because the Programme ends. Often the monetary values needed to keep activities going are not very high. Some of the outputs of the JP can probably be transformed into independent projects, involving the respective Ministries and UN agencies. The evaluation team recommends that two immediate actions should be considered:
  - The JP should, if at all possible, be extended for six months to reinforce ownership and sustainability of its outputs and products through: a) conclusion of ongoing activities; b) complete handover of outputs to the respective GoM institutions; and c) technical support to the implementation of the drafted exit strategy by the GoM institutions.
  - Governmental institutions and UN agencies that have been involved in each of the 12 outputs should analyse and decide what support can be given for the sustainability, continuation and leverage of the JP's products and results.
- The Government of Mozambique should consider the possibility of creating a special programme to promote cultural tourism in Mozambique, along the lines of what the JP did in Ilha de Moçambique and Inhambane; this programme could involve MICULT, MITUR, UNESCO and ITC.
- Future projects in the cultural sector would do well in trying to involve national educational institutions involved in art and culture such as the *Instituto Superior de Artes e Cultura*.
- Future Joint Programmes should consider limiting the ministries and UN agencies involved to a more manageable number. Future Joint Programmes should also consider limiting the number of outcomes and outputs to be delivered within the lifetime of the Programme.
- Changing the mind-set of stakeholders about "culture" and its role in economy and in development is not something that can be achieved in a short timeframe. In general, cultural projects should have a duration that is longer than what MDG-F allows for Joint Programmes. Furthermore, promoting the role of culture in socioeconomic development and its role in the economy generally should be part of internal GoM's advocacy efforts (arguably within MICULT).
- Future Joint Programmes on Culture and Development should consider not including the two aspects of Culture into one programme, unless ways are found to make them complementary and mutually supportive.



# 2. Introduction

This report represents the final evaluation of the Joint Programme (JP) on Culture and Development for Mozambique, also known as the Joint Programme on Strengthening Cultural and Creative Industries and Inclusive Policies in Mozambique. It was initially a three year programme for 2008-2011, financed by the Spanish Government through the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) with a \$5 million budget.

The JP counted on six United Nations (UN) agencies and ten Government of Mozambique (GoM) ministries in its implementation. The programme covered 6 areas: Maputo City, Zavala District, Inhambane City, Mossuril District, Ilha de Moçambique District and Nampula City (including Maratane Refugee Camp, on the outskirts of Nampula).

In June 2010, immediately following the mid-term evaluation, the programme was reformulated from its original ambitious scope from two components and six outcomes to two components and three outcomes. It was also extended for five months (to February 2012).

After the Executive Summary (Chapter 1) and this Introduction (Chapter 2), this report is structured into the following Chapters:

- Chapter three presents background information on the JP, explaining the reformulation process, the JP's goal and the management structure.
- Chapter four provides background on the evaluation, detailing its purpose, the methodology, as well as constraints and barriers that should be taken into account when reading this document. This also includes background information on the complexity of design and implementation of this JP, which should be taken into consideration when reading the report.
- Chapter five presents the first main evaluation results: an outcome-led evaluation per Programme's output. This Chapter evaluates the Programme's ability to deliver its outputs based on analysis of documentation, work sessions with the Coordination Team, interviews and focus group discussions.
- Chapter six presents the second main evaluation results. It responds to the five key JP evaluation criteria: relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. This Chapter contains a quantitative component deduced from the answers provided by the questionnaire filled in by 46 stakeholders from the central and provincial levels of Maputo, Inhambane and Nampula. It also contains qualitative information retrieved and analysed based on the interviews and focus groups discussions conducted during the data collection period.
- Chapter seven presents an analysis of the JP's contribution to the Extension of UNDAF 2010-2011, to the MDG-F Thematic Window on Culture and Development and it also analyses to what extent Delivering as One was present during implementation.
- Chapter eight presents Conclusions (including Best Practices and Lessons Learned) and Recommendations.



## 3. Background on the Joint Programme

### **3.1. Reformulation Background**

The **Joint Programme of MDG-F in Mozambique: Culture and Development** was formulated in 2007 for the UNDAF 2008-2011, with an initial start date of August 2008 and conclusion in August 2011. The Programme was reformulated in June 2010, immediately following the 2010 mid-term evaluation. The main reasons for the reformulation were related to a slow start, lack of a planning phase, a late installation of the management unit in 2008 and an overambitious initial design. The reformulation was used to refocus the components and activities and to extend the programme end date to December 2011.

This final evaluation is based on the outputs, indicators and targets of the reformulated programme. Table 1 below outlines the components and outcomes of the initial design and the reformulated one as a way of demonstrating the differences between them. The component names and concepts were not changed. Component 1 remained focused on cultural and creative industries and component 2 on social and cultural inclusion in development policies and strategies.

Although never directly referenced in the reformulation document, the third component, which refers to the management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, remained as an underlying aspect of the programme (UN, June 2010).

	Initial Programme Design (2008)	Reformulated Programme (2010)		
	onent 1: Cultural and Creative Industries' ibution to Social and Economic Development oted	Component 1: Cultural and Creative Industries' Contribution to Social and Economic Development promoted		
1.1	Legislative and regulatory frameworks, policies and strategies for the development of cultural and creative industries strengthened/enforced (in craft and music industries)	1.1	The enabling environment supporting the development of the cultural and creative industries strengthened and enforced	
1.2	Cultural tourism promoted through improved management capacities of cultural assets	1.2	Improved cultural products and services for the cultural tourism market destinations in	
1.3	Scale and quality of cultural goods and services boosted, leading to income generation and decent employment in craft and music industries		Inhambane, Nampula and Maputo City	
	onent 2: Inclusion of Social and Cultural Aspects velopment Policies and Strategies ensured		oonent 2: Inclusion of Social and Cultural Aspects velopment Policies and Strategies ensured	
2.1	Improved acknowledgement and use of traditional knowledge systems in local development	2.1	Socio cultural elements integrated in planning processes and local development strategies	
2.2	Socio-cultural elements included in development planning processes			
2.3	Socio-cultural elements mainstreamed in education and health policies, plans and strategies			

#### Table 1: Initial Programme Design and Reformulated Programme Design

Through colour coding, the table attempts to reflect how the evaluation team understands the integration of the initial outcomes into the reformulated programme document. The number of outcomes was reduced from six to three. However, the change of outputs was less drastic, decreasing from 18 to 12: the programme was reduced, but not halved as would be concluded from counting the number of outcomes in the reformulated document. The



mid-term evaluation explains the magnitude of the original programme design and its level of delivery to that point:

The joint programme is extremely complex. There are two components, 6 results, 18 outputs, and 88 products (deliverables), with 17 in year 1, 36 in year 2 and 35 in year 3.... Only two products [of the 17 in year 1] were finalized before the end of year. It is unlikely that the JP can complete the 86 products in the remainder timeframe. ... (Metwalli, March 2010, p. 12).

The justification best describes the reasons for this reformulation:

The two components of the JP remain valid. However, it was determined during the implementation that the scope of the programme was too ambitious to allow time for a dedicated team to achieve the results as originally designed, this considering the time, human resources and budget available, not to mention the start being delayed due to lags in hiring key personnel and the absence of a planning phase in Year 1. The UN agencies and the participating departments, although extremely dedicated to the implementation of the JP, and agreed on its importance, felt the pressure and challenges of these limitations (UN, June 2010, p. 1).

The end of year 1 Mini Monitoring Report (UNESCO, September 2009) reported a low level of execution of the JP: financial execution of only 49% of expected budget and programmatic completion ranging from 5% to 15% on most outcomes with only one outcome above 40%. This led to the following overall conclusion of the status of the programme in the report, which was described as:

Delayed (on some activities) in terms of predicted level of activities completed by end of Year 1, but necessary structures, government focal points and agency personnel that needed to be considered as a critical part of Year 1 now in place, and programme now on track or getting on track for most agencies (UNESCO, September 2009, p. 1).

This means that a justification for the reformulation of the programme was already taking shape prior to the mid-term evaluation, although a reformulation need was not yet clearly identified in the Mini Monitoring Report of September 2009.

## **3.2.** Programme's Goal and Coverage

The JP was a collaborative programme implemented by six UN agencies and ten GoM's ministries<sup>1</sup>. The programme aimed at improving the environment that supports the cultural and creative industries, through pilot projects, to show that with strategic support for cultural and creative industries and the inclusion of culture in development planning – culture in all its forms "can make a difference" (UN, June 2010, p. 1).

The programme also sought to demonstrate that culture can contribute to reducing poverty and to create more sustainable development initiatives, which empower and enable the

Originally, the number of GoM's ministries involved was nine. Given the separation of MICULT and MINED, the number of GoM's ministries involved increased to ten



government, donors and civil society to contribute more significantly to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, June 2010, p. 1).

The areas were also sub-divided by component, with Component 1 being primary focused in Maputo City, Inhambane City, Nampula City and Ilha de Moçambique, while Component 2 in Zavala, Mossuril and Maratane Camp (on the outskirts of Nampula City). The Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) output from component 2 was piloted in three geographical areas of implementation: Zavala, Mossuril and Ilha de Moçambique.

#### **3.3. Structure and Leadership within the JP**

A National Steering Committee (NSC), composed of representatives of the GoM, of the Spanish Government and the UN Resident Coordinator, was established for the three Joint Programmes in Mozambique (Children, Food Security and Nutrition; Environment Mainstreaming and Adaptation to Climate Change; and Strengthening Culture and Creative Industries and Inclusive Policies in Mozambique).

A central Programme Management Committee (PMC) was set up in Maputo in line with the Implementation Guidelines for MDG Achievement Fund Joint Programmes (MDG-F Secretariat, February 2011). Its role was to oversee programme implementation. This PMC was convened and led by a representative of the UN Resident Coordinator and a representative of MICULT. As reported in different interviews, the JP Coordinator had a significant role leading these meetings as well.

Programme Management Committees (PMC) were set up in each of the provincial capitals and integrated output leads, GoM's focal points (at provincial, district and municipal levels) and UN agencies' focal points. The provincial PMCs were led by a MICULT official (at the DPEC level).

In the first half of 2009, the lead UN agency, UNESCO, contracted a JP Coordinator. According to the Implementation Guidelines (MDG-F Secretariat, February 2011, p. 9), the JP Coordinator or Manager should report to the central PMC and be installed at the respective Ministry (*Ibid*, Annex 4). According to the different interviews held and the information gathered, the JP Coordinator (installed in the UNESCO head office) played a significant role in coordinating the overall implementation of the JP.

The JP Coordinator led the management coordination within the four PMCs as well as the UNESCO led outputs. In short, the JP Coordinator's role was vast and contained many tasks in both the coordinative, administrative and management role for the overall programme and the specific outputs led by UNESCO.

During the life cycle of the programme many focal points from agencies and ministries have changed. Many were also placed into their roles only in the last 12 months of the programme (during 2011). This partially accounts for the general focus on the past 12 months of the programme, as generally reported by the stakeholders interviewed.

The six UN agencies involved in the programme were: FAO, ILO, ITC, UNESCO, UNFPA and UNHCR. The ten Ministries involved in the programme were: Ministério de Ciências e Tecnologia (MCT), Ministério de Juventude e Desportos (MJD), Ministério de Industria e Comércio (MIC), Ministério da Cultura (MICULT), Ministério de Agricultura (MINAG), Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação (MINEC), Ministério de Educação



(MINED), Ministério de Saúde (MISAU), Ministério do Trabalho (MITRAB), Ministério do Turismo (MITUR). These agencies and Ministries were leads on different outcomes and outputs; Chapter 5 below details the output leads.

As a result of the recommendations set out in the mid-term evaluation, GoM leads were assigned to the three outcomes<sup>2</sup>. Officials from MICULT were appointed as leads for Outcome 1.1 and 2.1, while Outcome 1.2 was lead by an appointee from MITUR. Also, each output was divided among the participating UN agencies and Ministries, with agencies and Ministries being assigned as leads.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "It was apparent from the mid-term evaluation results and during the course of implementation that to secure sustainability of the initiatives after the life of the Programme and ensure Programme results are meeting the needs and expectations of the government, it is essential that the government leads the implementation. It was therefore decided that each of the three main results have a government counterpart lead" (UN, June 2010, p. 4).



# 4. Background on the Final Evaluation

This Chapter provides information on the purpose of this evaluation, the methodology and protocols used to conduct the data collection and analysis in response to the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the final evaluation. It also presents the constraints and barriers that were faced in conducting this evaluation, which should be taken into account when analysing the results presented in this document.

According to the MDG-F final evaluation generic Terms of Reference, the PMC should form the core of the evaluation reference group which should comprise of the representatives of the major stakeholders in the Joint Programme. The preparation phase of this final evaluation was carried out with the participation of the above mentioned reference group. The data collection tools were developed by the evaluation team with a conscious attempt to cover an extensive range of questions presented in the TOR. These tools were discussed, modified and validated by the Reference Group.

The evaluation team collected information over a six-week period from primary and secondary sources, conducting 32 interviews in all 6 areas, as well as 16 focus group discussions. A web-based survey tool was also used for the administration of the questionnaire. This allowed for a further collection of responses with 46 individuals providing their answers through this format.

## 4.1. Purpose and Scope of the evaluation

This evaluation responds to the TOR prepared by the MDG-F Secretariat and adapted by the Coordination and Reference group in Mozambique. The TOR outlines the stated approach in requiring analysis for five criteria: relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

This final evaluation was carried out based on the reformulated programme and the respective log frame of June 2010. A majority of the outputs was conducted or completed in 2011. Also, it became evident during the data collection that the outcome leads, several PMC focal points, and programme implementers became involved in the JP only in the last 12 months of the programme. The scope of the evaluation is therefore primarily focused on this shortened period.

The evaluation team acknowledges that activities took place after the field collection period, although initially there were no activities planned for Q4. The evaluation team is not able to report on all of the activities that took place after the data collection period (October and November 2011).

## 4.2. Methodology used in the evaluation

The methodology for this evaluation was designed in the inception phase (presented in the Inception Report) and was implemented over a six-week period, as outlined by the work plan presented in the Inception Report. It comprised the following steps:

- 1. Collection and analysis of key documents
- 2. Development of assessment tools



- 3. Field visits
- 4. Administration of a questionnaire
- 5. Interviews with key stakeholders (PMC Members, Ministries, UN and Output Related Staff in Provinces)
- 6. Focus Group Discussions with Implementers/Beneficiaries.

A detailed outline of each of the evaluation steps numbered above is given below.

#### 1. Collection and analysis of key documents

During the Inception Phase, the team collected all the documents related to outputs: monitoring reports, consultants' reports, pictures and all other physical and digital information that were relevant to analyse for this evaluation. This information also served as evidence for the log-frame analysis of indicators and targets. The key documents analysed, from a management perspective, were: JP document, updated log-frame, progress reports and monitoring and evaluation documents. For the cultural and impact perspective, the studies, monitoring reports and manuals were all relevant for analysis of the deliverables on each activity.

For the purpose of evaluating the level of completion of indicators and targets established in the updated log-frame, the team interviewed the JP Coordinator as well as PMC members and implementers. This allowed the evaluation of the level of completion, timeliness and impact of achieving (or not) the log-frame's indicators and targets, per output.

All the relevant and pertinent information collected in the inception phase, as well as during the interviews and focus group discussions was processed and constituted input for the analysis presented in this report.

#### 2. Development of assessment tools

Three different tools were developed: i) a quantitative tool for interviewing based on the requirements of the TOR; ii) a qualitative guideline for the focus group discussions with implementers and beneficiaries; and iii) interview guideline for high level officials (sent prior to the interview)<sup>3</sup>.

These tools were developed with respect to the Reformulated Programme and responded to the TOR. They were discussed and modified with the Final Evaluation Coordination and Reference Group, which ultimately validated them. The tools were included in the inception report. The tools were piloted with a UN staffer and an evaluation specialist who have some familiarity with JPs, but are not directly involved in this specific JP.

The quantitative tool comprised of 52 questions, some with possible answers Yes/No and most with a quantitative scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates the lowest (or negative) possible evaluation and 5 the highest (or positive) possible evaluation. Two version of this questionnaire were develop, one to be answered via the Internet, and one to be completed on paper. In the web-based version, six of the questions required follow-up answers for the respondent to indicate why they gave a certain score to the questions. Additionally, in the web-based version two additional open questions required the respondents to indicate "the best result in this programme" and "what aspect of the programme did not work well".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> These tools are presented in the Appendices.



#### 3. Field visits

The evaluation team visited all of the implementation locations to conduct an in-depth analysis of the output impacts and assess the level of satisfaction of the GoM, PMC and beneficiaries with the programme and outputs. The team spent one week in each of the provinces. Zavala and Inhambane City were visited from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 29<sup>th</sup> of October. Nampula City, Mossuril, Maratane and Ilha de Moçambique were visited from the 31<sup>st</sup> of October to the 5<sup>th</sup> of November. Activities in Maputo City occurred in parallel with the provincial visits as well as from the 7<sup>th</sup> to the 18<sup>th</sup> of November. The detailed list of the persons involved in this evaluation (through visits, questionnaires, interviews and focus groups discussions) is provided in appendix 1A, 1B and 1C.

The purpose of the field visits was to collect data from beneficiaries, provincial PMCs, and other stakeholders. Some of those met were asked to fill in the questionnaire and were asked questions in interviews. In addition, in each of the six areas, one or more focus group discussions were conducted.

#### 4. Administration of a questionnaire

The quantitative interviewing tool was used in two ways:

- For the Maputo based PMC members, UN staff members and Ministry personnel, the tool was turned into a web-based online questionnaire on www.surveymonkey.com<sup>4</sup>. The link was emailed out to a list of JP stakeholders based in Maputo (not beneficiaries) and the responses were collected and compiled over a 10-day period. Once the answers were compiled and analysed, a sub-group of the respondents was chosen for follow-up questions. These were primarily pre-identified by the JP Coordinator as particularly important for follow-up interviews. The total number of people that were interviewed in Maputo City, including higher-level officials (who did not answer the online questionnaire), was 15. The structure of the interviews included some general questions on culture, the Programme's management and the answers given in the online questionnaire, especially in relation to the output or outcome where the interviewee was involved. Also, some follow-up questions were asked when answers on the higher or lower ends of the scale (1 or 5) were given to a question.
- For the Provinces, the JP Coordination Team preselected key stakeholders, provided the necessary contacts and organized for the stakeholders to be interviewed at a specific time/date. The questionnaires were administered in the following way. A 5-page questionnaire with the 52 questions was administered at the commencement of the interview by the evaluator. The stakeholder completed the questionnaire and upon completion, the evaluator asked follow-up questions to deepen the understanding of why a certain answer was given.

Top-level officials, namely the Minister of Culture, UNESCO Country Representative, the UN Resident Coordinator and the Spanish Ambassador were part of the intended interviewees. The Minister of Culture was not available during the 6-week tool development and data collection period of this evaluation. However, the other three top officials were interviewed and their opinions are reflected in the analysis. These individuals were provided with a short list of interview questions (presented in appendix 2C), which dealt with the following issues:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Surveymonkey* is a web-based survey tool.



- JP Coordination
- Delivering as One
- Multi-Sectoral Approach
- Impact
- Positive/Negative Perception of Programme

# 5. Interviews with key stakeholders – PMC Members, Ministries, UN and Output Related Staff in Provinces

Interviews were used as the main data collection strategy on the impact and results of the JP based on the perspectives of its implementers, coordinators and stakeholders. Several long working sessions with the JP Coordinator were also held to assess the completion of indicators and targets and overall JP implementation per output.

A total of 32 interviews were held; 15 in Maputo, 7 in Nampula Province and 10 in Inhambane Province. 50 stakeholders (from UN agencies leads, ministries' focal points, outcome leads, members of PMC Maputo and members of central PMC, some implementers and other stakeholders related to the JP) received the questionnaire in a web-based format and 30 of them responded.

#### 6. Focus Group Discussions with Implementers/Beneficiaries

Two evaluators from the team were responsible for leading all of the 16 focus groups discussions. Information on the composition of focus groups is given in appendix 2B.

A focus group discussion does not have the same purpose as a group interview. It intends to make the group members speak about their experience and gives them more control over the direction the discussion takes than in an interview. It is the role of the facilitator, however, to keep the discussion from departing too far from the intended purpose, which is to collect detailed information about the collective experience of the group and about how the group evaluates that experience.

The following aspects were taken into consideration when conducting the focus group discussions:

- More or less homogeneous groups, composed of people who went through a similar experience and that have the information needed;
- Facilitation by the evaluation team, avoiding that certain group members inhibit the others from talking (because of hierarchy, cultural roles, character, etc.);
- At the start of each session the purpose of the discussion was explained to the participants and their consent to record the discussions was sought.
- Group members were informed that their responses would remain confidential and would be used only for the purpose of this evaluation.

The questions posed to the group members were generally directed to the activity (or *output*) the respondents were involved with. However, if the participants indicated they had information and/or opinions on a more general level, they were encouraged to share them.

A Culture Specialist formed part of the evaluation team and accompanied in the first week the Field visits in Inhambane Province (as agreed with the JP Coordinator). She provided culture/creative industry/gender insight by providing specific follow-up and cultural-specific



questions for the focus groups in order to help assess the impact of the programme within those key areas.

### **4.3.** Constraints and Limitations of the Evaluation

This evaluation faced five main barriers and limitations. They are:

- 1. The appropriateness of the questionnaire to district level stakeholders;
- 2. The time available for collection and analysis;
- 3. The information provided by stakeholders;
- 4. The turnover of staff and relatively high number of "new" members of the JP; and,
- 5. Language barriers.

The following pages outline in more detail each of the constraints and limitations numbered above.

#### 1. The appropriateness of the questionnaire to district level stakeholders

The questionnaire was designed in order to cover the entire scope of the TORs. The questions were understandable at the central PMC level. However, in some instances, the questionnaire turned out to be difficult to understand at the non-central PMC and focal points level.

Many of the questions were in relation to the overall Programme, its management and other coordination and administrative issues. Although the respondents were asked to focus on the outputs in which they were involved, many of them had difficulty in doing so. This was especially true when dealing with stakeholders dealing with activities tied to a single output.

This meant that respondents at the district level were less able to effectively answer the questions, and therefore often provided general answers and even presumably baseless positive reviews on questions not within their domain.

Therefore, the results of the questionnaire should be read with care and with this limitation in mind.

It is important, however, to highlight that the questions posed in the questionnaire helped to steer the subsequent interview, as they indicated topics on which the respondents had a strong opinion (either positive or negative). The questions turned out to be really helpful in this respect, helping the interviewer in obtaining relevant background information from different points of view.

It is also important to highlight that the qualitative component of the interview, that followed up the filling of the questionnaire, provided significant insight for this evaluation. This strongly counterbalances the less than optimal results of the quantitative component of the questionnaire.

Furthermore, the methodology included focus groups discussion. Participants of these discussions were able to provide some useful feedback to the effectiveness and impact of the activity/output in which they were directly involved.



#### 2. The time available for collection and analysis

The amount of time available for the collection and analysis of information was too short and required a rushed approach to both parts of the analysis: the output specific analysis and the findings on levels and criteria of analysis indicated in the TORs.

Typically, the evaluation team would have required another month for the Inception Phase and data collection. The two-week preparation period and the three-week data collection period, which stretched to a fourth week due to the availability of interviewees, only allowed for two full weeks of data analysis, interpretation and presentation.

This required the evaluation team to consult with many of the interviewees only once when more in-depth questions and information could have provided further insight into the programme's outputs. The period for the Evaluation Reference group to give feedback on the draft report was only a week, given that the final report was initially due 2 weeks after the delivery of the draft version. Eventually more days were allowed for the final report, which was also beneficial in terms of: a) incorporating new information of outputs concluded, and b) ensuring that comments to the draft version were incorporated into the report.

#### *3. The information provided by stakeholders*

In continuation and expansion on the issues of point 1 of these constraints (the appropriateness of the questionnaire to district level stakeholders), it was apparent that the overall answers provided through the quantitative questionnaire were extremely positive when compared to the answers provided as part of the interviews subsequent to the questionnaire.

This could be for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is part of the more collectivist cultural traces of the Mozambican society not to directly criticize a programme, an institutional partner or a superior for many different reasons, including respect and fear. Secondly, there is a tendency to give an answer even if someone is uninformed on the content of the question.

Of the 30 stakeholders who provided answers to the online questionnaire, 14 were interviewed individually. 16 stakeholders who filled in the paper version of the questionnaire, were also interviewed. This means that a large percentage of stakeholders who filled in the questionnaire received follow-up questions and had more in-depth discussions with respect to their impressions of the JP.

However, some of the more general questions on the JP, its impact, coordination and outputs were normally responded to in a superficial or vague way in field interviews and focus groups discussions.

In general, central level leads, UN agencies and GoM focal points had much more insight and input into the activities, even if their participation in the JP was limited in terms of time and scope.

However, it was very common for stakeholders to focus on activities carried out in 2011. This lead to a difficult analysis, given that many 2009 and 2010 results could not be discussed with most of the interviewees.



#### 4. The turnover of staff and relatively high number of "new" members of the JP

The turnover of staff during the JP took place at all levels, from the National Steering Committee (NSC) level down to the level of implementers. As many as half the people interviewed in the field and at central level had a limited time within the JP. Many adopted the programme from their predecessor.

This was mostly the case for the government at central and provincial levels; many PMC members were recent additions to the JP. This was detrimental to the evaluation. It resulted in having respondents who had limited overall vision of the JP, leading to responses that were based on legacy of the programme or impressions rather than experience of the actual stakeholder. It is important to highlight that the overall MICULT lead was replaced in the middle of the programme.

#### 5. Language Barriers

Unfortunately, the team's need to work in several languages was to the detriment of the efficiency. The evaluation team was made up of a mix of Portuguese/English speakers and a pure English speaker (the Culture and Creative Industries Specialist).

This linguistic barrier required the evaluation to be completed in English and in Portuguese to allow for feedback on the document from the culture specialist. The final document is in Portuguese, but was initially drafted in English to allow for all of the evaluators' participation.

Many of the tools were required in both English and Portuguese, which may have slowed the team's pace with relation to rolling out and implementing the evaluation. Some of the participants in the focus groups discussions required interpreters to support their participation and comprehension.

#### 4.4. Complexity of the JP to be taken into consideration

As a foreword to chapters five to nine of this assessment, it is appropriate to put this evaluation into the complex context of the JP. When reading the results of this evaluation, it is important to consider a number of aspects around the JP's design, planning and implementation that were recurrently mentioned during interviews, especially by the JP coordination team. These are:

Design:

The JP called on the active participation of six UN agencies, ten ministries, various implementing organisations and short-term consultants in its implementation. The JP entailed thus a complex coordination, management and implementation structure composed of many institutions, each with their respective expectations, objectives, needs and priorities. The amount and quality of coordination necessary to ensure that all institutions are aligned and in unison should not be taken lightly. Even within UN agencies, *Delivering as One* remains a real challenge. This proved to be particularly difficult with non-resident agencies (e.g. with ITC). Adding ten ministries to this equation is no easy task. This is especially true considering that



inter-ministerial cooperation has in the past existed between some ministries on certain specific topics, but in general has been relatively weak.

