



## Evaluation Unit (EVAL)

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Timor-Leste (US\$ 2,758,500) RBSA (US196,508)
- **Key Words:** Infrastructure, Labour Based  
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# TIM Works



Australian Government  
AusAID



## Timor-Leste – Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation (TIM Works) Final Independent Evaluation



### Final Independent Evaluation Report

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March 2012

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	6
1 BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION.....	7
1.1 Background.....	7
1.2 Project Description.....	8
1.3 Progress to Date .....	10
2 EVALUATION BACKGROUND .....	11
2.1 Purpose.....	11
2.2 Scope.....	12
2.3 Clients .....	12
3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS.....	13
3.1 Methodology .....	13
3.2 Questions.....	14
4 PROJECT STATUS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY AREA OF EVALUATION.....	17
4.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit .....	17
4.2 Effectiveness .....	20
4.3 Efficiency .....	27
4.4 Sustainability.....	29
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE.....	32
5.1 Conclusions.....	32
5.2 Recommendations.....	34
6 LESSONS LEARNT AND GOOD PRACTICES ON THE INTERVENTION APPROACHES AND RESULTS .....	35
6.1 Lessons Learnt .....	35
6.2 Good Practices .....	37
Annex A: List of Interviews .....	38
Annex B: Terms of Reference .....	40

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Successive crises in Timor-Leste have led to severe poverty and high levels of unemployment. When combined with social tensions and exclusion this has led to instability. The Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) has, therefore, made a priority of employment and income generation, particularly for youth. This has included public works programmes that create short-term employment whilst creating infrastructure in rural areas. The Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation Project (TIM Works) began in July 2008 and was completed at the end of February 2012. The project's objective was the reduction of poverty, economic growth and peace building through the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of rural infrastructure using labour based appropriate technology (LBAT).

The capital component of the project, capacity building and technical assistance received funding from the governments of Norway, Australia and Ireland together with the EC and the ILO. GoTL provided much of the labour cost of the project. TIM-Works has been implemented by the Timor-Leste National Directorate of Employment within the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE). ILO provided technical assistance. TIM Works was part of an overall strategy that built on past cash for work programmes and provided a more sustainable approach to employment in the infrastructure sector. The project has demonstrated the LBAT approach to road works and built capacity to manage such programmes. Forty-seven roads totalling 304km have been rehabilitated by a mixture of force account and contracting. SEFOPE staff have also been trained in the LBAT approach.

Roads for rehabilitation were identified with the help of communities and the district authorities. Community awareness training was undertaken by the SEFOPE teams with ILO support. Contracting firms were also trained in the LBAT approach and awarded trial contracts to rehabilitate 2km lengths of roads. Maintenance work was also carried out on 2,150km of road including those rehabilitated. At the time of the evaluation visit, all work on road rehabilitation was complete and work continued on maintaining some of the roads.

The evaluation purpose is to provide a final independent assessment of the TIM Works Project. It covers all project activities from its start in July 2008 to its conclusion at the end of February 2012. The evaluation found that the project was even more relevant to GoTL's priorities in 2012 than it was in 2008. It also continues to meet UN and ILO priorities. The project is also still in line with the country strategies of the donors who have supported it. Both the EC and Australia have committed to successor projects that will continue the work of TIM Works and will be managed by the ILO. The EC project will

be Enhancing Rural Access (ERA) and the Australian project will be Roads for Development (R4D).

TIM Works was originally designed to last for 18 months. The strategic elements were all eventually achieved after time extensions and additional funding. This indicates that the intervention logic was realistic but that cost and time estimates were too ambitious. The original estimate for the cost of the roads was \$15,000/km whilst the average cost achieved was \$22,000/km. The successor projects are being designed with figures of \$40,000/km and \$50,000/km so this suggests that the original estimates were too low.

The project is assessed as having met its goal of “To contribute to economic development by spurring growth in the infrastructure sector”. It also met its immediate objective of “Livelihood improvement and social stability in rural communities through rural development and employment generation.

Roads of this type require regular maintenance. This was in progress during the visit. The successor R4D project will undertake maintenance on all the TIM Works roads throughout its duration as it builds the capacity of the Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI) to take over the role. Care was taken with the environment although the nature of the roads meant that the problems were not significant. Guidelines and checklists were issued to SEFOPE staff and others. A total of 1,370,000 workdays were generated by the project: 27% of this was undertaken by women and 44% by youth. Over \$3million of cash was injected into the communities.

Fifty SEFOPE staff were trained under the project. Awareness and other training was given to 150 communities who worked on the road. Two training courses were given to contractors with ten companies taking part in each. All who were trained gave positive reports of the experience. The mid term review took place in 2009 and included a number of recommendations. The project team responded well to the mid term review and implemented almost all of its findings.

It had been the intention to use a mixture of bought and hired compaction equipment (rollers) on site but not many were for hire. Those that were available were unreliable and there was a recurring shortage of compaction equipment on the project.

The principal partnership was between ILO and SEFOPE and this worked well. Partnerships were established with the individual communities. Partnerships with other GoTL ministries were only informal and suffered as a result.

The project has benefitted from ILO’s technical resources and international experiences. Having four different donors made for additional administrative work in managing budget lines and preparing separate reports. The project has been cost effective despite the fact that final costs per km were significantly higher than the original estimates.

The physical works are believed to be sustainable because arrangements have been made for them to be maintained under the R4D project. SEFOPE is also being given \$20million next year to continue its work on road maintenance after TIM Works will have finished. This will ensure the sustainability of the roads and of the capacity built up in SEFOPE. Contractors improved capacity will only be sustainable if they are given the opportunity to use their skills on ongoing projects.

An impact study was undertaken to confirm that the benefits from the project were real and measurable. As well as improving the road access, the study found that those working on the road had average earnings of \$281. For most of the people working on the project, this had been their first opportunity to earn cash wages.

The evaluation concludes that most of the objectives of the project were eventually met and that initial estimates of time and cost were over optimistic. Recommendations made include the need to be more realistic with future time and cost estimates, the need to provide opportunities for contractors to use their skills and the need for GoTL to make funds available at the start of the financial year. Other recommendations include the need for more rollers to be purchased on future projects, the need for contracting firms to be screened before being admitted to training programmes, the need for more formal partnerships and for SEFOPE staff to be employed on longer contracts. A further recommendation is that agreement be reached with donors to provide only one set of reports for each project.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BOSS	Business Opportunities Support Services
CCI-TL	Timor-Leste Chamber of Commerce
CDP	Community Development Programme
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DDP	District Development Programme
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
EC	European Commission
ERA	Enhancing Rural Access
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
KSTL	Confederation of Trade Unions in Timor-Leste
LDP	Local Development Programme
Mol	Ministry of Infrastructure
MTR	Mid Term Review
RBSA	Regular Budget Supplementary Account
ROAP	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ILO)
R4D	Roads for Development
SEFOPE	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment
STEC	Short Term Employment Creation Department
LBAT	Labour Based Approach and Technology
LMI	Labour Markets Information
TIM Works	Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
YEP	Youth Employment Project

## 1 BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION

### 1.1 Background

Successive crises in Timor-Leste have led to severe poverty and to high levels of unemployment. When combined with social tensions and exclusion this has led to instability and has seriously limited the scope for sustainable development. The Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) has, therefore, made a priority of employment and income generation, particularly for youth. In 2008 the government established the “2008 National Priority Working Group – Employment and Income Generation”. Priorities established by GoTL include creating jobs and income earning opportunities, particularly for the young. This has included public works programmes that create significant short-term employment whilst providing much needed infrastructure in rural areas. GoTL’s Strategic Development Plan 2011 to 2030 includes commitments to strengthening rural access and to generating employment opportunities for the poor. In addition it contains a commitment to rehabilitating all rural roads by 2015.

Donor	Period	Amount		Remarks
		Contract Currency	Amount	
Government of Norway	July 2008 – December 2010	Norwegian Kroner	12,650,000	Equivalent to USD 2,499,452
European Commission	December 2008– December 2010	Euro	1,561,295	Equivalent to USD 2,322,307
Government of Ireland	July 2009 – June 2011	Euro	975,000	Equivalent to USD 1,311,712
Government of Australia	July 2010 – February 2012	AUD	3,300,000	Equivalent to USD 3,224,737
Government of Timor-Leste	July 2008 - February 2012	USD	2,758,500	Pledged and administered directly by GOTL
ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account	2008-2009	USD	196,508	With its own Project Document and own evaluation arrangements

The Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation (TIM Works) began in July 2008 and was completed at the end of February 2012. The project had as its objective the generation of employment, the reduction of poverty, economic growth and peace building. The immediate objective was “Livelihood improvement and social stability in rural communities through rural development and employment generation”. It aimed to achieve this through the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of rural infrastructure using

labour based appropriate technology (LBAT). The capital component, capacity building, and technical assistance received external funding whilst GoTL provided much of the labour cost of the project. There have been four donors in addition to ILO and GoTL: the Governments of Norway, Australia and Ireland together with the European Commission (EC). The amounts contributed together with the dates of involvement are included in the table above and totalled \$12,313,216.

The project formed part of an overall strategy, which links to and evolves from recent Cash for Work programmes that have provided temporary employment. TIM Works has offered more sustainable employment in the infrastructure sector in which major GoTL investment is now being planned. This will lead to significant additional jobs provided that a more labour-based approach is adopted.

The project aimed to institutionalise labour-based technology and methodologies within the regular public works programmes and project focus was on work to develop national and local capacities to plan and programme road rehabilitation and maintenance using labour-based methods. The project also developed strategies and guidelines for labour-based road maintenance and contracting, and advised and supported the government in these matters.

## **1.2 Project Description**

TIM-Works has been implemented by the Timor–Leste National Directorate of Employment within the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE). ILO provided technical assistance to the project that included international staff on a long and short-term basis. SEFOPE was the principal counterpart institution in government it has strong links to the Ministry of Infrastructure, Directorate of Roads, Bridges and Flood Control, and to the Ministry of Economy and Development.

TIM Works was part of an overall strategy that built on past cash for work programmes, which have provided temporary employment. It developed a more sustainable approach to employment in the infrastructure sector in which major government investments are being proposed. It has provided significant additional work opportunities through the adoption of a more labour-based approach.

