Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq

Independent interim evaluation

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Dr. Frederick C. Huxley (International Evaluator, Team Leader)
Dr. Akeel al-Khakani (National Evaluator)

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBT	Competency-based Training
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
GFITU	General Federation of Iraqi Trade Unions
ICI	International Compact with Iraq
IDO	Iraq Desk Officer
IFI	Iraqi Federation of Industries
ILO	International Labor Organization
ILO-ROAS	ILO Regional Office for the Arab States
KAB	Know About Business
LADP	Local Area Development Project
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NCE	National Council for Employment
NDS	the National Development Strategy
NEP	National Employment Policy
PMU	Program Management Unit
SDE-Iraq	Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq
SC	Steering Committee
TOR	Terms of Reference
TREE	Training for Rural Employment and Empowerment
TVET	Training for Vocational Education Trainers
UNDG-ITF	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
VTC	Vocational Training Centers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background and Context

This project fosters reconstruction and economic development in Iraq by supporting the establishment of a cost-effective, employment-oriented skills training system. It pursues this development objective via three mutually reinforcing components: two of them involve skills training across all governorates of Iraq (including Kurdistan), and the third supports development of a national policy for employment. The first component is a revitalized vocational-education system using competency-based training (CBT) techniques, materials, and curricula to develop skills for emerging jobs in the hotel industry, personal services, and related sectors. The second training component focuses on skills for entrepreneurship. The third policy component engages government officials, members of employers' and workers' organizations, and university professors through the Inter-ministerial National Committee for Employment (NCE) in designing national policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation and development.. The project is managed by a joint ILO-UNOPS unit based in Amman, Jordan, that is supported by ILO-ROAS in Beirut and ILO-HQ departments in Geneva. It is implemented in partnership with the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs, Education, and Higher Education.

Currently the project seems to have achieved important outcomes with regard to the entrepreneurship component. As part of this component, "Know About Business" materials were translated in Arabic and culturally adapted to suit the Iraqi context. KAB was subsequently piloted in 22 institutions across the country. The perceived positive changes in trainee attitudes about business and the private sector as a result of KAB led the project and its partners to expand this component almost five-fold.

Relative to the vocational-training component, SDE-Iraq has addressed the more than 20-year isolation of Iraqi vocational education and training providers via several efforts: it has conducted more than three times the workshops originally planned to acquaint Iraqis with current international training methods. It has helped Iraqis in both government and the private sector to write 33 new training modules embodying CBT; and it expects to have significant outcomes when those modules are piloted during 2011.

With respect to the employment policy component, on the other hand, the project has aided the formation of a network of officials, private-sector representatives, and academics that has carried out six in-depth background studies of the labour market economy in Iraq. This network expects to present a draft national policy for employment when a new government is formed on the basis of the elections last March.

The purpose of this independent interim evaluation is to provide its main client – the United Nations Development Group's Iraqi Trust Fund – with results for the "lessons learned" study it is conducting. This study involves a sample of 37 projects supported by the Fund, and it will indicate how successful the Fund has been by July 2010. Additional clients of the evaluation

include the project team in Iraq and Jordan, ILO-ROAS in Beirut, and selected ILO-HQ departments in Geneva.

Two evaluators, one international and the other an Iraqi national, conducted this assessment. They began with a desk review of secondary data provided by the project team and ILO-ROAS. Then they collected primary data through interviews with beneficiaries and key informants, and field visits to project sites to consult with partners, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders. Finally, the evaluators and the project team organized a Stakeholders' Workshop to disseminate a first draft of evaluation findings and analyses, receive comments about the draft, and collect additional information. Overall the evaluation was sustained by the work of all concerned, though it also was constrained by factors such as the elections in March.

Main Findings and Conclusions

The overall assessment of SDE-Iraq's performance is positive, though there are some concerns to be addressed so that the project can function better.

First, the project is extremely **relevant** to the country's current situation. Iraq is now assembling the second national government chosen under free and fair (though sometimes dangerous) elections. As it emerges from years of dictatorship and occupation, Iraq's economy will be critical for stabilizing the country and helping guide its future. Employment is thus a critical, cross-cutting issue, and SDE-Iraq addresses three aspects of employment: entrepreneurship, employment policy development, and vocational educational and training.

Second, SDE-Iraq has generally been **effective** in pursuing its objectives. The clear standout achievement here is training for entrepreneurship: the evaluation shows how such training has apparently transformed trainee attitudes to a degree that the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs, Education, and Higher Education supported nearly five-fold expansions of trainees and institutions during the second year of implementation. Training for entrepreneurship has also illustrated how positive training outcomes can be identified and documented.

With regard to vocational instruction, the project has revitalized training centers, educated Iraqis about competency-based training (CBT), and helped in developing new trainers, curricula, and materials to be piloted in 2011.

The project has also helped Iraqis learn how a national employment policy can illuminate both what skills will be needed to fill emerging job opportunities and how to train for such skills. Still another accomplishment for this component has been creating a network of policy-makers in government and policy advisors in the private sector and academia.

In addition to highlighting these positive aspects of project operation, the evaluation also indicates a key problem: some project reports have not clearly distinguished outcomes of an activity from other outputs, leading to a sometimes inaccurate picture of project accomplishment.

Third, SDE-Iraq has been **efficient** in operation. For example, improved security conditions have allowed the project to conduct half (16 of 32) of its workshops within the country, at greatly reduced cost by comparison to those held in Jordan or elsewhere. Furthermore, the symbiosis of ILO's technical expertise in employment training and policy with UNOPS expertise in procurement of goods and services and financial management have enabled the project to respond resiliently to changing circumstances inside Iraq in ways that save both time and money.

Fourth, the project has produced outcomes with **impact**, especially regarding the entrepreneurship objective. For example, the nearly five-fold expansion of trainees and training sites for such instruction from one year to the next is an impressive change in magnitude. And the illustration of techniques for identifying and measuring training outcomes should be productive for vocational training and perhaps for policy development as well. Positive statements by Iraqis interviewed inside the country, plus the active and informed participation of Iraqi partners at the Stakeholders' Workshop also suggest intensity of support for the project which the evaluation report discusses in greater detail.

Fifth and finally, the **sustainability** of project efforts seems highly likely for the entrepreneurship component due to its apparent success already from the perspective of Iraqi national counterparts questioned by the evaluation. With regard to vocational instruction also, the revitalization of training centers and providers (plus new trainers, materials, and curricula) suggest that this sector is mobilized for change. While this component has not yet reached its intended outcomes, additional support in piloting CBT courses beyond the current project duration would be important to sustain the investments made so far, reaching a stage in which it is sustained by national resources. And while development of a national employment policy is generally a long-term process, important precursors – such as the network for developing policy, background studies, and understanding of the need for an employment policy – now seem to be in place. A "follow-up" project would therefore have much to build on in Iraq.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

1. The project team and ILO-ROAS, should establish an SDE-Iraq monitoring plan that specifies what outcomes are and how they can be measured for each of the three project components – training for entrepreneurship, training for vocations, and policy development. Then they can use the plan to inform project reports, communication, and efforts for sustainability hereafter.

2. The project team should reanalyze the data on changes in attitudes and/or behavior about entrepreneurship resulting from training with the adapted KAB modules in Arabic and Kurdish.
3. It is important that support continue for the vocational training component of the project. The project team ought to analyze the data for outcomes of the vocational training that will be piloted and completed by August 2011, and incorporate that information into project reports, planning, and efforts for sustainability.
4. The project team and ILO-ROAS should follow the development of the national policy for employment in Iraq and assist that effort, as project resources permit.
5. ILO-ROAS and ILO-HQ (SKILLS) can profitably advocate for the continuation, refinement, and replication of the ILO/UNOPS good-practice model developed for SDE-Iraq.
6. And finally, as part of closing out the current funding for SDE-Iraq, ILO-ROAS can organize a sustainability workshop for project members, partners, and supporters. Such a workshop provides the opportunity to present key project achievements in the areas of entrepreneurship, vocational training, and employment policy development, while discussing how such achievements may be reinforced. Such a workshop also provides the platform to explore funding opportunities for a Phase 2 of the project incorporating these components; and establishing a clear exit strategy for the project.

Important Lessons Learned

- The combination of ILO and UNOPS in SDE-Iraq unites the technical strengths of the former with the logistical capacities of the latter. This unit can provide a useful model for UN component organizations seeking to operate more efficiently, cost-effectively, and in ways relevant to international hopes and concerns.

- More attention needs to be paid to projects at the design and inception phase to ensure that M&E plans are in order. Work plans and monitoring plans are standard parts of project design and operation and should be part of the prerequisite documentation at the inception phase of any project. The baseline, indicators and monitoring plan will determine the "evaluability" of the project for the duration of its activities, therefore taking the time to make sure that the adequate indicators have been established to evaluate project achievement is vital for an accurate tracking of progress.

Independent Interim Evaluation
Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq

1. Project Background: Strategic Fit and Relevance

In February 2007, "Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq" (SDE-Iraq) was approved by the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG-ITF). The fund authorized $4, 963, 256 donated by the European Community to support the project (No. B1-27) for an initial period of 18 months. It was subsequently extended until September 2009 and then September 2010, in order to complete implementation of some remaining activities. The Project is jointly executed by the ILO and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

The development objective of the project is to support reconstruction and economic development in Iraq through vocational training, employment policies and entrepreneurship within an integrated active labour market policy framework. The project has three outcomes:

1. Enhance vocational training provision for priority jobs in demand in the labour market

2. Enhance employment policy making at the national level

3. Foster self-employment initiatives among Iraqis including young women and men

ILO and UNOPS established a Program Management Unit (PMU) in Amman, Jordan, and set to work. ILO hired the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) and (for a period) an Economic Advisor for employment policy, while the Deputy CTA/Operations Specialist and Administrative and Financial Assistant are funded under the UNOPS budget. As SDE-Iraq began to operate, ILO provided technical expertise to implement the components related to vocational training, the development of a national employment policy, and the integration of entrepreneurship development curricula. These actions were complemented by UNOPS' expertise for project services, including financial management, procurement of equipment, contracting consultants, and related tasks. Supporting the PMU from inside Iraq was a national coordinator (now the National Program Coordinator) to facilitate activities by National Partners, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA). Finally, from Beirut the ILO's Regional Office for the Arab States (ILO-ROAS) provided program and financial oversight and supervision to the project.

Acting on recommendations of a 2004 conference entitled "Jobs for the Future of Iraq," the project additionally responded to a request by MOLSA for help in strengthening the relevance, quality, and governance of vocational training in Iraq. It also worked to assist the Iraqi government in pursuing **the National Development Strategy (NDS) goals** of reducing

unemployment (from 15% to 9%) and increasing the participation of women to about one-third (35%) of the paid labor force.

More broadly, SDE-Iraq fits several of the United Nations' current goals and responsibilities. First, the project is contributing to pursuit of **UN Millennium Development Goal 1**, "which aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, by devising a more inclusive employment policy, rebuilding the vocational-training sector, and promoting an entrepreneurship culture." Second, SDE-Iraq targets ILO's Strategic Objective for Employment, which seeks to "create greater opportunities for women and men to secure decent employment and income."[1] Third, the project supports the "primary focus" of **the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)**, a partnership chaired jointly by the government and the UN, through helping to build "a framework for Iraq's economic transformation and integration into the regional and global economy."[2] And fourth, SDE-Iraq has corresponded to **UNDG-ITF priorities** all along – from its initial approval for funding, through two "no cost" extensions of one year each, to today's focus on "private-sector development to create new jobs, public-sector reform, and strengthened essential services."[3] In fact, this project's ability to get into Iraq and operate, overcoming on-the-ground difficulties experienced by many other agencies, is one reason why the Iraq Trust Fund is looking forward to the results of this Interim Evaluation.[4]

Organizational arrangements and fit with national or international policies/agreements are one side of today's context for working in Iraq; another is how the project's objectives and outcomes respond to living in a zone of crisis and **engaging with real needs of different beneficiary populations**. Yet on that side also, SDE-Iraq seems to be doing well: interviews inside the country with a judgment[5] sample of 26 Iraqis – including men, women, youth, and representatives from Kurdistan – suggest that the project is widely appreciated for a number of activities to be discussed below. Furthermore, **project objectives and outcomes seem relevant and realistic**: SDE-Iraq has apparently achieved important outcomes already with regard to fostering entrepreneurship (and appears poised to do similarly elsewhere, at least with regard to vocational training), as will also be examined below. The manner in which the project has carried out such activities has also earned it some kudos: for example, government officials, a member of the employers' associations, and university professors remarked how the project has been "flexible, understanding, and ready to learn from Iraqis" already working on labor in their

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[1] International Labour Organization, "Programme and Budget for the Biennium 2010-2011" (hereafter cited as P&B), pp. 23-32.

[2] UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, "Fact Sheet on the International Compact with Iraq," p. 2.

[3] Press Release, "Report Shows 'Meaningful' Impact of UN Projects in Iraq," 1 April 2009.

[4] Interview with Ms. Marla Zapach, Programme Specialist: Office of Resident Coordinator-Iraq, 11 March 2010.

[5] This sample was <u>not</u> chosen by a probability method, which would have required more time, money, and control than permitted by the TOR or conditions inside Iraq. Instead the sample was established by reference to TOR analytical question 5.1.c and in close consultation with key informants knowledgeable about project activities. Results from a judgment sample cannot be taken as representative of the general population of Iraqis within a clear margin of error, but they can often illuminate broad trends or characteristics of a population if chosen carefully.

country. Taken together, such factors indicate that SDE-Iraq has found a useful niche and is playing a helpful role – for example, by **contributing both to the NDS and to the national strategy for poverty reduction by increasing employment opportunities**.

2. Evaluation Background and Methodology

A. Background

The **purpose** of this formative evaluation process is:

- To determine if SDE-Iraq has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- To determine the initial impact(s) of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- To provide recommendations on how to build on project achievements and ensure that they are sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- To document lessons learned, success stories, and good practices in order to maximize the existing resources within the constraints of the political environment; and
- To examine the joint-programming management model (mainly the coordination between ILO and UNOPS) to achieve the common objectives of the project.

The **primary client** for the evaluation is the project's funder, UNDG-ITF. This multilateral trust fund will consider the evaluation's findings, along with those of 36 similar assessments being conducted at about the same time, in carrying out a "lessons learned" examination before the fund officially ends in July 2010.[6] Additional primary clients will include ILO-ROAS in Beirut, the PMU in Amman, national and local partners inside Iraq, and others. Secondary clients of the evaluation include ILO-HQ departments in Geneva (SKILLS, CODEV, and EVAL), as well as the ILO International Training Center in Turin.[7]

The **scope** of the evaluation covers SDE-Iraq from its inception, and it projects slightly beyond its scheduled end of funding in July 2010 to preview possible activities continuing in a short, "no-cost" extension. The evaluation also examines four administrative levels concerned with project actions. First, the National Evaluator has focused on activities inside Iraq via visits and interviews in Baghdad with persons working in different areas of the country and through internet interviews with two officials in Kurdistan.[8] And second, the International Evaluator has focused on project-related activities outside Iraq via interviews with ILO-ROAS personnel in Beirut, PMU staff and persons working with partner organizations in Amman, and interviews with two individuals connected with ILO-Headquarters in Geneva.[9]

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[6] Interview with Ms. Bana Kaloti and Mr. Muhammad Usman Akram, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisors: Office of the Resident Coordinator-Iraq, 3 March 2010.

[7] TOR, p. 6.

[8] Please see Appendix 2a. Appendix 3c also shows the interview questionnaire for the National Program Coordinator to illustrate the kinds of questions posed in Iraq.

[9] Please see Appendix 2b. Appendix 3b also shows the questionnaire to illustrate the kinds of questions posed outside Iraq.

The **Evaluation Manager** is Mr. Jean-Francois Klein, Chief of Regional Programming Services at ILO-ROAS. The team that conducted the evaluation has two members: Dr. Frederick C. Huxley is an independent consultant who worked as the **International Evaluator and Team Leader**; and Dr. Akeel al-Khakani is an independent consultant who worked as the **National Evaluator**.

B. Methodology

The methodological approach to this evaluation had three phases:

- A desk review of secondary data provided by the ILO ROAS and the project team.

- Field interviews to collect primary data and validate information documented. Interviews included project beneficiaries and key informants, field visits to project sites for consultation with project partners and beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

- A Stakeholders' Workshop was held at the end of the process to disseminate a first draft of findings and analyses, to receive feedback comments about that draft, and to collect additional information (please see Appendices 2, 3, and 5 for further details).

