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International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour

IPEC Project Evaluation

**Combating the exploitation of child
domestic workers in Haiti**

HAI/99/05P/050/USA

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Glossary of acronyms

| | |
|-------------|--|
| AP | Action Program |
| BMS | ILO's Budget Management System |
| CDL | Child Domestic Labor |
| COHADDE | Haitian Coalition for the Defense of Children's Rights |
| CRS | Catholic Relief Service |
| CSEC | Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children |
| CSO | Civil Society Organizations |
| EAP | Economically Active Population |
| EPA | External Payment Authorization |
| FAES | Economic and Social Assistance Fund |
| FAFO | Institute of Applied Social Sciences (Norway) |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GOH | Government of Haiti |
| GHRAP | Haitian Group of Research and Pedagogical Action |
| HLC | Haitian Labor Code |
| HSI | Haïti Solidarité International |
| IBESR | Institute of Social Welfare and Research (Haiti) |
| IHSI | Haitian Institute of Statistics and Computing |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IO | International Organizations |
| IO1, IO2... | Immediate objective one, immediate objective two.... |
| IPEC | International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour |
| MAS | Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor |
| NCHR | National Coalition for Haitian Rights |
| NGO | Non Governmental Organization |
| SCF | Save the Children Fund |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USDOL | United States Department of Labor |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WV | World Vision |

Executive Summary

This report is the outcome of the final independent evaluation of the project “Combating the exploitation of child domestic workers in Haiti” (HAI/99/05P/050/USA), implemented by the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and funded by the United States Department of Labor. The evaluation, carried out during May 2003, had an ex-post, summative character and was of a participatory nature. As general topics, the evaluation addressed the following aspects: validity of project design, relevance of the strategy, project implementation and performance (effectiveness, efficiency, unexpected effects) and the perspective of sustainability of its effects.

The project development objective was “to contribute to the prevention and the progressive elimination of child domestic work in Haiti”. The original project document had three immediate objectives (expressed in a similar number of project components). However, given that the project was facing difficulties to achieve its goals, a revision was approved in December 2001 and the original objectives were modified.

Accordingly to a recent IPEC-UNDP (United Nations Development Program) nation-wide study on the issue, the number of children under the condition of “domesticity” in Haiti is currently estimated within the range of 124,000 to 173,00 children, meaning that between 10% and 13% of Haitian children fall under this situation. Many of them come from the poor rural *départements* of l'Artibonite and la Grand Ans. Around 9% of Haitian families host children under the condition of domesticity.

Child domestic labor (CDL) in Haiti is a multi-dimensional problem. It is a long-dated social practice ingrained in Haitian culture and it is also strongly underpinned in a context of widespread poverty, social and economic exclusion of the rural population and insufficient access to education. The practice is a source to widespread and varied abuse of all sorts towards children.

As an overall conclusion of the evaluation of the original project and its revisions it may be said that the project failed to reach most of its objectives and has limited sustainability due to:

- Several flaws in the original design of the project and in its highly “structured” strategy of implementation, which were not adapted to the limitations that characterize Haitian society, government and private institutions; likewise, the design and the strategy were not realistic with regards to different other factors implied in the issue of CDL. For example, while the targets corresponding to child removal were too ambitious (given the limitations of Haitian institutions), the project design lacked a more thorough strategy with regards to labor supply-side factors that are widely perceived at the origin of child domestic labor: i.e., the diminished status of childhood and of children’s rights, widespread urban and rural poverty and lack of access to education in the rural zone.
- The general context of political and economic instability, which made the issue of child domestic labor become a “secondary issue” among Haitian government priorities. Given that the project’s awareness-raising strategy was almost put to a stop by project management during the first two years of implementation, the project was not able to rally enough interest on its objectives from other local institutions and Haitian public opinion. In fact, IPEC’s profile and the project’s role remain widely unknown in the country and the issue of CDL is **not** yet considered as a national **problem** outside from some governmental and non governmental organizations (NGOs).

- The omission of concrete action from government officials, who by their lack of interest in going ahead with project activities hampered the project effectiveness and lead it to a stagnant situation; however, it should be stated that this may have been a response to the fact that the project, although aimed at involving important government action, was not designed and implemented in a clearly participatory manner with government officials and thus had no off-start mechanism from which “ownership” by governmental institutions could be built-up;
- The lack of a more rapid reaction from the local project management team in proposing alternative strategies and courses of action to counter these difficulties. The first project revision took a lengthy time to be accomplished, while actions in the field became more limited. Likewise, during the first two years and although being a “national” project, scarce activity was carried out outside Port-au-Prince. Thus, the project was not able to build a wider network of partnerships with local institutions for the effective delivery of outputs and activities. Although the second management team responsible for the project developed a more active approach which translated into a greater number of products (mainly studies) being achieved and established new institutional contacts in order to develop new alternatives for project implementation, the latter was neither able to implement a sustainable awareness strategy on the issue of CDL nor to entice government authorities to become **actively** involved and positively interested in the implementation of the project.

Although the project achieved limited success (given the scope of its original targets) with regards to the removal of children from domestic work, the option of child removal and immediate elimination of child labor might not be a sustainable, cost-effective strategy given the cultural and socio-economic underpinnings for this activity, the wide extent of the phenomenon (numbered in tens of thousands of children) and the lack of institutional and financial resources that make that this strategy can not be generalized to the whole country.

Notwithstanding the project limitations in achieving its main objectives, it should be stated that the project developed several sound studies that generated an important bulk of knowledge on the issue of child domestic labor in the country. Although the knowledge gained through the results of these studies on child domestic labor (and agricultural labor), remains still unknown and non disseminated to the general public, this important knowledge could be the basis to gather consensus with regards to the design of a more comprehensive and effective strategy for a new project that may involve a wider number of private and government implementing agencies throughout the country.

The evaluation report formulates 16 recommendations on three general issues in which IPEC’s further action in Haiti should be strengthened, as well as on actions that should be taken with regards to different stakeholders. These refer to the need to: a) carry out a more thorough, participatory and careful process in order to design a new strategy for IPEC, conducive to establish more effective partnerships with local institutions and to ensure a more feasible implementation of activities, a more relevant project impact and a greater degree of sustainability of outcomes; b) invest in increased leverage and advocacy with political authorities and local mass-media in order to galvanize commitment on the fight against child labor and child domestic labor; and c) develop a decentralized management scheme, improve monitoring systems and carry out leaner administrative processes in order to improve implementation capacity.

Likewise, the report suggests possible orientations on how future projects might address the outstanding needs of children, families and communities that were not addressed

through the evaluated intervention (see Annex 5). Finally, the evaluation report systematizes several “lessons learned” with regards to project design and strategy, implementation, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, as well as a limited number of potential good practices that may be useful for future projects on this issue.

1. Introduction

This report is the outcome of the final independent evaluation of the project “Combating the exploitation of child domestic workers in Haiti” (HAI/99/05P/050/USA) carried out during May 2003. This 3-years project was funded by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) and has been implemented since January 2000 by the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour of the International Labour Organization (IPEC-ILO). After a 6 month extension, the project is scheduled to end on June 30th, 2003.

The project development objective was **“to contribute to the prevention and the progressive elimination of child domestic work in Haiti”**. The original project document had three immediate objectives (expressed in a similar number of project components). However, given that the project was facing difficulties to achieve the latter, a project revision was approved in December 2001 and the original objectives were modified into four immediate objectives as follows:

| Original immediate objectives | Revised immediate objectives |
|---|--|
| IO 1: By the end of the program, the government will have developed a national policy and plan of action to combat child domestic work and will have developed the institutional capacity to implement it effectively | IO1: By the end of the program, the government will have developed the institutional capacity to take steps toward preventing child domestic work in Haiti, rehabilitating former child domestic workers and progressively eliminating child domestic labor. |
| IO 2: By the end of the program, successful awareness-raising efforts will have changed attitudes and perceptions of Haitian society about child domestic work, and a group of civil society will have been effectively recruited to combat abuses on a sustainable basis | IO 2: By the end of the program, 24,000 families in communities of origin and the population in general will be better informed about the nature and hazards of child domestic labor |
| IO3: By the end of the program, 10,000 child domestic workers in the nine administrative districts of Port-au-Prince will have benefited from access to rehabilitative services, and 1,000 child domestics working in abusive conditions will have been withdrawn and provided with other alternatives. | IO 3: By the end of the program, the at least 150 former child domestics and at least 1800 children in high-risk communities, will have been directly assisted |
| | IO4 (Added objective): By the end of the program, the phenomenon of child labor will be better known and understood, and strategies of interventions will have been analyzed and put to use in project activities |

The beginning of implementation of the revised project document coincided with a change in project management: A local coordinator was hired for the period going from December 2001 on, in replacement of the previous international expert who had acted as project manager for the first two years of implementation of the project (2000-2001).

The team in charge of this project evaluation was composed by two experts: Dr. Dwight Ordóñez (international consultant and team leader) and Mrs. Guerda Previlon (local

consultant and senior expert). Data collection was carried out at Port-au-Prince between the 5th and 16th of May.

The evaluation had an ex-post, summative character. The evaluation objectives were:

- To assess the overall impact of the project, reviewing its outcomes with regards to its objectives and how the project fitted into a national strategy on the issue of child labor, child domestic work, education and other related subjects.
- To document systematically lessons learned and knowledge generated in relevant strategic areas and the applicability of these to future IPEC projects.
- To assess the long-term sustainability of project's achievements and provide orientations on alternative future actions by different stakeholders.
- To provide orientation on how future projects may address the needs of target communities identified during implementation.

The evaluation had a participatory character. A wide range of project stakeholders and members of other institutions were interviewed as part of the evaluation process. Annex 4 includes the list of individuals and institutions that provided information for the evaluation process. The following table gives an overview of the main aspects covered by the evaluation and its general description.

| Aspect of the evaluation | General description |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Validity of project design | Consistency/ thoroughness of logical framework and project document; links between objectives, strategies, activities, outputs, indicators and means of verification |
| Relevance of the strategy | Qualitative analysis of the relevance of the different strategic components of the project in relation to cultural and political variables and the characteristics of child domestic labor in Haiti |
| Implementation of the project | Analysis of the process of implementation and the way in which the project inserted itself in the local inter-institutional context through specific partnerships and activities |
| Effectiveness | Degree of achievement of project's development and immediate objectives and review of project outcomes |
| Efficiency | Analysis of costs per component and beneficiary, financial analysis and performance of management systems |
| Unexpected effects | Assessment of external factors that had a positive or negative effect on project implementation and of project outcomes that had a similar unexpected effect on project-related issues or the wider context |
| Sustainability | Sustainability of outputs and outcomes; at the social (ownership), technical (increase of capacities) and financial levels. |

The following instruments were designed in order to collect information from key stakeholders: distinct questionnaires for project management team, implementing agencies, agencies not participating in the project, IPEC's senior management staff and USDOL staff; consistency matrix of project logical framework; 3 matrices on project expenditures, finance-output relation and comparative allocation per components under original and revised project documents; focus group guidelines for ex-child domestic workers, parents and employers; a technical questionnaire on L'Escale's (rehabilitation center for ex-child domestic workers) functioning, a check-list on L'Escale's infrastructure and services and a check list for review of children's files. The evaluation team also reviewed extensive technical and financial documentation on the project and drafts or final reports on studies that were funded by the project. Likewise, it visited L'Escale's premises and visited by night two street zones of Port-au-Prince where minors involved in sexual commerce were said to concentrate. The evaluation team also carried-out a restitution workshop for the project management team, implementing agencies and members of other institutions (on May 14), as well as attended a workshop on the issue of child domestic labor organized by the office of Haiti's First Lady and the Ministry of Social Affaires (on May 15).

The following table indicates the instruments used to assess each aspect of the evaluation.

| Aspect of the evaluation | Instruments applied |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Validity of project design | Matrix on consistency of original project document and revised project |
| Relevance of the strategy | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team Specific sections of questionnaire to implementing agencies Focus group guidelines for parents Focus group guidelines for employers Specific sections of questionnaire to agencies not participating in the project Interview with Mr. Astorga, project coordinator of IPEC's sub-program on Child domestic labor in Central America |
| Implementation of the project | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team Specific sections of questionnaire to implementing agencies Review of various project documents (project quarterly reports, terms of reference, solicitation of services, contracts, final reports or drafts of studies implemented, etc.) Telephone interview with USDOL staff Specific sections of e-mail questionnaire to IPEC's senior management staff |
| Effectiveness | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team Specific sections of questionnaire to implementing agencies Specific sections of e-mail questionnaire to IPEC's senior management staff Matrices on achievement of objectives & finance-output relationship Focus group guidelines for ex-domestic workers (10 children) Specific technical questionnaire to L'Escale Check-list on L'Escale's infrastructure and services |

| Aspect of the evaluation | Instruments applied |
|--------------------------|---|
| | Check list for review of children's files |
| Efficiency | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team 3 matrices on project expenditures, finance-output relationship and comparative allocation per components under original and revised project documents Interview with Mr. Wissing, Mexico program officer and Mr. Astorga, project coordinator of IPEC's Sub-regional program on Child domestic labor in Central America Specific sections of e-mail questionnaire to IPEC's senior management staff |
| Unexpected effects | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team Specific sections of questionnaire to implementing agencies Specific sections of questionnaire to agencies not participating in the project Specific sections of e-mail questionnaire to IPEC's senior management staff |
| Sustainability | Specific sections of questionnaire to project management team Specific section of questionnaire to implementing agencies Specific sections of e-mail questionnaire to IPEC's senior management staff |

The evaluation methodology has previously been applied within other assessments carried out by one of the consultants in Central American countries (Guatemala, Honduras) and had proven useful for its purpose. In the case of this evaluation the methodology proved also pertinent, allowing collecting and crossing information coming from different relevant sources. Unfortunately, because no sample groups of parents and employers of child domestic workers could be provided by the project (i.e., no activities have been carried out with the latter), the evaluation was unable to develop the focus groups intended for these informants. However, focus groups were carried out under this assessment with ex-child domestic laborers, which may be considered as the main key-informants on children's working conditions and hazards. Given that both of IPEC's very relevant quantitative and qualitative studies on the issue of child labor in Haiti had been carried out during 2001-2002 on the basis of wide and representative samples, the information provided by the latter served to compensate any information that may have been provided by the focus groups on the opinion of parents and employers on the issue of CDL. Thus, the absence of these two focus groups did not have a relevant impact on the evaluation's outcome.

The evaluators express their gratitude to all the people who participated in the evaluation and especially to the project management team, which arranged the agenda of this process.

2. Child domestic labor, the status of childhood and the issue of governance in Haiti: a complex, multi-problem context

Given the complexity of Haiti's general situation with regards to the economy, access to education and the phenomenon of child domestic labor in itself, it is necessary to introduce in this evaluation report some data related to the country's context. This will serve as social facts-background for our opinion on the outcome of IPEC-ILO's project on child domestic labor and may allow us to formulate suggestions regarding further efforts that may be carried out on this particular subject and country. Although the rationale organizing this first section of the report is based on the evaluators' point of view and information on Haiti, a great part of the background information on child domestic labor used within this section comes from two specific studies on this subject funded by the IPEC-ILO project¹, which may be said to be very important contributions of the project to the comprehension of the issue of child domestic labor in Haiti, as well as the main relevant outcomes of the IPEC-ILO's project funded by USDOL.

2.1. Child domestic labor in Haiti

As of year 2000², Haiti is the country with the lowest social indicators in the Latin American region and is placed among the quintile of countries with the lowest Human Development Index in the world (place 146 among 173 countries). 65% of the Haitian population lives in rural zones and 65% of the total population lives under the line of poverty (more than 70% in the case of rural population). Haiti's Gini coefficient (measure of inequity in income distribution) is among the highest in the Latin American region: 0.66 by 1996. Life expectancy at birth is of 52.6 years, while the rate of children mortality under 5 years old is of 125/1,000 and fecundity is of 4.4 children per woman. Population growth is accompanied by the problem of a dramatic reduction of water resources, the country being the scenario of a depletion of other resources such as natural vegetation and woods. Population under 15 years old is of 40.6%. 56% of the population is malnourished and 6.10% of the population is HIV-positive. Although the rate of primary schooling is nowadays of 80%, only 20% of children reach the secondary education level, 1.5% follows technical or university studies and near half the adult population remains illiterate.

Around 75% of the economically active population (EAP) is underemployed and an important, undetermined segment is unemployed. By 1999 more than 50% of the EAP worked in the informal sector and 44.5% work in agriculture, being that the formal public and private sectors only involved 4.1% of the EAP. However, by year 2001, while the tertiary sector of the economy (commerce and services) represented 51% of the Haitian gross domestic product (GDP), the primary sector, including agriculture, only represented 26.6% of the GDP. In fact, while the public deficit, local currency devaluation and the inflation index have increased dramatically during the past two years, most Haitian primary exports have been in net regression during the same period. Likewise, while foreign aid

¹ IPEC-ILO, Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail, UNDP, UNICEF, Save the Children Canada & UK, *Domesticité des enfants en Haïti – Caractéristiques, contexte et organisation*, Port-au-Prince, Décembre 2002; IPEC-ILO et al, *Etude sur les fondements de la pratique de la domesticité des enfants en Haïti*, Port-au-Prince, Décembre 2001.

² UNDP, *Report on Human Development*, 2002.

has diminished dramatically due to the political crisis that started in 2000, government expenditures in the social sector remain insufficient to attend the increasing needs of the Haitian people. With regards to childhood issues, a main problem is that an important number of Haitian children have no birth certificate; thus, they are legally “inexistent”, a fact that favors all sort of abuses against children.

Within such context of widespread poverty and social inequity, Haiti shares some common features with other Latin American and Third World countries whose societies are transiting towards a urban-based concentration of the its population and economy. As in other Latin American countries, the long-dated political and economic centralism of Haitian society has been reflected in the increasing abysm existent between the living conditions of urban and rural zones (and particularly in the relative absence of educational services in the rural zones). During the past 30 years this issue has been at the origin of both a massive flow of rural population into Haitian villages and cities (mainly Port-au-Prince), as well as of an increase in child labor rates and of the vulnerability of children coming from low-income families whose services are offered as “domestic help”. This fact has reinforced and at the same time transformed the old cultural practice of child domestic labor within the country.

Accordingly to a recent IPEC-UNDP nation-wide study on the issue, the number of children under the condition of “domesticity” is currently estimated within the range of 124,000 and 173,000 children (or possibly up to 206,000 children³). Thus, while it is estimated that around 9% of Haitian families host children under the condition of domesticity, between 10% and 13% of Haitian children fall under this situation.

Child domestic labor in Haiti is a multi-dimensional problem. It is a long-dated social practice ingrained in the Haitian culture that can be traced back to the XIX-eth century (the previous forms of child and adult domestic labor corresponding more to the specific social and economic setting of slavery). Thus, it should not be confounded with any form of “modern slavery on children”, as it is often said⁴. Within this context, the practice of child domestic labor has had different social and economic roles at the same time.

a) On the side of labor supply, child domestic labor is or has been:

- a way to reduce economic pressures on very poor (and very often rural) families with many children, unable to support all of them;
- a social response to the lack of adequate infrastructure and educational services for children in the rural milieu;
- a subtle strategy for migration and social promotion of the rural population within the urban context;
- a way of establishing subtle symbolic “alliance” links between underserved and “richer” family groups through the cession of parental responsibility and the right to demand

³ In case the estimation of the total Haitian population is placed around 8'000,000 inhabitants instead of 6'900,000 inhabitants, as considered within IPEC-UNICEF-UNDP's recent study on child domesticity.

⁴ It is to be mentioned that Haiti is not, as it is often said, a society that actively promotes “slavery-like practices”. This eventual ideological, foreign misperception of a local phenomenon (and mainly the wording involved) often hurts Haitian people's feelings and thus engenders misunderstandings that may hamper any further progress on this matter.

labor from children in exchange of caring for their needs and education (an old, original sort of common-law, unwritten contract between *bourgeois* and poor families that was later often broken throughout the XX-eth century);

- and as of recent times (although not enough recognized), a way for kinship to reallocate children having no available biological parents with them (due to parents' death⁵, parents migration to urban settings or outside the country, the subsequent effect of reconstitution of some nuclear families –e.g., establishment of new couples-, explicit child abandon or placement of children by young parents due to their inability to care for them⁶).

Thus, the typical scenario of the practice of domesticity initiates as follows: given that some parents are unable to continue providing financial support to all of their children, or given that (quality) education is unavailable in rural zones (or that parents think that children will benefit of learning “urban ways of life” or “acquiring more promising relations”), they decide that children will be better-off in another setting in which bed, food, medical support, clothing and education may be provided to them in exchange of their “services”⁷. Frequently, this will be the fate of the elder children within the family, and particularly girls. In fact, around 60% of child domestics are female. The idea that the child will attend school (something that cannot be easily provided within the Haitian rural zones) is an important expectation of the parents which leads to this kind of arrangement.