The TIM-Works project has demonstrated the Labour Based Appropriate Technology (LBAT) approach to road rehabilitation and maintenance. It has also built capacity to manage such programmes. All thirteen Districts of Timor-Leste have been included for routine maintenance activities whilst Aileu, Baucau, Bobonaro, Dili, Ermera, Lautem, Liquica, Manatuto and Viqueque have had roads rehabilitated. Forty-seven roads, totalling 304km, have been rehabilitated. The individual roads are between

2km and 16km long. A mixture of force account (direct labour) and contracting has been used for rehabilitation.

An effective structure for management of the labour-based work activities was established through the TIM Works Project and is now place within the Short Term Employment Creation Department (STEC) of SEFOPE. This Department includes a Central Team and District Technical Teams.

The Central Team is responsible for management, support and coordination at all levels of implementation of the labour-intensive works, including technical and financial reporting on activities. The Central Team approves projects and is responsible for timely and cost effective purchasing of all equipment, materials and services and is responsible for managing the STEC database. As of the end of the project, the STEC Central Team comprises the chief of department, the procurement officer, the finance officer, two operations officers and two monitoring officers.

Before work could begin SEFOPE staff had to be trained in the LBAT approach. This was done using a mixture of classroom sessions and practical training. ILO staff working in the field provided ongoing “on the job” training to SEFOPE staff throughout the project. A total of 50 SEFOPE staff were trained including engineers, supervisors and central office staff.

Roads for rehabilitation were identified with the help of communities and the district authorities. Once the road had been identified, discussions took place with the communities so that they understood their role and that they were willing and able to make labour available to do the work. If the works were to be undertaken using force account then the SEFOPE team, with ILO assistance, undertook design of the road and mobilised the community into working teams with team leaders. The work of the construction teams was overseen by the SEFOPE engineers and field officers on site who provided training and support. At the start of the project workers were paid \$2 per day but this was later increased to \$3 per day. This followed a policy decision by SEFOPE who were trying to harmonise wage levels across the Ministries involved in labour-intensive work activities. All work was paid for on a task basis whereby workers were given individual tasks to complete in a day that were expected to take about six hours to complete. Once the work was done the worker was free to leave the site.

Community awareness training was given to 150 communities working on the 47 roads. This included initial meetings and discussions on the proposed work. HIV / AIDS training was given to some communities. Community leaders attended gender awareness seminars in each district. Some numeracy and literacy training was

provided in association with the Youth Employment Project (YEP). On the job training was given in construction skills including basic setting out for the team leaders.

Contractors have been used successfully to undertake LBAT work in many countries and their use is regarded as best practice. No contractors in Timor-Leste had worked on LBAT construction so training of small contractors in the approach was necessary before letting trial contracts. Two training courses were held of ten companies each. Staff trained from each company included a director, an engineer and three supervisors. Nineteen of the twenty companies trained were then awarded trial contracts of 2km of road each. Road design was still undertaken by the ILO SEFOPE team. The contractor undertook the work as on a conventional contract but used LBAT and employed local labour paid on a task basis. Seventeen of the contracts were completed successfully and the standard of finish was equal to that achieved on force account roads.

Maintenance work was carried out by the project on the roads rehabilitated by the contract and on other roads identified with the help of the districts. As it wasn't always possible to find enough rural roads in maintainable condition, some district roads were maintained under the project. A cumulative road length of 2,150km was maintained. Contracts were signed with community contractors who were trained to undertake routine and other maintenance activities on the roads for which they were responsible.

### **1.3 Progress to Date**

At the time of the evaluation visit, work on all road rehabilitation was complete. Work continued on maintenance activities on some of the roads. This included roads that had been rehabilitated as part of the project as well as some other district and rural roads that had been identified for maintenance work. The roads rehabilitated are set out in the table below.

No	District	Sub-district	Suko	Road name	Km	Status	Completed	Remark
Road Rehabilitation Target					300			
1	Aileu	Remexio	Maumeta	Fahiso-i-Mameta	6.4	100%	Dec-09	
2	Aileu	Laulara	Madabeno	Madabeno-Lesimori	2	100%	Oct-09	
3	Aileu	Remexio	Fatuk Bloco	Maumeta-Fatuk Bloco	4.6	100%	Jun-10	
4	Aileu	Aileu Vila	Fatubosa	Hali Okos-Erhetu	8	100%	Oct-10	
5	Ainaro	Hatu-Builico	Mau Chiga	Hatukero-Mau Chiga	7	100%	Jun-10	
6	Baucau	Baucau	Gariwai	Gariwai-Watuva	4	100%	Jan-09	
7	Baucau	Vemasse	Ustico	Wailacam-Ustico	7	100%	Dec-09	
8	Baucau	Venilale	Bado Hoo	Caicoli-Liabala	7	100%	Nov-10	
9	Baucau	Laga	Soba	Dailaru-Boleha	9	100%	Dec-10	
10	Baucau	Baucau	Gariwai	Gariwai-Powerstation	2	100%	Nov-11	
11	Baucau	Vemasse	Cai Cua	Binagari-Cai Cua	6	100%	Jun-11	
12	Baucau	Vemasse	Vemasse	Binagari-Vemasse	4	100%	Nov-10	
13	Baucau	Gariwai	Gariwai	Nat road-Powerstation	4	100%	Oct-11	
14	Bobonaro	Balibo	Leohito	Vill-Mohac	6	100%	Jun-11	
15	Bobonaro	Lolotoe	Leber	Buci-Lebertas	6	100%	Aug-10	
16	Bobonaro	Atabae	Rairobo	Rairobo-Alima Naru	16	100%	Oct-11	
17	Ermera	Letefoho	Estado	Estado-Raimehae	8	100%	Feb-11	
18	Ermera	Railaco	Lihu	Railaco-Lihu	7	100%	Nov-10	
19	Dili	Cristo Rei	Becora	Kualaletek-Tangkae	7	100%	Mar-10	
20	Dili	Cristo Rei	Camea	Darlau-Fatu Ahi	7	100%	Nov-10	
21	Dili	Vera Cruz	Dare	Dare-Lelaus	8	100%	Feb-11	
22	Dili	Metinaro	Duyung	Benunuk-Bedquira	6	100%	Mar-10	Contracts
23	Dili	Metinaro	Duyung	Sahan-Bashae	3	100%	Mar-10	Contracts
24	Dili	Cristo Rei	Camea	Ailelhum-Manumata	2.3	100%	Mar-10	Contracts
25	Dili	Dom Alexio	Comoro	Toci Tolu-Masin Lidum	2.2	100%	Mar-10	Contracts
26	Lautem	Lautem	Ilalai	Dasidara-Liquidiga	11	100%	Dec-10	
27	Lautem	Lospalos	Muapatine	Muapatine-Malahara	9	100%	Dec-10	
28	Lautem	Iliomar	Iliomar	Arara-Ira Darate	8	100%	Dec-11	
29	Lautem	Lospalos	Leuro	Leuro-Sorulu	3	100%	Feb-12	
30	Liquica	Bazartete	Metagou	Fatumasi-Maometa	11	100%	Aug-10	
31	Liquica	Maubara	Vaviquinia	Maubara-Lautatabi	9	100%	Oct-10	
32	Liquica	Liquica	Hatuquesi	Nunuhau-Hatuquesi	8	100%	Jun-10	
33	Liquica	Bazartete	Fahilebo	Libalao-Fahilebo	6.3	100%	Mar-10	Contracts
34	Liquica	Bazartete	Ulmera	Ulmera-Quasit	2	100%	Mar-09	
35	Liquica	Bazartete	Fahilebo	Bucumera-Fahilebo	6.4	100%	Mar-11	Contracts
36	Liquica	Maubara	Guguleo	Loes-Faulara irrigation	15.4	100%	Oct-10	Contracts
37	Liquica	Bazartete	Leorema	Curluli-Manulete	3	100%	Oct-11	
38	Manatuto	Laclubar	Sananain	National road-Sananain	2	100%	Jan-09	
39	Manatuto	Laclubar	Manelima	Laclubar-Manelima	8	100%	Dec-10	
40	Manatuto	Laclubar	Funar	Laclubar-Funar	9	100%	Mar-11	
41	Manatuto	Soibada	Leohat	Leohat-Manlala	2	100%	Aug-09	Contracts
42	Manatuto	Laclo	Laclo	Bedquira-Laclo	14	100%	Nov-11	Contracts
43	Manatuto	Laclo	Laclo	Laclo-Hatukuna	6	100%	Dec-11	
44	Viqueque	Ossu	Loihonu	Loihonu-Weeulaek	5.2	100%	Sep-09	
45	Viqueque	Ossu	Ossu de Cima	Ossu de Cima-Builale	9	100%	Nov-10	
46	Viqueque	Viqueque	Kraras	Sukaer oan-Kraras	4	100%	Nov-11	
47	Viqueque	Uatalari	Loco Loco	Afaluicai-Loco Loco	3	100%	Feb-12	
TOTAL Rehabilitation				Completion rate	304	100%		

### Roads Rehabilitated on TIM Works

## 2 EVALUATION BACKGROUND

### 2.1 Purpose

The Terms of Reference (ToR) set out the purpose of the evaluation as follows:

*The proposed evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the TIM Works Project with regards to the relevance, validity of the Project design,*

*efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the Project implementation approaches, sustainability, gender equality promotion, monitoring and evaluation, knowledge sharing and learning environment.*

*The proposed evaluation will specifically examine the Project's achievement as a whole regardless of the specific contributions as per the project logical framework and contributions of each donor and budget delivery of each donor's contribution, including intended or unintended impacts and lessons learned.*

*The final evaluation will also examine to what extent the project has acted upon the midterm evaluation's recommendations.*

*The evaluation will document lessons learnt and good practices for knowledge sharing purposes.*

## **2.2 Scope**

The ToR set out the scope of the review as follows:

*The proposed evaluation will examine the TIM Works Project in terms of its progress, adjustments in implementation arrangements, partnerships, achievements, challenges, good practices, and lessons learned from the implementation of the TIM Works Project as per the Project Documents approved by the Governments of Norway, Ireland, Australia and the European Commission.*

*The evaluation shall include all TIM Works Project activities jointly undertaken by the SEFOPE and the ILO July 2008 to January 2012 and the planned activities for the remaining period of the Project (end of February 2012), as feasible.*

## **2.3 Clients**

The ToR identify the clients of the evaluation as follows:

*The primary clients of the evaluation are the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE), ILO, and the Project's four donors. The evaluation findings and recommendations will confirm and validate the achievements of the Project, provide lessons learned and be*

*instrumental in developing new projects of similar nature in Timor-Leste and elsewhere.*

The evaluation was undertaken by Martin Sergeant and Casimero dos Reis. The evaluation manager was Pamornrat Pringsulaka, Evaluation Officer based at ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific ROAP.