• The Programme attempted to address culture from two different angles simultaneously, culture as a potential driver for economic growth and the inclusion of culture in development policies and strategies.

#### Deliverables:

- The quantity of outcomes, outputs and their respective activities remained highly ambitious, even after the reformulation of the JP and the decrease from 6 to 3 outcomes and 18 to 12 outputs.
- Vast geographical dispersion of the locations where these outputs are supposed to occur, ranging from Maputo to Ilha de Moçambique.

#### Planning:

- The JP remained largely "idle" during the first eight months of year one, as procedures to indicate agency and ministry leads and focal points and to contract a coordinator proved to be a lengthy process.
- The JP lacked a proper planning phase during its first year. Instead planning occurred during the process. This resulted in procurement and contracting processes initiating much later than expected, resulting in further time loss.

#### Timeframe:

- After the reformulation in June 2010, the remaining time available to successfully implement activities and conclude all the outputs was extremely short.
- Many of the activities are linked to each other in the sense that one has to be completed before the next can commence. A delay in the first activity under a certain output implies that all the remaining activities will also be implemented later than planned.
- Another important aspect to take into consideration in terms of time is that the JP also aimed to change the mind-frame of its stakeholders in relation to what culture entails. This is not an easy task to accomplish in such a small period of time.

To conclude, as recurrently mentioned by stakeholders involved in this evaluation, even if the JP would have had a full three years to implement, the expectations for the outputs were set unattainably high. The JP as a programme is an ambitious undertaking that is from the start confronted with various challenges.

However, while this is not to be forgotten, it is important to clarify that the scope of this evaluation is to evaluate the JP based on its predefined targets according to the reformulated programme design, not on the basis of what the evaluation team regards as realistic deliverables and targets.



# 5. Level of accomplishment of Outcomes and Outputs

This Chapter presents the results of the evaluation of each of the 12 outputs that comprise the Joint Programme. This evaluation is based on the revised log-frame produced as part of the reformulation of the Joint Programme half-way through its lifetime. The information detailed in this Chapter is based on the data collected from programme documents, including M&E reports, mission reports, log-frame updates, as well as studies and documents produced in the context of the JP. It is also based on the perceptions and insights drawn from the work sessions with the JP Coordinator, focus groups discussions and interviews.

It is important to highlight that it was not the task of this evaluation to examine the validity of the 2010 log-frame or the appropriateness of its indicators. Although, with hindsight, it can be said that some indicators were unrealistic and others impossible to be met within the timespan of the Programme, this will not be taken into account in this Chapter.

The 2010 log-frame does not consider the many tasks that had already been carried out during the first phase of the Joint Programme. As a consequence relatively little attention is given in this Chapter to the activities that took place before June 2010, which might give the impression of an unbalanced or even unfair judgement, but is actually a consequence of the nature of this evaluation.

The evaluation of each of the 12 outputs is presented using the following structure:

- The official name and the agencies and ministries involved in its implementation.
- A table showing the indicators, baseline and targets as defined in the 2010 log-frame and an evaluation of each of them in terms of the level of completion, timeliness and – where possible – impact. As several activities were still taking place at the time of the evaluation, measuring their impact was often not possible.
- Short notes on each of the indicators and targets within the output.
- A table that is meant to give an impression of feed-back the evaluators received from the different stakeholders through the questionnaires, interviews and FGDs. These opinions have been organised by type of source (UN officials, Focal Points and Government representatives at central and at provincial level, implementers and beneficiaries). This information provides insight into the positive and negative aspects of the output in the eyes of the different groups of stakeholders. It should be stressed, though, that what is presented in these tables are the opinions of different stakeholders, which do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of the evaluators.
- Overall analysis and conclusions.

At the end of each component, an analysis and in-depth look at the outcomes and outputs from a cultural perspective is provided. The analysis assesses the terminology, learning and use of culture and creative industries in the JP. The matrix presented in the culture and creative industries sections speaks specifically to how the expected result was interpreted at UN agency, government and beneficiary levels. These sections also present the overarching cultural objectives from the components and what should have been expected as results from the outputs.



## 5.1. Component 1: Culture and Creative Industries' contribution to social and economic development promoted

Outcome 1.1: The enabling environment supporting the development of the cultural and creative industries strengthened and enforced

*Output 1.1.1: Revised legal framework and policy development for the sustainable growth of the creative industries* 

UNESCO led this output together with MICULT.

#### **Evaluation of Indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

				Evalua	ation
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Identification of incentives for the reduction of fiscal barriers in the Music and Craft Industry	Fiscal barriers to the development of the industry	2011 - proposal for the reduction of fiscal barriers elaborated	75%	Later than planned	Proposals for fiscal incentives are contained in several reports produced, but there is no evidence of these reports being used for further action. This indicator was
Strategic plan for the National Crafts Council	National Crafts Council with no strategic plan	2011 - Strategic plan approved	-	-	removed from the JP by approval of the PMC.
Action Plan for Creative Industries	Creative industries without an action plan	2011 - Action Plan drafted, harmonized and approved	-	-	This indicator was changed to Policy and Strategy for the Cultural and Creative Industries, which is an important tool for the newly created DNPIC.

**Target – (2011) Proposal for the reduction of fiscal barriers elaborated**. INLD produced three reports: one a review of the legal, regulatory and fiscal framework of the music industry and the other of the craft industry, and thirdly a compilation report that joined these together along with other studies produced by ITC and ILO. It was proposed for INLD to pull out the relevant information related to the fiscal incentives and push these reforms through the necessary approval process. However, currently there seems to be no plans to extract these proposed reforms from the documents. A significant challenge lies ahead for MICULT in terms of compiling and structuring proposals from the several reports and taking them for further action and desired impact.

**Target – (2011) Strategic plan for the National Crafts Council Approved**. This target was added during the reformulation of the JP, as UNESCO was supporting the legalisation of the National Craft Council in another programme. However, in June 2011 the indicator was eliminated by the central PMC as the UNESCO programme for the legalisation was delayed and it became apparent that there would be no time for the implementation of this activity. It was decided to use the funds for the capacity building and development of the Policy and



Strategy for the cultural and creative industries instead (the activity substituting the Creative Industries Action Plan – see next target), as these were experiencing a budget shortfall.

**Target – (2011) Action Plan for Creative Industries drafted, harmonized and approved.** The PMC decided that it was more important to concentrate on the Policy and Strategy for Cultural and Creative Industries and that the action plan would be developed in a later stage. The Policy and Strategy are meant to guide the newly created National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries – *Direcção Nacional de Promoção das Indústrias Culturais* (DNPIC). A consultant led three separate missions. Mission 1 and 2 were workshops for building capacity broadly (Government, civil society, creative entrepreneurs and private sector) around key concepts, taking into consideration that this is a new National Directorate and that the concepts are still relatively new. The missions were also used to gather inputs for the new Policy and Strategy from various stakeholders. Included was a 5-day training with DNPIC on mission 1 and 3. The policy and strategy were elaborated and are now being revised by MICULT. MICULT has now the challenge to approve this policy and strategy and to produce a plan for the cultural and creative industries to enable, guide and facilitate further development activities for the sector.

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>Several capacity building workshops have been held with GoM officials, focused on reviewing the draft cultural industry policy and strategy.</li> <li>UN officials say that the GoM now understands what Creative Industries are, how they are tied to the general economy and their importance.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Development and harmonisation of a proposal for reduction for fiscal barriers has yet to be approved by the MICULT and passed to the Council of Ministers</li> <li>Action Plan for Cultural and Creative Industries is yet to be approved and endorsed by the National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries.</li> </ul>
JP Focal points & GoM Central level JP Focal points Provincial & District	<ul> <li>The deliverables linked to the first indicator were provided to MICULT with adequate timing to be able to approve and enact.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>GoM officials have participated in workshops but the majority of them expressed modest knowledge of the actual status of the Policy and Strategy during interviews.</li> </ul>
Implementers & Beneficiaries	The creation of the DNPIC is seen by artisans as a recognition of the economic importance of cultural industries.	<ul> <li>The newly created DNPIC, lacking autonomy, is in serious danger of becoming yet another bureaucratic institution, without any real impact on artists' lives. Associations would prefer an institute that is outside the GoM, with participation of the private sector and civil society.</li> </ul>

#### Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.1.1

#### Analysis:

The largest unexpected result from this output was the creation of the National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries (DNPIC) at the MICULT, an excellent step towards GoM having ownership in Cultural and Creative Industries and providing the correct framework for these industries in Mozambique. The draft policy and strategy, although coming late in the last year, will be an important contribution of the JP, as it creates the foundation from which DNPIC can begin to support the sector.

However, the evaluators recorded serious reservations from beneficiaries' side regarding the potential efficacy of this institution as it forms part of the government structures and thus might suffer in terms of autonomy. A different solution would have been to create an institute with a greater degree of political, financial and administrative autonomy. As a National Directorate, it is more of a governmental body, rather than an institute that is led by creative entrepreneurs. Additionally, there are many personnel changes inside Ministries whereas institutes are commonly regarded as being more stable.



In terms of delivering the expected targets, there is little evidence of this output being achieved at the time of the evaluation. While discussion on incentives exist, they are not easily accessible and have not been delivered into a format that leads to action and next steps, and the action plan and document on fiscal barriers have not been approved and sent for approval by the central authorities.

The output was also hampered by a separate UNESCO activity (non-JP) on the National Craft Council legalisation that was late and whose delay eliminated the possibility to implement all the expected targets within the December 2011 timeframe.

### *Output 1.1.2: Establishment of a Mozambican Cultural Management Information System*

UNESCO led the output together with MICULT.

#### **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Evaluation		
			Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Cultural Information System designed	* No Cultural Information System in Mozambique * Lack of collection and processing of reliable statistical data	2010 - SIC-M designed	100%	On time	Fully designed.
SIC-M updated and functioning		2011- SIC-M functioning at central level and in Nampula	40%	Later than planned	Data still being uploaded and checked for quality and accuracy.

**Target – (2010) SIC-M designed.** This target was fully accomplished. The system was designed in 2010 and seems to include all the necessary elements for a functioning and publicly accessible database. It was designed in a participatory process with Ministry stakeholders over three capacity building and technical visits from an international cultural database consultant. During these visits decisions were made about which information should be in the database and which organisation would be responsible for each category of information.

**Target – (2010) SIC-M functioning at central level and in Nampula**. Upon completion of and training on the designed database, the 50 involved stakeholders signed a formal declaration as a compromise to input an initial amount of cultural information and maintain the database updated. However, the first upload of data by the Ministry and other stakeholders was far from complete and did not meet minimum quality standards. This was probably the result of incorrect definition of access "privileges" and the delay in indicating a single database administrator, compounded by a lack of technical capacity on the side of key stakeholders. A local consultant was hired to assist with the introduction of data, ensuring the accuracy and quality of the data. A management and maintenance plan are currently under development.



As of this evaluation, the website for SIC-M<sup>5</sup> was not publicly accessible. The introduction of new information and the correction of existing data were still on-going. The SIC-M was not functioning in Nampula at the time of the evaluation.

Therefore, the overall analysis of the deliverables is that the SIC-M was completed, but it was not fully operational and uploading and updating of data was still taking place at the time of the evaluation.

#### Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.1.2:

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Source Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>Through the JP, UNESCO has been able to assist MICULT in designing a structure for an online platform for a Mozambican Cultural Management Information System.</li> <li>2 workshops have been held and although participation has been varied, most interviewees regarded these as very useful.</li> <li>A Department for Cultural Statistics will be created within the Ministry of Culture to house the pioneering Cultural Management Information System. It currently coordinates with other partners, such as INE.</li> <li>MICULT has successfully assumed leadership of the SIC-M project.</li> <li>MICULT is confident of being able to continue the work of managing the online database.</li> <li>While a lack of funds makes future workshops unlikely, MICULT aims to provide internal training sessions.</li> <li>MICULT highly values the initiative and overall value of having an online cultural information database.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Negative aspects</li> <li>The levels of responsibilities and roles between UNESCO and MICULT were never clear during the beginning of the SIC-M project. This remained for a long time due to poor communication between the institutions. There was a feeling amongst the work team members that this was a UNESCO project – resulting in little initiative, poor ownership and a lack of leadership. Eventually, MICULT ITS Department was appointed as coordinator. MICULT feels they should have been leading from the start, as this would have resulted in faster implementation of activities.</li> <li>An external consultant based in Mexico has done the design and programming of the system. To this date, MICULT is dependent on the consultant for any structural alterations of the data base. There has been no successful transfer of knowledge to MICULT ITS Department in terms of technical capacity to independently manage and make alterations to the database.</li> <li>Site is yet to be launched online publically as</li> </ul>
JP Focal points Provincial & District Implementers & Beneficiaries	INE allowed MICULT to develop new work tools.	<ul> <li>it has still a limited amount of information. Updating of content will continue during 2012 and onwards.</li> <li>Local technical competency is below standard</li> <li>Lack of commitment on the part of MICULT</li> <li>The work team mentioned a lack of interaction with cultural associations. Establishing focal points in some of the more established cultural associations would be helpful for collection of data.</li> <li>A majority of the interviewees have little understanding of what the JP actually is, which means that this output has operated in relative isolation.</li> </ul>

#### Analysis:

An important achievement under this Output was the design of the Cultural Management Information System (first target of the output). However, challenges persist in terms of ensuring that the database is functioning (second target of the output).

Although the website is technically ready to be publically launched, at the time of the evaluation it was still not 'live' as several unresolved issues remain. Most importantly, the transfer of knowledge from the external consultant responsible for the design of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> http://189.206.56.100:8088/sicm/



database to the MICULT's ITS (Information Technologies and Systems) Department that is locally responsible for the updating and treatment of the data entered into the database has not been completed.

Members of MICULT's ITS Department received technical capacity building, including a regional workshop on cultural statistics in Ethiopia and is able to enter, check and correct data in the system. However, the MICULT's ITS team remains unable to independently change aspects of the database design. Simple structural changes, which are natural to appear when utilization starts, still need to be executed by the external consultant. Thus, against the design of this output, the database today remains dependent on the availability of the external consultant.

Additionally, there have been problems related to data entry from other institutions. There are capacity building and quality control requirements before national institutions are able to independently operate the database in all its aspects. Once the database starts to function as it should, there is no doubt that it will serve as a valuable instrument for research and as a data management tool for cultural information.

The database is hosted in Mexico, but transfer to a local host was planned to take place by the end of 2011. According to the Programme Coordination Team, the external consultant is ready to download the data to a Mozambican server and has been waiting for MICULT (in collaboration with INTIC) to create a Mozambican hosting for the system.

Overall, challenges in ensuring that the system is functioning at central level and Nampula (second target) are likely to be related to the following concurrent aspects: a) poor initial technical knowledge of the key staff selected for data entry and management; b) poor commitment of these to the task; and c) training sessions not producing the intended results of MICULT's ITS team being able to independently run the database (although additional training sessions were provided to those who needed additional explanations).

# *Output 1.1.3: Mozambican copyright and intellectual property protection harmonized to international standards*

UNESCO led the output together with MICULT.

#### **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Evaluation		
			Level of Completion	Time	Impact
SOMAS develops its Strategic Plan through 2015 and initiates implementation	SOMAS without capacity to develop a Strategic Plan	Strategic Plan elaborated, approved and in implementation	80%	Later than planned: completed August 2011	Plan has been elaborated, but not approved.
# of new organizations (media, bars, hotels, etc.) paying royalties to SOMAS	2009 - 2 (TVM & RM)	2010 - + 4 organizations 2011 - + 8 organizations	0%	-	Stagnation in SOMAS' financial sustainability and role.



		_	Evaluation		
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Mozambican copyright law regulation harmonized to international standards	No regulation of the Mozambican copyright law	2010 - drafted and in approval stage	100%	On time	Yet to be approved and leveraged on.
Regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment revised	Regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment outdate	2011 - drafted and in approval stage	100%	On time	Completed but yet to be approved by MICULT
# of regional public-private agreements signed for supporting the enhancement of copyright protection mechanisms	2009 – 17	2011 - + 3 new partnerships	0%	-	-

**Target – (2011) Strategic Plan elaborated, approved and in implementation.** The Strategic Plan of SOMAS (*Sociedade Moçambicana de Autores*) was delivered in August 2011. It was elaborated with use of a technical assistance team that combined management and technical expertise, comprised of local and Brazilian consultants and facilitators. An organisational assessment of SOMAS was carried out, followed by a six-day workshop for the design and development of SOMAS' strategic plan (July 2011). Although a participatory approach was taken in the elaboration and the draft was endorsed by the Secretary-General, as of this evaluation its General Assembly or Board had still not approved the plan. A significant challenge lies ahead for SOMAS to start implementation of its Strategic Plan. It is important to highlight that through this activity, the JP helped SOMAS to connect with ABRAMUS, who are willing to continue providing some support to SOMAS.

Target – (2010) 4 more organizations paying royalties to SOMAS; (2011) 8 more organizations paying royalties to SOMAS. There is no evidence that other organizations (other than TVM and RM) are paying royalties to SOMAS. With its new Strategic Plan in place, SOMAS will be in a better position to address this issue; until then this will significantly limit SOMAS' capacity to satisfy its members. The JP provided SOMAS with some computer equipment to host the software donated by ABRAMUS to manage their member base and the royalties collected.

**Target – (2010) Mozambican copyright law regulation harmonized to international standards drafted and in approval stage.** Although with a significant delay, this target was accomplished. A revision of the existing copyright law (Law 4/2001) was undertaken and a new regulation was drafted. In August 2011 these documents were presented to the Consultative Council of MICULT, but have not yet been sent for approval to the Council of Ministers. This is likely to take place in early 2012.

**Target – (2011) Regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment revised, drafted and in approval stage.** The draft regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment was finalised and presented to the Consultative Council of MICULT. It will be sent for approval to the Council of Ministers in early 2012. It can be concluded that the target was accomplished. Due to the inability to interview the MICULT focal point and the outcome lead covering this output, it is difficult for the evaluators to understand the reason for the delay inside MICULT.



Target – (2011) 3 new partnerships (regional public-private agreements) signed for supporting the enhancement of copyright protection mechanisms. No new regional PPPs took place during the JP. Some new partnerships, both locally and regionally, could be expected after the time of this evaluation, although no information during the data collection indicated this would be the case.

# Stakeholders' perception related to Output 1.1.3:

Source	Positive	Negative
Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>Through participation in the JP, SOMAS and MICULT have established a good relationship that will prove valuable for future cultural activities after the end of the JP.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>This output has been tainted from the beginning by a lack of political will and badly defined priorities on the part of the Government.</li> <li>The target of 12 new organizations (media, bars, hotels, etc.) paying royalties to SOMAS was too ambitious. Due to the urgency and priority to develop a strategic plan that would assist in creating new strategies for SOMAS to be able to attract new organizations dedicated to paying royalties, this indicator was compromised from the beginning. However, SOMAS insisted in keeping it in place during the reformulation phase.</li> <li>The programme was to produce a revision of the copyright law and its regulation. It was not expected to produce an approved one, as the approval is outside of the control of the JP. The goal was not able to prioritize this for approval during the life of the JP.</li> <li>There was a lack of political will to ensure the approval processes quicker – other prioritize arose.</li> </ul>
Focal points and Government officials at central level		<ul> <li>Had there been more high-level coordination, things would have run faster and more smoothly. There were a lot of bureaucratic issues that could have been avoided; this higher-level intervention could have supported a push for the law and regulation to go into the Council of Ministers sooner.</li> </ul>
Focal points and Government officials at provincial and district level		
Implementers and beneficiaries (musicians)	<ul> <li>Thanks to the JP, SOMAS has developed a 5-year strategic plan that has given it not only a sense of direction but also self-belief to carry out its mandate.</li> <li>Revised copyright law is finalized and ready to be approved.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Low level of participation in the association on the part of local musicians.</li> <li>SOMAS needs to work harder at reaching out to its beneficiaries.</li> <li>Activities with SOMAS and AMMO were good but were not based on a needs assessment<sup>6</sup>. Future capacity building sessions should take into consideration the needs of the stakeholders.</li> </ul>

# Analysis:

SOMAS did not have sufficient time and funds to start implementing its strategic plan, making it impossible for the evaluators to present a qualitative evaluation of its impact. Essentially, SOMAS has established itself as a player within the sector. Enabled with a plan, it can start looking for funding as well as sustainability through more media organisations paying royalties.

At the same time, when the revised copyright law and the draft regulation and its connected rights come into effect, SOMAS will be uniquely positioned to leverage the opportunity. As a result of the JP, SOMAS is connected with and has engaged in professional exchanges with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This refers specifically to the two one-day workshops delivered by ITC. Note that AMMO was not part of the scope of the JP. However, the evaluation team preferred to include this comment raised at one of the focus groups discussions, as it illustrated an important challenge for future development activities.



its counterparts in Brazil and South Africa, which has enabled it to define more clearly how it should develop within the Mozambican context and could allow it to better serve the national and the international copyright markets. In addition, SOMAS has established a healthy working relationship with its Brazilian counterpart ABRAMUS which is likely to continue beyond the life of the JP.

As SOMAS decided to wait on the completion of its strategic plan and for the campaign in 2011, to leverage more partnerships, it was not able to increase the number of royalty paying organisations. The increase would have been a clear indicator of an organization and environment that is capable of co-existing harmoniously beyond the JP.

# Output 1.1.4: Increased awareness raising and dissemination of key issues and results identified for securing sustainable growth for the creative industries

ITC and UNESCO led the output together with MICULT and SOMAS.

# **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

	Develop	<b>-</b>		Evaluati	on
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
# of advocacy events or actions for the promotion of authors rights realized	n/a	2011 - 10	80% <sup>7</sup>	Later than planned	Too early to measure any impact
Public institutions and organisations with solid knowledge about copyright law and its application	n/a	2011 - 12	Not possible to determine at this stage	N/A	On-going campaign

Target – (2011) 10 advocacy events or actions for the promotion of authors' rights realized.

Workshops on how to develop and how to negotiate a contract were conducted by ITC, both for musicians and for artisans in November 2010 (Maputo) and March 2011 (Nampula and Inhambane). Two manuals for contract guiding were launched together with these events. Later, the ITC-WIPO training in June 2011 in Maputo and Nampula distributed two other guides: 1. How to make a living out of music (only in English); 2. ITC-WIPO guide on IP and Crafts (English and Portuguese). In addition to these, two advocacy events took place within the timeframe of the JP.

Target – (2011) 12 Public institutions and organisations with solid knowledge about copyright law and its application. Although there was no baseline to evaluate the Indicators measured at the end of the programme, it is difficult to know how many institutions have knowledge about the existing copyright law, let alone about the revised law, as it still has to be enacted. The JP anti-piracy Campaign was prepared and was supposed to be launched in a single week during September. A few activities were carried out (concert, distribution of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The events carried out were: 2 advocacy events, 1 anti-piracy concert, 3 contract related workshops (in November 2010 and March 2011) and 2 WIPO related workshops (in June 2011). This totals 8 events.



communication materials); however, the video and audio campaigns are only expected to be launched in 2012. There are some doubts if MICULT's and SOMAS's approach to combating piracy are in line.

# Stakeholders' perception related to Output 1.1.4:

Source	Positive	Negative
Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>Awareness raising has put these issues in the spotlight and now it is up to SOMAS and MICULT to keep the issues moving forward.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>This output was plagued by delays and implementation started extremely late.</li> </ul>
Focal points and Government officials at central level		
Focal points and Government officials at provincial and district level		
Implementers and beneficiaries	<ul> <li>Anti-piracy campaign is something that has been missing for a long time. It is positive to see that this it slowly starting to be taken seriously by the government.</li> <li>Guides were developed for musicians and artisans on how to develop and negotiate contracts.</li> </ul>	

# Analysis:

The perceptions from those who were interviewed with regard to this output (the UN, GoM and beneficiaries) did not provide much insight on the output. The output was late in its implementation, and given that the revised copyright law and its regulation from output 1.1.3 were not yet established, any advocacy events and campaign based on the existing legislation would have been premature.

Given the brevity of time for data collection and lack of availability of the MICULT focal point or other members to give more specific insight into this output, it does not allow for an indepth discussion on the output, its activities and the general impressions of those involved.



# Outcome 1.2: Improved products and services for the cultural tourism market destinations in Inhambane, Nampula and Maputo City

# **Output 1.2.1: Artisans better able to manage their creative business**

ITC, ILO and UNESCO led this output together with MICULT and MITUR.

# **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

L. B. A.	Dessilies			Evaluation	
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion <sup>8</sup>	Time	Impact
		TOTAL: 400 trained (162 women; 205 youth)	390 trained (97,5% of target): 224 men trained; 166 women trained (over 100% of target); 188 youth trained (92% of target)	As planned	Total target was almost reached. Target for women trained was surpassed. Target for youth was almost reached.
# Trained	70 Artisans trained *Limited opportunities	<b>Maputo</b> : 300 trained (120 Women, 150 Youth)	225 trained (75% of target): 127 men trained; 98 women trained (82% of target); 64 youth trained (43% of target)	As planned	Target in terms of women trainer was almost achieved. Youth trained were less than half of target
women / % Youth)	Artisans (% in women / % professional	<b>Nampula</b> : 70 trained (30 Women; 40 Youth)	94 trained (over 100% of target): 68 men trained; 26 women trained (87% of target); 50 youth trained (over 100% of target)	As planned	Target in terms of women trainer was almost achieved. Youth target was overreached
		Inhambane: 30 trained (12 Women, 15 Youth)	71 trained (over 200% of target): 29 men trained; 42 women trained (over 300% of target); 74 youth trained (over 400% of target)	As planned	Target significantly overreached in all dimensions
4 Articope		Maputo: 114 Women and 90 Youth demonstrate readiness for fairs and markets	Women: 98 (86% of target) Men: 117 Youth: No information	As planned	Target for women trained almost achieved; no information on youth
# Artisans demonstrating readiness for the presence in fairs and markets (% Women/ %	0	Nampula: 10 Women and 10 Youth demonstrate readiness for fairs and markets	Women: 21 (over 100% of target) Men: 38 Youth: No information	As planned	Target on women surpassed; no information on youth
Youth)		Inhambane: 6 Women and 10 Youth demonstrate readiness for fairs and markets	Women: 26 (over 100% of target) Men: 42 Youth: No information	As planned	Target on women surpassed; no information on youth

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The level of completion is based on CEDARTE's Final Monitoring Report (CEDARTE, December 2011).



