

**MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE JOINT PROGRAMME “EDIBLE OIL
VALUE CHAIN ENHANCEMENT”**

FINAL REPORT

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PROGRAMME CHECK-LIST¹

Programme title	“Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement”		
Programme ID	MDG-F-2053-D-ETH		
Basic data	Starting date : 01/2010	Expected closure date : 01/2013	Budget (\$) over 36 months
Implementing United Nations Agencies : FAO, ILO, UNIDO Government partners agencies : Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, Regional Bureaus of Agriculture, Labour & Social Affairs, Industry, selected municipalities (Adama & Bahir Dar)			
Covered area ² : West Gojjam (13.300km ²) and South Gondar (14.100km ²) zones within the Amhara region (Fogera, Dera, Merawi <i>woredas</i>); East Gojjam (14.000km ²) ; Arsi (19.800km ²) & East Shewa (8.400km ²) zones within the Oromia region (Limu Bilbilo, Digeluna Tijo, Hitosa & Tikur Inchini <i>woredas</i>)			
			Agency budget 3.000.000
Outcome 1 : <u>Productivity & competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oilseed is enhanced</u>			
Output 1.1 Improvement of the farm inputs supply	Indicator seed, fertilizers, chemicals distribution per year	FAO	362.600
Output 1.2 Facilitated access to credit for small holders & commercial farms to enable procurement of inputs	Indicator credit facilities supported through financial intermediaries for farm input procurement	FAO	130.000
Output 1.3 Enhanced market-oriented farming	Indicator number of oil seed farmers integrated into the formal market; amount of oilseed marketed by HH, numbers of farms contracted by processors to grow oilseeds	FAO	280.000
Output 1.4 Enhanced investment in the production of oilseeds	Indicator number of processors, refineries & oilseeds producers in the value chain	FAO	194.000
Outcome 2 : <u>Capacity utilisation and quality of the end product in the targeted oil seed processing plants is enhanced</u>			
Output 2.1 Improvement of oil seeds storage, cleaning and grading	Indicator n° of commune officials trained, n° of PPD-workshops organised, n° of provincial action plans developed	UNIDO	140.000
Output 2.2 Improved processing efficiency in the targeted oil seeds processing industries	Indicator extraction efficiency	UNIDO	59.200
Output 2.3 Improved safety and quality of products	Indicator number of HACCP certified processing plants	UNIDO	170.000
Output 2.4 More attractive packaging of the final product on the market	Indicator number of processing plants using modern packaging	UNIDO	175.000
Output 2.5 capacity of edible oil producers through PPP	Indicator number of studies commissioned, PPP ,study tours made, number of trained personnel	UNIDO	160.000
Output 2.6 Improved access to finance for the processors, including cooperatives	Indicator number of processors benefitting from financial institutions, number of loans provided to processors and number of special loans windows studies negotiated	ILO	70.000

¹ As per original PRODOC

² See maps of programme areas in annex 7

Output 2.7 Enhanced capacity of Business Development Providers to deliver services to the processors, including cooperatives		Indicator number of processors reached by BDS and number of improved services offered by the providers	ILO	56.000
Output 2.8 Strengthened occupational safety and health of large processors		Indicator number of safety and health committees in large processing companies, and number of large processors & cooperatives with an OSH management system	ILO	34.000
Output 2.9 Processors organised to get economies of scale, representation and voice		Indicator number of new associations formed that provide relevant & effective services to the processors, number of processors accessing market information, increase of the cooperatives, unions and associations membership	ILO	69.000
Output 2.10 Processors from the informal economy upgraded to switching towards the formal economy		Indicator number of informal processors registered and benefiting from BDS services	ILO	101.000
Outcome 3 : <u>Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved</u>				
Output 3.1 Vertical linkages between oil seed producers, traders and processors improved through clustering		Indicator number of networks undertaking joint actions ; number of BDS offering adapted services to small scale oil processors	UNIDO	180.000
Output 3.2 Linkages between the processors as the marketing agents enhanced		Indicator Amount of transactions between the processors and the marketing agents	UNIDO	30.000
Output 3.3 Access to finance for the marketing agents and marketing cooperatives improved to enable bulk orders & purchasing		Indicator Amount of transactions between the processors and the marketing agents	ILO	30.000
Output 3.4 Enabled marketing agents to access local, regional and international markets		Indicator Number of new export destinations; number of organised study tours	ILO	258.000
M&E and baseline				80.000
Joint Programme preparation				20.000
	Programme costs (US\$)	Indirect support costs (US\$)	%	Total per agency (US\$)
UNIDO	1.081.050	75.674	39%	1.156.724
FAO	991.600	69.412	35%	1.061.012
ILO	731.000	51.170	26%	782.170
TOTAL			100%	2.999.956

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Oil seeds are the third major crop in Ethiopia, accounting for more than 20% of foreign exchange earnings. This agricultural resource remains largely untapped due to poor competitiveness, poor quality, production & productivity variability. It results in chronic shortages and an ever increasing proportion of edible oil imports. In that context, developing the edible oil sector domestically has become a priority for the Government.

The recently drafted Agro-Industry Sector Master Plan in which the edible oil is clearly earmarked as a priority sector for development resulted in the elaboration in 2008 of a MDG-f joint program which objective was to enhance the edible oil sector in the country by improving the supply system of raw materials, improving the oil seeds processing efficiency and access to markets of relevant stakeholders. The programme is being implemented by UNIDO as the lead agency, FAO and ILO together with a series of national counterparts which include the Ministry of Industry as the lead governmental institution, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs as well as their regional and *woreda* level representatives.

The programme was initiated in January 2010 for a 3 years' duration. By late 2011, this mid-term review took place.

The objectives of the review were to provide key decision makers relevant independent information about the implementation rate and performance of the joint programme in relation to the planned outcomes and relevant Millennium Development Goals (Goal 1 – poverty reduction, Goal 3 – gender equity improvement, Goal 7 sustainable development).

The evaluator used a series of direct & indirect data acquisition methods ranging from documentary review to focus groups and individual interviews.

Findings:

The programme design reflects the Governmental and UN priorities, in particular those included in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty and the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation. The programme is geographically limited to 2 regions (several *woredas* only) and limiting itself to only 2 promising and overlooked oil seeds (niger seed and linseed). Both seeds are low productivity crops which are actually often considered as fallow crops by farmers. By focussing on the entire value chain, the programme adopted a holistic approach in which each component implemented by the agencies will be effective if the others are implemented in the same way. The programme is contributing to MDG1 (poverty reduction) by supporting farmers to enhance their productivity, MDG3 (women empowerment) as nearly half of small-holder beneficiaries are female household heads, and accessorily MDG7 (sustainable environment) by promoting sustainable and environmentally friendly land husbandry techniques and reducing urban pollution. The monitoring framework was straightforward (SMART indicators) but some elements were no longer relevant as have become their corresponding activities.

Although the joint programme design was an internal UN process, it was built on the Government long awaited Agro-Industry Master Plan. Government insisted on a simple design with few UN agencies involved, validated the joint programme design and was instrumental in the selection of the regions where the JP would operate. The programme start-up was negatively affected by several factors: parliamentary elections 6 months after JP signature, the splitting of the lead ministry into the Ministries of Trade and Industry, a 2 months payment delay to effectively initiate the activities and a design flaw observed immediately at the start of the implementation (lack of improved oil seeds in the country required to implement the FAO component – improved seeds distribution -). This situation

resulted in FAO switching to locally selected seeds but lead to a slowdown of the programme overall implementation rate. The 2nd budget tranche out of 3 (3 years programme) was therefore disbursed with delays.

1 person per agency was assigned to each agency; in addition, UNIDO contracted 2 cluster Development Agents who have a pivotal role in the sector clustering process. FAO relies nearly entirely on the regional offices of the Ministry of Agriculture for its component execution which has the advantage of enhancing ownership but resulted in serious monitoring issues partly because of too many programme officers (4) successively in charge of FAO's component. The reporting issues by the regional offices of agriculture have prevented the extension and deepening of FAO's technical assistance to the target beneficiaries; ILO uses a mix of direct execution and contracting consultants but makes little use of its partners' human resources.

Several kinds of working groups were created – National Steering Committee, Programme Management Committee, and Cluster Groups – but the twice monthly inter-agency technical meetings are the most significant resolving issues, creating linkages between stakeholders or coordinating the actions of the agencies. The JP has a Coordination Unit but the Coordinator shares 2 functions (coordination function and UNIDO's focal point), which results in very high workloads, no programme advocacy & communication strategy, and little time to effectively oversee the overall JP implementation process but focussing more on UNIDO's component. Still, the programme's clear design, effective attribution of activities has not required a lot of coordination efforts between agencies. In addition, the lead Governmental counterpart (Ministry of Industry) is fully committed in this joint programme and willing to solve issues whenever required (e.g. taking the role as a facilitator for the attribution of land to PLCs within both regions and monitoring closely JP progress).

With regards to producers' productivity and competitiveness enhancement, FAO modified its intervention approach due to the unavailability of improved seeds: it supported farmers with locally selected seeds with some success and in parallel initiated a short timed breeding process to provide by the end of the joint programme improved seeds as per original project document. Still the original JP duration is too short for the breeding process to be completed (hence the need for a programme extension). The original seed fund handed over to the farmers unions was not conclusive (little money spent) because of the unavailability of improved seeds.

In order to enhance the capacity and product quality of processors, UNIDO is in the process of providing cleaning equipment to farmers' unions so that processors purchase higher quality seeds; improved process was observed after trainings sessions and resulted in a productivity increase. Additional support (basic laboratory equipment) is being planned for the processors organised as a PLC but it remains to be seen whether the PLC will be operational by the end of the programme. ILO has remarkably succeeded in a very short time frame to organise the processors in associations and some of them into a Private Limited Company, provided to processors OSH trainings and created linkages between the credit sector and the processors.

The joint programme focussed on sector clustering to improve access of producers to local markets. In particular UNIDO succeeded in raising awareness and creating between stakeholders both horizontally between processors and vertically between unions and processors. However, several activities (international marketing & HACCP) are no longer relevant (too complex, unlikely to be completed by the end of the programme) and should be reconsidered as the programme is focussing more on the clustering process and less on export.

With barely 12 months of effective implementation and another 12 months remaining, the joint programme results remain fragile, requiring consolidation. This is the case for farmers which were exposed during 1 cropping season only to oil seed improved land husbandry techniques, unions which only signed PLC agreements and have not yet been effectively engaged into oil seed trading with processors or the processors themselves who still awaiting the land attribution process to be completed. Several types of actions should be considered in order to strengthen the results and make

the programme more sustainable, through more Governmental involvement as an exit strategy; e.g. FAO integrating its component activities into the regional and *woreda* agricultural offices work plans or ILO involving more its partners into the implementation of its component. The processors' associations are quite new with a year's existence and one way to strengthen them would be to accompany the operationalization of their strategic plan. The PLCs remain virtual and it is too early to discuss their effective existence as the common land for basic refining has not yet been attributed to the processors.

Lessons learned:

Design flaws like the unavailability of improved seeds can significantly alter the original results. In practice these effectively reduce the time span of the programme further complicating the implementation (need to speed up execution and/or reduce expectations).

By transposing elements of a policy document (agro-industry master plan) into a pilot programme, the agencies maximised Governmental support which is a critical element for sustainability and potentially scaling up the programme in the future.

The agencies were resilient when facing unexpected situations (unavailability of seeds, new institutional set-up) or proactive enough, not hesitating to amend the PRODOC results / activities to enhance the programme impact (support common processors' facilities). UN Agencies need not be static but adapt the PRODOC according to circumstances.

The programme endorsed a holistic approach to development by supporting the entire value chain. However, to achieve this, the PRODOC needs be straightforward with few or no overlapping activities between agencies, therefore favouring simple interventions.

Conclusion:

The agencies involved in the JP have been resourceful and innovative by overcoming the issue of lack of improved seeds and adopting the sector clustering approach through common facilities; while these are risky solutions, they have the full support of the Government of Ethiopia, should there be additional (legal, technical) constraints. This is an encouraging factor for success. The issue at stake in this JP is less the overall impact of the activities in the sector in terms of MDGs contribution but the feasibility of the adopted approach and whether or not it can actually result in improving the lives of the value chain stakeholders.

Recommendations:

In general: a 6 month extension is required to enable FAO to cover an additional cropping cycle and oversee the distribution of high yield seeds to unions and processors and, ILO and UNIDO to consolidate the results of the clustering process (including the provision of common facilities).

A major PMC meeting should be planned to review the PRODOC and adapt it to the new realities of the programme; in particular the unavailability of seeds and the focus on clustering and common facilities; several activities should be reconsidered or becoming low priority: e.g. HACCP, international marketing, PPP, labelling, packaging, branding. Newly available financial resources should be allocated for consolidation and scaling up whenever appropriate. This would require timely coordination efforts so that the 70% threshold is reached by all 3 agencies at approximately the same time.

An exit strategy should be elaborated as soon as possible taking into account the governmental counterparts interest in the intervention: indeed, it is unlikely that the clustering process will be completed by the end of the programme; additional efforts will be required, possibly from the Government's side. A task force made up of representatives of the Government should be put in place to discuss the planning processes and discuss what might be necessary after the end of the programme to achieve its objectives.

The clustering process methodology is new in this sector and should be documented.