### **3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

#### **3.1 Methodology**

The evaluation began on 30 January 2012 with three days of reading key documents that had been provided by the ILO liaison office in Timor-Leste. During the same period, a briefing meeting was held with the Evaluation Manager in the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) in Bangkok. This was followed by a twelve-day visit to Timor-Leste from 4 to 16 February 2012 where a series of field visits and meetings were held. A meeting with the Senior Employment Intensive Investment Specialist in ROAP was not possible before the visit; but was held following the return to Bangkok from Timor-Leste. ILO also employed a national counterpart consultant, during the visit to Timor-Leste. Evaluation norms standards and ethics have been followed. There were no limitations or potential bias.

In the time available it would not have been possible to visit more than a proportion of the individual roads that had been built under the project. In the event 102km of the 304km roads rehabilitated were inspected. Meetings were held with almost all of the communities whose roads had been visited including beneficiaries. Meetings were also held with some district and sub-district officials. The ToRs for the evaluation required that visits be made to Liquica, Dili, Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem districts. All these districts were visited. Visits were arranged to include roads completed earlier in the project, roads recently completed, works carried out by trained contractors, as well as work rehabilitated using force account by SEFOPE. The simple logistics of organizing the visits led to some roads being included in the inspection visits whilst others were omitted.

Meetings held in Dili included the ILO liaison office, SEFOPE, the Chamber of Commerce, the Timor-Leste Confederation of Trade Unions, the Australian Embassy, Irish Aid, and the EC delegation. A meeting was arranged with the Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI) but failed to take place. A meeting was also held with a representative sample of the SEFOPE staff trained. Representatives of contractors who had been trained were invited to a meeting to discuss their experiences and seven people from four contractors attended. A presentation of initial findings was

given in Dili on 15 February to donors, SEFOPE and ILO. Of the donors only the Australian Embassy and Irish Aid were present.

The ToRs allocate five days for writing the draft report following the return from Timor-Leste. A further two days is allocated for finalizing the report in the light of comments from ILO.

### 3.2 Questions

The questions asked during the evaluation are based on those included in the terms of reference.

#### Relevance and strategic fit:

- Does the Project design effectively address the national development priorities, UNDAF, DWCP, and donors' specific priorities/concerns in Timor-Leste, noting that these priorities and concerns may have evolved significantly since mid 2008 when the TIM Works Programme was formulated?
- Were the Project's strategic elements (goals, outputs, implementation strategies, targets and indicators) achievable? Is the intervention logic realistic? If not, why? And what should have been done differently?
- Does the Project design effectively integrate the different interests and capacity levels of communities, contractors, SEFOPE, Ministry of Infrastructure in their roles as programme stakeholders, partners, implementers and beneficiaries?
- To what extent does the Project design and implementation strategy address the necessary synergies between the needs for improved transport network, employment generation, and administration and operational capacity of the government counterparts?
- What are the areas for further scaling up and reinforcement?
- Is the Project implementation coordinated with other ILO and government initiatives in rural economic development in Timor-Leste? What are those programmes?

Effectiveness:

- The extent to which the overall Project goals, immediate objectives, and expected outputs, qualitatively and quantitatively have been achieved or met?
- Examine the achievements of immediate objectives using stated indicators as per project logical framework (and as per project monitoring plan) and assessing the value of indicators at the end of the project against the baseline.
- In particular, what are the Project achievements in terms of:
  1. Infrastructure improvement
  2. Capacity building of government counterparts at the national and district levels
  3. Employment generation
  4. Community empowerment
  5. Contractors' capacity building
  6. Mainstreaming of youth employment and gender equality
- What are the adjustments that have been made in the programme implementation due to the midterm evaluations' recommendations? What motivated these adjustments? To what extent were these adjustments effective and enhanced the Project's outcome achievements?
- What are the Project's monitoring and evaluation arrangements to ensure that the Project is on track with regard to the expected outcomes? How is gender and youth mainstreaming effort monitored?
- What are the "surprised" achievements and challenges in the course of the implementation?
- In which areas of Project implementation where tripartism can be integrated meaningfully? The extent to which the social partners have been involved in the implementation of the project.
- What are the good practices and lessons learned noteworthy of documentation?

Efficiency:

- What are the partnership arrangements in the implementation of the Project at various levels, community, district, inter-ministerial, interdepartmental, and interagency? What were the challenges in the formulation of these partnerships? What were the results of these partnerships? To what extent the partnerships formulated for the implementation of the TIM Works Programme facilitate effective resource coordination (technical, socio-cultural, and financial)?
- Has the Project implementation benefited from ILO's technical resources and international experiences efficiently and in what ways?
- What are the experiences and results of coordinating TIM-Works different budget contributions including with the national budget? What is the government's budget contribution to the programme to date?
- What are the evidences of the cost-effectiveness in Project implementation and management?
- 

Sustainability and impact:

- Are the Project's achievements sustainable? What are they?
- What are the elements of the programme achievements that are not likely to be sustainable?
- What are the necessary action / interventions by the ILO, GOTL, and donors to ensure that the achievements of the programme can be sustained and provide a meaningful platform for further capacity building of the Government of Timor-Leste?
- What are the impacts of the project?
- What are the emerging impact of the project and the changes that can be causally linked to the project's intervention?

- How far has the project made a significant contribution to broader, longer term development impact?
- What are the realistic long-term effects of the project on youth employment, gender mainstreaming and capacity of government and social partners?
- Have the risks factors that need to be mitigated to ensure maximum and sustainable capacity enhancement after the Project ends been addressed?

## **4 PROJECT STATUS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY AREA OF EVALUATION**

### **4.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit**

#### *Development Priorities*

GoTL's Strategic Development Plan 2011 to 2030 includes commitments to strengthening rural access and to generating employment opportunities for the poor. One of the objectives is to rehabilitate all rural roads by 2015. TIM Works is therefore even more relevant in 2012 than it was in 2008 and meets evolving government priorities.

Para 37 of the current United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Timor-Leste 2009 - 2013 includes the following commitment - *The United Nations likewise will support strengthened community-based natural resource management, labour-intensive public works and development of a culture of resilience for response to disaster risks.* The TIM Works project is thus in compliance with the UNDAF.

ILO's Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) 2008 – 2013 for Timor-Leste, under Priorities and Outcome, in *Integrating Employment into Rural Economic Development* includes: *More employment generated by rural infrastructure investment programmes.* Under *Programme Strategy* it includes the following:

*The ILO will draw from its international experiences in employment intensive infrastructure programme covering planning, rehabilitation, maintenance, and training to assist Government of Timor-Leste and other development partners to center employment concerns in rural economic development investment and programmes. Technical cooperation projects will be implemented through a budget-*

*coordination strategy and in close coordination with SEFOPE's various employment-support services. Training efforts will target government technicians, administration and procurement personnel, small-scale contractors, and local communities.*

The DWCP specifically commits to the TIM Works project as part of the programme strategy. TIM Works was, and remains, consistent with the ILO DWCP.

Four donors have supported TIM Works during the course of the project. The first donor, Norway has withdrawn from Timor-Leste and no longer has a country representation. The contribution of the second donor, Ireland, ended on 30 June 2011. Irish Aid's Country Strategy Paper covers the period 2010 to 2013 and includes three pillars. TIM Works was funded under the first pillar: Service Delivery. Because of a good experience with ILO, Irish Aid is now funding ILO's Business Opportunities Support Services (BOSS). Because of Irish government cutbacks the programme and office will be closing in 2013.

At TIM Works project completion in February 2012, the only donor still providing funds was Australia. Timor-Leste is one of AusAID's three biggest priority countries together with Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. Australia is the biggest donor to GoTL and the "Australia – Timor-Leste Country Strategy 2009 – 2014" commits to further support to rural infrastructure including roads. Australia has already committed to a four-year successor project to TIM Works called Roads for Development (R4D), which will focus on capacity building of the government to manage the rural road sector and also carry out labour-based road rehabilitation and maintenance. R4D will be implemented by the ILO and will start in March 2012. Thus TIM Works remains in accordance with developing Australian policy.

The EC's contribution finished in December 2010. This was because TIM Works used stability funds, and so could only continue for eighteen months plus a single six months extension. The EC's Country Strategy Paper for Timor-Leste for the period 2008 – 2013 has rural development as a focus and this includes rural roads. A new, four year, rural roads project will start in 2012 under the title of Enhancing Rural Accessibility (ERA) and will continue much of the work of TIM Works in terms of contractor development for rural road works. ERA will be implemented by the ILO. The delegation is just beginning preparation of its next Country Strategy Paper (2014-2019) and this is likely to continue the emphasis on rural development and rural roads.

#### *Achievability of Strategic Elements*

The project was initially designed to last eighteen months and this was clearly too ambitious. The fact that the strategic elements were largely achieved after project

time extensions and with more funds suggests that the intervention logic was realistic. (See section 4.2 for outputs achieved.) The length of road was reduced at the time of the mid term review (evaluation) (MTR) although, with the additional funds provided by Australia, it was possible to complete slightly in excess of the 300km originally included in the indicators. The project was originally designed with a cost of \$15,000/km. The final cost achieved was \$22,000/km and even this has meant that costs were pared down to a level where drainage structures and road inclines were built that were not always ideal. The EC ERA project has been designed with a cost of \$40,000/km and the Australian Roads for Development (R4D) project with a cost of \$50,000/km. This indicates that a higher figure would have been more realistic for TIM Works.

#### *Integration of Stakeholder Interests*

Communities were involved in the construction works and community mobilisation took place before work started on the individual roads. In discussions, during the evaluation, communities were positive about the ILO/SEFOPE inputs at the start of the project, and during construction. This must be seen as a success.

Contractors were involved relatively late in the project. Two batches of ten each were trained. Nineteen of these contractors passed the formal training and were afforded the opportunity to tender for trial contracts as part of the overall training process. Seventeen of the contractors completed their contracts successfully. Only two meetings were held with communities who had worked for contractors and they did not report any delay in payment by the companies.

The initial output was for thirty SEFOPE staff to be trained and a total of fifty were eventually trained. The project team always sought more involvement with Ministry of Infrastructure (Mol) although there was no formal link. The link with Mol was one of the least satisfactory parts of the project.

#### *Areas for Further Scaling up*

This is the final evaluation report undertaken during the final month of the project. Any scaling up will be done as part of the AusAID R4D and EC ERA projects. This will include, but will not be limited to, further training for government supervisors, capacity building for Mol and training for contractors. The successor projects will also include rural road rehabilitation and maintenance.