Process.

First, the evaluation team reviewed several key documents prior to fieldwork. These included the Project Document ("Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq": Programme/Project B1-27), the Terms of Reference for an Independent Interim Evaluation of the project, technical and progress reports of project activities, and related materials before departing for the Middle East.

Second, the evaluators consulted by internet and/or telephone with each other, with the Evaluation Manager in Beirut, and with other ILO representatives in Beirut or Amman. These consultations established preliminary understandings about the evaluation process, highlighted priorities in its TOR, and negotiated logistics for carrying out the evaluation. Then both team members traveled to the Middle East to assess how the project was working on the ground in Iraq and how it was being managed from Amman and Beirut. Dr. al-Khakani started in Baghdad by interviewing project stakeholders from government, direct beneficiaries, and ILO's social partners. Dr. Huxley carried out related interviews and consultations with officials at ILO's Regional Office for the Arab States in Beirut and then proceeded to Amman for similar work with the Project Management Unit and associated UN agencies. To guide and inform these

interviews and consultations, both evaluators used a matrix relating the TOR questions to data sources and methods.[10]

On March 1, al-Khakani began fieldwork in Baghdad, most of which was carried out at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), by discussing project goals, activities, and achievements with the National Project Coordinator and making logistical arrangements to carry out the evaluation in Iraq. Huxley, by contrast, consulted with the Evaluation Manager and key staff at ROAS about evaluation methodology, schedules, and related matters.

From March 2 through March 12, al-Khakani continued Iraqi interviews (all held at MOLSA), visits to project sites (including a vocational training center, a vocational high school, and a business-administration institute -- all in Baghdad). He consulted daily by internet and/or telephone with Huxley. To supplement and oversee that activity, Huxley flew to Amman and interviewed the Iraq Desk Officer (IDO), the CTA, PMU staff, and officials at UN agencies and offices supporting the project from there. Al-Khakani completed the Iraqi fieldwork and traveled to Amman on March 12.

From March 12-14, both evaluators combined data from Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and they also conferred about their division of labor for writing the first draft of the evaluation report. In the late afternoon of March 14, they met with the CTA, PMU staff, and others to preview the evaluation's preliminary findings and to plan for a Stakeholders' Workshop on April 6.

On March 15, both members of the team left Amman to begin the next stage of the evaluation process.

Third and finally, Al-Khakani and Huxley assessed and integrated the desk review, fieldwork consultations, and related materials to produce a first draft of the evaluation report in English. This draft was submitted to ROAS and the PMU for review on March 30. On March 31, al-Khakani submitted a version of the draft translated into Arabic. Key ILO personnel in Beirut and Amman read the drafts in English and/or Arabic and compiled written comments about them. On April 3-4, al-Khakani and Huxley returned to Amman, and the following day they reviewed arrangements and materials for the Stakeholders' Workshop. On April 6, they participated with National Partners (including representatives from MOLSA, MOE, MOHE, Iraqi universities, and others), project staff, and an M&E advisor from ORC-Iraq in that workshop to review the evaluation process and the first-draft report.[11] The role of the evaluation team then was to highlight the logic of the assessment and to represent and analyze both the views of the individuals consulted and the gist of the documentation assembled. The team's

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[10]   Please see Appendix 3a.
[11]   Please see the materials in Appendix 5 concerning the workshop's List of Participants, Agenda, and the Report of Group Discussions and Presentations.

presentation was constructive in form and did not dwell on personal or small details. Workshop participants (and especially National Partners) had opportunities to comment, probe the accuracy of report data and interpretations, and provide additional input about the draft report. In the afternoon, National Partners formed groups to discuss written questions posed by the evaluators about all three of the project's objectives. Each group reported its discussion back to the plenary session, and then an open and appreciative discussion resulted among the various participants.

On April 7, al-Khakani and Huxley returned home to deal with each of the comments raised at the workshop or in writing earlier, either by revising the draft or by explaining why they felt it already addressed the points concerned. They also added the various Annexes specified by the TOR to the revised draft and submitted the Final Report on May 3.

c. Limitations

The following exogenous factors influenced the course of the evaluation. First was the national election in Iraq on 7 March 2010. In addition to a curfew restricting personal movement inside the country on parts of that day and the one before, a national holiday was declared for the period 4-8 March, so that Iraqis could not go to work or conduct personal business as usual. The second set of outside factors was the PMU's move to a new office in Amman 9-11 March which presented logistical limitations And third was rush for the evaluation to meet UNDG-ITF deadlines, which required repeated logistical revisions during the course of the evaluation and contributed to postponement of the Stakeholders' Workshop until April 6. Though the surge was demanding – and sometimes even irritating – it also was illuminating: it illustrated the stress, unclear situations, and abrupt changes often characteristic of working in a crisis-affected zone.[12]

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[12] It also highlighted how a principled resilience can be adaptive under such circumstances.

3. Main Findings of the Evaluation: Design, Effectiveness, and Results

A. Project Design

Economic conditions inside Iraq began a long decline during the early 1980's, and today are at a sorry stage. Overall, jobs are scarce and labor supply does not articulate well with labor demand. One-in-seven Iraqis (15%) is unemployed, and joblessness is higher in key demographic categories. For example, **a quarter of men aged 20-24 is currently unemployed, and eight-in-ten (82%) of adult women are outside the paid labor force**.[13] The structure of the Iraqi job market also is worrisome. Over a third (35%) of all employment is with the government, while private-sector jobs are both few in number and hard to find. The security situation and the regulatory environment remain problematic, so starting a business or other forms of self-employment are even more daunting propositions.

Consistent with these indicators, technical education and vocational training have declined appreciably over the period. For example, student enrollment dropped about 40 percent (99,000 to 59,000) during the ten years between 1995-96 and 2005-06, and **women constituted less than a fifth of enrollees by the end date**.[14] The destruction and deprivation from years of war, sanctions, and more war were worsened by widespread looting and burning of public property during the early days of the U.S. occupation and by sectarian fighting afterward.

Such were the **baseline conditions** when SDE-Iraq began in 2007. As indicated above, gender and age of job-seekers and sectoral structure of the job market were among the dimensions considered in designing project objectives and activities. A three-fold approach was envisaged for that task: first, vocational training would be recalibrated and revitalized; second, development of a more inclusive and productive national employment policy would be encouraged to reflect and reinforce a newly emerging economy; and third, entrepreneurship and self-employment would be promoted.

The **intervention logic** underlying this three-fold approach has been **internally coherent and generally realistic for its setting in contemporary Iraq**. For example, the Logical Framework section of the Project Document[15] describes SDE-Iraq's Development Objective:
"The project will support reconstruction and economic development in Iraq through vocational training, employment policies, and entrepreneurship within an integrated active labor market policy framework."[16]

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[13] TOR, p. 1.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Logical Framework, "Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq: Programme/Project B1-27," 13 November 2006, pp. 8-19 (hereafter cited as LogFrame).
[16] LogFrame, p. 9.

Contributing to this overall objective are the three Immediate Objectives/Outcomes:
"1. Enhance vocational training provision for priority jobs in demand in the labor   market;
 2. Enhance employment policy-making at the national level; and
 3. Foster self-employment initiative among Iraqis (including young women and men)."[17]

Considering outcome 3 for illustration, the Logical Framework then describes project inputs (e.g., "Know about Business [KAB] training and materials) which can be combined through project activities (e.g., adapting the ILO/KAB modular training package to give Iraqis more knowledge and practice about business) to produce outputs (e.g., raised awareness among Iraqi men and women about business in their country).

However, neither the Logical Framework, nor the Project Document more broadly, nor the various technical and progress reports that the project has filed to track its actions over time, explains how these **inputs, activities and outputs are enabling (i.e. logically necessary) but not sufficient in themselves** to produce the outcomes sought. That explanation usually accompanies the development of two other plans, intermediate between the Project Document and technical/progress reports: the first -- a Workplan -- is prospective and used to guide activities toward objectives; and the second -- a Monitoring Plan -- is retrospective and used to show what outcomes the activities have accomplished so far.

The CTA of SDE-Iraq has developed several well-formulated workplans for accomplishing project tasks.[18] However, neither he nor others have yet developed a clear and comprehensive Monitoring Plan to track this project's outcomes over time.[19] This lack of a Monitoring Plan indicates an omission, not so much in the project's intervention logic, but in the training and supervision provided to key project personnel so that they can implement and monitor this logic in action.[20]

This omission has also complicated the project's "evaluability." It highlights a need for UNDG ITF and associated organizations to monitor carefully, not only the structure (e.g., logical frameworks and corresponding entities) of programs/projects it funds, but also how the programs/projects function and report about their activities. SDE-Iraq has met its reporting

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[17] Ibid.
[18]   For example, see Chapter 8 ("Future Vision and Plans To Improve KAB") and Annex 1 ("Proposed Plans") in Foster Entrepreneurship Culture among the Iraqi Youth: Assessing the Implementation of the KAB Programme, January 2010, pp. 39-54 (hereafter cited as Assessing KAB).
[19]   ITF-mandated technical and progress reports do contain sections where quantitative measures and narrative descriptions can be recorded to track outputs and outcomes. For example, the project's Fourth Quarterly Fiche October-December 2009 shows a measure (p. 3) and a description (p. 4) for Objective/Outcome 3. However, the nature of this or other outcomes has not been clearly specified – e.g., as changes in attitude, behavior, and/or products of behavior (such as policies) resulting from project activities and contributing clearly to a Development Objective – so reporting of the outcome is insufficient.
[20]   Despite this lack, the project has apparently produced some clear outcomes and shows promise for more, as will be detailed during discussion of project implementation below.

requirements faithfully – submissions filed on time, submissions followed by review meetings, etc. – but the **content** of its reports was flawed. And that flaw led, in turn, to lapses in the quality of reporting and communicating about a project working better on the ground (despite the conditions in Iraq) than it appeared in its reports.

The **objectives of SDE-Iraq have been clear and realistic but were unlikely to be accomplished within the original 18-month timeline**. The project has had to adjust (and readjust) its activities to address the "start and stop" of a short initial duration, followed by a one-year extension, and then by another one-year extension. Such "discontinuities" may also have contributed to the lapses in reporting discussed above. By contrast, **the resources (including human resources) allocated to this project have apparently enabled it to show some surprising results**, as will be explained below. And **project outputs also seem to have been relevant and realistic for needs inside Iraq**.

Within the project, ILO and UNOPS have formed a **"symbiosis" that combines the technical expertise of the former with the logistical/operational capacities of the latter**. In the views of both its members and outsiders, this partnership has performed admirably under often difficult circumstances. Inside Iraq, the project's main partners have been the ministries – especially MOLSA, but also the Ministries of Education (MOE) and of Higher Education (MOHE). ILO's "traditional partners" -- the employers' association (the Iraqi Federation of Industries or IFI) and the workers' association (the General Federation of Iraqi Trade Unions or GFITU) have also been helpful. Both the inter-ministerial National Council for Employment (NCE) and the intra-MOLSA Steering Committee (SC) have played critical roles that will be discussed in Section 3Bc below. And finally, the project's main partners outside Iraq have included other UN agencies operating mostly from Jordan, plus the ILO office in Beirut (ROAS) and selected departments at ILO-Geneva (especially SKILLS).

The project was based, of course, on **several assumptions**. Most of these seem reasonable and appropriate, such as "close cooperation between all project partners" including MOLSA, the NCE, ILO, and UNOPS.[21] In retrospect, however, one assumption seems especially notable:
"No significant disruptive changes in the political or security situation in Iraq, which may affect the organization and provision of project services, and especially the staff development programmes."[22]
Actualities in Iraq have unfortunately been more chaotic and destructive than this assumption hoped for, and they have been highlighted in every technical or progress report the project has filed so far.

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[21] LogFrame, p. 9.
[22] Ibid.

Most of the **indicators for measuring and monitoring inputs, activities, and outputs seem appropriate and useful**. The same applies with regard to **the means of verification** for those indicators. For example, among the indicators of progress for component 1 was that SDE-Iraq would produce at least 30 packages for training occupational skills (including modules on self-employment and small-business development.[23] In fact, the project has developed 33 such packages, all of which make available to Iraqis the kind of competency-based training that has been absent from their country since the 1980's. The main issues with regard to measurement and monitoring concerned understanding the nature of objectives/outcomes, as discussed above, plus the lapses in reporting, supervision, and communication which seem associated with that.

By contrast, it seems that most of the **strategy for sustainable impacts of project efforts** was not clearly defined during the design phase of SDE-Iraq. Instead, most of the early thinking apparently focused on getting the project started under difficult circumstances, and then keeping it going through the starts and stops of administrative and on-the-ground constraints. Despite this, the project appears to have operated reasonably well. It has now reached a stage where clearer reporting and working more cohesively and coherently with its Iraqi counterparts can lead to real outcomes, including sustainability of activities begun by the project.

B. Project Progress and Effectiveness

General Implementation.

SDE-Iraq is making significant progress toward its planned objectives/outcomes, and it seems to have already surpassed its targets for fostering entrepreneurship (objective/outcome 3). The Project Document says that one indicator of the output "awareness raised among Iraqi men and women toward the creation of an enterprise culture in Iraqi society" would be instructing a core group of 44 teacher/trainers about self-employment and small business development.[24] That training occurred in Amman during April/May 2008, and those teachers returned home to adapt ILO's "Know about Business" (KAB) module for the Iraqi society. The adapted KAB was then given pilot implementation with 454 trainees in 7 vocational training centers, 10 vocational schools, and 5 technical colleges or institutes inside Iraq during the school year 2008-09.[25]

Both before this training and after it, trainees completed a questionnaire requesting standard demographic information (name, gender, age, name of the training institution, etc.), agreement/disagreement with a number of statements about entrepreneurship, work in the private or public sectors, and related matters.[26] Using this questionnaire, SDE-Iraq illuminated several

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[23] LogFrame, pp. 9 and 10.
[24] LogFrame, p. 11.
[25] Assessing KAB, p. 33.
[26] The KAB Program, Registration Questionnaire, 5 pp. (n.d., in Arabic).

promising potential outcomes: before the training, 45% of trainees expressed a desire to establish a private business; after the training, 70% did so. Before the training, 15% said that they knew a lot about small businesses; after it, 44% said that.[27] Because of these and related attitudinal changes, implementation of the adapted KAB was expanded almost five-fold, to 105 locations inside Iraq with 2,100 trainees in 2009-10. Similar evaluations of the training are expected to be completed by the end of this school year to see if such encouraging results are repeated.

Indeed, KAB seems, so far, to be a precursory "shining example" of the success of SDE-Iraq, one that could serve as a telling sign of how similar successes in the project's other components could be achieved in terms of **capacity development**. First, it showed a good degree of adaptability by Iraqi partners to learn new things fairly quickly under Iraq's challenging circumstances, to apply them rather effectively, and finally to move towards self-sustainability. That goal has not been realized yet, but it appears realistically attainable. In the project's other two components – vocational training (CBT) and policy development (NEP) --the Iraqi partners showed a similar readiness to learn new things and engage in capacity-developing. But these two components are still in their initial stages and will require both time and further action to see if they can repeat the "success story" of the KAB component. Early indicators are encouraging.

For example, with regard to CBT, SDE-Iraq has implemented a number of **capacity-building activities** with senior officials in several ministries and agencies (including some in the Kurdish region), and it has trained a cadre of over 50 curriculum developers, TVET instructors, and writers/designers of instructional materials. In turn, this cadre has developed 33 (versus the 30 planned in the Project Document)[28] new modular learning packages for jobs in priority economic sectors. While these outputs have not yet translated into a clear outcome for this component, they do constitute useful steps (or "building blocks") toward that achievement.

Additionally, such activities have increased Iraqi capacities not only for those particular occupations, but also for more general learning and teaching capacities. For example, SDE-Iraq's records indicate that the project has implemented a total of 36 workshops. Half (16) of these were organized and delivered inside the country, helping Iraqis to develop their own training programs, based on international best practices for TVET but adapted to fit national economic priorities and cultural understandings. So these efforts inspire expectations that vocational training also can achieve outcomes similar to those apparently already reached by entrepreneurship training.