Indiantar	Deseller	Tourset		Evaluation	
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion <sup>8</sup>	Time	Impact
# Selected Associations managing and operating "Wood Bank"	0	2 associations	1 Association: Nampula association with concession license	Nampula: On time Maputo: -	Nampula: Satisfactory, but only operational in 2012 Maputo: None
# Trainers certified in IYES	0	20 certified trainers (Maputo: 10, Nampula: 6; Inhambane: 4)	21 trainers in IYES certified (over 100%). In addition, 19 trainers in "Start your cultural business" (SYCB) module certified	On time	Positive impact on artisans as evident at e.g. FEIMA

**Target – (2011) 400 Trained Artisans (40% women).** The JP successfully carried out various workshops to train trainers (e.g. "Improve your exhibition skills" (IYES), "Start your cultural business") and completed training workshops with selected artisans in the three provinces. In general, these were well received and regarded as helpful by the craft associations and artisans. Artisans (especially in Inhambane) referred they would like to have manuals to refer to at the end and would have liked more follow-up activities (not scope of the training), which would have added value in terms of overall impact of the trainings. The overall target of 400 was almost reached (97,5%).

Target – (2011) 240 Artisans demonstrating readiness for the presence in fairs and markets (54% Women). The latest monitoring report on this (CEDARTE, December 2011) shows that targets for women were surpassed in Nampula and Inhambane and almost achieved in Maputo. It is not possible to comment on youth targets as there is no information<sup>9</sup>.

Target – (2011) Two selected associations managing and operating "Wood Bank". The selected associations were ANARTE in Maputo and ASARUNA in Nampula. The JP succeeded in assisting ASARUNA to obtain its concession license for its Wood Bank but this will only become operational in 2012 instead of 2011 as initially planned. Training in the management of a wood bank was completed and ASARUNA has a business plan and operational manual. Meanwhile in Maputo, the JP failed due to the late submission of the concession application. Funds available due to this were instead used to train artisans about types of wood in Maputo.

**Target – (2011) 20 Trainers certified in IYES**. The JP managed to exceed the target (with 21 trained trainers). Those who participated in the focus group discussions regarded the training as valuable and of good quality.

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Officials of UN	Clear establishment of craft as a real industry in the	
Agencies	minds of artisans and Government.	
	Individual artists were encouraged to become part of	
	associations to receive the benefits of the association	
	that one can't get as an individual (e.g. access to	
	finance). Many individual artisans joined associations	
	because of this push from the IP.	

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.2.1:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The explanation given for this is that the age (youth) parameter came later; after activities had commenced.



		,
JP Focal points &	<ul> <li>The JP successfully carried out various training workshops, including training of trainers, e.g. IYES. These were well received and regarded as helpful by the craft associations. E.g. application of IYES concepts at FEIMA: while FEIMA is not part of the JP, the resident artisans certainly benefitted from JP activities that supported and enhanced their products.</li> <li>The value chain mapping of the craft industry was successfully finalised and interviewed leaders of associations expressed that it has been very helpful in acquiring a better understanding of the needs of artisans and the craft sector in general, e.g. the importance of helping artisans obtain a fiscal number (NUIT).</li> <li>DaO was successfully implemented in the joint elaboration of a TOR for all JP work under craft.</li> </ul>	
GoM Central level		
JP Focal points Provincial & District		
Implementers & Beneficiaries	<ul> <li>The trainings succeeded in ensuring a large participation of both youth and women – resulting in 52% of the trained trainers and 55% of the final beneficiaries of the IYES trainings, and 38% of the trained participants in the Business Skills For Artists Programme, being women.</li> <li>While certain types of craft are dominated by male artisans (e.g. wood), women are involved in other types of craft as well as administration of companies (e.g. ARASUNA told of two companies belonging to the association being managed by women).</li> <li>The establishment of the Wood Bank is the biggest success for ASARUNA in Nampula Province. Whereas before the artisans spent a lot of time looking for and illegally chopping wood, now ASARUNA have a license through the <i>Direcção Provincial de Agricultura</i> (DPA) to collect wood from local communities. While the JP paid for the license, ASARUNA have already budgeted for next year's license and will be able to pay for this through the earnings of the association. ASARUNA has also initiated plans to start replanting trees together with local communities.</li> <li>Company owners saw clear benefits of having participated in trainings in Maputo. For example, after having received training in Maputo, a company owner shared his new insights with his workers, resulting in the workers being more stimulated to produce as much as they can, realizing that the company will benefit from added sales – instead of just producing the targets set by their superior.</li> <li>A much-valued part of the training was how to correctly price a product. This brought about capacity to calculate real production costs and thus set a more appropriate price for their products.</li> <li>The training enabled artisans to better understand the level of quality required to make their craft products attractive to international buyers. Before they just produced as much as possible hoping to sell whatever they could, whereas now they have a greater awareness of how quality and workmanship</li></ul>	<ul> <li>While the trainings were perceived as useful, this new knowledge has little value if artisans remain unable to get access to financial assistance. Interviewed associations stressed repeatedly during interviews that their main challenge is finance, and were thus disappointed that the JP did not attempt to address this problem. In short, there is little value in knowing how to sell a product if you don't have the financial leverage to produce a marketable product.<sup>10</sup></li> <li>Regarding the planning of the JP itself: Implementing associations like CEDARTE were only engaged by the JP in late 2010 and were given very little time to implement their activities – resulting in many activities being rushed. Considering they were primarily involved in capacity building activities, it will be impossible to assess the impact of their work at the end of the JP.</li> <li>Capacity building of artisans should be seen as a continuous process whereby the trainers frequently monitor and follow up with trained artisans to ensure that they are developing the required skills. In this sense, the JP is wrongly designed as most of the trainings are once off sessions on specific topics without follow up. Associations express frustration at not being able to measure results or see the impacts of the work done.</li> <li>The main implementer of craft activities is of the opinion that UN agencies of the JP have failed to deliver as one. Firstly, reports have to be submitted to various agencies in different formats and secondly, each UN agency has its own financial procedures. All funds and reporting should have gone through a single coordinating agency. As it was, it was very confusing and associations lost a lot of time with administrative issues, e.g. CEDARTE only got ITC budget in May 2011 for activities that started in December 2010.</li> <li>The JP failed to establish a Wood Bank in</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Note that addressing this was not part of the initial design and planning of outputs, targets and/or activities. However, the evaluation team preferred to include this comment raised at one of the focus groups discussions as it illustrates an important aspect to take into consideration in future programmes.



a greater willingness to experiment with recycled	Maputo. Many reasons were given by
	, , , , ,
materials.	different interviewees e.g. late submission of
	application, unnecessary bureaucracy on
	part of DPA, unclear application request.
	• The JP enjoys little ownership on the part of
	the Government as they don't see the value
	of the JP in terms of their own objectives.
	They didn't participate in the trainings or any
	of the activities and at times actually
	contributed negatively towards certain
	activities, e.g. establishment of a craft fair in
	Nampula.
	• The outcome of the value chain mapping of
	the craft sector was 3 capacity building
	sessions. The artisans felt this was fairly
	weak and that more could have been done
	during the final year of the JP.

There are four important elements required to make artisanship more economically viable, according to the artisans:

- 1. Continuous training courses with many practical exercises;
- 2. Financial backing or support in some way as access to credit is difficult for artisans;
- 3. Identification of market demand in order to guarantee selling of product (no point in trainings if they result in unsold products);
- 4. Technical assistance in producing craft (new design, methods, techniques or new raw materials) for example bringing in an expert from another country where they are more advanced and can teach the artisans other ways of using the materials.

The Joint Programme has contributed substantially to the first and last of these items, and, to a lesser degree, to the third one. While there have been both positive and negative comments regarding the work done under this output, there is a general consensus that the artisans have benefited from the work of the various agencies involved.

The training sessions have resulted in providing added value to other successes such as FEIMA in Maputo, by greatly improving the exhibition skills of vendors as well as improving their knowledge of how to interact with potential buyers. Having also trained 21 trainers, the JP has ensured that there exists potential for trainings to continue after the end of the JP. Artisans gave as their opinion that the trainings would have gained if more practical exercises would have been included and if a more intensive programme of follow-up activities had been developed, in order to verify that they were on the right track.

One of the biggest successes of the JP within this output is the establishment of the Wood Bank for the craft association ASARUNA in Nampula. This has given them secure access to raw materials for their products. On the other hand, the Maputo-based association, ANARTE, expressed great disappointment that they have not managed to establish the Wood Bank.



# *Output 1.2.2: Improved national Vocational Curriculum for the craft sector*

ILO and UNESCO led this output together with MITRAB through the National Institute of Employment and Professional Training – *Instituto Nacional de Emprego e Formação Profissional* (INEFP).

# **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

In diastan	Dessline	Townsh		Evaluation	
Indicator	Baseline	Target -	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
New National vocational training curriculum in the area of craft validated and responding to the sector's needs	Current curriculum is inadequate and does not respond to the current needs of the sector	1 validated curriculum	80% <sup>11</sup>	Later than planned	Too early to measure
INEFP applies new national curriculum in vocational training in the area of crafts	n/a	At least 1 course using the new curriculum, tested	0%	-	-

**Target – (2011) One New National vocational training curriculum in the area of craft validated and responding to the sector's needs.** The JP was expected to support the development of a national vocational training curriculum as well as 5 training modules. The curriculum and the modules have been elaborated by INEFP with the assistance of an expert hired by ILO and UNESCO, and in partnership with an informant group that was comprised of PIREP, the certifying institute, MINED (Adult Education Department), MICULT, craft experts and master artisans. The curriculum, although very advanced, is still not in its final form to be officially submitted to PIREP for final approval. Its approval is expected in early 2012.

**Target – (2011) At least one course using the new curriculum, tested.** This target cannot be achieved without a validated and approved curriculum. As of the end of the JP, the curriculum has not yet been approved by the certifying agency, PIREP.

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.2.2:

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Officials of UN	<ul> <li>There is a widespread consensus amongst</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The National Institute of Employment and</li> </ul>
Agencies	interviewees of various levels that the JP helped	Professional Training (INEFP) provides formal
	show that creative industries is a sector that has a	training with various curricula in all provinces of
	vast potential for providing job opportunities as	Mozambique. However, these curricula do not
	well as generating income. However, realizing this	include courses specifically related to the crafts
	potential hinges in a large degree on artisans	industry. One of the aims of the JP was to aid the
	receiving formal education and achieving a status	INEFP to establish a national Vocational
	as professionals in the national business	Curriculum for the craft sector. Regrettably, this
	community.	curriculum has yet to be finalized and approved.
	• Although the curriculum is yet to be finalized, craft	<ul> <li>Due to delays in initiating this output, this</li> </ul>
	associations like CEDARTE learnt much about the	curriculum, although very advanced, is not yet in
	process of developing a curriculum by being part of	its final form; it will not be able to be officially
	the actual process.	submitted on time to PIREP for final approval and
		adoption.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The draft curriculum and the training modules have been elaborated but have not yet been approved.



Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
JP Focal points & GoM Central level	• The trainings of the JP have been very helpful for members of INEFP as they are now able to provide training to beneficiaries in the craft sector, e.g. there are already trainings programmed for 2012 in provinces not included in the JP.	<ul> <li>Many of the activities are being implemented only now, at the end of the JP – even though the activities have been approved. Many times this is because of funds not arriving as scheduled.</li> </ul>
JP Focal points Provincial & District		
Implementers & Beneficiaries	<ul> <li>Members of craft associations were invited to participate in vocational curriculum development workshops – so this process was regarded as participatory.</li> </ul>	• Artisans expressed concern over the fact that the Vocational Curriculum for Crafts is yet to be finalized at the end of the JP. They have serious doubts about whether INEFP has the capacity to finish the work without the assistance of the JP.

There is a clear understanding on all levels (UN, Government, beneficiaries) regarding the importance of having a vocational curriculum for the craft sector and the impact it can have for the national creative industry.

In 2010, UNESCO sent INEFP leads to Cape Town and Johannesburg to do an assessment of craft sector vocational training programmes in South Africa, in order to have a base for comparison and to identify good practices and lessons learned for Mozambique to decide how it wants to develop its own curriculum. This also intended to enhance the capacity of the lead focal point for this activity, whose craft sector experience was limited. This visit was facilitated by Aid to Artisans South Africa Trust.

In order to elaborate a curriculum, an informant group of 12 people was created, assisted by consultants from Evolutions Research Solutions, as well as other relevant participants from government institutions and civil society (individual artisans, PIREP, INEFP, FEIMA, CEDARTE). Although it suffered long delays, it was considered a very useful learning process by all involved.

# **Output 1.2.3: Improved market access for artisans**

UNESCO, ITC and ILO led this output together with MITUR.

# **Evaluation of indicators and targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

Indicator	Baseline Target	Evaluation			
		larget	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Increase craft sales for artisans that received technical assistance/training (% Woman / % Youth)	Production cannot meet market demand. Inconsistent quality of cultural products	2011 - increase of 10%	Cannot be reported at this point.	-	No sales figures available yet, but experience at FEIMA indicates an increase.



		Evaluation			
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
# new lines of craft products created and accept by the market	n/a	26 lines created, 60% with market acceptance	200% of target: 30 groups with 52 lines were developed. Market acceptance cannot reasonably be measured after such a short time	On time. Market acceptance study cannot be carried out within the timeframe of the JP	Market accepted part of lines, but no exact sales figures are available yet.
# Artisans (Men, women and youth) that received assistance in the development of products, report improve sales	n/a	18 artisans report improved sales	-	Study on this not yet finished.	Market accepted part of lines, but no sales figures are available yet.
Key Government bodies develop strategies that support the growth of the craft sector, at central and provincial level	n/a	2011 - 1	Still under development	Later than planned	Cannot be reported at this point

**Target – (2011) 10% Increase in craft sales for artisans that received technical assistance/ training**. CEDARTE and FEIMA are currently still concluding the research of sales volume for artisans that received technical assistance/training, so this cannot yet be evaluated. The study at FEIMA (a sample) reports sale increases. According to CEDARTE (December 2011, p. 7), "Although it is difficult to estimate the sales of all artisans who benefited from the Programme, we can take FEIMA as an example: in November 2010, at the beginning of the Programme, Sales of 213 artisans of FEIMA were 630.640 Meticais and in November 2011, at the end of the Programme, the same artisans reported sales of 1.649.000 Meticais, an increase of 162%". After the study for FEIMA, research will be conducted with artisans at Feira do Pau in Maputo and Feira Dominical in Nampula.

Target – (2011) 26 new lines of craft products created and 60% accepted by the market. Following a value chain analysis successfully concluded under phase 1, the overall project was implemented with 30 groups (8 groups in Maputo city, 4 in Inhaca, 3 in Inhambane city, 3 in Zavala, 7 in Nampula city, 3 in Ilha de Moçambique and 2 in Mossuril) and 52 new product lines were developed. This means a 200% accomplishment. CEDARTE's retail store Greenarte has repeated orders on more than 10 collections for the artisans involved in this activity, which seems to confirm market acceptance. At the National Fair, most of the artisans that benefited from the product development workshops sold out their products. Maputo and Nampula were regarded as successes, while Inhambane's design consultant was unsuccessful on the first run and another designer was required to train and develop new lines in that province.

Target – (2011) 18 Artisans that received assistance in the development of products, report improved sales. CEDARTE and FEIMA are currently concluding the research of sales volume of artisans that had received assistance, to measure potential improvements on sales and other positive effects that may have happened after training. The results of the research were not available at the time the evaluation was concluded.



**Target – (2011) One Key Government body develops strategies that support the growth of the craft sector, at central and provincial level.** This activity – including the government in the capacity building of the craft sector – was incorporated into the JP during the reformulation phase, acknowledging that the government lacked knowledge of the sector and its potential. A total of 26 government officials from the provinces and districts participated in a five-day capacity building training in Maputo, which aimed at improving their capacity to understand the global market opportunities (local/tourist, regional and international) for the craft sector. This was complemented by an exchange visit to South Africa during which they saw how craft is incorporated into the South African tourism strategy and which other strategies for support of the craft sector are in place in South Africa. This visit resulted in an action plan in which several support strategies for the craft sector in Mozambique were developed, although as of this evaluation none of the action plan seems to have been implemented.

Source	Positive	Negative
Officials of UN Agencies Government officials at national level Focal points and Government officials at provincial and district level	<ul> <li>Value chain analysis (done in phase I) was really useful in understanding and gaining invaluable insights into the necessities of the craft industry.</li> <li>"Visit to RSA made us aware of the economic potential of cultural industries". It was important for the focal points to see a successful craft sector "in person". Without these insights it would have been difficult for the Government focal points to envision how domestic strategies for improving market access for artisans should be articulated. There is now a solid awareness of the role creative industries can play in the</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The activities under this output reached only a limited number of artisans – there are many more that need this type of support<sup>12</sup>.</li> <li>The work could have been more efficient if there had been better communication between stakeholders.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>economy.</li> <li>The craft sector in Mozambique has recently stagnated due to a large degree of copying and imitation. This has led to a lack of variety and a decrease in the quality of the craft produced locally. To address this, design workshops were held and have contributed to artisans copying less, and becoming more concerned about the originality of their products.</li> <li>CEDARTE was the only Mozambican organization that could implement this level of a programme with this speed.</li> <li>CEDARTE has proven that it is able to provide its members with trainings of good quality.</li> </ul>	
Implementers and beneficiaries	<ul> <li>The trainings were of good quality and new skills were acquired.</li> <li>Those who received assistance from a designer think this was useful and has helped them think about design in new ways. The sessions with the designers stimulated creativity and encouraged experimenting with new materials.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The training sessions were very fragmented and at times months could pass between trainings. There was in general very little follow-up with the artisans after the trainings.</li> <li>Artisans feel the need to participate in more craft fairs as this gives them not only a chance to sell their product but also valuable experience in what the market demand is.</li> <li>It remains difficult to obtain good quality raw materials.</li> <li>The JP has done too little in terms of creating conditions for artisans to access foreign markets. "This is one of</li> </ul>

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.2.3:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> It is important to note that the target on the number of artisans to train was achieved. However, the evaluation team preferred to maintain this comment as it indicates an existing gap (not only in the areas of implementation of this Programme but also in other geographical areas) and is a recommendation for future Programmes.



Source	Positive	Negative
		our primary concerns and it hasn't been addressed concretely in the JP". <sup>13</sup>
		<ul> <li>No transparency about how the artists were selected that received help from a designer.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Some of the training activities were too general in nature and not always adapted to the specific needs of the artisans.</li> </ul>

This output remained very ambitious even after the reformulation of the JP and possibly too many activities were held under this output, as evidenced by many of them at the time of evaluation not having been fully completed.

One of the causes of delay was the difficulty of UNESCO and ITC working together, with ITC taking a long time to give feedback and e.g. to develop their Memorandum of Understanding with CEDARTE. Better planning and coordination between UNESCO and ITC could have created a more efficient partnership.

Despite having problems with the designer assigned to Inhambane, causing UNESCO to assist ITC and CEDARTE to create a financial solution that would allow having a different designer to complete the work, the design courses were highly appreciated by the beneficiaries and taught them how to work with new materials (e.g. recycled materials) and to reinforce (and in some cases introduce) fundamentally important concepts such as originality and quality control.

As a result of this output, artisans have increased their portfolio and developed marketdriven products. More than 500 artisans, mainly in Maputo and Nampula, were linked to local, national and international markets. Once market research studies on sales and market acceptance for new product lines are concluded it will be easier to verify the actual impact of the activities under this output.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Note that access to foreign markets was not within the scope of the JP. However, the evaluation team preferred to include this comment raised at one of the focus groups discussions as it illustrated an important challenge for future development activities.



# *Output 1.2.4: Improved tourist access to high-potential cultural assets*

ITC and UNESCO led this output together with MITUR.

# **Evaluation of indicator and targets**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

L. P			Evaluation			
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact	
Improved coordination in the promotion and development of Cultural Tourism amongst key government institutions and relevant private sector institutions	n/a	1 Coordination unit identified	100%	Later than planned	Improved relationship between Government and private sector; delay in this indicator resulted in delays in the implementation phase.	
Model for the development of Touristic packages developed	n/a	1 model developed and tested	100%	Later than planned	Document created and based on participatory process with providers.	
Cultural Tourism Packages/itineraries, based on newly developed models, operationalized	0	A maximum of 2 touristic packages per province	75% 4 pilot cultural tourism tour packages defined (2 in Ilha and 2 in Inhambane) - not yet operational	Later than planned	Too early to measure impact.	

Target – (2011) One Coordination Unit Identified for improved coordination in Promotion and Development of Cultural Tourism. A Coordination unit was identified but only after serious delay on the part of ITC to develop TORs for the coordination unit. This resulted in serious delays for the implementation phase.

**Target – (2011) One Model for the development of Touristic packages developed and tested.** UNESCO and ITC combined perspectives and technical knowledge, but serious administrative delays on the part of ITC endangered the implementation and forced UNESCO to assume the coordination and technical lead. The model was developed through a participatory process in Inhambane and Ilha de Moçambique, that started in the first phase of the JP with the mapping of cultural assets and a study on the demand and supply for cultural tourism. The results of these studies were applied in the development of training materials that were used in training sessions with representatives of cultural tourism.

Workshops were held with community based cultural entrepreneurs, about what cultural tourism is, how to create a cultural tour and aspects such as costing and pricing, customer service, hygiene and safety, and HIV in tourism. Two pilot cultural tours were then composed in each of the two locations in a participatory process that involved not only tour guides, but other service providers (storytellers, local cuisine, cultural groups, sailors) as well. The tours were evaluated and approved by representatives of the focal points at



central, provincial and district level, UNESCO, ITC, PROSERVE and the tourism agency that will sell the tickets.

Target – (2011) 4 Cultural Tourism Packages/itineraries, based on newly developed models, operationalized (maximum 2 per province). At the time of writing, the Coordination team was preparing for the formal testing of the tours. As testing of the tours has taken place after the final evaluation visit, no assessment of this target is possible at this stage.

#### Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 1.2.4:

Source	Positive	Negative
Officials of UN Agencies Focal points and	<ul> <li>The selected members of the cultural tour have shown great enthusiasm and look forward to finally implementing the cultural tour.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>It is surprising that it has taken such a long time to initiate the tours given the relative simplicity of implementing such and activity.</li> </ul>
Government officials at central level		
Focal points and Government officials at provincial and district level (also provincial FP)	<ul> <li>The "cultural mapping along existing tourism routes" (done in phase I of the JP) was very useful as ensured that the training courses were relevant for the involved stakeholders.</li> <li>Tours were developed in a participatory fashion together with local community members.</li> <li>Local residents now recognise that cultural manifestations can be a tourist attraction</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"We should have been more involved by the JP in the planning and implementation of tours".</li> <li>"The level of communication between stakeholders has at times been quite poor – but this has been improving as the start of the tour is getting closer".</li> </ul>
Implementers and beneficiaries (tourism providers)	<ul> <li>"We received a lot of useful information and acquired new skills through the trainings".</li> <li>"We have a better understanding of the concept of culture and how important it is for tourism as well as the impact it can have on our lives in terms of income generating possibilities."</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"It would have been very helpful if the trainers had left the participants with manuals or any similar type of documentation following the training sessions".</li> <li>Some training activities were too fast or superficial – more time was necessary in order to make full use of the training sessions.</li> <li>Participants of cultural tours felt they should have received a compensation for lost income during training sessions, especially tour guides.</li> <li>There was a long time between trainings and the beginning of tours. Without refresher sessions it is hard to remember what was discussed during the trainings.</li> <li>Members of the cultural tour expressed that it remains difficult to obtain bank credit to cover initial costs related to the cultural tour. If the members of the cultural tour could get official licenses issued by the municipalities this would give them greater legitimacy and potentially also greater probability of obtaining credit through financial institutions.<sup>14</sup></li> </ul>

#### Analysis:

While the impact of this output has the potential to be very positive, an evaluation of this is not possible, as the tours had not yet been launched at time of visit by evaluation team. The main reason for the late implementation seems to have been the fact that it took ITC a long time to elaborate the joint TOR and to contract their portion of the consultants who were to implement phase two of the trainings. In late 2010, prior to the overall joint TOR being completed, UNESCO moved forward with the design of Phase 1 training packages in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Official certifications were provided by the municipalities after the time of the evaluation team's field visit.



anticipation of implementing them in early 2011 together with ITC. Despite delays, the two agencies brought a unified approach to the implementation of the output on the ground.

While the overall perspective of the beneficiaries of the trainings was that they had been very helpful, there were several concerns raised during interviews. Participants complained that no manuals or other materials were given to them after the trainings. The tour guides said they would have liked to be trained by a professional tour guide.

It is not clear to the evaluators if the results of the mapping of cultural assets, done in the first phase of the JP, were ever published, but participants in the trainings alleged they had never seen them.

Dialogue between Government and UN agencies on this output seems to have been very positive, especially at local level.

If this model proves to be successful it can be used for replication in other parts of the country.

# **The Cultural Component Assessed**

<u>Component 1: The economic side: Promotion of cultural and creative industries'</u> <u>contribution to social and economic development</u>

This evaluation is an outcome evaluation or summative evaluation asking the following question: what happened differently because of this programme?

Given the cultural/creative industry objectives with respect to Component 1 the evaluators expected to find the following:

Outcome 1.1: Reinforcing the enabling environment which the creative industry depends on for its growth.

Outcome 1.2: Strengthening the capacity of the cultural and creative industries to generate revenue at the grassroots level and of the government to support the key needs of the craft sector.

#### **Expectation of findings for Component 1:**

- 1.1. An understanding of the contribution of the cultural and creative industries to poverty alleviation (providing employment, generating income, setting up of community networks, establishing collaborative buying, joint marketing programmes, foreign exchange earnings) leading to a deeper understanding of the value of the sector and how to ensure that poverty is alleviated through it (especially by the focal points, members of the PMC).
- 1.2. A recognition of the cultural heritage that is being promoted in the programme (tourism, craft, music) (PMC, focal points, practitioners).
- 1.3. Establishment and facilitation of networking and partnerships between cultural practitioners, entrepreneurs and cultural organisations for their collective benefit



leading to a new or renewed commitment to work in partnerships and associations with an understanding of what the benefits are (cultural practitioners).

- 1.4. Training and capacity building around the cultural and business components of entrepreneurship, business skills, management, logistics, service to customers, presentation of product or service, tourism knowledge etc. leading to cultural entrepreneurs approaching their business differently, with more knowledge, information and skill (practitioners).
- 1.5. Contribution of culture, traditional knowledge as well as cultural/creative products and services to the tourism package leading to creative people being able to add value to the tourist products and packages and tourism stakeholders understanding how cultural/traditional products and services can be utilised to add value to the tourism product (focal points, members of the PMC, government, cultural practitioners).