#### *Coordination with other ILO and government initiatives*

TIM Works is coordinated with three other ILO initiatives. The Youth Employment Programme (YEP), providing labour intensive employment opportunities for young people is the main area of coordination. BOSS has links to the contractor training element of TIM Works. Labour Markets Information (LMI) also has links to the overall programme.

Other government schemes with links to TIM Works include the Ministry of State Administration's Local Development Programme (LDP) and District Development Programme (DDP) that funds a lot of projects for small infrastructure including water and sanitation. LDP's projects cost up to \$15,000 and DDP's up to \$150,000. The Local Government Support Programme (also administered by the same ministry) provides small infrastructure and support to local authorities. The government is planning a new initiative, the Community Development Programme (CDP), which will provide \$50,000 to each suco (village) with AusAID helping with the design of the programme.

## **4.2 Effectiveness**

*Extent to which goals, immediate objectives, and expected outputs have been met*

The project goal was "To contribute to economic development and poverty reduction by spurring growth in the infrastructure sector." The immediate objective was "Livelihood improvement and social stability in rural communities through rural development and employment generation." The original generic project document from 2008 had four verifiable indicators for the immediate objective whilst the most recent log frame included only three. The indicator that is missing is "Government 2010 annual budget balances rehabilitation and maintenance allocation". Clearly this has not been met whilst two of the other indicators, on the length of road improved and workdays generated, have been met after the project was extended and had more money made available. The final indicator is "Labour based methods integrated into national work fare programmes". LBAT methods have clearly been demonstrated effectively in the project and elsewhere. Workfare programmes have now finished except for those administered by SEFOPE and the successor programmes, all of which will mainstream LBAT methods

A total of 304km of road were rehabilitated by the project of which 102km was inspected during the site visits. The quality of road works seen was good. All the roads were to the same width: 3.5m carriageways with 0.25m shoulders. The roads were almost all in hilly or mountainous areas, which inevitably has led to some steep inclines of up to 15%. This leads, in turn, to the danger of damage from rainwater runoff and some damage was seen on the steeper slopes. In a very few locations,

where the roads are very steep, concrete has been laid on the carriageway by the project and this was certainly a wise move.

Pipe culverts were not used and small box shaped culverts with removable slab tops were used for cross drainage. The design has the advantage of avoiding excessive excavation and of making access for cleaning easier. Drifts and vented causeways have been used in many locations where the cross drainage flow would have too great to be accommodated by standard culverts. A very few larger box culverts have been built where the flow of water required it and there was no alternative. Side drains are usually unlined but have stone linings where the water velocity is expected to be high. Some gabions and masonry walls have been used to stabilise slide slopes.

Roads of this nature require regular maintenance and this is especially true in mountainous locations. There were some reported examples of communities undertaking emergency maintenance themselves when their road links were threatened. Many of the roads were being maintained by TIM Works during the visit so that they could all be handed over in good condition at project completion. The AusAID R4D project will carry out regular maintenance on the TIM Works roads for the duration of the project whilst building the capacity of the Mol to take over the role.

The steep nature of the topography meant that care had to be taken with the environment. The fact that the roads followed existing alignments, and that cut and fill was limited, meant that environmental problems experienced were not great. Engineers and supervisors were issued with guidelines and checklists on how to deal with different situations including side slopes, quarries and borrow pits. TIM Works have just completed a study examining how environmental issues should be handled in the successor projects.

All the donors interviewed commented on the effectiveness of the project. In two cases, Australia and the EC, this has led to them funding follow on rural road projects with ILO involvement. In the case of Irish Aid this has led to funding of another ILO project, BOSS.

#### *Achievement of Immediate Objective against Logical Framework*

The project was monitored against the logical framework and there was no separate monitoring plan. The immediate objective was "Livelihood improvement and social stability in rural communities through rural development and employment generation". Using the latest version of the logical framework the first verifiable indicator is "Total km of road networks restored/created." The target was originally 300km although this was cut to 231 km after the MTR. With the additional funds available to the project

from AusAID and the time extension, it has been possible to rehabilitate a total of 304 km.

The second verifiable indicator for the immediate objective is number of workdays generated and amount of cash injected into communities. Initially the indicator was to 1,037,000 days with 30% being women. The final figure was 1,370,000 workdays including 27% women and 44% young people. By the end of the project there had been 32,500 beneficiaries and over \$3 million of cash had been injected into the communities.

The third verifiable indicator was labour-based methods integrated into national workfare programmes. LBAT has certainly been mainstreamed into this project. The national workfare programmes are no longer in existence so that the indicator is no longer strictly relevant.

### What are the Project Achievements?

#### *Infrastructure Improvements*

A total of 304km of rural roads have been rehabilitated and 2,150 km have received routine and periodic maintenance. The quality of work done is good and the roads are being handed over in good condition. As noted above, the R4D project will take over responsibility for future maintenance whilst building capacity of Mol to maintain the roads.

#### *Capacity Building of Government Counterparts*

Initially the target was for 30 engineers and technicians to be trained in LBAT approaches. In the end a total of 50 SEFOPE staff working with the central and district technical teams were trained. This included non-technical staff in the central team who received training in data base management and other activities relevant to their individual roles. All technical staff received one month's initial training on LBAT, gender and socialization aspects. In addition to formal training they received "on the job" training from the ILO staff attached to the project. The latter was the most important.

During a meeting, as part of the evaluation, to discuss the training; staff were positive about the training given. Discussions with the staff trained showed that they all felt that the training received was relevant and useful. Training identified as being most valuable included labour management, and community related training. When asked what they would have done differently on the training, one of the engineers interviewed commented that he would have appreciated more training on

participation and specifically on how to deal with difficult people. Another commented that more training in soil testing would have been useful. The procurement specialist would have liked training in how to undertake company evaluation.

The SEFOPE staff interviewed were all on short-term employment contracts and commented that the three-month contracts they were on gave little security of employment. They also commented that they were paid on “permanent rates” but with short-term contracts. In other words they were paid the comparatively low wage rates normally paid to permanent government staff but without the additional benefits, in terms of job security, that permanent job status would bring.

### *Employment Generation*

As noted above a total of 1,370,000 workdays were generated. Of this 27% were for women and 44% for young people. There have been 32,500 beneficiaries working on the road works and \$3 million of cash has been injected into the communities.

### *Community Empowerment*

Community awareness training was provided at each of the 150 communities who worked on the 47 roads. This included training for the 175 community contractors. Community awareness training included meetings and discussions on the proposed work. For some communities HIV/AIDS training was tested out but the team did not manage to roll it out to all communities. There was also gender training for some other communities but only two per district to which community leaders were invited. There was also some numeracy and literacy training in association with YEP. On the job training for the workers in construction skills was included in the project.

### *Contractor's Capacity Building*

Two training courses were held for contractors each with ten companies taking part. Of these, nineteen have undertaken trial contracts with support from TIM Works. Typically a trial contract was 2 km long and the contractors were provided with support by ILO and SEFOPE. Seventeen completed their contracts successfully and the quality of work is similar to that achieved in the force account work undertaken by the project. Both ERA and R4D will continue with support for contractors. A total of 175 community contractors were also trained.

A meeting was held with contractors who had attended the courses. Only four of the firms trained were represented. Those attending included three directors, two engineers and two supervisors. The courses included some elements outside the

strict scope of LBAT including management and business planning. Those attending expressed satisfaction with the training provided and commented that there was no training of this type available in Timor-Leste from government or anyone else. When asked whether they would use LBAT methods more generally the response was that it was only useful for particular situations – by which they appeared to mean situations where its use was a contractual requirement.

When asked which parts of the training they found most useful the directors mentioned management training and commented that the ILO trainer was very good. An engineer found training in setting out and managing work the most useful. Another engineer mentioned that working with communities was the most useful part of the training to him. A supervisor commented that learning to manage work according to a budget was the most relevant aspect of the training for him.

When asked what parts of the training they would have changed one of the directors would have liked it to be longer. One of the engineers would have liked the training to be done with the sophisticated GPS based electronic equipment he was used to using. Two supervisors asked for training in asphalt despite the fact that none is used on the project roads.

#### *Mainstreaming of Youth Employment and Gender Equality*

The project exceeded its target of 40% youth employment with 44% being achieved. The target for gender equality was slightly missed with 27% being achieved as opposed to 30%. Both youth employment and gender equality were mainstreamed in the project but not yet in Timor-Leste as a whole. Ongoing support will be required in successor and other projects to promote mainstreaming in Timor-Leste.

#### *Response to Mid Term Review*

The Mid Term Review (MTR) was positive although it did include some recommendations for change. The project attempted to implement all except one of the recommendations and drew up an implementation matrix. These changes were motivated by a desire to improve the project. The MTR recommended that the total length of road rehabilitated be cut from 300km to 231km and that the project be extended by at least three months. This was initially accepted and the project extended by six months. When additional funds were available the higher figure was reinstated and the contract extended to 3 yrs and 7 months.

The MTR recommended that the project undertake more work on gender issues and this was done but the figure remained at 27 to 28%. There appear to be cultural and other issues militating against the achievement of higher rates of female employment

on roads in Timor-Leste. The MTR recommended that work be done to capture information on changes in traffic characteristics and other issues arising from the completion of the roads. An impact study was therefore undertaken. The study confirmed that there was genuine impact on the communities as the project team believed. The MTR also recommended that the project do more work on the documentation and dissemination of information about the project's best practices, challenges etc. This was partly met by the impact study and partly by the preparation of completion reports for the separate donors' inputs.

The MTR recommended that the project address the backlog in data entry for the computerized management information system. This was done. It was further recommended that the project minimize the variations in the number of days that participating households were able to work and the situation improved. It was also recommended that the project increase labour productivity and this was achieved. The MTR also recommended that the project strengthen its links with the District Employment centres with the intention of increasing participation of workers in numeracy and literacy training: this was achieved by strengthening linkages with the YEP project.

The MTR recommended that the project undertake before and after traffic counts. This was not implemented as the project team considered that the baseline was zero traffic and that final figures were very low. The impact study included some information on increased road usage.

#### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

No separate monitoring and evaluation document was developed but the project used the logical framework itself as the basis for monitoring. A database was kept including all beneficiaries so it was simple to obtain data on numbers, gender and youth for each of the roads.