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[27] "Potential outcomes" because accepted evaluation practice would call for clearer reporting about exactly how the trainees were selected, how many of them completed the questionnaires before and after, under what instructions and conditions at each location, etc. Even stronger evidence for attitude change caused by the KAB training would involve comparison with a control group. But SDE-Iraq is not doing medical research; it is promoting entrepreneurship under conditions that sometimes approximate a warzone. In that optic, these are encouraging results.

[28] LogFrame, pp. 9 and 10.

Another example of **cultural awareness** manifested by SDE-Iraq concerns peculiar Iraqi decision-making arrangements at institutional levels which, if they had gone unnoticed, would have hampered capacity-building efforts. In this regard, there is a recurring tension within Iraqi institutions regarding the actual worth and/or need for capacity-building between high-level, decision-making "bureaucrats," on one hand, and technically specialized people on the other. The former, as unspecialized and politically appointed people, might not have understood the value of the project, while the latter were more open to seeing its potential. SDE-Iraq wisely invited the "bureaucrats" along with technical people to the first workshop in Turin, Italy, to introduce the kind of competency-based training that had developed internationally while their country was more isolated politically. It also structured the workshop in such a way as to show the decision-making bureaucrats the value of the project. This convinced them to sign onto it and, in turn, facilitated the sending of the specialized people to subsequent workshops and training sessions. The strategy successfully got otherwise reluctant officials on board, something that translated into consistent support and enthusiasm for the project among participating Iraqi institutions.

Moreover, SDE-Iraq has been effective in **raising awareness** among Iraqi partners about areas of need which went unrecognized before the launching of the project. For instance, national policy-makers and academics did not see the need for a National Employment Policy as a strategy to reduce unemployment and fight poverty. They subscribed to the misleading notion that a booming national economy would automatically take care of the crippling challenges of unemployment and poverty. They initially did not believe that an intermediate strategy was needed between causes (booming economy) and effects (reducing unemployment and eliminating poverty). The ILO part of SDE-Iraq patiently worked in the initial stages to show Iraqi partners the importance of such a strategy. When these partners were finally convinced of the need, they started working on devising a National Employment Policy, establishing the building blocks for finalizing a draft sometime this year and having it approved by parliament, hopefully early next year. Throughout this learning experience on the part of Iraqi partners, important capacity-building skills were acquired and put to good use to increase national ownership of the capacities involved.

One **potential hindrance to capacity-building** in CBT (as well as in many other sectors of activity) is what can be called the **"practice of allotment"** in Iraqi state institutions: sending delegates for training purposes, particularly outside the country, is dealt with as a privilege to be "distributed fairly" among the personnel, rather than as a task to be discharged by relevantly qualified employees. Because of this, different employees (many of them unqualified) get sent to workshops, conferences, and training sessions, rather than sending the same qualified ones who need to accumulate expertise for the purposes of capacity-building and sustainability. Different Iraqi partners have complained of this practice which, sometimes, has deprived them from

training they needed as part of their capacity-building roles. Fortunately for SDE-Iraq, both the National Program Coordinator and the Chief Technical Adviser have long years of experience in vocational training institutions in Iraq. This has helped them to intervene effectively, sometimes in order to get qualified employees sent to repeated training sessions and workshops**.**

But with regard to project activities in vocational education overall, **outcomes have been slower in coming than they were with entrepreneurship training.** Several factors seem to have contributed to this delay. One already mentioned during the discussion of capacity development activities above was Iraq's virtual isolation from international vocational training for over 20 years. To deal with this period of isolation, SDE-Iraq has conducted seven courses (versus just two planned by the Project Document)[29] to illustrate, explain, and document the value of CBT to MOLSA staff. The CTA wrote a manual in Arabic to help that audience learn how to make CBT training materials and curricula; concurrent KAB instruction has illustrated how CBT worked in developing entrepreneurial skills. And private-sector firms have had to learn how to link vocational training to labor market needs and worker capacities, rather than to government commands. As a result, 33 new curricula are now in the final stages of development. Several of these are oriented toward occupations in emerging economic sectors (e.g., accounting and interior-design courses for the hotel industry, or haircutting and commercial baking of Middle Eastern pastries for Iraqi women). Courses using these materials and curricula are projected for piloting from mid-February 2011 onward, and evaluation techniques like those used to measure attitude changes for KAB could be completed by late August of that year. Due to all these reasons, the prospect for component-1 outcomes seems strong.

 Outcomes for a national employment policy (the third component of project activity) seem reachable but less definite than those for vocational training. Several outputs of note already suggest the path. As described above during discussion of SDE-Iraq's effectiveness in **raising awareness among national partners**, the project invested roughly a year in convincing Iraqi decisions-makers about the necessity for a national policy to link job training (vocational or entrepreneurial) to the emerging labor market. Another important output has been the production of six in-depth reports about the Iraqi economy, employment, youth and gender issues. These reports have highlighted key background information and analysis about each topic. In addition, being involved in production of the reports under project guidance has deepened the understanding of Iraqi intellectuals and linked them into policy dialog with government officials and representatives for employers' and workers' associations. This network of policy-makers and advisors should contribute importantly to sustaining Iraqi efforts for employment well beyond the end of SDE-Iraq. Finally, this project-guided network is in the last stages of producing a draft national employment policy and hopes to present it to the NCE for further development when the next national government is formed later this year. Once the policy

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[29] Comment on Revised Draft, 27 April 2010.

becomes an implemented law, then its effects on Iraqi attitudes and behavior can be measured to show whether there are outcomes for this component as well.

So the overall assessment of project progress is mixed. SDE-Iraq seems to have outcomes with impact for entrepreneurship; it would likely have such outcomes for vocational training by mid-2011; and such outcomes may be possible over a similar period for the national employment policy. Given this pattern, it seems reasonable to conclude that "the progress glass is more than half-full." And while benefits of such achievements have <u>not</u> accrued equally to men and women, it also seems that project efforts are helping to narrow the "gender gap" by encouraging women to become entrepreneurs, offering more (and better) courses for women in vocational training, and promoting a more equable and inclusive national employment policy.

In the views of representatives for ILO's traditional tripartite partners in Iraq, the project has built capacities by helping to develop a more integrated national policy for employment. Another benefit of SDE-Iraq Project cited most often (by 11/26 of interviewees in Iraq) is how it has helped to educate the government, employers, and unions about global trends in marketing and labor. Members of the IFI also mentioned how activities by ILO (in general) and those of the project (in particular) have aided the federation in registering more than 3,000 informal economic firms or activities, strengthening the federation internally, and helping it to furnish ideas and even language for Iraq's current labor law. SDE-Iraq in addition seems to have contributed toward ILO's global strategies via such actions as working for better gender equality, poverty reduction, and labor standards. A major test seems likely for its promotion of "social dialogue" (i.e., dialogue among the government, employers' association, and workers' association to establish labor policy) once the recent election results are clear and a new government is formed.

With regard to UN collaboration, probably the most effective example has been within the project via the cooperation/complementary expertise shown by ILO and UNOPS. For example, when SDE-Iraq wanted to help Iraqi VTCs procure, install, and maintain equipment for vocational training in auto repair, UNOPS experience with procurement helped MOLSA develop standards and protocols for judging competing bids and writing contracts. In turn, this has enabled the ministry to become a more discerning and effective partner in implementing this project and in acquiring/sharing knowledge about international procurement practices.

Regarding alternative strategies and whether any might have been more effective in pursuing project objectives/outcomes, more will be said in discussing management arrangements. Similar remarks apply to discussing how efficient and effective the project has been in reporting and communicating its results and how the project may achieve more within the time and budget remaining before July 2010.

SDE-Iraq's ministry partners – and particularly MOLSA – have been enthusiastic collaborators with regard to all three of its objectives. This is probably why almost all (8/9) of government representatives in Iraq remarked that the project should somehow continue after ITF funding ends in July, to sustain the activities begun and outcomes achieved and then to go beyond them to other issues (such as administering the labor law or addressing the apparently new situation of low-wage Asian workers in Iraq). This attitude of collegiality and partnership with the project may also underlie the most common complaint that they expressed about it: more than a third (9/26) of interviewees claimed that project members had promised more at workshops and trainings than had actually been delivered. That is, partners complained not about what SDE-Iraq had done, or was trying to do, but about what it allegedly had said and then not done – such as providing more training materials or business games for KAB training. In turn, it should be noted that the almost five-fold expansion of entrepreneurial training used up the funds originally planned for this activity and more (please see the discussion of "remote programming" below).

Finally, **security has probably been the major factor affecting implementation , though the latter is outside project control.** Holding the election, and the respectable voter turnout it produced, may be encouraging signs that security will improve over the long term; however, current complaints about vote counting and how results have been reported show that such progress is not guaranteed. Under such conditions, the project's approach of building on results it apparently has already achieved in entrepreneurship, and seems likely to achieve in vocational training, is the most prudent strategy for it to follow.

C. Efficiency of Resource Use.

SDE-Iraq has allocated its various resources strategically to achieve outcomes. For example, project managers (and especially the CTA) saw both trainee and government interest in the KAB materials and training, so they put pursuing the entrepreneurship objective/outcome on a fast track. KAB was adapted for the Iraqi context and pilot-tested with 22 institutions in 2008-09. The apparently successful outcome of the pilot led to an almost five-fold expansion of the initiative over the following school year. Meanwhile, activities for improving vocational training and developing the national employment policy proceeded at a more deliberate pace.

Partly because of this strategic use of resources, the project has progressed efficiently. As of January 2010, with just a little over 20% of project duration remaining, SDE-Iraq still had about $1.4 million remaining in its budget, almost 30% of the total amount originally allocated.[30] This remainder could be helpful for further analysis of KAB results and for pursuing outcomes still to be produced (such as in vocational training). Such strategic and efficient use of resources are especially remarkable, given that many project activities have had to be held outside Iraq for security reasons and despite the greater cost which that has entailed.

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[30] Record of the Iraq Programme Review Meeting, Beirut, 21 January 2010, p. 1.

Security concerns also have markedly influenced the timeliness of delivery for project funds and activities. Delivery speed is often a concern for development projects, and those administered by UN agencies and offices are not an exception. For expenses paid in Iraq, funds must be delivered to an agent in Jordan, who carries them into Iraq, pays, gets receipt of payment, and returns that to Jordan, all of which tends to slow down the process and makes it more complex to manage [31] Such are the perhaps unavoidable costs in time (and money) required to preserve accountability and transparency of financial requests and disbursements under current conditions in Iraq.

D. Effectiveness of Management Arrangements.

Management capacities in SDE-Iraq are generally adequate and sometimes inspired. **Discussions above have highlighted the "symbiotic" cooperation between ILO and UNOPS in the PMU**. This collaboration adds value to project operations by combining technical expertise about employment, vocational training, and entrepreneurship with logistical expertise concerning financial and administrative systems that work on the ground in Iraq.

"Remote programming" of activities in Iraq from an office in Amman (supported by other offices in Beirut and Geneva) is working: it provides better security for project personnel in Jordan (and perhaps also for allied government officials, employers, trade unionists, academics, trainers, and trainees in Iraq). **But there are tradeoffs**. Planning and/or implementing activities in Jordan is three-to-four times more costly than performing those tasks within Iraq.[32] And remote programming also takes more time: rather than being able to contact individuals directly, the CTA must work through one or more intermediaries. One of these is usually the National Program Coordinator, based in Baghdad, who is a key (often <u>the</u> key) junction through which information and related project resources enter/leave Iraq. Another set of intermediaries is the membership of the project's Steering Committee (SC). This committee has generally played a facilitative role in guiding project activities toward cooperative, capable individuals and institutions inside Iraq. The SC meets quarterly in Baghdad or Amman, is headed by a Deputy Minister of MOLSA, and all its members are affiliated with that agency. **The committee has also been effective in helping to interpret and modify parts of the Project Document judged premature or inapplicable in Iraq**. For example, in November 2007, the SC helped to modify project output 1.1, "facilities of 10 Vocational Training Centres (VTCs) enhanced:"[33] the committee decided to rehabilitate the VTCs using its own budget, thus allowing the project to focus on providing equipment only to the centers. The committee also decided that establishing a Training Needs and Labor Marketing Information System (TN&LMIS) that would support the

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[31] Interview with A. Qureshi (Chief, Regional Administrative Services) and G. Harmoush (Finance Verifier), ILO-ROAS, 1 March 2010.
[32] Ibid.
[33] LogFrame, p. 10.

NEP via a database of on-the-job training/apprenticeship opportunities was premature for a country where the electrical system functions sporadically and often for only a few hours per day. The SC also decided that putting together "tool kits" and grants for establishing small businesses was not practical for Iraq's current situation; instead, the funding was reallocated to providing additional materials for expansion of entrepreneurial training. Thus, with regard to all three sectors of project activity, the SC has been active.

Communication seems generally good between project partners inside Iraq and the PMU office. Access by internet or telephone is easily available (except in special cases), and two flights a day link Amman and Baghdad. Communications between the PMU and ILO-ROAS in Beirut, or ILO-HQ in Geneva, is also facilitated by modern media and sometimes personal visits. **Yet the heavy workload in Beirut, which is responsible for activities in all states of the Arab Mashriq, sometimes impacts on its responsiveness. And the orderly, bureaucratic world of Geneva seems far from the frequent turmoil of Baghdad**. Perhaps these factors, plus the desire to get something going on the ground in Iraq, contributed to supervision and support that did not recognize key signals – such as the absence of a project Monitoring Plan or lapses in project reporting and communicating about outcomes of its activities.

In fact, despite attention to gender issues in all parts of its three-fold approach, SDE-Iraq's main problem seems to be how it understood, analyzed, monitored, reported, and communicated about its accomplishments. **The monitoring and evaluation (m&e) system manifested in project technical and progress reports is SDE-Iraq's biggest problem**. This system should be re-thought, and its application revised, so that the project presents a more accurate picture of what it has accomplished and is achieving. For example, SDE-Iraq has demonstrated apparent changes in attitude about entrepreneurship after training with KAB materials and methods adapted by its Iraqi national partners to the national context. Yet the questionnaire used to reveal these changes has 40 questions, and the project has analyzed results from only four of them. Potentially, ten times more information is available about trainee attitudes from data the project already has. Furthermore, so far the project has looked only at changes in "top line" results, those coming from pooling all the trainees together to see how overall results changed over time. **Yet the project already has standard demographic data (gender, age, name and type of training institution, etc.), and it can reanalyze how results are distributed over those demographic categories**. That is, it can show whether women trainees changed attitudes after training more, less, or the same as men. It can illuminate whether changes in attitude are more, less, or the same across all the training institutions, or in all the regions/locations, where the KAB training has been evaluated. In short, the project can understand and report a lot more about what it has accomplished by analyzing better the information it already has. In turn, that improved understanding and reporting may help SDE-Iraq target its inputs, activities, and outputs more effectively and produce even better outcomes.

While illuminating this project problem is important, it also is important to clarify what the problem is not. **The problem is one of understanding, reporting, and perhaps supervision; it is <u>not</u> a problem of doing**. Indeed, the project seems to have done admirably on the ground in Iraq, and project staff and partners there perhaps see that because they do not depend on an M&E system (or at least the project's official technical and progress report system) to know that. But people not on the ground in Iraq (e.g., donors) <u>do</u> rely on that system, so they may get an inaccurate, insufficient picture of project accomplishments. This is something that should be changed, and it probably will not be hard to do it.

Finally, SDE-Iraq is one part of a larger ILO/UNOPS unit that also includes two other projects (Technical Vocational Education and Training and Local Area Development Programme). According to the overall CTA/Team Leader, **the staff of these projects work together flexibly, focusing more on common or overlapping program functions than on project structures**. For example, they work as a team in budget planning and in use of consultants, and they coordinate their collaboration via weekly meetings at the building holding all projects of the larger PMU. This arrangement seems effective for dealing with operations in Iraq and could provide a useful model for other collaborative projects. **SDE-Iraq has also stayed in touch with other ILO or UN projects in Jordan by enabling both the CTA and Deputy CTA to participate in outside workgroup meetings**. For example, the CTA is Chair of a UN working group that meets regularly to discuss and cooperate on education. This networking may build synergies of effort and increase the effectiveness of all participants and their respective organizations.