In this context, it is important to notice that in relative numbers (percentage) child domestic laborers' location follows the general distribution of the population (i.e., 73% are located in rural zones), although there is an important number of child domestic laborers –around 45% of the total- in the Western Province, including Port-au-Prince, due to greater concentration of population in this zone. Likewise, it is important to notice that nowadays **one third of Haitian families are mono-parental (more often headed by women), and that two thirds of children living without none of their biological parents⁸ were born at the home where they now live.** The Haitian rural setting, and particularly the provinces of **L'Artibonite** and **La Grande Anse**, remain as important (and maybe the main) sources of origin of child domestic laborers.

b) On the side of child labor demand

Obviously, child domestic labor also responds to certain needs of the economy and to the way that child “help” has informally or formally been used in the rural and urban setting since long time ago. In fact, child domestic is cheaper for employer families than hiring the services of an adult worker. The exchange between “family expectations” and the “need of

⁵ The negative evolution and status of Haiti's health indicators as well as the ravages caused by the AIDS epidemics might have played a role in the increase of the number of vulnerable children, as in the past did the political violence that afflicted the country during decades, or as currently does the desperate economic situation of many Haitian families that increases migration to the cities and abroad.

⁶ The rate of early, undesired pregnancies in Haiti may be relevant in this aspect.

⁷ Which is not the only current one (see labor supply factors).

⁸ The data comes from IPEC-ILO's funded nation-wide study on child domesticity carried out by the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI), UNDP and FAFO (Norway), with complementary funding from UNICEF and Save The Children Canada & UK.

home help” having occurred (with or without intermediation⁹), there seems to be three main tasks which in the Haitian context will be more often assigned as “chores” of domestic children: water carriage for human use (90% of domestic children), home cleaning and other domestic chores –e.g., cooking, washing clothes, purchases, disposal of excretes, etc.- (50-60% of children, depending on the chore) and guarding small children (20%). The first task is related with a particular feature of Haitian society: 54% of the population lacks safe water service and an even greater percentage lack sewage service. Thus, adults in the urban sector tend to assign domestic children those chores which are considered more cumbersome and time-consuming, although vital for a proper home tenure. In some way, families with domestic children also replace the use of their own children’s “help” in this tasks with the labor of child domestics, and in some cases use their labor within other personal (company for elder adults) or economic activities (as vendors in families’ businesses, etc.).

The above description corresponds to what may be called as the “formal” kind of domesticity, based on an unwritten consensus (“contract”) between the family of the child and the “employer family” and on mutual expectations (room & board plus education in exchange of child labor), with or without child consent on this matter. Of course, mutual expectations could be broken with time, as they often did, particularly from the side of the employer family, as for example, by exploiting children or not sending them to school as agreed with their parents. In the past, this kind of “formal” arrangement was practiced between rich and poor families, the fact of having children under this condition and respecting their agreement being a source of status and prestige for the former. Thus, child domesticity back to 50 years ago probably implied some form of social mobility for rural underprivileged children of the time, some of them having even been educated in a trade. Unfortunately, the reality of child domestic labor in modern Haiti seems to have retained very few of the “positive” features of this ancient practice. The increasing levels of impoverishment among the Haitian society and its peasantry during the past decades has had an important impact on the increase in the number of children under domesticity, being that nowadays most of child domestics work for families belonging to the lower income levels of society, and even for families whose adult members may be formally unemployed, thus being unable to meet the domestic child needs. In fact, according to IPEC-UNDP’s study on child domestic labor, while 12% of families with the highest income have children under domesticity living with them, 8% of families with the lowest income do also.

Although the “formal” kind of domesticity “contract” described above (practiced outside of kinship links between the child’s family and the employer family) may be considered as “informal” in western terms (i.e., based on an unwritten and unenforceable agreement, from which many abuses to the child may arrive), there is also an “informal form” of domesticity which it is difficult to say if it is not even more widespread within Haitian society¹⁰. Within the latter and because the biological parents are absent for one or

⁹ Although it is not the main channel through which the placement of children is done, it is known that in some cases the practice of domesticity involves the services of “intermediaries” (mostly women) between the supply and demand of child labor. These intermediaries travel into the rural zones offering families the possibility of placing their children among better-off and “reliable” families which they have previously contacted.

¹⁰ A similar although different case is that of parents who **pay** relatives or other families in the city/villages in order for them to host their children so they can attend school, given that there are no secondary (and even primary) schooling services in many locations of origin. In these cases, the children will not be treated as a domestic but as a paying guest.

another reason, the child is given to live with or is raised among other family belonging to his/her “kin”. This “inception” of the child by other “relatives” or people “who are near to the family” does not necessarily imply any formal adoption of the child. The notion of kin within the Haitian context would be considered as “flexible” or “vague” in occidental terms: “kin” refers not only to the biological links of a person, but also his/her step-family links, or symbolic linkage (godfather or godmother), or in some cases, family friends or even members of the same village of origin living in the city. In all these cases, an emotional bond may or may not develop between the child and his/her hosts and a status of “equal” (among the family) may or may (often) not be applied to these “placed” children. In fact, although the relationship will be described as of “mutual aid” between the child and his/her relatives, very often these children will be treated as “domestic servants” within their new lieu of residence. And although this informal “child care system” of others people’s children may be considered as a cultural form of solidarity (a child in need, unable to be taken care of by his/her own parents is hosted and fed¹¹) it may also lead to all kind of abuse against the child (please see next section on this issue).

As a summary on this issue it may be said that apart from what we have called “formal child domesticity”, which may occur within or outside of kinship links, in Haiti there is also a widespread kind of “informal child domesticity”, which occurs within vaguely defined “kinship links” and which, as it will be seen later, is not covered by any legal provision, thus is not formally recognized by society as such. The first kind is named under the label of “*restavek*” (a pejorative expression which indicates the diminished status of the child) and other mild terms. In both cases, the child may be subject to different kinds of abuse, partly due to the particular family context in which he/she may be inserted, but other derived of the own limitations of Haitian society to satisfy its population needs.

2.2. The status of “childhood” and child domestic labor in Haitian society

a) Similar issues on both sides of the coin: access to education and family violence in relation to domestic and non-domestic children

For rural people in Haiti, who amount to most of the Haitian population, children needs and aspirations are not necessarily differentiated from those of their family group: “Children are the richness of parents” (i.e., support for the latter during their late age) is a common local say. Thus, among most sectors of Haitian society there is no clearly recognized status for “childhood” as a distinct category that is entitled to benefit of specific rights. It may also be said that the country lacks specific and effective policies regarding children’s welfare. Although Haiti has ratified the United Nations Convention on Children’s Rights, it has no specific Code on Children and Adolescence¹².

¹¹ Accordingly to IPEC-UNDP’s nation-wide study, although between 30 to 40% of children with alive-parents (could or) do return eventually to their family home, 60 to 70% of children with alive-parents would expect to remain under domesticity conditions until reaching adulthood. The study states that for child domestic laborers their link with their biological parents is not considered anymore as the most important relationship in their lives.

¹² A proposal in this direction, elaborated under UNICEF’s sponsorship, has been under the Haitian authorities’ consideration for the past two years, but it has not yet been approved. Likewise, Haiti has not signed ILO conventions 138 (on minimum age for work) and 182 (on the elimination of the worst forms of child labor).

Otherwise, and although there is no nation-wide study available on this subject, it is well known that most Haitian children (being that 65% of the population lives in rural zones) do assume different chores since early age within the subsistence-based economy of their rural families. Some of these chores, if performed by adults outside the family, would be considered as labor, which is not the case for children, the latter serving as un-paid support for their parent's economic activities or partially substituting these with regards to home chores, so adults can work outside home. On the basis of the results of the IPEC-UNDP's study cited before, the amount of time invested in domestic work by non-domestic children may be estimated as 1/4 to 1/3 (in average) of the amount of time invested by domestic children. Likewise, the amount of time invested in domestic work increases accordingly to the increase in age of individuals, although in a much more relevant way in the case of non-domestic rural girls and domestic rural and urban girls. Thus, gender differences with regards to child domestic work increase accordingly to accrual in age of individuals.

Thus, many children of both sexes "work" with/for their families in the fields, selling-goods or taking care of home chores. In fact, accordingly to the Haitian Statistics and Computing Institute (Institute Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique), child labor represents up to 10% of the labor time provided within family-handled agricultural units. For example, accordingly to a recent study sponsored by IPEC's project at the locality of Furcy¹³, an agricultural zone near Port-au-Prince, most (if not all) children of both sexes work for their families in agricultural related activities and almost 60% do so before being 11 years old. While most (85%) of these children attend school, children do face important labor-related risks (e.g., one-fifth of the population sampled in this study had had agricultural labor-related accidents). Likewise, in many cases agricultural child work is cumbersome and excessive for children's physical capacities. Although parents value and favor children's education, most of them have a positive opinion of child labor and find that it has a positive effect on children's development.

With regards to education, since the country's independence in 1804 the access to schooling has remained the privilege of a small segment of the urban population, a feature that is currently reflected in that almost 50% of the Haitian population is illiterate. In fact, education services and infrastructure are generally scarce, almost absent in many rural zones and greatly centered on the primary level. Although Haitian law guarantees "free education for all children", 80% of schools are private (thus paying) and just 20% of them are public (thus "free"). Thus, it will not be surprising that according to IPEC-UNDP's study: 16% of Haitian children under schooling age have never attended school and that an additional 6% of children currently receive no education (i.e., 22% of children do not attend school); likewise, an additional 38% of children attend a school-grade under the expected level for their age (thus, only 40% of children attend the school-grade corresponding to their age).

The additional burden imposed by domestic labor on children's education is also evident: the percentage of children under domesticity that have never attended school (29%) or that are not currently doing so (11%) triples the percentage observed for the same categories among non-domestic children. Likewise, while 25% of non-domestic children attend a school-grade under the expected level for their age, 60% of children under

¹³ Cf. *"Etude sur la nature et les conditions socio-économiques du travail des enfants et des adolescents dans la production agricole"* (draft version of the report).

domesticity fall under this case. Moreover, most children under domesticity attend night-shift schooling, which is often of rather poor quality.

Child battering or corporal punishment, as a form of raising and “correcting” or “disciplining” children, is a common practice among Haitian society. An interesting piece of information coming from IPEC-UNDP’s study is that non-domestic children seem to suffer most kinds of mistreatment with “educational purpose” even more often than domestic children. Thus, around 50% have been battered with an object (more often a whip) and around 35% have been forced to remain kneeling for long periods of time as a way of punishment. Adults consider this as normal child raising practices, which are even more often used on their own heir than on domestic children. Thus, child mistreatment against the domestic child should be better understood within the context of a society in which physical violence against children is often legitimized due to their diminished status with regards to that of adults.

While very often domestic children are trusted with chores that are inappropriate for their strength and age, sexual violence is known as a frequent risk related to child domestic labor, and it may be exercised, mainly towards domestic girls, by both adults and young members of the employer family. In such case, the aggressors profit of the vulnerability of the child, who at best has the status of a “second class relative” if any at all, as well as of the fact that there is no **effective** child protection system in place that may protect children from these abuses. Some of these children will eventually flee from such harsh treatment and some will engross the ranks of the street children population of some Haitian cities and villages. In fact, most ex-child domestic laborers included within the focus group carried out during the evaluation process mentioned, as main reason to escape from their employer’s home, their desire to avoid physical punishment and cumbersome work, such as carrying water every day.

b) Visibility of the phenomenon and social consciousness on the problem

Notwithstanding the above, it is to be said that given the economic and social constraints faced by most Haitian families, child domestic labor is seen by many local people as an unavoidable practice, over which it is mostly the fact that children are not sent to school or that sometimes they may be sexually abused what attracts a negative opinion from the respondents. Thus, for many people the issue of child domestic labor in itself may even be a valid road for individual progress (i.e., as a way for the child to escape greater poverty and to have an opportunity to attend to school). The fact that children are raised separately from their parents/siblings and the negative conditions under which children work are seldom mentioned as the most important issues. Thus, while some better-educated Haitians may understand this issue as a Human Rights problem and may advocate for the immediate elimination of such practice, it seems that most people consider this practice as “normal” and many would be satisfied with just eliminating the “abuses” within child domestic labor and ensuring that these children effectively attend school.

Thus, it may be said that although the issue is highly visible and relatively well known, the situation of children under domesticity is not perceived as an important problem among most Haitian sectors of society (as for example it may neither be the issues of physical punishment of children or the observance of children’s rights). So much rests to be done in terms of raising Haitian people’s conscience on this subject, starting by the development of a distinct perception on the status of childhood in itself. In fact, children under

domesticity may be seen as one of the most excluded sectors within a society in which most of the population is excluded from the access to opportunities of well-being.

c) The institutional framework intended to protect childhood

The fact that most Haitian children lack of specific recognized rights does not mean, however, that legislation on child labor issues is absent in the country. Haitian legislators in the decade of the 40's and more importantly during the decade of the 60's tried to regulate the increasing practice of child domestic labor (mainly through the Haitian Labor Code –HLC-). The HLC forbids the practice of domestic labor for children under twelve years old, but establishes a vague category of “child domestic service” for children between 12 and 14 years old, to whom it however recognizes some rights, including that of education and health care and specific days and number of hours of daily rest; the HLC also establishes that the labor assigned to the children should be adapted to his/her age and forbids all physical and psychological mistreatment of such children, fixing penalties for the aggressor in case of incompliance. The HLC also rules the conditions under which child domestic labor (for children between 15 and 18 years old) is exercised (including the right to a salary equivalent to half of that of an adult)¹⁴. Finally, the HLC stipulates the obligation that in children under domesticity are registered at the Institute of Social Welfare and Research –IBESR), the government agency in charge of children's welfare.

Thus, although imperfect with regards to many features of the issue, since the beginnings of the 60's there was a legal framework on child domestic labor in place in the country. The problem is that, as in many other aspects of Haitian society, **law is not applied nor enforced at all**. The reasons for this are both political and functional. The issue has never been perceived (in a “self-motivated way”) as a national priority by local authorities, because other main issues of political and economic character remain at the top of the political agenda. However, given that in recent times child domestic labor in Haiti attracted a negative coverage from the international press, the Haitian government started to make several public declarations about its intention to eliminate this social phenomenon.

Notwithstanding the latter, up to the date of this report an effective governmental response to the problem of child domestic labor in Haiti remains absent. The institution in charge of attending child welfare issues (the Institute of Social Welfare and Research –IBESR-) is under-staffed and under-funded (the IBESR has a gross annual budget of around US\$300,000 for all its work in the country), its activities being highly concentrated in Port-au-Prince. Additionally, IBESR's staff is poorly trained to perform its mission. In fact, during year 2001 the IBESR forwarded authorization for less than 20 children to provide domestic services. Likewise, given that the correctional institution that used to lodge children at risk in Port-au-Prince (the “Centre d'Accueil de Carrefour”) has remained closed during the past decade, IBESR currently lacks of any accommodation services for children victim of abuse; thus, in case of such need, IBESR is forced to contact some scarce and small private institutions, whose services are insufficient to assist the wide scope of children in need of support and rehabilitation¹⁵.

¹⁴ However, it is to be said that domestic servants, even in the case of adults, do not enjoy the same labor rights and benefits that other trades do under the Haitian Labor Law.

¹⁵ In fact, child and juvenile delinquents are currently placed in the women's prison and other adult facilities.

The Haitian Justice system is also afflicted by the same kind of staffing¹⁶ and financial limitations. There is a scarce number of Children Tribunals, mostly concentrated in Port-au-Prince and their capacity to apply law in order to protect children as well as their reach, is scarce. However, as of recent the government of Haiti (GOH) has established a small Police of Minors force within the Haitian Police Force, which will start its duties in June 2003. Coordination among the IBESR and the Haitian Children Tribunals on the issue of child domestic labor is scarce and ineffective.

As a summary on the above issues, it may be said that while the status of childhood and the existence of children's rights are scarcely recognized within the Haitian society, the social, political and economic strains that afflict Haitian families and children have determined the existence of **a general context of high vulnerability for many children in Haiti**, within which families links are easily broken and reconstituted, many children are forced to live separately from their biological parents and there is an insufficient provision of basic services, including education, for a vast sector of the population. Within this context, the harsh economic reality faced by the country in the last decades has both contributed to the massive migration of peasant population to the urban milieu as well as to make of child domestic labor one of the main features or roads for this migration.

However, while many Haitian people recognize this old cultural practice has become source for all kind of eventual abuses for children, there is scarce consciousness among the population about the importance of this issue and the need to develop a proactive approach to tackle this problem: in fact most people consider child domestic labor as a "normal" practice. In some way, poverty and the lack of educational opportunities remain at the same time the main causes and the main arguments for an attitude of social justification of the phenomenon. Likewise, the lack of a strong commitment and capacity for effective delivery on the part of governmental agencies, impede that children's rights in general, and particularly those of children under domesticity, are effectively protected by the rule of law and by a consistent and related institutional framework.

2.3. The project's environment: Limited governance and quality of the institutional context as a problem issue for project implementation

The problem of limited governance, lack of firm commitment of government authorities and the wide gap existing in Haiti between law and reality on one side, and between discourse and commitment /effective action on the other side, were major unexpected difficulties that the project, due to its initial design, was not prepared to overcome. These problems were accrued by the severe political and economic crisis faced by the country since May 2000 and the subsequent questioning of the legitimacy of Haitian government instances by the international community. The general institutional crisis afflicting the country has also afflicted the Haitian Justice System during the past years (in fact, since the beginning of the institutional crisis, three Ministers of Justice have resigned).

The absence of clear and effective government policies (on poverty, education, child labor and other) and the scarce public resources invested in different development sectors,

¹⁶ For example, accordingly to Port-au-Prince's Judge of Minors, the Tribunal lacks the services of medical, psychology and social work staff.

starting with primary economic production, is a major obstacle that hampers the sustainability of most social development projects in the country. For example, even in face of a dramatic depletion of water resources and loss of productive land, the country lacks a policy on water irrigation and soil conservation. In the same sense, although some institutions charged with dealing with childhood-related issues, such as the Ministry of Social Affaires (MAS) or the IBESR are nominally existent, the country has not put into place effective policies and institutional and financial means to attend this target population's problems.

Given that in the Haitian cultural context it seems quite "normal" that political discourse is not necessarily followed by concrete action, it is not surprising that the memorandum of agreement signed between IPEC and the GOH became non useful as an instrument to achieve the immediate objectives of the project.

The nominal character of government institutions scarcely interested in accruing their performance, and the virtual character and limited applicability of existent law, made the project's idea of "organizing" a fight against child domestic labor (e.g., ratification of ILO Conventions, set-up of National Steering Committee, elaboration of National Action Plan) a non relevant initiative within such institutional culture context. Lack of interest and eventual "blockade"¹⁷ of project implementation on the part of government agencies (who would anyway participate at numerous meetings to discuss these issues) derailed the implementation of the first project component, which aimed to ensure some sustainability for project's future outcomes. **In fact**, although the project had originally been designed on the basis of short-term consultations with **previous** government authorities and technicians, the project started 18 months afterwards, and by that time two Ministers had held the post at the MAS. **It seems that the opinion and criticism on the project design coming from the "new" technicians at the Ministry was not taken enough into account** by the initial project management team and thus these resented this fact throughout the project's lifetime¹⁸.

In turn, such political stagnation with regards to the project's evolution seemingly produced a long period of expectation and of no concrete implementation of (concrete) alternative strategies in the field by the initial project management. By the time of our visit to Haiti, although relationships with government officials related to the project seemed more positive (although unproductive), there seemed to be some distance and scarce coordination between the 3 different government actors potentially related to the project (the General Direction at the MAS, the Head of the IBESR and the Minister's Cabinet at the MAS, which works closely with the First Lady). This situation made the issue of who to approach to seek cooperation a sensitive subject for project's management team.

¹⁷ By using this word we refer to the fact that by delaying indefinitely to pursue action with regards to its commitment with ILO, the GOH and more concretely its representatives at implementing agencies (MAS, IBESR, etc.) hampered the viability of **at least one** of the immediate objectives of the project and maybe the one that was, from the operational point of view, the most important to ensure project's sustainability.

¹⁸ For example, the technical advisor at the Ministry of Social Affaires expressed this displeasure by expressing that "in the future this kind of initiatives should not omit 'important partners', with which consensus building was insufficient; planning should involve more the partners and work should be carried out in a more coordinated manner". He also requested that investments in infrastructure should be considered. This last query was joined by IBESR's employees. In fact, apart from supporting the costs of a seminar, the sole proposal presented by IBESR to the project was to invest in repairing and equipping IBESR's closed correctional house for Minors at Port-au-Prince, in order to be in capacity of lodging ex-domestic children that run-away from their employers. Obviously, government officials are more inclined to do things that can be "shown" to public opinion.