#### *Surprise achievements and challenges*

The project team believes that there were many achievements but that not many were a surprise. One surprise was that two big programmes: R4D and ERA have grown out of the project. Another surprise is that GoTL is putting \$20m into SEFOPE to continue road maintenance work after TIM Works is completed.

There were a number of surprise challenges. Firstly there was the difficulty of getting villages to work with one another where they were both working on one road. A further problem was finding local compaction equipment (rollers) for hire. The weather in 2010 was also very wet and there was little dry season. Funding from

GoTL tended to be delayed at the start of the financial year. Despite a budget being approved, the funds were only available in the second quarter leading to a lack of financial control.

### *Tripartism*

Government was involved with the project at all times. An employment study was carried out at the start of the project and trade unions and employers were consulted at that time. Employers have been involved through the training of the contractors who then went on to employ unskilled labour. Decent work principles were integrated into that training.

A meeting was held with the Executive Director of CCI-TL, the chamber of commerce. The organisation has only been in existence since 2010 so had not been consulted at the start of the TIM Works project. The Executive Director was unaware of the project although he was involved in preparations for the successor ERA project.

A meeting was held with the General Secretary of KSTL, the Confederation of Trade Unions in Timor-Leste. He advised that only 15% of the work force was in the formal sector whilst 65% were in the informal sector including agriculture. The remainder were unemployed. He confirmed that the organisation had been involved in early discussions about the project and that he had visited once with an EC mission. He was aware that the project had been mainstreaming health and safety, and KSTL did receive progress reports. He had not been involved in any steering committee meetings and so was unable to comment on the details of TIM Works. The General Secretary confirmed that it was difficult to organize projects of this nature.

The chamber of commerce had not been involved in the TIM Works project and unskilled labour such as that employed during the project is not organized in Timor-Leste. Under these circumstances there was only some opportunity for meaningful integration of tripartism on the project as a whole.

### *Good Practices and Lessons Learnt*

Good practice and lessons learnt on the project are as follows:

1. Working within an institution such as SEFOPE was useful and contributed to the positive outcome.
2. Ongoing continuous training also contributed to a good outcome.
3. The use of training and trial contracts was a good way to develop contractors.

4. Contracting firms need be screened before they are accepted into a training programme.
5. The original 18-month project duration was too short.
6. Initial costing was unrealistic. It was based on other country experience and failed to take account of the need for more drainage and slope protection.
7. More compaction equipment should have been purchased early in the project.

### **4.3 Efficiency**

#### *Partnership arrangements*

The principal partnership was between ILO and SEFOPE. This worked well and SEFOPE were committed to the project. At community level the principle partnership was between the communities, represented by the suco (village) chief, and the ILO/SEFOPE teams that were working on their roads. Project staff also had regular meetings with district and sub-district staff who were initially responsible for identifying roads for the project and who had a watching brief for government on TIM Works.

Inter-ministerial partnerships included the MoI with whom meetings were held and who were consulted on the roads to be rehabilitated. Another partnership was with the Ministry of Economics and Development, although there was no formal link, because their remit includes rural development. There were discussions on how the rural roads coordinated with other rural infrastructure such as markets in the villages served. The Ministry of State Administration is responsible for the districts and sub-districts.

Interdepartmental partnerships within SEFOPE included the Labour Market Information Department and the Gender Adviser. Interagency partnerships included coordination with UNDP, IOM and WFP. Close partnerships were formed with the donor agencies funding the project: AusAID, Norway, Irish Aid and EC.

The principal challenge met in the formulation of many of the partnerships was that they were inevitably informal in nature. Whilst TIM Works sought collaboration with all relevant organizations, many were too busy to respond meaningfully. SEFOPE and the four donors were useful partners. The partnerships formed have led to the new successor projects and to the future financial allocations for SEFOPE to continue its work in rural road maintenance. Having four donors, however, meant that four separate sets of reports had to be prepared and there was some uncertainty as to when funds would be available. There were no problems on socio-cultural or

technical co-ordination as all donors were agreed on the basic approach to be adopted.

#### *Benefits from ILO resources and experiences*

The project has benefited from ILO's technical resources and international experiences because international ILO staff have been attached to it. They brought experience gained on projects elsewhere in the world including Africa and Asia. Technical resources in the form of manuals and other documents have been used on the project and have formed the basis for manuals produced in Timor-Leste and translated into the Tetun language.

#### *Effect of different budgets lines*

Having four donors led to additional administrative work in managing the budget lines. This included the preparation of separate progress and final reports for the four donors. There was no distinction made by identifying individual projects as coming from individual donors. The government contributed \$2.7 million in total. GoTL funds were usually delayed by three to four months at the start of the financial years.

#### *Evidence of Cost Effectiveness*

The roads have been completed at an average cost of \$22,000/km inclusive of all project costs. The initial construction estimates were based on a figure of \$15,000/km so that the final figure is 47% higher than the original estimate. The original estimates were based on figures from elsewhere and the TIM Works team believe that the initial figures did not reflect the additional costs arising from the mountainous terrain. These include higher earthworks, drainage and slope stability costs. The roads built by contractors averaged \$25,000/km which suggests that the higher figure is more realistic than the lower figure. The roads have not been built to an excessively high standard and there are places where further lined drains or a shallower slope would have been desirable. It should be noted that the forthcoming ERA and R4D projects are estimated to cost \$40,000/km and \$50,000/km respectively for roads of a similar standard.

All contracts followed ILO financial regulations and major inputs such as rollers or materials were subject to competitive tendering. At the time of the MTR there was some discussion on the norms being achieved by labour during construction. The use of task-based payment was new to Timor-Leste. The daily rate for labour increased from \$2 to \$3 during the project and the opportunity was taken to attempt to raise norms at that time. The team believe that norms improved during the course

of the project and that, by completion, they were comparable with what was being achieved elsewhere.

#### **4.4 Sustainability**

*Are the Projects achievements sustainable and what are they?*

The issue of project sustainability can be divided into two issues. Firstly there is the sustainability of the physical works – the roads that have been rehabilitated. Secondly there is the sustainability of the capacity building that has taken place.

The roads have been built to a good standard but it must be understood that they are gravel roads in a mountainous terrain where there is heavy rainfall during the wet season. There is, therefore, a need for maintenance. The project has carried out maintenance on all roads that have been rehabilitated and some other roads suggested by the districts. Before the project started little maintenance was done on rural roads in Timor-Leste and there is, inevitably, a danger that they will not be maintained. There are, however, good reasons to believe that the roads will be properly maintained.

As mentioned above, the new R4D project funded by AusAID will undertake maintenance on all the TIM Works roads whilst building the capacity of a new Department for Rural Roads within the Mol. This means that maintenance will be undertaken for at least four years whilst the capacity of the new department is being built up. Furthermore, SEFOPE, the key partner in the TIM Works project, will be given \$20million to undertake road maintenance by GoTL.

There is also the issue of the sustainability of the capacity built in SEFOPE and elsewhere in Timor-Leste. The training received has been effective and has enabled SEFOPE to partner ILO effectively. SEFOPE can now undertake rural road rehabilitation and maintenance. A new department has been established within SEFOPE and this will receive regular funding from government to undertake road maintenance. In the case of the contractors it will depend, to a large extent, as to whether they have an opportunity to carry out contracts using their new skills. There is always a danger that they will forget the lessons learnt and this will depend on the new R4D project providing opportunities for the contractors to work.

*Elements of the Programme achievements not likely to be sustainable*

Responsibility for road rehabilitation and maintenance will move to the new Department of Rural Roads at Mol and some of the engineers trained in SEFOPE will

move there too. SEFOPE itself will have funds to do road maintenance and, with the remaining technical staff, will certainly have the ability to manage simple maintenance. SEFOPE is unlikely to continue to be able to manage road rehabilitation and that will, in any case, be outside its remit. Other than this there is no reason why any of the achievements should not be sustainable provided the expected successor projects come into existence.

#### *Necessary Actions / Interventions*

ILO must continue with its proposed involvement in the R4D and ERA projects. GoTL must establish the new Department of Rural Roads in the MoI and make funding available for road maintenance through both SEFOPE and the MoI. AusAID and the EC must start the R4D and ERA projects respectively. All of these things are already happening and will provide a meaningful platform for further capacity building.

#### *What is the impact of the Project*

Following the MTR an impact study<sup>1</sup> was undertaken to confirm that the benefits to livelihoods that were believed to come from the project were real and measurable. The study was carried out by an independent consultant and covered a representative sample of the roads rehabilitated under the project.

The study found that TIM Works had made improvements in the livelihoods of the communities affected. As well as improving road access to the communities the project has provided average earnings of \$281 to those individuals working on the road. The improved roads had led to increased goods and passenger services along the roads. This improved the mobility of the communities and provided better business opportunities.

In addition to the above benefits the impact study found that the project was seen, by 96% of interviewees, to have managed the distribution of work fairly. Furthermore 98% approved of the way women were given an equal opportunity to work. For 83% of the participants this was the first opportunity they had in their lives to earn cash. The project also succeeded in providing labour opportunities to people in the 15 to 29 years age group, a group GoTL is anxious to target and which has higher than usual levels of unemployment. As well as earning cash from the project, the participants gained basic construction skills that may be useful in the future.

The impact of the project was discussed with communities during the evaluation visits. Many stated that they had spent the money earned on house building

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<sup>1</sup> TIM Works Impact Study , May 2011, Gorm Skjaerlund

materials, school needs (uniforms and books), setting up businesses (largely setting up small shops usually referred to as “kiosks”) and regular food and other consumables. Many of the communities mentioned the benefits of access to health posts and hospitals, including the ability of ambulances to use the road when someone was sick. Access to schools, markets and new public transport services including microlet (mini bus) services were also identified as benefits.

*Significant contribution to broader longer-term development impact*

The project has rehabilitated 10% of the rural roads in Timor-Leste. As noted above the impact study, carried out by the project following the MTR, has shown that the project is making a difference to the lives of the population. The project has also led to follow on projects that will continue the work of TIM Works so the project is leading to longer-term development impact and the benefits will not be lost when the projects closes.

The project has contributed to broader longer-term development impact and should have a longer term effect on youth employment and gender mainstreaming. The follow on projects will contribute on a longer-term basis.

*Realistic long-term effects of the project on youth employment, gender mainstreaming and capacity of government and social partners*

The project has certainly had a short-term effect. SEFOPE will get \$20million in 2012 to continue its work and will continue to emphasis youth employment and gender in its activities. Youth employment and gender mainstreaming are key objectives for GoTL and this is reflected in the Strategic Development Plan 2011 to 2030. Gender focus points are being established in each ministry. Work with the social partners has been limited in this project although there has been some training of contractors. The follow on projects will continue the work in these fields and will help to ensure that the effects are long term.