E. Project Impact Orientation and Sustainability

This report has already discussed the **apparent changes in attitude and capacities produced by SDE-Iraq work for entrepreneurship**. Implicit in that discussion, but to be highlighted here, are associated changes in institutions: both MOLSA and MOE now have in-house experts specialized in training for KAB and related topics. This in-house expertise is being drawn upon in strengthening the vocational-training component of the project. Although actual outcomes are still distant with regard to developing a national policy for employment, there too the years of capacity development through training and conducting background studies have laid the foundation for further work in this area. These achievements have high potential for becoming durable changes for the better in Iraq, partly because the people and institutions involved are anxious and willing to work hard to continue them.

That does not mean that the project can now fly on auto-pilot. There is still work to be done, and most of it demands attention and insight. The easiest task will be to carry out the post-training evaluations of adapted KAB training and materials at the 105 institutions where they are being

used this school year. These results hopefully will confirm, deepen, and enrich those concerning attitude changes about entrepreneurship revealed by the pilot implementation last school year. The next-more-advanced step should be to examine the results for all 40 items of the evaluation questionnaire to see if all (or some set) of them show similar patterns of change. Subsequently, changes in attitude among the 2,100 trainees can be analyzed to correlate with their genders, ages, types of training institution, and location of training institution. Similar steps can be taken to analyze the 2008-09 trainee data, and results for the 22 locations where the training occurred in both years can be compared to show any changes over time. Then the project will have a much more detailed and comprehensive picture of what it has accomplished with regard to entrepreneurship in Iraq.

That, in turn, will also give SDE-Iraq a good guide toward understanding, measuring, reporting, and communicating about what it has done for vocational training. Concerning that part of its mandate, the project is helping to develop materials and techniques whose pilot implementation is now scheduled to be completed by mid-August 2011. Accordingly, a good use for any budget remaining after July might be sustaining that effort to learn whether (and if so, how much) the new courses will lead to enhance the skills and employability of the trainees..   It is to be noted that **none of the tasks recommended for the entrepreneurship component entail a large commitment from staff, budget, or time. All tasks related to this component can be completed before or shortly after July 2010**. This would in turn   enrich project accomplishments as well as strengthen its chances for gaining any "Phase 2" support.

If SDE-Iraq has the actual and potential outcomes that now seem likely, what impact[34] will that have for broader and more long-term development of the country? "Appreciable" seems the appropriate answer: **entrepreneurship and vocational training of the sort discussed in this report prepare citizens for occupations that get (or keep) them out of poverty and into the jobs advocated globally by the ILO**. **An effective national policy for employment would connect training programs with actual needs in the emerging labor market**. If all these project efforts lead to successful outcomes, then it seems both accurate and fair to say that the project has had important development impact.

As discussed earlier, **SDE-Iraq has built an ardent core of national partners in government, employers' and workers' organizations, and elsewhere**. However, about a third (8/26) of them express concern that work begun by the project will not be sustained if the project itself stops operating in July. Some of those partners are associated with the vocational-training component, which is poised for a breakthrough performance when new training modules are piloted in early 2011. Yet many of those helping to develop the national employment policy also

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[34]   The term "impact" here means the magnitude and/or intensity of an outcome in development. For example, multiplying almost five-fold the number of institutions where the adapted KAB module is used in Iraq seems to be an outcome with respectable impact.

recognize that theirs is a long-term process, with many steps to follow submission of their proposal to the NCE, hopefully this year. **Perhaps only the entrepreneurship component of the overall project mandate is sufficiently developed so as to continue even without project support**.

One way the project can facilitate continuation of its approach and the results apparently obtained by it is by highlighting – during the period which remains – program and/or geographic areas that deserve further attention. For example, both the entrepreneurial and vocational training components have established contacts with students who completed training courses and either changed (or seem likely to change) their attitudes and/or behavior because of it. An obvious follow-up would be to maintain the contacts and learn who in fact started businesses or got jobs. This could be done at regular intervals (say, 3 months after training and then 6 months after that) when training "graduates" could explain their current employment status, say whether their training was in fact helpful, talk about what might improve their status and/or the training etc. This follow-up information could supplement the evaluation data already obtained and analyzed, showing how long the changed attitudes and/or behavior lasted and how often they led to actual changes in employment.[35]

Another way that project initiatives might be continued is by focusing them on geographic areas where Phase 1 work should be supplemented. For example, SDE-Iraq seems to have been most effective in Baghdad and the south (including Basra), so additional efforts might focus on extending project activities to the central and northern areas of the country. Some work has already been done in this direction – for example, the adapted KAB module was translated into Kurdish and seems to be well received. However more work in these geographic areas is needed.

The evaluation has found <u>no</u> obviously negative effects, unexpected, unintended, or otherwise stemming from the project's interventions. Concerns expressed by some about the possible end of SDE-Iraq efforts in July 2010, however, suggest that a certain "withdrawal" effect may ensue, especially if the project's activities end abruptly. Important initiatives are underway with the vocational training and employment policy components, so support should be sought to carry at least those efforts to term.

Finally, as the prior discussions have indicated, there seem to be some relatively simple and productive ways in which the reporting, communication, and supervision concerns about SDE-Iraq can be fixed. When that is accomplished, the project's apparent success with the entrepreneurship component, its likely success with the vocational training one, and the possible success of the national employment component would all call for a Phase 2 of this project. That

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[35] The former Training for Rural Employment and Empowerment (TREE) projects in Pakistan and the Philippines illustrated this kind of follow-up. See, for example, ILO Evaluation Summaries, RAS0255USA_EvalSumm_2007 at www.ilo.org.

phase could usefully add follow-up support investigating actual employment status, and a geographic focus on areas of the center and north, to its current portfolio of activities.

4. Evaluation Conclusions: Lessons Learned, Good Practices, and Recommendations

A. Lessons Learned and Good Practices

A "lesson learned" is any positive or negative insight into administrative or technical matters that had substantial impact on project operations (inputs/activities/outputs), on achieving outcomes, or on sustainability of outcomes.[36] "Good practices" are not simply elements of a project that have met their administrative goals; they are interventions that have performed so well that they should be replicated and/or up-scaled in other UN projects, tool kits, or model interventions.[37]

With that in mind, the following points seem to be the most important lessons learned and good practices by SDE-Iraq:

A good practice that should be highlighted in the SDE-Iraq project is the union of ILO and UNOPS in the PMU. There is a clear division of labour, wherein the ILO assumes the lead technical role, while UNOPS provides the operational and logistical support. ILO holds technical leadership in employment promotion including entrepreneurship development, employment policies and vocational training. UNOPS, on the other hand, provides project support services including procurement of equipment, supplies and goods, implementation of training activities and fellowships, and contracting of consulting firms and contractors for services and works. This union combines the technical strengths of the ILO with the administrative and financial strengths of UNOPS, as has been illustrated in the report above. While UN component organizations seek to make themselves more efficient, cost-effective, and relevant to international concerns and hopes, the ILO/UNOPS model may become a wave of the future.

More attention needs to be paid to projects at the design and inception phase to ensure that M&E plans are in order. Work plans and monitoring plans are standard parts of project design and operation and should be part of the prerequisite documentation at the inception phase of any project.   The baseline, indicators and monitoring plan will determine the "evaluability" of the project for the duration of its activities, therefore taking the time to make sure that the adequate indicators have been established to evaluate project achievement is vital for an accurate tracking of progress. Similarly, investment in staff basic knowledge of M&E is essential to ensure a common understanding of the intervention logic of a project, the importance of project reporting, monitoring and evaluation. In the case of SDE-Iraq, the project seems to have achieved better and more than what appears in its technical and progress reports due to an inadequate monitoring system that did not sufficiently measure and capture project results. This

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[36]   ILO Evaluation Unit, Checklist No. 4 – Formatting Evaluation Reports, March 2010, p. 5.
[37]   Ibid.

explains the discrepancy between project achievement as captured in project reports and stakeholder perception of the project. While the Project recorded weak performance in some components as illustrated in progress reports, people on the ground who were able to see firsthand and judge project activities, had a different perception of project achievements.

B. Recommendations

"Recommendations" are actionable, time-bound suggestions focused on steps to be taken by ILO officials, National Partners, and/or other project stakeholders regarding sustainability, design, and/or implementation.[38]

1. The PMU amd ILO-ROAS should establish an SDE-Iraq monitoring plan that specifies what outcomes are and how they can be measured for each of the three project components – entrepreneurship, vocational training, and policy development. Then they can use the plan to inform project reports, communication, and efforts for sustainability hereafter.

2. The project team should reanalyze the data on changes in attitudes and/or behavior about entrepreneurship resulting from training with the adapted KAB modules in Arabic and Kurdish. Then it can incorporate that information into project reports, planning, and efforts for sustainability.

3. It is important that support continue for the vocational training component of the project. The project team ought to analyze the data for outcomes of the vocational training that will be piloted and completed by August 2011, and incorporate that information into project reports, planning, and efforts for sustainability.

4. The project team and ILO-ROAS needs to follow development of the national policy for employment in Iraq, and assist that process as project resources permit. The development of the national policy for employment will reach a critical juncture when a draft policy is submitted to the NCE, project for later this year. Given project investments so far, it seems prudent to follow developments as this draft is discussed and amended,.

5. ILO-ROAS and ILO-HQ (SKILLS) can profitably advocate for continuation, refinement, and replication of the ILO/UNOPS good-practice model developed for SDE-Iraq.

6. And finally (as part of closing out the current funding for SDE-Iraq), ILO-ROAS can organize a workshop for project members, partners, and supporters. This workshop could have several objectives: first, to present project achievements for entrepreneurship,

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[38] Ibid.

vocational training, and policy development; second, to discuss how such achievements may be reinforced by showing their contributions to actually getting/keeping a job and by focusing efforts on Iraqi regions that have been served only marginally so far; third, to explore funding opportunities for a Phase 2 of the project incorporating these components; and fourth, to establish a clear exit strategy for the project from Iraq.

Appendix 1: ILO Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Independent Interim Evaluation

Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq
Iraq

1. Introduction

The last 25 years of economic and social devastation in Iraq have led to a situation where employment and self-employment opportunities are scarce, while labour market supply does not meet labour market demand. As a result, unemployment and poverty are high. The recently conducted Iraq Household Economic Survey shows that 23% of the Iraq population (nearly 7 million) still falls under the poverty line.

Employment opportunities have been hindered by the legacy of the past administration, where the government was the major employer and controlled virtually all aspects of the economy at the detriment of the private sector. Today, the government continues to provide 35% of all jobs. The security situation in Iraq has further hampered economic activity, particularly private sector development, with colossal implications on entrepreneurship.

The most unemployment statistics for Iraq indicate an unemployment rate of 15%. A further 26% of the labour force works part time. Unemployment is concentrated and rising among the poor, where as many as 25% of the male labour force aged 20-24 is unemployed. Only 18% of Iraqi females participate in the labour force, of which only 42% hold a formal job. Self-employment opportunities, on the other hand, have been scarce in the absence of the private sector and the adequate regulatory environment.

Technical vocational education and training has undergone a sharp decline in the last 15 years, from around 99,000 students enrolled in 1995/1996 to about 59,000 students enrolled in 2005/2006. Women make up less than 20% of student enrolment, with significant gender disparities across subject fields. Enrolment was particularly affected by sanctions, drastically reduced employment opportunities and limited access to modern teaching equipment. This situation grew more severe due to the huge damage of infrastructure after the last war, from

looting, burning of public property and lack of security. This has resulted in a situation where today vocational training (VT) programs no longer respond to labour market demands.

It is against this background that the Skills Development to Support Employment General Project in Iraq was established in 2007 to reform and enhance the Iraqi Vocational Training System under an enhanced national employment policy framework, which promotes employment and self-employment opportunities alike.

2. SDE Key Features

The Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq Project was approved in February 2007 with a total budget of $ 4,963,256. The initial duration of the project was 18 months. It was subsequently extended until September 2009 and then September 2010, in order to complete implementation of some remaining activities. The Project is jointly executed by the ILO and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The operational modality of collaboration is governed by a Letter of Agreement signed between the two UN Agencies, in accordance with the project document and the matrix of roles and responsibilities of the ILO and the UNOPS.

Development Objective: The project will support reconstruction and economic development in Iraq through vocational training, employment policies and entrepreneurship within an integrated active labour market policy framework. It will also contribute to the recommendations and Action Plan of the International Conference on Jobs for the Future of Iraq, to the UNCT Strategy of 2006-2007 and to the MDGs, in particular MDG1, in line with the objectives of the National Development Strategy for 2005/2007.

Immediate Objectives (outcomes) relevant to the ILO component of the UN Joint Project:
Objective 1. Enhance vocational training provision for priority jobs in demand in the labour market
Objective 2. Enhance employment policy making at the national level
Foster self-employment initiatives among Iraqis including young women and men

Outputs:
- Facilities of 10 Vocational Training Centres (VTCs) enhanced
- Staff development programme designed and implemented for at least ten (10) core groups of participants of the Vocational Training Centres (VTCs)
- Framework for training cum-production activities identified, developed and operational.
- A network of MoLSA vocational training providers established
- New modular employment-oriented curricula and training material made available for immediate delivery of short term (up to one year) training programmes.

- Short-term skills development annual courses organised and conducted within MoLSA VTCs for at least 1000 trainees (unemployed and vulnerable groups) in priority occupations.
- Staff development programme designed and implemented for ESCs officers on vocational counseling and guidance
- Private training providers assessed and outsourcing plan for private sector delivery of VT developed
- Database of on-the-job training / apprenticeship opportunities within ESCs enhanced and networked

- National policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation and development designed and introduced to the Inter-ministerial National Committee for Employment (NCE)
- Staff development programme designed and implemented for the technical secretariat and main stakeholders of the NCE
- Framework for national competency standards and certification scheme introduced for short-term (up to one year) skills training, including continuous training and retraining
- Training Needs and Labour Market Information System (TN&LMIS) developed and capacities enhanced for its update and maintenance

- Awareness raised among Iraqi men and women towards the creation of an enterprise culture in the Iraqi society
- Basic entrepreneurship skills enhanced within the unemployed and positive attitudes developed towards self-employment as a career option
- Selected and willing registered unemployed receive enterprise start-up and basic business management training
- Staff development training developed and implemented on entrepreneurship development and mentoring for ESCs staff
- Tool kits designed and provided to MoLSA as part of its enterprise-grants scheme or similar programmes

Project partners
The Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA);
The inter-ministerial National Committee for Employment (NCE);
The Employment Service and Vocational Training Centres;
Social partners;
United Nations Office for Projects Services;
ILO International Training Centre.

Project management arrangements

The ILO and UNOPS work under a joint execution modality. A Programme Management Unit (PMU) was established in Amman for the implementation of the project. ILO assumes the lead technical role, while UNOPS provides the operational and logistical support. ILO holds technical leadership in employment promotion including entrepreneurship development, employment policies and vocational training. UNOPS provides project support services such as procurement of equipment, supplies and goods, implementation of training activities and fellowships, contracting of consulting firms and contractors for services and works. The evaluation therefore should not be limited to the ILO administered portion of the budget, but to the ILO/UNOPS component of the project, that is led technically by ILO.

The ILO/UNOPS Programme Management Unit meets on a monthly basis to review progress and plan ahead, while senior level Programme Progress Review meetings takes place on a quarterly basis either in Amman or in Beirut, bringing together ILO regional and UNOPS managements to discuss and monitor progress.

The Project's Chief Technical Advisor assumes the full responsibility for the provision of technical inputs, day-to-day monitoring and backstopping of the project. The UNOPS Operations' Specialist acts as deputy CTA and has primary responsibility over the logistical arrangements.   Regular quarterly review meetings are held between ILO and UNOPS programming and Operational Units to ensure appropriate supervision of project implementation. Close consultation, collaboration, and information sharing regularly takes place to ensure prompt and successful implementation of the activities of the project.

The project team is composed of a Chief Technical Advisor based in Amman, and an international Economic Advisor (Employment Policies and services) who holds primary responsibility over the implementation of objective 2 of the programme. In particular, the Economic Advisor is responsible for monitoring economic developments and their impact on employment; devising appropriate employment and labour market policies/strategies to feed up to the NCE, conduct studies and assessments and provide training. A national project coordinator based in Baghdad has primary responsibility for following up the day-to-day project implementation under the guidance of the above international experts, with the national stakeholders in Baghdad. Ad-hoc national and international short term consultants and external collaborators, who were either seconded from the ILO, and or recruited during the implementation of the project. The CTA's office is located within the UNOPS Compound in Amman. Travel to Iraq on average took place at least once every four to five months.