Given that labor unions and entrepreneur associations were respectively weak or lacked of interest in the issue of child domestic labor, an ILO classic tripartite approach could neither be implemented. Changes in governmental authorities (Ministers) and a context of uncooperative and confrontational relationships between government and civil society organizations (e.g., National Coalition for Haitian Rights) complicated even more the feasibility of gaining consensus to implement one of the project's main strategies. In fact party politics being so divisive as they seem to be in Haiti, most adults seem more interested in other kind of "adult subjects" than in childhood-related issues.

However, as international pressure on human rights issues in Haiti increases, childhood related issues and child domestic labor **might** become in the near future part of the current government's political agenda. Thus, during the past year the GOH passed a law on family violence and submitted to Parliament a law on child domestic labor which eliminates title 9 of the Haitian Labor Code (on the issue of "*enfants en service*") but which seems a rather flawed initiative that may further hamper the effective protection of these children's rights. Likewise, during year 2002 President Aristide made a public declaration before the U.N. on his commitment to eliminate child domestic labor, and recently, after a French TV network issued a negative report on the issue of Haitian child domestic laborers in December 2002, the First Lady took the issue personally on hand, publishing a book on the same by March 2003 and organizing with United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF) support a seminar for government institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) in order to start discussing the basics of a "policy" on this subject ¹⁹. During the meeting, some talk went on about the need to ratify ILO's Conventions on child labor. As to put in evidence the communication problems existent in Haiti, within the publication of Mrs. Aristide there are three explicit mentions of IPEC's funded study on child domestic labor, but unfortunately the origin of the work is attributed **only** to UNDP (the "UNDP's study...", etc.).

Although the politics underlining all these initiatives and their effective outcome still seem not clear, it is obvious that it would be commendable that IPEC could make a more open approach and offer/seek cooperation to/from these new potential majors players on the field of child domestic labor in Haiti. While the issues of effective rule of law, building-up an adequate institutional framework and of establishing sound policies on child domestic labor will always remain uncertain, this might be a clever road for getting out of the stagnation that has characterized government-IPEC's project relationships. Up to now there is no evidence that recent government initiatives on the CDL issue have been somehow related with efforts initiated under the IPEC project. However, given that the GOH is apparently shifting towards giving this issue a more prominent attention, it would be highly commendable that IPEC-ILO takes advantage of this sudden opportunity and increases its advocacy efforts before the government-related bodies that are interested in this issue.

With regards to the particular case of the Office of the First Lady, IPEC-ILO should make a serious and patient assessment about the latter's commitment to give a sustainable and long-term attention to the issue of CDL and of its real intention to "informally" help to "institutionalize" the GOH's specialized bodies' **effective** attention to this subject. The First Lady of Haiti already presides a Public Committee on the issue of HIV-AIDS in Haiti

¹⁹ However, as to show that these efforts are still incipient and that there is yet no shared and clear resolve on the part of the GOH's high-rank officers on this issue, in April 2003 the Minister of Justice publicly declared that "the *restavek* problem belongs to the past".

and it seems that the latter has served to entice a more clear action of GOH's institutions on this other issue. Both the First Lady's leverage on government officials (of which we were witness given the attendance to the May 15 Conference) and her long-term interest on the matter (which is reflected on the book she authored on the same) could start being put into test in the benefit of CDL's interests, even if this effort just leads to have a better "door-opener" for IPEC's long-term goals among GOH's officials.

3. Findings

3.1. Validity of the project design: Too ambitious and unrealistic (given the Haitian institutional context) and lacking a thorough internal logic

Although the beneficiaries of the project were identified within the original document, the extent of both the development and immediate objectives were unrealistic and far ambitious with regards to the local political and economic reality, the duration of the project, the dimension and extent of the child domestic labor problem in the country and the social and cultural issues related to this practice in Haiti. As per our informants, it seems that the elaboration of the original proposal submitted by IPEC-ILO at USDOL request was done in a hastily way and in a too short span of time²⁰. In fact, at the moment when the project document was elaborated, ILO lacked of enough knowledge on child domestic labor issues in Haiti and had scarce institutional experience in the same (in fact, except for another project on promotion of employment, there had been no ILO representative in Haiti as there is none up-to-now (in fact, the institution does not necessarily have offices in all the countries it supports). Thus, it may be said that the immediate objectives were formulated in a far optimistic way by the initial ILO mission to the country. For example, it was unlikely that in a three-year span “the behaviors and perception of the Haitian society with regards to the (*long-dated, culturally ingrained*) issue of child domestic labor *would* have been modified” (*as stated in the project’s original design*). It seems that the Government of Haiti, that was to be an important partner in the project implementation and later signed an agreement in this sense, did not participate in an adequate and sufficient manner in the project design.

On the other hand, the **logical framework of the project was inadequately designed**. That is: most of the immediate objectives were not quantified in an adequate manner nor had a clear articulation or hierarchy among them, a fact that made unclear which was the specific contribution of each objective to the project’s development objective. Likewise, the scope of most of the project’s activities and outputs remained very limited with regards to the rather ambitious immediate objectives (or it may be more proper to say otherwise:

²⁰ Accordingly to ILO officers who participated in the initial assessment mission, this particular project (**CDL in Haiti**) was originated **at the specific request/ interest of USDOL** in 1998. **In fact, this was to be IPEC’s first experience both with regards to the subject of CDL in the Region and with regards to Haiti** (IPEC later initiated other projects on CDL within the Central American Region). Given the latter and the short delay given for the submission of a proposal, an IPEC-ILO officer from the HQ’s at Geneva and another one from IPEC’s Central American Sub-regional bureau, carried out a 15 day mission in Haiti in order to contact governmental and non governmental organizations **of the time** (government later changed at the beginning of the project’s lifetime) and obtained some expression of interest of the same on the issue. Likewise, they consulted the available literature on the subject, which was rather of a general character and stated gross figures on the problem. However, no initial beneficiaries’ needs assessment or **analysis of institutional capacities** was carried out at this time. For example, there was only one institution, with a limited operational capacity (L’Escale, for 40 children) working to remove and reintegrate CDLs to their families –a process that can take more than a year per case (but not in acquaintance with this fact, the original project proposal targeted the removal of 10,000 children in three years!). Neither was there any reliable data on the distribution of the CDL problem within the country. On the basis of this partial information, a proposal was drafted by IPEC-ILO staff and submitted by ILO to USDOL.

that the immediate objectives were very unrealistic considering what was really implied by the expected project outputs, activities and inputs²¹).

Apart from the above, **the project seems to have lacked a thorough rationale and articulated strategy**. For example, most strategies were organized in relatively independent clusters of activities that were to be carried out by implementing agencies. The latter were not clearly enough identified in the project document nor their responsibilities were defined in a precise way. This off-start burden determined that since the beginning of project implementation the management team had to invest lots of efforts in identifying implementing agencies and/or in dealing with already identified implementing agencies whose originally presumed capacities were suddenly revealed as very limited or inexistent.

The fact that several project indicators were unrelated with the immediate objectives or difficult to measure, or even formulated in a non-quantifiable manner²², made it difficult to put in place an adequate planning and monitoring system in order to follow up the achievement of the immediate objectives. Likewise, many indicators were related to activities, not outcomes, and they had no proper breakdown by age, sex, location of origin and other variables. Gender issues relevant to the target groups were not considered in an appropriate manner within the project strategies nor among the indicators.

In fact, as it is mentioned later in this report, IPEC's sub-regional and local management teams put in place a project implementation style mainly based in the completion of unrelated (although foreseeable) activities, rather than in the follow-up and measurement of results of clearly oriented program strategies. Because of this style of management of IPEC's project in Haiti, the targets of the subsequent project reformulations were to become unrealistic and thus, in several cases, unfeasible. A more in-depth analysis would have been needed at the time of the project revision in order to dress-up a more comprehensive (and the same time more detailed) alternative strategy.

It now seems that the first project revision (approved by ends of year 2001) did not take enough into account some of the issues that had previously limited the implementation of the original project document. Thus, **while preserving the sense of most of the original objectives, the project revision did not propose feasible alternatives to the difficulties encountered**: it just substituted the initial project **strategies** with a limited scope of new project **activities**, while it also reduced the number of project beneficiaries **without reducing the budget allocation to the project**. The fact that after the project revision some actions originally stated under one sole immediate objective (IO2: awareness raising) were divided into two new immediate objectives (IO2: awareness

²¹ Example: "To train 10 social workers from the National Institute of Social Welfare and Research (IBESR)" as stated in the original project document would anyway have been insufficient for IPEC in order to "aid IBESR increase its effectiveness against abusive forms of labor within child domesticity". In fact, the number of children under the condition of "domesticity" is currently estimated within the range of 124,000 and 173,00 children (or up to 206,000 children, in case the estimation of the total Haitian population is placed around 8'000,000 inhabitants instead of 6'900,000 inhabitants, as considered within IPEC-UNICEF-UNDP's recent study on child domesticity).

²² E.g., "reduction in the number of children going from rural to urban zones to work as domestic laborers" (however, there was no baseline study information available at the time, as there is currently none on this subject); or: "capacity of NGOs related to the program to offer services of direct re-adaptation services to children in domesticity" (in fact, this population is not to be readapted or rehabilitated, nor this "capacities" were clearly defined nor its measurement stated).

raising and IO4: generation of knowledge) had mix effects on project's implementation and outcome. On one side, it allowed IPEC to carry out under the new IO4 additional studies intended to generate relevant information that may enrich the implementation of other project components and a better understanding of other aspects of the CDL issue and of child labor in general in Haiti. Likewise, it also allowed to better precise the number of direct beneficiaries of the awareness raising strategy (cf. the new IO 2). Given that the project could not implement a thorough and on-going communicational strategy, the greater precision added to the new IO2 made more evident the project's failure to achieve this objective. However, separating one original immediate objective into two new ones also served to create a mechanism within the project by which a general "lump sum" was assigned to "studies" which in not all cases were relevant for the **specific** project's subject (CDL) and which in some cases became too costly given their final outcome (please see examples of this issue under footnote # 30 within section 3.5.b of this report).

3.2. Relevance of the strategy: An insufficient and sometimes maladapted response to a complex institutional context and problem-issue

Given the complex features of child domestic labor in Haiti and the governance and institutional framework weaknesses existent in the country (please see to the first section of this report), the strategy designed by the project may be considered as incomplete, not clearly focused on the main issues related to the problem and, in some cases, not adapted to the Haitian social reality nor to the needs of the potential beneficiaries. In fact, most of the strategies applied did not respond to the needs and opinion of government authorities nor of the beneficiary population. The following paragraphs analyze the limitations and scope of the different "components" or strategies proposed by the project document and its effective application.

a) The first component of the Project: Strengthening of institutional capacities in order to establish a legal and administrative framework to national activities

Given the particular political and institutional context of the Haitian society, the implementation of some of this first component's main strategic elements (e.g., to promote a National –inter-institutional- Directive Committee on Child Labor issues, the ratification of ILO conventions 138 & 182 and the formulation of a National Action Plan on child domestic labor) revealed themselves as unfeasible at very early stage of the project implementation. This general strategy (not specifically aimed towards child domestic labor) tried to establish some basis for further sustainability of project's activities. In fact, it may be said that IPEC applied to the Haitian context a general strategy (National Committee, Action Plan, etc.) that had proven useful in other Latin American countries but that was unrealistic for the current Haitian context.

With this purpose in mind, ILO signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the GOH in December 1999. Due to the instability of the Haitian political environment and the apparent lack of interest (and even obstruction) coming from authorities at the Ministry of Social Affaires -MAS- and the Institute of Social Welfare and Research –IBESR- (the project's official partners), the agreement did not lead to any relevant action on the part of the government. Likewise, during the past years there seemed to be a conflictive relationship between MAS and IBESR authorities, which hampered any effective cooperation among these institutions (although the IBESR formally belongs to the MAS). Moreover, due to the problem of political legitimacy faced by the Haitian Parliament during

the past years, the project's management team never approached this institution in order to lobby for the ratification of the ILO conventions 138 and 182.

All these facts lead local project management to maintain a cordial, although unproductive relationship with government authorities for a very long period of time. When by the third year of the project some agreement was reached in order to carry out a study on possible modifications to be done on Haitian law on child domesticity and on which structures of IBESR and of the local police were to be strengthened, the project lifetime was already near to run out. Thus, generally speaking it may be said that because the original strategy was not reviewed and substituted in the field in an early and timely manner by other strategic approach, most of the project outputs and activities dependent on the above became unfeasible.

Unfortunately, while all this happened, the existent Haitian Labor Code and its provisions on the protection of child domestic laborers remained unapplied. Looking backwards, the project might have had better chances of getting more effective governmental cooperation if instead of implementing its originally intended strategy (ratification of ILO conventions and other), would have limited itself to offer support to the Haitian authorities so they could start putting into practice the already existent Haitian law on the subject. Likewise, the project's outcome would have benefited had the project management decided to seek possibilities of cooperation with other governmental agencies linked to other aspects of the child domestic labor problem, such as the Ministry of Education, instead of remaining exclusively linked to its original and "not performing" partners within the GOH (the Ministry of Social Affaires and the IBESR).

As relationships with the government authorities remained relatively stagnant and unproductive, most of the initial activities considered under the first component of the project (as well as part of the activities within the third component) were never implemented. Even the idea of substituting the original "National Steering Committee" by a "Committee of Experts" failed to be implemented due to the fact that it was unnecessarily linked to the final outcome of a study on modification of Haitian law and on the strengthening of IBESR and police structures. By the time of the field evaluation to Haiti the final report on such study had not yet been completed. In fact, after reviewing the second draft of the report provided by the consultant in charge of this analysis, it is the opinion of the evaluators that such document, which has a mainly theoretical orientation and whose proposals were not discussed in depth with IBESR staff, will be scarcely useful as an instrument in order to deepen the cooperation between the project and the said government agency.

As a summary, it may be said although the first component of the program seemed reasonable from a theoretical point of view and that it thus remains as relevant long term goal in terms of the sustainability of project's activities, the instable institutional reality of Haiti would have required applying a more flexible and unstructured approach, aimed at building-up some limited consensus on small issues with different governmental and civil society organizations. This might have lead to implement small scale actions (as well as small investments in public institutions and CSOs), aimed to allow these potential implementing agencies to gain confidence in their ability to intervene on the issue of child domestic labor, by attending immediate problems in concrete geographic settings. It now seems that certain initial rigidity on the part of project management lead it to assume a passive and expectant approach throughout the first year and a half of project implementation, an attitude that impeded it to seek other concrete ways of implementing

the strategy of building up some coalition among different Haitian government and civil society organizations against child domestic labor.

It should be said that without this latter corner-stone, the effective strengthening of local institutional capacities would have anyway become also unfeasible.

b) The second component of the Project: Awareness raising on the issue of child domestic labor in order to change population's attitudes and behaviors

Although highly visible and known by everybody, the issue of child domestic labor is not considered as a social **problem** (thus to be urgently addressed) among most of Haitian society. Child domestic labor is more often perceived by the population as an **effect** of what are considered the main national problems: widespread poverty, absence of infrastructure, insufficient and low-quality educational services and other, a fact that for many people contributes to legitimize its existence until effective changes occur at the level of the presumed "causes" of the phenomenon. There is a very limited awareness among people on the specific rights of children as well as on the actions that may be taken to ensure children's protection. On the other side, many parents in the rural zones ignore the real hazards faced by children under domesticity. ILO conventions 138 (on the minimum age for labor) and 182 (on the elimination of the worst forms of child labor) are virtually unknown by most people, including public authorities.

Thus, awareness raising seemed as a relevant strategy for the aims of the project and the situation of the country. Unfortunately, the implementation of this second component of the project was unnecessarily conditioned for a long time by the initial project management to the completion of the study on child domesticity being carried-out by UNDP. The rationale for this decision was to use the figures and other data to be provided by the latter within the awareness activities to be implemented. However, because the results of this study were available very lately within the project lifetime, during the first two years of the project very few was done in order to implement awareness activities apart from printing and distributing (3,000 copies) a small booklet on the issue of child domestic labor produced by World Vision.

The new management team that took responsibility for the project by ends of year 2001 tried to increase the scope of activities carried out under this component by organizing 5 missions to rural areas of the country and 5 seminars on child domestic labor addressed to journalists around the country, with the aim of training them in how to organize awareness campaigns on this issue. Likewise, the project sponsored some small activities against child labor by a Port-au-Prince community and translated to Creole and distributed Convention 182 among relevant institutions (the Convention is now being published). However, given the late time within the project's lifetime in which they were being implemented, these small-scale activities did not had the chance to evolve into a more structured communication strategy of the project on the issue of child labor.

One important missing element in order to develop such structured strategy was that the project had not considered undertaking a nation-wide study on the public opinion's perception on the issues of child labor and child domestic labor. Would the project had done this, it might have had relevant information about the differences of attitude among different segments of Haitian society and regions of the country, which would have allowed the project to adapt the content and form of its messages to the characteristics of the different public (children, rural families, employer families and other) at different parts of the country. Thus, because the project was unable to implement a proper

communicational strategy on the issue of child domestic labor throughout its lifetime, many different kinds of activities that could have been carried out by implementing agencies on the urban and rural zones with different beneficiary groups were not undertaken.

IPEC's public profile in Haiti remained low-key, but at the same time, very few people have become in acquaintance with the project's objectives and strategies. For example, although informants at *Le Nouvelliste* (daily journal) and *Radio Métropole* (both among Haitian most prominent media) said they would be interested in collaborating with IPEC in "media campaigns adapted to the Haitian reality", they declare not knowing well IPEC's objectives and strategy in the country. Even among the implementing agencies interviewed by the evaluators, very few of these could tell what were IPEC's and the projects' goals and strategies. Most of them could only provide information about the specific activities they had carried out for the project. Many thought that, given that IPEC had insisted at the beginning of the project in the option of removing children from labor and that it had later begun to support L'Escale, the project's main strategy on child domestic labor was to promote the immediate removal and rehabilitation of children under domesticity.

As a summary it may be said that although the strategy of awareness raising was highly relevant it was never implemented in a consistent and structured manner. In fact, there were very few awareness activities carried out on children, families, communities, CSOs and government institutions and the impact of project activities and proposals in the local media was very limited.

c) The third component of the Project: Assistance to former child domestic laborers and high risk communities

The third component of the original version of the project was relevant in terms of the needs of health and educational support of child domestic laborers, as well as of the need to provide an immediate way-out from exploitation to a certain number of children under domesticity.

Unfortunately, due to the difficulties in establishing an effective partnership with government agencies, the educational and health support intended for child domestic laborers in Port-au-Prince could not be implemented. Thus, under the revised version of the project these activities were replaced by other related to the **prevention** of involvement of new rural children in domestic labor. However, although this latter shift in strategy seemed promising, it was neither implemented due to the impossibility faced by the potential implementing agency (World Food Program) to carry out the intended activities because of incompliance of expected conditions to be set-up by the Ministry of Education.

The option of rehabilitating and reintegrating child domestic laborers at high risk to their families of origin seemed relevant with regards to the needs of part of this population. However, this strategy also presented several problems. First, there were not enough reliable private institutions in Haiti which could provide such services (in fact, after 3 years the project only established one effective partnership for this purpose in Port-au-Prince – L'Escale-). Thus, the target fixed in the original project document had to be reduced during the project's revision from 1,000 to 150 children. Secondly, after having visited L'Escale, it is possible to say that the weakest part of this institution's methodology is its strategy for reintegrating former child domestics to their families of origin, being that no consistent follow-up of this population is done by the institution. Thus, the real outcome of

such an strategy remains unknown. In the third place, the option of providing direct funding to institutions so they may provide direct assistance to children in need is not a sustainable strategy in the long-term, given that alternative sources to replace such subsidies are scarce in Haiti.

However, the main issue concerning the relevance of this strategy is related to the number of the child domestic labor population in Haiti. Under the lowest estimate (124,000 children) and assuming that at least 20% (a very low percentage) of this population would need to benefit of an immediate removal (i.e., 24,000 children), the project's original target (1,000 children) seemed meager and its final outcome (150 children) seems irrelevant (0.6% under our proposed scenario). Thus, apart from the valid humanitarian reasons that lead to put into place this option, the question that remains with regards to the strategy of providing direct assistance for children's immediate removal from labor is that of its real intended impact and the need to include this kind of strategy within this kind of project.