For FAO: the agency needs to accompany more efficiently its counterparts by contracting 2 local focal points. Their mission would be to facilitate the local execution of FAO's activities but also to integrate wherever feasible the activities into the work plan of their counterparts (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture); testing of new confidence building measures (contract farming, voucher systems, crop insurance) are necessary to attract additional farmers into edible oil seeds cropping. The consolidation of the results should come in the form of an extension package available to farmers who already grew oil seeds in 2011 so that they are encouraged to grow the oil seeds the next season. The agency should raise awareness on oil seeds among primary cooperatives members with exchange visits, farmers' day events so that they are enticed to work more closely with unions and *woreda* development agents (divulging improved land husbandry techniques). FAO in cooperation with ILO should address the lack of working capital and capacity for primary cooperatives (storage, awareness raising on selling to unions & marketing activities, basic equipment / small implements, etc.) and wherever relevant involve Business Development Services providers.

For ILO: close monitoring of the PLC loan request should be carried out once the land area has been granted. The financial capacity of the PLC members should be clarified and the project amended (down-scaled) if necessary so that the loan process can be initiated as soon as possible. A business plan for the PLC will be necessary and require support (in association with BOLSA and REMSEDA). More efforts should be devoted to differentiate both the associations and PLCs and an emphasis be put on the association though the operationalization of its strategic plan and widening its membership basis. With new agreements signed between unions and the PLC or individual processors, the lack of working capital of the processors might become an issue if they want to use their equipment at nominal capacity or over a longer period after harvest time. This should be discussed with the processors. ILO should involve more its (regional) partners in the implementation of the programme e.g. by preparing together the actual delivery of activities, as an exit strategy. This role might be supported by the CDAs. OSH training should be scaled up once the PLC becomes operational.

For UNIDO: the Coordinator together with the Ministry Of Industry should devote resources on unlocking the land issue so that the programme can go ahead with the physical installation of the processors on common premises. With a basic refinery construction under way, the PLC members will be able to comply with new food regulations; still, many (non-member) processors are not supported by the programme. The association should bring value (e.g. representation, advisory role) to all those processors and the joint programme assess how they could comply with the regulations (low cost technical solutions) and/or accompany their process of change (become suppliers, engage in new activities, become specialised). So far, no advocacy and communication plan has been effectively initiated. This should be addressed all the more so as visibility is a key element for Governmental empowerment and ownership. The stakeholders under UNIDO's supervision should review the added value of the middlemen and assess how they might be integrated in the programme; so far they have somehow been excluded although they do bring added value to the sector through their flexibility, working capital capacity, etc.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialization
AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo / Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Development
AIMP	Agro-Industry Mater Plan
ASAP	As soon as possible
BDS	Business Development Services
BOLSA	(Regional) Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs
CSA	Central Statistical Agency
DBE	Development Bank of Ethiopia
EARS	Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute
ESE	Ethiopian Seed Enterprise
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEMSEDA	Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency
GOE	Government Of Ethiopia
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
HQ	Headquarters
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITC-ILO	International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation
JP	Joint Programme
LOA	Letter Of Agreement
MDG-f	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MOA	Ministry Of Agriculture
MOARD	Ministry Of Agriculture and Rural Development
MOFED	Ministry Of Finance and Economic Development
MOI	Ministry Of Industry
MOLSA	Ministry Of Labour and Social Affairs
MOTI	Ministry Of Trade and Industry
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PLC	Private Limited Company
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRODOC	Programme Document
RC	Resident Coordinator (of the United Nations)
RCO	Resident Coordinator Office (of the United Nations)
REMSEDA	Regional Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency
RLMC	Regional Level Management Committee
RTC	Regional Technical Committee
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises

SMART	Specific, Measurable, Accessible, Realistic, Time specific
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
US\$	United States Dollar
VC	Value Chain

The exchange rate between US\$ and the Ethiopian birr was at the time of the evaluation ±17,3 ETB per US\$.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background, context, program objectives

1. With over 1.1 million square kilometres and 90 million people, Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world. It has great agricultural potential thanks to large tracts of fertile land, diverse agro-climatic areas ranging from near-desert to sub-humid conditions, with topographic induced variations, and a large labour pool. The agriculture sector accounts for over 80% of exports. The principal crops are coffee, pulses, oil seeds, cereals, potatoes, sugarcane, and vegetables. Nonetheless, agriculture remains largely underdeveloped due to low productivity, weak infrastructure, and low levels of technology.

2. Oil seeds are the third major crops after cereals and pulses in terms of cultivated area. Rape oil seed (*Brassica spp.*), niger seed ('noug' – *Guizotia abyssinica*), sesame (*Sesamum indicum*), lint seed (*Linum usitatissimum*), safflower (*Carthamus tinctorius*), cotton (*Gossypium spp.*) are widely cultivated in the country with a strong basis in Oromia and Amhara regions. Oil seed exports account for as much as 20% of foreign exchanges earnings of the country.

Population (2011 est. ³)	90,8 million
Capital	Addis Ababa
Land area	1,1 million km ²
Agricultural land	20%
GDP (ppp ⁴)	94,8 billion US\$
GDP/capita (ppp)	1.100US\$
Literacy rate (2003)	50% (male) & 35% (female)
Inflation (2011 est.)	29%
Main exports	Coffee, qat, gold, leather products, live animals, oilseeds
Mainly imports from:	China (15,1%), United States (9,5%), Saudi Arabia (8,8%)
Mainly exports to:	China (13,9%), Germany (10,5%), Belgium (7,5%), Saudi Arabia (7,1%), United States (6,8%)

Table 1 : Country basic data
Sources: CIA World Factbook, Index Mundi, UNDP

3. While the country has the potential to respond to both domestic and export needs, the oil seeds sector is characterised by domestic chronic shortages of supply due to a combination of effects: poor competitiveness, sub-standard quality, production variability resulting in under-use of its production capacity. To compensate for this, the country imports over 60% of its consumption, mainly from Asia with palm oil, with an overall 5 fold increase over the past 10 years. Edible local oils cannot currently compete with large volume imports both in terms of price

and quality, and the sector development is also hampered by the presence of illicit oils sold informally.

4. Given its potential for export, the edible oil seed sector has been consistently high on Government's agenda and several Governments' incentives resulted in increasing oil seed production for export (mainly sesame) through its industrial development strategy, while initiatives to increase the availability of national edible oil on the local market have met little success. More recently, the Government devised the Agro-Industry Sector Master Plan in which oil seeds are a priority area together with cereals and coffee.

³ Estimate

⁴ Purchasing Power Parity

5. In that particular sector (oil seeds), the United Nations agencies in Ethiopia took advantage of the MDG-f⁵ funding opportunities and submitted for approval in late 2008 a programme to enhance the edible oil value chain sector in Ethiopia. The resulting joint programme combined the expertise of several UN⁶ agencies (UNIDO⁷, ILO⁸, FAO⁹) together with the Ministry of Trade and Industry¹⁰ to reduce poverty and gender disparities through improved commercialisation of oil seed production and increased competitiveness of the edible oil seed value chains.
6. The objectives of the programme are to improve a sustainable supply system of raw materials, promote an efficient processing capacity and improve for all involved stakeholders the access to markets. This framework approach will concentrate on integrating the private sector - linking the stakeholders - at every step of the value chain, from production and processing to marketing and business development services.

1.2. Evaluation objective

7. The objective of this mid-term review is to provide relevant decision makers with sufficient information to make an independent assessment of the performance of MDG-F-2053-D-ETH to date in relation to:
 - The achievement of the overall programme outcomes: 1. enhance the productivity and competitiveness of oil seed producers, 2. enhance the capacity and competitiveness of stakeholders involved in oil seeds processing, and 3. improve the accessibility of both local and international markets to producers
 - Relevant MDG goals: 1. 'Poverty reduction' (Goal 1 – halve the proportion of people living under 1\$/day and achieving decent employment for people), 2. 'Gender equity improvement' (Goal 3 – economic empowerment of women) and indirectly 3. 'Ensuring environmental sustainability' (Goal 7 – sustainable development).
8. The Terms of Reference are presented in [annex 1](#).
9. In addition, it will identify key lessons learnt, identify best practices and make practical recommendations for follow up.
As per ToRs¹¹, the consultant has been requested to pay particular attention to the following:

⁵ Millennium Development Goals Fund : pool of funds (528M\$) from Spain and managed by the United Nations Development Programme to achieve the MDGs; the UN agencies can get access to it through calls for proposals in several thematic windows including 'Development and Private Sector'

⁶ United Nations

⁷ United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

⁸ International Labour Organisation

⁹ Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

¹⁰ The original Ministry was split in 2010 into the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry

¹¹ Terms of Reference

- The design quality & coherence of the programme components, in relation with UNDAF¹², MDG and the degree of national ownership
- The Programme management model
- The effectiveness of the programme and its contribution to the main outcomes, improving the capacity and competitiveness of producers, processors aiming at increasing access to markets and ultimately reducing poverty.

1.3. Methodology used for the evaluation

10. The evaluation methodology was based on a 4 step approach: 1. Passive data acquisition (documentary review), 2. Active data acquisition (interviews & field trip), 3. Data analysis (turning data into relevant information), 4. Presentation of information & recommendations.

Several types of data acquisition methods were combined: namely focus group, semi-structured interviews; individual interviews were carried out during the mission and followed a detailed review of activities through the documentary analysis.

11. Specific sets of questions for each type of stakeholder (UN agencies, [non-]Government counterparts [national, regional and *woreda* departments], final beneficiaries [farmers, processors, Business Development Service providers, trade unions], associated programme partners [e.g. subcontracted partners like NGOs¹³]) were designed based on a check-list of issues which details for each evaluation criterion and evaluation question what kind of information to obtain, from whom and how. The detailed methodological approach is presented in [annex 3](#).

1.4. Constraints and limitations on the study conducted

12. The mission timeframe was very short and the JP¹⁴ geographical area too large to produce any statistically significant quantitative data. The programme activities are located in 4 zones covering over 61.000km² although only some *woredas* were selected within those zones and several activities restricted to both regional capitals. The evaluator was barely able to sample a few beneficiaries per project site.
13. The evaluation process was very well received by the UN agencies and Government. So much so that the evaluation was oddly constrained by the willingness of all institutional stakeholders (UN and Government alike) in participating to the interviews with both local stakeholders and final beneficiaries, therefore removing the independent nature of the evaluation process. It was a major constraint at the start of the field mission with all stakeholders present during interviews, therefore smoothing the opinions of interviewees.

¹² United Nations Development Assistance Framework

¹³ Non-Governmental Organization

¹⁴ Joint Programme

Through discussion, the situation improved over time although not as the evaluator would have expected as is standard in regular evaluations.

This showed the dilemma between carrying out an independent assessment and an internal participatory and learning evaluation process, or at least showed the difficulties in reconciling both approaches.

14. In both programme areas, the emphasis was put on meeting a wide range of beneficiaries (governmental, private sector related, beneficiary population) although little or no quantitative data was collected; in that context, the evaluator relied mainly on indirect information and crosschecking of information (*in-situ* field checks, stakeholders interviews, and documentary review) to reach certain conclusions and recommendations. The information was gathered from as many sources as possible. Accordingly, farmers, processors, BDS¹⁵ providers, Governmental institutions and some external stakeholders were therefore interviewed. A list of meetings and persons met is provided in [annex 2](#). The methods used included focus group discussions, semi structured interviews, individual interviews and a detailed review of the implemented activities and documentary review.
15. The field missions in Oromia and Amhara regions were carried out in full collaboration with the JP Coordinator who very efficiently provided contextual information on the local status of programme implementation, and on-site JP staff and governmental officials who accompanied the evaluator during the field trips. They also provided their own perspective on the programme.

¹⁵ Business Development Services

2. Description of interventions carried out

2.1. Initial concept

16. The program is financed by Spain through the MDG-f, which was created to contribute to reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Based on calls for proposals, United Nations agencies can tap in funds from 8 programme areas including Development and the Private Sector.

Five principles steer the access to this fund: 1. Programme ownership within national priorities, 2. Sustainability of activities, 3. Implementation (including monitoring and evaluation) focussing on results (and not activities), 4. Collaboration between the United Nations agencies, leading to joint implementation and, 5. A reduction of transaction costs through minimum bureaucratic processes.

17. Accessing the fund is done through the elaboration of a concept note (call for proposals from selected UN country offices as per Spanish Government priorities) which if accepted and after revision, is turned into a full scale programme proposal.

18. Several brainstorming sessions between UN agencies were carried out during 2008 after the MDG-f window on Development and Private Sector became open for proposals; initially, UNDP¹⁶, ILO, FAO, ITC¹⁷ and UNIDO were interested; in particular, UNIDO had carried out a previous similar project to upgrade edible oil companies, ILO was interested in supporting the marketing aspects of the programme as was ITC but for activities focussing on trade and international markets, FAO wanted to support the producers and UNDP was involved in supporting PPP¹⁸. In addition, UNDP, UNIDO and FAO were at the time supporting the GOE¹⁹ in finalising the elaboration of the agro-industry sector master plan for Ethiopia. The funding of a JP on agro-industry would have been an opportunity to translate several aspects of the master plan into a set of activities.

19. The Government through the Ministry of Trade and Industry insisted that the programme was to be implemented by 2 UN agencies maximum to avoid exposing the executing partners to different sets of procedures and bureaucratic processes. Still the concept note presented to the Secretariat included 3 UN agencies (UNIDO, ITC and ILO) plus UNDP with a minor role, and ITC withdrawing from the process. The Government also selected the original programme areas: Tigray (later deleted due to the presence of a similar programme), Oromia and Amhara. The concept note – final version – was sent in early 2008 with a budget estimate topping nearly 4.000.000\$.

20. A national consultant was hired to prepare a baseline report following the concept note outline and a full scale proposal involving UNIDO, ILO and FAO was presented in late 2008 with a budget over 3.800.000\$. Several versions of the programme proposal were reviewed

¹⁶ United Nations Development Programme

¹⁷ International Trade Centre

¹⁸ Public Private Partnership

¹⁹ Government Of Ethiopia

by the Secretariat, its budget trimmed to 3.000.000\$ and eventually approved in October 2009.