The project is assisted, administratively and financially by an Admin and Finance Assistant, financed by the UNDG ITF Technical Vocational Education Training project. UNOPS takes the lead in procurement and other administrative issues, including security and logistical issues

related to the transfer/travel of Iraqi stakeholders and beneficiaries from Iraq to places of implementation of activities in neighbouring countries. UNOPS support staff includes the Deputy CTA, UNOPS.

The project is backstopped by the Iraq Desk Officer, based at the Regional Programming Services Unit at the Regional Office for Arab States in Beirut. Technical backstopping was provided by the ILO Regional Office specifically the SMEs and Skills specialists, ILO HQ respective technical unit, and ILO international Training Centre in the planning, administration, monitoring and backstopping of the activities and inputs of the project. Additional administrative support was provided by the Regional Admin/Finance unit.

The SDE project adopted both, direct and indirect approaches in and outside Iraq to monitor the project's implementation. Inside Iraq, the project worked through the:
- ILO national coordinator, alongside CTA visits as cleared by UNAMI;
- Project National Steering committee: A Steering Committee was set up, headed by the Deputy Minister with representatives from MOLSA directors. This Committee is jointly responsible with the project's team in setting the implementation strategy, and facilitating the implementation of the project's activities inside Iraq.
- MOLSA and NCE assisted and guided the project management and supported the production of outputs through their participation to the Project Steering committee which guided the activities of the project. The SC meets on quarterly basis in either Baghdad or Amman to define the general project planning and strategic management, and play a key role in advocacy and implementation of policies which are developed and incorporated into the VET and Employment system in Iraq.

3. Background and project context
The project acts on the recommendations of the International Employment Conference, "Jobs for the Future of Iraq," held in Amman, Jordan in December 2004. The project has been designed in response to the specific request of Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) to reinforce the governance, relevance and quality of the vocational training system in Iraq.

This programme emanates from the pre-2008 Cluster system: Cluster B, Education and Culture, falling under Cluster Outcome 2.1 "Universal and Equitable Participation and Completion of Quality Education," Output 6 "Technical and Vocational Education Revitalized for employment creation." Currently, SDE falls under the Education Sector. It addresses UNCT Goal 2 of the 2006/2007 Strategy for Iraq which aims at "assisting in the provision of basic services and promoting community development and participation." The focus of SDE is also in line with the present UNCT strategy for Iraq, where employment has been identified as a cross-cutting issue in the UN Development Assistance Framework for Iraq 2010-2014.

The project is contributing, in the long term to MDG1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, by devising a more inclusive employment policy, rebuilding the vocational training sector, and promoting an entrepreneurship culture. This in turn will permit the un-employed and other most vulnerable target groups to learn employable skills in order to secure decent and sustainable employment.

The project assists the Iraqi government through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the National Committee for Employment to achieve the National Development Strategy goal of reducing the unemployment rate from 18% to 9% and to increase the labour force participation of women to 35% by building the capacities of both MOLSA and the NCE. The Project is also working to strengthen social dialogues process among the social partners (Government, employers' and workers' organizations) and to have a national employment policy which addresses the unemployment issue especially for youth and women. In parallel, the project is developing a vocational training programme to be demand driven based on labour market needs and expansion of the vocational training opportunities for women. Furthermore, the The project introduces the entrepreneurship skills through the adaptation of the two ILO manuals: Know About Business (KAB), and Start & Improve Your Business (SIyB). KAB manual was adapted to the Iraqi culture in both Arabic and Kurdish.

Even though funds were received in May 2007, the project did not effectively begin until the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) was recruited in September 2007. The UNOPS Operations Specialist responsible for procurement and administration was recruited toward the end of 2007. Instability and insecurity, particularly in the central and southern parts of the country that is under Security Phase IV conditions, heavily impacted the operational modalities of implementation. Physical access to areas outside of Baghdad and Erbil UN compounds for UN recruited personnel was extremely problematic, with the exception of the Kurdistan region. Access to areas outside the UN compounds was restricted to sites considered secure.

For staff based outside of Iraq, including the CTA for this project, missions to Iraq were constrained by the limited slots of missions cleared by UNAMI. Continued insecurity further undermined the ability of national personnel and stakeholders to move across regions and in and out of the country, also constraining the steady progress of execution.

This has led the project to rely more heavily on local partners for service provision, as described in the management arrangements section, while maintaining "remote programming" from the ILO-Iraq office in Amman and the ILO Regional Office for Arab States in Beirut.

4. Rationale for the independent evaluation
The evaluation of this project will be conducted as part of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund (ITF) Steering Committee evaluation process. UNDG ITF has

launched an evaluation process for select projects and programmes funded by the ITF, where at least one project from each agency has been chosen for the evaluation process. Even though this project will not be completed until July 2010, it has been selected for evaluation. The evaluation process will therefore keep in mind that this is an interim, and not a final evaluation. The purpose of the evaluation is to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative, aiding in the design of future programmes and similar engagements.

While seeking to meet UNDG ITF evaluation criteria in as much as possible, this independent evaluation will be undertaken in line with ILO policies and procedures on evaluations. It will be conducted by an external evaluation team and managed by the ILO Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS), as described in the sections below.

5. Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to:
- Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- Determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- Document lessons learned success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;
- Examine joint programming management model mainly the coordination between ILO and UNOPS to achieve the common pre-set objectives of the project.

Scope
The evaluation will look at the project duration so far and at all activities implemented until present. As this is not the final evaluation and the project will not be completed until July 2010, the evaluation will take stock of planned activities and any needed adjustments in the remaining duration of the project for successful achievement of results.   The evaluation will take specific note of the role of ILO constituents in the implementation of the project, as well as the integration of the gender dimension and human rights based approach.

In particular the evaluation will evaluate the quality and impact of project activities on the target groups, including:
- Development effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention's objectives and intended results were achieved;
- Resource Efficiency: The extent with which resources were economically converted into results, including mention of alternative more cost-effective strategies when applicable;

- Impact: Positive and negative, intended and unintended long-term effects;
- Relevance: The extent to which the development intervention meets beneficiary requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies;
- Sustainability: The continuation of benefits and probability of continued long-term benefits after the project has been completed.
- Partnerships: The extent to which the project contributed to capacity development of the involved partners, the effectiveness of partnership development and implications on national ownership and project continuity/sustainability;
- Lessons learned and good practice: Good practices identified by the project, key lessons learned from programme implementation, and recommendations for similar programmes/projects.

Clients of Evaluation

The primary client for this evaluation is the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), Iraq Trust Fund (ITF), who will draw on this evaluation to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative, intended to aid in the design of future programmes and similar engagements. Other primary clients include ILO ROAS, ILO constituents, donors, the project management team (UNOPS and ILO Iraq team), and local and national partners listed above. Secondary clients include ILO HQ technical departments (SKILLS, CODEV, EVAL, ITC TURIN).

6. Suggested Analytical Framework

6.1 Relevance and strategic fit

- How is the project contributing to national priorities as identified in the Iraq National Development Strategy (NDS), the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the Millennium Development Goals?
- To what extend does the project respond to the UNDG ITF programs developed to support the national priorities of the Government of Iraq?
- Does the project respond to the real needs of the different beneficiary groups, including men, women, children, youth and marginalized population groups?
- Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground?
- How well does the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address employment issues and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? Does the project's original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions have not addressed?

6.2. Validity of the design

- What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established? Was a gender analysis carried out?
- Does the project document take into account the gendered nature of employment, describing the project's strategy to address these in design and implementation?
- Is the intervention logic coherent and realistic? Do outputs causally link to outcomes, which in turn contribute to the broader development objective of the project?
- Do the main strategic components of the project contribute and logically link to the planned objectives? Are they too wide in scope or do they link well to one another? What impact does the latter have on the project's "evaluability?"
- Are the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)? Is the time frame for programme implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic?
- Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Where the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- Who are the main partners of this project? How strategic have they been partners in terms of influence, capacities and commitment?
- On which risks and assumptions does the project build? How crucial are they for the success of the project?
- How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- On which risks and assumptions does the project logic build? How crucial are they to the success of the project?
- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes how? Was the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?

6.3. Project progress and effectiveness

- Is the project making sufficient progress towards its its planned outputs and activities? Is the project likely to achieve its planned objectives upon completion?
- Have the quantity and quality of outputs produced so far been satisfactory? Do the benefits accrue equally to men and women?
- Which components of the project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? How can the project build or expand on these achievements?
- In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- Is the project developing and building the capacities of national partners and tripartite constituents in developing an integrated active labour market policy framework in Iraq?

How effective has the project been in establishing national ownership? Has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs of the national constituents and changing partner priorities?

- How effective was the collaboration with other Participating UN Organization and what has been the added value of this collaboration?
- What alternatives strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- Has the project approach produced demonstrated success so far? In which areas does the project have the greatest and least achievements? Why is this and what have been the supporting/constraining factors? How can the project expand on its achievements, while resolving bottlenecks? How can this be achieved in the remaining period of the project until it is completed in July 2010?
- How efficient has the project been in communicating its results, disseminating success stories and enhancing visibility?
- How effective are activities implemented by partner institutions and their contribution to the immediate objectives of the project? What are some of the lessons learned from these partnerships?
- How are factors outside of the control of the project affecting project implementation and project objectives and how is the project dealing with these external factors? How realistic were the risks and assumptions that the project built upon?

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6.4. Efficiency of resource use

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- Have resources been used efficiently? Has the implementation of activities been cost-effective? Will the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results have been attained with fewer resources?
- Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner? Were there any major delays? What were the reasons, and how did the project deal with this delay in work plan?

6.5 Effectiveness of management arrangements
- Are management capacities adequate? b. Does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Is there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between UNOPS and the ILO? What is the value-added of this collaboration and has it been successful?
- Given the security situation inside Iraq, is "remote programming" working? What are the challenges and how is it affecting the effectiveness of project management and relations

with national partners and key stakeholders? Is the project adequately addressing these challenges?

- Does the Project's national Steering Committee have a good grasp of the project strategy? How are they contributing to the success of the project?
- How effective is communication between the project team inside Iraq, the "remote office" in Amman, the ILO Regional Office for Arab States and the relevant HQ departments? Does the project receive adequate technical, programmatic, administrative and financial backstopping and support from the latter?
- Has relevant gender expertise been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized? g. How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been? Is relevant data systematically being collected and analyzed to feed into management decisions?
- h. Has the project made strategic use of coordination and collaboration with other ILO projects and with other donors in Iraq to ensure synergies and increase effectiveness and impact?

6.6. Impact orientation and sustainability

- What observed changes in attitudes, capacities and institutions etc. can be causally linked to the project's interventions? Are these results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? What remaining achievements are projected before the completion of the project?
- To what extent is the project making a significant contribution to broader and longer – term development impact? Is the project strategy and management steering towards impact?
- What are the realistic long-term effects of the project on the poverty level and decent work conditions in Iraq?
- How effectively has the project built necessary capacity of local authorities and community level organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor an integrated active labour market policy framework for Iraq?
- How effective and realistic is the project's exit strategy? Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Is the project gradually being handed over to the national partners? Are national partners able and willing to continue with the project? Are resulted anchored in national institutions and can the partner maintain them financially at end of project?
- Can the project approach or results be replicated or scaled up by national partners and cover other Iraqi areas? What can the project do to support their replication and scaling up in its remaining duration period?

- Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project's interventions? How can the project strategy be adjusted to minimize negative effects for the remaining duration of the project?
- Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?

7. Methodology/Approaches to Evaluation

The evaluation will be conducted by an evaluation team including one international evaluator, who will serve as team leader, and two national evaluators based in Iraq. The team leader will be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. This will need to be approved by the evaluation manager.

The project team based in Amman and ILO ROAS will be responsible for providing all logistical support to facilitate the evaluation process. The evaluation will be carried out using a desk review, field visits to project sites for consultations with project staff and project partners and beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. Upon completion, the Evaluation Team Leader will conduct a stakeholder workshop for the dissemination of initial findings. Due to security constraints it is envisaged that selected stakeholder consultation processes may take place outside Iraq.

While the evaluation will be strictly external and independent in nature, the evaluation will seek to be participatory to the extent possible, engaging project management, partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The evaluation will include but will not be restricted to:
- A desk review conducted in home-country of project documents and materials provided by the evaluation manager to the evaluation consultant;
- Presentations /inductions with available project staff and key stakeholders and partners to the project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation(depending on staff and key stakeholder security and mobility the evaluation team could repeat this presentation in several locations);
- Key interviews with project staff (ILO and UNOPS), project partners, and key project stakeholders;
- Phone Interviews with ILO HQ, and meetings with relevant focal points in the ILO Regional Office for Arab States and ILO office in Amman ;
- Presentation of findings and recommendations to selected stakeholders and partners upon completion of the Evaluation Report.

8. Deliverables

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluation consultant are:
- A desk review;

- An evaluation plan (including instruments and methodology) prepared by the evaluation team;
- Stakeholder workshops facilitated by the evaluation team;
- Draft evaluation report including stakeholder workshop proceedings and findings from field visits by evaluation team;
- Final Report including:
- Executive Summary;
- Clearly identified findings;
- Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations;
- Lessons learned and potential good practices and effective models of intervention
- drafted in user-friendly language for publication and circulation to wide audiences;
- Appropriate Annexes including present TORs;
- Standard evaluation instrument matrix.

Sample structure and table of contents of the Evaluation l Report[39]:
- Cover page with key project and evaluation data
- Abstract (3-5 pages according to ILO Evaluation Summary template)
- Brief background of the project and its logic
- Purpose, scope and clients of evaluation
- Methodology employed
- Review of implementation
- Findings regarding project performance
- Conclusions
- Recommendations (including tracking table with relevant follow-up responsibilities)
- Lessons learned
- Summary of potential areas for further investigation and implications for global/regional strategies
- Annexes, including TORs, persons contacted etc.

The final report will be circulated to key stakeholders (those participants present at stakeholder evaluation workshop will be considered key stakeholders) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the evaluation manager at the Regional Office for Arab States and provided to the team leader. In preparing the final report the team leader should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

9. Management arrangements, work plan and timeframe

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[39] The template will be provided by the M&E officer in the ROAS.

The evaluation will be managed by the Regional Programming Services monitoring and evaluation office at ROAS Beirut. The evaluator will have to report exclusively to the evaluation manager.

Evaluation Team and responsibilities

The final evaluation mission will be comprised of one international evaluator, the Evaluation Team Leader (ETL), who will be contracted by the ILO and two national evaluators.

The ETL is responsible for conducting the final evaluation, as per the terms of reference. The appointed consultant shall:

- Review the TOR and provide input, as necessary;
- Review project documents and materials;
- Develop the evaluation methodology, instruments and plan;
- Undertake as agreed in the preliminary work plan mission to Jordan and Iraq if possible or follow up and mentor notional assistants recruited for this mission;
- Conduct preparatory briefings with ILO, UNOPS, UNDP national programme coordinator, the UNDG ITF M&E unit other relevant UN staff for the Participating UN Organization;
- Conduct debriefing on findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the evaluation with Key stakeholders ;
- Draft evaluation report and finalize it based on comments from the stakeholders.

The National evaluators (NE) will be required to:

- Review the project document and the Final Evaluation Terms of Reference in order to become fully familiar with the strategy and objectives of the project;
- Accompany the Evaluation Team Leader on all meetings when needed and conduct meetings as per assignment from the ETL according to the evaluation schedule ;
- Provide national / local perspectives in the evaluation process;
- In consultation with the ETL , the national consultant should support and facilitate stakeholder workshop in the field (including presentation in local language and report of the workshop in English);
- Assist in the formulation of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the mission; and
- Provide inputs to the draft report in consultation with the ETL.

The Evaluation manager (EM) is responsible for:

- Drafting the final evaluation TOR;
- Finalizing and approving the TOR with input from the stakeholders and the evaluators
- Ensuring proper stakeholder involvement;

- Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission;
- Assist in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings;
- Circulate draft and final report to stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments of the evaluation report;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation;
- Ensure follow- up to the evaluation recommendations.

The ILO backstopping officer in Beirut, the SKILLS in Amman are responsible for:
- Reviewing the TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials and information;
- Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission;
- Providing logistical and practical support, as needed;
- Coordinating exchanges of comments of the evaluation team with the partners during the evaluation;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the draft evaluation report.

Estimated duration

The expected starting date of the evaluation is 15 February 2010. The latest expected submission of the final report date is 1 April 2010. The dissemination of the results will take place in the first two weeks of April 2010.