Expected finding	UN Agencies	GoM	Participants of Focus Groups Discussions
1.1. An under- standing of the contribution of cultural and creative industry to poverty alleviation (providing employment, generating income, setting up community networks, establishing collaborative buying of raw material inputs (craft), joint marketing programmes, foreign exchange earnings.	The JP succeeded in clarifying that culture is not only about dancing and singing but that creative industries have a potential impact on the country's Gross Domestic Product. Training programmes run with the staff in the Ministry of Culture linked culture to the economy. This training also occurred in Ilha de Moçambique and included Government officials from Inhambane and Nampula Province.	A key success of the JP is that there is now a methodology to teach Mozambicans that culture is not just talk but can be implemented. Has a strong view that the JP changed own view of the value of culture and that culture must be taken seriously. The JP has helped the government recognise the value of cultural products and services. The example given was the stand built for artisans to showcase their work. The Municipality of Inhambane believes that their role in the JP was to educate and talk to the artists. On the other hand, the tourism FP highlighted the positive contribution made by the JP: enabling cultural actors (storytellers, local cuisine, artisans) to feel valued in the tourism industry. A provincial level culture govt focal point of the JP believed that while culture has always been important, there was a lack of knowledge of its importance in development and how culture can be used to positively contribute to development. Through the JP, people have come to understand that small cultural industries can add value to a country's economy and in that way contribute to the alleviation of poverty.	The artisan participants understood the contribution of the craft sector to the national economy and that it can contribute towards employment opportunities and ultimately the reduction of poverty. While not part of the scope of the JP, artisans recommended that future programmes included assistance with access to finance, as this remains a serious problem for them.
1.2. A recognition of the cultural heritage that is being promoted in the programmes (tourism, craft, music).	There was training given to government officials, tour guides and cultural tour entrepreneurs about the potential of the cultural industry, including cultural heritage.	Government was positive about the JP's contribution to ensure that culture is now part of government plans and being spoken about inside of government.	Cultural tourism tour guides commented that they had been given cultural knowledge related to heritage and specific buildings from the municipality prior to the JP. The JP augmented this with trainings about buildings, natural resources, beaches, mountains, boat building, fishing, traditional food, dances and storytelling.

The table below represents Stakeholders' perceptions related to the expected findings.



Expected finding	UN Agencies	GoM	Participants of Focus Groups Discussions
1.3. Establishment and facilitation of networking and partnerships between cultural practitioners, entrepreneurs and cultural organisations for their collective benefit (cultural practitioners).		While previously artists, artisans etc had no say in municipal life, the presi- dent of the municipality now has regular meetings with the creative group. On the other hand, the municipality seems to believe that they are teaching the artists to value their work and their art and how to improve what they do rather than the munici- pality having a new understanding of culture from this dialogue with the example of going to meet with artists who create sculptures and tell them how they should interact with tourists. The craft training provided through the JP has opened the minds of artisans and increased the vision of artisans. While encouraging artisans to join associations was not explicitly part of the JP, local government has encour- aged artisans to join associations as a way to increase collaboration and networks within the sector.	This was particularly well under- stood by the crafters/artisans focus group participants and artisans were actively encouraged to belong to associations. They recognised the importance of associations for security, capacity building, business understanding, working with new materials, participating in craft fairs and understanding that improved quality was needed to make craft products more attractive. On the other hand the associations felt that the JP should have facilitated access to finance for associations. The cultural tourism entrepreneurs focus group reported that the dance group was confirmed as an association. The training about determining costs and managing the tour as a collective was useful for future collaboration.
1.4. Training and capacity building around the cultural and business components of entrepreneurship, business skills, management, logistics, customer service, presentation and packaging of product or service, tourism knowledge	The JP will be distributing and leaving behind a book which outlines the methodology used as a practical handbook of the process and the training materials will be left with the ESHTI, Ministry of Culture, MITUR (INATUR) and the local municipalities. Due to the delays in implementation, the JP recognises that follow-up of the cultural tours was not feasible and the impact not measurable in terms of income generated as the tours are now only able to be put in practice publicly after the close of the programme.	The JP contributed to seeing artisans as having value in society. The Tourism FP appreciated the training and capacity building as it gave government insight into cultural aspects and enabled them to plan. The working together of institutions dealing with culture and tourism was highlighted as the most positive aspect of the JP. The listing of cultural assets was one of the biggest successes of the JP, along with the training of musicians and artisans regarding contracts and assisting tour guides in getting licensed at a reasonable price.	Training was given to cultural entrepreneurs about constructing a tour, what tourism means and why tourists visit the area. However participants were frustrated not to receive manuals or material to refresh their knowledge. <sup>15</sup> The trainings, while useful and very relevant, was not practical enough with e.g. tour guides not knowing how to implement what they had learnt after the training. In addition, the delay in arrival of funds meant that activities were delayed, result- ing in gaps of inactivity between trainings sessions and activities. Some activities, such as food preparation of traditional dishes rely on a steady stream of tourism to avoid risk of oversupply.
1.5. Contribution of culture, tradi- tional knowledge as well as cultural/ creative products and services to the tourism package		The Tourism FP for government high- lighted the importance of the mapping of assets and the inventory which allowed them to package these for tourists.	This recognition was not evident in the artisan group with no examples/ evidence of the relationship be- tween preserving heritage through craft or the traditional usages of craft items and items currently focused on for the tourist market. Most respondents felt that the collaboration between the munici- pality and the trained guides was a positive step but that certification from the municipality was necessary to show neighbours why tourists were coming to their houses. <sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The JP will be distributing a pocket size reference book "Guide for Cultural Tour Guides" in January that will serve as an ongoing reference as well as a manual entitled "Visual and Narrative Documentation of Cultural Assets". These aim to provide historical and cultural information to improve guides' knowledge and skills to provide accurate historical references and stories during tours. <sup>16</sup> See footnote 14.



# 5.2. Component 2: Inclusion of social and cultural aspects in development policies and strategies ensured

Outcome 2.1: Socio cultural elements integrated in planning processes and local development strategies

Output 2.1.1: Improved livelihoods through the identification and promotion of traditional knowledge in forestry and agriculture in select communities

The output was led by FAO together with MINAG.

#### **Evaluation of Indicators and Targets**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

				Eval	uation
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Traditional forestry resources better valued by the communities	Reduced community participation in fiscalization	2 communities in Nampula and 5 in Inhambane actively participating in Forestry fiscalization; 1 exchange visit in each province	100%	On time	Interviews with communities in Zavala and Mossuril showed that there is greater awareness of forestry resources through the work of the JP.
Knowledge of beneficiary communities about participatory natural resource management increased	n/a	1 Training seminar in Mossuril and 1 in Zavala; 2 exchange visits between CBO per district	50%	On time (for the 50% achieved)	Knowledge seems to have increased in Zavala but little has been done in Mossuril.
Community forest areas increased	Reduced number of community planted forests	At least 5ha of community forest planted	100%	On time	Community forests were planted in Zavala and Mossuril.
Interest groups of economic activities identified and capacitated	Identified interest groups (wood, mussiro, bees) in 2 districts	1 interest group identified in Mossuril; 1 bee production group trained per district	50%	Later than planned	Despite failing to reach the target, it was possible to see that the mussiro CBOs in Mossuril has had a slight improvement of quality of life through the production of mussiro. Unable to visit the beekeeping group in Zavala.
Improved used of traditional knowledge regarding	Weak information on traditional knowledge in	Study on traditional practices in production and protection of crops performed in Zavala	50%	On time (for the 50% achieved)	A cassava local variety demonstration area was established in Mossuril.– difficult to assess impact of this activity based on monitoring reports.
agriculture	knowledge in agriculture 2 fairs on Local Knowledge carried out per district	25%	-	One Local Knowledge fair took place in Zavala in September 2011.	



Target – (2011) Two communities in Nampula and five in Inhambane actively participating in Forestry fiscalization; one exchange visit in each province. An exchange trip took place for the exchange of experience between members of the Management Committees of Natural Resources (CGRN) and Community Leaders from the districts of Zavala and Mabote (in Inhambane province). The management plan for the Matibane Forest Reserve was presented to partners in Nampula. Eight Community Based Organisations (CBOs) were legalized in the District of Mossuril (Nampula). Supported and granted exploration licenses to four Firewood Management Committees of Natural Resources, including Cabodoho, Chivangue, Mahita and Canetane (Zavala).

Target – (2011) One Training seminar in Mossuril and 1 in Zavala; 2 exchange visits between CBO per district. In 2011, one seminar was held in Zavala where 5 CBOs participated. There was also one exchange visit carried out in Zavala. However, no training was held in Mossuril.

**Target - At least 5 ha of community forest planted.** Community forests were established in Nhanbete, in Zavala district (5 ha), and in Naguema (1 ha) and M'crusse (2 ha), in Mossuril district. The planting of native species is done to enrich degraded forests, in order to create conditions for the selective cutting of trees.

**Target - One interest group identified in Mossuril; one bee production group trained per district.** 5 CBOs trained in producing and selling in mussiro in Mossuril. A trained bee group in Zavala has benefited from a beehive house (for the processing of honey) but not in Nampula.

**Target - Study on traditional practices in production and protection of crops performed in Zavala.** Studies on traditional practices in production and protection of crops were carried out in Zavala and Mossuril. According to monitoring reports a "Cassava local variety demonstration area was established in Mossuril".

**Target - Two fairs on Local Knowledge carried out per district.** One Local Knowledge fair took place in Zavala in September 2011.

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Source Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>The most pleasing accomplishment is that communities who benefited from the JP in Nampula have established a fully functioning forestry management plan. This is the main accomplishment under this output of the JP and where the JP has been able to make a difference. Now there exists an approach where wood</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>There is a lot of confusion within the forestry component regarding what is JP and what is not. Many see this output as a separate project, not as part of the JP.</li> <li>Within reforestation projects, there is a large element of frustration amongst the local population as trees grow slowly and the</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>cutters consult the local community and ask where they can cut wood. The local forestry inspectorate is then consulted so that it can control how much is cut. The money the communities make from wood sales is put into a bank account and saved for future community projects such as opening a borehole, or constructing a school building.</li> <li>Nurseries have been established in communities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>community seek short term returns on their investment. This has a negative effect on the willingness of communities to invest without additional incentives in reforestation projects, e.g. mwenje tree.</li> <li>Due to the high degree of illiterate population, the target community associations e.g mussiro producing associations in Mossuril, have few members that are able to population to a paraditate.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Nulseries have been established in communities with help of FAO (e.g. Naguema) that now are able to provide other communities with seedlings.</li> <li>In terms of utilizing local knowledge: JP wanted to introduce a farming activity to boost income levels of local communities and suggested an</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>members that are able to participate in capacity building sessions. As a consequence, the success of these associations is heavily dependent on the individual capacity of these members.</li> <li>There were some wrong assumptions made from the start regarding indigenous knowledge: that the communities had some cultural practice</li> </ul>

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 2.1.1:



Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
JP Focal Points & GoM Central level JP Focal points Provincial & District	<ul> <li>improved variant of cassava seed. However, Mossuril community informed FAO of a local breed that proved very resistant to salty waters and local pests. FAO was not aware of this and could have unintentionally caused harm.</li> <li>The preservation work is gaining regional recognition and there are already other provinces interested in knowing more about the preservation work.</li> <li>FAO firmly believes DPA has capacity and political will to continue working with local communities after the end of the JP.</li> <li>UN agencies were in certain instances able to "deliver as one", e.g. UNESCO released funds for FAO's use as part of the reformulation phase to enable their operational participation during the extension period granted through December 2011.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>that ensured sustainable management of the forest. This was partially correct for communities in Mossuril where there were established forestry management groups, but in the case of Zavala it was discovered that communities simply assume that God has given the forest, and that it will always be there for them.</li> <li>The relationship with other UN agencies was mainly only at PMC level. There were attempts to do more e.g. monitoring together but it was difficult to work together since there was no cohesion on the programming and delivery level. To be harmonised, UN agencies should have been dealing with the same target group – which was not the case. Even within the district each UN agency was working on their own output with their own beneficiaries, such as in Mossuril where some worked in the villa and some in Matibane.</li> </ul>
Implementers & Beneficiaries	<ul> <li>Most positive aspect about the JP for the communities in Crusse was the suggestion from the JP to initiate the mussiro production as a relatively quick income generating activity. While the income levels so far have been relatively modest, the local associations have gained insights into business principles and confirmed that their overall life quality has improved due to their higher income.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Although some of the members of the associations participated in capacity building sessions, the associations feel that these trainings are insufficient – resulting in a feeling of stagnation. They need further trainings in order to learn how to increase their sales.</li> <li>The JP has only managed to identify a single person who has vital indigenous knowledge about how to gather mwenje seeds (in Zavala). Regrettably, the JP has not made use of this source of knowledge as the person confirmed that he had not been requested to teach anyone else how to gather the seeds.</li> </ul>

Reforestation projects in poor rural communities are not an easy task. Communities are in desperate need of quick income and efforts to promote reforestation of trees that can take over 50 years to achieve market ready size, will be met with modest enthusiasm. During the final evaluation field visits, it was evident that while this was largely still the case, there has been some progress in terms of creating an awareness amongst stakeholders concerning the impact deforestation has on the cultural heritage and future economic potential of their communities.

In this context, planting mwenje trees (that timbilas are made out of) was proven to be difficult. It was difficult to spread the notion of the cultural importance of preserving the mwenje tree, as only one community in 3 in Inhambane adopted the planting strategy. Attempts to convince several villages to initiate reforestation have failed and it continues to prove difficult to change the mind frame of communities.

While some of this can be attributed to economic reasons, there have also been some questionable findings by the evaluation team during their visit – one striking example is that in terms of indigenous knowledge there is only one person in the Zavala area, which is the "home" of the timbila, who knows how to collect the mwenje seeds. When asked if the JP had requested that he train others in how to collect the seeds, he responded that while he is regularly in contact with the focal point of the JP from DPA (who purchases seeds from him), he has not once been asked to teach others this difficult skill. This weakness has been noted



before by monitoring teams and recommendations have been made to the implementing bodies, but they have not been implemented.

In terms of operating as a Joint Programme, there were shortcomings in terms of the involvement of major stakeholders in this output. The Ministry of Agriculture was involved and participated in the design of the JP, but, unfortunately, during the implementation of the Programme the role of MINAG at central level was almost nonexistent. FAO coordinated mostly at provincial level and was unable to mobilize MINAG at central level. Coordination with UNESCO was also limited.

A factor that contributed negatively to the ability to deliver results was that there were severe problems in relation to continuation of personnel; a lot of the personnel in agencies (mainly FAO) as well as government came into the middle of the programme at both provincial and central level.

In terms of inter-sectoral cooperation, the provincial and district governments have shown a greater awareness regarding the importance of incorporating cultural aspects into their work and have made efforts to bring sectors such as agriculture, education and culture together on common issues. In the case of this output, the collaboration between different sectors of the government at local level has significantly improved (which should be seen as a success), while UN agencies remain working individually.

This output developed in relative isolation from the rest of the JP. Most of the beneficiaries were not aware of this output being part of a wider programme – which is not necessarily a bad thing – and the output was commonly referred to as "the FAO project", as if it was not part of the Joint Programme.

Output 2.1.2: Inter-cultural dialogue between refugees and host community promoted and refugees' knowledge to the culture of origin valued in local development plans

UNHCR together with the National Institute for Support of Refugees – *Instituto Nacional de Apoio aos Refugiados* (INAR) led this output.

#### **Evaluation of Indicators and Targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

Indicator	Baseline Target		Evaluation		
mulcator			Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Cultural mapping of the Maratane Refugees' Centre in Nampula	Y2: 1 500 (+) only for the cultural week	2010 - Report based on interviews with 80 families produced with practical recommendations	100%	Cultural mapping was done on time, but the report was approved much later than planned	The report had little opportunity to have impact as its delivery was very late
# and types of		Year 1: 6	Y1: Information missing		
intergenerational		Year 2: 8	Y2: 8 events (100%)	-	-
cultural exchanges		Year 3: 8	Y3: Information missing		



Indicator	Basalina	Target	Evaluation		
indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact
# and gender of children attending intergenerational exchanges	No inter- generational activities were planned	Year 1: 300 children (40% female) Year 2: 400 children (50% female) Year 3: 500 children (50% female)	Year 1: Information missing Year 2: 740 children (185%) (50% female) Year 3: Information missing	-	-
# of events to promote cultural exchanges between refugees and local Mozambican communities		Year 1: 6 Year 2: 8 Year 3: 8	Y1: Information missing Y2: 8 events (100%) Y3: Information missing	-	-
# of refugees and local residents participating in the above cultural events; and % of men	TBD	Year 1: <u>Directly</u> : 1 500 refugees; 150 Mozambicans <u>Indirectly</u> : 3 000 refugees and 5 000 Mozambicans Year 2: <u>Directly</u> : 2 000 individuals; 1 750 refugees; 250 Mozambicans <u>Indirectly</u> : 4 000 refugees; 8 000 Mozambicans <u>Year 3:</u> <u>Directly</u> : 2 500 individuals; 2 200 refugees; 300 Mozambicans <u>Indirectly</u> : 4 677 refugees; 12 000 Mozambicans	Y1: 0 (0%) Y2: 6 242 directly and 8 000 indirect (over 100% of accomplishment) Y3: 0 (0%)	-	-
# of refugees and Mozambicans responsible for cultural activities	Refugees and Mozambicans : 1000	Year 1: 15 individuals, 12 refugees, 3 Mozambicans (30% women) Year 2: 25 individuals, 20 refugees and 5 Mozambicans (40% women) Year 3: 30 individuals (50% women)	Y1: Information missing Y2: 16 individuals (64%) Y3: Information missing	-	-
# of newsletters produced annually; circulation; and % of cultural topics included	6 editions per year, inconsistent number of cultural articles and zero (0) journalists trained	Year 1: 12 editions 20% cultural articles Year 2: 24 editions 30% cultural articles 6 journalists trained Year 3: 24 editions 40% cultural articles 6 new journalists trained	Y1: Information missing Y2: 44 editions to date; 2 000 copies per month issued. Y3: 5 journalists trained	-	-

Target – (2010) Report on Cultural mapping of the Maratane Refugees' Centre in Nampula based on interviews with 80 families produced with practical recommendations. The draft report was produced and it included practical short-term and long-term recommendations. However, it took very long to be finalised. The final draft was only officially approved in the third quarter of 2011. 116 households (138 individuals) were interviewed, which is much



more than anticipated. UNESCO only had a small budget to do the mapping and did not have any follow-up budget to assist in its application.

**Target – (2008-11) 22 intergenerational cultural exchanges.** There are records of 8 events during Year 2. Some of these are: intergenerational exchange at the museum through film screening, Generation Encounters, Celebration of the Cultural week, Women's Day, World Refugee Day, Peace Day, Omuhipiti Festival in Ilha de Moçambique. The types of events include: Musical Festivals, Cultural Exhibition, Cultural Performance, and Generation Encounters.

**Target – (2008-11) 1,200 children attending intergenerational exchanges over 3 years.** There are records of 740 children attending in intergenerational exchanges in Year 2.

**Target - (2008-11) 22 events to promote cultural exchanges between refugees and local Mozambican communities.** There are records of 8 events during Year 2. Some of these are: intergenerational exchange at the museum through film screening, Generation Encounters, Celebration of the Cultural week, Women's Day, World Refugee Day, Peace Day, Omuhipiti Festival in Ilha de Moçambique). The types of events include: Musical Festivals, Cultural Exhibition, Cultural Performance, and Generation Encounters.

Target - refugees and local residents participating in the above cultural events; and % of **men**. Level of accomplishment to be confirmed.

Target - (2008-11) 70 refugees and Mozambicans responsible for cultural activities. Level of accomplishment to be confirmed.

**Target - (2008-11) 60 newsletters produced; circulation and % of cultural topics included**. A newsletter has been produced regularly by the refugees. It has not been possible to confirm the level of accomplishment of this target.

Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
Officials of UN	Introducing the concept of culture in refugee	• While the cultural mapping was a positive exercise,
Agencies	camps has shown to be a positive tool for	the local camp authorities have poor knowledge of
	repatriation as it contributes to maintaining	how to deal with cultural issues and are thus not
	(and in the case of children, creating), a	prepared to use culture as a tool.
	sense of cultural identity for the different	<ul> <li>There was no budget for UNESCO to be able to</li> </ul>
	ethnic groups. This helps create a sense of	provide technical support for follow-up after the
	belonging to refugees' own community and	mapping.
	promotes a desire to return to their cultural	The success of incorporating a cultural component
	roots.	in the refugee camp hinged on a successful cultural
	<ul> <li>The cultural mapping showed to be a useful</li> </ul>	mapping exercise being completed during the first
	exercise as it showed that cultural sensitivi-	year of the JP in order to use the findings during the
	ties existed within the camp.	next 2 years. However, this activity met various
	<ul> <li>The cultural groups in the camp received</li> </ul>	difficulties. Initially, several issues led to a long
	subsidies, instruments, benefited from cul-	delay: funds arrived late, and planning with local
	tural exchange with nearby Mozambican	authorities was delayed due to elections; once
	communities – all these are very positive –	planning was finalised, the procurement and
	especially considering that UNHCR's priority	contracting process of an external consultant was a
	is not culture – it deals chiefly with life-saving	very lengthy process. All of this resulted in the
	activities. With this in mind, the refugee cul-	mapping only initiating in late 2010. Unfortunately
	tural groups benefited greatly from the JP's	there were further problems. During the
	presence in the camp, and there was impact	consultancy both UNHCR and UNESCO expected the
	- but how to continue this work after the end	other to lead the consultancy work – which led to
	of the JP is the real challenge.	general confusion. Furthermore, it became
	• One of the successes of the JP within this	apparent that there was a difference between
	component is the concept of increasing	UNESCO and UNHCR regarding the objective of the
	dialog and creating linkages between stake-	study: UNHCR wanted an inventory of the cultural

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 2.1.2



Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
	<ul> <li>holders of the JP. While it is true that dialog between UN agencies was far from perfect, the JP provided a necessary start to an aspect that has been lacking and in fact is important within UN agencies. Historically there has been no dialog between UNESCO and UNHCR in Mozambique, but today the communication channels exist. On a different level, the local authorities today see value in links due to the work carried out within the JP. Local communities initially saw immigrants as negative but when immigrant groups demonstrated their culture and tradition there was much more acceptance from local community, thus mitigating potential problems for local authorities.</li> <li>The JP has succeeded in creating an awareness regarding the importance of culture – however the next step is missing: how to use this awareness in practice.</li> <li>Despite only having funding for the cultural mapping, UNESCO was able to provide support for the training of content development for HIV &amp; AIDS for the journalists for the future running of the community radio which UNHCR is assisting, the integration of cultural content in the newsletter, support in the development of a visual dictionary, and assisting UNHCR in creating linkages made for the cultural exchange on Ilha de Moçambique and beyond.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>aspects within the camp – which would have been very practical for UNHCR staff in the camp – but the consultancy report dealt more with traditional refugee issues – which UNHCR already is knowledgeable in. A compromise was eventually made and the final report of the mapping was approved in October 2011 by both agencies. So the use of the traditional and cultural knowledge has only been able to start very late. This unfortunately shows evidence of poor coordination between the two agencies. Definition of roles and responsibilities needs to be clearer for future inter-agency collaboration – especially between agencies that normally have little interaction and differ in work methodology.</li> <li>The JP activities would have had more sustainable results if funds had been lower initially, during the planning phase, and greater towards the end during implementation phase.</li> </ul>
JP Focal points &		
GoM Central level JP Focal points Provincial & District		
Implementers & Beneficiaries	<ul> <li>The cultural groups are 50/50 men and women.</li> <li>A newsletter was created through the JP, which has been a valued and helpful source of information for the refugees to know what is going on in the camp as well as back home. The journalists were pleased with the training received in Ilha de Moçambique organized by the JP.</li> <li>The outings with cultural groups to e.g. Ilha were very positive and contributed towards a very good atmosphere within the population of the camp.</li> <li>Through cultural activities, a good relationship has been established with the local Mozambican population around the camp. Refugees have even been given plots of land to grow crops outside the camp.</li> <li>The cultural activities have created an acceptance and respect for the different cultures that exist within the camp. This has been extremely important as an instrument to mitigate ethnic/cultural friction within the camp.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The refugees expressed disappointment with the commitment from the local authorities to listen to their concerns and genuinely make an effort to find solutions to existing problems. The answer to all questions, they say, is that there is no money.</li> <li>There is a lack of instruments for the cultural groups. This is extremely important to them as instruments are a vital tool for their cultural activities.</li> <li>There is disappointment regarding the failure to launch the community radio station in the camp. This is an important instrument that will have much greater potential to reach inhabitants of the camp as many cannot read. The radio can broadcast programs in many languages as well as music by refugee music groups. A Canadian exchange programme has capacitated members of cultural groups, so only infrastructure is now missing.</li> <li>While it is good that journalists received training, they still lack credentials that would allow them to participate in official meetings inside the camp. Currently they cannot prove that they are journalists and are thus often stopped at the door.</li> <li>There are no forms of transport to distribute the newsletter. Many community members have no access to it as the camp is large.</li> <li>While the idea to install a "house of culture" is good, the actually structure is a dismal construction without a solid roof and is currently inhabited by chickens. Unless the structure is improved it will serve no purpose as there is no desire to hold any activities there.</li> <li>The cultural exchange trips to Ilha are appreciated</li> </ul>



Source	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
		but there are many logistical problems that need to
		be solved. Past problems include: allocated
		inappropriate accommodation (one single room)
		resulting in men having to sleep outdoors on the
		veranda, lack of meals during trip resulting in artists
		having to perform without having eaten all day,
1		poor transport, resulting in overcrowded bus.

The main concern within this output is that the result that would lay the foundation for the rest of the activities – the cultural mapping of the Maratane Refugee Camp – was only officially validated in October 2011 by both UNESCO and UNHCR.

The evaluation team understands that not only was there confusion regarding who was to lead the work, but also a difference between the expectations of the UN agencies and the deliverable of the consultant, resulting in the study being redrafted and delayed. As a consequence, at the time of the final evaluation, the results were yet to be disseminated and thus have hardly been used during the implementation period of the JP. A further concern is that while the results of the cultural mapping may prove to be useful, the local authorities lack the capacity to make use of the cultural findings in their work.

Because of poor coordination and cooperation, the result at the end of the JP is thus a cultural mapping report of the camp that is too complex for local authorities to put in use.