21. The programme concept took into consideration the adoption of a value chain approach, the PPP concept as well as several key recommendations of the agro-industry master plan. One of the main obstacles in improving the supply of edible oil seeds both on the local and international market has been the absence of an integrated value chain in which each stakeholder benefits from the added value of another ; indeed, the sector has always been fragmented and highly competitive down the value chain. Moreover, the absence of clear legislation on edible oil in the past has further contributed to this overall negative competition between stakeholders lowering availability, access and consumption of local edible oil for the final beneficiaries.

In that context, this programme was seen by the GOE as an opportunity to enforce newly passed legislation, strengthen the sector through stakeholders' clustering while at the same time empowering producers and trade unions to improve supply, and above all raising standards for both local consumption and possibly export in the medium term.

22. The main requirements of the Government were to make sure that the programme is aligned with governmental strategies and that the programme activities are being supervised and executed preferably by governmental agencies whenever possible.

2.2.Detailed description of the evolution of the programme

- The program document was signed in December 2009 for an estimated implementation period of 36 months (from January 2010 to January 2013). The programme was initiated with a launching workshop in early 2010 which resulted in the need for a fact finding mission to review the potential programme areas. Due to the parliamentary election in May 2010, the fact finding mission was led by UNIDO in July 2010 and involved all agencies and several governmental representatives. The mission was followed by the preparation of each agency's work plan. In late 2010, further diagnostic studies were carried out by the CDAs for UNIDO & ILO interventions as part of the UNIDO Cluster Development Methodology.
23. Following the elections, the Ministry of Trade and Industry was split into two ministries in October 2010 with relatively little involvement by governmental staff prior to settling the status of the ministry. The newly founded Ministry of Industry took over the JP leadership after the splitting of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
 24. As with other MDG-f programmes, a National Steering Committee and Programme Management Committee were established. The NSCs²⁰ of the MDG-f programmes in Ethiopia were merged in June 2011 for more efficiency into a single entity which would review annually all JP at the same time.

²⁰ National Steering Committee

25. Some developments significantly altered the way the programme would be implemented:

1. When FAO prepared its work plan in early/mid 2010, it became evident that the agency would not be able to gather enough improved seeds for distribution as per original PRODOC²¹ - this was a major shortcoming of the design phase -; the objective was to increase significantly oil seed production (and quality) so that processors would be able to link with producers to get raw material; actually, improved seeds were available in research stations only and for scientific research, not distribution.

FAO was able to obtain breeder seeds only, requiring several additional breeding cycles before certification and distribution by private farms and multiplication farmers; it substituted the original distribution activity with locally improved seed distribution (from regular farmers). This has probably significantly reduced the outreach of the programme and will require major alterations of the programme.

year	2010		2011		2012		
month	01-06	06-12	01-06	06-12	01-06	06-12	12
original PRODOC	high yield seed distribution	cropping season	selling to processors	cropping season	selling to processors	cropping / end of programme in 12/2012	end of programme
new formula by FAO	finding a solution: get breeder seeds & organise selection of local seeds		purchase of breeder seeds	cropping season	distribution of pre-basic seeds	cropping	
			distribution of local varieties	cropping season	selling to processors	cropping	

Table 2 : FAO component implementation modifications

With the new formula in mind requiring turning breeder seeds into pre-basic seeds and basic seeds, 1 or 2 cropping cycles at best would be necessary to have certified seeds ready for large scale distribution to farmers (an additional issue is cross-pollination, requiring possibly even more breeding cycles before certification); the length of the programme is too short for this. FAO first, would not be able to distribute high yield varieties by the end of the programme - at best basic seeds - and in any case, the programme would be closed by the time these new high yield seeds would be sold to processors (which is one of the objectives of the programme).

Therefore, FAO found an alternative solution: selecting on-farm local seeds for distribution while at the same time starting the improvement cycle of breeder seeds into basic seeds ready for certification. In any case however, FAO is unable to distribute certified seeds from improved varieties by the end of the programme which logically requires an extension of the programme duration to fulfil FAO's primary objective.

2. For UNIDO, the situation analysis showed that the oil seed market was highly competitive and fragmented; in that context, several activities considered in the PRODOC (like PPP or HACCP²² certification or international marketing) were not actually feasible before the stakeholders were actually brought together to discuss competition, quality standards, processing/marketing issues, etc. Therefore UNIDO

²¹ Programme Document

²² Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points

opted for getting the individual processors together around some basic common processing facilities; this resulted in the need to organise the processors into associations with a common goal (e.g. provide a basic standardised oil), to improve their process and requiring a common facility for additional processing capability (getting the processors together on the same premises).

26. Gathering oil seeds processors onto the same premises required the acquisition of land preferably nearby their previous activity (e.g. in a regional capital). This development not anticipated or planned beforehand is requiring support outside the scope of this JP (e.g. by the regional and national authorities). Now that the issue of common premises has been effectively integrated into the JP with the delivery of substantial JP activities (bring together the processors, support their installation & possible renewal of machinery, facilitate the lending processes so that common machinery is being purchased, etc.) there is therefore a risk that the JP smooth implementation might become dependent of resolving this issue.

3. Levels of analysis: evaluation criteria and questions

3.1. Programme design

3.1.1. Relevance

27. The formulation of the 2007-2011 UNDAF reflecting the GOE priorities resulted in the incorporation of the economic growth thematic through support of the private sector as a way to increase the income of the poor with labour intensive activities and increased productivity. This was pursued through the development of Economic Growth Corridors.
28. The programme reflects very adequately the priorities and strategies formulated both by the GOE and the United Nations:
 - The aim of the programme is to increase the income of the poor by increasing productivity and through diversification and to increase the capacity of the value chain stakeholders, as specifically mentioned in the UNDAF and PASDEP²³.
 - The programme will focus in the most promising areas and thematic where the effects of the programme might be maximised and possibly multiplied as recommended by the ADLI²⁴ strategy: the JP will support only the linseed and niger seed as a way to operationalize the AIMP²⁵. Both crops are currently overlooked but have a significant and unexplored economic potential. The programme is restricted to a sample of areas with the most adequate agro-ecological conditions in Amhara (linseed in Gonder province) and Oromia (niger seed in Arsi & Shewa provinces) as confirmed in the Ethiopia Agricultural Atlas²⁶; the JP will also focus on agricultural small holders, micro-entrepreneurs and SMEs, as specified in the ADLI strategy.
29. Oil seeds are currently being grown by farmers for their own consumption but they also allow them to earn additional cash whenever processing facilities are available in their areas. Many oil seeds are cultivated in the country; the 3 major oil seeds in terms of production are sesame, niger and linseed with secondary production of rapeseed, safflower and groundnuts.

²³ Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty – ref 7.1.4; note as well that the document mentions explicitly seed multiplication as an objective (which was not initially planned in the PRODOC but eventually included as an additional activity due to the unavailability of improved oil seed varieties for FAO)

²⁴ Agricultural Development Led Industrialization

²⁵ Agro-Industry Mater Plan

²⁶ http://www.csa.gov.et/docs/Atlas%20of%20Agricultural%20Statistics%202006_07%20to%202010_11.pdf
pg16-17

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		Average productivity (Qt/ha)
	harvested area	Production	harvested area	Production	harvested area	Production	harvested area	Production	harvested area	Production	
Oil seed NES (Neug)	274 720	147 759	285 237	159 820	313 445	190 752	256 794	157 847	247 611	144 847	6
Linseed	174 108	108 222	152 129	169 855	180 873	156 079	140 801	150 628	73 688	65 421	9
Groundnuts	37 126	51 080	40 198	44 685	41 761	46 887	41 579	46 425	49 603	71 607	12
Safflower	13 019	11 176	8 999	8 074	7 853	6 581	4 653	5 552	5 490	5 067	9
Sesame	211 312	149 387	185 912	186 773	277 992	216 741	315 843	260 534	384 683	327 741	8
Rape seed	30 637	29 206	34 584	47 721	33 223	38 664	21 247	22 628	13 455	..	10,4

Table 3 : Oil seeds production trends
 Source: CSA²⁷ 2010

30. The actual productivity of oil seeds is very low (compared with on-farm trials) and could be substantially increased to serve both the domestic and international markets. In the recent past, Government has put efforts on developing sesame (see Table 3 above), resulting in the production being largely exported and providing the country, foreign currencies. At the same time, niger seed and linseed remain largely underdeveloped with niger seed often considered by farmers as a fallow crop. Oil seeds are processed by small scale entrepreneurs and sold locally. The value chain for oil seeds is quasi exclusively controlled by traders which let demand and offer come into play to maximise profits at the expense of both producers and processors without producing much value to the oil seeds value chains. Further to this, the standards of local oil production are so low and varied between processors that the local food oil can on occasion be unfit for consumption and that the country is actually importing most of its food oil (palm oil) despite the production potential of local seeds. New GOE standards have come into force recently to try to regulate the flow of poor quality food oils.
31. Therefore, the programme was formulated in a way as to upgrade substantially the value chain so that the stakeholders can benefit truly from each other but also gain bargaining power and increase the availability of adequate quality food oils to the citizens. To do this, the programme planned to :
1. Analyse in detail the value chains so as to understand its strengths and weaknesses and review the opportunities (a July 2010 fact finding mission to assess the feasibility and implementing modalities of the programme by each agency). Choosing the most promising regions and oil seeds benefitting (ADLI).
 2. Improve the supply of farm inputs and credit to increase the productivity of the small-holders so that there is a regular supply of oil seed to feed the value chain; the objective is to control better the agricultural environment, increase both the number of farmers who grow oil seeds and the yields.
 3. Increase the production of oil by the processors through better organising the brokers and/or linking directly the producers with the processors to avoid food oil production shortages, and through PPP.

²⁷ Central Statistical Agency

4. Improve the efficiency, safety and packaging of the oilseed processing industries: this will be achieved by facilitating access to credit for the processors, enhance the capacity of BDS providers so that they can respond adequately to processors. By clustering the sector around common facilities and entities (associations), they will be able to increase their bargaining power (buying & selling and credit requests) and enable their products to comply with the new GOE regulations in terms of quality and safety.
32. In this programme, the approach is very innovative because each UN agency with its governmental counterpart will target specific value chain stakeholders with specific activities that taken collectively will contribute to enhancing the sector as a whole. It is called a holistic approach. However, to make this approach successful with 3 different agencies (UNIDO, FAO and ILO) and various governmental agencies would definitely require a strong leadership and efficient coordination.
33. The programme is logically contributing at achieving MDG1 (poverty reduction) through increasing the income of farmers with production activities, of processors with more efficient industrial processes and offering the end consumer locally produced and safe food oil as an alternative to foreign imports. The programme is also supporting women small holders - achieving MDG3 (women empowerment) - which account for 45% of HHH in Amhara and 20% in Oromia although the programme has not mentioned any particular gender specific approach for activities' implementation; nor was it observed during the evaluation process.
34. A monitoring framework was attached with the PRODOC. Most of the indicators are easy to collect – SMART²⁸ - and it was possible to confirm some positive trends (e.g. oil extraction efficiency, OSH²⁹ standards compliance, association creation, etc.). Still, due to the unavailability of improved varieties for FAO and the need to focus for UNIDO/ILO on accompanying processors in their aim to create a PLC³⁰, several activities are no longer relevant and/or largely delayed (improved varieties, international marketing, PPP, HSCCP, etc.); the indicators are of little use in that context; the activities should actually be reviewed together with the indicators.

3.1.2. Ownership in the design

35. Given its agricultural and export potential, and in order to reduce its dependency from imports, the oil seed sector is a priority sector for the Ethiopian Government as detailed in the PASDEP. In addition, the GOE adopted a policy response to Ethiopia's food security and agricultural productivity challenge through the ADLI strategy. This strategy sees developing smallholder agriculture and micro- & small-scale enterprises as critical to transforming Ethiopia's agrarian economy into a modern one and promoting cross-sectoral and integrated growth by differentiating potential areas. Finally, the Government drafted in 2009 the AIMP

²⁸ Specific, Measurable, Accessible, Realistic, Time specific

²⁹ Occupational Safety and Health

³⁰ Private Limited Company

with the support of UNDP, UNIDO and FAO which is focussing on oil seeds together with coffee and cereals.

36. For the Government, this programme was therefore an opportunity to operationalize the AIMP and at the same time respond to recently passed legislation in terms of food safety (prohibiting the commercialisation of cold processed food oil). While the programme design was an internal UN process between the agencies, the governmental counterpart – the then Ministry of Trade and Industry -, unlike many other JPs, followed very closely the formulation process and was involved through several validation processes (as the PRODOC was reviewed several times by the Secretariat).
37. One paramount point for the GOE was to avoid at all costs a complex programme. It strongly suggested reducing as much as possible the number of involved UN agencies. The GOE wanted at best two UN agencies; the JP was settled with three. In particular, UNDP was removed as an official partner although it remained within the PRODOC for several activities with UNIDO; activities like PPP, the promotion of dialogue between stakeholders including Government (possibly for facilitating the adoption of results?). In practice, these activities have not been initiated by UNIDO and are considered low priority in the new context of implementation for the agencies (focussing on clustering).
38. The GOE was decisive in selecting the regions where the JP would operate; initially 3 regions were considered: Oromia, Tigray and Amhara. The launching workshop and following baseline study would actually prune these to two to align better the budget with the realities on the field and JP goals.