*Risk factors on capacity enhancement addressed?*

There are two principal sources of risk on capacity enhancement. Firstly the contractors may not be able to get any work and will lose interest in LBAT based work. The forthcoming R4D project will provide opportunities for such work although there is no guarantee that there will be sufficient work for every company trained. Secondly there is the possibility that the staff who have been trained at SEFOPE will leave. Engineers are paid only \$221 a month and at the meeting with SEFOPE staff there were some comments about poor conditions. So far as is possible the risk

factors have been addressed but the ILO is not in a position to address the issue of wage rates for government temporary staff.

## **5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE**

### **5.1 Conclusions**

The TIM Works project reflects the priorities of the government as set out in GoTL's Strategic Development Plan 2011 to 2030. The project also meets the evolving country policies of the UN and ILO as set out in the UNDAF and DWCP respectively. The project is also in accordance with the evolving country policies of the EC and AusAID, both of whom have committed to substantial rural access programmes with ILO as a result of their experiences with TIM Works.

The strategic elements of the project were achievable although only with more time and money than was originally included in the project. The intervention logic was certainly realistic and it was possible to complete slightly more than the 300km of road rehabilitation included in the original logical framework indicators. The initial estimate of \$15,000/km was unrealistically low and the \$22,000/km achieved is not unduly high.

Stakeholder interests were integrated effectively in the project. Relations with the communities were managed well. Relations between contractors and communities also appear to have been good. The target for the training of SEFOPE staff was exceeded with a total of fifty being trained compared with a target of thirty. Training for SEFOPE and others was a mixture of classroom and "hands on" training during work.

There will be further scaling up of the project but this will be as part of the forthcoming AusAid R4D and EC ERA projects. TIM Works is coordinated with other ILO projects: YEP, BOSS and the LMI. The project also has links to other rural development activities within GoTL.

The project goal was "To contribute to economic development and poverty reduction by spurring growth in the infrastructure sector." The immediate objective was "Livelihood improvement and social stability in rural communities through rural development and employment generation." Using the indicators included in the latest version of the logical framework both goal and immediate objective have been met.

A total of 304km of roads has been rehabilitated and 2,150km of roads has been maintained. The quality of road works seen on the site visits was good. Roads of this nature require regular maintenance and the project is undertaking maintenance on project and other roads to a good standard. The project had environmental guidelines and an environmental checklist for road works.

The initial target for workdays was 1,037,000 with 30% women and 40% young people. The final figure was 1,370,000 with 27% women and 44% young people. Attempts were made to boost the percentage of women but without success. By the end of the project 32,500 beneficiaries had worked on the road and earned a total of \$3 million. Communities were empowered through awareness training and some gender and HIV/AIDS training. Training of contractors was carried out effectively through training courses and trial contracts.

The project was intended to contribute to peace building by providing work opportunities for unemployed youth who had been involved in civil disturbances. By meeting and exceeding the target of 40% for young people employed on the project TIM Works has contributed to peace building as intended.

The project suffered from inadequate compaction equipment (vibrating rollers). It had been intended to use a mixture of hire and purchase and there were insufficient machines available for hire. There were also many breakdowns leading to delay on the works.

The MTR was generally positive and the project team responded effectively to the recommendations made by the reviewer. The project reported against the logical framework and there was no separate monitoring and evaluation process.

Partnership arrangements worked well. The principal partnership was between ILO and SEFOPE. Links with communities and donors also worked well. Links with other GoTL ministries were a little less effective as they were largely informal. The project benefited from ILO's technical resources and international experience. Having four donors plus ILO RBSA and GoTL funds led to additional administrative work in managing the budget lines.

The project was cost effective and achieved an average cost of \$22,000/km. Successor projects are expected to cost \$40,000/km and \$50,000/km so that TIM Works is seen to have kept costs to a minimum.

The physical outputs are believed to have been sustainable because arrangements have been made for maintenance through the successor R4D project. R4D will maintain TIM Works and other roads whilst building the capacity of Mol to undertake

maintenance itself. SEFOPE will continue to receive substantial funding each year to carry out routine and periodic maintenance on rural roads and has the capacity to continue the work. The sustainability of the capacity building undertaken with contractors will depend to a large extent on whether or not they have contracts to work on.

The project is seen to have been effective by donors and this has led to successor projects that will continue the role of TIM Works into the future. ILO must continue with its involvement in the successor projects.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

The TIM Works project is now at an end and there is no opportunity to implement recommendations on that project. The ILO country office in Jakarta and the office in Timor-Leste will, however, need to follow up and act on the recommendations. Any recommendations will also be implemented on the successor projects, ERA and R4D or on projects elsewhere. The design process for the successor projects has closely involved the TIM Works team and most of the key lessons learnt have been included in the projects. Inevitably many of the recommendations made will reflect the lessons learnt included in the next section of this evaluation report.

Recommendation 1 – Future time estimates must be realistic and based on experience in the same country if at all possible. The initial estimate of 18 months for TIM Works was clearly not achievable and it took 3 years and 7 months to finish all the work. **(Action ILO)**

Recommendation 2 – Future cost estimates must be realistic and must reflect the situation in country. The terrain and adverse climate in Timor-Leste requires that sufficient attention is paid to drainage and protection works. The figure of \$15,000/km was clearly too low and led to excessively steep slopes being included in some areas as attempts were made to keep costs down. **(Action ILO)**

Recommendation 3 – Future projects must include at least a portion of work to be constructed using private sector contractors rather than force account. This will enable contractors trained under TIM Works to use and strengthen the skills acquired under TIM Works. **(Action ILO)**

Recommendation 4 – GoTL must change its financial procedures so that funds are available at the start of the financial year rather than in the second quarter. This will enable projects such as TIM Works to draw funds down when they are needed. The benefits would be felt in all areas of the government's work. Furthermore, project design must take into account uncertainties in terms of levels and timing of

government counterpart funding and include appropriate mitigating measures. **(Action GoTL)**

Recommendation 5 – All partnerships with government departments must be clearly identified at the beginning of projects and must be formally established through memoranda of understanding or other appropriate agreements. **(Action ILO and GoTL)**

Recommendation 6 – Sufficient numbers of vibrating rollers for compaction must be bought at the start of a project. This must include sufficient for one roller on each road under construction and additional machines to cover breakdowns. Spare parts must also be purchased. **(Action ILO)**

Recommendation 7 – Contracting firms must be screened before they are admitted into a training programme. **(Action ILO)**

Recommendation 8 – SEFOPE staff working on the project are employed on three-month contracts. It is recommended that they be employed on annual contracts. **(Action GoTL)**

Recommendation 9 – On future multi-donor projects agreement with the donors should be reached to provide only one set of reports rather than separate sets for each donor. **(Action ILO and donors)**

Recommendation 10 – The Project was fully embedded in SEFOPE working closely with counterparts in all aspects of implementation. This created a sense of ownership and enabled very important and continuous the job training for counter part staff. The establishment of the Short Term Employment Department in SEFOPE with capable staff, was one of the key achievements, which was only possible because of this approach. Any future capacity building programmes should work with and through the institution it aims to build. **(Action GoTL, ILO and donors)**

## **6 LESSONS LEARNT AND GOOD PRACTICES ON THE INTERVENTION APPROACHES AND RESULTS**

### **6.1 Lessons Learnt**

The project team had many achievements but not many that were a surprise or provided lessons learnt that can be included under this heading. Lessons learnt include the following.

**The original eighteen-month project duration was much too short.** This was apparent at the time of the MTR when a six-month extension was agreed. With additional funding and time extended to 3 years and 7 months it was possible to achieve all the main outputs. It is important that realistic estimates of time be included in future projects.

**The initial costing was unrealistic. It was based on experience in other countries and failed to take account of the need for more earthworks, drainage and slope protection in the mountainous areas of Timor-Leste.** The initial estimate was based on \$15,000/km and \$22,000/km was achieved. Trying to achieve the lower figure led, in places, to sub optimal designs including the use of overly steep inclines on some of the roads. Future projects must be based on more realistic estimates of the cost. The forthcoming ERA and R4D projects are based on \$40,000/km and \$50,000/km respectively which are much more realistic.

A further lesson learnt was that **assumptions on the availability of local compaction equipment (vibrating rollers) for hire were overly optimistic.** The project bought some and hired others. Breakdowns were frequent and, as the rollers were a key piece of equipment, this delayed work on construction. In future projects adequate numbers of rollers must be bought at the start of the project and there must be spare machines to take over when there is a breakdown. Spare parts must also be purchased.

**It was difficult to get villages to cooperate with one another where they were both working on one road.** Many of the roads crossed two or three sucos or villages and there was often a problem in getting the communities to work with each other. One result of this was that communities would not permit workers from one suco to work on roads in another suco's area.

The weather in 2010 was also very wet and there was little dry season. **Assumptions on working days available were shown to be overly optimistic and construction work was delayed.**

**Funding from GoTL tended to be delayed at the start of the financial year.** Despite a budget being approved, the funds were frequently only available in the second quarter leading to a lack of financial control on the project.

**Contracting firms need be screened before they are accepted into a training programme.** Three of the twenty firms trained failed to get to the trial contract stage of the project. Screening them for capacity and genuine interest in the project would have helped to avoid this.

## 6.2 Good Practices

**Working within an institution such as SEFOPE was useful and contributed to the positive outcome.** ILO staff working full time on the project were restricted to the labour-based engineer in Dili and the three regional engineers. ILO staff, on attachment, undertook other short-term inputs such as the contractor training. SEFOPE was committed to the project and provided all the staff that worked in the field on the projects. SEFOPE's key role and the positive attitude of the director and others were crucial to the success of the project.

**Ongoing continuous training also contributed to a good outcome. This included training for SEFOPE as well as the community contractors, the regular contractors and the communities.** In addition to the formal training this included continuous "on the job" training. ILO trained SEFOPE staff continuously and SEFOPE staff trained the communities, contractors and others continuously.

**The use of training and trial contracts was a good way to develop contractors. The trial contracts gave an incentive to the contractors to attend the training.** During discussion with the contractors it transpired that there was little suitable training available in Timor-Leste and that this was the first training that many had attended. The training included issues not solely related to LBAT including planning and management and these were seen to be very useful by the participants.