Despite not being able to make proper use of the cultural mapping, the JP still managed to incorporate substantial, and according to the interviewed cultural groups in the camp, much valued cultural activities during the period of the JP. Interviewed refugees expressed much appreciation for the various cultural exchanges and concerts and other cultural initiatives that were made possible through the JP. These were considered by the refugees to have had a very positive impact on their relationship with the surrounding local communities and were thus much appreciated.

Many other activities have been organised with support from UNESCO, although not reflected in the log-frame targets and despite the lack of a specific budget for them, such as the training on HIV & AIDS for the journalists that will be running the future community radio, the integration of cultural content in the camp's newsletter, support in the development of a visual dictionary, and assisting UNHCR in creating linkages for the cultural exchange on Ilha de Moçambique and beyond. This shows that even without a budget, there are various linkages that can be leveraged for the benefits of the community.

The cultural activities that the JP brought to the work in the camp, which is not normal praxis for UNHCR, should be considered a valuable and positive lesson learnt for future UNHCR work. Additionally, it was confirmed by UNHCR that the cultural activities have been valuable in the sense that they reinforce cultural identity of young refugees, thus promoting the will of these refugees to repatriate back to their own communities.

It has not been possible for the evaluators to measure to which extent the improved knowledge about the culture of the refugees has actually influenced local development plans.



# *Output 2.1.3: Model for socio-cultural profiles developed and disseminated for use in the elaboration of district development plans better adapted to the local context*

UNESCO and UNFPA led the output. MICULT was the designated Ministry lead.

# **Evaluation of Indicators and Targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Evaluation		
			Level of Completion	Time	Impact
Model for the elaboration of socio- cultural profiles elaborated	Weak consideration given to socio- cultural aspects in planning	2011 - Model elaborated with the participation of stakeholders	100%	Later than planned	The model was used in local planning in 4 districts
Model and Guidelines for the elaboration of socio-cultural profiles disseminated in selected districts		2011- Model and guidelines disseminated	50%	-	Too early to measure impact

**Target – (2011) Model for the elaboration of socio-cultural profiles elaborated.** This output suffered much delay due to the difficulty in identifying a coordinating/technical consultant who would be able to dedicate 100% effort to its accomplishment and due to the changing nature of the model over time, based on inputs within the UN system as a whole. During the development of the model and the strategy for the pilot there was an overall conceptual switch which transformed this socio-cultural model into an integrated approach for applying culture, gender and human rights into district development planning. A reference group with specialists from various institutions (including ARPAC, UEM, and relevant stakeholders) was formed and trained. This reference group then elaborated the model and piloted it in 2011 in three districts (Mossuril and Ilha de Moçambique in Nampula and Zavala in Inhambane). The model is in its final editing stages and is expected to go to print soon.

**Target – (2011) Model and Guidelines for the elaboration of socio-cultural profiles disseminated in selected districts.** This target is dependent on the previous one being completed – thus it has not started yet. The guidelines that will accompany the model have been drafted, and both the model and the guidelines are expected to be distributed in January 2012. If an appropriate strategy for follow-up is not put in place (with the adequate resources), there is a significant risk that the model will not be leveraged in the future.

Source	Positive	Negative
Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>JP created a reference group for the integrated approach to planning with people from different sectors (government, civil society, university), which will probably continue to exist even after the JP ends.</li> <li>Bringing in Mozambican specialists improved receptivity in the districts and contributed positively to the degree of ownership of the district officials.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Historically strained relationship between UNESCO and MICULT has not been very helpful.</li> <li>The tools are not ready yet; more time is needed.</li> <li>Replication at national level is dependent on acceptance of the integrated approach by the MPD (Ministry of Planning and Development).</li> </ul>

# Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 2.1.3:



Source	Positive	Negative
	<ul> <li>Manuals and guides on how to use them are almost ready and can be used in replication.</li> <li>Integration of the results of 2.1.4 into 2.1.3 was very useful.</li> </ul>	
Focal points and Government officials at central level		
Focal points and Government officials at provincial and district level	<ul> <li>As a result of consultations with religious leaders, children that before wouldn't have attended school, now go to public school in the morning and have "madrasa" (Muslim school) in the afternoon – in the same building.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>More time is needed to really change attitudes and to fully apply the concept in district planning; JP of 3 years is too short.</li> </ul>
Implementers and beneficiaries	<ul> <li>Integration of culture, gender and human rights has been a very positive aspect.</li> <li>The manual was adapted to local circumstances and can now be used in other districts.</li> <li>"The training sessions were very helpful in terms of preparing us for the work in the districts".</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The problem-based and participatory approach doesn't go very well with the official approach of the ministry of planning and this will be an obstacle for other districts.</li> </ul>

The development and adaptation of the model to local reality has been a very positive learning experience for all who were involved in it. National experts have taken ownership of the process from the beginning, which contributed positively to its acceptance at district level. The piloting of the models in three different districts has been a very positive experience and the new methodology that incorporates an integrated approach with culture, gender and human rights has received very good response from district planners – who have been involved in the training activities from the beginning – interviewed by the evaluation team.

While these are early days, this approach has the potential of becoming an integrated part of district planning in the future. Although an MPD (Ministry of Planning and Development) focal point participated in the initial workshops, the involvement of MPD has been less then would have been desirable. As districts are obliged to make their yearly plans according to models developed by MPD, it is essential that the new approach receives support at provincial and central level from MPD.



# *Output 2.1.4: Socio-cultural practices, norms and beliefs taken into consideration in health programmes in the selected districts*

UNESCO and UNFPA led the output together with MISAU, MINED and MICULT.

#### **Evaluation of Indicators and Targets:**

The following table presents the indicators, baseline and targets for this output (based on UN, June 2010) as well as the evaluation results:

In diastan	Decelies T	Tourset			Evaluation	
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Level of Completion	Time	Impact	
Increase in the rate of coverage for clinical deliveries in the districts of Zavala and Mossuril	Zavala 32,96% Mossuril 44,62% Source: SIS 2009	TBD After finalizing the study	Current data does not exist to reflect the activities that took place in 2011. These data will be introduced in the final report	-	-	
Increase in the coverage rate of family planning in the districts of Zavala and Mossuril	Zavala 12,7% Mossuril 6,4% Source: SIS 2009 Ilha de Mozambique Consultations 2010: 1424 2009: 891 2008: 701 Mossuril Consultations 2010: 2941 2009: 1469 2008: 740 Zavala Consultations 2010: 2.412 2009: 1.382	TBD After finalizing the study	Current data does not exist to reflect the activities that took place in 2011. These data will be introduced in the final report.	-	-	
Socio-cultural aspects incorporated in the design and implementation of activities in Sexual and Reproductive Health activities, in selected districts	Socio-cultural aspects not adequately considered in plans and activities in the area of SRH at the district level	2011 - 3 districts incorporate socio-cultural aspects	100%	Later than planned	Manuals developed; leaders with changing behaviour; Agencies and Ministries changing approaches and forging partnerships.	

**Target – No target was specified.** Data is also not present in monitoring reports. Information missing to be able to evaluate the delivery on the basis of a concrete target.

**Target – No target was specified.** Data is also not present in monitoring reports. Information missing to be able to evaluate the delivery on the basis of a concrete target.

Target – (2011) 3 Districts incorporate socio-cultural aspects in the design and implementation of Sexual and Reproductive Health activities. The approach to incorporating these aspects began with an assessment of the socio-cultural element of SRH, conducted by KULA (and finalised in March 2010) for Zavala and Mossuril as well as Nhamatanda and Ribáuè districts. This study formed the basis for the application of the socio-cultural approach, by nature a highly participatory approach, whereby a team (composed of representatives of the formal education and health sectors, as well as local



leaders, traditional healers, traditional midwives and religious leaders) sets up a meeting in a school or community site to talk about problems related to sexuality. The team invites people to present their problems. This leads to an open discussion about all kinds of topics, which then form the basis for intervention. One of the overall objectives is to avoid conflicting messages from the formal sector and the traditional system (traditional leaders, healers and religious leaders) that often render interventions counterproductive.

A small taskforce was developed in each district where the results of the first phase were incorporated into an annual work plan for 2011. The process led to three improved, more culturally appropriate training manuals that can be used with non-literate people, developed on the basis of common problems found in the three districts that participated. One example of the positive result is that implementation of the learning is taking place in Mossuril, where a Muslim leader is incorporating the promotion of condom-use into his religious acumen.

Many of the discussions are ultimately linked to topics like family planning, women's rights and domestic violence, within the local cultural context in each of the three districts (Zavala, Ilha and Mossuril). It was considered important to provide better information about legal aspects such as the Family Law and the Law about Domestic Violence in each of the districts, so legal specialists were involved to provide the necessary information.

Source	Positive	Negative
Source Officials of UN Agencies	<ul> <li>Positive</li> <li>The JP showed that bringing together the cultural and the scientific helps to solve certain issues at community level.</li> <li>This is a good example of how culture can be used in Mozambique.</li> <li>Coordination between UNESCO and UNFPA was difficult in the beginning, but as it got better, it was very positive and became very productive.</li> <li>There were several opinions around this output that agencies with strong drivers were more successful in implementing their own activities.</li> <li>The methodology developed can be used in other districts.</li> <li>Activity will be replicated and scaled up.</li> <li>Donors have showed interest in applying this methodology elsewhere.</li> <li>UNFPA is planning to apply the same methodology in 30 other districts.</li> <li>Recognition of the socio-cultural approach has strengthened the position of those people in Government that were already convinced of the need to take culture into account.</li> <li>Involvement of law students certainly helped to bring the aspect of rights (women's rights, children's right) into the picture.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Negative</li> <li>The complexity of inter-agency cooperation was underestimated.</li> <li>Insofar as there is a conflict between tradition and rights (women's rights e.g.), there hasn't really been an attempt to find a methodology to deal with that.</li> <li>Planners at district level have not really been made more sensitive to this conflict.</li> <li>Not successful in being able to deliver to the level they had hoped. The support base for the issue of culture in development is still not considered high enough.</li> <li>Waited too long for the evaluation. Impression that an evaluation on the result of changing the behaviour of people should have happened sooner.</li> <li>General delay in getting this output planned and able to move to implementation stage was the real culprit in the level of impact it could have had within the JP period.</li> </ul>
Focal Points and Government officials at central level	<ul> <li>The JP made ministries (health and education) work together closely, which created much more openness and helped to create solutions based on a common understanding of the problems.</li> <li>This activity helped the Government to see culture as the key to community development.</li> <li>High level of "ownership" by the communities: they want the programme to extend into other neighbourhoods and villages.</li> <li>Manuals have been developed that can be used in other districts, but might need to be adapted to local circumstances.</li> <li>The socio-cultural approach will be part of health programs from now on.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Implementation started very late, which limited the impact.</li> <li>UN agencies (UNESCO, UNFPA) did not work well together and there were many delays in disbursements, which had a negative impact on motivation and created embarrassment in the communities and between the communities and focal points.</li> <li>The Agriculture sector should have been included in the output (because of nutritional aspects).</li> </ul>

#### Stakeholders' perceptions related to Output 2.1.4:



Source	Positive	Negative
Focus points and Government officials at provincial and district level	<ul> <li>Very good communication between formal and informal health sector.</li> <li>Local leaders (sheiks) are now promoting the use of condoms – something most would not appreciate prior to the JP.</li> <li>Owners of "video clubs" are now more careful in their programming to avoid exposing children to inappropriate material.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The formal health sector insisted during focus group discussions that it has not learnt anything from the informal health sector.</li> </ul>
Implementers and beneficiaries	<ul> <li>Traditional healers are no longer using the same knife or needle on different people.</li> <li>Traditional midwives changed their practices, now taking into consideration the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS through certain procedures.</li> <li>There is today more respect in the formal sector (health and education) for traditional healers as they now work together and have closer links.</li> <li>Radio programmes are very popular and have proven to be a successful way of reaching out to the local communities.</li> <li>Some local problems that contributed to teen pregnancies have been solved: e.g. in the case of Quissico there is no boarding school, so parents have little control over what their children do after classes. Now "guardian parents" support students from outside Quissico; local bars close now at 21h.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Radio programmes will not continue without payment – these payments have been made in the past by the JP and it is doubtful that the government will cover this cost in the future.</li> <li>While progress has been made, the SRH need more support from the Government: there are illegal discos, cinemas that are open until late and attract the youth. "We will approach the Government to ask them to resolve these issues."</li> </ul>

This output is almost unanimously considered the one representing the biggest success of the JP, based on both process and results. It might have created enough momentum to continue and spread to other districts – if the Health and Education authorities make financial means available. MISAU has arranged funds to print more of the manuals, and UNFPA and UNESCO have integrated the Lessons Learned from the output for 30 more districts for the next UNDAF.

At district level, the people who participated in this activity took ownership of it, and in the focus group discussions the evaluators conducted with them, they made it very clear that they were prepared and able to continue their activities in the community, in schools and through radio programs, after the Joint Programme comes to an end.

The output became paramount for UNFPA and the country in terms of understanding why so few people use condoms and how closely tied to culture the issue is, providing the answers to many questions that the agencies and MISAU were not aware of the root cause. There are deep-seated views why they are not being used and the lesson learned is that if a programme does not go under the surface of the causal analysis, then it will not be successful. UNESCO's role in bringing the socio-cultural approach to this issue has been fundamental.

The output is probably the best example of how the JP led to more collaboration between ministries (in this case Health and Education<sup>17</sup>), forging a partnership that will likely outlast the JP, as well as between UN agencies, with a strong partnership between UNFPA and UNESCO. This output also seems to be the best example of the JP in terms of planning, programming, participation and execution as should be expected in joint delivery. Beyond this, many of the stakeholders see this activity as the first approach to HIV/AIDS that really seems to work, and should therefore be leveraged for future activities around HIV/AIDS and SRH.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> According to an interviewed focal point, the focal points of culture and health only spoke twice during the duration of the JP.



At the end of the programme, UNFPA, UNESCO and UNDP worked together in the Zavala, Mossuril, and Ilha de Moçambique districts and used the learning for the district planning exercise (output 2.1.3). UNFPA and UNESCO successfully demonstrated to UNDP the importance of the integrated approach, demonstrating that there was a tangible offering in terms of using culture in planning. UNFPA has since incorporated the approach into the UNDAF for 2013 for 30 more districts.

While the socio-cultural approach has led to the inclusion of a more scientific understanding of HIV and AIDS and SRH issues in the traditional system, the opposite does not seem to have happened. The evaluators found no evidence of the inclusion of cultural aspects into the formal education and health systems and representatives of the formal health system that participated in focus group discussions were quite categorical that they had not learned anything from the informal health sector.



# **The Cultural Component Assessed**

# <u>Component 2: Intangible side: Ensuring the inclusion of social and cultural aspects in</u> <u>development policies and strategies.</u>

Outcome 2.1: Inclusion of socio-cultural aspects in development policies and strategies ensured.

#### **Expectation of findings for Component 2:**

2.1. An understanding of the terms 'culture', 'tradition', 'indigenous knowledge', leading to a clarity amongst development practitioners of the differences and their value (PMC, Focal Points)

2.2. An understanding of how local cultural knowledge/indigenous knowledge systems can be used to enhance development practices leading to people having a clear understanding of how to ensure that culture/tradition and indigenous knowledge contributes to development solutions (PMC, Focal Points, government services, traditional leaders).

2.3. Examples of how local cultural knowledge/indigenous knowledge has been used to enhance development practices (PMC, Focal Points, government services, traditional leaders).

2.4. Evidence of the integration of socio-cultural elements of development in the normal work of education, health, forestry etc. (PMC, Focal Points, government services).

2.5. A two-way recognition between traditional leaders, traditional systems and cultural norms and that of government delivery systems such as health, education, forestry, etc) of both their mutual benefits and programmes to ensure they work in a complementary manner (PMC, Focal Points, government services, traditional leaders).

The core area of work of Component 2 was implemented in rural areas, namely the Zavala District of the Inhambane Province, and Mossuril and Ilha in Nampula Province.

While the cultural evaluation expected to find an understanding of how local cultural knowledge/indigenous knowledge systems can be used to enhance development practices, the key finding was that the Joint Programme was used to overcome traditional practices that were at odds with the development of the community or had severe negative implications for the empowerment of women. The programme to educate and empower women in e.g. Family Law is a case in point where awareness raising programmes and laws to assist vulnerable and sexually abused women were used to override the oppression and silencing of women in very traditional communities. Hardly any examples were offered of traditional values and customs and norms that assisted the development practices of agencies such as health or education.

Very little evidence was found about mainstreaming gender, although the field work found a high level of community participation and ownership of interventions in most districts. Beneficiaries commented on the results of activities such as wood cutting and tree planting. Traditional knowledge in the management of forests was respected with added value about sustainability enhanced, due to the government restrictions placed on the quantity of wood cutting allowed.



# The table below represents Stakeholders' perceptions related the expected findings.

Expected finding	UN	GoM	Focus Group Participants	Traditional leaders
2.1. An understanding of the terms 'culture', 'tradition', indigenous knowledge 2.2. An	The traditional healers/midwives are now invited to attend deliveries in the clinics and more women are coming to the clinic to deliver. This means that the public health system benefitted by respecting the traditional system. As community members respect the traditional healers/midwives more than the formal health system, now health clinics have more women delivering at the clinics.	Clarity that local population had 'abandoned' traditional practices and had turned to modern equipment. Nevertheless, a belief that the community as a whole still did not recognise the value of these traditional practices and local culture: e.g. the bee hive community is not interested in planting as it takes too long and they believe that trees are given by God and are not convinced of the importance of reforestation or the planting of mwenje trees. Lack of willingness from key focal point to engage in discussion about culture or its meaning as this was not in this person's area. However it was acknowledged that new understanding of taboos and myths in SRH were learnt during the JP with new methodology to deal with these issues. One focal point highlighted the taboos regarding HIV/AIDS and the involvement of communities and local schools as the biggest success of the JP. One focal point highlighted the understanding of indigenous knowledge about the mwenje tree and its cultural importance for the timbila – 'heritage of humanity'. The enhanced relationship	Focus group participants working in the area of sexual and reproductive health had a limited understanding of the difference between local culture, tradition and indigenous knowledge. Participants believed that the joint programme benefitted the traditional healers, as they now understand issues of public health (importance of using new syringes per family member, basic hygiene). However, they did not believe that the increased awareness and knowledge of culture and tradition or their working relationship with traditional healers benefitted the methods and effectiveness of the public health system.	There was no clarity on the distinctions between tradition, indigenous knowledge and culture. In the conversations traditional leaders referred to both culture and tradition as if these are the same.
2.2. An understanding of how local cultural knowledge/indig enous knowledge systems can be used to enhance development practices.		between religious and traditional leaders is good for the SRH issues in education and health. The dialogue between the community, the agriculture and culture departments (and FAO) enhanced understanding of wood cutting and trees which are important for heritage.	their methods were working well and the JP's contribution was merely to legalise them, formalise them, provide a mechanism to sell wood in Maputo and also to place restrictions on their wood cutting. It appeared therefore that there was little knowledge gained about the developmental considerations about wood cutting. Clear that the JP, by bringing culture to the fore, benefitted the life	
2.3. Examples of how local cultural knowledge/ indigenous		An example given was the involvement of the whole community in SRH, rather than only the youth, to ensure that one message was delivered to	(well-being) of the communities. Improved communication with parents in the education system regarding SRH was cited although it is	In Inhambane, the respondents were unable to provide any example of how local cultural



Expected finding	UN	GoM	Focus Group Participants	Traditional leaders
knowledge has been used to enhance development practices		the youth without opposing views from parents and local leaders. A frustration about the lack of local indigenous knowledge about the quality of the soil in the Zavala district on the part of the JP. The mwenje does not grow well in this district – it would do well in Vilankulos.	not clear that this was about local cultural knowledge or new understanding about involving parents and whole communities in the education system. There is now a broader connection between education and health because of the JP. The wood cutting group cited the example of now consulting the local community about where they can cut wood and contacting the forestry inspector who controls the amount of wood cut. The income earned is banked and used for community projects. Noted the successful outcome of working with local cultural knowledge in SRH.	knowledge or indigenous knowledge would benefit development practices. No evidence of the integration of traditional systems into existing formal health/education systems. Different for forestry, where local knowledge was used to frame the JP programmes. In Nampula, an example given was that whereby before schools would join boys and girls for SRH education, now these classes are separated, as they are in the traditional system, whereby girls and boys learn separately and go through initiation rites separately.
2.4. Evidence of the integration of socio-cultural elements of development in the normal work of education, health, forestry, etc		The local and traditional leaders are now interested in working with government and the JP. The JP's socio-cultural methodology will now be applied to other districts as well, which is evidence of a positive outcome. The different departments worked well together with education leading (planted the seedlings and took responsibility for the nursery). Local government in Zavala was a reluctant participant with resistance to community development groups and their legalisation.	The positive outcome for SRH was the motivation and ability of the different sectors to work together, but this did not necessarily translate into the integration of socio- cultural elements into their normal work. While participants asserted that local knowledge was taken into consideration, no examples were given of what these may be. In fact, there was more evidence of how the JP assisted them to overcome traditional customs and norms to empower women through education around e.g. Family Law, which gave women a voice in the family in respect of educating their children and household decisions. The health sector now works with the traditional and religious leaders around SRH education. Evidence that moving away from speeches about HIV/AIDS to discussing traditional issues was the factor that got the community to listen.	Recognised the new learning about syringes and basic hygiene improved their offering a better service to the community. The traditional leaders have changed their procedures with their new knowledge about HIV/AIDs received through the JP.



Expected	UN	GoM	Focus Group Participants	Traditional leaders
finding				
2.5. A two way	The fact that a Muslim	The JP assisted in providing	This recognition was one	
recognition	leader is now promoting	information which will be useful	way – the JP assisted the	
between	the use of condom is a	to the new generation about	traditional healers to	
traditional	benefit to the formal	culture - from the planting of	understand basic health	
leaders,	health system which has	mwenje plants, to the curtailing	and hygiene which	
traditional	been trying to promote	of late evening activities and	improved their methods	
systems and	this for the prevention of	organising communities in	of healing. The Health,	
cultural norms	HIV & AIDS unsuccessfully	defence of local culture.	education system	
and that of	in the past.		appeared not to record	
government			any real benefits from	
delivery systems			working with a culturally	
such as health,			sensitive approach.	
education,			The forestry/ wood	
forestry etc.) of			cutters participants	
both their			believed that the JP	
mutual benefits			worked with them in the	
and			manner that they had	
programmes to			always worked (been	
ensure they			going since 2005) and	
work in a			respected their	
complementary			community values. The	
manner.			benefit of the JP was	
			unclear to all. They	
			reluctantly accepted the	
			restrictions on cutting	
			wood and seemed to be	
			indifferent to their new	
			legal status.	



## 6. Findings in the levels and criteria of analysis

The first part of this Chapter introduces the tool used for the collection of quantitative data. It gives a general overview of the findings and it explains why these results should be interpreted with some degree of caution. The second part presents, for each of the five criteria of analysis (relevance, ownership, efficiency, efficacy and sustainability) defined by the Terms of Reference, a brief analysis based not only on the answers to the questionnaire, but also on information gathered through interviews, focus group discussions and on existing documentation.

## 6.1. Analysis of the quantitative data collected

As explained in section 4.2 on methodology, a questionnaire was developed to collect information on what stakeholders think of different aspects of the JP.

There were two version of the questionnaire, a web-based version and a paper version. The web-based version had some open questions that were not included in the paper version. The reason for that is that all people that completed the paper questionnaire were subsequently interviewed, so these questions, if considered relevant, could be asked during the interview.

Common to both versions were a total of 52 closed<sup>18</sup> questions. Most of these had to be answered on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 indicates the lowest and 5 the highest degree of agreement with the question posed. In almost all cases a score of "1" means that the respondent has a very negative opinion on that aspect of the JP, while a score of "5" indicates a very positive opinion. For two questions (24 and 26), however, the scale was inverted, with a score of 5 being negative and a score of 1 positive. In all questions the respondent was also offered the option of answering "I don't know".

There were also four questions that only allow for a "yes" or "no" answer. These questions were "filters", in the sense that the subsequent question(s) were to be answered only by those who answered "yes" on the filter questions.

The relatively big number of closed questions in this questionnaire was supposed to have two different functions. On the one hand, these questions helped to steer the subsequent interview, as they indicate topics on which the respondents have a strong opinion (either positive or negative). The questions turned out to be really helpful in this respect, helping the interviewer in obtaining relevant background information. However, the follow-up questions in the interview also showed problems. When asked to explain the answer given to a certain question, it sometimes turned out that the respondent either had not understood the question correctly, or had given what seemed to be a random answer to a question about which he or she did not have the necessary information to be able to give a relevant answer.

The second function of the closed questions was to obtain a relatively large number of quantitative data that could be easily analysed. To this effect, 30 stakeholders completed the web-based version of the questionnaire, which can be found in Appendix 2A. Due to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> A closed question is one where the respondent has to choose from a limited number of predefined options.



connectivity problems in the provinces, the online questionnaire was mainly sent to respondents based in Maputo.


In total, 46 questionnaires were completed, either web-based or on paper. Unfortunately, one of them had to be invalidated because of incomplete information. Table 2 gives an overview of where the 45 remaining respondents are based and to which sector they belong. Of these 45 respondents, 29 (64%) were subsequently interviewed.

#### Table 2: Questionnaire respondents

		Location			
		Maputo	Inhambane	Nampula	Total
	Government	10	10	4	24
Sector	United Nations	15	1	3	19
	Civil Society	2	0	0	2
	Total	27	11	7	45

The average scores given on each of the questions as well as the number of people who answered the question is given in section 6.2. Graph 1 shows the average scores that were given on the questions<sup>19</sup> with a 1 to 5 scale (please refer to section 6.2 for the actual phrasing of each question).

#### Graph 1: Average scores by Province



The chart demonstrates that the resulting scores are generally on the high end of the scale. On most questions the average comes close to 4. Taken at face value, this seems to indicate a very high level of approval of the JP. However, for reasons explained in more detailed in Section 4.3 on the background of the evaluation and based on information gathered through interviews and focus group discussions, that is not necessarily the case, and the very high "approval rate" might actually reflect an unwillingness to criticize through the questionnaire or a lack of understanding of the question or at which level to apply it (especially if the respondent works at a certain output level and has little knowledge of other outputs). This suggests that all quantitative results should be interpreted with caution and that not much meaning can be attached to the absolute value of scores.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> No provincial averages are given for Questions 21, 22, 24, 26 and 35 as any comparison between provinces would be pointless because of the low number of respondents



The question that received, on average, the highest score is question 37 (*The intervention types (meetings, training, etc.) in which you participated were useful to your work?*), which indicates that, at a personal level, respondents found that the JP had been relevant and useful for them.