3.2. Process level

3.2.1. Efficiency

39. Although the programme was initiated nearly right after JP signature, in March 2010 with a launching workshop, the first activities were delayed because of parliamentary election and full commitment from the lead Ministry of Trade and Industry was ensured only after it was split in September 2010. A couple of fact-finding missions were carried out right before and after the parliamentary elections, and the baseline study shortly afterwards. With the coordination unit team recruited by mid-2010, the implementation of on-site activities for all 3 agencies was effectively initiated only in late 2010/early 2011, nearly 1 year after the JP signature. Although it is a very substantial delay which can dangerously compromise the completion of the programme, it is no different from other JPs as per evaluator's experience.
40. So far, the effective implementation pace has been very slow: the 70% threshold necessary to request new funds was reached in September 2011 and the 2nd tranche (out of 3 tranches – 3 year program) received during that period. That is 21 months after JP start-up instead of 12. Note as well that the implementation rate so far has been very different between agencies, the lowest being FAO's. It negatively affected the implementation rate of UNIDO and ILO

which had to ‘wait’ for FAO before pursuing their activities and requested the 2nd tranche. Indeed, FAO needed to resolve first the lack of improved varieties, which delayed substantially its component and resulted in a 1 year delay. The first cropping season of oil seeds (selected seeds from farmers and breeder seeds with multiplication farmers & enterprises) was initiated in 06/2011. It is however highly unlikely that it could have started the year before due to the elections. Moreover, the fact finding mission which determined the JP implementation area was conducted in July 2010 (after the sowing season).

Therefore, the issue for the PMC³¹ since its debut has been how to implement as best as possible a 3 year programme in 2.

41. Three UN agencies are implementing the programme:

- FAO with 1 programme officer has delegated the execution of the activities to the Regional Bureaus of Agriculture of Oromia and Amhara through LOAs³².
- UNIDO as the lead agency is directly implementing its component with 1 HR at national level, acting as well as the JP Coordinator; UNIDO contracted locally in each region two Cluster Development Agents who are facilitating the component implementation; consultants are also employed.
- ILO with 1 programme officer is relying on a mix of local and international consultants and direct implementation with ILO’s staff and ITC-ILO³³ (Turin).

All 3 agencies are working closely with governmental counterparts either through direct execution as for FAO and/or monitoring and facilitation for the other two.

42. Monitoring and evaluation is carried out independently by each agency with little input from the Coordination Unit which is nonetheless overseeing the process so as to feed the PMC with relevant information and as per Secretariat’s requirements.

43. FAO is monitoring results through on-site visits and reports from its executing partners (Regional Agricultural Bureaus); monitoring has been very ineffective at reporting the execution issues encountered by the Agricultural Bureaus and adapting the work plan/resolving the issues accordingly: activities as per LOAs signed in January 2011 were due to be implemented within 3 months with 3 tranches (20% - 30% - 50%). 11 months later, FAO had not released yet the 2nd tranche and was still expecting to receive the initial financial/narrative report from the Bureaus. Those requirements were actually not clear initially for the Agricultural Bureaus which at the time of the evaluation were barely processing the financial information from the *woredas* and combining it to draft a narrative report in order to get the next tranche. This has had serious consequences on the implementation rate of FAO’s component: instead of funds being spent in 3 months for JP activities, barely 20% of it was spent in over 11 months, wasting valuable JP time while more funds were due to be allocated for further activities in that timeframe. As a result, FAO’s activities are being diluted (little money spent for few activities and/or few beneficiaries) and will impact negatively on the JP’s outreach. This lack of effective monitoring could also be

³¹ Programme Management Committee

³² Letter Of Agreement

³³ International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation

the consequence of high rotation staff within FAO: 4 people were successively designated as reference programme officers within the first 22 months of the programme. The same person follows the programme for ILO since its commencement and the Coordinator acts as well as UNIDO's component Programme Officer since he was contracted in 06/2010.

UNIDOs' monitoring of activities is done directly by both Cluster Development Agents and is straightforward. The clustering process though is being accompanied by an external consultant³⁴. The slow progress regarding the issue of land allocation to both clusters which is vital for the success of the JP has been presented at the last PMC for its urgent attention with so far a closer monitoring by the lead Governmental counterpart (Ministry Of Industry) towards the national institutions involved in the process.

ILO's monitoring of activities is performed by ILO's staff including ex-post monitoring of trainings.

44. Overall, the interviews carried out during the evaluation showed that all FAO, UNIDO and ILO's training activities of association/PLC³⁵ members, unions, BDS providers, farmers, while only carried out relatively recently (within the last 6-9 months) have hardly resulted in an overall adoption of messages; it is too early; the beneficiaries were more in an attitude of information taking than being already convinced; this was particularly the case for farmers who were testing selected oil seeds on small plots, of trainings related to organisational and financial management of stakeholders which did not result automatically in any behavioural change. At the opposite, several practical trainings were followed in a relatively quick adoption of messages like all activities linked to increasing the industrial process efficiency (although these have not been systematically monitored).

45. Several working groups have been formed for this JP to monitor and facilitate the JP implementation:

- Cluster Group: at regional level consisting of local stakeholders & beneficiaries: universities, unions, consultants, legal advisors, municipalities, industry leaders
- Regional Level Management Team: with representatives of the beneficiaries and all involved institutional stakeholders (agriculture, social affairs, industry, SME agency, etc.).

These 2 levels seem to have little or no decision taking power but discussions can feed both the Coordination Unit and each agency so as to improve their own component implementation. More pressing issues not resolved at regional level are convened to the PMC.

- Programme Management Committee: it comprises all 3 agencies, the Coordination Unit, and the main Governmental ministries including representatives at regional level. It is chaired by the lead governmental institution (Ministry of Industry). It is being fed with information by the Coordination Unit located within its premises. The PMC's role is to review what has been achieved and settle common issues. While all issues are presented, it is still ineffective at resolving a problem concerning an individual agency even though it could affect the entire JP; these are considered internal agency issues

³⁴ Consultant specialised in cluster development - <http://www.msme.foundation.org/>

³⁵ Private Limited Company

that need to be settled internally and are not brought at PMC level. In that sense, the PMC cannot fulfil its role – independent decision taking for the good of the JP – like supporting FAO when it has problems operationalizing its component because of a design flaw. On the other hand, the more pressing issue of clustering processors resulted in an overall close collaboration between ILO and UNIDO to support several intertwined stakeholders (e.g. unions / processors / BDS providers) but that was actually not tackled by the PMC but the inter-agency technical meetings. See paragraph [below](#). External factors that might affect the overall results of the JP are indeed being presented by the agencies for the attention of the relevant parties; it must be emphasized that the issue of land allocation, so critical for the success of the JP, is being closely monitored by the MOI.

- NSC: since 2011, it is meeting once a year and reviews collectively all JPs. The NSC made up of the RCO³⁶, MOFED³⁷ and AECID³⁸ is informed about the pace of implementation. While it has the mandate to take decision of a strategic nature, it has little or no expertise (and probably no time) to effectively review major issues and decide on the best course of action; these are left to the PMC. The NSC has been called upon for more general issues that Government and the RCO can facilitate like custom issues or facilitating dialogue between governmental institutions.

In addition, all 3 agencies meet on average twice a month (22 meetings since 06/2010) to discuss effectively the implementation / technical issues, coordination of activities (timing of activities, same beneficiary categories), which has so far resulted positively in the creation of linkages between the stakeholders (see 3.3 - Programme results).

46. UNIDO as the lead UN agency has created a Coordination Unit (Coordinator & 3 staff), which is overseeing the JP implementation rate and feeding the PMC with relevant information so that it can take informed decisions. The Coordinator is also appointed UNIDO's JP Programme Officer. This is considerably stretching his schedule between field visits, organising coordination meetings between the stakeholders and dedicating time to the actual implementation of UNIDO's component; he has little time to effectively oversee the entire JP implementation process and find innovative solutions to issues as they unfold although these could affect the JP results: e.g. focus on the processor's land issue, exercise coordination leadership together with the governmental lead ministry to resolve outstanding issues like speeding up the implementation of FAO's component by applying pressure on MOARD³⁹, entice a stronger involvement of governmental institutions within ILO's component, etc.

Given this situation, it is not a coincidence that the JP communication and advocacy strategy is going nowhere.

It was a wise decision for UNIDO to contract CDAs who actually act locally as the linchpins of this JP. It would have been wiser though for the sake of effectiveness to separate the functions of Coordinator and Programme Officer.

³⁶ Resident Coordinator Office

³⁷ Ministry Of Finance and Economic Development

³⁸ Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo / Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Development

³⁹ Ministry Of Agriculture and Rural Development

47. The UN stakeholders have so far not taken advantage of the JP to test new / amended procedures to allow a more efficient implementation process and reduce transaction costs, probably because there has been no need for it: while some JP results will require an efficient coordination of UN agencies actions, the effective implementation of the activities will not require integration, hence no need for new procedures. This is due to the JP design: the activities and areas of intervention of each agency are very well defined.
48. Several results will require UNIDO and ILO to coordinate their actions. This process is relatively easy because of UNIDO's permanent presence in both regions. In the case of FAO, some stakeholders might be the same with UNIDO and ILO but will not necessarily need combined actions. The programme looks very much as joint between UNIDO and ILO by necessity while FAO is running its component independently, the more so that it has no presence in the region and its component is entirely executed by a governmental institution reporting only to FAO.
49. The visibility and advocacy component of the JP has not been initiated. It has definitely been overlooked as there is no expertise neither in communication nor advocacy within the Coordination Unit. Each agency has the liberty to communicate on its own activities. Safe for the launching workshop, no activities have so far been carried out.

3.2.2. Ownership in the process

50. The local structures (Cluster Group, Regional Level Management Committee) ensure an adequate participation of all local and regional stakeholders into the JP implementation albeit exercising more an advisory role rather than decision-making.
51. With regards to FAO, the GOE through the Regional Agricultural Bureaus is executing several JP activities linked to farmers and small holders. It has full authority to act within the framework of the LOAs signed with FAO (using its HR, own methodology, etc.); 2 issues are involved with the ownership: 1. the LOA work plans and corresponding activities are not explicit enough for a smooth implementation; they are subject to interpretation which is why the activities went on for months without any revision and never followed the initial timeline; 2. FAO and/or the Bureaus did not take into account the regular staff activities; the JP activities were summed up in addition to the usual activities of *woredas* agricultural offices; this resulted in overburdening the local staff, which also contributed to a slow implementing process. The situation is relatively similar for LOAs signed with unions; these were unable to carry out the activities (inability to use the seed fund because of FAO's lack of improved varieties) and the contracts went dragging on without much activity. A close monitoring by FAO is lacking (it has no representative in the regions, unlike UNIDO).

52. Several stakeholders (MOLSA⁴⁰, BOLSA⁴¹, MOI⁴², FEMSEDA⁴³, REMSEDA⁴⁴) are involved in ILO's activities. So far, ILO conducted high level trainings but did not involve fully the institutional stakeholders in the implementation. This is particularly the case for MOLSA, BOLSA and REMSEDA which have remained so far away from ILO's component implementation, only regularly informed of progress through RLMC and PMC meetings but willing to contribute more actively in the JP implementation (e.g. through provision of services, trainings). Interviews showed that the organisations are not involved enough as they had expected initially and their potential contribution not sufficiently recognised by ILO. At regional level, this is partly because ILO is relying on the CDAs⁴⁵ who might actually not devote enough time to ILO's core activities (they were actually contracted by UNIDO) and ILO's counterparts. ILO does not have representatives at regional level as with UNIDO. Still, overall, the CDAs could be considered as focal points for ILO given the linkages between the 2 organisations and numerous positive collaboration opportunities that already arose.
53. UNIDO through its CDAs is working closely with the MOI at regional level although like ILO, the activities are being implemented directly in this case by the CDAs and subcontracted consultants with the institutional stakeholders accompanying the process. At national level, there is a very strong commitment from the MOI in following up this JP (the PMC meetings are often chaired by the Minister of Industry) and make it successful. It is because the GOE is very much aware of the issues at stake: improving food oil safety, expand the sector to increase the income of farmers and create growth through SME development, provide an alternative to food oil imports and possibly target exports in the long term. Therefore, it is important from MOI's point of view that this JP demonstrates the feasibility of the clustering approach of a sector, establishing a common processing facility and linking stakeholders as a way to promote economic growth – hence the value of this JP as a pilot initiative -. This is why it is important that the UN agencies focus on the essential, leaving out several PRODOC results that might not be so relevant anymore or might not achieve any meaningful result with the short remaining time span for implementation.

3.3. Programme results

3.3.1. Effectiveness

54. The value chain issues as identified in the PRODOC have been addressed so far as follows:
55. Enhancing the productivity & competitiveness of oil seeds producers (OUTCOME 1)

⁴⁰ Ministry Of Labour and Social Affairs

⁴¹ (Regional) Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs

⁴² Ministry Of Industry

⁴³ Regional Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency

⁴⁴ Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency

⁴⁵ Cluster Development Agent

As **FAO** was unable to supply improved varieties (no linseed and niger seeds available at the Holeta EARS⁴⁶ or ESE⁴⁷), it adopted a twin track approach: on the one hand, growing breeder seeds for 1 or 2 cycles in order to get basic seeds that could be certified and distributed on a large scale to farmers, and on the other hand distribute on-farm selected (local) seeds; ‘so far so good’ for the first option: multiplication farmers and enterprises grew the oil seeds (69ha); in both regions, several tours were organised to enterprises but none to visit multiplication farmers; this could be a missed opportunity to divulge the potential of improved oil seeds to farmers in ‘real conditions’ given that those living close-by were very much impressed by the productivity differences as observed during interviews. For selected seeds, over 269 farmers were exposed to new land husbandry techniques (some issues to be reported like the lack of fertilizer in some areas although that was planned in the *woreda* “agricultural package”) but some farmers were not willing to buy local selected seeds and used theirs instead. There is a risk as to whether farmers will indeed be convinced of increasing oil seed production with their own oil seeds or seeds collected close-by. Still, this is a pre-condition for processors so that they can indeed invest in improved processing (refinery) without the risk of running out of raw materials. In terms of impact, the contracts with the Regional Agricultural Bureaus dragged on for over 11 months instead of 3; the financial resources initially planned for land preparation and initiation of farmers to the growing cycle prior 3 months prior to sowing time were actually used for the entire cycle through extension advice. One can therefore conclude that the extension service intensity per farmer has been substantially weaker than what could have been anticipated. The impact of this activity might therefore be reduced resulting in a low adoption rate of oil seeds new land husbandry techniques. This should be a high priority monitoring activity for the remainder of the programme.