The timetable and schedule is as follows:

Responsible person	Tasks	Timeline
ETL	Distance briefings (with evaluation manager, project team, etc) and desk review of project documents. Submission of evaluation methodology and instruments based on desk review	TBD
ETL and NEs , with the project staff logistical support.	1 day briefing and meetings in Amman 1 day briefing and meetings in Beirut Evaluation mission to Iraq 1 day debriefing workshop/meetings in each area	TBD
ETL	Drafting report	TBD

EM	Circulate draft report to key stakeholders Consolidate comments of stakeholders and send to team leader	TBD
ETL	Integration of comments and finalization of the report.	TBD

10. Qualifications

International evaluation consultant:

- Relevant background in employment and skills development in post-conflict settings;
- At least 10 years experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects; Experience in evaluations in the UN system, preferably as team leader;
- Relevant regional experience preferably prior work experience in Iraq or with Iraqis;
- Fluency in spoken and written English and strong editorial skills in English are necessary, knowledge of Arabic/Kurdish would be appreciated;
- Experience in facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

National evaluation consultant:

- Relevant background in social and/or economic development;
- Experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects, in particular with local development projects;
- Technical knowledge of local economic development or agricultural development projects;
- Fluency in Arabic / Kurdish if covering North Iraq and English;
- Experience facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

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Appendix 2a: Interviewees inside Iraq[40]

No.	Name, SURNAME	Institution	Title	Date	Location
1.	Aziz Ibrahim Khalil	MOLSA	Director of Labor & Vocational Training Department	March 1	Baghdad
2.	Bassim Abdul Hassan Allami	MOHE	KAB Trainer in Administration Institute	March 2	" (joint with 3)
3.	Kareem Aboud Hamza	MOLSA	In charge of KAB at vocational education	"	" (joint with 2)
4.	Mushref Abdulkaleq Flayyih	"	KAB Trainer, in charge of the KAB unit	"	" (joint with 5)
5.	Mohammed Ahmed Abdullah	"	In charge of the Unit responsible for training the KAB trainers	"	" (joint with 4)
6.	Abed Suhoud	"	Deputy Chief Engineer. Supervises the design of CBT-based syllabi	"	" (joint with 7)
7.	Sadeq Khazal	"	In charge of the CBT-based syllabi unit	"	" (joint with 6)
8.	Najam al-Deen abdul al-Maqsood Ali	"	Director of Vocational Training, Rassafa 2, Rashaad area	"	" (joint with 9, 10)
9.	Raad Sadiq al-Fattal	"	Director of al-Mutassim Center (vocational training)	"	"(joint with 8, 10)
10.	Dr. Subhi Abdulsattar Hassan	"	director of the Iraqi-Korean center	"	" (joint with 8, 9)
11.	Zozik Ahmed	MOE	Engineer in vocational training	March 8	Dihuk (by Yahoo Messenger)
12.	Dr. Mudhafar Hosni	MOHE	College of Economics and Business Management, al-Mustansiraya University	March 9	Baghdad
13.	Dr. Adnan Mustapha	"	Baghdad University	"	"(joint with 14)
14.	Behnam Eliass Puttros	MOLSA	expert on national employment policy	March 9	"(joint with 13)
15.	Dr. Wafaa Jaafar Al-Mahdawi	MOHE	College of Economics and Business Management, al-Mustansiraya University	"	" (joint with 16)
16.	Dr. Fallah	"	College of Economics and Business	Marc	" (joint with

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[40]   Interviews were conducted face-to-face with single individuals (except as indicated).

	Thuwaniy		Management, al-Mustansiraya University	h 9	15)
17.	Hashim Thanoon al-Atraqchi	IFI	President	March 10	"(joint with 18)
18.	Hussain Ali Zankana	"	Vice-President	March 10	"(joint with 17)
19.	Ali Raheem al-Saadi	GIFTU	Member of the Executive Office for the Labor Unions	"	" (joint with 20)
20	Hadi Ali Lefta	"	Secretary-General of the labor unions in Iraq	"	" (joint with 19)
21	Khoula Luaiby	MOLSA	Senior chief statistician, Member of the committee responsible for writing a national employment policy	"	" (joint with 22)
22	Talal Sabeeh Shawqi	"	General Director of Legal Affairs, Member of the committee responsible for deciding wages	"	" (joint with 21)
23	Sabri Meka Armeia	MOHE	Vocational Training	"	Arbil (by Yahoo Messenger)
24	Student[41]	MOE	Soumer Vocational School	"	Baghdad
25	Student	MOLSA	Iraqi-Korean Center	"	"
26	Student	MOHE	Institute of Business Management	March 11	"
27	Zahid Warod Hassan[42]	Iraq-SDE	Iraq-SDE National Project Coordinator	March 11	"

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[41] Students are unnamed because no special permission was sought from parents or other authorities to identify them individually.

[42] As the National Project Coordinator, Mr. Hassan is a project staff member: his responses were considered separately from those of the other interviewees in Iraq, who were beneficiaries or stakeholders of the project.

Appendix 2b: Interviewees outside Iraq[43]

No.	Name, SURNAME	Institution	Title	Date	Location
1.	Jean-Francois KLEIN	ILO-ROAS	Chief, Regional Programming Services	Mar. 1	Beirut
2.	Rabia JALLOUL	"	IDO	"	"
3.	Walid HAMDAN	"	Workers' Specialist	"	"
4.	Hisham ABOU JAOUDE	"	Employers' Specialist	"	"
5.	Mary KAWAR	"	Senior Regional Advisor on Skills and Employability	"	"
6.	Rania BIKHAZI	"	Enterprise Development Specialist	"	"
7.	Ghassan HARMOUCHE	"	Finance Verifier	"	"
8.	Mohammad Anser QUREISHI	"	Chief, Regional Administrative Services	"	"
9.	Ghassan AL-SAFFAR	PMU	CTA	Mar. 3	Amman
10.	Bana KALOTI	ORC-Iraq	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	"	"
11.	Muhammad Usman AKRAM	"	"	"	"
12.	Rabia JALLOUL	ILO-ROAS	IDO	Mar. 4	"
13.	Dijana DUBOCANAC	PMU	OS and Deputy CTA	"	"
14.	Ghassan AL-SAFFAR	"	CTA	Mar. 11	"
15.	Marla ZAPACH	ORC-Iraq	Program Specialist	"	"
16.	Vladimir GASSKOV	ILO-EMP/SKILLS	Senior Specialist	Mar. 12	"
17.	Christine EVANS-KLOCK	"	Director	Mar. 13	Geneva (by telephone)
18.	Mina AL-OMAR	PMU	AFA	Mar. 14	Amman
19.	Soroush JAVADI	"	CTA and Iraq Program Team Leader	"	"

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[43] Interviews were conducted face-to-face with single individuals (except as indicated).

Appendix 3a: Evaluators' Matrix

Question Category	Typical Questions	Written Data Source(s)	Spoken Data Source(s)				Methodology
			ILO	Project staff	Gov & Part	Beneficiaries	
Project Relevance, Strategy	Fit national priorities, ITF programs, local needs/realities/efforts?	Proj Doc, NDS, ICI, MDG	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC		Document review, interviews (personal & group)HQ/B/A/I
Project Design	Baseline conditions? Design coherent for inputs, outputs, outcomes? For indic/verific/ sustainability? For Gendered employment?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
Project Effectiveness	Qual/quant progress toward objectives? Effects for gendered employment, tripartism, nat/reg partners?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I
	Effect of KAB training /materials? Other publications?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I
	Context on implementation? Original assumptions realistic?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I

Efficiency of Resource Use	Funds, labor, skills nec to achieve? Outcomes cost-effective? How address delays?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, HQ deps. Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
Management Effectiveness	Overall adequacy? Div of labor ILO/UNOPS? Remote direction? SC and NC-Iraq?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, HQ deps. Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
	M&E system? Gender expertise? Collab other ILO, donors?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal)
Impact(s) & Sustainability	Durability/significance achievements? Effects for ILO programs, Iraqi labor policy, other? Exit or Phase 2?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I

Question Category	Typical Questions	Written Data Source(s)	Spoken Data Source(s)				Methodology
			ILO	Project staff	Gov & Part	Beneficiaries	
Project Relevance, Strategy	Fit national priorities, ITF programs, local needs/realities/efforts?	Proj Doc, NDS, ICI, MDG	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC		Document review, interviews (personal & group)HQ/B/A/I
Project Design	Baseline conditions? Design coherent for inputs, outputs, outcomes? For indic/verific/ sustainability? For Gendered employment?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
Project Effectiveness	Qual/quant progress toward objectives? Effects for gendered employment, tripartism, nat/reg partners?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I
	Effect of KAB training /materials? Other publications?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I
	Context on implementation? Original assumptions realistic?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I

Efficiency of Resource Use	Funds, labor, skills nec to achieve? Outcomes cost-effective? How address delays?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, HQ deps. Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
Management Effectiveness	Overall adequacy? Div of labor ILO/UNOPS? Remote direction? SC and NC-Iraq?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, HQ deps. Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal & group) HQ/B/A/I
	M&E system? Gender expertise? Collab other ILO, donors?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS, SKILLS dep Geneva	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners		Document review, interviews (personal)
Impact(s) & Sustainability	Durability/significance achievements? Effects for ILO programs, Iraqi labor policy, other? Exit or Phase 2?	Proj Doc, reports, materials	ROAS	CTA, OS, key staff, NC-Iraq	MOLSA, NCE, SC, VTC/ESC, local partners	MOLSA staff, trainees, businesses	Document review, interviews (personal & group) B/A/I

Appendix 3b: Discussion Guide for Chief Technical Advisor

General Introduction

THANK for SUPPORT ALREADY GIVEN (especially logistical) to carry out this evaluation of SDE-Iraq.

Both the National Consultant and I have been READING DOCUMENTS to learn about the project (PD, technical and progress reports, TOR, etc.)

But we also need to learn the PRACTICAL PROJECT:

a. How it is WORKING ON THE GROUND in Iraq

b. And how it is BEING MANAGED from Amman and Beirut

Project Management Unit (PMU)

When was the PMU established? With whom? Do you have an ORGANIGRAM showing the relationships among project members?

Chief Technical Advisor

a. CTA since? Prior experience with IRAQ? With ILO/UN?

b. Do you have PROGRAM authority? What about FINANCIAL authority? Any OTHER?

c. What is your view of the PROJECT WORK SO FAR?

d. How many times have you visited IRAQ this year? Since 2007?

e. And how many times has the NPC visited you this year? Since 2007?

f. What is your main contact with the NPC – is it by email? Telephone? And how often?

g. And what are your expectations AFTER the project closes?

Deputy CTA

a. How long has the Deputy CTA been working with the project? Did she have prior experience with Iraq? With ILO/UN?

b. The PD says the Deputy CTA has "logistical authority" – what is that? Who reviews her performance?

c. What are the advantages/disadvantages of this arrangement in general? And for this project?

Economic Advisor

a. Who is the Economic Advisor?

b. How long did he work?

c. What was his responsibility with the project? Who does that now?

Administrative and Financial Assistant

a. Who is? How long has she been working with the project? Did she have prior experience with Iraq? With ILO/UN?

b. What are her duties? Who reviews her performance?

Are there other PMUs in this office?   Which?   What is SDE-Iraq's relationship with them?

PMU relations with ILO-ROAS?

What are your responsibilities to the Chief, RPS (Mr. Klein)?
a.   How long has he been in that post? Did he have prior experience with Iraq? With ILO/UN?
b.   What are his responsibilities to SDE-Iraq?
c.   Has he visited this project? How often do you visit ILO-ROAS? Other contacts?
d.   Any concerns?

And what about your responsibilities to the IDO (Ms. Jalloul)?
How long has she been in that post? Prior experience with Iraq? With ILO/UN?
What are her responsibilities to the project?
How are you in contact? And how often?
Any concerns?

And what are your relations with the Departments at ILO-ROAS?
a. Do they support the PMU? SDE-Iraq? How?
b. How helpful have they been to project operations here? In Iraq? How so?
c. Any concerns?

PMU relations with OTHER UN agencies/organizations in Amman?
Which one has been MOST IMPORTANT? Why do you say that?
And which one has been MOST HELPFUL? Why do you say that?
Why was this project chosen for the ITF evaluation?

PMU relations with persons/operations/structures INSIDE IRAQ?
NPC
a. How long has Zahid Hassan been the NPC? What has been his experience in Iraq? With ILO/UN?
b. What are his duties? What is his contractual relationship with the project?
c. What have been his greatest strengths/weaknesses?
Regarding Operations, how is the project doing with VOCATIONAL TRAINING? What OUTPUTS has the project achieved? What OUTCOMES?
And what about component 2 of your activities – developing a NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY? What outputs? Outcomes?
And for component 3 – developing ENTREPRENEURSHIP? What outputs/outcomes?

Can you explain for me the difference between the Steering Committee (SC) and the National Committee for Employment (NCE)?

a. How often does each of them meet?

b. How important has each of them been to the project? Could you give me some examples?

c. How many of the SC have been invited to the Stakeholders' Workshop? What about members of the NCE?

SDE-Iraq operations relative to the GOALS of the EVALUTION

In your opinion, has the project ACHIEVED its OBJECTIVES (as described in the PD)?

a. In all THREE COMPONENTS/sectors of activity – vocational training, policy development, and supporting entrepreneurship?

b. In all FOUR MAJOR REGIONS of Iraq?

c. What is/are the reason(s) for these achievements/non-achievements?

What ACHIEVED IMPROVEMENTS have been SUSTAINED for a period? How long?

a. Which ones are likely to be sustained AFTER the project ends? Why do you say that?

b. What IMPACT have these changes had in the 3 components of project activities? Across the regions of Iraq?

What RECOMMENDATIONS do you have about

a. How to BUILD ON project achievements?

b. How to insure they are SUSTAINED by project stakeholders?

According to your views, what are

a. The GOOD PRACTICES of the project? Why do you say this?

b. The project's SUCCESS STORIES? Can you give me some examples?

c. LESSONS LEARNED? (i.e., anything particularly pos/neg with major impact on operations, achievement of outcomes, etc.)

How has the MANAGEMENT MODEL of SDE-Iraq worked so far?

a. With respect to coordination between ILO and UNOPS?

b. With respect to REMOTE PROGRAMMING from Amman and Beirut?

Thank you for answering my questions; do you have any for me? (Evaluation methodology/Stakeholders' Workshop/completion of report) OK, next time I'd like to go through your last quarterly report with you, so you can explain it to me. And thanks again for all the time, effort, and help you have given so far to this evaluation and to the project.

Appendix 3c: Discussion Guide for National Program Coordinator, SDE-Iraq

(First, thank Mr. Hassan for meeting with you. Then work out logistics with him. Find out if you will have use of an office, phone, transport, or other support. Ask if appointments have been made with others and when you can interview him. If it's right away, begin the questions.)

A. I'd like to begin by asking about the SDE project as it is working on the ground in Iraq. We are reading documentation – the Project Document, quarterly and six-month reports, etc. – so we are learning about the project in that way. But we also want to learn your view of how it is working here.

   In your opinion, what parts of the project activities are CLEARLY SUCCESSFUL so far? (Which ones have met all the targets?) Why do you say that? (What REASONS make you judge these parts a clear success?)

   By contrast, what parts of project activities are CLEARLY NOT SUCCESSFUL so far? (Any complete failures?) What REASONS make you say those parts are not a success? And what parts of the project are more IN THE MIDDLE, moderately successful?

B. In your view about what PERCENTAGE (%) of all project ACTIVITIES fit into each of these categories – what percent are CLEAR SUCCESSES? And what percent are CLEARLY NOT SUCCESSES? What percent MODERATE SUCCESSES?

C. And what PERCENTAGE of all project FUNDS fit into those categories – i.e., the clear successes have used ___% of funds spent so far; the non-successes have taken ____%; and the moderate successes have taken the rest?

D. WHERE are the successes located in the SECTORS OF THE PROJECT – have they been in Vocational Training, Entrepreneur Training, or National Policy? Or have they been spread evenly across all sectors? What about the non-successes? Can you think of REASONS WHY successes have been in ___ sector (e.g., in vocational training but not in policy and only moderate success in small business training)

E. In your opinion WHERE are the successes located geographically IN IRAQ? Are most of them in one region or governorate? And where are the non-successes? The moderate successes? Can you think of REASONS for this distribution of each of the categories?