The question that received the lowest average score is question 49 (*Do the partners* (*Government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations*) have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the positive results produced throughout the programme?), which seems to be indicating a generalised preoccupation with the effect lack of funding might have on the sustainability of the programme's results.

There are drastic differences between the answers from Maputo, Inhambane and Nampula. Averages are highest in Inhambane and lowest in Maputo. Graph 2 represents the difference between the average score in Inhambane and in Maputo on each of the questions. It shows that answers in Inhambane are consistently much higher than in Maputo. The two questions for which the difference is negative, i.e. for which Inhambane gave a lower score than Maputo, are the ones which have an inverted scale (24 and 26). Again, this result should not be taken to indicate that respondents in Inhambane were much more positive about the programme than respondents in Maputo. Qualitative data from the interviews actually indicate a contrary position. This again suggests that quantitative results, especially from Inhambane, should be interpreted cautiously. The reasons that made respondents give higher scores in Inhambane are not necessarily indicative of a higher level of satisfaction with the aspects of the JP the questionnaire intended to measure.






Comparing the average scores on each question in Nampula and in Maputo, as in graph 3, there is a more balanced scoring. Although answers in Nampula, in general, are higher than in Maputo, they are much less so than in Inhambane. The same mechanisms that seem to be at work in Inhambane could also affect Nampula, but apparently to a lesser extent.

It might be interesting to analyse some cases that deviate from the above mentioned pattern. E.g. Inhambane on question 4 has an average of only 3,55 - one of its lowest results - almost as low as Maputo (*In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the M&E (Monitoring & Evaluation) of the Joint Programme?*). Coming from the province, that might be of some interest. Scores on question 28 (*To what extent have the target population had ownership of the programme, taking an active role in it?*) also are almost as low as in Maputo.




Graph 3: Differences in average scores between Nampula and Maputo



Question 6 (Has the participation of different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) added value to creating solutions in the development culture sector in the programme locations?) and 31 (To what extent are the partners (particularly non-governmental organizations) encouraged to seek resources to ensure sustainability of the Programme's results?) are among the lowest in Nampula, much lower than in Maputo and Inhambane.

On the other hand, Nampula scores much higher than Maputo on question 41 (*To what* extent did the Joint Programme help to increase dialogue between the stakeholders and/or in the involvement on issues regarding development policies?) and 42 (*Did the Joint* Programme have impact (in medium or long term) on the government's working methods?).

Comparing the answers given by people from the different sectors, the two respondents from Civil Society Organisations will be left out, because their number is too low to make any sensible comparison. Graph 4 gives an overview of the answers given by the remaining 43 respondents to all the questions on a 1 to 5 scale.



Graph 4: Average scores by Sector


As is apparent form the graph, on almost all the questions the average scores by respondents from the Government are much higher than the ones by respondents from UN agencies. There are only two exceptions to this rule: Government respondents give lower scores than UN respondents on questions 5 (*In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the Joint Programme design re-*




formulation in 2010?) and 51 (To what extent can the Joint Programme be replicated or extended at the local level?).

Graph 5, representing the difference between the average score for Government and for UN respondents on each of the questions, makes this even clearer.

Graph 5: Differences in average scores between Government and UN respondents



To determine whether this difference is mainly a reflection of the fact that the percentage of Government respondents in Inhambane and Nampula is higher than in Maputo, differences between averages for Government and for UN respondents were calculated for the Maputo respondents only. Graph 6 shows that even in Maputo Government has a higher assessment than UN on almost all questions, albeit there are more exceptions to the rule. UN scores are higher than Government not only on Question 5 and 51, but also on questions 3 and 39 and, to a lesser extent, 28 e 11.




Graph 6: Differences in average scores between Government and UN in Maputo

The information gathered in interviews certainly reinforces the impression that Government respondents, in general, had a *less positive* appreciation of the JP than UN respondents. The fact that the answers given by Government respondents are actually higher than the ones given by UN respondents could reflect the fact that many did not want to spend much time on an evaluation about a Programme to which they do not feel a strong linkage. Another factor contributing to the higher scores might be that the culture of never criticizing very harshly is more entrenched between Government officials than between UN officials, many of whom are foreigners.

Four questions in the questionnaire were simple yes/no questions. The number of respondents who answered "yes" to each of these questions can be found in the table in



section 6.2. Questions 20 and 34 asked if respondents are familiar with the concept of "Delivering as one" and with the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Out of 45 respondents, 32 said they know the concept "Delivering as One" and 24 know the Paris Declaration. Graph 7 below shows the distribution of the answers in the different provinces.



Graph 7: Percentages of respondents familiar with certain concepts

"Delivering as One" is known by all respondents from the UN agencies, but by only 11 (46%) of the Government respondents. The Principles of the Paris Declaration are known by 14 (74%) of UN respondents but by only 9 (38%) of the Government respondents.

### 6.2. Criteria of Analysis

The tables in this section organize the 52 closed questions from the questionnaire that required a yes/no answer or an answer on a 1 to 5 scale, that respond to the five key criteria of evaluation required by the Terms of Reference for this Evaluation. The question, its mean and number of respondents per question are provided, as well as the overall mean for each of the criteria.

In addition, each criterion is analysed with respect to the answers given in the questionnaire responses, through the interviews and focus group discussions and an overall impression based on the field visits and document analysis. The analysis draws inference from specific outputs, but attempts to respond directly to the requirements for evaluating the programme against the background of these overarching criteria.

#### Relevance

"Relevance" is defined in the Terms of Reference of this Evaluation as "The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.<sup>20</sup>

Despite Mozambique's rich cultural heritage, in 2008, at the start of the JP, a significant amount of its stakeholders had not only a very limited fundamental understanding of what the concept of culture entails, but in particular little awareness of its potential as a strong

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> MDG-F (August 2011b) p. 3.



contributor to the country's economy. At the time of the final evaluation of the JP however, it can be confirmed that the above description is less true in the intervention areas. The evaluation team has heard from all interviewed sectors, ranging from top government officials to final beneficiaries how the JP has helped them understand how vast the concept of culture is. Having in the past understood culture as "singing and dancing", in particular government officials now understand that culture embraces a wide spectrum of elements that, if put into action, can bring about enormous benefits to the Mozambican economy. In particular, the JP's committed effort for creative industries to be taken seriously as a sector that can stimulate innovation, create jobs, improve income levels, raise living standards and provide a boost to the country's GNP has succeeded, as evidenced by government officials recognizing during interviews that this sector has largely been ignored in the past but now urgently needs concrete policies and strategies in order to maximize its potential.

#	Question	Mean score	N	Mean of means
1	In your opinion, to what point did the Joint Programme contribute to resolving the needs (in your sector)?	3,86	43	
2	In your opinion, to what point did joining the creative industries issue with the socio-cultural development aspects in a single programme succeed?	3,65	43	
3	In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the Joint Programme implementation?	4,09	45	
4	In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the M&E (Monitoring & Evaluation) of the Joint Programme?	3,60	43	
5	In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the Joint Programme design re-formulation in 2010?	3,98	40	
6	Has the participation of different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) added value to creating solutions in the development culture sector in the program locations?	4,18	45	3,83
7	Was the M&E strategy useful?	3,69	39	
8	Was the M&E instrument easy to use?	3,54	39	
9	Did the M&E strategy indeed help to measure the Joint Programme results?	3,64	39	
10	How well do you know the C&A (Communication and Advocacy) strategy of the Joint Programme?	3,51	37	
11	Was the C&A strategy useful?	4,11	27	
12	Did the Joint Programme review in 2010 effect the necessary changes to the program?	4,08	39	

As mentioned above, at the beginning of the JP, the GoM lacked capacity and experience in order to realize its needs in terms of how to make use of its cultural heritage and creative industries. So, while it cannot be said that the JP's objective of promoting culture as an instrument initially fitted in with cultural sector needs of the country (as these were not yet identified), it does today fully fit in with the government's general objective of raising living standards and reducing poverty in Mozambique.

The real added value of the JP is arguably its contribution in creating awareness of a "new instrument" that, if designed and implemented correctly, can assist the government in more rapidly reaching its primary objective of improving the living standards of its citizens.

The JP has tried to "attack" culture on two fronts simultaneously - culture as a potential driver for economic growth (main goal of Component 1) and the inclusion of culture in development policies and strategies (main goal of Component 2). Both components have coexisted throughout the JP, but no evidence has been found that one has benefited from the other. Most people the evaluators talked to were not really aware of this two-pronged approach, but those who were did not feel that any value had been added by combining the two in one Programme.



In general, most respondents gave as their opinion that Government, UN Agencies and Civil Society have worked together in the implementation of the JP. However, this conviction is substantially stronger on the UN than on the Government side.

Did they also work well together on Monitoring and Evaluation? Here opinions are much more sceptical, and they are particularly negative in Inhambane province. Although one of the main roles attributed to Government focal points was data gathering for Monitoring and Evaluation, no proper instruments for the collection of data for M&E have been developed and used, maybe as a result of the fact that the programme did not have an M&E specialist for most of its lifetime. Focal points also complained that they were never specifically trained for their monitoring task.

Almost none of the people who are now involved in the JP actively participated in the initial formulation of the project, but a much larger number has been involved in the reformulation that followed the mid-term evaluation in 2010. Most respondents are of the opinion that the different sectors (Government, UN and Civil Society) worked together on this re-design of the Programme, but it is worrying that the Government respondents are much less positive about this than the UN respondents. Fortunately, all stakeholders seem to agree that the reformulation actually effected the changes that were necessary. They also agree that the reformulation has been implemented. The vast majority is of the opinion that the participation of different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) has added value to creating solutions for culture-for-development. Respondents in Nampula, though, seem to be relatively less convinced of this.

The Monitoring and Evaluation strategy is well known only by a part of the respondents and those who know it are not very positive about its usefulness.

A communications and advocacy specialist did not come on board the JP until this year, so it doesn't come as a surprise that the JP's C&A strategy is little known; but it is positively appreciated by those who consider themselves familiar with it.

#### Ownership

## "Ownership in the process" is defined in the Terms of Reference as: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions<sup>21</sup>

The very methodological philosophy of a Joint Programme, joining multiple institutions across several sectors to jointly work towards specific objectives, is already in itself a highly ambitious undertaking for any programme in any country. Attempting this in a country with a weak culture of inter-ministerial and cross–sectoral cooperation is an even greater challenge. From the outset, the JP was thus bound to encounter stern challenges.

Regrettably, this also proved to be the case. Judging from interviews with outcome leads and focal points of the JP, the overall level of Government ownership of the JP has arguably been one of its greatest weaknesses. For some, the lack of ownership by Government representatives is because they don't see the value of the JP in terms of their own objectives; it is the consequence of the Government not having been involved sufficiently

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> MDG-F (August 2011b) p. 4.



right from the beginning, i.e. from the formulation of the Programme, of not including in the JP some of the Government's priorities in the cultural sector and of not explaining clearly from the start what roles and responsibilities the JP expected of its focal points. Almost all interviewed focal points expressed candidly to the evaluation team that there existed a very poor understanding on a personal level regarding what their role actually was, even as late as two years after the start of the JP.

Outcome leads were established in late 2010 and installed in early 2011, in response to a recommendation in the mid-term evaluation. Although TORs for the role existed and were divulged, outcome leads remained unclear about their roles and expectations and unable to translate these into concrete management activities. As a result, this did not improve the ownership and leadership in the coordination structure on the part of the Government, as was expected

Being government officials, the normal praxis is to receive funds and implement activities. However, this was not the case with the JP. Focal points at central level neither saw funds (as these were, according to them, channelled directly to province and district level or to the implementers/beneficiaries) nor were they involved in the implementation of activities. While focal points gradually understood the importance of culture through capacity building workshops during the initial stages of the JP, not understanding their role resulted in focal points quickly becoming disillusioned and losing motivation to participate and take an active involvement in the Programme.

For others, the lack of ownership is a symptom of low political will on the Government's part to give culture the priority it needs, compounded, maybe, with an expectation of personal gain on the part of the focal points. Although there have been discussions regarding this topic during coordination meetings and attempts to clarify expectations, these have simply resulted in a majority of focal points today understanding their role as "attending meetings when called and reading monitoring reports of activities most of us are not involved in". Lack of ownership on the part of the Government has resulted, in some cases, in focal points not participating in the trainings or other activities and at times they actually contributed negatively towards certain activities. One example cited is the unwillingness of the municipal Government of Nampula to establish a craft fair in a more appropriate location.

#	Question	Mean score	N	Mean of means
28	To what extent has the target population had ownership of the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)	3,93	44	
29	To what extent have the traditional authorities had ownership the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)	3,68	40	3,75
30	To what extent have the local authorities had ownership in the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)	3,85	41	
31	To what extent are the partners (particularly non-governmental organizations) encouraged to seek resources to ensure sustainability of the program's results?	3,49	37	

Clearly, the JP failed to secure a critical success factor in its initial phase: securing ownership on the part of the government through its key focal points, not only in Maputo but also at provincial level. The PMC of Maputo City, while initially reasonably organized and motivated, has only had only one meeting in 2011 and, in the words of one respondent, the committee



is "breaking down" as a unit. In 2010, there were 5 meetings with UN (no meetings without UN), more or less once every 2 months.

As far as ownership of the JP by the target population is concerned, the picture is mixed, with some of the beneficiaries really taking an active part in the programme, as e.g. in the case of the people involved in the activities around sexual and reproductive health, while others cannot really be bothered to get actually involved, as e.g. in the case of certain communities that cannot be convinced to plant mwenje trees. Respondents in Inhambane province were relatively less positive about the ownership by the target population than respondents in Maputo and Nampula.

The ownership of the JP by traditional authorities, in general, is considered low by the respondents, but it is not clear what the reason might be, as traditional authorities were not really involved in most of the outputs of the JP. Where they were, their involvement tended to be positive.

As for the local authorities, their ownership of the JP is, in general, assessed positively by the respondents. That opinion coincides with the impression the evaluators got in the field, that local authorities, especially in Nampula, became actively involved in the JP and adopted it as their own to a much higher degree than happened at central level.

Little has been done in the course of the JP to encourage partners to find alternative resources to ensure the sustainability of the program's results. This seems to be one of the aspects that simply has not received enough attention during implementation.

To conclude, the poor ownership reported above strongly undermines the continuation and sustainability of the work of the JP in the future.

#### Efficiency

## "Efficiency" is defined in the Terms of Reference of this Evaluation as the extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results.<sup>22</sup>

In order to function efficiently, JPs fundamentally require its multiple stakeholders to not only assume active engagement but also promote excellent coordination between themselves in order to jointly work towards achieving the defined results – in other words, that the stakeholders do not simply rely on the coordinating agency but instead take ownership of the programme and its activities. With ownership running low on the part of the Government, the implications on the level of efficiency were several.

- 1. One of the goals of the JP was to stimulate inter-ministerial communication and coordination. For this, a budget was provided in order for focal points to be able to organise monthly meetings between themselves without involvement of UN agencies. However, these meetings rarely happened, due to focal points not seeing the value of attending nor preparing for these meetings. As a result, the focal points, when present, were regularly unprepared at the three-monthly PMC meetings arranged by UNESCO and thus were not able to contribute much to these meetings.
- 2. Implementers as well as beneficiaries voiced strong concerns regarding the level of commitment and willingness to cooperate on the part of government officials

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> MDG-F (August 2011b) p. 4.



concerning activities related to the JP. While focal points of the JP inside government institutions could have potentially "opened doors" and facilitated JP activities that require government intervention, this has not been the case, thus causing delays to JP activities.

3. Due to the lack of commitment to the JP in general, reports requiring for example feedback from government institutions have taken longer than expected to return as government officials prefer to prioritize internal tasks given to them by their government superiors. In the context of Mozambique, it is imperative for ambitious programmes such as the JP to receive the political good-will and active support of high-level government officials in order to ensure that the programme is prioritized within the government by respective ministry personnel. Judging from interviews with governmental focal points, there is evidently little support for JP activities from a higher political level. Processes have thus moved very slowly, resulting in long delays.

#	Question	Mean score	N	Mean of means
13	In terms of the Joint Programme management model did the PMC (Programme Management Committee) work efficiently?	3,74	42	
14	In terms of the Joint Programme management model: In the output (specific outcome) in which you were involved, was the coordination between the leader of the specific outcome of the UN and the Ministry was effective?	3,76	42	
15	To what extent was the information flow and communication in the Joint Programme effective?	3,84	44	
16	To what extent the combined intervention of various UN agencies in a single program was more efficient in management and administration terms (compared to what could have been done through an intervention of a single agency or ministry)?	3,77	43	
18	The combined intervention of various ministries and UN agencies on the same output was more efficient?	3,98	43	
19	To what extent did the National Steering Committee contribute to the Joint Programme efficiency and effectiveness?	3,64	33	3,63
20	Do you know the concept <i>Delivering as One</i> ?	yes:	32	
21	Did the implementing partners use working methods that increase the efficiency in Delivering as One?	3,74	31	
22	Did the implementing partners use financial instruments that have increased efficiency in Delivering as One?	3,10	29	
23	Have you encountered Administrative obstacles?	yes:	29	
24	If yes, to what point has this affected the Joint Programme efficiency? 3,15 27		27	]
25	Have you encountered Financial obstacles? yes: 23		]	
26	If yes, to what point has this affected the Joint Programme efficiency?	3,04	23	]
27	To what point have the proposed recommendations of the mid-term evaluation been implemented by the Joint Programme?	3,91	34	

A further aspect that has affected efficiency negatively within the JP is the coordination between UN agencies themselves. The fact that different UN agencies pursue vastly different goals and objectives implies that they also have different work methodologies. While agencies such as UNHCR, that deal with so called "saving" activities, are obliged to think predominantly short-term and focus on immediate actions, agencies such as UNESCO work very differently, predominantly striving towards long terms goals such as achieving policy change, capacitating stakeholders and raising awareness. This divergence in work methodology has naturally resulted in a certain level of miscommunication and differences in expectations, e.g. amount of monitoring and report writing.

However, while some representatives of UN agencies clearly expressed a certain level of frustration regarding this problem, it was simultaneously made clear that this is not a



particular agency's fault, but simply a working culture conflict that should be seen as an opportunity to learn from each other. Overall, agencies see the potential value of the approach of inter-agency cooperation and confirmed a willingness to continue with this approach – albeit conceding that reducing the number of agencies involved would make for easier inter-agency cooperation and more efficiency.

Across the board, efficiency is seen as one of the JP's weaker points. Many of the people the evaluators spoke with were convinced that many of the positive results of the JP could have been attained through smaller projects, involving fewer organisations. Administrative and financial obstacles are seen by many as a major stumble block to efficiency.

One factor that impacted negatively on efficiency was the delay in the very beginning of the programme. It took eight months for the coordinator in the lead agency to be appointed and for most of the coordination structures to be set up. It might be argued that there were insufficient human resources in place to deal with such a large and complex programme.

The National Steering Committee, which is supposed to give "strategic guidance, oversight and coordination" (MDG-F Secretariat, February 2011, p. 6) to all three Joint Programmes the MDG-F is financing in Mozambique, has not lived up to expectations. The NSC is almost completely unknown by our respondents and those who know it do not think is has contributed much to efficiency. In the words of some of our interviewees, the NSC has been "virtually non-existent".

The Programme Management Committee's role is also not evaluated very positively by most of the people the evaluators spoke to. In part, that reflects the lack of ownership of the government representatives in the PMC. As for the cooperation between the UN and the Government output leads, the evaluation is also not very positive. Opinions are a little bit more positive about the information flow within the JP, although the evaluators heard many complaints about reports arriving late, and being translated late or not at all. Collaboration between different ministries is appreciated more positively by most of our respondents and is considered to have contributed positively to effectiveness and efficiency. Collaboration between UN agencies and ministries also contributed positively to efficiency, but to a lesser degree.

Most of our interviewees had a very negative opinion about "Delivering as One" on the side of UN agencies. The evaluators heard many examples of agencies working together on the same *output* but still demanding reporting to be done each following its own model and following completely different administrative and financial procedures, causing long delays in the reception of funds, for example. This opinion is very different from what we heard from some UN leads, which are of the opinion that the agencies – despite many difficulties – have actually managed to operate as one in some of the outputs. A more detailed analysis of this aspect can be found in section 7.3



#### Effectiveness

## Effectiveness is defined in the Terms of Reference as the extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.<sup>23</sup>

While efficiency is generally considered one of the JP's weaker points, its effectiveness, on the other hand, is rated positively by the vast majority of our respondents. This seems to indicate that, in the eyes of most stakeholders, despite whatever might have gone wrong in the JP, it has at least delivered. It is, however, very difficult for the evaluators to judge the quality and impact of the results, due to the fact that many of the expected results of the JP had not been implemented by September 2011 as planned. However, despite not having been implemented for long, the evaluation team considers certain results to show very strong promise of being able to have a positive and valuable impact on their respective target groups.

#	Question	Mean score	N	Mean of means
17	Regarding the known outputs that you are aware: The combined intervention of various ministries in the same output was more effective (compared to what could have been done through an intervention of a single ministry)?	4,18	39	
32	To what extent are the results of the Joint Programme aligned with the Millennium Development Goals?	4,40	45	
33	To what extent has the Joint Programme contributed to the established objectives of the MDG-F thematic window "culture and development"?	4,28	39	
34	Do you know the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?	yes:	24	
35	To what extent did the Joint Programme (policy, budgets, design and implementation) contribute to improve the implementation of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?	3,88	24	
36	In your opinion, did the Joint Programme achieve the expected impact on beneficiaries?	3,72	43	
37	The intervention types (meetings, training, etc.) in which you participated were useful to your work?	4,46	39	4,03
38	The output (specific outcome) in which you were involved contributed to gender equality?	4,05	39	
39	The output in which you were involved, helped to reduce the imbalance between urban and rural areas?	3,42	38	
40	To what extent did the Joint Programme contribute to the implementation of the National Development Plans, Policies and UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework)?	4,08	39	
41	To what extent did the Joint Programme help to increase dialogue between the stakeholders and/or in the involvement on issues regarding development policies?	4,02	42	
42	Did the Joint Programme have impact (in medium or long term) on the government's working methods?	3,79	43	
43	Did the Joint Programme have impact (in medium or long term) on the government's perspective of the role of culture in development?	3,95	41	

In terms of achieving results, a critical aspect raised by several focal points was that collaboration between different sectors has a greater potential to show impact where there exists natural linkages between the different sectors in regard to the challenge faced. An excellent example of this is the SRH output where three sectors (health, education and culture) combined their expertise and experience in order to create a holistic approach towards a common challenge – promoting good behavioural practices within SRH. Communities could thus no longer disregard information as coming from "foreign agents" as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> MDG-F (August 2011b) p. 5.



the teams of activists consisted of community leaders, representing every single sector of the community, and could thus promote a common message.

From a human resource perspective there are two key factors that have had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the JP.

- 1. The UNESCO lead for JP activities simultaneously carried the role of JP overall coordinator. It is unrealistic to assume that the lead of the UN agency that is responsible for all JP coordination can at the same time be responsible for overseeing and monitoring all JP activities. Overworked key personnel will always have a negative impact on the effectiveness of any programme especially if this person is the programme manager and expected to provide guidance and leadership to the rest of the JP team. Spending too much time on monitoring and meetings also removes time from the programme manager to deal with soft issues such as networking and "selling" the programme to key stakeholders that can potentially provide a push for the JP.
- 2. The JP has experienced a high level of staff turnover within both UN agencies as well as government institutions. As a fundamental part of the JP consists of focal points who have to be aware of the cultural issues linked to the JP's objectives, a substantial amount of time and funds has been spent on providing capacity building for these focal points. Losing trained staff in return for untrained staff is a trade-off that naturally has negative implications for the overall effectiveness of the JP.

Multiple government and UN agencies identified the need to converge the beneficiaries over several outputs. Although the activities took place in the same geographic areas, it was rare to have beneficiaries taking part in more than one output at a time. This led to lack of synergies among the implementing agencies and ministries, the sharing of resources took place due to the common location (cars, funds), but the leads rarely worked with one another as they were dealing with beneficiaries that were not involved in the same activities.

At a personal level, the vast majority of people involved in the JP found that its interventions (workshops, training sessions, meetings, etc.) had been relevant and useful for them, which in itself is a very important result. If asked if the Joint Programme achieved the expected impact on beneficiaries, answers were usually much less enthusiastic.

To the question if the results of the JP are aligned with the MDG, the answer was almost unanimously very positive. This is also what transpires from the JP's monitoring reports. A little less outspoken, but still generally positive, was the opinion on the question if the JP had contributed to the implementation of the National Development Plans and Policies and to the UNDAF. More on the JP's contribution to UNDAF can be found in section 7.1.

The MDG-F, in its thematic window on culture and development, aims to promote social and cultural inclusion, and facilitate political participation and the protection of rights; it seeks to support efforts to promote cultural and creative industries and to generate the data and information necessary for the effective formulation and monitoring of policies on diversity, culture and development. As argued in a more detailed way in section 7.2, the JP has contributed positively to two of the three goals.



The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action are not very well known, even among respondents who work for a UN agency. Those who are familiar with them expressed some doubts if the JP actually contributed to their implementation.

Respondents, in general, were positive about the way the JP addressed gender inequality, but less so about the degree to which it helped to reduce the urban/rural imbalance. It must be said that redressing the imbalance between rural and urban areas was not an explicit goal of this JP, so if it contributed to it at all, it must have been indirectly.

The general perception of respondents is that the JP increased the dialogue between stakeholders and that the JP will have an impact (in the medium or long term) on the government's perspective of the role of culture in development. As for the JP's impact on the government's working methods, feelings were mixed, but it should be noted that most respondents in Nampula were very positive.

#### Sustainability

## "Sustainability" is defined by the Terms of Reference of this Evaluation as the probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term<sup>24</sup>.