Access to credit was provided through a seed fund managed by farmers unions; it met little interest because farmers were not willing to request credit for growing locally selected seeds (instead of high yield varieties as originally planned). FAO will initiate in 2012 alternate activities to enhance farming like contract farming, warehouse support, crop insurance farming.

So far, 4 oil seed extractors expressed their interest in farming but there are no formal activities yet.

As a conclusion, the JP should focus both on consolidation so that farmers adopt new land husbandry techniques and expansion so that unions can supply adequately the processors organised into PLCs.

56. Enhancing the capacity and product quality of oil processors (OUTCOME 2)

UNIDO is providing to farmers unions 2 seed cleaning units (1 union in each region) so that these supply the market with clean products and therefore increase the value of the seeds; the cleaning units are also a necessary step to enable linking directly the processors (through a PLC) with the farmers’ unions; it is considered more effective to facilitate the cleaning of large quantities by unions than provide support to each processor. The bidding process was underway. One union had a lack of space and was addressing the issue at the time of the evaluation. The cleaning machines will solve one major issue: contamination of seeds by dirt.

⁴⁶ Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute

⁴⁷ Ethiopian Seed Enterprise

Two trainings on proper oil pressing and processing were provided to the processors ; it resulted for some of them in an immediate increase in productivity (2-3% increased oil content); some processors indicated their willingness to buy cookers but the vast majority are unable (or unwilling) to invest in individual processing facilities, which is why the agencies switched to clustering the processors around a common facility (small scale refinery) instead of supporting the most willing or proactive processors.

UNIDO plans to support the provision of laboratory equipment for quality control (feasibility study carried out already) and packaging material to both PLCs. Experimenting unrefined oil packaging for one processor in 2011, has been considered successful with orders accumulating after the participation of the processor to two trade fairs. As the equipment will be provided to both PLCs, it is necessary to have the refineries in place beforehand. HACCP does not seem to be relevant anymore because it is way out of reach of the processors capability; laboratory equipment is more adequate; with regards to PPP, the JP has been promoting the debate on oil seeds by having numerous workshops and formal / informal meetings of stakeholders.

Before the JP was implemented, the financial sector had shown very little interest in the oil seed agro-industry sector because the stakeholders are fragmented, unreliable and until recently not necessarily interested in integrating the formal sector. With new legislation in place on food oil quality standards, processors will need to upgrade their equipment. Without access to credit, it is unlikely that they will do so. The JP is directly addressing these issues through ILO's component: with lobbying (workshops, roundtables, forum, etc. on the oil seed value chain), **ILO** has raised awareness among the stakeholders - both the banking institutions and processors -; in particular, the processors are now more aware of credit conditions (the need or not for collaterals, the advantages in joining together to request credit, etc.). Processors anticipated this activity by requesting support to study the feasibility of a common refinery (one in each region), which should lead to a credit request.

At regional level, the most recognised BDS providers are coming from the public sector like REMSEDA. They are mostly sought for services because these are nearly free of charge. Private sector BDS providers exist but are under-utilised by economic agents like oil seed processors; still, they could add value by adapting their services to small-scale agroindustry specific requirements. So far, training sessions were conducted creating awareness; the interviews showed that private sector BDS providers could bring added value to the JP through their expertise (book-keeping, business plan development, legal advice, etc.) that could be used to upgrade value chain stakeholders like processors, unions, primary cooperatives.

So far, an OSH study was conducted and resulted in some modifications in the safety and working conditions of workers in the processing facilities. However a debriefing workshop is expected in early 2012. In any case, it is anticipated that the processors will move towards a common area and it will be necessary for ILO to ensure that processors comply with OSH standards.

As part as organising the processors to raise their voice and represent the oil seed sector at regional level, **ILO** has remarkably managed in a very short timeframe (6 months) through the CDAs to establish formally 2 processors' associations and 2 PLCs a little later. The vast majority of processors in both regional capitals were associated with the newly formed structures; interviews however showed that these still require capacity building; in particular

on the different aims of both types of entities. There seems to be a confusion of objectives in both regions: ‘the purpose of having a processor’s association defending the interests of the sector is to promote its members whose objectives are profit maximisation through a PLC’. This was further confirmed through interviews with other institutional stakeholders. The confusion stems from the fact that the members are the same in both entities. To avoid this would be to enlist processors not necessarily interested in the PLC created under the JP so that the association could truly embrace the interests of the sector as a whole.

57. Improving the access of producers to local and international markets (OUTCOME 3)

By clustering the sector around a small scale new industrial process (refineries), **UNIDO** has managed to network together very competitive economic agents (processors). It raised awareness among the stakeholders horizontally between processors and vertically between unions and processors (backward linkages). This awareness was further translated into concrete results: an association and PLC for the processors, agreements on demand and supply between unions and processors; the latter is particularly important because for the time being, processors are able to press oil seeds only within the 2, 3 or 4 months after harvesting, then seeds are no longer on the market; direct agreements with unions will allow the processors to increase the utilisation rate of their machinery by allowing them to purchase oil seeds over a longer period after harvesting time. This is an outstanding achievement given the short time frame. So far, it has not resulted in any increased trade of oil seeds because the PLC is still inoperative but for the time being, it is hoped that individual processors will be able to supply themselves straight from the unions through the PLC while awaiting the effective installation of a common refinery. Forward linkages have also been created between several processors and Addis Modjo Edible Oil Complex that has little oil pressing capacity. Processors participated in several exhibitions and fairs, some with positive results (see [above](#)). Marketing the products with **ILO**’s support e.g. through proper packaging (standardised containers, labelling, branding) is not yet a priority because both regional refineries are still at the feasibility stage. International marketing (& export) as mentioned in outcome 3 seems to be a very remote prospect given the sequence of results to be still achieved beforehand: 1. getting a common land for processors, 2. construct basic infrastructures, 3. Move the existing processors machinery (or install new ones as per processor’s preference and financial means), 4. request a loan and import the refinery machinery, 5. incorporate JP packaging machinery and laboratory equipment, 6. install the machinery and test the new industrialised process, 7. contract staff to run the PLC and sell to final product...

Both **UNIDO** and **ILO** have very efficiently taken advantage of local expertise by subcontracting Adama & Bahir Dar universities for several studies like the plant feasibility study and the study on the architectural design of the industrial process (in each region). Both UN agencies supported the unions through various types of capacity building activities (book-keeping, provision of materials, networking capability, web site design). The activities are still under way.

58. The success of the outcomes will be dependent on how the JP can speed up the implementation and how much extension time will be allowed to complete the clustering process. Nonetheless, all 3 agencies already indicated that the JP time frame with or without

an extension might be too short to achieve all the results as mentioned in the PRODOC, and that the agencies should focus on activities that will be sustained in the long run and consolidate what has been achieved so far. This is not enough though; more importantly is the need to involve more closely the governmental institutions in the JP implementation as a way to take over by the end of the programme (see chapter 3.4 on Sustainability below).

59. So far, it is too early to detect effects on MDG1 (poverty reduction). Nonetheless, one can anticipate that the clustering process will have very positive effects on the income of farmers (and indirectly on women – MDG 3) if FAO manages to attract enough farmers in cultivating more oil seeds – preferably high yields varieties – so that processors (possibly the PLCs) will be able to supply themselves at the unions with high grade oil seeds. This would require a good coordination between primary cooperatives and unions although the JP does not address so far the weaknesses of primary cooperatives. Any positive effect of the JP on the environment (MDG 7) will come indirectly from increased areas of oil seeds; niger seed and linseeds are indeed requiring very little inputs (much less fertiliser & pesticide than other crops). On the consumer side, prices might slightly decrease mechanically if larger volumes are involved but one of the objectives of the JP is to add value (safety & quality) to products placed on the market through a new industrial process. Prices should logically increase. However, there is a specific demand for locally produced food oils: niger and linseed oil should not compete with low cost imported palm oil.

3.4. Sustainability

60. After an effective 12 or 14 months of implementation (since late 2010), most of the programme results are still fragile and should not be taken for granted. They will require consolidation (e.g. repeat certain types of trainings, expand these to value chain stakeholders not initially considered for support, increase the number of beneficiary farmers to expand the production basis to sustainable levels for processors and/or a refinery, etc.).
61. On the bright side, this programme is closely watched by the Ministry of Industry which is keen to take its role as a facilitator whenever necessary to unlock problematic situations or provide support to the agencies and their counterparts accordingly (e.g. land issue). Given the strategic nature of the sector for the Ministry, its potential in terms of growth and the pilot nature of the JP, it is highly unlikely that the GOE will cease to support entirely the clustering process by the end of the JP. The other institutional stakeholders are somehow standing back although they are indeed active participants in the numerous JP induced meetings (cluster group, RLMC, PMC, etc.). They have not yet become empowered with the results of the JP, possibly because it is too early: Regional Bureaus are subcontracted institutions and FAO has never discussed how to integrate the JP activities in the Agricultural Bureaus annual or multiannual work plans. BOLSA, REMSEDA were convened by ILO to discuss the operationalization of the JP but their involvement (active participation of HR) so far has been weak although there is a demand for it. These issues should be addressed by the JP, possibly

as an exit strategy by early 2013 (the earlier the better though) if a JP extension is being granted.

62. As mentioned above, FAO's support has been considerably delayed and amended by necessity (or JP design flaw); less has been done in too little time. When the programme will be closed in 12/2012, FAO will have followed 2 cropping cycles of selected local seeds that might not attract too much interest from farmers (stopgap measure) and turned breeder seeds into basic seeds. No further support (certification, distribution of basic seeds) will be possible from harvesting time (JP closure period) hence turning several results of outcome 1 ineffective. It is therefore paramount to extend the JP duration so that FAO is able to finalise in adequate conditions its support to farmers by accompanying the distribution of basic / certified high yield seeds to farmers and ensure follow-up and advice of farmers at harvesting time of the second cropping cycle. Interviews of farmers who visited multiplication farms (breeder seeds cultivation) showed that they were particularly impressed with the differences in productivity and were interested in cultivating these high yield varieties. By the end of programme, FAO should therefore enable interested farmers (the most proactive ones that grew selected local seeds) in getting high yield varieties before the end of the JP so that they might be able at least to contribute to the value chain as per original JP objective in the following years. To ensure the sustainability of the supply side of the value chain, efforts have been made to increase the capacity of unions (new cleaning material from UNIDO, capacity building trainings with ILO), neglecting the supply chain to the unions: interviews showed that primary cooperatives are so weak that efficient unions entirely bypass them when purchasing agricultural products (to be more effective) due to their lack of storage capacity although they do add value to the supply side by enabling large quantities to be collected by unions (efficiency). For the moment, primary cooperatives are used primarily to supply inputs. That would be all the more important if large numbers of farmers were to grow oil seeds because of JP support. For the sake of sustainability this issue should be urgently addressed for the remainder of the JP.
63. ILO has managed to formalise both PLCs and processors' associations. Although the strategic plan of the associations has been drafted with the support of a consultant through ILO, the associations' sustainability still has to be put to the test independently from any future operational PLC. The challenge for the associations will be how best to attract processors who might not have the capacity to follow the JP processors in upgrading their installations to meet the new legal standards or joining the PLC altogether. Hence the need to find cogent arguments (e.g. representative capacity of the sector, leverage power to influence GOE decision taking in the sector, advise & expertise, etc.). Further to this, as the members in both PLCs and associations are nearly the same, there is a risk that the public and the institutions will make little difference between the associations and PLCs with a resulting loss of credibility. One way to avoid this would be to increase their number of members so as to clearly discriminate their aims from the PLCs'. This could only be achieved by widening geographically the processors membership basis.
64. The clustering process has only been initiated over 1 year ago. Specialists indicate that it can take over 5 or 6 years (experience in India) to organise the sector through clustering. Opting

for common facilities (that was not anticipated in the PRODOC) has further complicated the implementation of the programme because it requires bringing together the processors and their machinery on a piece of land: obtaining land is out of scope for the UN agencies; UNIDO took a chance and put its faith into a swift process to grant a piece of land to the processors. Interviews showed that the institutional stakeholders (Ministry of Industry to begin with) are willing to support the processors but the size of the area has proved so far an issue requiring a detailed analysis of the industrial process in order to optimise the necessary land area and is delaying the process with negative consequences given the short remaining lifespan of the JP. If it is indeed granted, then several JP activities will follow immediately but won't probably be completed by the end of the programme. An extension of the programme is justified so that UNIDO can accompany as far as possible the clustering process (see paragraph 57 – last sentence).

65. Therefore, the sustainability of the programme will be ensured through consolidating the current achievements (e.g. strengthening the associations & PLC), adding specific activities that could further consolidate the JP results (e.g. address the primary cooperatives weaknesses) but also being able to complete the clustering process (in particular the small-scale refineries) either within the JP lifespan which looks ever more unlikely or make all necessary provisions so that governmental institutions (MOI, MOARD, FEMSEDA, MOLSA) are empowered with the JP results by the end of it and have integrated this particular clustering exercise into their own development priorities.