As a summary, it may be said that given the particularities of the Haitian context, the strategies considered within the third component of the original project document, although limited in their scope, overestimated the current institutional capacities existent in Haiti, lacked financial sustainability and were of limited impact.

d) The fourth component of the project (added after project's revision in December 2001): Research and dissemination of knowledge

The fourth component of the project concentrates the two main project's contributions to the issue of the elimination of child domestic labor in Haiti. The two studies on child domestic labor in Haiti, of a quantitative²³ and qualitative²⁴ nature, funded by the project are thorough analysis on this issue and relevant sources of information that should allow building up better strategies to approach this phenomenon in the future. Unfortunately, as with most project outputs, the results of these sound studies were available towards the end of the project (one of them having not yet been published), so they were not useful during the project's lifetime. Thus its results have not yet been sufficiently disseminated.

However, even if the rationale for carrying out these two studies was adequate, there is a gross piece of information missing among the collected data: At the moment of carrying out the quantitative study on child domestic labor with UNDP, the project should have profited also **to carry out a national study on child labor (in general) in Haiti**, because it is against this background that the issue of child domestic labor would be better understood.

On the other hand two other studies funded by the project under this component also came out lately. The rapid assessment on commercial sexual exploitation was available by April 2003, just two months before the project's end (although the quality, relevance and usefulness of this study is limited –see later-); and the rapid assessment of child labor in agriculture activities had not yet been finished by mid-May 2003. Thus, during the

²³ IPEC-ILO, Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail, UNDP, UNICEF, Save the Children Canada & UK, *Domesticité des enfants en Haïti – Caractéristiques, contexte et organisation*, Port-au-Prince, Déc. 2002

²⁴ IPEC-ILO et al, *Etude sur les fondements de la pratique de la domesticité des enfants en Haïti*, Port-au-Prince, Décembre 2001.

project lifetime the results of these studies will be of little use. The results of a third study, concerning the evaluation of the outcome of the reintegration of 50 children to their families by L'Escale, were expected for mid-June 2003, almost by the end of the project.

Thus, while IPEC is scheduled to complete the products of this component, it would lack enough time during project's lifetime to make an adequate dissemination of the information provided by these studies. Notwithstanding this, the main products under this component are both relevant and should be useful in the future to design future actions on the issue of domestic child labor in Haiti.

As a summary of this aspect of the evaluation, and given the additional information provided in the first section of this report, it is possible to say that:

- The absence of national policies concerning childhood and the lack of a proactive approach on the part of government authorities and NGOs hampered severely the feasibility of implementing an ambitious program to strengthen institutional capacities in the country. The strategy proposed by the project on this issue (national action plan, etc.) was not relevant to the Haitian institutional reality, which may have benefited of more limited goals and activities, more adapted to the reality of under-funded and understaffed government agencies. The project did not fit into any national strategy with regards to poverty alleviation, child protection, education or domestic labor because in practice there were none in place being developed in an structured way at the time.
- No structured awareness raising and communicational strategy was implemented by the project. This should have been a priority given the limited conscience of the Haitian population on children's rights and on the issue of child domestic labor as **a social problem to be solved**.
- Some of the main strategies applied by the project were not adapted nor immediately applicable to the Haitian context. Thus, although in line with the relevant Conventions on childhood and on child labor, the strategies applied by the project were not always relevant to the causal factors contributing to the existence of child domestic labor in Haiti (e.g., the supply side of child labor). For example, **the issues of low-family income and insufficient access to education in zones of origin of child laborers were not specifically addressed by the project**.
- Thus, the strategies applied did not address the (still undetermined) social, educational and economic needs of the beneficiary population (to be considered by age, sex or geographic zone). Likewise, due to the fact that the project privileged its relationship with government institutions, NGOs and international organizations (IOs), it did not target the needs of specific communities nor developed specific relationships with other kind of civil society organizations.
- In fact, much more would have been advanced with regards to the accomplishment of project targets if a more focused approach, composed by multiple small-scale activities, would have been undertaken in order to make viable the main strategic components of the project. This would have implied among other: focusing activities on specific urban and rural zones in which the problem of domestic labor is more relevant; providing support to communities and local NGOs so awareness raising and prevention activities may develop within the same; mainstreaming through other institutions' projects the messages on child domestic labor that were to be addressed

to vulnerable populations²⁵ and carrying-out advocacy activities toward other cooperation agencies, so part of their programs related to increasing access to education and economic opportunities may be implemented in the main zones of origin of the child domestic labor population.

- The strategy of child labor removal, although feasible in the Haitian context, had a very limited scope and possibility of being developed. It is a costly and non sustainable option with low impact on the overall extent of the issue (e.g., like “taking water out of the sea with a teaspoon”). That is, that given the duration and cost involved in the individual attention of each case vs. the total number of CDLs in Haiti (at least more than 120,000), this strategy should be considered in the future not as an efficient instrument to **eradicate** the CDL phenomenon but more as a way to provide specific assistance in cases of particular abuse to CDLs. Unfortunately, it was classed as an “eradication” strategy. On the other hand, although the strategies used by the only implementing agency in this field (L’Escale) seem to be consistent with the project’s overall strategy, the real outcome of reintegration to family processes is yet to be assessed²⁶. Finally, it should be said that although the project later intended to apply another strategy on the preventative side of this issue (i.e., support to two local associations, one working with street children and child domestics, the other composed of community groups, both running a school for at-risk children), this was finally not implemented.

3.3. Implementation of the project: Faced with multiple obstacles and mainly centered in completing isolated activities instead of developing strategies to achieve long-term objectives

a) Project management style

Due to the obstacles faced for establishing an effective partnership with governmental agencies and to the fact that some of the main activities included in the original project document could not be implemented, the project management team had important difficulties in developing an strategic (i.e., flexible) planning system. Thus, the project management centered a great part of its efforts in trying to comply with internal administrative procedures as well as to get implemented, in an isolated way, some planned activities that could be carried out more rapidly. Faced with a stagnant situation, it showed a proactively limited approach in implementing any alternative scheme in the field in order to progress towards the achievement of the immediate objectives. However, with backstopping from IPEC’s HQ, the initial project management did seek revision of the original proposal by the donor, which was finally approved by the end of the second year of the project.

²⁵ For example, through USAID-funded support to agriculture programs carried out by different institutions in which benefited around 240,000 families in the Haitian rural milieu (FY2000 figures); or also, linking the issue of child domesticity in awareness campaigns to the issue of responsible parenthood.

²⁶ Apart from this, given that L’Escale seems to be the only Haitian institution working on the basis of child removal and reintegration to the family, it may be said that the latter also hampered the project’s ability to work with several implementing agencies in order to reach its original and ambitious target of “rehabilitating and removing **10,000** children”. By the project’s end only 148 had been benefited by this strategy.

Due to this reason, and although such initial lack of a proactive approach in the field²⁷ was partially corrected by the second management team, by its end the project showed a limited capacity to make other local institutions rally around its goals, as well as to increase the awareness of the Haitian population on the issue of child domestic labor.

b) General characteristics of local organizations working on childhood issues

On the other hand, at the time when the original project document was drafted there was no clear idea on which specific civil society organizations would be the best candidates for establishing partnerships under the project (and work as implementing agencies). It is the evaluators' impression that Haitian CSOs are not accustomed to work together in an organized way or to develop joint approaches in order to tackle social problems. Most of the private institutions working on childhood issues do so in an isolated way, are weak both in technical and financial terms and are heavily dependent of external aid. Although their human resources seem highly motivated their qualifications (except in the case of research institutions) tend to be low. Due to their "charity" work style²⁸, their overall impact is scarce, being that their programs are mostly centered in activities of small scope with a limited number of beneficiaries (most of the most relevant NGOs having their HQ located at Port-au-Prince). In fact, the ideas on what to do about child domestic labor differed greatly from one institution to the other and most Haitian NGOs approached by the project staff showed little interest in scaling-up their activities or in investing efforts on the removal and rehabilitation of child domestic laborers, as proposed under the third component of the project. Likewise, although most CSO had some awareness of gender issues, the content of ILO's Child Labor Conventions was virtually unknown in Haiti before the arrival of the project.

c) Project relationship with CSOs and NGOs

During the first two years of the project, apart from a one-day seminar with NGOs and an inventory of existing organizations working with children in the country (elaborated by World Vision), the initial project management did little to establish a network of local organizations that may collaborate with its purpose under the project's umbrella. Thus, having in mind that the civil organizations should "elect" a representative among themselves to integrate the "National Steering Committee" (that was never established), the project did little to foster exchanges between these organizations in order to promote that at least some of them could rally around a common minimal platform on child domestic labor.

In fact, the initial management team centered itself in exploring the possibility of establishing a separate and direct collaboration with some local NGOs, mainly oriented in carrying out the activities of the third project component (removal and rehabilitation of child domestic laborers). One of these partnerships (L'Escale) was put into practice in the second half of the second year of the project's lifetime.

²⁷ I.e., in order to find alternative ways to implement project strategies.

²⁸ "Charity work style": This wording refers to the difference between "dependency" and "empowerment" as the result of development assistance. A "charity work style" satisfies directly the needs of its beneficiaries without necessarily empowering them in order that the latter may learn to provide to their own needs and to better cope with the limitations of their social and natural environment.

Thus, although the project was intended to be an initiative of “national scope”, during years 2000-2001 the project management did not pursue any relevant contacts outside Port-au-Prince. On December 2001 a new project manager (local coordinator) took responsibility for the implementation of the revised project. The new project management adopted a more proactive approach throughout 2002 on, started contacting NGOs around the country in order to assess their will to participate in project actions and carried out a small awareness raising activity with a local community group²⁹. However, by that time the project was intending to implement an strategy that would have been more productive during the first rather than the third year of project’s lifetime. Linked to the latter, in the second half of 2002 the project management prepared terms of reference for new action programs with several Haitian NGOs. Unfortunately, due to administrative reasons (please see to the section of this report on project efficiency) and to the fact that the project life was coming to and end, these could not be started.

Otherwise, under the second management team’s lead the project used the services of some local institutions to carry out specific technical activities in support of project’s main objectives, such as four specific studies on different subjects and the organization of training workshops for journalists around the country. While the latter activity proved successful, 3 out of the four studies (to be achieved before June 2003) had problems in terms of timeliness, quality or costs (please see to the sections of this report on project effectiveness and efficiency).

As a summary of the project’s relationships with CSOs and particularly with local NGOs, it may be said that although the latter might have limited technical capacities and a small institutional scope to implement major activities, very limited efforts were carried out IPECs local project management throughout the first part of the project’s lifetime in order to actively involve a relevant range of local NGOs in the fight against child domestic labor. And although this approach was partially corrected by the second management team (a fact that reflected in a greater capacity of the project to achieve some concrete results), this burden obviously hindered the possibilities of the project to achieve its goals.

d) Project’s relationship with international organizations

Cooperation with International Organizations (IOs) proved to be more productive (although sometimes also difficult) for the project’s development. An effective partnership was established in the first year of the project with UNDP, UNICEF and Save the Children Fund – UK and Canada-, in order to fund and develop a national quantitative study on the issue of child domestic labor. However, given that the main partner (UNDP) faced several technical problems with the implementing agencies of the study (the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique and the Institute of Applied Social Sciences –FAFO, a Norwegian organization) the results of the quantitative study were not available up to the end of the third year of the project (i.e., by the time of this report the results of this study had not yet been published). Likewise, a cooperation agreement with the World Food Program in order to implement substitutive activities under the third component of the Project (e.g., prevention with regards to strengthening of educational opportunities in the

²⁹ E.g., the new project management promoted the celebration of the national day of the Child and the first celebration of the World Day against Child Labor. From IPEC’s perspective, this was important because it allowed ILO to put June 12 on the national calendar and it was done in the same rural community where an AP (action program) was later drafted, although not approved nor implemented.

rural sector) failed to be implemented due to alleged incompliance of commitments by the Ministry of Education (however, this problem would have been avoided if instead of funding activities through the World Food Program –WFP-, to be carried out at schools that had not yet been built by the Ministry, the project would have provided this support to already existent public schools in the rural sector).

Although partnership with IOs proved to be productive (e.g., IPEC was successful in leveraging resources among these institutions for the joint implementation of certain activities), the project showed a limited capacity throughout its lifetime to assume an explicit and more visible leadership among other international cooperation agencies with regards to the issue of child domestic labor. Apart from a joint IPEC-UNICEF meeting that was to be carried out on the subject of ratification of ILO conventions on child work on June 2003, the project did not manage to build up a joint continuous platform of activities on this subject with other IOs, thus each of them continued acting and contacting GOH on its own³⁰.

As stated before, although the project had cordial relationships with many institutions, there was a lack of general strategy regarding partnership and on “positioning” the issue of child domestic labor on the public opinion’s mind and the government’s agenda (however, it is to mention that the second project management team promoted successfully that some of the project stances and activities as well as some information on the negative features of CDL were disseminated to the public by the main Haitian newspaper *Le Nouvelliste* and other local media). On the other hand, given the increasing negative opinion of the international community on the issue of Human Rights in Haiti, in May 2002 President Aristide made some public commitment before the UN General Assembly that his government will approach the problem of CDL. However, the issue was more recently (re-)introduced as a “national problem” by a “negatively-oriented coverage” (TV report) from the French network *Antenne 2*, forcing government’s and local media’s attention on the latter). Thus, although the issue CDL is being “talked about” from time to time at the media and within some institutions (e.g., there were some public declarations coming from the Minister of Justice on this subject in November 2002), its serious approach is yet to be placed among the GOH’s priorities and within public opinion’s conscience (that is, as a problem that requires specific and continuous action to be **solved**).

Curiously enough in a country in which government agencies’ activities are fostered by the “interest” shown on certain subjects at the highest levels of political power, the project management undertook no lobbying activities before the First Lady’s office or Parliament Officials on the issue of child domestic labor; in fact, at certain time this “distance” might have been deliberate and thought as “necessary” due to the legitimacy problems facing the current authorities. In fact, it seems that due to the latter, the project management felt that any possible contact with Parliament members in view of the ratification of ILO’s conventions on child labor was “useless”³¹. Anyway, it is the evaluators’ opinion that

³⁰ It is worth noting that there was some talk about organizing a thematic group inside the United Nations System local structure in 2001. But the decision relied on the Resident Representative and was never implemented.

³¹ However, more recently project management has taken some action to correct this long-standing omission. Thus, a seminar on the ratification of ILO conventions that was planned within the project revision is to take place in June 2003 and parliamentarians are among the personalities that will take part in it.

IPEC's project management would benefit by getting in acquaintance with the strategies carried out by other international agencies, such as UNICEF or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in order to enhance the chance of getting effective governmental support for the success of their current programs³².

e) Participation of other relevant stakeholders

Given that almost none activities were carried out directly on parents, teachers and communities, and that in the only case in which this was done at one community it was a one-day activity with no follow-up, it is not possible to evaluate the outcome of this activity nor the further commitment of such group. The same goes for the journalists trained around the country, for which no follow-up system was put in place. However, with regards to the strategy of removal and rehabilitation of children under domesticity, it is possible to say that this alternative was implemented in a gender sensitive manner.

f) Appropriateness and timeliness of project revisions

Although it was appropriate to carry out a project revision, the results of these were insufficient. In fact, IPEC should have asked the first project revision from the donor after the first six months of project implementation, when IPEC's officials at Geneva had already detected the slow pace that was affecting the implementation of project's activities. Although the need for a project revision was formally mentioned for the first time in year 2000 last quarter field report to USDOL, it seems that the review process became lengthy and that formal approval from the donor took one more year to be obtained, although a joint USDOL-ILO mission was carried out in May 2001. Apparently, this fact led project management to slow down the pace in the implementation of the project while expecting the outcome of the review process.

As mentioned before, the project revision done by ends of year 2001 did not change in a relevant way the sense of the immediate objectives. It just reduced in some cases its scope and stated new activities in which project funds would be spent. This procedure revealed itself as ineffective and lead to a further and final revision of the project by beginnings of year 2003 and to an extension of its lifetime when some of the expected activities of the first revision were found unlikely to be completed in time.

After the failure to seeing the "National Steering Committee" come to life, the project should have immediately adopted other alternative approach. Had the project adopted a more active and "informal" consensus-building approach with regards to other institutions, it would have been in the position of carrying out meetings centered on what to do with regards to child domestic labor (and not only on the tasks that were being carried out punctually for the project by some agencies). Such an inter-institutional coordination approach would have allowed the project to collect alternative ideas from other potential

³² Among which may be included some of the following: i.e., giving some support for institutional capacity building to other key-agencies related with governmental planning and decision making (including computer equipment and other), increasing project's "leverage" before public institutions by intensive lobby at the right high-instances of government (and not exclusively at the governmental body designed as "official stakeholder"), providing support for some government agencies' small awareness raising activities on the project's issue (seminars, conferences and other) and other.

implementing agencies in order to start dressing up a strategy on child domestic labor that could have been later discussed with higher-level government authorities.

Had the project management decided with ILO HQ's approval to put in practice some specific awareness raising and health and education pilot-programs with NGOs (thus partially replacing some of the activities to be originally implemented by government agencies), it might have avoided important delays in expenditures while it awaited for the approval of the project revision.

g) The impact of change of management on project's ability to achieve its objectives

The corrective actions proposed by the first project revision (December 2001) contributed to the project execution by reducing project targets and including new more limited range of concrete and feasible activities that could be carried out independently of governmental cooperation (such as several studies and seminars). Thus, it made it easier for project management to start expending project funds in an increasing path. Unfortunately, due that the activities that were planned to be carried out with WFP (support to six schools) were cancelled, the project ended with an important remnant of unspent funds. The last project revision of January 2003 mainly responded to the need to adapt project activities to this foreseeable negative outcome.

h) Some administrative issues that hindered project implementation

Otherwise, the frequent delays imposed on project's activities due to UNDP's own administrative delays for disbursement of funds hindered the project effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of activities, particularly with regards to proper compliance with work plans and calendars. The same goes for IPEC-ILO's own administrative procedures and for the delays imposed by the multiple consultations carried out between different layers of management within IPEC-ILO (please see the section of this report on project efficiency). An example of the effect of this issue on project efficiency is Save The Children's Canada-UK's decision to withdraw from the co-sponsorship of one of the studies due to ILO-Geneva's own administrative delay on how to implement an agreement for this activity.

i) Use of work plans and of general monitoring system

Within this context, implementing agencies and local project management did establish work plans, but partly due to the above mentioned constraints, project activities were generally carried out in an untimely and delayed manner. However, in the case of three of the latest studies, implementing agencies had difficulties of their own in complying with approved timetables and/or produced outcomes of limited quality which had to be reformulated a project management's request (e.g., on commercial sexual exploitation, on the analysis of changes to be introduced in child labor legislation & governmental agencies' structure, and on the evaluation of the outcome of the reintegration to family strategy applied by L'Escale).

As a summary it may be said that project management lacked of sufficient strategic planning and monitoring systems, the latter being exemplified by the fact that the local project management did not had a monthly access to information on the evolution of the project's budget. Although this information was provided approximately on a quarterly

basis by ILO's Mexico bureau and the San José and Geneva bureau also shared monitoring responsibilities, there seems that there was an insufficient use of the financial monitoring system in this project for "alert" purposes and thus the corrective measures on the same came too slowly. In fact, local project management was centered in the administrative management of specific activities (outputs) and did not develop an anticipative and strategic management of the project's finances, as for example, preventatively proposing annual or quarterly reallocation of foreseeable "remnants".

3.4. Project effectiveness: Limited and uneven between the different project components

a) Overall project outcome

The project did not reach nor is it likely to achieve its development objective and its two more important objectives: e.g., building up local capacities and raising awareness on the issue of child labor. However, under the revised version of December 2001, the project achieved the more humble objective of removing 150 children from domesticity, as well as it is expected to complete by June 2003 all of the studies included under the component of "Research". Thus, on a general perspective the effect of the project with regards to the elimination of child labor in the target population was marginal, as well as no relevant changes were produced in families of origin or employer families. In fact, as stated before, many of the project's original targets were unrealistic.

The table included as Annex 1 at the end of this report gives an overall view (as per the time of the field evaluation —mid-May, 2003) of the final foreseeable outcome of each of the four immediate objectives and of its development objective (accordingly to the main project revision done in Dec. 2001). **The conclusion of the evaluation with regards to this issue is that most of the immediate objectives were not achieved**, and when some progress was reached, it was a partial, rather marginal one with regards to the development objective of the project. In fact, it is difficult to assess the likely role that the different project components may have in the process of eliminating child labor because most of the originally stated project strategies and activities were not implemented.

b) Specific project outcomes

As stated before, the project did not have a relevant impact in the planning and coordination capacities of the public and private institutions trusted to deal with the problem of child domestic work. As a result, no specific changes in legislation were adopted on this issue during the project's lifetime. Given that the awareness-raising component of the project was implemented in a very limited manner, it had a very marginal and non measurable effect on relevant stakeholders and the public opinion. Thus, the project showed a marginal capacity to influence a change of attitudes concerning child domestic labor among the latter.