#	Question	Mean score	N	Mean of means
44	The decisions taken by the Joint Programme coordinating body ensured the sustainability of the Joint Programme results?	3,60	40	
45	The decisions taken by the Joint Programme implementing partners ensured the sustainability of the Joint Programme results?	3,76	41	
46	To what extent did the national institutions participate and contribute to the Joint Programme?	3,93	45	
47	Do those institutions have the technical ability to continue to work with the program?	3,60	45	
48	Do those institutions have the commitment and leadership to continue the program approaches, methodologies and strategies?	3,55	42	2.67
49	Do the partners (government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations) have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the positive results produced through-out the program?	2,78	37	3,67
50	Have the partners (government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations) developed new skills and/or products to maintain the positive results produced by the program?	3,80	41	
51	To what extent can the Joint Programme be replicated or extended at the local level?	4,00	42	
52	To what extent can the Joint Programme be replicated or extended at the national level?	3,95	38	

The sustainability of the JP can be evaluated in three aspects:

 Whether the government and its partner institutions are genuinely interested in continuing the work commenced under the JP: For a government that is being introduced to new work philosophies, approaches and methodologies, the interviewees largely agreed that the fundamental concept here is "seeing is believing" – in order to accept and adopt new approaches and strategies that differ from current praxis, the stakeholders need to first see the positive effects before they are able to fully understand the benefits. It was clear that focal points involved

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> MDG-F (August 2011b) p. 5.



in successful outputs were in general more positive towards ideas put forth by the JP in comparison with focal points who were involved in less successful outputs. For example, focal points involved in the SRH output showed during interviews real enthusiasm over having finally found a methodology that immediately showed very positive results in relation to a problem they have unsuccessfully battled with for a long time. Seeing the importance of cultural values and cultural leadership put in practice has given them a success case that they are extremely keen to replicate on a national level. However, considering that many of the outputs have yet to show any sort of impact, it is at this stage difficult to evaluate in general the probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.

- 2. Whether the partners of the JP have developed the technical capacity required to continue the work of the JP in order to maximize its potential impact: Naturally, the answers differed according to the success of the output in which the interviewees where involved, but in general there are still significant gaps that need attention. Across many of the different outputs, focal points and beneficiaries spoke of good quality but insufficient amount of trainings with a lack of continuous follow-up. There is a perception amongst artisans that trainings were often given by a foreign consultant about a relatively complex topic with little follow-up. In order to truly build up capacity, many of the focal points suggested using cheaper local consultants who are then able to provide follow-up workshops.
- 3. Whether there exists financial capacity to continue the activities initiated during the JP: There is consensus here that the GoM lacks the financial ability to fund the JP activities after the end of the JP. According to the focal points, the vast majority of the JP activities are at considerable risk of being abandoned once the JP ends.

Respondents in general were neither very negative, nor very positive about the sustainability of the JP. They had their doubts if decisions taken by the Joint Programme implementing partners ensured the sustainability of the Joint Programme results and even more in relation to decisions taken by the JP coordination.

Although, in general, respondents are of the opinion that national institutions have participated in and contributed to the Joint Programme, doubts persist about if they have the technical ability to continue the Programme's work and even more about if those institutions have the commitment and leadership to continue the program approaches, methodologies and strategies.

The biggest worry among all stakeholders, however, is of a financial character. The majority of interviewees are afraid that the partners (government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations) will not have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the results produced by the programme. Respondents are much more positive about partners having developed new skills and/or products to maintain the positive results produced by the program.

Perhaps surprisingly after having shown serious doubts about the future of the JP's results, especially for financial reasons, people are, in general, very optimistic about the extent to which it will be possible to replicate or extend the Joint Programme at the local and the national level.

Finally, it is worth once again mentioning the critical importance of ownership as a crucial element directly affecting the future sustainability of the positive results accomplished



during the JP. Without the conviction of key political figures, the activities of the JP stand little chance of being given the necessary resources to continue.

## 7. The JP's contribution to the UNDAF, the MDG-F thematic window on Culture and Development and "Delivering as One"

# 7.1. JP contribution and alignment in relation to the Extension of the UN Development Assistance Framework in Mozambique 2010-2011

The JP was initially designed under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Mozambique (UNDAF) 2007-2009 and intended to contribute to Outcomes 1 and 4. In August 2009, the UNDAF was extended for another two years. Since the JP was reformulated in June 2010 (after the Extension was signed) and assuming that: a) this evaluation is mostly based on the reformulated programme and b) the extended UNDAF incorporates all the Outcomes of the initial one, this analysis is based on the text of the Extension of the UNDAF 2010-2011 (UN, August 2009).

The matrix below aims to provide an overview of the contribution and alignment of the JP to Pillars 1 and 4 of the Extension of the UNDAF (2010-2011), with regards to relevant outcomes and their specific and relevant goals / indicators (or main results).

Relevant UNDAF	Relevant Goals /	JP's Contribution
outcomes for JP	Indicators or Main Results	
1.1 Capacity of the	11 Provinces and at least	The JP has contributed to this goal / indicator through Output
decentralised	50 district plans integrate	2.1.3: "Model for socio-cultural profiles developed and
Government enhanced in	fully the cross-cutting	disseminated for use in the elaboration of district development
all the provinces, at least	issues with resources	plans better adapted to the local context". A model developed by
50 districts and at least 3	allocated, especially	specialists from various institutions (including ARPAC, UEM, and
municipalities, for	HIV/AIDS, gender, disaster	relevant stakeholders of the JP) provides an integrated approach
participatory	management, food	for applying culture, gender and human rights to district
development and	security, environment,	development planning. The model was piloted in 2011 in 3
planning, monitoring and	information technology	districts (Mossuril and Ilha de Moçambique in Nampula and
evaluation sensitive to	and communication and	Zavala district in Inhambane). The model has received positive
gender, evaluation of	culture (at least 2 districts	feedback at district level and it is hoped that the integrated
gender sensitive needs as	and 2 provinces).	approach can be fully integrated in district planning from 2012
well as coordination and		onwards.
partnerships.		
1.2 Improved capacity of	At least 11 cultural	The JP has strived to contribute towards this goal/indicator, and
the government to	institutions empowered to	has done so, not only by providing various capacity building
provide basic services at	provide cultural services	trainings to institutions such as MICULT, but also, most notably,
provincial, district and	and products.	by stimulating the creation of the National Directorate for the
municipal levels.		Promotion of Cultural Industries. At MICULT, capacity building
		trainings were extensive to a number of Directorates and
		Departments (DNPIC, ITS Department, and other). The JP has also
		contributed to this outcome by providing capacity building
		trainings to staff of Provincial Directorates of (Education and)
		Culture (in Inhambane and in Nampula), staff at District and
		Municipal levels and also cultural associations such as SOMAS,
		thus succeeding in empowering 11 cultural institutions.
1.3 Strengthening the	Culture national policy	The JP contributed to this goal/indicator as it supported the
capacities of	elaborated and approved.	elaboration of the Policy and Strategy for Cultural and Creative
management,		Industries. Although this Policy and Strategy is not yet approved
harmonisation and		by MICULT, this is an important tool for the newly created
alignment of policies at		National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries. This
national level downstream		Policy and Strategy will certainly contribute to a future "Culture

#### Pillar 1 – Governance



Relevant UNDAF outcomes for JP	Relevant Goals / Indicators or Main Results	JP's Contribution
and upstream.		national policy".
<b>1.6</b> The organisations and structures of the civil society () strengthened and involved in the development agenda at national and decentralised level	<b>1.6.2.</b> Capacity enhanced of the civil society organisations, CBOs, volunteer organisations () to build partnerships and to take true development agents.	The JP has contributed towards this main result through various capacity building trainings of various associations and CBOs, e.g. institutional and technical assistance to CEDARTE, support to ASARUNA in establishing and managing their Wood Bank, support to groups linked to cultural tourism in Inhambane and Ilha de Moçambique and "training of trainers" in order to strengthen craft associations and artisans (almost 400 artisans have received training through the JP). The JP has also, in particular, aimed to strengthen CBOs led by women, such as the <i>mussiro</i> producing CBOs in Mossuril.

#### *Pillar 4 – Economic Development*

Relevant UNDAF outcomes for JP	Relevant Goals / Indicators or Main Results	JP's Contribution
<b>4.2</b> Improved productivity and availability of food and the consumption goods, the management of natural resources and the valorisation of cultural and environmental issues in development.	4.2.4. Local economic development supported through activities promot- ing cultural tourism in the provinces of Nampula, Inhambane and Maputo City (and the respective indicator "Some local governments, communi- ties, and of SMEs, empow- ered in cultural tourism management (Baseline: 0 in 2008; Target: 50 in 2011)")	This main result (and its indicator) is directly covered by JP's output 1.2.4 "Improved tourist access to high-potential cultural assets". A model for a cultural tour was developed through a participatory process in Inhambane and Ilha de Moçambique, in a process that started in the first phase of the JP with the mapping of cultural assets and a study on the demand and supply for cultural tourism. The results of these studies were applied in the development of training materials that were used in training sessions with representatives of central and local government in Maputo, Inhambane and Nampula on the concept of cultural tourism. Four specific cultural tours have since then been designed and piloted in Inhambane and Ilha de Moçambique, incorporating several providers and community-based cultural entrepreneurs.
<b>4.3</b> Economic growth strengthened by the promotion of employment, local industries, access to markets, trade, services of finances and local infra- structures	4.3.2. Assisted transition of businesses from informal to formal sector, enhancing the capacity to solve the constraints from the side of offer, quality certification and capacity of testing the products destined to internal and external markets	The JP strived to create awareness regarding the potential of creative industries as a strong contributor towards the national economy as well as all the positive effects on all players involved in the sector. This work has advanced through the activities within the outputs under component 1 of the JP. Some examples of this include: training of artisans in how to identify and make use of market access opportunities, develop new product lines according to market demand and promoting entrepreneurship and income opportunities through establishment of cultural tours in Inhambane and Ilha de Moçambique.

### 7.2. JP and the MDG-F thematic window on Culture and Development

According to its Framework Document (MDG-F, 2007a, p. 5), the MDG-F "will primarily finance activities at the country level. To this end, the Fund will be guided by (...) seven key development challenges which are widely acknowledged as central to the achievement of MDGs and internationally-agreed development goals". One of these is **Culture and Development**.

In accordance to the same document, where "the Steering Committee decides to invest resources at the country level in a given area, a 'thematic window' will be opened for that purpose" (*Ibid*, p. 5) and "for each thematic window, **Terms of Reference** will be developed which identify the policy and programmatic goals of the Fund in that area" (*Ibid*, p. 6).

In line with the Terms of Reference for the Thematic Window on Culture and Development "the MDG-F seeks to support countries in the design, implementation and evaluation of effective public policies that promote social and cultural inclusion, and facilitate political participation and the protection of rights. The Fund also seeks to support efforts to promote



cultural and creative industries and to generate the data and information necessary for the effective formulation and monitoring of policies on diversity, culture and development" (*Ibid*, p. 5).

This section presents an analysis of how the indicators and targets achieved by the JP contribute to some of the MDG-F lines of intervention suggested in the above mentioned Terms of Reference. This analysis is not intended to be detailed as the details are already covered in Chapter 6 for each output.

The following table presents an analysis of how the indicators and targets achieved by the JP contribute to some of the MDG-F lines of intervention in terms of *"Formulate, implement and monitor socially- and culturally-inclusive public policies"*.

MDG-F strategic lines for development support linked to "Formulate, implement and monitor socially- and culturally-inclusive public policies"	Contribution of the JP <sup>25</sup>
<ul> <li>Support dialogue, cross-cultural initiatives, and educational exchanges designed to promote understanding and tolerance among different cultural communities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 2.1.2</li> <li>Cultural mapping of the Maratane Refugees Camp in Nampula</li> <li>8 intergenerational cultural exchanges</li> <li>740 children attending intergenerational exchanges</li> <li>8 events to promote cultural exchanges between refugees and local Mozambican communities</li> <li>6 242 directly and 8 000 indirect refugees and local residents participating in intergenerational cultural exchanges</li> <li>44 editions of newsletters; 2 000 copies issued per month</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Build institutional capacity in official bodies, departments and agencies responsible for implementing policies and cultural practices which promote equal opportunity</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.1</li> <li>A number of training sessions for MICULT (including DNPIC, IT Department and others)</li> <li>A number of training sessions and capacity building workshops with Provincial Directorates of (Education and) Culture and official bodies at district and municipal level</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Promote respect, intercultural understanding and multiculturalism in policies regulating religion and religious practice</li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
• Support inter-culturalism and multiculturalism in policies on customary law and legal pluralism, and laws on official languages	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
<ul> <li>Protect systems of traditional knowledge, recognizing its contribution to environmental protection and natural resource management, health and education</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 2.1.1</li> <li>Involvement of the communities in participatory natural resource management and forestry conservation</li> <li>Studies on traditional practices in production and protection of crops were carried out in Zavala and Mossuril</li> <li>One Local Knowledge fair (regarding agriculture) realized in Zavala</li> </ul>
• Develop, implement and monitor legal policies, procedures, and regulations at the national, regional and local level designed to facilitate <i>the inclusion of cultural minorities in public office</i>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Note that this table gives emphasis on the contribution of the JP to the MDG-F thematic window in terms of the indicators and targets achieved; when the contribution is not clear in the indicators or targets achieved, an example of activities undertaken is provided.



MDG-F strategic lines for development support linked to "Formulate, implement and monitor socially- and culturally-inclusive public policies"	Contribution of the JP <sup>25</sup>
<ul> <li>Develop, implement and monitor equal opportunity policies in the recruitment and promotion of cultural minorities and other groups excluded for cultural reason in         <ol> <li>the public sector, including in appointed office, the civil service and the security forces at local, regional and national levels;</li> <li>elected parliaments, in sub-national assemblies, and in ministerial office; and</li> <li>the judicial branch and the courts</li> </ol> </li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
<ul> <li>Promote civic engagement among ethnic minorities through the news media, voluntary groups, community associations, interest organizations, and new social movements</li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
• Develop and implement equal opportunity policies and practices, especially in promoting minority access to employment, education and training, as well as access to other public goods and services.	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)

The following table presents an analysis of how the indicators and targets achieved by the JP contribute to some of the MDG-F lines of intervention in terms of *"Realize the economic and social potential of the cultural sector and strengthen cultural and creative industries"*.

MDG-F strategic lines for development support linked to "Realize the economic and social potential of the cultural sector and strengthen cultural and creative industries"	Contribution of the JP <sup>26</sup>
• Develop policy recommendations to improve the institutional and regulatory environment in specific cultural and creative industry sector(s) such as music, new media, design and crafts, newspapers, television and books	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.1</li> <li>Policy and Strategy for the Creative and Cultural Industries drafted</li> <li>Proposal for the reduction of fiscal barriers is being prepared</li> <li>Output 1.1.3</li> <li>Mozambican copyright law regulation harmonized to international standards (document in approval process)</li> <li>Regulation for Performance and Public Entertainment revised (document in approval process)</li> </ul>
Build capacity designed to improve the management of cultural assets, entrepreneurial skills, and business management practices among cultural entrepreneurs, start-up businesses, self- employed artists, both within the formal and informal economies	<ul> <li>Output 1.2.1</li> <li>390 artisans trained (166 of which female)</li> <li>146 female and 179 male artisans trained demonstrate readiness for the presence in fairs and markets (as a result of training and workshops provided by the JP)</li> <li>21 trainers certified in "Improve your exhibition skills" (IYES) module</li> <li>19 trainers in certified in "Start your cultural business" (SYCB) module</li> </ul>
• Support the creation of local cultural enterprises by developing "creative enterprise incubators" for both men and women entrepreneurs operating in the creative sector	<ul> <li>Output 1.2.4</li> <li>Model for the development of Touristic packages developed</li> <li>4 Cultural Tourism Tours designed and piloted (these</li> </ul>

<sup>26</sup> Note that this table gives emphasis on the contribution of the JP to the MDG-F thematic window in terms of the indicators and targets achieved; when the contribution is not clear in the indicators or targets achieved, an example of activities undertaken is provided.



MDG-F strategic lines for development support linked to "Realize the economic and social potential of the cultural sector and strengthen cultural and creative industries"	Contribution of the JP <sup>26</sup>
	leverage on existing cultural enterprises)
• Develop training activities on cultural management, as well as exchange programmes to build and expand the capacity of local cultural managers	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.2</li> <li>Exchange between SOMAS, Brazil, South Africa</li> <li>Output 1.2.3</li> <li>26 Government officials in an exchange visit with South Africa</li> </ul>
• Build capacity in the creation of <i>fiscal and</i> other incentives for technological renewal or improvement of facilities and infrastructure, as well as funding schemes for developing the creative sector	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.1</li> <li>Incentives for the reduction of fiscal barriers in the Music and Craft Industry identified (this was undertaken by INLD, which is expected to have built capacity through the process)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Support the preservation of physical and non- physical heritage and promote its social value</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.2.4</li> <li>Model for the development of Touristic packages developed</li> <li>4 Cultural Tourism Tours designed and piloted (these leverage on existing cultural enterprises)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Recover depleted or destroyed cultural assets, for example in the aftermath of conflicts and crises, identifying and analysing assets for their patrimonial value and potential contribution to regenerating and rebuilding social fabric</li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
• Design and implement specific policies for the development of micro and small industries related to the production of arts and craft industries	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.1</li> <li>Policy and Strategy for Culture and Creative Industries draft with the support of the Programme</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Focus on the economic viability of producing contemporary cultural products for targeting domestic audiences using ICTs as well as more traditional media such as community radios</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.2.3</li> <li>52 new lines of craft products created; 10 of which already accepted by the national market</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Commercialize local cultural products in national domestic markets and seek opportunities to export to regional and international markets</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.2.4</li> <li>Model for the development of Touristic packages developed</li> <li>4 Cultural Tourism Tours designed and piloted (these leverage on existing cultural enterprises)</li> <li>Output 1.2.3</li> <li>52 new lines of craft products created; 10 of which already accepted by the national market</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Support the presence of domestic cultural products and creativity in international markets and multicultural spaces, through trade policies and export programs</li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
Collect data and develop relevant and reliable indicators in the area of creative industries in order to develop appropriate policies.	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.2</li> <li>Cultural Information System designed and being uploaded with data (indicators for creative industries are still to be defined)</li> </ul>

The following table presents an analysis of how the indicators and targets achieved by the JP contribute to some of the MDG-F lines intervention in terms of "Generate information, monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of cultural policies".



MDG-F strategic lines for development support linked to "Generate information, monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of cultural policies"	Contribution of the JP <sup>27</sup>
<ul> <li>Build local capacity in statistical analysis and the dissemination of existing data relevant to monitoring cultural diversity derived from official household census, public opinion polls, market research, and social surveys</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.2</li> <li>Cultural Information System designed and being uploaded with data</li> <li>Local staff trained</li> </ul>
• Encourage the exchange of expertise and the dissemination of best practices on data collection, surveys and the use of indicators at national and international levels, including south-south cooperation, through seminars, exchanges, and technical training workshops, among government officials, educational research institutes, private sector market research companies, and non-governmental think-tanks	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
<ul> <li>Expand local institutional capacity to design, manage, and implement surveys, including sampling techniques and the organization of survey fieldwork</li> </ul>	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
• Expand geographical and time-series coverage in the leading cross-national surveys of cultural attitudes, values, and behaviour in the selected countries, such as the World Values Survey, Global Barometer, the Gallup World Poll, and the International Social Survey Program	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
• Use social audits to monitor the effectiveness of public service delivery in reaching minority communities and creative communities	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)
<ul> <li>Build and deepen the capacity of institutes in developing countries to collect relevant statistical data on cultural diversity and cultural rights, to conduct social scientific surveys, to influence their design, and to interpret the results</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Output 1.1.2</li> <li>Cultural Information System designed and being uploaded with data – Local staff received capacity building trainings</li> </ul>
Develop indicators on culture and development in the context of Human Development Indices	(not included in the Programme's Design and not expected to be integrated in the implementation)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Note that this table gives emphasis to the contribution of the JP to the MDG-F thematic window in terms of the indicators and targets achieved; when the contribution is not clear in the indicators or targets achieved, an example of activities undertaken is provided.



## 7.3. JP and "Delivering as One"

The UN launched the "Delivering as One" (DaO) pilot initiative in 2007 and Mozambique was one of the countries that volunteered to pilot the initiative. The Delivering as One Countryled Evaluation 2010 – Mozambique mentions that<sup>28</sup> "The goal of DaO in Mozambique is to improve program <u>delivery, results and impact</u>, through a UN which is more coherent and <u>better-coordinated</u>, -funded and <u>-managed</u>" (UN, 2010, p. 19)

This section aims to provide an overview of how DaO has succeeded within the context of the JP responding specifically to the underlined goals mentioned above. This section is, therefore, structured in two parts:

- Delivery, Results and Impact; and
- Coordination.

#### 7.3.1 Delivery, Results and Impact

As a means of delivery, it is assumed that DaO is a relevant and appropriate tool for UN agencies to apply in their interventions in order to maximize the value of its results in relation to the effort made and money spent.

It is important to highlight briefly three good examples, namely: **Output 1.2.1 on training of artisans and training of trainers**, **Output 2.1.4 on SRH and Output 1.2.4 on Cultural Tourism**.

All these outputs faced issues inter-connected to various UN Agencies and sectors. Addressing training of artisans and training of trainers in the culture environment requires close collaboration of UN Agencies working on business (ILO) and culture (UNESCO). Tackling SRH requires (amongst many other things) convincing traditional and religious local leaders of the necessity to take into account HIV/AIDS risk awareness into their regular teachings. Creating a successful cultural tour requires knowledge related to tourism marketing, entrepreneurship as well as local cultural knowledge. Thus, the success of these outputs required the close collaboration of various UN agencies and GoM sectors in order to guarantee that the activities related to the outputs did not leave out crucial players.

**Specifically on Output 1.2.1 on training of artisans and training of trainers**, ILO and UNESCO together successfully promoted and carried out various workshops to train trainers (e.g. "Improve your exhibition skills", "Start your cultural business") and completed training workshops with selected artisans in the three provinces. In general, these were well received and regarded as helpful by the craft associations and artisans. By delivering as one, ILO and UNESCO were able to address both cultural and business related knowledge needs of their common target group.

**Specifically on Output 1.2.4 on Cultural tourism**. Despite the difficulties in the process (which will be mentioned later under "coordination"), in the end, the product (4 cultural tours) was "delivered as one", in the sense that UNESCO and ITC shared the same vision for the result and managed to complement each other during the implementation phase – UNESCO providing cultural tour members with trainings on cultural aspects while ITC focused on business and entrepreneurial aspects. So, despite delays, the two agencies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Underlining added.



brought a unified approach to the implementation of the output on the ground. This also resulted in pushing for a greater collaboration of MITUR and MICULT, sectors that traditionally don't have a record of close collaboration.

**Specifically on Output 2.1.4 on SRH**, the socio-cultural approach is by nature a highly participatory approach, whereby a team (composed of representatives of the formal education and health sectors, as well as local leaders, traditional healers, traditional midwives and religious leaders) sets up a meeting in a school or community site to talk about problems related to sexuality. The team invites people to present their problems. This leads to an open discussion about all kinds of topics, which then form the basis for intervention. Due to the strong buy-in from all stakeholders, this resulted in an effective cross-sectoral approach as shown by the fact that interviewed community leaders gave strong testimonies to the evaluation team of swift results in their communities.

#### 7.3.2 Coordination

One of the main concerns of the JP was the efficiency of its processes, as many of the processes are tied to UN agencies. In theory, DaO should facilitate and speed up administrative activities such as procurement, financial transactions and reporting. However, as noted through the interviews, the JP suffered in these areas, even after the reformulation of the programme.

Most notably, implementing partners complained about two aspects. First, financial procedures were deemed complicated; compounding this difficulty was that each agency maintained their respective financial rules and regulations – forcing implementing partners to have to learn and comply with several different financial rules. Second, agencies insisted on receiving reports according to their own templates – thus forcing implementing partners into writing several different reports about the same activity.

The complexity of the structure of the JP, involving six UN agencies and twelve outputs of considerably different areas has also had a general overall negative impact on effectiveness. It is evident that the coordination and co-implementing of activities has been difficult, increasing the time required due to administrative bureaucracy.

It is important to highlight here two instances where this proved to create efficiency constraints:

Output 2.1.2 "Inter-cultural dialogue between refugees and host community promoted and refugees' knowledge to the culture of origin valued in local development plans" (where UNHRC and UNESCO where involved). Significant challenges were noticed in the process in terms of coordination. During the consultancy regarding the cultural mapping of the refugee camp, both UNHCR and UNESCO expected the other to lead the consultancy work – which led to general confusion. Furthermore, it became apparent that there was a difference between UNESCO and UNHCR regarding the objective of the study: UNHCR wanted an inventory of the cultural aspects within the camp – which would have been very practical for UNHCR staff in the camp – but the consultancy report dealt more with traditional refugee issues – which UNHCR already is knowledgeable in. There was a difference between the expectations of the UN agencies and the deliverable of the consultant, resulting in the study being redrafted and delayed. This shows evidence of poor coordination between the two agencies. Definition of roles and responsibilities needs to be



clearer for future inter-agency collaboration – especially between agencies that normally have little interaction and differ in work methodology.

**Output 1.2.4 "Improved tourist access to high-potential cultural assets" (where ITC and UNESCO where involved)**. Significant challenges were noticed in the process in terms of timing, most due to lack of planning and coordination between the two agencies. Firstly, there was a significant delay on part of ITC to develop the overall joint TORs and to contract their part of the consultants. In late 2010, prior to the overall joint TOR being completed, UNESCO moved forward with the design of Phase 1 training packages in order to not compromise the implementation phase due to the short time available.

One of the goals of the JP was to bring together different sectors and promote a closer collaboration as a more effective means of tackling cross-cutting challenges. Although DaO did not always function ideally within the JP, we can conclude that there were areas such as SRH where DaO functioned properly and created an effective partnership between UNESCO and UNFPA – two agencies with no previous common work history. In the long-term, continued belief in DaO hinges on success stories such as UNFPA/UNESCO in Output 2.1.4 where successful implementation creates an awareness of the potential of DaO as a means of increasing efficiency and effectiveness.



## 8. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter outlines main evaluation findings in terms of best practices (and positive aspects), lessons learned (and aspects to be improved in the future) and other conclusions. It also includes a final section on recommendations.

#### 8.1. Best Practices and positive aspects

This section brings together the main positive aspects of the programme, some of which should be considered in future programmes. When relevant, some recommendations for future programmes are also presented<sup>29</sup>.

#### JP Implementation

- On a personal level, the vast majority of people who were interviewed or surveyed agree that the interventions of the JP they participated in (workshops, trainings, meetings, etc.) were very useful for their work. These seem to create impact and should be considered in future programmes of development activities [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- Many stakeholders conclude that the studies that were carried out in the earlier phases of the JP in many of the outputs provided a solid basis for the subsequent activities; however, it is felt that they often caused delays in activities further down the line and that their results were not as widely shared as would have been desirable. Studies take time and because subsequent activities depend on the outcome of these studies, it is very important to plan them realistically [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].