## Annex A: List of Interviews

NAME	POSITION	ORGANISATION
<b>GoTL</b>		
Paulo Alves	Director Division of Employment	SEFOPE
António Amaral	Chief	Matahoi Suco
Estevão de Carvalho	District Development Officer	Viqueque District
Luis da Costa	Chief	Iliomar I Suco
Tomas Francisco Freitas	Administrator	Vemasse Sub District
António Augusto Guterres	Administrator	Baucau District
Carlos Alberto Guterres	Community Development Officer	Sub District
Joao Antonio de Jesus	Chief	Ailebaran Suco
Antonio Gomes Moniz	Chief	Builale Suco
João Pedro	Public Works Regional Engineer	
Abilio Quintão Pinto	Administrator	Iliomar Sub District
David Gerónimo Sanches	CDO	Iliomar Sub District
Felismino Babo dos Santos	Chief	Fahilebo Suco
Lucio dos Santos	Head of Dept Short Term Employment Creation	SEFOPE
Geraldo Romualdo da Silva	Chief	Caicua Suco
Cassildo Gomes Soares	Public Works Officer	Viqueque District
Francisca Mónica Fátima Soares –	Chief	Laga Suco
José da Costa de Sousa-	Secretary	District
Adolfo Pinto Ximenes	Chief	Iliomar II Suco
<b>Donors</b>		
Ruth Maria Jorge	Attaché	EC Delegation

<b>NAME</b>	<b>POSITION</b>	<b>ORGANISATION</b>
Pedro Campo Lopez	Attaché	EC Delegation
Amy Rose McGovern	Programme Manager	Irish Aid
Jeff Prime	First Secretary	Australian Embassy
<b>ILO</b>		
Roberto Pes	Chief Technical Adviser (CTA)	ILO Timor-Leste Programme Office
Pamornrat Pringsulaka	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
Chris Donnges	Senior Employment Intensive Investment Specialist	ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
Tomas Stenstrom	Labour Based Engineer	ILO Timor-Leste Programme Office
Vann Samsan	Regional Engineer ILO	TIM Works Project
Un Yat	Regional Engineer ILO	TIM Works Project
<b>Other</b>		
Rigoberto Monteiro	General Secretary	KSTL
Etelvino Mousaco	Executive Director	CCI-TL

## Annex B: Terms of Reference



### TERMS OF REFERENCE (Jan 2012)

FOR

**Final Independent Evaluation**

Of

**Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and  
Employment Generation (TIM Works)**

<b>GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE</b>	Timor-Leste (9 Districts, namely Aileu, Baucau, Bobonaro, Dili, Ermera, Lautem, Liquiça, Manatuto and Viqueque)
<b>STARTING DATE</b>	21 July 2008
<b>ENDING DATES</b>	29 February 2012
<b>WORK PERIOD FOR EVALUATION</b>	21 July 2008-29 February 2012
<b>PROGRAMME LANGUAGE</b>	English
<b>IMPLEMENTING UNIT</b> <b>Technical Backstopping</b> <b>Administrative Backstopping</b>	ILO Timor-Leste Programme ILO/ROAP ILO Office for Indonesia and Timor-Leste
<b>SOURCE OF FUNDS/DONORS</b>	Government of Norway, European Commission, Government of Ireland, Government of Australia, Government of Timor-Leste, and RBSA-Local Economic Development/Job and Infrastructure

<b>DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS</b>	USD 11,488,599
	TIM/08/M50/NOR: USD 2,334,615
	TIM/08/M51/EEC: USD 2,028,227
	TIM/08/M52/IRL: USD 1,311,712
	TIM/10/M50/AUS: USD 3,224,737
	Government of Timor-Leste: USD 2,392,800
	RBSA: USD 196,508

## I. Introduction and Rational for Evaluation

This Terms of Reference provides the framework for the final independent evaluation of the TIM Works project. TIM Works has been implementing since July 2008 and it will end at the end of February 2012. The midterm independent evaluation was conducted in January 2010. The final independent evaluation aims at examining the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and whether and to what extent the project has acted upon the recommendations of the midterm evaluation. The final evaluation will also document lessons learnt and possible good practices for sharing of knowledge and experience. The final independent evaluation will take place in January 2012. The evaluation will be managed by ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and will be conducted by external independent consultant.

The evaluation will comply with UN Norms and standards and that ethical safeguards will be followed<sup>2</sup>.

## II. Background and Justification

2. The successive crises in the young nation has drawn Timor-Leste communities into fierce poverty and social tensions and exclusion, creating ground for continued cycles of instability that prevent development and promote further social unrest. The Government of Timor Leste therefore prioritized employment and income generation as a key priority of work in 2008 and created the "2008 National Priority 4 Working Group - Employment and Income Generation". The Priorities set by the Government included creating jobs and income-earning opportunities particularly for young people, implement public works programs that can create significant short term employment and which deliver infrastructure services essential for growth and development, and development of a vibrant private sector for long term sustainable job creation. Infrastructure development and employment generating activities remain key priorities for the Government of Timor-Leste and feature prominently in the Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030.
3. The Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation (TIM Works), hereinafter referred to as the TIM Works Project, seeks to contribute to employment generation, poverty reduction, economic growth and peace building through the

<sup>2</sup>

UN Evaluation Norms and Standards and OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. See <http://www.ilo.org/eval/policy>

rehabilitation, construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure using labour-based (equipment supported) work methods. The capital component, capacity building and technical assistance receive external funding whilst the Government of Timor-Leste provides funding for the labour cost component of the Project.

4. The TIM Works Project makes strategic contributions to support Timor-Leste's national efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations Development Assistance (2008-2013), and the Timor-Leste Decent Work Country Programme (2008-2013)-Outcome 4 "More employment generated by rural infrastructure investment programmes." Specifically, the TIM Work Project supports the following national development priorities:
  - Providing sustainable and productive employment opportunities for a rapidly growing labour force;
  - Improving poor access to social services and markets;
  - Private sector development support;
  - Improving and maintaining rural infrastructure; and
  - Human resource development and institutional strengthening.
  
5. The TIM Works Project was formulated in 2008 in close consultations with the Government of Timor-Leste and the Project's three original donors, the Government of Norway, European Commission, the Government of Ireland, and with the Government of Australia joining the Project in July 2010. The donors agreed on the overall project approach, expected outcomes, outputs, and activities. The Project Documents for each donor are identical in most part with the exception of the budget and outputs sections whereby the expected kms of roads and worker days to be generated differ. Annex I presents the generic TIM Works Project Document, and Annex II includes a document providing a summary of the outputs for financing by each donor. Due to the different review and administrative process by each donor, the project budget has different implementation periods. However, TIM Works has been treated as one Project with inputs provided at different times. The table below provides details of the contractual arrangements.

Donor	Period	Amount		Remarks*
		Contract Currency	Amount	
Government of Norway	21 July 2008 – 15 December 2010	Norwegian Krone	12,650,000	Equivalent to USD 2,499,452
European Commission	1 January 2010 – 15 December	Euro	1,561,295	Equivalent to USD 2,428,142
Government of Ireland	1 July 2009 – 30 June 2011	Euro	975,000	Equivalent to USD 1,311,712
Government of Australia	1 July 2010 – 29 February 2012	AUD	3,300,000	Equivalent to USD 3,224,737
Government of	21 July 2002 -	USD	2,392,800	Pledged and

Timor-Leste	29 February 2012			administered directly by the GOTL
ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account	2008-2009	USD	196,508	With its own Project Document and own evaluation arrangements

\* funding actually received in USD may differ somewhat depending on exchange rate fluctuations

6. As of November 2011, the TIM Works Programme has made significant progress. It is implemented as a partnership programme between the ILO and the Government of Timor-Leste, represented by the Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE). SEFOPE, with the support from the ILO, recruited national staff to implement the Project in all districts under the Projects's coverage. A total of around 50 national staff were recruited and assigned to the TIM Works programme. These staff received day-to-day coaching support from ILO technical staff. On programme administration, an operational database in SEFOPE is instrumental for the monitoring the procurement of goods and capturing employment data generated by the Project.
7. Progress made by the TIM Works Project has been regularly reported to Project Steering Committee (PSC) in Dili, comprising representatives from relevant government counterparts, donors, and the ILO. Since Project inception, the PSC have met four times in October 2008, June 2009, November 2009 and May 2010. As some funding came to an end in 2010 (EC and Norway) and as new funding with reviewed design was provided by Australia, no additional PSC's were deemed necessary. Presented to the PSC included the Project's inception report and progress reports. The Inception Report, progress reports and completion reports are attached as Annexes III to this TOR. A Mid Term Review was carried out in November 2009. This exercise and the following PSC resulted in an agreement to reduce physical targets from the original project design to better reflect the reality and costs experienced on the ground. The MTR is attached as Annex IV to this TOR.
8. An impact assessment was carried out by the Project in early 2011 to confirm and validate achievements and impacts by the Project intervention. The impact report is attached as Annex V to this TOR.

### III. Client, Scope and Purpose of the Evaluation

#### Purpose

9. The proposed evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the TIM Works Project with regards to the relevance, validity of the Project design, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the Project implementation approaches, sustainability, gender equality promotion, monitoring and evaluation, knowledge sharing and learning environment. .
10. The proposed evaluation will specifically examine the Project's achievement as a whole regardless of the specific contributions as per the project logical framework and contributions of each donor and budget delivery of each donor's contribution, including intended or unintended impacts and lessons learned.

11. The final evaluation will also examine to what extent the project has acted upon the midterm evaluation's recommendations.
12. The evaluation will document lessons learnt and good practices for knowledge sharing purposes.

### Scope

13. The proposed evaluation will examine the TIM Works Project in terms of its progress, adjustments in implementation arrangements, partnerships, achievements, challenges, good practices, and lessons learned from the implementation of the TIM Works Project as per the Project Documents approved by the Governments of Norway, Ireland, Australia and the European Commission.

The evaluation shall include all TIM Works Project activities jointly undertaken by the SEFOPE and the ILO July 2008 to January 2012 and the planned activities for the remaining period of the Project (end of February 2012), as feasible.

### Client

14. The primary clients of the evaluation are the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment, ILO, and the Project's four donors. The evaluation findings and recommendations will confirm and validate the achievements of the Project, provide lessons learned and be instrumental in developing new projects of similar nature in Timor-Leste and elsewhere.