Likewise, the project strategies did not generate an increased government commitment to address the problem of child domestic work. However, as mentioned before, due apparently to international press' pressures on this issue, as of recent times the GOH, mainly through the office of the First Lady, has stated its interest in addressing the plight of child domestic children as an important national issue and a debate is starting about the need to sign ILO's Conventions 138 and 182. However, given the level of political interest

involved in this kind of initiatives, it may be yet early to assess the GOH's real commitment to address this issue in an effective and continuous manner.

The results of the action program concerning the rehabilitation of former child domestics and their reintegration to their families carried out by the local NGO L'Escale were almost fully completed under the project's definition. Between October 2001 and March 2003, in which the project supported L'Escale's activities, 116 children were reintegrated to their families while 32 were been hosted and rehabilitated at L'Escale's facilities (total 148 over a final expected target of 150 children³³). However, the actual effectiveness of L'Escale's methodology for reintegration of children to their family of origin was yet to be assessed through a specific study to be completed by mid-June 2003. As per the evaluators' observation and discussions with L'Escale's staff, it seemed that this institution lacked proper procedures to make a periodical follow-up of the children it had previously reintegrated to their families and to provide further support to the latter. Otherwise, focus group results with children showed that while well treated, even adolescent children lack freedom to temporarily leave L'Escale's premises on their own; the visit to this institution also showed that although the quality of services and food provided to children was good, the shape of the infrastructure, equipment and space available for children's daily activities is rather poor.

The main project's contribution to the fight against child labor in Haiti seem to have been the two studies (quantitative and qualitative) on child domestic labor, as well as a pioneer study on agriculture and child labor, still in draft version. The first two latter studies provide reliable estimations and in-depth knowledge on the geographical distribution of the CDL population and on the main characteristics of this issue. However, the fact that by May 2003 most of these studies had not yet been published nor largely disseminated to the Haitian public opinion hampered project effectiveness on this aspect. IPEC's future efforts in Haiti should include making a wide dissemination of the results of these studies among the general public and the scientific community, including academia and other concerned institutions. In fact, the proper dissemination of this knowledge could become the basis to increase public awareness on this issue and to promote a more informed debate within Haitian society on the same. Likewise, this valuable knowledge should be useful to help IPEC dress up a more specific strategy on child domestic labor in the country.

c) Assessment on the quality and relevance of rapid assessment surveys on commercial sexual exploitation, child labor in agriculture and on other issues

While, as stated before, the quantitative and qualitative studies on child domestic labor were relevant and of sound quality, other two studies carried out by the project had an uneven outcome.

The rapid assessment study on commercial sexual exploitation seems not pertinent within the framework of the project on child domestic labor, the link between both phenomena remaining more theoretical than frequent. Likewise, because the sample of the said study was mainly composed by street children and by some other youngsters

³³ According to the latest project progress report, the number of beneficiary children would now be 153 (source: communication received from IPEC after the completion of the field evaluation). It is to be said however that the evaluation detected that at least 10% of L'Escale's current beneficiary population at the time of the visit were not ex-child domestic laborers, but other kind of "abandoned" or placed children.

involved in street peddling and because the study had relevant difficulties in accessing other groups involved in commercial sexual activities, its results seem to be not representative of the variety of population that may be involved in this activity. In fact, the study provides little information on the specific localization and no estimation on the number of minors that may be involved in sexual commerce, not even in the cases of street-based sexual commerce. Otherwise, some of the items in the questionnaire and the corresponding analysis of data seem confusing and misleading. The organization of the team in charge of observing the phenomenon and interviewing children seems also to have been poorly managed. A night visit to the main zones of street-based sexual commerce in Port-au-Prince by one of the project evaluators lead us to the impression that the number of minors involved in this latter activity is rather scarce and that this subject was not as important as it may have been initially thought. By comparison with other international consultant's visits to commercial sex activity zones in cities of Colombia, Peru, the United States and Brazil, in which minors' involvement is frequent, it may be said that at least **minors' street peddling** is not yet a prominent phenomenon in Haiti (the difference is between a phenomenon that may be openly **counted** in a few dozens or in the other cases in several thousands). Obviously, this does not say nothing about the possible existence of other forms of hidden minor's commercial sex (independent or organized in "rings") which are very difficult to reach, assess its extension and to approach through an "assistance program", and which were neither detected nor studied within the above mentioned research as originally intended.

Although its report is still in a draft version and although it was based on a limited sample, the **exploratory study on child labor in agriculture** seems a promising initiative with an instructive outcome. In fact, given the link between rural migration to the cities and the issue of child domestic labor, this study was particularly relevant within the context of the project. In this sense, the goal of generating knowledge about the economic, social and educational features of rural Haiti seemed highly pertinent. Had IPEC made a general nation-wide survey at the beginning of the project in order to assess the prevalence of different forms of child labor in Haiti, it may have been established that child work within the frame of family-subsistence agricultural activities is perhaps the most extended form of child labor in Haiti. Likewise, the rapid assessment also reveals that due to the conditions in which agricultural labor is carried out it is also a risky activity for minors, often leading to labor accidents. Thus, the results of this study may open some other interesting issues for IPEC's further work in Haiti.

Unfortunately, due to the fact that they were available at very late stage in the project's lifetime, the results of none of these studies were used as inputs for the design of action programs.

3.5. Project efficiency: Burdened by administrative issues and procedures

a) Analysis of costs per component and beneficiaries

A table included as Annex 2 at the end of this report gives an overall view of project's expenditures per component and year provided by IPEC's Mexico Bureau (i.e., Mr. Thomas Wissing), using a project evaluation's format. Likewise, a table included as annex 3 shows ILO's forecast of total project expenditures by the end of the 6 month extension period, using its own budget management system (BMS). In both tables there appears an additional and unexpected remnant on project funds. However, there is a minor difference of US\$ 6,648 between the amounts of the expected additional remnant stated in each

table (US\$ 25,699 in Annex 2 and US\$ 19,051 in Annex 3); this difference is to be clarified by ILO.

The figure shown in Annex 2 as a forecast of total project expenditures by June 2003 (US\$ 1,014,134) includes both an already approved budget reduction of US\$ 183,702 (requested through a second project revision on Jan. 2003) as well as the unexpected additional remnant mentioned above. The following table shows the evolution in project's budget reductions and remnants (figures expressed in US\$).

| | |
|--|-----------|
| a. Amount of original project budget | 1,223,535 |
| b. Remnant over original project budget (budget reduction done in project's revision of Jan. 10, 2003) | 183,702 |
| c. Amount of approved budget after project revision of Jan. 2003 (= a – b) | 1,039,833 |
| d. IPECs analysis of total expenditures by June 30, 2003 (as per Annex 2) | 1,014,134 |
| e. Expected additional remnant (= c - d) | 25,699 |
| f. IPEC Mexico's bureau's adjusted forecast of additional remnant by June 30, 2003 (as per Annex 3) | 19,051 |
| g. Difference to be explained by IPEC (= e - f ; probably placed under additional unidentified administration -mission costs- expenditures) | 6,648 |
| Forecast of total unspent project funds (= b + f ; i.e., reduction on project's original budget + additional remnant, as per IPEC-Mexico bureau's forecast). Conclusion: 16,57% of original project budget will not be spent. | 202,753 |

Because the commitment and allocation of funds varied considerably from one year/ project revision to the other, it is difficult to establish the deviance existent within each project component (e.g., funds allocation vs. actual expenditure throughout the project's lifetime). However, the following table assesses such difference by comparing the amounts stated in the original project document, the project revision of Dec. 2001 and ILO's forecast of total expenditures by June 2003.

Analysis of actual expenditures (forecast) vs. original and revised budget of Dec. 2001

| | Budget accordingly to original PRODOC and first budget revision | | Actual project expenditures (forecast) | Difference between expected and actual (forecast) ratio of expenditures | | | % of actual expenditures per component over total expenditures (budget lines in C / total of column C) | |
|--|---|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| Budget component | (A) Budget in original project document ³⁴ - Dec. 1999- (in US\$) | (B) Reviewed budget -Dec. 2001- (in US\$) | (C) Placing all research-related costs under the 4 th , added project component | (D) Reviewed budget (col. B) / original budget (col. A) | (E) Actual project expenditures (col.C) / original budget (col.A) | (F) Actual project expenditures (col.C) / reviewed budget (col.B) | (G) Placing all research-related costs under the 4 th , added project component | (H) Placing research costs within the other 3 components (as per stated in Annex 2) |
| Personnel | 304,600 | 456,264 | 452,436 | + 49,79% | + 48,53% | - 0,84% | 44,61% | US\$ 452,436 (44,61%) |
| Administration | 62,300 | 135,687 | 156,375 | +117,79% | +151% | + 15,25% | 15,42% | US\$ 156,375 (15,42%) |
| Institutional development | 252,000 | 65,451 | 0 | - 74,03% | - 100% | - 100% | 0% | US\$ 37,951 (3,74%) |
| Awareness raising | 106,400 | 72,399 | 27,170 | - 31,96% | - 74,47% | - 62,48% | 2,67% | US\$ 108,270 (10,67%) |
| Direct action | 322,500 | 159,765 | 61,660 | - 50,47% | -80,89% | - 61,41% | 6,08% | US\$ 140,200 (13,83%) |
| Research (4 th project component added after project revision of Dec. 2001) | 0 | 181,689 | 197,591 | New project component | New project component | + 8,75% | 19,49% | N/A |
| Program support at 13% | 175,735 | 152,280 | 118,902 | - 13,35% | -32,35% | - 21,92% | 11,73% | US\$ 118,902 (11,73%) |
| Provision for cost increases | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL (in US\$) | 1,223,535 | 1,223,535 | 1,014,134 | | | | 100% | US\$ 1,014,134 (100%) |

³⁴ As per document: Prodoc_revision format-November 2001.doc 07.01.2002. Column B is based in this same source.

Boxes in yellow within the above table indicate project indirect costs. The ratio of indirect costs originally approved for the project was of 44% (rather high)³⁵. However, the table shows that the project had an additional increase in indirect costs, which ended accounting for 71,76% of the total expenditures of the project, **while the direct project investments only accounted for 28.24% of total project expenditures**. The boxes in red within the table show how the first project revision of Dec. 2001 and the actual total project expenditures implied an increase of almost 50% in personnel costs as well as of more than 1 and 1 ½ times in administration costs³⁶. Because of the latter and the fact that the project's budget had to be reduced by US\$ 183,702 (15% of the original budget) after a second project revision in Jan. 2003, the gap between indirect and direct costs increased dramatically, although the program support costs line had a proportional decrease. As a summary, this means that **as the project showed a lesser capacity to achieve its objectives, the cost of project management increased**³⁷.

The fact that the project did not achieve its main objectives is reflected in budget expenditures in two ways:

- Figures under columns E and F show how the actual total expenditure per each component was much smaller than expected, respectively, with regards to the original project budget (boxes colored in orange) and the reviewed budget of Dec. 2001 (boxes colored in light blue). Thus, **expenditures were not carried out as planned with regards to both scenarios** (in fact, the second project's revision of Jan. 2003 implied an overall budget reduction of 15% due to the unfeasibility to spend this amount³⁸). The reasons for such limited overall expenditure have been stated in the previous sections of this report.
- Figures under column G show the limited percentage of effective expenditures carried out under the first 3 main project components (boxes colored in rose) and how the fourth component ("research" –box colored in green-), added during the project revision of Dec. 2001, accounted for most of the direct project expenditures (19,49% of total project expenditures and almost 70% of total direct cost expenditures)³⁹. Except

³⁵ This outcome was influenced by the fact that the originally foreseen international experts costs for the first two years of the project (US\$ 295,839) amounted to 24% of the total original project budget and to 65,38% of the personnel costs component. However, personnel costs also include the cost of local management team's missions to identify NGOs around the country and support workshop activities, as well as the cost of hiring some local consultants in support of specific project activities.

³⁶ This outcome may have been influenced by the cost of additional ILO foreign staff missions to the country for project revisions and other, acquisition of power system for the project's office, rent of new locale for office and moving costs, etc.

³⁷ Given that there was no additional hiring of staff nor an increase in the level of salaries, it was the six-month project extension period which had an important effect on the additional increase of the gap.

³⁸ The budget reduction carried out during the second revision of the project was due to the fact that it was foreseeable that the project, even after the six-month extension that was being requested, would be unable to attain the original financial target (US\$1'223,535). Given US government rules establishing a maxim span of 5 years for the use of project funds, no extension of the project lifetime was legally possible (the Haiti project had been approved on June 1998).

³⁹ Column H shows this research costs placed within the other project components, as per the information submitted by ILO (see annex 2). However, even under this scenario, the table shows that the amount of funds invested in each of the original 3 main components was rather limited.

for the study on commercial sexual exploitation, it is our opinion that the need to carry out all the other proposed studies was justified.

The following table summarizes project's actual (forecast) expenditures per component (as per column G in the previous table):

| Project Component | | US\$ | % |
|--------------------------|---|-----------|--------|
| Indirect costs | | 727,713 | 71,76% |
| Direct costs (28.24%) | Original 3 main components | 88,830 | 8,75% |
| | Research (4 th component added on Dec. 2001) | 197,591 | 19,49% |
| Total | | 1,014,134 | 100% |

On the other hand, as it is shown in the next table, the outputs obtained by the project were limited, given the project's length and its total budget (obviously, the general distribution of budget expenditures also had an effect on this outcome).

Main project's outputs and their relative cost per beneficiary

| Project components | Number of direct beneficiaries | Number of indirect beneficiaries (estimation) | Total cost (US\$) | Cost per dir. benef. (US\$) |
|---|--------------------------------|---|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Institutional development | ----- | | | |
| 2. Awareness raising | | | | |
| Workshops with journalists (2002) | 163 | 80,000? (through radio spots) | 8,305 | 50.95 |
| Workshop with journalists at P-au-P (2002) | 23 | 120,000? (through radio and printed press) | | 81.10 |
| Workshop with NGOs (2000) | 79 | ----- | 8,289 | 30.36 |
| Workshop with NGOs (2002) | 30 | ----- | 1,553 | 51.76 |
| Comic-book on child labor (World Vision) | 3,000 copies distributed | 30,000? (potential readers/ assuming 10 readers per copy) | 2,200 | ----- |
| Meeting on ILO conventions 138 & 182 (2003) | 40 | ----- | 6,310 | 157.75 |
| 3. Direct Action | | | | |
| Rehabilitation of children and reinsertion to family (L'Escale) | 148 | ----- | 39,500 | 266.89 |
| 4. Research | | | | |
| Qualitative and quantitative studies on child domestic labor (with the collaboration of UNDP) | 2,000 copies printed | 10,000? (potential readers/ assuming 5 readers per copy) | 81,100 | ----- |

| | |
|--|---|
| Other various studies related or not to the 3 other components (on modifications in law and IBESR, agriculture, sexual commerce, etc.) | Studies do not have direct or indirect beneficiaries unless they are published and disseminated (or its recommendations are put into practice). The former was only done in the case of IPEC-UNDP's qualitative study on child domestic labor. The same reasoning applies to the directory on NGOs elaborated by World Vision. |
|--|---|

Based on the content of the previous sections as well as on the above analysis of project's expenditures, remnant funds and outputs, it is our opinion that the project had an overall limited impact and that its results did not justify the costs incurred⁴⁰ (e.g., the project's main contributions, such as several relevant studies, could have been carried out at a lesser overall cost⁴¹).

b) The effect of administrative processes on project efficiency

The project implementation schedule was generally not carried out as originally planned due to the limitations already described in sections 3.2 (i.e., relevance of strategy) and 3.3 (i.e., project implementation). Apart from these limitations, related to local political and contextual factors (i.e., governance and quality of institutional context), there were other more endogenous, organizational factors that seemingly played an adverse effect on the overall project efficiency. These may be categorized in 4 aspects:

- **Multiple layers of project decision-making, administration and supervision:** Due to ILO's administrative procedures⁴² and the fact that the project depended at the same time technically from the San José Sub-regional Office and administratively from the Mexico office, these multiple layers of management contributed to otherwise avoidable administrative delays and to some involuntary confusion in the communication between different layers and on authority/approval lines of management. Likewise, in other cases local project management had to wait for a long time until a final decision on the details of an action program or contract was built among all the multiple stakeholders (in some cases it took two months to get a final approval on an agreement with an implementing agency). For example, some documents had to go several times back and forth from one level to the other to get finally approved (particularly due to the fact that because of ILO's administrative procedures, all Action

⁴⁰ Obviously, the chart and analysis above do not reflect well other methodological and demonstrative contributions that the project may have had on the issue of CDL in Haiti. Likewise, this type of analysis does not presume that "direct actions" will necessarily have a greater impact on beneficiaries than "indirect actions". Notwithstanding the latter, it is evident that the costs incurred between some activities were uneven and in some cases unjustified. For example, while the cost-benefit ratio of assisting 148 children at L'Escale amounted to US\$ 267 per child (a reasonable figure assuming an average period of 10-month support per individual), the cost of the study to assess the effectiveness of L'Escale's family reintegration methodology appears as excessive (i.e., US\$ 872 per individual, over a sample of 50 individuals to be reached/ interviewed; total cost: US\$ 43,630). Likewise, the cost of the study on possible modifications of Haitian law and on the kind of support to be provided to IBESR seem also too high (US\$ 37,951) for the scope of work involved in this study.

⁴¹ However, a curious omission in the project revision approved by December 2001 was that no budget was allocated for the publication of the results of the studies. This omission was later corrected within the second project revision and through internal administrative procedures by IPEC.

⁴² E.g., all financial decisions concerning action programs above US\$ 20,000 and all budget revisions above US\$ 50,000 require previous approval from IPEC-ILO's HQ in Geneva.

Programs with a cost above US\$ 20,000 had to get prior Geneva's approval). Given that even the drafts of questionnaires applied in different project research were reviewed in some cases both by San José and Geneva staff (having to be translated first from Creole to French), this procedures also had a negative impact on the timeliness of some project's activities. Likewise, misunderstanding of USDOL's procedures and limits on project's lifetime extension also played a role in the repeated remaking of timetables and goals for the last stage of the project. Otherwise, the insufficient number of French-speaking staff existent at San Jose's Sub-regional office implied that the revision of documents coming from Haiti had to be managed forcedly by one member of the San Jose team which had another, more complex institutional role and did not always have enough available time for this additional task. It is to be said however that during the last year some of the institutional response to these difficulties has partially improved, although they have not been totally solved⁴³.

- **UNDP's lengthy delays in disbursement of funds:** As mentioned before, this issue had an important negative effect on project efficiency. For example, in several cases (e.g., seminar with journalists, various studies) implementing agencies had to initiate the activities with their own funds in order to comply with agreed timetables and were tardy reimbursed when project's funds finally became available. This produced a negative image of project efficiency among some partners and affected its credibility, while at the same time served some implementing agencies to unduly justify their own delays in producing the expected outputs by agreed deadlines. At the time of this report, there were difficulties in this sense with two implementing agencies in charge of research activities.
- **Absence of an on-going monthly monitoring system centered on the achievement of immediate objectives:** IPEC's teams did not order by "hierarchy" the different strategies and indicators of this project and was thus unable to build up a proper "alert system" that could rally Haiti's and San Jose's management teams on a joint early reaction to project's strategy shortcomings. This would have required that all stakeholders had a previous agreement and shared understanding of which activities and outputs were to be considered as important project "milestones" and of which were the alternative strategies to be undertaken in case of project's persistent failure to achieve its original plans. Such an "alert system" should have been based on a monthly follow up of expenditures and achievements **per project component** (parallel to ILO's budget management system, in which expenses are registered by budget line and that does not allow an easy follow up of such kind⁴⁴). The financial follow up of

⁴³ For example, the responsibility of reviewing the draft of research-related questionnaires that was previously handled by one member of the HQ's staff has been assumed since year 2002 by a member of the San Jose office (a further effort could be made in order to standardize "basic questionnaires" –e.g., models- on different issues for the variety of countries carrying out research on similar topics). Likewise, since March 2003 the project in Haiti is receiving additional support and guidance from the officer in charge of IPEC's sub-regional program on child domestic labor for Central America. Likewise, since April 2003 the project was placed under both a technical **and administrative** support from San Jose Regional office (previously, the administrative support was carried out by IPEC's Mexico office). Likewise, local project management should have made an appeal for a more frequent use of simple contracts' procedures instead of a generalized use of action programs' procedures, being that the first kind is easier/ faster to be handled within ILO's management system (e.g., service contracts under budget line 21, external collaboration contracts, etc.).