#### JP Impact

- Even though the understanding of what is meant by culture is still limited at best and ambiguous at worst, through its inter-sectoral and holistic approach to culture and development, the JP contributed to culture being part of government plans. This should be further promoted in the future **[UNESCO, MICULT]**.
- The JP has contributed to a much more participatory and integrated approach to planning in three districts. The approach and methodologies used should be leveraged to other districts [UNESCO, MICULT, MPD].
- The JP has shown how cultural tourism can generate income for many different actors. The model that has been developed and tested can, in principle, be used in other districts [MICULT].
- In some cases and on some specific topics, collaboration and communication between ministries has improved and more openness has been created. In others, though, compartmentalisation continues to hamper collaboration [MICULT, MITUR, MINED, MISAU].
- Collaboration between some UN agencies has proven that "Delivering as One" is the best way to improve programme delivery [UNRCO].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Stakeholders that can follow-up on recommendations are <u>suggested</u> in straight brackets.



#### On the SRH Output

The integrated approach to health issues of output 2.1.4 was almost unanimously considered the JP's big success. In trying to understand what made this output so successful, we would like to suggest the following factors:

- Interventions are based on a study, carried out by independent specialists
- Interventions involve the community as a whole, including local authorities, traditional and religious leaders
- Interventions put the traditional sector on the same footing as the formal (education and health) sector
- Interventions are based on respect for local knowledge and culture
- Interventions use a multi-sectoral approach, with relevant ministries and agencies working together.

#### 8.2. Lessons Learned and aspects to be improved in the future

The section highlights issues with the design and reformulation, implementation, impact, culture, and monitoring and evaluation that need to be improved or considered in future design and implementation of similar programmes. When relevant, some recommendations for future programmes are also presented.

#### JP Design and Reformulation

- One conclusion that is shared by practically all stakeholders is that too much ambition and too much complexity do not help the implementation of a program like the JP. It was felt that many of the results could probably have been achieved by smaller projects, involving fewer organisations - possibly with less bureaucracy and at a lower cost [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- While the conclusion that the programme was overambitious was already reached before the mid-term evaluation, even after the reformulation of 2010 it was still not realistic to expect all the outputs to be finalised by the end of 2011. As a result, even at the end of the programme, many of the activities were being implemented and were therefore not ready for an outcome evaluation [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- The Government of Mozambique feels it hasn't been sufficiently involved in the 2010 Reformulation (which can have impacted negatively the GoM's ownership of this JP). This should be considering when designing and reformulating future JPs [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].

#### JP Implementation

 Outcome leads were established in late 2010 and installed in early 2011, in response to a recommendation in the mid-term evaluation. Although TORs for the posts existed and were disseminated, outcome leads remained unclear about their roles and expectations and unable to translate these into concrete management activities. As a result, this did not improve the ownership and leadership in the coordination structure on the part of the Government, as was expected [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].



- Communication between the central PMC and the provincial PMCs has been deficient due to lack of incentives, mandate and roles; these should be clearer in the implementation of future programmes [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- Provincial PMCs have had a very limited role in the management of the JP and in some cases none at all; future programmes should consider strategies for a better design and involvement of such structures [leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- At the time of this evaluation, some of the provincial focal points of the JP still had no clear understanding of their role, nor were they very interested in changing that [MICULT; leading (UN) agencies in the future].
- The fact that the JP Coordinator was at the same time UNESCO lead on four outputs of Component 1 and provided technical input to the other outputs of Components 1 and 2 seriously limited her availability to coordinate the programme [leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- The fact that communication between UN agencies and the Government has not always been optimal has had a negative impact on Government ownership [leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- The involvement of several UN agencies in the same output/activity, each with their expectations, own methodology and procedures, specifically financial procedures, very frequently lead to miscommunication and slowed down the implementation of those activities **[leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT]**.
- Generally, there has been a lack of synergy between the different outputs of the JP. Each output seemed to be a project on its own, working with its own specific subset of beneficiaries. Opportunities were missed for certain activities to benefit from others (e.g. in Inhambane artisans from output 1.2.3 were not involved in the cultural tours of 1.2.4; in Mossuril, output 2.1.1 has not been able to solve the transportation problems for the SRH team of output 2.1.4 to work in the villa of Crusse). Future programmes should put in place strategies to leverage potential synergies among different outputs [leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].
- The JP has experienced a high level of staff turnover, especially within Government institutions. This has naturally had a negative impact on effectiveness [MICULT].

#### JP Impact

- In general, the level of commitment on the part of government officials concerning activities related to the JP has been low. While focal points of the JP inside government institutions could have potentially opened doors and facilitated JP activities that require government intervention, this has only rarely been the case, thus causing delays to JP activities [MICULT; leading (UN) agencies in the future].
- There is a relatively high degree of pessimism about the sustainability of the programme's results, both among Government officials and UN staff, especially because of the lack of financial capacity of the Government and Civil Society Organisations. This also points to the poor ownership amongst the beneficiaries as many initiatives were piloted but not yet fully implemented. Until stakeholders see results more clearly, the likelihood of continuing the path of the Joint Programme is very low [MICULT].
- A certain number of certified trainers were trained, who can continue their training activities after the end of the JP; it is, however, doubtful, if they will be able to provide trainees with relevant training materials as long as funding is not guaranteed [MICULT; CEDARTE].



• Critical issues hampering the viability and sustainability of artisans were not or insufficiently addressed by the JP, such as availability of financial incentives, bank finance, sourcing of raw materials, identification of market demand to guarantee sales, access to funds in general, management tools for associations and technical assistance in producing craft. Although it is acknowledged that some of these were not part of the design or objectives of this JP, this should be considered when designing future programmes [MICULT; leading (UN) agencies in the future].

#### On Monitoring & Evaluation

- No proper instruments for the collection of data for M&E have been developed at the start of implementation, possibly because the programme did not have an M&E specialist for most of its duration. Monitoring tools were only handed to focal points during the last monitoring trip and most focal points failed to fill out and submit the forms. [MICULT; leading (UN) agencies in the future].
- Although the focal points were supposed to actively gather data for M&E, they were never properly trained for that specific task. Future programmes have to have this strategically built into the planning and inception phase and budgeted for appropriately. [MICULT; leading (UN) agencies in the future].

#### **On Culture**

- There is a perception within many internal JP stakeholders that the formal sector succeeded in 'educating' traditional healers (in SRH) and cultural actors in general (artisans, tour guides and cultural service providers). However, no evidence was found of the formal sector *learning* from the traditional healers. Future programmes should consider this in their design. [MICULT; MISAU].
- The two different aspects of the JP (the promotion of cultural/creative industries and the role of culture in human development) were not really integrated and coexisted as two separate conceptions of what culture is and what role it can play. The design of the programme did not aim at integrating this. Future programmes should consider whether such different components should be part of the same programme and, if yes, mechanism to leverage potential synergies between them should be put in place [MDG-F Secretariat; leading (UN) agencies in the future; MICULT].

#### **8.3. General Conclusions**

In addition to the above, this section highlights other overarching conclusions of this final evaluation.

#### JP Implementation

- Despite the little time for implementation, many outputs were achieved.
- The JP has contributed positively to a number of outcomes under Pillars 1 and 4 of the Extension of the UNDAF (Mozambique) 2010-2011.
- The JP has contributed positively to a number of intervention lines defined in the Terms of Reference of the MDG-F Thematic Window on Culture and Development.
- "Delivering as One" has proved to be difficult to put into practice for the UN agencies involved in the Joint Programme, but in those cases where agencies



managed to establish fruitful forms of collaboration, this definitely improved programme delivery.

• MDG-F Joint Programmes are supposed to be "nationally owned" and to "improve the ability of the UN to deliver results that support national development outcomes, while placing greater emphasis on government leadership and commitment." (MDG-F Secretariat, February 2011, p. 4). In this JP, however, *ownership* and leadership on the part of the Government has been very weak.

#### JP Impact

- All stakeholders involved in the JP agree that the Programme has changed their concept of and perspective on culture. The JP has helped to create awareness of the importance of the role of cultural and creative industries, and thereby changed the status of e.g. artisans. However, generally, amongst those who participated in the JP (at several different stakeholder levels) there still is a limited understanding of how to operationalize the contribution of these industries to economic growth and poverty alleviation, without appropriate technical support. There is not sufficient confidence that those who became more aware of the potential role of culture will be able to transfer this understanding within their own ministries and at the highest level to the extent necessary for it to become a national priority.
- *Effectiveness* (out of the five evaluation criteria) was generally considered as one of the main virtues of the JP. This seems to indicate that, in the eyes of most stakeholders, despite whatever might have gone wrong in the JP, it has at least delivered.
- The Government is convinced that some of the outputs can be replicated elsewhere and UN agencies and donors are interested in the replication of several of the activities that are part of the JP [MICULT].
- The integrated approach to health issues of output 2.1.4 has helped local Government to see culture as the key to community development; the same methodology will be applied in other districts. As a relatively cheap way to address a series of problems, securing funding shouldn't be difficult [MICULT; MISAU; Districts].

### 8.4. Recommendations

In addition to recommendations made in the three sections above (linked to best practices, positive aspects, lessons learned, or aspects to be taken into consideration in future), this final section presents additional recommendations for the future. These can be incorporated in the MICULT planning, or taken into consideration when designing future Culture and Development (Joint) Programmes in Mozambique (and elsewhere, when applicable).

- Many of the positive products and results of the JP only started to make themselves felt towards the very end of the program. It would be very unfortunate if they would get lost because the Programme ends. Often the monetary values needed to keep activities going are not very high. Some of the outputs of the JP can probably be transformed into independent projects, involving the respective Ministries and UN agencies. The evaluation team recommends that two immediate actions should be considered:
  - The JP should, if at all possible, be extended for six months to reinforce ownership and sustainability of its outputs and products through: a)



conclusion of ongoing activities; b) complete handover of outputs to the respective GoM institutions; and c) technical support to the implementation of the drafted exit strategy by the GoM institutions [Central PMC, UNESCO and the representative of the Government of Spain].

- Governmental institutions and UN agencies that have been involved in each of the 12 outputs should analyse and decide what support can be given for the sustainability, continuation and leverage of the JP's products and results [UNESCO and MICULT].
- The Government of Mozambique should consider the possibility of creating a special programme to promote cultural tourism in Mozambique, along the lines of what the JP did in Ilha de Moçambique and Inhambane; this programme could involve **MICULT, MITUR, UNESCO and ITC [MICULT]**.
- Specific examples of the need for continuation of activities or leverage the JP's outputs include the following:
  - Under the JP, studies on legal impediments and fiscal incentives for the development of culture have been conducted. It is advisable that the results of these studies be transformed into policy and a revised legal framework [MICULT].
  - The integrated approach to planning needs to be approved and supported by the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) to assure its replication to other districts [MICULT].
  - The Cultural Management Information System (SIC-M) needs continued support – technical as well as organisational – for the system to become fully functioning and self-sustaining. It will have to include more data about the creative industries in order to be able to contribute to the development of appropriate policies in this area [MICULT].
  - The replication of the SRH output has been assured by its inclusion by UNFPA in the UNDAF for 2013 for 30 more districts. It needs the continued support of MINED and MISAU **[UNFPA, MINED, MISAU and MICULT]**.
- Future projects in the cultural sector would do well in trying to involve national educational institutions involved in art and culture such as the *Instituto Superior de Artes e Cultura* [MICULT].
- Future Joint Programmes should consider limiting the ministries and UN agencies involved to a more manageable number. Future Joint Programmes should also consider limiting the number of outcomes and outputs to be delivered within the lifetime of the Programme [MDG-F Secretariat].
- Changing the mind-set of stakeholders about "culture" and its role in economy and in development is not something that can be achieved in a short timeframe. In general, cultural projects should have a duration that is longer than what MDG-F allows for Joint Programmes. Furthermore, promoting the role of culture in socio-economic development and its role in the economy generally should be part of internal GoM's advocacy efforts (arguably within MICULT) [MDG-F Secretariat; MICULT].
- Future Joint Programmes on Culture and Development should consider not including the two aspects of Culture into one programme, unless ways are found to make them complementary and mutually supportive [MDG-F Secretariat].



## 9. References

CEDARTE (December 2011). Final Monitoring Report.

MDG-F (2007a). MDG-F Framework Document.

MDG-F (2007b). Terms of Reference for Thematic Window on Culture and Development.

MDG-F (August 2011a). RFP for Final Evaluation of JP.

MDG-F (August 2011b). Generic ToR for Final Evaluation of MDG-F Joint Programmes.

MDG-F Secretariat (February 2011). Implementation Guidelines for MDG Achievement Fund Joint Programmes.

Metwalli, Neder (March 2010). JP Mid-term Evaluation.

UN (2010). Delivering as One Mozambique Country-Led Evaluation 2010.

UN (August 2009). Extension of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2010-11.

UN (December 2007). *Revised United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2007-2009 (Revised version of 7 December 2007) Mozambique.* 

UN (June 2010). Joint Programme Reformulation Document.

UNESCO (September 2009). Mini Monitoring Report.



## **10. Appendices**



## Appendix 1A – Interviews conducted

Date	Place	Person	Q	UN/Gov	Level	FP	Institution	Title	Area	Output
25-10	Maputo	Lorraine Johnson	+	UN			UNESCO	JP Coordinator		Coordination JP
25-10	Quissico	Álvaro Abdula	+	Gov	Dist		SDAE	Director of SDAE	Agriculture	2.1.1
26-10	Quissico	Armando Dombe	+	Gov	Dist		SDPI	Technician (substitutes Humberto Titos Dombe)	Environment	2.1.3
26-10	Quissico	Lino Digombe	+	Gov	Dist	+	SDEJT	Director SDEJT; FP for Zavala District	Education	Overall
26-10	Quissico	Afonso Vilankulos		Gov	Prov	+	DPA - Forestry	Head of subdivision of forestry	Agriculture	2.1.1
27-10	Inhambane	Daniel Cumbane	+	Gov	Mun	+	Inhambane Municipality	FP Municipality	Trade	1.2.4
27-10	Inhambane	Manecas Amaral	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPEC - Culture	Head of Department; deputy FP Inhambane	Culture	Overall
27-10	Inhambane	Juvenal Armazia	+	UN			UNESCO	Programme Assistant		Coordination Inhambane
27-10	Inhambane	Dique Nguenha	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPJD	FP Youth & Sports	Youth & Sports	1.2.1 (& 1.2.3 to a lesser degree)
27-10	Inhambane	Alfredo Uetimane	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPTur	FP Tourism	Tourism	1.2.4
28-10	Maxixe	Maria Elisa Atanásio	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPEC - School health	Head of Department	Education	all (in practice only 2.1.4)
31-10	Ilha	Salma Zainadine	+	UN			UNESCO	Programme Assistant		Coordination Nampula
31-10	Ilha	Josefina Salência	+	Gov	Dist	+	District Government	Advisor to the Government	Tourism	Overall
01-11	Mossuril	Mário Paciano	+	Gov	Dist	+	SDEJT	Director; FP for Mossuril district	Education	Overall
02-11	Maputo	Lupwishi Mbuyamba		UN			UNESCO	Country Rep		Overall
03-11	Nampula	Momade Karim	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPIC; IPME	FP for Ind & Trade (instead of Emílio Manhique)	Industry & Trade	Outcome 1.2
03-11	Nampula	Mário Intetepe	+	Gov	Prov	+	DPEC	Head of Department of Heritage; FP for Nampula	Culture	Overall
04-11	Maputo	Francelina Romão	+	Gov	Nat	+	MISAU	FP for Health	Health	2.1.4
04-11	Nampula	Rute Monjane/ Edna Omwega	+	UN			UNHCR	Head of Administration Maratane Camp		2.1.2
04-11	Nampula	Anabela Fernandes	+	UN			FAO	FAO officer		2.1.1
07-11	Maputo	Carla Cuambe	+	UN			FAO	Programme Officer, Nat Res Management &		2.1.1



								Environment		
07-11	Maputo	Felicidade Bambo	+	Gov	Prov	+	INEFP	FP Maputo for Creative Industries	Professional Training	1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3
08-11	Maputo	Herminia Manuesse	+	Gov	Nat		ARPAC	Director Nacional; Outcome Lead	Culture	All Component 2
08-11	Maputo	José Luis Gravata	+	Gov	Nat	+	MinTur	Lead for Ministry of Tourism, Deputy FP	Tourism	Outcome 1.2
09-11	Maputo	Boaventura Afonso	+	Gov	Nat		Ex-MICULT	Former Director of INLD and main FP of JP from beginning through December 2010	Culture	Programme design, implementation and reformulation
09-11	Maputo	Ana Scattone	+	UN			UNHCR	UNHCR Lead		2.1.2
09-11	Maputo	Astrid Bant	+	UN			UNFPA	Deputy Rep; UNFPA Lead		2.1.4
09-11	Maputo	Ellen Hayward		UN			UNESCO	UNESCO Lead on Integrated Approach		2.1.4
16-11	Maputo	Jennifer Topping		UN			UN	Resident Coordinator		Overall
16-11	Maputo	Ainhoa Jaureguibeitia	+	UN			UNRCO	Coordinator		Overall
16-11	Maputo	Domingos Artur	+	Gov	Nat		MinCult	Director Nacional Indústrias Criativas	Culture	Creative Industries in general
18-11	Maputo	D. Eduardo López Busquets					Spanish Embassy	Ambassador		Funding, through MDG-F

#### Notes:

Q – Questionnaire completed?

Gov – Government; UN – United Nations

Nat – National; Prov – Provincial; Dist – District; Mun – Municipality

FP – Focal Point



Date	Place	Group	# Part.	Q	Output
25-10	Quissico	Sexual and Reproductive Health Group Quissico	6	2	2.1.4
26-10	Cabodoho	Natural Resources Management Commission (firewood cutters)	12	-	2.1.1
28-10	Inhambane	Cultural Tourism Service Providers	8	-	1.2.4
28-10	Inhambane	Artisans	8	-	1.2.1 & 1.2.3
31-10	Ilha	Sexual and Reproductive Health Group Ilha	4	-	2.1.4
01-11	Ilha	Cultural Tourism Service Providers	4	-	1.2.4
01-11	Mossuril	Sexual and Reproductive Health Group Bairro Mingurene	8	-	2.1.4
02-11	Crusse	M'crusseForest Reserve Inspectors	3	-	2.1.1
02-11	Crusse	Mussiro Group "Beira-Mar"	9	-	2.1.1
03-11	Nampula	Artisans from ASARUNA	3	-	1.2.1 & 1.2.3
04-11	Maratane	Refugees in Maratane Refugee Camp	14	-	2.1.2
08-11	Maputo	Artisans	9	-	1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.2.1, 1.2.3
08-11	Maputo	Musicians	4	-	1.1.1, 1.1.3
09-11	Maputo	Cultural Management Information System group	4	-	1.1.2
09-11	Maputo	"Integrating Culture in Planning" group	2	-	2.1.3
10-11	Maputo	CEDARTE	4	2	1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.2.1, 1.2.2,

## Appendix 1B – Focus Group Discussions Conducted

Notes:

# Part. – Number of Participants

Q – Number of participants that completed the questionnaire



## **Appendix 1C – Questionnaire Respondents**

The questionnaire was completed by the 27 persons indicated in Appendix 1A, by the 4 people indicated in Appendix 1B, whose names are given below with an asterisk, and by a further 14 people who are also identified in the table below.

Nr	Name	Function	Sector
1	*Casmiro Fernando Nhabinde	Education	Government
2	*Henriqueta Jaime Quive	Health	Government
3	*Abel Dabula	CEDARTE, Administrator	Civil Society Organisation
4	*Evaristo Madime	CEDARTE, Executive Director	Civil Society Organisation
5	Carla Machavane	UNESCO, Sr Programme Assistant	United Nations
6	Debora Nandja	UNFPA, Programme Manager	United Nations
7	Emídio Vicente Mavila	INEFP, Focal Point for Labour	Government
8	Francisco Benesse	MinCult Lead, Main Government FP	Government
9	Linda Manjate	UNESCO, Sr Assistant	United Nations
10	Maria da Graça de Natividade	INEFP, Focal Point	Government
11	Marie-Claude Frauenrath	ITC, Genevea	United Nations
12	Moira Welch	UNESCO, Sr Assistant for C&A	United Nations
13	Paulo Mondlane	ITC, Programme Officer	United Nations
14	Remígio Alberto Magumbe	MITUR, Focal Point	Government
15	Severino Gabriel Ngole	UNFPA, Inhambane	United Nations
16	Silencer Mapuranga	Representative ITC	United Nations
17	Virgilio Manjate	FAO, Programme Assistant	United Nations
18	Zulmira Rodrigues	UNESCO, Programme Manager	United Nations



## Appendix 2A – On-line Questionnaire

- 1. In your opinion, to what point did the Joint Programme contributed to resolving the needs (in your sector)?
- 2. In your opinion, to what point did joining the creative industries issue with the sociocultural development aspects in a single programme succeed?
- 3. In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the Joint Programme implementation?
- 4. In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the M&E (Monitoring & Evaluation) of the Joint Programme?
- 5. In your opinion, did the different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) work together in the Joint Programme design re-formulation in 2010?
- 6. Has the participation of different sectors (UN agencies, ministries, civil society) added value to creating solutions in the development culture sector in the program locations?

Please explain your answer

- 7. Was the M&E strategy useful?
- 8. Was the M&E instrument easy to use?
- 9. Did the M&E strategy indeed help to measure the Joint Programme results?
- 10. How well do you know the C&A (Communication and Advocacy) strategy of the Joint Programme?
- 11. Was the C&A strategy useful?
- 12. Did the Joint Programme review in 2010 effect the necessary changes to the program?
- 13. In terms of the Joint Programme management model did the PMC (Programme Management Committee) work efficiently?
- 14. In terms of the Joint Programme management model: In the output (specific outcome) in which you were involved, was the coordination between the leader of the specific outcome of the UN and the Ministry was effective?
- 15. To what extent was the information flow and communication in the Joint Programme effective?
- 16. To what extent the combined intervention of various UN agencies in a single program was more efficient in management and administration terms (compared to what could have been done through an intervention of a single agency or ministry)?
- 17. Regarding the known outputs that you are aware: The combined intervention of various ministries in the same output was more effective (compared to what could have been done through an intervention of a single ministry)?
- 18. The combined intervention of various ministries and UN agencies on the same output was more efficient?
- 19. To what extent did the National Steering Committee contribute to the Joint Programme efficiency and effectiveness?
- 20. Do you know the concept Delivering as One?
- 21. Did the implementing partners use working methods that increase the efficiency in Delivering as One?
- 22. Did the implementing partners use financial instruments that have increased efficiency in Delivering as One?
- 23. Have you encountered Administrative obstacles?
- 24. If yes, to what point has this affected the Joint Programme efficiency?
- 25. Have you encountered Financial obstacles?
- 26. If yes, to what point has this affected the Joint Programme efficiency?



- 27. To what point have the proposed recommendations of the mid-term evaluation been implemented by the Joint Programme?
- 28. To what extent have the target population have ownership of the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)
- 29. To what extent have the traditional authorities had ownership the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)
- 30. To what extent have the local authorities had ownership in the program, taking an active role in it? (1: not involved, 2: passive participation, 3: some active participation; 4: very active participation; 5: participation in decision making)
- 31. To what extent are the partners (particularly non-governmental organizations) encouraged to seek resources to ensure sustainability of the program's results?
- 32. To what extent are the results of the Joint Programme aligned with the Millennium Development Goals?
- 33. To what extent has the Joint Programme contributed to the established objectives of the MDG-F thematic window "culture and development"?
- 34. Do you know the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?
- 35. To what extent did the Joint Programme (policy, budgets, design and implementation) contribute to improve the implementation of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?
- 36. In your opinion, did the Joint Programme achieve the expected impact on beneficiaries?

Please explain your answer

- 37. The intervention types (meetings, training, etc..) in which you participated in were useful to your work?
- 38. The output (specific outcome) in which you were involved contributed to gender equality?
- 39. The output in which you were involved, helped to reduce the imbalance between urban and rural areas?
- 40. To what extent did the Joint Programme contribute to the implementation of the National Development Plans, Policies and UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework)?
- 41. To what extent did the Joint Programme help to increase dialogue between the stakeholders and/or in the involvement on issues regarding development policies? *Please explain your answer*
- 42. Did the Joint Programme have impact (in medium or long term) on the government's working methods?
- 43. Did the Joint Programme have impact (in medium or long term) on the government's perspective of the role of culture in development? *Please explain your answer*
- 44. The decisions taken by the Joint Programme coordinating body ensured the sustainability of the Joint Programme results?
- 45. The decisions taken by the Joint Programme implementing partners ensured the sustainability of the Joint Programme results?
- 46. To what extent did the national institutions participate and contribute to the Joint Programme?
- 47. Do those institutions have the technical ability to continue to work with the program?
- 48. Do those institutions have the commitment and leadership to continue the program approaches, methodologies and strategies?



- 49. Do the partners (government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations) have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the positive results produced through-out the program?
- 50. Have the partners (government, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations) developed new skills and/or products to maintain the positive results produced by the program?
- 51. To what extent can the Joint Programme be replicated or extended at the local level?

Please explain your answer

52. To what extent can the Joint Programme be replicated or extended at the national level?

Please explain your answer

In your opinion, what was the best result of this programme? Why?

In your opinion, what aspect of the programme did not work well? Why?



## **Appendix 2B – Focus Group Discussion Guide**

#### **Guiding questions for Focus Group Discussions**

- 1. I would like you to talk about the (four) most *positive* aspects of your participation in [the specific activity you have been involved with] in the Joint Programme.
- 2. I would like you to talk about the (four) most *negative* aspects.
- 3. If [the specific activity you have been involved with] were planned NOW, what, in your opinion, should be done *differently*?
- 4. Who or what are the organisms, organisations, entities or individuals that gave most *support* to [the specific activity you have been involved with]?
- 5. Who or what are the organisms, organisations, entities or individuals that created most *obstacles* for [the specific activity you have been involved with]?
- 6. The [specific activity you have been involved with] has contributed to the promotion of gender equality?
- 7. Question about indigenous knowledge relevant to this group
- 8. Question about creative industries relevant to this group
- 9. In your opinion, will the [specific activity you have been involved with] be continued after the Joint Programme comes to an end? Why (not)?



## **Appendix 2C – Interview Guide for Higher Officials**

1. How do you define "culture"?

2. Do you think the JP has positively changed the perception of the role of culture in development?

3. What was the most important activity of the JP, what activity should be supported to continue or replicated?

4. Do you think any of the activities supported or promoted under the JP will survive after the close of the JP?

5. Did the JP results meet your expectations?

6. Was inter-agency and inter-ministerial collaboration achieved with the JP? And if so, do you think the JP left a strong foundation from which the Ministry of Culture can continue and expand this collaboration?

7. In your opinion, how has this JP contributed to the MDGs? The Paris Declaration?

8. How has MICULT built in the continuation and sustainability of the positive elements, results and good practices of the JP to date? Integrated into policy, strategy and state budget?

#### FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

As the donor, are you satisfied with the way the JP's strategy regarding how culture and creative industries have been approached and in the implementation of the program?