4. Lessons learned / conclusion

66. The unavailability of high yield seeds has resulted in FAO modifying its intervention approach with the original goal unlikely to be met (distribution of high yield oil seeds). Finding an alternative resulted in effectively shortening the lifespan of the intervention for FAO, which by development standards is very short.

Complex interventions as this JP involving a value chain and very different kinds of stakeholders require a lot of coordination; a straightforward design avoiding overlapping of activities between agencies will facilitate the implementation. Coordination efforts will be minima and require few resources as in this JP.

The PRODOC formulation stage is capital and will largely determine the success of JP implementation.

67. This JP is backed by the Ministry of Industry which will facilitate implementation and involve its services to resolve or unlock any institutional issue. Indeed, the stakes are high because the JP concept fits the Ministry's agro-industry strategy. The JP is an opportunity for the Ministry to turn several key recommendations of its agro-industry master plan into an intervention; key innovative elements like the value chain & clustering approach were translated into a pilot initiative which could serve as a blueprint in the future for other sectors.

Translating existing policies into pilot initiatives will de facto ensure full governmental support which is why it is important to have JP design validated by Government.

68. The involved agencies showed great resilience when faced with unexpected situations like the lack of seed or adapting to a new institutional framework (elections in 2010 and the division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry); they were not shy either to largely modify several key elements of the JP in order to achieve best the overall programme objectives (more focus on the clustering approach and organising the processors around an improved industrial process). *UN agencies need not be static and follow mechanically the PRODOC but adapt to circumstances as allowed by this particular donor. This will ensure a more effective JP implementation.*

69. This JP is supporting an entire sector: Most of the key stakeholders are involved in the intervention. In order to be more efficient and effective, the programme endorsed a holistic approach to development: although activities are agency specific, successful results will require input from different agencies. This is an efficient implementation methodology, the alternative being the achievements of the results individually. Further to this, agencies like ILO and UNIDO shared common resources (e.g. use of CDAs) which is a starting point for joint implementation though it was overall done in parallel. This approach has been possible only because the PRODOC is straightforward and the implementation does not require complex interactions between agencies (which is a must in bureaucratic environments like the UN system). The areas of intervention of each UN agency are consistent with their core expertise, resulting in little or no overlapping.

A holistic approach to development should be favoured because it can lead to increased effectiveness but it can only be successful if the PRODOC avoids complex interactions between agencies.

70. Conclusion:

The agencies have been resourceful in finding solutions to unexpected issues (FAO / lack of high yield seeds) and innovative to enhance the JP impact (UNIDO sector clustering). They took risks by endorsing the need for a common land for processors which might deadlock the entire JP while less risky solutions would have been at hand (but with probably far less impact). The value chain & clustering approaches introduced in Ethiopia are new for the oil seed sector and currently being tested through this JP in a sector that has never received substantial development aid in the past.

This JP has the potential to serve as a model for future sector wide interventions in Ethiopia; while it might not achieve a substantial impact on the MDGs (in terms of number of beneficiaries) validating the approach and intervention method is actually at stake in this JP.

5. Recommendations

71. General recommendations:

- a. It is imperative to grant the JP a 6 months extension (or more if allowed, provided funds are still available): this will allow FAO to cover an additional cropping cycle from sowing to harvesting time and oversee the distribution of high yield seeds to unions and processors; it will enable ILO and UNIDO to plan in a more prospective manner consolidation of sector's clustering and in particular the common processors facilities: numerous incremental steps are still required (see paragraph [above](#)). If land was granted today, it might be possible to plan within 3-6 months the introduction of the loan request to the banks (if processors can cover the 30% financial contribution), the construction of the basic processor's infrastructure within 9 months together with the transfer of the processors' existing machinery and arrival of imported machinery by 12 months. This would leave just 6 months to test the new industrial process, just in time with the January harvest.
- b. A PMC meeting should be convened asap⁴⁸ to review the existing activities and adapt them to the new realities: unavailability of improved seeds, focus on clustering and common facilities; only achievable results should be considered and several activities could be deleted like HACCP, international marketing, PPP). Several activities should be considered low priority (marketing: labelling, branding, packaging) and funds released if priority results are achieved. This would free up resources for consolidation and scaling up whenever appropriate. This would require a successful coordination of implementation so that the 70% threshold is reached at the same time by all 3 agencies; if necessary, some financial resources from tranche 2 could be swapped between agencies to avoid further delays by either of the agencies.
- c. An exit strategy should be devised based on the appropriation of the results by Government: it is clear that the clustering process will not be completed by the end of the programme; the JP can only lay the foundations of this process. It will be up to MOI, MOARD, MOSLA, FEMSEDA (or their regional representations) to pursue this approach through networking. While there is no doubt that MOI will be on top of the process, there has been so far little involvement of the other 3 entities as decision makers. They should be empowered as well through more interaction with their UN counterparts. A task force composed of representatives of these organisations could also be suggested; its purpose would be to discuss on the follow-up when the JP is closed in June 2013. They could liaise and anticipate allocating resources during the 2013/2014 fiscal planning to consolidate the JP achievements.
- d. As the clustering approach is new, it will be necessary to document the methodology so that other sector might benefit from this experience if successful; a consultant should be contracted in 2013 to review the JP achievements, its shortcomings, etc.

⁴⁸ As soon as possible

72. Recommendations for FAO:

- e. FAO needs to revise the LOAs signed with the unions and the Regional Agricultural: the contracts need to be more specific in terms of work plan and what is actually expected in practice from both entities. In short, they should be tailored.
- f. FAO needs to accompany more closely its counterparts; so far, very weak reporting was observed and the actual implementation of activities varied widely according to the local context for both the Agricultural Bureaus and unions while at the same time, FAO did request reports and make field visits from its HQ. This monitoring is not enough: close proximity is necessary to effectively monitor and react immediately in light of the actual circumstances. It is suggested that FAO follows the same method as UNIDO did: contracting 2 focal points who should advise both entities on how best to carry out the LOAs (including explaining the reporting procedures). A task attributed to these focal points would be to help Agricultural Bureaus on the best approach to integrating the JP achievements so that they are empowered of the results and support the sector's stakeholders in completing the clustering process. Another task would be to facilitate the integration of JP activities into the *woredas*' work plans in order to avoid overburdening the local agricultural officers and development agents as has been observed so far. The revision of the LOAs should include for the unions the redefinition of the seed fund which has been little used although provisions should be made for early 2013 when certified seeds could be made available from multiplication farmers and the ESE.
- g. In order to consolidate the initial results on oil seed production (voluntary farmers willing to grow selected local seeds), FAO should test new confidence building measures that might attract additional farmers into growing oil seeds, like contract farming, voucher systems, crop insurance.
- h. In general terms, FAO's priority should be consolidation of results: make provisions for the 'extension package' so that 1st season farmers will grow again oil seeds in June 2012 and do not abandon the crops; they should constitute the primary target for 2013 certified seeds distribution; FAO should make sure that their 2011 production is being sold at market price, preferably through unions with agreements with the PLC or individual processors involved in the JP. Expanding to other areas should not be a priority. The JP is a pilot initiative.
- i. FAO should support additional activities that create awareness among primary cooperatives' members on oil seeds in the unions areas of intervention: focal points should work closely at *woreda* level with development agents to divulge oil seeds improved land husbandry (use of fertilizer, weeding, harvesting & storage techniques); 'farmer's day' events and exchange visits should be multiplied to create more awareness among potentially interested farmers.
- j. Now that several unions have agreements on oil seeds supply to processors, the lack of

working capital might become an issue. FAO should address this issue – possibly in cooperation with ILO -, should it become critical for the JP achievements.

- k. So far, the JP seems to have overlooked the primary cooperatives as an important stakeholder. For the time being, their actual value is very small because unions bypass them altogether. The situation might change when farmers will be able to supply the unions; FAO should address this issue in 2012 with activities related to storage / warehouses for unions and primary cooperatives; ILO should coordinate with FAO on how best to support primary cooperatives with its core expertise (e.g. book-keeping, capacity building trainings). BDS providers could be subcontracted to train primary cooperatives most proactive leaders in several key areas (awareness raising [in marketing / advantage of selling to unions], issue of quality standards, business plan development, bookkeeping) and make provisions for small material to weight agricultural product, small office furniture, etc. while FAO will support/upgrade cooperatives' warehouses.

73. Recommendations for ILO:

- l. ILO should monitor closely the PLC loan request as soon as the land area has been granted and possibly anticipate financial capacity issues among the Bahir Dar PLC members; interviews at REMSEDA and among Bahir Dar PLC members indicated that the processing plant estimate might be too high to support for some members. This situation should be clarified and the project amended if necessary (e.g. downscaling it) so as not to lose precious time when the PLC goes ahead with the loan request. REMSEDA and BOLSA should work more closely with the PLC if it is to prepare a business plan and contract staff to run the processing plant.
- m. ILO should work with both the association and PLC to throw light on (again?) the differences of aims of both entities (see [above](#) for details). One way to improve the situation could be for the association to start operationalizing its strategic plan and inclusively the provision of activities to widen its membership base as a way to detach itself from the PLC. Additionally, it is unlikely that the association will be operational with just the annual memberships fees; it is imperative that the association finds new sources of funding (through donors) as a way to promote the sector.
- n. The interviews of key stakeholders on the reasons why the utilisation rate of oil presses is under their nominal capacity, showed that there is no consensus whether it is due to a lack of seeds on the market or of working capital. In any case, when oil seeds will become available, the lack of working capital will become a more pressing issue for the processors. Will be able to press more oil seeds for a longer period in the year (less seasonality). ILO should review the situation and possibly make provisions on how best to address this issue (EDB⁴⁹, micro-finance organisations, commercial banks, etc.).

⁴⁹ Ethiopian Development Bank

- o. In general terms, interviews showed that several regional institutions (inclusive BOLSA & REMSEDA) were interested in taking a more active role in the JP ; e.g. involve them more in the actual preparation of activities delivery (not just planning) with ILO's PO in Addis Ababa and through the regional CDAs as their delivery capacity might be still limited at this point. This could be an opportunity for ILO to devise an exit strategy, progressively delegating tasks to these institutions and enabling them to incorporate the JP achievements for further actions and or support when the JP is closed.
- p. ILO has initiated OSH activities with the initial study. So far, the OSH management will be proposed to the processors but as the clustering process proceeds, it might be necessary to propose the OSH management system to the PLCs as well.

74. Recommendations for UNIDO:

- q. So far, the PLC still remains an empty shell: processors won't invest into the company unless they have a common facility that will bring leverage and economies of scale; UNIDO as the lead UN agency through its Coordinator should devote resources together with MOI to unlock the land allocation issue: speed up the plant area study, have it submitted to the appropriate authorities - accompany the process of submission & approval -.
- r. Through the provision of common lands for a refinery, the processors should be able to comply with the new regulations on food oil. Still many other processors located outside of the regional capitals are not supported; in the meantime, the associations should enlarge their membership base as a way to differentiate itself from the PLC; in that case, many small isolated processors could become members, as long as the associations do bring added value. UNIDO should study together with the universities the feasibility of designing low capacity cookers that could be assembled locally; should that be economically feasible, provisions should be made to design, test units and possibly train local craftsmen.
- s. The Coordinator should allocate some time with other agencies to discuss a communication and advocacy plan; as the coordination unit has little expertise, this activity could be subcontracted either to an external service provider or possibly make use of communication departments within other UN agencies with a strong communication policy (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP).
- t. In the current framework, middlemen are excluded from the clustering process; still traders / brokers can add value in the sector: they are flexible [they buy from farmers on the spot while unions are more bureaucratic, not necessarily open all the time], they know the market prices and can react swiftly to price changes. Their activities are not transparent, some can fix prices and their products lack quality standards. Still, the vast majority of farmers rely on them; eliminating the middlemen altogether will result in chaos. As the clustering process will bring more transparency and equity in the value chain, middlemen will have to adapt and UNIDO should accompany this process; a code

of conduct / a compact could be drafted; its endorsement by middlemen could enable them to sell to members of the oil seeds association.

- u. As with FAOs' focal points, CDAs should support BOLSA, REMSEDA, MOI, on the best approach to integrating the JP achievements so that they are empowered of the results and support the sector's stakeholders in completing the clustering process – to be combined with recommendation 'o'.

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Annex 1: Terms Of Reference

EVALUATION OF JOINT PROGRAMMES ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

General Context: the MDG-F Development and the Private Sector Window

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDGF supports countries in their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development goals by funding innovative programmes that have an impact on the population and potential for duplication.

The MDGF operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

The 12 joint programmes in this window support, either directly or indirectly, national productive forces (e.g. farms, small and medium enterprises and other economic agents). These joint programmes in particular seek to contribute to: increasing the competitiveness of micro- and small enterprises and/or farms, adopting or improving policies in favor of small enterprises and/or farms, and increasing the capacity of existing enterprises and/or farms through technical training.

The beneficiaries of the Joint Programs are fairly concentrated. Many joint programs involve the government, as a major actor of the support to enterprises. Entrepreneurs and/or farmers are naturally another key stakeholder, identified as such in all Joint Programs. Beneficiaries are sometimes part of specific sectors (such as crafts, tourism, textile, agriculture), and sometimes all entrepreneurs without restriction.

The following points should be provided by the joint programme team

- Describe the joint programme, programme name and goals; include when it started, what outputs and outcomes are sought, its contribution to the MDGs at the local and national levels, its duration and current stage of implementation.
- Summarize the joint programme's scale of complexity, including its components, targeted participants (direct and indirect), geographical scope (regions) and the socio-economic context in which it operates.

- It is also useful to describe the human and financial resources that the joint programme has at its disposal, the number of programme implementation partners (UN, national and local governments and other stakeholders in programme implementation).
- Changes noted in the programme since implementation began, and how the programme fits in with the priorities of the UNDAF and the National Development Strategies.

2. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes lasting longer than two years will be subject to a mid-term evaluation.

Mid-term evaluations are highly formative in nature and seek to **improve implementation of the joint programmes during their second phase of implementation. They also seek and generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned** that could be transferred to other programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the Fund.

3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The mid-term evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this interim evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This mid-term evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:

1. To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the **Millennium Development Goals**, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.
2. To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the **One UN** framework.

3. To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the **Private Sector thematic window**, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

The main users of the evaluation represented in the evaluation reference group (Section 8 of the TOR), and specifically the coordination and implementation unit of the joint programme, are responsible for contributing to this section. Evaluation questions and criteria may be added or modified up to a reasonable limit, bearing in mind the viability and the limitations (resources, time, etc.) of a quick mid-term evaluation exercise.

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

Design level:

- **Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.**
- a) Is the identification of the problems, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?
 - b) Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women and men in the areas of intervention?
 - c) To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions does the programme envisage, to respond to obstacles that may arise from the political and socio-cultural background?
 - d) Are the follow-up indicators relevant and do they meet the quality needed to measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?
 - e) To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?
1. **Ownership in the design: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions**

- a) To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans and programmes, to identified needs, and to the operational context of national politics?
- b) To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social agents been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention?

Process level

- Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, etc.) have been turned into results

- a) To what extent does the joint programme's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) contribute to obtaining the predicted products and results?
- b) To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other, with the government and with civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?
- c) Are there efficient coordination mechanisms to avoid overloading the counterparts, participating population/actors?
- d) Is the pace of implementing the products of the programme ensuring the completeness of the results of the joint programme? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate?
- e) Are work methodologies, financial instruments, etc. shared among agencies, institutions and Joint Programmes?
- f) Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural problems identified?

- Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions

- g) To what extent have the target population and participants made the programme their own, taking an active role in it? What modes of participation have taken place?
- h) To what extent have public/private national resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's objective and produce results and impacts?

Results level

- Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved or are expected to be achieved, bearing in mind their relative importance.

- a) Is the programme making progress towards achieving the stipulated results?
 - a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?
 - b. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?
- b) Is the stipulated timeline of outputs being met? What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?
- c) Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?
- d) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- e) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- f) Is the programme providing coverage to beneficiaries as planned?
- g) In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?
- h) Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?
- i) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of fair youth employment?
- j) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of internal and/or external migration?
- k) What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.

- a) Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme?

At local and national level:

- i. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?
 - ii. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?
 - iii. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?
 - iv. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?
 - v. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will project the sustainability of the interventions?
- b) To what extent are the visions and actions of the partners consistent or divergent with regard to the joint programme?

- c) In what ways can the governance of the joint programme be improved so that it has greater likelihood of achieving future sustainability?

5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The mid-term evaluations will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, consultants are expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. Consultants are also expected to use interviews as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the desk study report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the Secretariat of the MDGF:

✧ **Inception Report** (to be submitted within fifteen days of the submission of all programme documentation to the consultant)

This report will be 10 to 15 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose initial lines of inquiry about the joint programme this report will be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers. The report will follow this outline:

0. Introduction

1. Background to the evaluation: objectives and overall approach

2. Identification of main units and dimensions for analysis and possible areas for research

3. Main substantive and financial achievements of the joint programme

4. Methodology for the compilation and analysis of the information

5. Criteria to define the mission agenda, including “field visits”

✧ **Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 15 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be shared with evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions. This report will contain the same sections as the final report, described below.

✧ **Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within ten days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page
2. Introduction
 - Background, goal and methodological approach
 - Purpose of the evaluation
 - Methodology used in the evaluation
 - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
3. Description of interventions carried out
 - - Initial concept
 - - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions
5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
6. Recommendations
7. Annexes

7. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION

The mid-term evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

- **Anonymity and confidentiality.** The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- **Responsibility.** The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.
- **Integrity.** The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- **Independence.** The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.
- **Incidents.** If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, they must be reported immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.
- **Validation of information.** The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.
- **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

8. ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION

The main actors in the mid-term evaluation process are the MDGF Secretariat, the management team of the joint programme and the Programme Management Committee that could be expanded to accommodate additional relevant stakeholders. This group of institutions and individuals will serve as the evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.
- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents,(Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).

- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team's access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

The MDGF Secretariat shall promote and manage Joint Programme mid-term evaluation in its role as commissioner of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the joint programme evaluation. As manager of the evaluation, the Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated, promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process.

9. TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

A. Preparation of the evaluation (approximately 45-60 days before the date the programme reaches a year and a half of implementation). These preparatory activities are not part of the evaluation as they precede the evaluation exercise.

1. An official e-mail from the Secretariat is sent to the RC, coordination officers in the country and joint programme coordinator. This mail will include the official starting date of the evaluation, instructive on mid-term evaluation and generic TOR for the evaluation.
2. During this period the evaluation reference group is established, the TOR are adapted to the context and interest of stakeholders in the country and all relevant documents on the joint programme are sent to the evaluator.

This activity requires a dialogue between the Secretariat and the reference group of the evaluation (the body that comments on and reviews but does not interfere with the independent evaluation process). This dialogue should be aimed at rounding out and modifying some of the questions and dimensions of the study that the generic TOR do not cover, or which are inadequate or irrelevant to the joint programme.

3. The Secretariat's portfolios manager will discuss with the country an initial date for having the field visit.
4. From this point on, the evaluation specialists and the portfolio manager are responsible for managing the execution of the evaluation, with three main functions: to facilitate the work

of the consultant, to serve as interlocutor between the parties (consultant, joint programme team in the country, etc.), and to review the deliverables that are produced.

B. Execution phase of the evaluation study (87-92 days total)

Desk study (23 days total)

1. Briefing with the consultant **(1 day)**. A checklist of activities and documents to review will be submitted, and the evaluation process will be explained. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
2. Review of documents according to the standard list (see TOR annexes; programme document, financial, monitoring reports etc.).
3. Submission of the inception report including the findings from the document review specifying how the evaluation will be conducted. The inception report is sent and shared with the evaluation reference group for comments and suggestions (**within fifteen days of delivery of all programme documentation to the consultant**).
4. The focal person for the evaluation (joint programme coordinator, resident coordinator office, etc) and the consultant prepare an agenda to conduct the field visit of the evaluation. (Interview with programme participants, stakeholders, focus groups, etc) (**Within seven days of delivery of the desk study report**).

Field visit (10-15 days)

1. The consultant will travel to the country to observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document revision. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, the Secretariat's programme officer may need to facilitate the consultant's visit by means of phone calls and emails, making sure there is a focal person in the country who is his/her natural interlocutor by default.
2. The consultant will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

Final Report (54 days total)

1. The consultant will deliver a draft final report, which the Secretariat's programme officer shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group (**within fifteen days of the completion of the field visit**).

2. The Secretariat will assess the quality of the evaluation reports presented using the criteria stipulated by UNEG and DAC Evaluation Network **(within seven days of delivery of the draft final report)**.
3. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation quality, the Secretariat can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed **(within fifteen days of delivery of the draft final report)**.

The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the evaluation, but these may not affect the evaluator's freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

All comments will be compiled in a matrix that the Secretariat will provide to the evaluation focal points.

4. On the completion of input from the reference group, the evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit **(ten days)** and submit to the MDG-F Secretariat a final evaluation report.
 5. The Secretariat will review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report to the evaluation reference group in the country **(within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments)**.
- C. Phase of incorporating recommendations and improvement plan (within fifteen days of delivery of the final report):**
1. The Secretariat's programme officer, as representative of the Secretariat, shall engage in a dialogue with the joint programme managers to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.
 2. The Secretariat will publish the evaluation in its website.

10. ANNEXES

a) Document Review

This section must be completed and specified by the other users of the evaluation but mainly by the management team of the joint programme and by the Programme Management Committee. A minimum of documents that must be reviewed before the field trip shall be established; in general terms the Secretariat estimates that these shall include, as a minimum:

MDG-F Context

2. MDGF Framework Document
3. Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
4. General thematic indicators
5. M&E strategy
6. Communication and Advocacy Strategy
7. MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines

Specific Joint Programme Documents

8. Joint Programme Document: results framework and monitoring and evaluation framework
9. Mission reports from the Secretariat
10. Quarterly reports
11. Mini-monitoring reports
12. Biannual monitoring reports
13. Annual reports
14. Annual work plan
15. Financial information (MDTF)

Other in-country documents or information

16. Evaluations, assessments or internal reports conducted by the joint programme
17. Relevant documents or reports on the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels
18. Relevant documents or reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the country
19. Relevant documents or reports on One UN, Delivering as One

c) File for the Joint Programme Improvement Plan

After the interim evaluation is complete, the phase of incorporating its recommendations shall begin. This file is to be used as the basis for establishing an improvement plan for the joint programme, which will bring together all the recommendations, actions to be carried out by programme management.

Evaluation Recommendation No. 1				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
1.1			Comments	Status
1.2				
1.3				
Evaluation Recommendation No. 2				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
2.1			Comments	Status
2.2				
2.3				
Evaluation Recommendation No. 3				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
3.1			Comments	Status
3.2				
3.3				

Annex 2: Field visit calendar and people met

VISIT SCHEDULE OF MID TERM EVALUATION TEAM (05 Dec. - 20 Dec. 2011)			
Date / time		Place	Meeting
SU – 4/12	PM	Arrival in Addis Ababa from Belgium	
MO - 5/12	9h30	Addis Ababa, UNIDO - briefing	Mrs. Ines Mazarrasa Steinkuhler, RCO Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point Mr. Olijira Kuma, Adama Cluster Development Agent Mr. Shumet Chanie, National Project Coordinator - ILO Mr. Hailu Teka, FAO Focal Point UNIDO Mr. Asegid Adane, National Programme Officer – UNIDO Mr. Kjell Sundin, UNIDO Consultant HQ
	14h00	Addis Ababa, UNIDO	Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point Mr. Olijira Kuma, Adama Cluster Development Agent Mr. Asegid Adane, National Programme Officer - UNIDO Mr. Kjell Sundin, UNIDO Consultant HQ
	16h00	Addis Ababa, Ministry of Industry	Mr. Dendena Chemed, Agro-processing Industry Development Director Mr. Zarga, Team Coordinator for Cereals & Seed Oil – Ministry Industry Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point Mr. Kjell Sundin, UNIDO Consultant HQ
TU - 6/12	9h00	Addis Ababa, ILO	Mr. Shumet Chanie, National Project Coordinator - ILO
	11h00	Addis Ababa, FAO	Mr. Detachew Faluka, FAO Former Focal Point Mr. Workisho Jateno, FAO Programme Officer Mr. Hailu Teka, FAO Focal Point
	14h00	Addis Ababa, SNV	Mrs. Eyerusalem Regassa Biftu, SNV Economic Development Advisor Mr. Haile Getent, SNV Consultant Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point Mr. Hailu Teka, FAO Focal Point
	16h00	Addis Ababa, EDB	Mr. Beimnet, Senior Research Officer - Ethiopian Development Bank
WE - 7/12	AM	Travelling to Adama & Arsi zones	
	11h00	Adama	Mr. Olijira Kuma, Adama Cluster Development Agent
	14h00	Adama, Etosa Union	Mr. Eshetu Wakene, Deputy Manager - Etosa Union Union members
	16h00	Lode Hoto Woreda	Mr. Kebede Eshetu, Woreda Agronomist Mr. Hailu Iko, Kebele Development Agent
	17H00	Lode Hoto Woreda	Final beneficiaries: Lint breeder seed farmer Primary Cooperative member
TH - 8/12	9h00	Adama, PLC/Association	Oil processors PLC: manager/chairman, member Sectoral association: chairman, 2 members, accountant officer
	AM	Adama city	Oil Processor

	PM	Adama city	Oil Processor
	15h00	Adama University	Mr. Abebe Belay Gemta, Director of Knowledge & Technology – Interchange Unit Mr. Gemechu Kaba, Engineering School – Adama University
	17h00	Adama municipality	Mr. Hashim Gemechu, Chairman of Cluster Group and Head of Industry Office in Adama city
	18h00	Adama city	Mr. Deressa Bedada, Attorney – BDS provider
FR - 9/12	9h00	Addis Ababa,	Mr. Beyene, Oromia Agriculture Bureau
	11h00	Addis Ababa	Mr. Yasin Mohamed, Focal Point Regional Bureau of Industry Mr. Mogas, Trade & Marketing Development Bureau
	13h00	Addis Ababa - FAO	Mr. Detachew Faluka, FAO Former Focal Point Mr. Workisho Jateno, FAO Programme Officer Mr. Hailu Teka, FAO Focal Point
SU – 11/12	PM	Travelling to Bahir Dar	
	18h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Abiot Belin, Bureau of Trade & Transport Mr. Abebe Getahun, Agricultural Bureau
MO – 12/12	AM	Travelling to Chagni	
	10h00	Chagni city	Mrs. Tenasaw, Chagni Farm Multiplication Enterprise Manager
	14h00	Mecha <i>woreda</i> – Ambo kebele	Mr. Hailu, Ambo Farm Enterprise Seed Specialist
	17h00	Bahir Dar – Mercheb Union	Mr. Migbaru, Manager Cooperative Representative Member of board of Directors Chairman of the Board
	19h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Tsigalu Teka, JP Cluster Development Agent
TU – 13/12	09h30	Fogera <i>woreda</i> - Alember village	Alember's primary cooperative machine operator (oil production)
	10h00	Fogera <i>woreda</i> - Alember village	Mr. Tesfay, JP Fogera <i>woreda</i> Focal Point & leader of the Extension Department Alember kebele Development Agent Area Development Agent Supervisor
	11h00	Fogera <i>woreda</i> - Alember village	Beneficiary farmers (4)
	12h00	Fogera <i>woreda</i> - Alembe Primary Cooperative	Manager Chairman – Board of Directors Cooperative Extension worker Cashier
	15h00	Bahir Dar, PLC/Association	Oil processors PLC: chairman, accountant, auditor, cashier, 3 members Sectoral association: secretary, 4 members, cashier
	17h00	Bahir Dar - University	Mr. Ashenafi Hailu, Director of Chemical & Food Engineering School Mr. Belay Teffera Yalew, Lecturer & Deputy Managing Director - Chemical & Food Engineering School Mr. Eneyew Tadesse, PhD student on edible oil seeds
	21h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Yonas Yazachew, Extension & Communication Specialist – Ministry of Agriculture