⁴⁴ As mentioned before, there was a lack of a more anticipative and strategic management of the financial aspects of the project. Project management at the different management layers was based more on the administration of specific action programs (which by the end were mostly studies).

each project component and the technical follow up of some project's "core" strategic indicators, would have lead to a more anticipative and strategic style of management, more centered in managing the path towards the completion of immediate objectives than in implementing isolated activities (e.g., "action programs"). It would have allowed the local management team to: a. carry out the institutional strengthening, awareness raising and direct action component independently one from the other; b. include more independent activities with CSOs and NGOs **nation-wide** in replacement of unimplemented activities with government organizations; and to develop activities regarding both aspects of the child domestic labor: supply and demand of labor.

- **Insufficient number of short-term contract, technical support staff:** Given the institutional complexities of the country and the multiple administrative bottlenecks observed in project management, it would have been advisable that the national coordinator would less in administrative problems (to be handled by Haiti's other staff) **in order to focus on the build-up of an inter-institutional framework with CSOs and high-level government authorities** and that some of the technical follow-up responsibility over specific research would have been carried out by short-term external support staff.

3.6. Unexpected effects: Mainly negative, although...

As stated throughout this report, limited national governance and a precarious institutional framework of limited quality were major external factors, unforeseen in the original design of the project, which burdened significantly its capacity for achievement. The project was not prepared to deal with the lack of interest and inactivity shown by governmental implementing agencies charged with dealing with the issue of child domestic labor, and had difficulties to elaborate an alternative strategy for the achievement of its objectives. Likewise, the problem of legitimacy faced by the current Haitian Parliament hampered project's possibility of speeding procedures for the ratification of the two ILO Conventions on child labor. Thus, government instability affected directly the possibilities of achieving the outputs considered under the first component (institutional strengthening) of the original version of the project.

It is now obvious (but it was not at the beginnings of the project), that in the future IPEC will have to design a less "structured" and legalistic-based approach (National Steering Committee), because one of the main problems of Haiti is precisely that of rule of law and the limited capacity of achievement of local institutions.

The political instability faced by the country might have also affected the capacity of delivery of other implementing agencies, like in the case of the long delay incurred by UNDP to get the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Research to complete research on child domestic labor or in WFP's failure to implicate the Ministry of Education in a preventative school-based program in the rural milieu.

However, international press attention on the issue of child domestic labor, while inadequately attributing a generalized connotation of "slavery" to *restaveks*' living conditions, might have an eventual positive effect in IPEC's future possibilities of getting more serious attention from the part of government authorities on the issue of child domestic labor. The recent activities of Haiti's First Lady with regards to this issue may be a hopeful indicator that some changes in government's attitude might be near and the new ventures for mutual collaboration may be opened if properly explored.

3.7. Sustainability: Limited

Given the above mentioned information on project effectiveness, it is understandable that the sustainability of the project's outputs and overall outcome may be very limited. While child domestic issues are yet far from being mainstreamed into policy environment and the relevant institutions in charge of this problem, the factors contributing to child labor were not effectively addressed by the project and thus have not been eliminated; in fact, gender and social-cultural issues related with the problem remain almost intact. Likewise, because the project did not achieve partnerships of wider-scope with CSOs and local NGOs, a very limited ownership of project goals was achieved and no phase-out strategies could be undertaken. Thus, the issue of project's eventual replication is not to be addressed at this stage until a more thorough and adequate project strategy is put into place.

Only in the case of L'Escale (child removal strategy), in which the institution was already developing activities of its own prior to the project's start, it is reasonable to think that the activities supported will continue in a sustained manner. In fact, this institution receives partial support from other foreign sources (mainly Switzerland) and its already looking for additional funds to replace the project's transitory input. The other implementing agencies that collaborated with the project (Panos, Haïti Solidarité International –HSI- and other) lack enough long-term commitment and financial and technical capacities to initiate activities of their own.

However, within the international institutions with which the project established specific partnerships (mainly UNICEF and Save The Children Fund –UK & Canada-), there seems to be an increasing interest in developing activities regarding the issues of child domestic labor and of advancing the cause of children's rights in Haiti. May IPEC decide to develop new projects in Haiti on the subject of child labor it may count on these institutions' interest to join efforts for such endeavor. As it was stated before, the project was successful in leveraging resources among these institutions in order to share costs in the implementation of certain joint activities.

In fact, IPEC's major contribution and strength on the issue of child domestic labor in Haiti lies on the knowledge it generated on this issue in partnership with other international organizations. The information contained in these studies and their associated data-bases should provide IPEC with insight and hints so as to actively involve and build consensus with Haitian NGOs, SCOs and government institutions in order to implement a less ambitious but decentralized program of actions that may later lead to the formulation of a national policy adapted to the local context.

4. Conclusions

- a. As an overall conclusion of the evaluation on the original project and its revisions it may be said that the project failed to reach most of its objectives and had a limited sustainability due to:
 - Several flaws in the original design of the project and in its highly “structured” strategy of implementation, which were not adapted to the limitations that characterize Haitian society and government and private institutions; likewise, the above were not realistic with regards to different other factors implied in the issue of CDL. For example, while the targets corresponding to child removal were too ambitious (given the limitations of Haitian institutions), the project design lacked a more thorough strategy with regards to those labor supply-side factors that are widely perceived at the origin of child domestic labor: I.e, the diminished status of childhood and of children’s rights, widespread urban and rural poverty and lack of access to education in the rural zone. Generally speaking, the insertion of IPEC and the project in a new, unknown reality would have called for a more modest and flexible intervention, based in gathering first some basic information on the phenomenon and on possible partnerships in order to later build an implementation strategy.
 - The general context of political and economic instability, which made the issue of child domestic labor become a “secondary issue” among Haitian government priorities. On the other hand, given that the project’s awareness-raising strategy was almost put to a stop by project management during the first two years of implementation, the project was not able to rally enough interest on its objectives from other local institutions and Haitian public opinion. In fact, IPEC’s profile and the project’s role remain widely unknown in the country and the issue of CDL is not yet considered as a national PROBLEM outside from some governmental and NGO sectors. Thus, the issue is yet to be mainstreamed to the public opinion so more people start feeling it as a problem on which they should do something.
 - The omission of concrete action from government officials, who by their lack of interest in going ahead with project activities hampered the projects effectiveness and lead it to an stagnant situation; it should be stated however that this may have been a response to the fact that the project, although aimed to involve important government action, was not designed in a participatory manner with government officials and thus had no off-start mechanism from which “ownership” by governmental institutions could be built-up.
 - The lack of a more rapid reaction from the local project management team in proposing **alternative** strategies and course of action to counter the above difficulties. The first project revision took a lengthy time to be accomplished, while actions in the field became more limited. Likewise, during the first two years and although being a “national” project, scarce activity was carried out outside from Port-au-Prince. Thus, the project was not able to build a wider network of partnerships with local institutions for the effective delivery of outputs and activities. Although the second management team responsible for the project developed a more active approach which translated into a greater number of products (mainly studies) being achieved and established new institutional contacts in order to develop new alternatives for project implementation, the latter was neither able to implement a sustainable awareness strategy on the issue of CDL nor to entice government authorities to become **actively** involved and positively interested in the implementation of the project.

- b. Although the project reached some limited success (given the scope of its original targets) with regards to its domestic child removal component, the option of child removal/ immediate elimination of labor might not be a sustainable, cost-effective strategy given the cultural and socio-economic underpinnings that support the increase of child domestic labor, the wide extent of the phenomenon (numbered in tens of thousands of children) and the lack of institutional and financial resources that make that this strategy can not be generalized to the whole country.
- c. Finally, the project's greatest asset, the important bulk of knowledge gained through the results of its studies on child domestic labor (and agricultural labor), still remains mostly unknown and non disseminated in its details to the general public. However, this important bulk of knowledge could be the basis to gather consensus with regards to the design of a more comprehensive and effective strategy for a new project that may involve a wider number of private and government implementing agencies throughout the country, as suggested within the next section of this report.

5. Recommendations

In order to prepare a new program of future actions to address the issue of domestic work in Haiti, IPEC should consider the following recommendations:

a. **INVEST IN IMPROVING PROJECT DESIGN in order to achieve greater sustainability**

In the near future it may be convenient that IPEC carries out a more thorough and careful process in order to design a new strategy/ project for its operations in Haiti, conducive to establish IPEC's new long-term work plan in the country. This design process should serve as a mean to **establish more effective partnerships** with local institutions and to ensure a more feasible implementation of activities, a more relevant project impact and a greater degree of sustainability of outcomes.

- a.1. On the basis of the data obtained in IPEC-UNDP's studies, IPEC should develop a six-month to one year process of consensus building with different implementing agencies, both working in the field of childhood related-issues and in other fields. The process to build-up a new IPEC strategy and action plan in Haiti (that can later be translated into one or more specific projects), should be highly participatory (contrary to the original project, which was not), and start by a first phase of collection of data on the current activities, needs, proposals and eventual interest of involvement in specific activities of different potential partners (both governmental institutions and CSOs), **nation-wide**. This effort, that should also allow IPEC to do a more realistic assessment of potential implementing agencies' capacities and needs of strengthening, should have a multi-sector character on the government side, going beyond the Ministry of Social Affairs and the IBESR (i.e., to be expanded to the Ministry of Education, –the Economic and Social Assistance Fund –FAES-, the Juvenile Court, etc.). If necessary, an addenda to the original Memorandum of understanding between ILO and the GOH should be signed to support this aim. In its participatory efforts with Haitian government agencies and instances of political power IPEC should assume both a "relevant sector" and a selective approach. That is that first IPEC should try to increase and improve its relationships with some specific agencies "legally responsible" of attending this issue, such as the Direction Générale of the MAS, the IBESR, but also the Minors Police and the Court of Minors (and it should also try to "hear better and incorporate some of the government officers' own ideas/ initiatives on what should be done on the issue, making them feel that they are receiving proper credit for what is later carried out). In this framework, should avoid that institutional competition among government agencies hamper its own efforts: for example, IPEC should not accept any "restriction" (as it did in the past) coming from middle to high-rank officers in the MAS to openly approach the Police of Minors in order to know which is the latter stance on plans on CDL and how this may be complementary with IPEC's mission. Secondly, IPEC should start raising awareness on the issue of CDL among Parliament members, Ministry of Justice's officers and prominent advisors and law-makers, so a discussion is established about the need to adopt ILO's conventions 138 & 182 and/or the need to establish a better national legal framework on the issue of child domestic labor. Thirdly, IPEC should selectively approach in a more proactive manner those instances of Haitian political power that have recently shown some interest in promoting changes in the issue of child domestic labor, such as the Minister of Social Affaires, its Cabinet and the Office of the First Lady, in order to offer its support, try to promote a common stance on the issue of CDL

and request their help in order to foster “improved working relationships” with some government agencies dependent on the former’s leverage.

- a.2 IPEC should carry out a parallel approach in the same sense with regards to other IOs working in the country, so that the activities considered within it are complementary to those of the latter. IPEC should not only consider working with UNICEF, Save The Children Fund and other child-oriented institutions, but also with other institutions such as USAID, World Vision (WV), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Care, Caritas, etc. which are developing agricultural and economic development programs and educational initiatives in several rural zones of Haiti⁴⁵.
- a.3 Based on the above, in a second phase IPEC should draft a proposal-document on a new proposed “IPEC multi-annual strategic plan” plan against child domestic labor in Haiti”, and organize a national forum with NGOs, IOs and governmental agencies in order to discuss the proposal and collect other institution’s interest in participating in its implementation⁴⁶. It is only after having obtained consensus from other potential partners on this “IPEC’s” strategy and action plan and on other institution’s eventual role within the same, that IPEC should turn out to look for further funding from donors, in a wholesome or partial way (e.g., funding for specific components or small projects), for the activities that it is to support from there on in Haiti. As funding comes-in and programs start to be implemented, IPEC should carry out yearly evaluation forums with implementing agencies and other organizations, in order to collectively assess the outcome of programs and share experiences among institutions.
- a.4 Likewise, it is strongly recommended that this first effort to draft “IPEC’s ” strategy may serve as an starting point to establish a mechanism for monthly, periodical meetings or an **ongoing forum with possible implementing agencies** in order to discuss different aspects of the CDL issues, as well as to present and discuss each institution’s experience on the matter. Hopefully, such an institutional forum should adopt as one of its tasks to discuss and draft a policy document and concrete proposals on the issue of CDL that may serve as preliminary inputs to be incorporated by government within a national policy / action plan on this issue (see below: point b.2 of this section).
- a.5 For the elaboration of such multi-annual strategic plan, it is our opinion that IPEC should retain the following issues as **priorities for its institutional support** in the fight against child labor in Haiti⁴⁷ (a brief description of the activities related to each priority may be found in Annex 5)⁴⁸:

⁴⁵ In fact, there seems to be a growing interest among other cooperation agencies and countries with regards to the issue of child labor in Haiti. For example, during year 2002 the local project coordinator was approached by staff of USAID and the Spanish and Japanese Embassies in Port-au-Prince to express their interest in exploring the possibility to support IPEC’s project activities.

⁴⁶ This forum and “IPEC’s” related (next 3 to 5 years?) “strategy and action plan document” could be later used as “precursors” or inputs for a national policy and action plan on child domestic work to be implemented by the government.

⁴⁷ The following “priorities” proposed by the evaluators partly coincide with the generic proposals formulated by the institutions that attended the “feed-back workshop” organized at the end of the field evaluation (e.g., MAS, HSI, PANOS, Save the Children Fund -SCF-UK & Canada-, L’Escale), i.e.: a. Give support to public institutions in order to elaborate a National Policy on Child domesticity in Haiti; b. Obtain a large consensus through a national forum on the best strategies to use in order to progressively eradicate domesticity in Haiti; c. Put more emphasis on the prevention area – information and sensitization activities for families - media

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- **Awareness raising** among the urban and rural population to promote a better comprehension of children's rights and **needs**, including the issues of violence against children, access to and protection of children's education and specific hazards involved in child domestic work and other forms of child work.
 - **Rule of law and increase of government agencies' technical capacities:** Supporting specific government agencies to implement mechanisms that help them comply with the current Haitian law on child domestic labor⁴⁹.
 - **Diminution of rural children's vulnerability** related with the issues of economic and educational exclusion in targeted rural zones of Haiti.
 - **Generation of knowledge** on child labor in general and sound monitoring on the evolution of the issue of child domestic labor. Pending research to be carried out under this component should include a public opinion study on attitudes towards child labor, child domestic labor and other childhood-related issues, that may help better orient and focus the efforts to be carried out under an awareness raising strategy, and a national survey on the main forms of child labor in Haiti (through a household enquiry). In fact, **if a "national plan" and policy is someday to be drafted an enacted later by the Haitian government, it should be on the issue of child labor in general, and not only on the issue of child domestic labor.**
- a.6. It is also suggested that such a document should have both a more stratified and focused orientation than the original IPEC project⁵⁰. That is, the project should make clear distinction and detail of the strategies to be implemented in the urban (i.e., Port-au-Prince **and other cities**) and rural sectors, and propose a list of specific type of interventions to be carried out, per strategy component, at specific regions and locations. For example, on the basis of the data-base of IPEC-UNDP's study, it should be possible to establish which *départements* and districts of the country have a greater weight as zones of origin of child domestic laborers. It is suggested that IPEC's action

campaigns; d. Support children escaping from domesticity – help in the creation of homes for children and put in place a sound program of social reinsertion; e. Develop a coordination mechanism between institutions and implementing agencies.

⁴⁸ It is the evaluators' opinion that the strategy of child removal, due to its limited impact potential nation-wide should not be retained as a program PRIORITY. However, some contingent financial support could be provided to institutions (orphan houses and others) willing to host transitorily ex-child domestic run-a-ways, by specifically funding their activities-related to reintegration of children to their families.

⁴⁹ This means that other objectives, such as the ratification of ILO's Conventions on child labor by the GOH, the design of a national policy on the CDL issue, establishing a national committee on the same and harmonizing local law with international standards should continue to be pursued in a parallel way, as long-term political **objectives** that may come as a result of greater consciousness about the need of these instruments by authorities and institutions. Thus, **these objectives should not be the basis for project implementation** in Haiti but and **added value** to the same. In fact, the Haitian institutional context seems to be characterized by multiple Conventions and laws that are not applied at all and by Committees and organizations that follow their stated Mission in a very limited manner.

⁵⁰ It is also recommended that in the logical framework of IPEC's new strategy, immediate objectives should be more clearly defined and targets quantified where possible. Outputs and proposed activities should be linked more clearly to objectives. Indicators should refer to specific outcomes with regards to child laborers status and conditions (broken down by sex, gender and location) and not to the program activities in themselves. Likewise, issues related to gender differences should be approached in a more clear and explicit manner.

plan propose the implementation of pilot-projects focused on these specific zones (which will very probably correspond to the départements of l'Artibonite and la Grande Anse). As a general procedure, IPEC dialogue with potential implementing agencies should be based in facts, coming from the information available within the said studies.

- a.7. IPEC'S strategy in the country should be based in a **wider diversification of partnerships** within a **decentralized focus** (e.g., increasing the number of actions outside of Port-au-Prince). Likewise, IPEC local management team should consider doing a **more extensive use of a "down-up" approach**: That is, put greater emphasis in working with Civil Society Organizations other than NGOs (community groups, schools, etc.), in activities related to awareness raising in the urban and rural milieu, promotion of rule of law and economic and educational initiatives in rural areas. Given that such a wide diversity of partnerships might be difficult to be monitored directly by IPEC staff, IPEC could use the service of local NGOs to implement such multiple community-based action programs.
- a.8. As a general procedure, no specific project type of activity should be considered for inclusion within the action plan without having an alternative strategy and/or alternative ("replacement") implementing agencies to carry out the same, as well as a clear picture of implementing agencies' matching funds/contribution) to the implementation of such activity. Likewise, it is suggested that the general scope of activities to be implemented are kept not too ambitious and take into account the effective capacities for delivery of implementing agencies. The general rationale of the action plan should be that of a gradual scaling-up of actions throughout a 3 to 5 year-span (that is, going from smaller to more relevant actions), so each implementing agency may gradually increase its confidence, technical capacity and institutional strength in order to achieve more and acquire a sense of **ownership** of the specific part of the program that it carries out. IPEC's financial and technical support to each implementing agency should be scaled down as to ensure that the level of outcome reached can be sustained after the end of external funding. A calendar for gradually phasing-out IPEC's support to local institutions should be included within all proposed activities.
- a.9. The general amount budgeted and spent in project activities (e.g., direct costs) should be greater than the amount foreseen as indirect costs. In order to reduce the weight of the latter on the general budget of a project, future proposals should consider using local staff instead of international staff as its main project implementers.

The latter is also a relevant suggestion that may be addressed to USDOL for funding of other operations. Likewise, in the case of countries with weak institutional capacities or in which a sufficient assessment of crucial issues is initially unavailable, USDOL should consider the convenience of **providing initial funding for specific studies and for the cost of elaboration of sound multi-annual project strategies** that are based in a previous thorough discussion with potential implementing agencies and on a parallel assessment of the latter's level of commitment, specific needs and technical capacities.

b. INVEST IN INCREASED LEVERAGE AND ADVOCACY before political authorities and local mass-media in order to galvanize commitment on the fight against child labor and child domestic labor

While implementing the above 6-month to one year process of building up a new country-strategy, IPEC's local management team should:

b.1. Work closely and proactively with the local media, that is: Disseminate in a nation-wide manner (“stratified” accordingly to the needs of different target groups), the results of the quantitative and qualitative studies on child domestic labor. This implies publishing in abridged manner the main results of these studies as well as ensuring that they are widely disseminated by the written, radio and TV press. IPEC should promote that the Haitian media (radio and TV stations) organizes debates between Haitian institutions about the best ways of attending the different needs of the child domestic labor population, children’s needs and rights, Haitian current law on the issue of CDL and the kind of treatment these children are expected to receive from their employers. Issues concerning violence against children (particularly CDL), children’s education and labor and other hazards involved in CDL should also be included as subject of these debates. Government officials, advocacy groups such as the National Coalition on Haitian Rights (NCHR), the Haitian Coalition for the Defense of Children’s Rights (COHADDE), the Groupe Haïtien de Recherches et d’Actions Pédagogiques (GHRAP) and others should be part of these debates. As a secondary effect, these debates should allow IPEC and its Mission to become known among Haitian public opinion and acquire some more “visibility” than it currently has.

b.2. Implement a parallel, proactive and explicit strategy of rapprochement toward higher instances of Haitian government (e.g., mainly the Office of the First Lady, the Cabinet of the Ministers of Social Affaires and Education and members of different sectors of Parliament) in order to explore new venues of collaboration with the same. By mid-2003 this has become **an strategy to be carried out urgently** given the sudden, recent attention given by the highest instances of Haitian government to the issue of CDL. In this case, by following an approach similar to that of other IOs working in the country (e.g., UNICEF), IPEC should aim to enhance its role as an effective “technical advisor” for Haitian government on the issue of child labor.⁵¹ Within this framework, IPEC should be ready to consider funding technical assistance to the higher levels of decision-making in Haitian government, so that, **after receiving proposals of other sectors of society/ local institutions**, these can elaborate a policy on child labor (and within it, on child domestic labor) and assess the means and costs needed for its implementation. This eventual “government’s proposal” on a national policy on child labor should later be presented and discussed with other sectors of society before official approval and enactment⁵². IPEC should work in a parallel manner with the NCHR, the COHADDE, the GHRAP and other advocacy groups and political groups with the aim to **de-politicize the issue of child labor** so it may be approached more as long-term social problem (and not exclusively an issue against government) and so that some of these groups initiatives can be

⁵¹ Establishing this wider level of contacts with government should also help IPEC “ease” its relationship with other instances at the MAS and IBESR, as well as it may help increase the previous degree of collaboration received from the latter. This in no way questions IPEC’s identity, which is of being an international program within ILO whose mandate goes further than providing technical assistance.