## IV. Key evaluation questions/analytical framework

15. Suggested evaluation questions – to be refined and finalized by the evaluator in consultation with the evaluation manager– are as follows:

#### Relevance and strategic fit:

- Does the Project design effectively address the national development priorities, UNDAF, DWCP, and donors' specific priorities/concerns in Timor-Leste, noting that these priorities and concerns may have evolved significantly since mid 2008 when the TIM Works Programme was formulated?
- Were the Project's strategic elements (goals, outputs, implementation strategies, targets and indicators) achievable? Is the intervention logic realistic? If not, why? And what should have been done differently?
- Does the Project design effectively integrate the different interests and capacity levels of communities, contractors, SEFOPE, Ministry of Infrastructure in their roles as programme stakeholders, partners, implementers and beneficiaries?
- To what extent does the Project design and implementation strategy address the necessary synergies between the needs for improved transport network, employment generation, and administration and operational capacity of the government counterparts?
- What are the areas for further scaling up and reinforcement?
- Is the Project implementation coordinated with other ILO and government initiatives in rural economic development in Timor-Leste? What are those programmes?

Effectiveness:

- The extent to which the overall Project goals, immediate objectives, and expected outputs, qualitatively and quantitatively have been achieved or met?
- Examine the achievements of immediate objectives using stated indicators as per project logical framework (and as per project monitoring plan) and assessing the value of indicators at the end of the project against the baseline.
- In particular, what are the Project achievements in terms of:
  1. Infrastructure improvement
  2. Capacity building of government counterparts at the national and district levels
  3. Employment generation
  4. Community empowerment
  5. Contractors' capacity building
  6. Mainstreaming of youth employment and gender equality
- What are the adjustments that have been made in the programme implementation due to the midterm evaluations' recommendations? What motivated these adjustments? To what extent were these adjustments effective and enhanced the Project's outcome achievements?
- What are the Project's monitoring and evaluation arrangements to ensure that the Project is on track with regard to the expected outcomes? How is gender and youth mainstreaming effort monitored?
- What are the "surprised" achievements and challenges in the course of the implementation?
- In which areas of Project implementation where tripartism can be integrated meaningfully? The extent to which the social partners have been involved in the implementation of the project.
- What are the good practices and lessons learned noteworthy of documentation?

Efficiency:

- What are the partnership arrangements in the implementation of the Project at various levels, community, district, inter-ministerial, interdepartmental, and interagency? What were the challenges in the formulation of these partnerships? What were the results of these partnerships? To what extent the partnerships formulated for the implementation of the TIM Works Programme facilitate effective resource coordination (technical, socio-cultural, and financial)?
- Has the Project implementation benefited from ILO's technical resources and international experiences efficiently and in what ways?
- What are the experiences and results of coordinating TIM-Works different budget contributions including with the national budget? What is the government's budget contribution to the programme to date?
- What are the evidences of the cost-effectiveness in Project implementation and management?
- What are the good practices and lessons learned noteworthy of documentation?

Sustainability and impact:

- Are the Project's achievements sustainable? What are they?
- What are the elements of the programme achievements that are not likely to be sustainable?
- What are the necessary action / interventions by the ILO, GOTL, and donors to ensure that the achievements of the programme can be sustained and provide a meaningful platform for further capacity building of the Government of Timor-Leste?
- What are the impact of the project?
  - What are the emerging impact of the project and the changes that can be causally linked to the project's intervention?
  - How far has the project made a significant contribution to broader, longer term development impact?
  - What are the realistic long-term effects of the project on youth employment, gender mainstreaming and capacity of government and social partners.
- Have the risks factors that need to be mitigated to ensure maximum and sustainable capacity enhancement after the Project ends been addressed?
- What are the good practices and lessons learned noteworthy of documentation?

**V. Expected Outputs of the Review****16. An Evaluation report ( approximately 35 pages excluding annexes):**

The report will comprise an Evaluation Summary (in standard ILO template) and the Evaluation Report with necessary annexes. The report shall be written in English and follows the standard evaluation report outline:

- Title Page (using standard template)
- Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- Acronyms
- Background and project description (and progress to date)
- Purpose of evaluation
- Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
- Project status, findings and recommendations by areas of evaluation (relevance and strategic fit; effectiveness; efficiency; and sustainability)
- Conclusion and recommendations by degree of importance
- Lessons learned and good practices on the intervention approaches and results
- Annexes, including but not limited to list of interviews, evaluation schedule, proceeding of stakeholders meeting, and other relevant information

The Evaluation Summaries will be prepared as per the template attached in Annex VI.

17. The Evaluation Report and Evaluation Summary will be written in English and their final forms will be submitted in print ready copy. **The final Evaluation Report will meet the minimum quality standards as per the evaluation report appraisal checklist as shown in Annex VII (checklist 4: Formatting requirements for**

**evaluation reports) and VIII (checklist 5: Rating for quality of evaluation report).** The final report is subject to final approval by ILO Evaluation Unit.

18. Quality recommendations in the evaluation report must meet the following criteria as stated in the The ILO Evaluation guidelines to Results-based evaluation: Principles and rationale for evaluation – Version 1 and the ILO guidelines for formating requirements for evaluation reports. The are as follows: -
1. recommendations are based on findings and conclusion of the report
  2. recommendations are clear, concise, constructive and of relevant to the intended user(s)
  3. recommendations are realist and actionable (including who is called upon to act and recommended timeframe)
  4. recommendations should be numbered (not bullet point)
  5. recommendations should not be more than 12
  6. all recommendations must be presented at the end of the body of the main report, and the concise statement should be copied over into the Evaluation Summary (that is, the concise statement)
19. ILO management will prepare management responses to the evaluation recommendations and action to act upon the recommendation will be undertaken and report to ILO Evaluation Unit in due course.

## **VI. Suggested Evaluation Methodology**

20. ILO's Evaluation Guidelines provides the basic framework, the evaluation will be carried out in accordance with ILO standard policies and procedures.
21. The evaluation is an independent evaluation and the final methodology and evaluation questions will be determined by the Evaluator in consultation with the Evaluation Manager. Several methods will be used to collect information in order to have the questions
22. Sufficiently mainstreaming youth employment and gender equality promotion, involvement of ILO social partners.
23. The Evaluation Terms of Reference has incorporated inputs and recommendations from the programme donors, national counterparts, and ILO technical and programming units. , Evaluation methods will include but are not limited to:
- Desk review of background documents listed below:
    - Project Documents
    - Inception Report Oct 08
    - Progress Reports Mar 09, Sep 09, Mar 10, Sep 10, Mar 11, Sep 11
    - Mid Term Review January 2010
    - Completion Reports (EC, Norway and Ireland)
    - TIM Works Impact Assessment
    - Steering Committee Meetings Report
    - Donor country strategies (as relevant)
    - Timor-Leste 2008 and 2009 National Development Priorities
    - Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030
    - Timor-Leste Decent Work Country Programme (2008-2013)
    - Timor-Leste UNDAF (2008-2013)

- Field visits, interviews and focus group discussions. The evaluation mission will visit a number of project sites which will give a representative picture of the Tim Works activities. This will include roads completed early in the project, roads recently completed, works carried out by trained contractors as well as work done in house with SEFOPE staff., rehabilitation as well as maintenance, visiting the western as well as the eastern districts. It is proposed to visit projects in Liquica, Dili, Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem districts and meet with local authorities and communities involved in these projects. The planning for the field visits will be done by the ILO Program in Dili.
  - Stakeholder briefing at the completion of the field mission, which will be organized by the ILO Programme in Dili, to discuss the overall findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
24. All data should be sex-disaggregated and different needs of women and men and those marginalized groups should be considered throughout the evaluation process.
25. The Team Leader will coordinate and facilitate the involvement of all key stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. The national consultant will support all activities during the mission to Dili. The Team Leader will further work closely with the ILO Evaluation Manager appointed specifically for this Programme Evaluation, who is not involved in the Project design, implementation, and monitoring/backstopping.

## VII. Evaluation Management

26. The evaluation will be managed by Evaluation Manager – Ms Pamornrat Pringsulaka, Evaluation Officer based at ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. She will be in charge of the selection of the consultants in consultation with ILO's Office in Jakarta, which is in charge of ILO programme in Timor Leste and ILO Timor Leste Liaison Office. The ILO Liaison office in Timor Leste will handle all contractual arrangements with the evaluation team and provide any logistical and other assistance as may be required. The evaluation team reports to the evaluation manager.
27. **The evaluator:** The evaluator will have strong background in project evaluation, capacity building, and local resource-based road works who has not been involved in the TIM Works Project design and implementation. S/he should have technical engineering background in employment-intensive rural road planning and rehabilitation. Familiarity with Timor-Leste and ILO's international experiences are a must. Language proficiency in Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, and/or Tetun is an advantage.
28. The evaluation will be financed by the project TIM/10/M50/AUS.
29. The cost of the External Collaboration Contracts for the Evaluation Team Leader and National Consultant will be in accordance with ILO rules and regulations. It will for the Team Leader comprise professional fees for 20 days, travel to Dili and the relevant districts in Timor-Leste, and applicable UN Daily Subsistence Allowance for the duration of 12 days in Timor-Leste. The national consultant will work with the Team Leader in Dili and in the field and will be remunerated for effectively 8 days of work.

### VIII. Time Frame

30. The Evaluation is scheduled to take place in February 2012

31. Tentative schedule of evaluation works is:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Work</b>	<b>Output</b>
2nd Week of January 2012	Award of contract to the Team Leader	External Collaborator Contracts
3rd Week of January (3 days)	Desk review	Evaluation questions
4-16 February mission to Timor-Leste, (effectively 10 working days including meetings, field visits and preliminary findings preparation)	Field works, interviews, preliminary findings drafting and stakeholders briefings	Preliminary evaluation findings and recommendations discussed with key stakeholders
20-24 February (5 days)	Report drafting	Draft report to be submitted to ILO no later than 20 February 2012
Feb 24-Mar 6, 2012	Sharing the draft report with key stakeholders for comments and inputs, Evaluation manager consolidates all comments and send them to the evaluator.	Consolidated comments sent to evaluator
Second week of March (2days)	Finalizing the evaluation report	Final evaluation report and evaluation summaries to the satisfaction of the ILO.  The final report shall be submitted to the ILO no later than 15 March 2012

#### Annexes:

1. TIM Works Project Document (generic)
2. TIM Works Outputs by Donor
3. TIM Works Inception Report, Progress Reports (6) and Completion Reports (3)
4. TIM Works Mid Term Review
5. TIM Works Impact Assessment
6. Evaluation Summaries Template
7. Checklist 4: Formatting Requirements for Evaluation Reports
8. Checklist 5: Rating for Quality of Evaluation Reports