F. Now I'd like to understand better how the program on the ground in Iraq fits with the HIGHER LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION in the UN.

First, do you have an ORGANIGRAM of the project, a chart showing the formal reporting relationships of the various parts of the project to each other in Iraq and then those to the PMU in

Amman, to ILO-ROAS in Beirut, or higher in UN organization? Are the formal relationships important to the SUCCESS/NON-SUCCESS of the project? How?

In general, how HELPFUL has the PMU been in supporting/guiding the project in Iraq? What about the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA)? The Economic Advisor? The Deputy CTA? The Admin and Finance Assistant? Does the PMU approve both project activities and funding for them? How fast and helpful are the approvals – e.g., once approvals are made how long does it usually take to get the money? HOW OFTEN do you REPORT to the PMU – daily, weekly, or what period usually? Have any of the PMU members visited Iraq to see project work on the ground? How often?

And moving up the administrative ladder, how HELPFUL has the ILO-ROAS been generally to project efforts in Iraq? What about the CHIEF, Regional Programming Services (Mr. Klein) – has he been HELPFUL? The IRAQ DESK OFFICER (Ms. Jalloul)? How? And what about the staff at ILO-ROAS? Does that office approve BOTH project activities and funding requests? How fast and helpful has it been? Do you ever VISIT THERE? How often and for what reasons? Have Mr. Klein, Ms. Jalloul, or ILO-ROAS staff ever VISITED YOU HERE? How often and for what reasons?

G. Does Mr. Hassan have questions for you? If so, what are they?

(Thank him for his time and information; we appreciate the help on this important project. Tell him you may have some more questions after you have made other visits/interviews and thought about the answers; is it OK for you to come back and ask them later? How will you notify him about that?)

Appendix 4: List of Publications Cited

International Labour Organization, "Programme and Budget for the Biennium 2010-2011," International Labour Office-Geneva, 2009.

International Labour Organization Evaluation Summaries, RAS0255USA_EvalSumm_2007, www.ilo.org.

International Labour Organization-Evaluation Unit, "Checklist No. 4 – Formatting Evaluation Reports," International Labour Office-Geneva, March 2010.

International Labour Organization-Regional Office for the Arab States, "The KAB Program: Registration Questionnaire," Beirut, (n.d., in Arabic).

----------------------, "Record of the Iraq Programme Review Meeting," Beirut, 21 January 2010.

Interview with Mr. A. Qureshi (Chief, Regional Administrative Services) and Mr. G. Harmouche (Finance Verifier), ILO-ROAS, 1 March 2010.

Interview with Ms. Bana Kaloti and Mr. Muhammad Usman Akram, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisors: Office of the Resident Coordinator-Iraq, 3 March 2010.

Interview with Ms. Marla Zapach, Programme Specialist: Office of Resident Coordinator-Iraq, 11 March 2010.

 Press Release, "Report Shows 'Meaningful' Impact of UN Projects in Iraq," 1 April 2009.

Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq Project-SDE, "Assessing the Implementation of the KAB Programme," January 2010.

Terms of Reference, "Independent Interim Evaluation: Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq," IRQ/07/01/UNQ.

 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, "Fact Sheet on the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)," www.uniraq.org.

United Nations Development Group-Iraq Trust Fund, "Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq: Programme/Project B1-27," 13 November 2006.

----------------------, "Project #: B1-27b Fourth Quarterly Fiche," October-December 2009.

Appendix 5a: Participants List
Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq
Stakeholders Workshop

	Affiliation	Name	Title
1	MOLSA	Abedulsada Shnawa Fahad	Deputy Minister
2	MOLSA	Talal Sabeeh Shawqi	Director General of the Legislative office
3	MOLSA	Mohammed Ahmed Abdullah	Labour & Vocational Training Department – TOT Manager
4	MOLSA	Mushref Abdulkaleq Flayyih	Labour & Vocational Training Department – KAB Unit
5	MOLSA	Subhi Abdulsattar Hassan	Labour & Vocational Training Department – Manager of the Korean VTC
6	MOLSA	Aziz Ibrahim Khalil	Expert in Labour & Vocational Training Department
7	MOLSA	Sadeq Khazal	Manager of Curriculum Department
8	MOLSA	Abed Suhoud	CBT-Team – Baghdad
9	MOLSA	Hussien Ali Hussien	CBT-Team – Baghdad
10	NEP Team	Behnam Eliass Puttros	National NEP Consultant
11	NEP Team	Dr.Mahdi Ali Mahdi Al-Wahid	Dean of the Technical Administration College
12	NEP Team	Dr.Wafaa Jaafar Al-Mahdawi	Professor in Al-Mustanseriya University
13	Labour Union	Ali Raheem Ali Al-Saedi	Member in the Iraqi Labour Union
14	MOHE / FTE	Basim Abdul Hassan Allami	KAB Trainer in Administration Institute
15	MOE	Hamid Yaseen Jebur	Manager of Vocational Training
16	KRG	Zozik Ahmed	Manager of Duhok VTC
17	KRG	Asoo Fatah	Manager of Sulaymaniyah VTC
18	KRG	Sabri Meka Armeia	CBT-Team
19	KRG	Ismaeil Hamad	CBT-Team
20	Evaluator	Dr. Frederick C. Huxley	International Evaluator, Evaluation Team Leader
21	Evaluator	Dr. Akeel al-Khakani	National Evaluator

22	ITF	Bana Kaloti	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
23	ILO	Soroush Javadi	ILO Team leader, Amman
24	ILO	Rabia A. Jalloul	Iraq Programme Desk Officer, Regional Programming Services Unit, Beirut
25	ILO	Ghassan Al-Saffar	Chief Technical Advisor SDE & TVET projects
26	ILO	Zahid Hassan	National Project Coordinator , Baghdad
27	ILO	Ahmad Al-Zoabi	ILO , Jordan Programme
28	UNOPS	Dijana Dubocanac	Operations Specialist
29	UNOPS	Mitri Baramki	Project Officer
30	UNOPS	Mina Al-Omar	Programme Administrative Associate

MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
KRG	Kurdistan Region
MOE	Ministry of Education
TOT	Training of Trainers
MOHE/FTE	Ministry of Higher Education / Foundation of Technical Education
NEP	National Employment Policy
CBT	Competency Based Training
ITF	Iraqi Trust Fund
KAB	Know About Business
ILO	International Labour Organization
VTC	Vocational Training Centre
UNOPS	United Nation Office for Project Services

Appendix 5b: Agenda

Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq
Stakeholders Workshop
April 6th, 2010 / Amman – Jordan

مشروع تنمية المهارات لدعم خلق فرص العمل في العراق
"ورشة مراجعة التقييم"
٦ نيسان ٢٠١٠ – عمان الاردن

	Timings	
الجلسة الافتتاحية **سروش جوادي** , رئيس فريق عمل منظمة العمل الدولي في عمان **ربيعة احمد جلول** , مسؤولة برنامج العراق في قسم البرامج في مكتب بيروت **غسان الصفار** , رئيس خبراء مشروع تنمية المهارات و مشروع التدريب و التعليم المهني	9:30 – 10:00	Workshop Opening **Soroush Javadi** , ILO Team leader, Amman **Rabia A. Jalloul,** Iraq Programme Desk Officer, Regional Programming Services Unit, Beirut **Ghassan Al-Saffar**, Chief Technical Advisor SDE & TVET projects
عرض عن مشروع تنمية المهارات لدعم خلق فرص العمل في العراق. غسان الصفار , رئيس خبراء مشروع تنمية المهارات و مشروع التدريب و التعليم المهني	10:00 – 10:30	Brief on SDE Project Ghassan Al-Saffar, ILO, SDE&TVET CTA
الاطار المنطقي للتقرير د. فريدرك س. هاكسلي (مُقيِّم دولي، رئيس الفريق التقييم)	10:30 – 11:00	The Logic of the Report Dr. Frederick C. Huxley (International Evaluator, Evaluation Team Leader)
استراحة	11:00 – 11:15	Coffee- Tea Break
اسئلة و تعليقات المشاركين	11:15 – 12:15	Questions and Comments
التحضير للمناقشات الجماعية	12:15 – 1:00	Organising the Group Discussions
استراحة غداء	1:00 – 2:00	Lunch
مناقشات جماعية	2:00 – 3:00	Group Discussions
عرض المناقشات الجماعية	3:00 – 3:45	Group Presentations
استراحة	3:45 – 4:00	Coffee- Tea Break
الخطوات المستقبلية الجلسة الختامية	4:00 – 5:00	Next Steps / Workshop Closing

Appendix 5c: Report of Group Discussions and Presentations

Skills Development To Support Employment Generation in Iraq
Stakeholders Workshop
April 6, 2010 / Amman, Jordan

The participants were divided into three groups as follows:

Group 1 – Objective 1: Enhance Vocational Training for Priority Jobs in Demand in the Labor Market (CBT)
Group 2 – Objective 2: Enhance Employment Policy-Making at the National Level (NEP)
Group 3 – Objective 3: Foster Self-Employment among Iraqis (KAB)

Over a period of 1 hour, each group discussed the Questions sheets circulated by the Evaluators; the Answers and Comments of each discussion group are listed below:

Group 1 / Objective 1 / CBT
Enhance Vocational Training for Priority Jobs in Demand in the Labor Market
9 National Partners
1. What is CBT? Is it important for vocational training in Iraq? Why?

CBT (Competency Based Training) will positively affect the Training Curricula's to meet the labour market needs, thus improving the Production Skills for the Iraqi Labour Force needed by the market.

Implementing the CBT Programme in Iraq will raise the productivity of the Iraqi Labour Force with raising their competency and skill levels that is needed in the Labour market which will reflect positively on the production levels.

2. How is CBT manifested in the vocational training scheduled for Fall 2010 in Iraq? What results are expected from this training?

CBT-based curricula for 33 occupations will be ready by mid-February 2011; after that the VTCs will pilot these curricula for 6 months. Data on possible outcomes (attitude changes due to training) will become available by late August 2011.

CBT Programme will enable the unemployed Labour Force looking for jobs, to gain necessary skills that will enable to find jobs, thus reducing the high levels of unemployment.

3. If funding additional to ITF becomes available:
Should SDE-Iraq continue to a Phase 2? For how long? If it is continued, should SDE-Iraq have the same or other activities – e.g., should it stay in touch with trainees to learn who gets a job? Whether the training helps them to get or keep the job? If so, how is it helpful? If continued, should SDE-Iraq work in the same locations or focus on more needy regions? If so, which ones?

- If there is additional funding, the CBT Programme will have a PHASE II, completing PHASE -It will provide training to the CBT Teams in the Training Centres about the CBT, design the training methods for the CBT course, and prepare the CBT Team to properly implement and assess the Programme.
- Training CBT teams on how to prepare, design, and use the training methods to implement the CBT Programme will require a programme extension of 2 years, determined by:
  – Completing the design of the 33 new curricula using the training regulation prepared as the baseline.
  – Identifying the positive and negative effects of the pilot implementation of the Programme.
- The new CBT units should be implemented all over Iraq in the Training Centres, as in Phase I of the Programme.

4. So far what have been the BEST RESULTS from vocational training aided by SDE-Iraq? Have there been any BAD or WEAK RESULTS from the training? If so, which?

SDE-Iraq's BEST RESULTS:
  – CBT Teams have been trained on how to design the Trainers manuals (70 CBT Designers).
  – 33 Training manuals/regulations have been completed.
  – Capacity building of the CBT Team, enabling them to conduct Training courses on the CBT Programme.
  – Conduct 4 Training Courses (Competency based Training) by the National Team whom have been Trained during the implementation of the Programme.
  – Conduct Media Course Training inside Iraq for the design and production of the CBT Courses by MOLSA facilitators.

Programme Weak points:
  – Delay in the delivery of the Stationary and IT-equipment needed for the Programme.
  – No international exposure (Field trips) on similar CBT implemented programmes.

5. What is your opinion of the EVALUATION presented and discussed this morning? What were its BEST points? And BAD or WEAK ones? If so, which?
    -The Evaluators have met with all concerned parties implementing the project, thus assessing the direct/actual work progress and results.
    -The report focused on some activities more than others in spite of the variance of these activities in terms of duration needed to show results.

6. Was it WORTHWHILE for you to participate in the evaluation through the Stakeholders' Workshop? If so, how?

    -The CBT Team participating in reviewing the Evaluators report was successful.

    -Defining the positive impact of the implemented activities, the scope of work completed, and what is planned for the future.

    -Presenting the CBT Programme which needs to extend the implementation period to successfully complete the programme.

7. Are there ANY OTHER POINTS you want to raise about CBT in vocational training? About SDE-Iraq generally? About the Evaluation generally?

The vital need to extend the project period to successfully complete the planned activities, namely:

1. Design of the training curricula.
2. Capacity building of the CBT Team.
3. Involve other parties in Technical Education to benefit from the programme.

Group 2 / Objective 2 / NEP
Enhance Employment Policy-Making at the National Level
6 National Partners

1. In your opinion, why is a national employment policy (NEP) important?

    -Implements the millennium development goals to achieve sustainable development.

    -Supports the Anti-hunger strategy in Iraq.

    -Helps to stabilize the transformation of the Iraqi Labor Market through generating work opportunities in the formal and informal private sector.

    -Relates NEP Goals to the Iraqi National Development Plan for 2010-2014.

    -Supports ending violence in Iraq through eliminating/reducing the unemployment rates, thus reducing the crime rates and creating social balance.

    -Supports the Iraqi economy through raising the productivity levels of the labour force and accelerating the economic growth rates.

2. How has SDE-Iraq contributed to drafting an NEP?

    -It has made a productive contribution through showing that Iraq does not have a NEP. The employment polices were previously defined by the government according to the prevailing situation, which made these polices random policies.

    -The SDE project generated employment opportunities for Iraqis capable and willing to work.

    -Translated the NEP dream to a reality, thus obtaining a Copyright for the Project.

-The SDE project merges all the national capacities to obtain the project goals and the NEP through benefiting from the vast and extensive experience of Iraqi university professors and MOLSA specialists.

3. What are the NEXT STEPS toward establishing an NEP after the draft is submitted to the NCE this month?
- The NEP first draft will be available end of April 2010; afterwards the NEP will be submitted to the high National Committee.
- Where as the NEP is a long term activity and needs continuous update and revisions according to the influential prevailing situation, the next steps to be taken into consideration for the NEP should be:

Policy Drafting Phases
- First Draft on the NEP to be developed
- Submit the First Draft to the National Committee to study and review.
- Revisions of the First Draft according to the Feedback from the National Committee.
- The revised NEP to be discussed in a National Conference on a broader scale, discussing the Policy with the beneficiaries and concern parties. Afterwards the NEP will be presented to the National Committee for approval from various National institutions and representatives from the government. The NEP to be submitted to the National Committee on 30 July 2010.
- The approved NEP will be presented to the ministries council and the parliament for endorsement (expected end 2010). Once the NEP is endorsed it will obtain the necessary legislative format to be implemented in Iraq.

- **Steps Following the Endorsement of the NEP:**
  -The SDE project should be requested to provide specialized training sessions for ministry representatives and high- level delegates on how to successfully implement the NEP.

4. If funding additional to ITF becomes available: Should SDE-Iraq continue in a Phase 2? For how long?
-If continued, should the project continue to help with the NEP? If so, how and for how long?
-If continued, should SDE-Iraq work in the same locations or focus on more needy areas? If so, which ones?
-Set the implementation Plan for the NEP, including the Trainings, assessment and Follow up

5. So far, what have been the BEST RESULTS from SDE-Iraq support to developing the NEP? Have there been any BAD or WEAK RESULTS from its support? If so, which?
Best results:

1) Exposed the NEP Drafting Team to international NEP experiences. (The Jordan NEP experience was <u>not</u> a successfully example to be introduced).
2) Paving the way for drafting the NEP Policy for Iraq which had not been applied in Iraq before.

- **Weak points**
There is no NEP general framework in Iraq.

6. What about SDE-Iraq generally – what have been its BEST RESULTS? Any BAD or WEAK ones? If so, which?

7. What is your opinion of the EVALUATION presented and discussed this morning? What were its BEST points? Any BAD or WEAK ones? If so, which?

8. Was it WORTHWHILE for you to participate in the evaluation through the Stakeholders' Workshop? If so, how?
   The Participation was successful especially in determining the weak and strong points in the Programme.