⁵² It is within this framework that the needs to ratify ILO conventions 138 & 182 and to harmonize current national law on child labor with international standards will necessarily have to be discussed. It is strongly suggested that ILO work this issue in joint venture with UNICEF, so as that this initiative does not become unrelated to current efforts being carried out to draft a Children’s and Adolescents Code. The approach proposed above is different to the one used within the original project (e.g., a National Steering Committee in which official “decision-making power” would have necessarily been shared, at least officially). It is the evaluators’ opinion that within a highly-polarized society in political terms, this latter approach was unfortunately deemed to be unsuccessful.

mainstreamed into the policy proposals to be drafted by government authorities. By assuming this role of “bridging” within a divided and politically stagnant society, IPEC may be doing a major contribution to the issue of child labor in the country⁵³. Obviously, in a later stage of political development and within a more favorable context for an equalitarian debate, such a “national policy” could be re-discussed and adjusted, and a “National Steering Committee” could eventually come in place to supervise and monitor its implementation.

c. **DEVELOP A DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT SCHEME**, improve monitoring systems and carry out leaner administrative processes in order **to attain improved implementation capacity**

- c.1. It is recommended that future activities to be carried out by IPEC in Haiti should be implemented under an ILO “decentralized administration” project approach, placing lesser responsibility on project supervision and monitoring by IPEC’s HQ staff at Geneva. Thus, IPEC’s Haitian local management team should depend exclusively for decisions, both technical **and administrative**, from IPEC’s Central America Sub-regional Office. Likewise, IPEC’s operations in Haiti should be integrated/ supervised by IPEC’s Sub-regional program on child domestic labor⁵⁴. The latter recommendation should ensure an easier communication between both offices. IPEC’s Central America Sub-regional Office should implement sufficient backstop in French language, so as to speed-up revision of documents from Haiti.
- c.2. The Haitian management team should be reinforced by a UN volunteer or through eventually hiring short-term local consultants for specific technical tasks, so the core-team may focus in dealing with the political and partnership-building aspects of project implementation⁵⁵. The local management team should adopt a proactive and flexible approach towards partnership and program implementation, based more on complying with final outcomes than with the institutional processes described in project documents. Once sound country strategy and action plans are available, IPEC’s Central America Sub-regional Office should also adopt a flexible approach on this issue. In order to diminish administrative work within offices, the Haitian office should develop its activities using more “contract forms” than “action programs”, and trying to formulate these (amount of budget) as so they do not go beyond limits of approval requiring IPEC’s HQ opinion⁵⁶.

⁵³ Obviously, within the instable political, economic and institutional context of Haiti, nothing ensures that the approach proposed above will necessarily succeed. However, given that IPEC’s more “political” objectives would have been more clearly separated from its “program delivery-related” objectives, the eventual failure on one part of IPEC’s actions will have this time a lesser possibility of compromising the outcome of the other part.

⁵⁴ Although these two recommendations have been recently implemented, most of the Haitian project was carried out under another framework which complicated its implementation.

⁵⁵ Likewise, field work should be supported with a new vehicle, so as to allow better field supervision and monitoring; the project’s current vehicle is a 7 year-old unit with has high costs of maintenance.

⁵⁶ The current limit for Sub-regional approval is of US\$ 20,000 per contract/ action program, which is rather low. It would be advisable (although obviously this would require a difficult modification in ILO’s general administrative procedures) that the limits of approval for Sub-regional Offices could be elevated to US\$ 50,000 per contract/ action program.

- c.3. The Central America Sub-regional Office should implement a thorough technical and financial monitoring system to be used with a monthly periodicity, on the basis “annual operational plans” previously agreed with local project management. Such system should be based on establishing a “hierarchy” of strategies (as per their expected impact) and on the selection of a limited number of core outputs & activities, as well as in the use of realistic timetables. A similar monitoring system should be used in a monthly way by IPEC’s local management team with regards to implementing agencies’ programmed activities. Where possible, monthly meetings/ visits should be held with implementing agencies to assess programs’ progress (where this is not possible, visits to partners should at least be done on a quarterly basis). Implementing agencies should be enticed to apply similar monitoring procedures with regards to community leaders, beneficiary groups or parents (as applicable). It is commendable that the local management team staff is trained in project monitoring techniques, as well as in the use of simple software for this means, such as Microsoft Project or other.
- c.4. All change in project implementation (drop-down of an action program) should imply an immediate reallocation of the corresponding funds to other (new) activity within the general budget and timetable of the project. This program management sound procedure was not followed during the original project implementation, generating a big amount of exceeding non allocated (nor spent) funds.
- c.5. In case UNDP’s administrative speediness is not improved in the short-term, IPEC should consider establishing other more rapid means to furnish funding to implementing agencies, such as direct transfers to partners from ILO’s Sub-regional Office accounts or opening a local project account (with double signature by the national coordinator and the administrative official), to be monthly “replenished” on the basis of project expenditures.

6. Lessons learned

a. Project design and selection of strategies

- It is useful to make prior research and have a sound assessment on a country's context and problem-issues as inputs for project design, so that strategies are adapted to the local cultural and social reality and the complexity of factors that may be involved in certain issues.
- Likewise, it is convenient to make a prior assessment of potential partners effective commitment and capacities for delivery before planning further collaboration.
- Potential stakeholders from all levels of authority need to be actively involved in project design so that they may acquire an initial sense of ownership of the same and so the strategies selected and the range of specific and expected outcomes are more adapted to the commitment and capacities of its future implementers.
- Within certain contexts, agreements with government and the "legal institutionalization" of policies are not necessarily the main road for sustainability of project's outcomes. In such cases, other venues should be explored.

b. Implementation

- It is of uppermost relevance that project implementation is based on a diversified range of partnerships, so projects may be built on the foundations of a wide "social support" for their objectives. For this means it is important that project strategies do not rely mainly on one sole (supposedly) "stronger" partner and that project implementation is accompanied with an effective, on-going, awareness raising strategy, which nowadays will necessarily lead to develop a partnership with local mass-media on specific social issues. Active advocacy is an important mean to increase public consciousness on social issues and support to project implementation.
- In contexts where legitimacy of authority is questioned and where the practice of "doing things together" is limited, it may be convenient, in order to enhance project effectiveness, not to propose institutional cooperation schemes in which authority/leadership is "shared". The latter may be out of the "rules of the (political) game" of certain countries and make this otherwise sound strategy to become unviable.
- Government agencies are not equal to "government". Thus, in many cases it may be convenient to not necessarily assimilate a "government/country's interest or (written) commitment" to "government's agencies will" in implementing the latter. Obtaining support from higher levels of political authority in order to enhance project's delivery is an option that should be essayed when project implementation becomes stagnant.

c. Effectiveness

- Close monitoring of outputs and investments, on a monthly-basis if possible, allows for a permanent assessment of on-ongoing result and a more rapid decision-making process. It is important that management teams are trained in project cycle management and in the use of specific monitoring instruments.

- Project management should be ready to react timely and proactively when reality does not follow the planned paths in order to “limit damage” and find alternative ways to advance towards the achievement of goals.
- Within instable social and institutional contexts it is wise to be ready to apply a range of alternative implementation paths in case of negative, unsurpassable contingencies.

d. Efficiency

- In order to keep-up with an adequate level of investment, all modification in project implementation or expected course should have alternative, “contingency-plans of investments” built-in since their approved design, as allow management teams to reallocated funds from one priority to another in case of facing unsurpassable obstacles to carry out some planned components. Within highly-contingent local scenarios projects should have a “menu” of contingent program and budget allocation options.
- Project efficiency is enhanced by keeping project management layers and decision-making processes as lean as possible. Administrative procedures should be used as a tool to ease project management.
- Indirect costs are to be kept under reasonable levels so as to increase the resources available for direct costs needs.

e. Sustainability

- As mentioned above, it is wise to build up a project’s strength and sustainability on a wide range of partnerships.
- The sustainability of different project components should always be considered separately.
- Sustainability is enhanced when project support to implementing agencies is scaled since the beginning to their effective capacity to continue activities after project’s end and when concrete gradual phase-out mechanisms are carried out during the project ‘s lifetime.

7. Potential good practices

Although mostly of general nature (i.e., not related specifically to the CDL issue), the following elements may be considered as good practices that may be useful and replicable in other contexts:

- The development of relevant quantitative and qualitative studies on CDL and of a promising study on agricultural labor. These may serve as important inputs for a new project design
- An interesting effort in systematizing a repertory of NGOs existent in the country; this may also serve as a relevant input for a new project design and implementation
- A relevant and committed effort, during the last period of the project, to decentralize some project activities and to train and involve journalists in the fight against child domestic labor
- Elaboration of awareness-raising material adapted to the general public (comic-book on CDL)
- The decision by IPEC's HQ to unify the technical and administrative supervision of project under one sole office. Although this decision was not aimed specifically to this project, it will have an unintended positive effect on the same.
- The decision to hire local project management staff with valid knowledge of the local context and access to decision-makers in government.

ANNEX 1. General overview of project's outcomes per objective

A. DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE: This project will contribute to the prevention and progressive elimination of child domestic work in Haiti.

THE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT WAS NOT ACHIEVED.

B. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

Immediate objective 1:

By the end of the project, the government will have developed the institutional capacity to take steps toward preventing and progressively eliminating child domestic work in Haiti, rehabilitating former child domestic workers, and progressively eliminating child labor.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE NOT ACHIEVED

Due to the social and political context of the country since year 2000, the original strategies considered under this component were not implemented (e.g., ratification of ILO Conventions 138 & 182, harmonization of Haitian legal framework on child domestic labor, elaboration of a national policy and plan of action on this issue, set-up of a national steering committee on the same and other). After the project revision, immediate objectives remained more or less the same in their sense, while the original strategies were replaced by the following activities:

| OUTPUTS | MAIN ACTIVITIES | RESULTS |
|--|---|---|
| 1.1 Increased capacity of relevant government agencies to prevent and progressively eliminate child domestic labor | 1.1.1 Conduct an institutional analysis including: a) identification of areas in which capacity of the government to combat child labor can be improved, and b) identification of the gaps between Haitian law and international standards with regard to child labor 1.1.2 Present a proposal to relevant authorities for the harmonization of national legislation with international standards 1.1.3 Submission of analysis and proposal to relevant government authorities 1.1.4 Follow up technical assistance to the global analysis conducted | Preparatory meetings started in September 2002; by mid-May 2003, a first draft of the study, lacking insufficient quality/ depth was available. The study started too late with regards to the project's timetable and took too long to be completed. Unachieved by mid-May 2003 and unlikely to be completed by the end of the project. Unachieved by mid-May 2003 and unlikely to be completed by the end of the project. Unachieved by mid-May 2003 and unlikely to be completed by the end of the project. |

| | | |
|---|---|------------|
| 1.2 Process initiated to create a national plan of action against child labor | 1.2.1 Promote the establishment of an ad-hoc group of experts as a precursor to an eventual National Steering Committee 1.2.2 Organize meetings of the group of experts to discuss and disseminate project-sponsored studies 1.2.3 Organize a national seminar to promote the development the national plan of action | Unachieved |
|---|---|------------|

Immediate objective 2:

By the end of the project, families of origin and the population in general will be better informed about the nature and hazards of child labor.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE NOT ACHIEVED. THE PROJECT'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY REMAINS UNCLEAR

Most of the strategy and activities initially foreseen were not retained after project's revision. In fact, the previously included activities had not been implemented at all during the first two years of the project. Although the immediate objective remained more or less the same after the project revision, the original strategy was replaced by the following activities:

| OUTPUTS | MAIN ACTIVITIES | RESULTS |
|---|--|---|
| 2.1 Key actors are informed regarding child labor | 2.1.1 Organize a seminar with NGO's 2.1.2 Organize a seminar with journalists 2.1.3 Hold a Colloquium on Conventions 138 and 182 2.1.4 Production of awareness raising materials (reprinting of World Vision booklet, radio and TV spots, etc.) | Achieved Achieved; unfortunately, no consistent follow-up Unachieved by mid-May 2003. Achieved On a very limited scope (comic-book, t-shirts, translation of ILO Conventions to Créole and distribution in French) |
| 2.2 Awareness raising activities on child labor conducted in rural areas | 2.2.1 Develop and print awareness raisin materials targeting rural populations 2.2.2 Conduct train-the-trainers sessions in conjunction with the World Food Program | Unachieved Unachieved |

Immediate objective 3:

By the end of the project, child labor in Haiti will be better known and understood, and the existing capacity of civil society to address it will have been analyzed.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE ADDED AFTER REVISION AND PARTIALLY ACHIEVED.

The second aspect of this objective has not been achieved and the results of most studies have not yet been published nor disseminated by mid-May 2003. The rationale for some of these studies remains unclear.

| OUTPUTS | MAIN ACTIVITIES | RESULTS |
|--|--|---|
| 3.1 Qualitative and quantitative information on child domestic servitude is available | 3.1.1 Conduct a nation-wide survey on child domestic labor 3.1.2 Conduct a qualitative study on child domestic labor 3.1.3 Study of children who have been returned to their families by the NGO L'Escale conducted 3.1.4 Publication of reports | Achieved over a 2 year period (excessive). Still in print Achieved. Published Delayed, final report expected for mid-June 2003 Partially achieved (By mid-May 2003 only the qualitative study on CDL had been published) |
| 3.2 A directory of Haitian NGO's | 3.2.1 Agreement reached with World Vision to conduct the survey 3.2.2 Survey to NGO's working with children conducted 3.2.3 Follow-up contact is made with selected NGO's | Directory on NGO's working with children achieved but unpublished. Contact with NGO's done on a limited punctual basis. |
| 3.3 Rapid assessments of the child labor situation in agricultural activities and commercial sexual exploitation | 3.3.1 Prepare terms of reference for each study 3.3.2 Solicit proposals from qualified research organizations 3.3.3 Select research organizations to conduct the studies 3.3.4 Organize, in conjunction with selected organizations, two workshops to discuss and disseminate the studies | Study on commercial sexual exploitation achieved but unpublished; the final report lacks enough depth/ quality; data collection has flaws. First draft on agricultural labor available by mid-May 2003. Unachieved; no clear dissemination strategy on the results of studies is available |

Immediate objective 4:

By the end of the project, 150 former child domestics and 1.800 children in high risk communities will have been directly assisted.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE PARTIALLY ACHIEVED. MOST IMPORTANT NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES/ TARGET GROUP NOT REACHED

The second aspect of the objective was not achieved

| OUTPUTS | MAIN ACTIVITIES | RESULTS |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1 A mechanism for rehabilitating child domestic workers and reuniting them with their families is established | 4.1.1 Identify child domestics who have fled from their place of work 4.1.2 Provide rehabilitation services to target children 4.1.3 Locate families of origin 4.1.4 Return children to families of origin 4.1.5 Provide school materials and matriculation fees to target children | Almost achieved (148 children: 116 CDL reintegrated to their families between Oct 2001 and March 2003; by the latter month 32 children were under residential rehabilitation at L'Escale) |
| 4.2 Six schools in rural areas are strengthened | 4.2.1 Identify the needs of 6 schools assisted by the World Food Program in communities of origin 4.2.2 Provide targeted school with supplies and additional learning materials for children 4.2.3 Teachers trained on the subject of child labor | Unachieved Unachieved Unachieved |

OVERALL CONCLUSION: Neither the project development objective nor most of the immediate objectives and activities were achieved.

ANNEX 2. Overview of project's expenditures per component and year

| Components | 2000 | | | | 2001 | | | | 2002 | | | | 2003 | | |
|---|---------|-----------|----------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|----------|
| | Commit | Allocated | Expended | Remnant | Commit | Alloc. | Expend. | Remnant | Commit | Alloc. | Expend. | Remnant | Commit | Allocated | Expended |
| Personnel | | 188'200 | 185'828 | 2'372 | | 193'406 | 162'268 | 31'138 | | 86'189 | 53'648 | 32'541 | | 59'022 | 50'692 |
| Administration | | 63'000 | 44'569 | 18'431 | | 51'007 | 36'184 | 14'823 | | 83'641 | 20'574 | 63'067 | | 55'648 | 55'048 |
| 3) Institutional development | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | 9'488 | 9'488 | 0 | | | 28'463 |
| Contrat de Service HSI | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36124 | 37'951 | 9'488 | 28'463 | 36022 | 28'463 | 28'463 |
| 4) Awareness raising | | n.a. | 2'399 | | | | 0 | | | | 8'741 | | | | 97'130 |
| Enquête enfants domesticité | | n.a. | 0 | | N° 36012 | 81'100 | 0 | 81'100 | | 81'100 | 0 | 81'100 | 36020 | 81'100 | 81'100 |
| ContrServ PANOS | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36024 | 8'305 | 8'305 |
| Seminaire journalistes | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36031 | 1'415 | 1'415 |
| Sem. Elimin. Travail.enfants | N°36049 | n.a. | 2'399 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | |
| Table ronde Conv. 138 & 182 | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36066 | 6'310 | 6'310 |
| Colext 44/02 Sophie About | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36107 | 3'500 | 3'500 | 0 | | | |
| 1er seminaire avec journalistes (2002) | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36123 | 1'864 | 1'864 | 0 | | | |
| 2em seminaire avec journalistes (2002) | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36129 | 1'553 | 1'553 | 0 | | | |
| Seminaire IPEC Rep Dom | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36184 | 1'824 | 1'824 | 0 | | | |
| 5) Direct action | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 32'284 | | | 49'176 | 20'755 | 28'421 | | | 87'161 |
| Prog.d'Action TURBO | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36000 | 43'630 | 43'630 |
| PA World Vision | | n.a. | 0 | | N° 36013 | | 10'960 | | | | 0 | | | | |
| World Vision Colext 01/02 | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36008 | 2'200 | 2'200 | 0 | | | |
| Contr. Serv. 20/01 Bárbara Laurenceau | | n.a. | 0 | | N° 36080 | | 9'000 | | | | 0 | | | | |
| Contr.Serv INESA | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | N° 36152 | 19'800 | 4'800 | 15'000 | 36019 | 10'200 | 10'200 |
| Prog.d'Action L'Escale | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36021 | 13'421 | 13'421 |
| ContrServ 89/02 C.Sassine | | n.a. | 0 | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | | 36023 | 19'910 | 19'910 |
| PA l'Escale | | n.a. | 0 | | N° 36102 | | 12'324 | | N° 36102 | 27'176 | 13'755 | 13'421 | | | |
| Progr. support at 13% | | 85'140 | 30'263 | 54'877 | | 65'495 | 30'026 | 35'469 | | 78'973 | 14'743 | 64'230 | | 43'870 | 43'870 |
| Provision for cost increases | | 18'300 | 0 | 18'300 | | 13'017 | 0 | 13'017 | | 13'017 | 0 | 13'017 | | 6'300 | 0 |
| TOTAL | | 758'360 | 263'059 | 495'328 | | 582'319 | 260'762 | 321'557 | | 699'478 | 127'949 | 571'529 | | 387'628 | 362'364 |
| (*) This column does not have a complete information on the forecast of remnants. Please see Annex 3. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Budget line 17 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Budget line 21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Budget line 32 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Consolidated chart of spent budget and %

| Budget components | US\$ | % |
|--|------------------|----------|
| Personnel and administration | 608811 | 60% |
| Institutional development including research costs | 37951 | 4% |
| Institutional development not including research costs | 0 | 0% |
| Awareness raising including research costs | 108270 | 11% |
| Awareness raising not including research costs | 27170 | 3% |
| Direct action including research costs | 140200 | 14% |
| Direct action not including research costs | 61660 | 6% |
| Program support costs | 118'902 | 12% |
| Provision for costs increases | 0 | 0% |
| Total expended | 1'014'134 | |

ANNEX 3. Recent allocations and financial forecast – June 30th, 2003

ANNEX 3: Recent allocations and financial forecast - June 30th, 2003

| | Total allocations | Allocations 2003 | Spent until 30 June | Unspent resources | Observations |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|
| BL 11 | 295'839 | 0 | 0 | 0 | No problem. |
| BL 13.01 | 47'977 | 8'572 | 6144* | 2'428 | Includes already vacation payments |
| BL 13.02 | 22'191 | 4'298 | 3553* | 745 | Idem. |
| BL 15 | 8'500 | 3'661 | 2'000 | 1'661 | Eventually to be used for debriefing mission? |
| BL 16.01 | 18'537 | 6'351 | 6'351 | 0 | No problem. |
| BL 16.02 | 15'000 | 15'000 | 15'000 | 0 | No problem. |
| BL 17.01 | 72'057 | 23'152 | 20'895 | 2'257 | To be compensated by overspending on BL 17.03 |
| BL 17.02 | 32'000 | 23'000 | 17'050 | 5'950 | Problem. |
| BL 17.03 | 2'200 | 0 | 3'050 | -3'050 | To be changed to budget line 17.01** |
| Total BL 17 | 106'257 | 46'152 | 40'995 | 5'157 | Problem. |
| BL 21 | 261'356 | 210'029 | 210'029 | 0 | See annex with details of action programmes |
| BL 32 | 24'037 | 12'759 | 12'000 | 759 | Due to overcautious budgeting. |
| BL 41 | 24'901 | 4'500 | 4'500 | 0 | No problem. |
| BL 51 | 17'222 | 5'122 | 4'522 | 600 | Eventually still to be used. |
| BL 53.01 | 58'815 | 7'014 | 15'113 | -8'099 | To be compensated by BL 53.02 and 53.03 |
| BL 53.02 | 9'000 | 9'000 | 4'500 | 4'500 | Compensates difference on BL 53.01 |
| BL 53.03 | 5'000 | 5'000 | 0 | 5'000 | Compensates difference on BL 53.01 |
| Total BL 53 | 72'815 | 21'014 | 19'613 | 1'401 | No problem. Eventually still to be spent. |
| BL 68 | 118'902 | 43'870 | 43'870 | 0 | |
| BL 71 | 6'300 | 6'300 | 0 | 6'300 | |
| TOTAL | 1'039,834 | 387'628 | 368'577 | 19'051 | Includes unused cost increase on BL 71 |

* Exact figures depending on real exchange rate between USD and Gourdes during the last two months.