WE – 14/12	09h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Kindie Alemayehm, Deputy Head – Bureau of Industry & Urban Development Mr. Tadesse Chekol, MSEA – Micro & Small Enterprise Agency (former REMSEDA)
	10h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Atuaful Belay, Regional Bureau for Labor & Social Affairs
	11h00	Bahir Dar	Mr. Gebane, M&E Specialist – member of the Regional Technical Committee - Cooperative Promotion Agency of Amhara
	12h00	Bahir Dar	Edible Oil Processor
	13h00	Bahir Dar – Agricultural Bureau	Mr. Abebe Getahun, Agricultural Bureau
	13h30	Bahir Dar - DBE	Mr. Yehualashet Mitsiku, Managing Director - Bahir Dar DBE Branch
	14h00	Bahir Dar	Edible Oil Processor
	15h00	Bahir Dar – BDS provider	Mr. Gedefaw Arega – Project Coordinator / Ambassador Man Power Recruitment & Consultancy PLC
	16h00	Bahir Dar	Deputy Mayor of Adama city Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point
TH – 15/12	PM	Returning to Addis Ababa	
FR- 16/12	09h00	Addis Ababa - AECID	Mr. Eduardo Reneses de la Fuente, Senior Programme Manager – AECID
	10h00	Addis Ababa - MOLSA	Mr. Fitsum Gebremichael, Labour Inspector – Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs
	12h00	Addis Ababa, ILO	Mr. Shumet Chanie, National Project Coordinator - ILO
	13h00	Addis Ababa, UNIDO	Mr. Asegid Adane, National Programme Officer – UNIDO
	14h00	Addis Ababa, FEMSEDA	Mr. Solomon Assefa, Senior Expert for Best Practices & Development – Federal Micro & Small Enterprise Development Agency
	16h00	Addis Ababa, Ministry of Industry	Mr Tadessa Hailee, Minister of Industry Mr. Dendena Chemed, Agro-processing Industry Development Director
MO – 19/12	09h00	Addis Ababa, Ministry of Industry	Mr Tadessa Hailee, Minister of Industry Mr. Dendena Chemed, Agro-processing Industry Development Director Mr. Muluneh Woldekidan, National Project Coordinator & UNIDO Focal Point Mr. , Olijira Kuma, Adama Cluster Development Agent Mr. Shumet Chanie, National Project Coordinator - ILO Mr. Hailu Teka, FAO Focal Point UNIDO Mrs. Ines Mazarrasa Steinkuhler, RCO
TU – 20/12	AM	Departure from Addis Ababa to Belgium	

Annex 3: Detailed methodological approach

Methodological approach of the evaluation

Several basic principles have been used to carry out this evaluation:

- Effective participation of all stakeholders (government, agencies, communities, associations including male / female interviews)
- Crosschecking of gathered information (a check-list of issues to review will be produced prior to arrival by the consultant).
- Pushing for consensus and agreement of recommendations by the stakeholders.
- Transparency of debriefing (all programme stakeholders are convened to the debriefing).

The consultant elaborated a checklist of issues to be investigated during the field mission and prepared questionnaires.

The **check-list structures the field mission:**

1. **Which** information to gather?
2. **Where** to get it (from whom? which different sources of information for cross reference),
3. **How** to gather it (which appropriate tools? Interview, report, focus group, individual interviews, government data, etc.)?

Field mission check-list objectives

A 4 step approach is to be adopted to carry out the evaluation: 1. passive data acquisition, 2. active data acquisition, 3. data analysis into relevant information and 4. Information interpretation,

1. **Passive data acquisition:** documentary analysis: analysis of PRODOC, UN & partners' agency country programs, periodic planning and M&E reports, annual programme reports, etc.

During this phase, the consultants will elaborate a checklist detailing for each evaluation topic how and from whom to obtain relevant information. Beneficiaries' questionnaires were drafted from the checklist.


The international & national consultants worked closely in the preparation of this checklist.

2. **Active data acquisition:** interviews of all stakeholders through individual/group interviews of final beneficiaries, institutional beneficiaries, implementation stakeholders, external stakeholders; the interviews (number, target, duration) were derived from the checklist.
 - In situ sampling of subprojects & interviews of beneficiaries with an emphasis on green processes and poverty reduction

- Interviews of implementation partners (UN agencies, MOI, MOA, City Councils, EDB, subcontracted NGOs, etc.) to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of programme implementation
- Open discussion with external stakeholders (defined on arrival) active in the programme geographical area and/or in the private / entrepreneurship sector

3. Data analysis: conversion of data into relevant information to assess the programme status and for decision making by the Secretariat, NSC & PMC; inclusion of the information into the evaluation report – proposal for recommendations.

4. Presentation and discussion of findings to all stakeholders; a debriefing session was carried out at the end of the mission in Addis Ababa.



Methodological framework for the programme evaluation – field mission

As with rapid evaluations (8 days of fieldwork), no statistically significant findings were produced; hence the importance of cross-checking through interview & data collection of various stakeholders.

Annex 4: PowerPoint presentation at the debriefing

Mid term evaluation team of MDG-f:
“Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement”
presentation of findings

Introduction

Rapid evaluation goals:

- Review the 3 outcomes:
 - 1. improved agric. production,
 - 2. improved proc. industries,
 - 3. improved access to nat./intern. markets
- Relevance re. MDG goals
- Key lessons learned
- Best practices

Methodology

Principles:

- Effective stakeholders participation
- Crosschecking info
- Transparency

1. Doc review
2. Multilateral interviews
3. Field mission : beneficiaries (institutional / final)
4. Bilateral interviews (if necessary)
5. Data → information
6. Selected information → recommendations

Main findings

On the design

+++ (entire) value chain approach

+++ limited n° of beneficiaries (pilot)

+++ involve financial sector (for enhancement)

+++ selection of UN / Gov agencies (FAO / MOARD, ILO / MOLSA & FEMSEDA, UNIDO / MOTI...)

- - - unavailability of improved seeds (→ major design fault)

Approach: ADD VALUE

↓ legal issue

farmer → trader/broker → processor → consumer

farmer → 1° coop → union → processor → refinery → consumer (& export)

Main findings

Achievements to date

- + + + individual processors → clustering (PLC / sector association) AND formalisation / UN facilitation role (Modjo / own planting)
- + + capacity building / strengthening of both institutions (ILO)
- + + improved process for processors (more efficient, safer) (UNIDO)
- + + + alternate solution for improved seeds (FAO)

VERY slow start-up:

6 months delay for JP operationalisation + 6 months initial studies
→ effective implementation after ±12 months (late 2010 / early 2011) → dire implem. consequences (refinery & improved seeds)

External issues: elections & split MOTI in mid-2010

Main findings

FAO implementation

- + + + integration of MOARD (national implementation !!!)
- + + + support of unions (not all contacted though) – awareness creation

Major issues: lack of improved seed → need to select seed / provision of breeder seed (too long cycle – breeder → pre-basic/basic/certified);
= MOST limiting factor of JP (FAO component)

- - - 4 months LOA → 12 months implementation at 30% expenditure → no action from FAO ??? / contact farmers
(idem 4 unions: no improved seed → no or little use of seed fund)
- - - little support for 1° cooperatives yet (e.g. > storage, marketing skills)
→ low disbursement rate
→ Little pro-activity of FAO in following up / high rotation of HR (3X)

Main findings

FAO results

- + + + effective support of MOARD for both breeder seed & selected seeds (non-) model farmers (high interest of farmers / no fertiliser in reviewed area [Bahir D.] / in < area)
- - - very low intensity support (min. 3X less than anticipated)
- + + + pre-basic seeds in early 2012 / - - - need for 1 add. cycle min. for certification
- + + + plans for contract farming (↗ sustainability)
- - - very weak primary cooperatives (add. support necessary)
- - - unfavourable weather conditions (pre-basic seed prod. Reduced)

Main findings

UNIDO implementation

- + + + presence of CDA → good follow-up ; appropriate response
- + + + value chain support of processors (up/downward : cleaning equip. / lab equip.)
- + + + cluster development OK BUT: upward equip. → land + processors installation → ↗ time / proc. dependant
- + + + use of BDS (agreements, by-laws)
- Approach due to legislation requirements: promotion of refining / no support for cold pressed oil ??? risk of underground industry...
- Unforeseen challenges: need for cluster land / infrastr. / refinery (not considered in the original JP) ; GOE support in principle for land (for refinery, see ILO)
- - - PLC not operational (→ land – loan – building / refinery procurement - installation – PLC HR recruitment – testing – PLC HR training.... in 12 months!!!)

Main findings

UNIDO results

- + + + clustering agreement / sectoral association operational within 6 months !!!
- - - poor understanding of association objectives

- + + + formal agreement PLC / unions

- + + VC training & cluster dev.: good linkages with GOE (follow-up→ exit strategy?)

- + + + effective process changes through trainings (machinery, efficiency)
- + + + support to PLC: feasibility & industrialisation studies – land area

- - - confusion Adama university; industrialisation study on hold: proceed with min. area or given area (3ha informally agreed) ?

Main findings

ILO implementation / results

- - - individual implementation (little interaction with GOE)

- + + + awareness raising of financial sector
- + + leadership training (insufficient)
- + + accountancy training (insufficient)

- + + + OSH diagnostic carried out BUT no involvement of MOLSA
- + + + refinery feasibility study

- + + Material support to associations
- Very low disbursement rate ! “Much lobbying”

- - - rare synergies ILO (\$) / UNIDO (TORs) : industrialisation land study

Main findings

Institutional arrangements

- PMC: JP status / not a platform to resolve in-depth issues - INFO
- RLTC: similar to PMC – INFO

JP: individual planning (in 2010) / individual implementation

Ad-hoc synergies ; no MOU for joint planning (ex. test common procedures)

→ 1HR part time Coordinator / part-time UNIDO

- Monthly technical trainings: between UN
- Few or no bilateral TECHNICAL periodic meetings at regional level
 - remote FAO / ILO monitoring
 - close UNIDO monitoring (+ interactions through CDA only (technical / monitoring / facilitation)

Recommendations

Overall:

- 6 months extension (more time for 2 cycle pre-basic + move to cluster land [+basic support to refinery])
- priority = support to processors NOT refinery
- Support to 1° cooperatives (weakest VC link)
- Reformulate 2012 workplan jointly: 1st stage regionally – 2nd stage between agencies assess training needs / support for each stakeholder → more participative
- need to review / support standards for cold-pressed oil
- support increase of assoc. members: embrace more processors
- speed up land acquisition
- No JP visibility → need to draft a com. & advocacy plan (action plan) + contract 1 specialist within coord. team + allocate funds + success stories
- OR coordinate with individual UN agency COM HR (e.g. FAO, ILO, δ?)

Recommendations

- FAO:

- need for exchange visits of farmers / coop personnel to see improved seeds fields (immediate action before harvest)
- addition. Support / follow-up of (selected seed) farmers (test → full scale)
- complete 'overhaul' of LOAs of both union & MOARD: adapted contract / detailed activities ('operationalisation')
- contract focal points in each region to support & facilitate MOARD / union activities delivery → close follow-up
- need to use BDS providers (ex. strengthen 1° coop, market skills)
- support 1° coop (improved storage quality / capacity to cope with ↗ qty)

Recommendations

UNIDO:

- need to separate UNIDO / Coordination functions
- accompany industrialization study: Adama (standby) Bahir D. (60/50000m²)
- need to quantify trainings' results (not only success stories) (→ monitoring forms) + proc. visits to 'success stories'
- priority: support of processors / modernize equipment when clustered
- lab. quality control equipment relevant for processors 1st (2nd for refinery)
- need to support brokers (market info / price info) → formalisation (Adama)
- priority: increase n° of members in *woredas*
 - provide support (↗ quality ; ↗ quality) to new members even if no refinery
 - ↗ awareness on ≠ assoc / PLC
- create linkages with universities (improve process / engineering / quality) – students
- coordinate Coop/union /processors agreements with effective capacity delivery (UNIDO / FAO) (geographically/n° of farmers...) ELSE: no more interest
- need to document clustering methodology by early 2013 (WHY successful? constraints...)

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Lessons learned

UN agencies in this program:

- avoid same HR for lead & coordination → poor COM, few UN synergies
- need to involve more GOE in planning / implementation (ex. ILO + MOLSA ; FAO + MOARD) → close M&E necessary
- systematic CLOSE monitoring of activities delivery = absolute necessary

Conclusion

- strong VC approach
- good GOE leadership
- clustering + + + in 6 months
- slow start-up + enhanced JP results (land, refinery...) → higher risks
UN agencies to stick to support WHERE mostly relevant / avoid being beneficiary dependant

Refinery is out of scope of UN support (loans, buildings, equipment...)

Priority on processors / clustering / association (build 'strong base')

→ GOE support

→ ↗ time

THANK YOU

Annex 5: Maps of programme areas

Sources: DPPA