9. Are there ANY OTHER POINTS you want to raise about SDE-Iraq work concerning the NEP? About the project generally? About the EVALUATION?
   The need of the NEP Team to be exposed to successful NEP polices.

Group 3 / Objective3 / KAB
Foster Self-Employment among Iraqis
(Including young women and men)

4 National Partners

1. Why did SDE-Iraq decide to expand KAB after the pilot experience at 22 locations in 2008-09?

The KAB Programme was implemented in 22 Training Sites as follows:
   – 5 colleges and Training Institutes in the Foundation of Technical Education
   – 7 Vocational Training Centre under Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
   – 10 Vocational schools under the Department of Vocational Education

The aim of the pilot implementation of the Programme was to assess the positive and negative sides of the programme according to the planned goals and objectives. The Programme was implemented under several constraints; nevertheless, the determination and coordination of all parties concerned helped in its successful implementation.

2. Is the current (2009-10) KAB training in 105 locations on track? What are the expected results?
   - Positive changes in the attitudes of participants towards self-employment, especially starting their small business.
   - Decrease the rates of unemployment among the youth.
   - Set the infrastructure for the small and medium enterprise and show its influence on supporting the national economy.
   - Reduce the youth looking for and depending on government work and encourage them to start their small business as an alternative and successful work.
   - Foster self-employment among Iraqi society.
   - Reduce the unemployment rates through involving the youth in the small and medium enterprise.
   - Encourage women's participation in the labour market through small and medium enterprise to be successful businesswomen.

3. If funding additional to ITF becomes available:
   - Should SDE-Iraq continue? For how long?
   - Should it have the same or other activities – e.g., should it stay in touch with trainees after they complete training to learn who starts a business, gets funding, hires workers, etc.?
   - Should it work in the same locations or focus on more needy regions? Which ones?

The KAB Team strongly supports the actual finding on the result of the KAB Programme Implementation and as addressed in the evaluation report for the vital need to extend the project for additional two years in order to:
   - Implement the KAB programme in all the vocational and educational centres.
   - Invest and keep the national KAB capacities trained under the KAB Programme.
   - Train trainers for the KAB Programme in the new centres to reduce the gap in qualified trainers.
   - Establish a follow-up mechanism for the KAB programme trainers.
   - Provide for the needs of related ministries (like the Youth ministry).
   - Obtain financial support from donors, following up the needs of the trainees after graduation.

4. So far, what have been the BEST RESULTS from KAB or other self-employment training? Have there been any BAD or WEAK RESULTS from the training? If so, which?

Best results
   - Increased the number of trainees willing to participle in the Programme.
   - Graduated KAB Trainees have started their own businesses, which reflect the successful implementation of the KAB programme.
   - Increased the skills and capacities of the trainees through modem forms of training.

- Created communication channels and continuous knowledge sharing among the three ministries.
- Increased the motivation of trainees to establish their own business.

5. What about SDE-Iraq generally –what have been its BEST RESULTS? Any BAD or WEAK ones? If so, which?

      Weak points

      1) Limited Training resources, which are needed to successfully implement the Programme.

      2) Limited media Coverage about the KAB Programme.

      3) The absence of a KAB website.

6. What is your opinion of the EVALUATION presented and discussed this morning? What were its BEST points? Any BAD or WEAK ones? If so, which?

The Evaluation Report was positive with regard to the KAB Programme.

7. Was it WORTHWHILE for you to participate in the evaluation through the Stakeholders' Workshop? If so how?

The Participation was successful, especially with the vast experience of the participants in enriching the Programme in spite of the limited time of the workshop.

8. Are there ANY OTHER POINTS that you want to raise about KAB or other training for self-employment? About SDE-Iraq generally? About the Evaluation generally?

- The need to continue the KAB Programme though the SYB Programme.
- The urgent need of the Training Resources (IT and Stationary) for the KAB implementation along with the need to nominate a KAB Training Hall at each training site.
- The need to include CBT programme in the Vocational Training Schools.
- The need to be exposed to international experience in countries who have successfully implemented the process of sharing KAB knowledge.

Appendix 6: UNDG ITF Programme/ Project Evaluations TORs

Terms of Reference with Guidance

1. Introduction and Context
- Provide brief introduction to the project/ programme within the social, political and economic context of Iraq
- Highlight issues most pertinent to the subject matter of the project being evaluated.
- Include, as appropriate, the relevant human development indicators, key features of international, regional and national economy and regional and national policy issues
- Provide brief description of the programme/ project including:
  – Timeline, budget, key implementing agencies
  – Intended outcome(s) and output(s)
  – Underlying logic as per programme/ project design
  – Key assumptions that guided the design and implementation strategies
  – Risk mitigation strategies (if any)
  – Any major divergences in the design and/ or implementation strategy

2. Purpose of the evaluation
Describe the strategic intent of the evaluation - formative, or summative
How the evaluation results will be used and by whom

3. Evaluation objectives
This section should define the primary focus of the evaluation – what questions and issues it will address. These are often guided by the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, resulting institutional and/ or behavioural changes, sustainability. In addition, the evaluation should also distil lessons learned while providing recommendations for future. In the case of ongoing programmes/ projects, the evaluation should address implementation issues (if any) and assess the effectiveness of strategies including partnership to achieve the underlying programme/ project results. As a guideline, the following generic objectives can be customized for the proposed UNDG ITF programme/ project evaluation:

– To assess and showcase the achieved progress and results against stipulated project/ programme results/ objectives on all stakeholders especially beneficiary groups;
– To identify and assess any unintended positive or negative results of the programme/ project and its effects on beneficiary groups;
– To assess the efficiency of the programme/ project interventions;
– To understand the effectiveness of programme/ project interventions in addressing the underlying problem and to see if the programme/ project has been the best option to respond to the particular issue/s;

- To assess the relevance of programme/ project components in addressing the needs and issues of beneficiary groups;
- To understand the extent to which this programme/ project has contributed to forging partnership at various levels with the Government of Iraq, Civil Society and UN/ donors;
- To assess management arrangements (including procurement procedures, coordination, monitoring) in place by the GoI and/ or the beneficiary communities towards the sustainability of various programme/ project-initiated services and benefits;
- To generate lessons on good practices based on assessment from the aforementioned evaluation objectives and to provide recommendations to all stakeholders (GoI, UN, donors, civil society) on how to maximize the results from similar initiatives in comparable situations.

4. Evaluation Scope

The description of the scope in the TOR should clarify the breadth and depth of the evaluation including time period, phases in implementation, geographical area, parameters with respect to the subject and stakeholders being examined.

Every UNDG ITF programme/ project evaluation will focus on both development and operational effectiveness. The scope defined in the TOR, therefore, should be realistic; it needs to be feasible given the budget and time available for the evaluation.

The scope should also take into account other existing or planned evaluations of the same subject and explain how information from other evaluations may be used or how this evaluation will complement the planned ones including the UNDG ITF Lessons Learned Exercise that aims to assess the development and operational effectiveness of the UNDG ITF.

5. Key Evaluation Questions

The questions should address the specific demands for information needed to address the purpose of the evaluation and guided by the evaluation scope and objectives, including:

- Relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes or projects being evaluated, as well as the sustainability of results and contributions to development context;
- Value-added of the programmes and projects in comparison with alternatives;
- UN's partnership strategy and its relation to effectiveness in achieving the outcome;
- UN's strategic positioning and its comparative advantage;
- Cross-cutting issues applicable to the project/ programme;
- Operational effectiveness of the programme/ project and the extent to which underlying strategies, processes and management structures contribute to development effectiveness of each UNDG ITF programme/ project.

Each evaluation question should be substantiated with evidence and disaggregated information by gender, ethnicity, location and/ or other relevant criteria

Annex 1 and Annex 2 provide recommended questions on development and operational effectiveness respectively. The suggested questions will generate the necessary evaluative evidence and information at programme/ project level to feed into the UNDG ITF Lessons Learned Exercise.

6. Evaluation Methodology

Note that defining the detailed evaluation methodology will require the involvement of the evaluator(s).

The methodology section of the TOR should outline how the evaluation will be conducted. The TOR should provide only the key elements of the evaluation approach, the minimum standards that must be adhered to, upon which the evaluator(s) can elaborate.

The evaluation methodology is dependent, among other things, on the purpose, scope and objectives of the evaluation. It will also depend on the nature of information available to the evaluator(s), such as indicators, baseline information, and specific targets.

Refer to key approaches for the review and analysis of secondary/ existing information including the quality and availability of existing information, spell out the needs for the collection of primary data (as required), and plans for engaging with programme/ project stakeholders.

7. Expected Deliverables

Describe the type of products including the Evaluation Report expected from the evaluation, its use and how it will be used.

The **Evaluation Report** should contain the following:

Title Page
List of acronyms and abbreviations
Table of contents, including list of annexes
Executive Summary
Introduction: background and context of the programme
Description of the project/ programme – its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success
Evaluation Methodology & Approach (including key challenges and limitations)
Findings with clear evidence base and interpretations
Conclusions
Recommendations

Lessons and generalizations
Annexes

Note: It is highly recommended that the Evaluation Report should follow the standards set out by UNEG. Refer to UNEG Standards for Evaluation

8. Composition, skills and experience of the evaluation team

Outline the skills, experience, qualifications and other relevant competencies - such as language capabilities that will be needed to conduct the evaluation effectively (whether by a consulting firm or by individual consultants).

The evaluators should be independent meaning that they have not been involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of the programme or project to be evaluated.

The evaluation team should be gender balanced and the team members should demonstrate prior experience in undertaking gender sensitive evaluation work.

9. Management Arrangements

Clearly spell out the management arrangements including:
- Role of the UN agency commissioning the evaluation
- Role of national counterparts and partners
- Role of evaluator(s)

Also, specify the mechanism for quality assurance and the quality standards to be followed through the evaluation process, and guided by:
- UNEG Norms for Evaluation
- UNEG Standards for Evaluation
- UNEG Ethical Guidelines

In order to enhance national ownership and to comply with Paris Declaration, it is recommended that the evaluation should be closely coordinated with, if not fully guided by, the key national counterpart throughout the evaluation process. A Joint Task Force comprising of UN, national counterpart(s) and the Evaluation Team may be created to guide and coordinate the evaluation process.

10. Indicative Work Plan

The final section of the TOR should outline a timetable for the evaluation, including key activities and deliverables in the process, with responsibilities.

Phase	Key Activities	Time Frame*	Responsibility

Preparatory phase			
Field work/ Data Collection			
Data Analysis			
Report preparation			
Dissemination			

* Tentative and to be finalized with the Evaluation Team/ Evaluator(s)

Annexes

The following documents should be appended to the TOR when provided to the evaluator(s):
- UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation
- UNEG Ethical guidelines
- Programme/ Project document
- Any other related document/s

Annex 1

UNDG ITF Programme/ Project Evaluations

Recommended Questions on Development Effectiveness

Realization of development results (institutional and behavioral changes resulting from the programme/ project)
- What have been the specific benefits of the project to different beneficiary groups including men, women, children, youth and marginalized population groups?
- How the project has contributed to national priorities as identified in the Iraq National Development Strategy (NDS), the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)?
- Has the project created full time/ temporary employment opportunities? Provide sex-disaggregated numbers of any jobs created as a result of the project?
- Are there any unintended positive or negative results of the programmme/ project and how are those perceived by the stakeholders?

The question needs to address and assess gender balance and women involvement in all project/program stages including pre-analysis, design, implementation, in addition to assessing programme/ project outcomes (development objectives) on women.

Efficiency and effectiveness

Were the results achieved to date at a reasonable cost compared with alternative approaches to accomplishing the same development objectives/ results?

- To what extent the programme/ project and its components have addressed the underlying issues?
- How programme/ project results contribute to improved access and utilization of services?
- How did the programme/ project engage with stakeholders and beneficiaries in during project planning and implementation?

Relevance

- Has the programme/ project responded to the underlying development issues that provided rationale for the programme/ project? How?
- How the project strategies were tailored to the current programme/ project context and in line with the national policies and strategic plans?
- How did the programme/ project contribute to local/ national needs and priorities?
- Should the direction of future programme/ projects be changed to better reflect those needs and priorities?

Partnerships

- Who are the partners in this programme/ project? How they are/ were selected? Has the programme/ project forged new partnerships/ strengthened existing partnerships and how?
- What factors hindered or fostered effective partnership development?
- To what extent has the programme/ project contributed to capacity development of the involved partners?

Sustainability

- What is current status of the programme/ project components? Are functions and facilities still maintained? Who is responsible for the management and oversight of programme/ project facilities after the project closure?
- How far the programmme/ project activities can be self-sustained from domestic resources – financial, materials and human?
- What is current status of services provision in the selected facilities? Has the service provision been affected (negatively or positively) after the end of the programme/ project cycle and why?
- Has the programme/ project resulted in knowledge transfer from those who were trained and capacitated in different competencies and how?
- How the programme/ project addressed the issues of security during the implementation phase? What risk mitigation measures were undertaken and how successful were they?

Lessons learned and good practices

- What are the good practices that have resulted from the programme/ project? How and why some these practices can be labeled as a 'good practice'? Substantiate with evidence.
- What are the key lessons learned from programme/ project implementation?   What

recommendations could be replicated in similar programmes/ projects implemented in comparable situations?

- Are there any specific recommendations to be considered when designing similar programme/ projects in the future?

Annex 2
UNDG ITF Programme/ Project Evaluations

Recommended Questions on Operational Effectiveness

Alignment and Harmonization
- What efforts were made to ensure alignment between the programme/ project and national priorities?
- How did the project contribute to national priorities and the ICI benchmarks?
- How did the government facilitate alignment between the intended programme/ project results and the national priorities?
- How effective/ facilitative was the UNDG ITF project approval process? How did it contribute to improved coordination and coherence in the overall programme/ project management? How these mechanisms can be used for programme/ projects outside the UNDG ITF?
- What has been the role of Sector Outcome Team (SOT) structures in contributing to programme/ project planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting? What have been the key challenges?
- How project/ programme was designed? Was any assessment undertaken to inform programming? What has been the contribution of peer review and/ or SOTs to programme planning and design? What existing/ available national structures/ processes/ mechanisms were used in support of planning, implementation, management and monitoring of the project/ programme?
- What has been the role of donors in programme/ project design and planning?

Management of Development Results
- To what extent the programme/ project integrated the principles of RBM? What have been the key challenges and how these were addressed?
- What level of Government participation/ ownership was secured and maintained during programme/ project design? How?
- What were the major constraints/bottlenecks to effectively implement joint/ integrated programming? How did the programme/ project address the relevant crosscutting issues? What have been the key issues in integrating crosscutting issues?
- Did the project undertake a proper risk analysis, risk monitoring and management of risk?
- What risk mitigation strategies were developed and implemented?
- Did the project have any clear exit strategy? What arrangements were made to sustain programme/ project operational and programmatic structures?

Capacity Development Approach
- How did the project/ programme address capacity development of national partners?
- How the capacity gaps were identified and by who? Was any capacity assessment undertaken? If not, why?
- What capacity development approaches the project/ programme employed? What were the strengths and weaknesses?
- What instruments were used to monitor capacity development and what arrangements were made to ensure the sustainability of developed capacities?

National Ownership
- How did the programme/ project define and promote government ownership?
- What arrangements were made to ensure government ownership of the porgramme/ project?
- How the government was engaged during the transition phase – relief/ reconstruction to development?
- Was there any co-financing? If not, why and what efforts were made towards it?
- To what extent the government managed to lead and own the programme/ project? What were the key challenges?

Accountability
- Was the programme/ project results framework clear, logical and focused?
- What monitoring arrangements were in place? What were the key challenges? And how did the programme/ project team address those?
- Were adequate resources made available to support M&E at the various levels?
- What monitoring data was used for reporting? How was it collected, maintained and utilized?
- How were the national partners involved in the M&E of the programme/ project?
- Were any joint M&E initiatives (involving 2 or more UN agencies and/ or UN agency and national partner/s) undertaken? What systems were put in place to monitor programmes and projects remotely? How well they responded to agencies' and MDTF's reporting requirements? What have been the key challenges in monitoring and evaluation of the programme/ project?
- Did the programme/ project undertake any midterm and/ or annual review and/ or independent evaluations? If not, why? How were the national partners involved in these activities?
- What arrangements in place to share lessons and learning from the programme/ project within and outside the UNCT? If not, why?
- How did the programme/ project address the issue of donor visibility? If not, why?

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