** Due to a temporary lack of funding on budget line 17.01 (the last 2002 payment had to be charged in 2003 on this budget line), contract 04/03 for.

Sabine Manigat was charged to budget line 17.03 that did not receive sufficient funding during the budget revision in January 2003

Detail of expenditures per current action programs / contracts

| | Allocated | Spent | Pending | Observations |
|------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|---|
| TURBO | 43'630 | 11'000 | 32'630 | To be delivered by 10 June. Outstanding final payment. |
| INESA | 10'200 | 7'000 | 3'200 | Outstanding final payment to be registered. |
| PNUD / FAFO | 81'100 | 81'100 | 0 | Finished. |
| L'ESCALE | 13'421 | 6'418 | 7'003 | Finished. Remaining funds will be used for a service contract on awareness raising, on a new EPA. |
| HSI | 28'463 | 24'668 | 3'795 | Final version delivered, but observations not included. Last payment will be cancelled and a service contract issued to include the observations. |
| RRA (C.Sassine) | 19'910 | 10'000 | 9'910 | To be delivered by end May. Outstanding final payment |
| PANOS | 8'305 | 8'305 | 0 | Finished |
| | 5'000 | 0 | 5'000 | To be allocated on contract on ESCI in rural areas. |
| TOTAL | 210'029 | 148'491 | 61'538 | |

ANNEX 4. List of evaluation's key-informants

I. IPEC / ILO (National Offices, Sub-Regional Office, Regional Office and Headquarters)

| Name | Position | Organization |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Sabine Manigat | National Coordinator | IPEC / ILO – Haiti |
| Daniel Altiné | Technical Assistant | IPEC / ILO – Haiti |
| Rose-Flore Frédérique Martelly | Administrative assistant | IPEC / ILO – Haiti |
| Thomas Wissing | Program Officer | IPEC – Mexico |
| Carmen Moreno | Sub-regional Co-ordinator | IPEC / ILO - Central America Sub- regional Office |
| Rigoberto Astorga Morales | Project Co-ordinator of IPEC's Sub-regional Child Domestic Program in Central America | IPEC – Central America Sub-regional Office |
| Benjamin Smith | Chief Technical Advisor | IPEC / ILO - Central America Sub- regional Office |
| Eduardo Araujo | Regional Program Director | IPEC / ILO Regional Office |
| Florencio Gudiño | Senior Program Officer (Evaluation) | IPEC / ILO - HQ |
| Mary Read | IPEC Desk Officer - ILO 5.72 | IPEC / ILO – HQ |

II. US Department of Labor

| Name | Position | Organization |
|-----------------|----------|--------------|
| Mehgan Cronin | | US DOL |
| Kevin Willcutts | | US DOL |

III. Stake-holders (past, current or potential implementing agencies and partners)

Governmental institutions

| Name | Position | Organization |
|----------------------|--|---|
| M. Samedy | General Director | Ministry of Social Affaires and Labor |
| M. Noël | Technical advisor | Ministry of Social Affaires and Labor |
| Mme. Mon Désir | Consultant, Responsible of Family Services | Cabinet of the Minister - Ministry of Social Affaires and Labor |
| Jean Harry Toussaint | Head of the Minister's Cabinet | Ministry of Social Affaires and Labor |
| Me Price Cyprien | Legal Advisor | Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research |
| Marie Ange Colinet | Administrator | Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research |
| Perrero Junior Per | Protection service | Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research |
| Mannie Carmel Dejean | Defense social | Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research |

International organizations

| Name | Position | Organization |
|------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| Monique Pierre-Antoine | Responsible of Unit on Fight against Poverty | UNDP |
| Bethie Casty | Administrator of Child Protection Project | UNICEF |
| Maryse Guimond | Country Director | Save the Children Fund - Canada & UK |

Haitian NGO's

| Name | Position | Organization |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|
| Dr. Nadine Burdet | Director | L'Escale |

Consultant institutions (studies / services)

| Name | Position | Organization |
|-------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Henry Cassioun | Director | TURBO Enterprise |
| Richard Mathelier | General Director | INESA – Inter Enterprises SA |
| Jean Claude Louis | Co-ordinator | L'Institut PANOS |
| Jean Lherisson | Director | Haïti Solidarité International |
| Carole Sasine | Consultant - Agricultural study of IPEC | ----- |

IV. Other international organizations working in Haiti and local civil society organizations

| Name | Position | Organization |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Philippe Cantave | Civil Society Advisor | USAID |
| Robert Chery | Director | Centre pour l'Education Populaire |
| Père Michel Jean Baptiste | Director | Foyer Maurice Sixto |
| M. Hansen | Member of the Board | Foundation for Reproductive Health and Family Education (FOSREF) |
| Emmanuel Lacroix | Judge | Minor's Court President of the Haitian Coalition for the Defense of Children's Rights -COHADDE |

V. Haitian mass media

| Name | Position | Organization |
|---------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| Carlo Désinor | Editor | Le Nouvelliste (newspaper) |
| Jöel Widmaier | General Editor | Radio Métropole |

Annex 5. Orientations for IPEC on future program priorities and related activities on the issue of child domestic labor in Haiti

I. Program priorities

As stated within the section on “Recommendations” of the evaluation report, it is suggested that the following 4 issues are considered as program priorities for IPEC in the fight against child domestic labor in Haiti:

- Awareness raising among the urban and rural population to promote a better comprehension of children’s rights and needs, including the issues of violence against children, access to and protection of children’s education and specific hazards involved in child domestic work and other forms of child work.
- Rule of law and increase of government agencies’ technical capacities: Supporting specific government agencies to implement mechanisms that help them comply with the current Haitian law on child domestic labor ⁵⁷.
- Diminution of rural children’s vulnerability related with the issues of economic and educational exclusion in targeted rural zones of Haiti.
- Generation of knowledge on child labor in general and sound monitoring on the evolution of the issue of child domestic labor.

II. Suggested lines of activity per program priority

1. Start by carrying out an intensive and continuous effort in awareness raising on the CDL issue

- Efforts in this field should be carried out through mass media campaigns and direct “face-to-face” activities with target-populations. Campaigns’ aim should be to make the issue of CDL become a real “social problem” for Haitian citizens’, so that public support can be rallied around specific actions in this matter. The content of messages should be adapted to the kind of public (adults, children, parents, employers) and the milieu (urban, rural) to which they are addressed. Means for such campaign should involve the media (radio, press, TV), different sorts of printed material (leaflets, posters and other), participation in public events, street events in urban concentration zones (theater, music), messages painted in walls and panels (something frequently done in Port-au-Prince), training of teachers so this issue is better known, debated and questioned by children and youth in schools and universities, face-to-face informative meetings with rural communities within other development programs carried out by NGO’s and IO’s, etc.

⁵⁷ This means that other objectives, such as the ratification of ILO’s Conventions on child labor by the GOH, the design of a national policy on the CDL issue, establishing a national committee on the same and harmonizing local law with international standards should continue to be pursued in a parallel way, as long-term **political objectives** that may come as a result of greater consciousness about the need of these instruments by authorities and institutions. Thus, **these objectives should not be the basis for project implementation** in Haiti but **added value** to the same. In fact, the Haitian institutional context seems to be characterized by multiple Conventions and laws that are not applied at all and by Committees and organizations that follow their stated Mission in a very limited manner.

-
- Given its important research-based knowledge on the issue of CDL in Haiti, IPEC is in an outstanding position to lead the efforts to educate Haitian public opinion on the same. Thus, IPEC should seek to establish a broad partnership with the highest levels of government, multiple CSOs and IOs to carry out this effort. In this sense, although the main orientation and messages of the awareness raising campaigns should be standardized as much as possible, their implementation at each “département” of the country should be coordinated with local authorities, media, NGOs and community leaders, as to form a local “task-force” on child domestic labor in each of these regions. Media should be provided with standardized and reliable information coming from IPEC studies and a careful follow-up of campaigns should be carried out in all regions. Awareness raising campaigns should focus/ be started in those zones of the country which are the sites of origin of the majority of CDL, as well in “receiving” zones. Where possible, the delivery of messages should be mainstreamed into the development programs on agriculture, income-generation, educational infrastructure and other issues carried out by local and international development institutions.
 - Given the important underpinning of CDL in Haitian society related to diverse economic and social factors, as well as the unfeasibility of changing these in the short term, awareness raising messages should start not by “denouncing child exploitation” but in advocating for the rights of Haitian children in general and in the need to protect children and give them better conditions of treatment. It is necessary to “humanize” the image of child domestic laborers (“restaveks”) and make both urban and rural people conscious of the difficult conditions of life that these children face, how they feel about it, labor-related risks and the risks involved in giving one own children to other families. Particular risks related to gender differences should be remarked. “These children are like yours and It may be anybody’s children’s situation”, could be the general message of such campaigns. It is important to put as much emphasis on children’s needs than on their “rights”: Living on a day-per-day basis, most of Haitian society seems to be moved more by a cultural rationale based on people’s “needs” than by an abstract perspective based on people’s “rights”.
 - Parallel or alternate awareness raising campaigns should be carried out in partnership with government, NGOs and IOs on the issues of “the protected status of childhood”, the rights of all children to education, health care and good treatment (avoid violence). Messages addressed to employer families should address the issue as a responsibility issue, particularly concerning education; e.g., “This child is giving you a part of his life... what are you really giving back to him / her?” or “You are not only an employer, you are responsible for a child’s future. Are you taking enough care of this fact?” or “You might have had a limited chance (with regards to education), are you ready to see this being repeated with another child as you once were?” (Obviously, such kind of messages should be pre-tested to be adapted to its specific targets). It is also important that messages provide guidance on “small things” that people can/ should do to improve these children’s situation. Efforts should be carried out as to try to recuperate the ancient “social contract” involved in the practice of CDL in Haiti (work in exchange of education), so as that a new “Conduct Code” ⁵⁸, based on a nowadays lessened tradition, may start being generalized among Haitian society until the day

⁵⁸ As has been proposed by the Groupe Haïtien de Recherches et d’Actions Pédagogiques (GHRAP).

other preventative and economic development efforts lead to the elimination of child domestic labor.

- Likewise it is necessary to inform people about the provisions on CDL contained within Haitian law. Most people probably ignore the current, imperfect legal framework on this issue as well as the penalties involved in case of incompliance with law. Law (whatever law, national or international) will not be respected unless that it is known and its rationale is understood and accepted. Public information should serve as the starting point to implement other specific control and improvement mechanisms on child domestic labor (see below).
- Awareness raising and training among government agencies staff (IBESR, police, justice system and other) is of great importance as to motivate them to become important stakeholders in public efforts on Child domestic labor. Government agencies staff should be involved in the design of awareness raising campaigns so they start developing a sense of ownership of activities.
- Finally, specific means should be developed as to reach the population of child domestic laborers itself and make it aware of its rights as children, the issues on which they can denounce employers in case of abuse or seek help, and the places/ means to do so (see below). Messages should be built up taking into account the different risks and needs faced by each gender.

2. Strengthen rule of (existing) law and of mechanisms of social and government agencies' control on the issue of CDL as to improve the concrete situation of a great number of children

Given the unfeasibility of achieving an immediate eradication of child domestic labor while more important action is not taken with regards to the issues of widespread poverty and insufficient access to education, the efforts developed to strengthen rule of law on this matter should aim towards establishing an affective protection system for the more than 100,000 children involved in this CDL in Haiti. Such "improved protection" of CDL by government agencies should start by localizing and registering children under this condition, as stipulated within the Haitian Labor Code.

Thus, in a second-phase/ year of activities, IPEC's efforts should include working with IBESR, the recently created Police of Minors and the Judiciary system in order to jointly design and establish:

- A national registration system of child domestic workers: IPEC should provide and financial support to IBESR technical (e.g., for build up of computer data-bases and other means), so that this institution can start accomplishing its (current) legal mission with regards to CDL and its staff can build a sense of concrete achievement. IPEC should also support GOH campaigns on the obligatory character for employer families to register at IBESR the CDL living with them. Co-ordinations should be made so that every child registered at IBESR may immediately also (be registered) receive a birth certificate in case of lacking one. Free-registration of children shall be carried out in a one year period, after which employers handling un-registered children will be subject to penalties and loss of child's custody. At the moment of registering children employers will formally commit themselves to see that the rights of children under their responsibility are duly respected (i.e., access to education and health services,

adequate personal treatment and labor conditions, adequate room and board and the child's right to visit his/ her parents at least twice a year or be visited by them, etc.).

- An easy accessible system for denunciation of abuses on CDL and an effective, joint intervention by authorities. For example, some existent government initiatives such as "SOS-Timoun" (SOS-child) should be reinforced with IPEC's support and should partially be put to the service of protecting child domestic laborers. Likewise, parents and children should be able to directly present their complaints before the authorities. IPEC should support government's efforts in informing public opinion about this system and should also invest in training CSOs and community leaders so as to establish community-based "child domestic labor task-forces" that work in coordination with authorities in selected communities where the CDL issue is particularly relevant. The rationale for this is that "legal enforcement" will be more effective when accompanied / carried out under a favorable setting of "social enforcement" of child protection.

Coordination procedures among government instances involved in this system should be carefully designed so that the main responsibilities of the different actors are handled timely and efficiently. (IBESR: rapid assessment of each case submitted and decision on the same –corrective measures and follow-up of agreement between IBESR staff and employer families, or immediate child removal-; Police of Minors: implementing child removal; and Judge of Minors: Legal decision of transitory placement of the child in a protective institution and penalization of transgressors⁵⁹). Obviously, IPEC's co-ordinations with the Ministry of Justice would also be helpful, moreover if this Ministry acquires more stability and the general crisis that has afflicted the Haitian Justice System during the past years is positively solved (in fact, since the beginning of the institutional crisis, three Ministers of Justice have resigned). The actual holder of the post has recently had a public stance (declaration of April 2003) which is contradictory with those of the President and the First Lady, declaring that "the *restavek* problem belongs to the past".

The rationale of both systems would be to protect children's rights, ensure that children receive an adequate treatment from their employers and foster the development of a culture of respect for children's rights and needs. The implementation of such systems will certainly require of an intensive training of government institutions' staff and should be focused initially in Port-au-Prince and one or two other departments that are main "receivers" of CDL (selected on the basis of information coming from the IPEC-UNDP quantitative study). It would be important that in a first-stage such "pilot-projects" remain focused in a small number of relevant zones, so as to become increasingly efficient and acquire a "demonstrative" or model character of what can be achieved in the fight against CDL. On a second stage, if the implementation of the system is successful, it may be extended to other country's "departments".

3. Contribute to shut-down the "pipe" of CDL: Promote economic alternatives and access to education for the rural poor.

⁵⁹ Given that the number of these institutions is limited, IPEC should promote that as a matching contribution to IPEC's support to the IBESR, the government of Haiti takes as a priority to re-open and put into operation the *Centre d'Accueil Le Carrefour*. Likewise, some contingent financial support could be provided by IPEC to residential institutions (orphan houses and others) willing to host transitorily ex-child domestic run-a-ways, by specifically funding their activities-related to reintegration of children to their families.

a. Income-generation and economic improvements in rural zones

- IPEC should develop intensive advocacy before other international cooperation institutions working in Haiti (such as USAID and others) and the GOH, so as to promote that protection of childhood and prevention of child domestic labor become a main concern among such institutions and that they take into account these criteria these criteria when deciding where to focus their investments in the country (i.e., the “départements” and districts of Haiti which are the main origin zones of child domestic labor should be considered among the poorest in the country and as priority focus for projects on agricultural development, income-generation and access to schooling).
- Likewise, IPEC should promote that the development programs being implemented by these institutions may be used as a channel to mainstream preventative messages to the Haitian rural population on children’s needs and rights, child work and child domestic labor.
- IPEC should also consider establishing partnerships for joint economic initiatives in rural zones with some of these institutions. Within such joint programs, the individual program-related benefits provided to families could be conditioned to community commitment in protecting children’s education and preventing child domestic labor.

b. Increase of children’s access to education in rural zones

- IPEC should work closely with the Ministry of Education promoting future government investments in building schools in the main zones of origin of child domestic laborers. Likewise, IPEC should approach international organizations that invest in this field in Haiti so that the latter also use this criterion when deciding where to prioritize the allocation of their investments.
- Likewise, IPEC should support projects in carefully targeted rural communities, in order to establish preventative community structures on child labor on the basis of schools and grass-roots organizations. These small-scale initiatives should promote active community, family and child participation in the fight against child labor and in the promotion of children’s rights. This kind of interventions should aim to increase access to schooling at these communities for children not currently attending (conditioned transfers) as well as investments in schools’ development. Community leaders should be trained as preventative agents and as key-element for promoting a change of community attitudes with regards to childhood and child labor.
- IPEC should also promote that the Ministry of Education formulates an alternative educational curricula for the rural and urban milieu whose contents and duration are adapted to the living conditions of child domestic laborers (i.e., a less “formal” schooling process, that may promote as a priority that children acquire knowledge on their rights, health issues, responsible parenthood, civic education and other topics that help them to better integrate themselves into society).

4. Research

Pending research to be carried out under this component should include:

- a public opinion study on attitudes towards child labor, child domestic labor and other childhood-related issues, that may help better orient and focus the efforts to be carried out under an awareness raising strategy; and
- a national survey on the main forms of child labor in Haiti (through a household enquiry). Thus, following its recent incursion in research on the field of agricultural labor, IPEC should continue to clarify, through additional research, the extent, conditions and risks under which labor in general is carried out by children in Haiti.

In the future, IPEC's knowledge on the issue of child domestic labor in Haiti should be reframed within the wider scope of the issue of child labor in general and of the relation of the latter with the local social dynamics and economy. In fact, **if a “national plan” and policy (on CDL or other) is someday to be drafted and enacted by the Haitian government, it should be on the issue of child labor in general, and not only on the issue of child domestic labor.**