



ILO - EVALUATION

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This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has been quality controlled by the ILO Evaluation Unit

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACRP3	Australian Community Rehabilitation Program
AUD	Australian Dollar
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BDS	Business Development Services
CAY	Conflict Affected Youth
CBO	Community-Based Organization(s)
CB-TREE	Community-Based Training for Rural Economic Empowerment
CO	Country Office of the ILO in Sri Lanka
CoC	Chamber of Commerce
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DoA	Department of Agriculture
DoCD	Department of Cooperative Development
DoFAR	Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
DS	Divisional Secretary
DSD	Divisional Secretariat Division
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
DWT	Decent Work Team
EC	Evaluation Criteria
EFC	Employers' Federation of Ceylon
FCSU	Fishermen's Cooperative Society Union
FHH	Female-Headed Household
GA	District Secretary <i>known locally as the Government Agent</i>
GN	Grama Niladhari
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GYB	Grow Your Business
HRD	Human Resource Development
IDP	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
iNGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LED	Local Economic Development
LEED	Local Empowerment through Economic Development
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoL&LR	Ministry of Labour and Labour Relations
MoLR&MP	Ministry of Labour Relations and Manpower
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPCS	Multipurpose Cooperative Society
MSE	Micro and Small Enterprises
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PPD	Public - Private Dialogue
PRODOC	Project Proposal
PTF	Presidential Task Force for Northern Development
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
ROAP	ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SRL	Sri Lanka
TCCS	Thrift and Credit Cooperative Society
ToR	Terms of Reference
TREE	Training for Rural Economic Empowerment
TST	Technical Support Team (AusAID)
UN	United Nations

UNDAF	United Nations Development Framework
US\$	American Dollar
VAV	Vavuniya District
VCD	Value Chain Development
Xcom	Ex-combatants

Executive Summary

Background & Context

Summary of the Project Purpose, Logic and Structure

1) The project's overall objective is to contribute to poverty reduction, sustainable job creation and peace building through an improved environment with strengthened governance, effective community-based services and public-private partnership that economically empower vulnerable groups in conflict-affected populations. The project's intervention logic is based on the rapid deployment of the United Nations' International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Community-Based Training for Economic Empowerment (CB TREE) approach, enhanced by support for value chain development (VCD) for micro and small enterprises (MSE) and business development services (BDS), including business placements for female headed households (FHH), people with disabilities (PWD), ex-combatants (Xcom) and conflict affected youth (CAY) in local businesses.

2) The project's intervention logic is summarised in the form of a Logical Framework Approach (LFA) matrix comprising 74 sub activities, 37 main activities and 17 outcomes, within six main project components. The project was planned to be implemented in 17 Divisional Secretariat Divisions (DSD) in three districts (*i.e.*, Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya) in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.

3) The project planned to adopt a four tiered, bottom-up governance structure consisting of community level sector associations and community based organisations (CBO), divisional level Public Private Dialogue (PPD) cells, district level MSE forums and a national Project Advisory Committee (PAC). The Country Director of the ILO Country Office (CO) in Colombo is responsible for the overall implementation of the project. A project management team has been appointed to run the project activities under the guidance of the PAC. At the district and field levels the project is implemented through the ILO's field office in Vavuniya and a sub office in Kilinochchi.

Present Situation of the Project

4) The project design has undergone significant changes since commencing in June 2010. The project has shifted away from the original CB TREE approach, finally adopting a market drive approach to local economic development (LED) in October 2011, as the conceptual framework underlying the project's sub project activities. The geographic scope of the project as has also altered considerably. The project is operational in only one of three districts originally proposed, while Kilinochchi District and Mullaitivu District have become areas of operation under the project.

5) The project has completed the implementation of 25 sub projects in three districts and at the provincial level, with a total programme delivery value of US\$421,133. A further 25 sub projects are ongoing at a cost of US\$855,365. One sub project has been suspended, one sub project has been terminated and two sub projects have yet to be signed. Out of the 54 sub projects that have been initiated or planned by the project, 26 are in support of economic infrastructure development at a cost of US\$1,128,863, equivalent to 75% of programme delivery costs. Twenty eight sub projects have been initiated by the project in support of BDS, at a cost of US\$383,833.

6) The first phase of the project is scheduled to end in June 2013. A formal decision is expected from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) in January 2013, following the completion of AusAID's Mid Term Review (MTR) of the third cycle of the Australian Community Rehabilitation Programme (ACRP3. The formal decision will decide if the project continues into the second phase of the ACRP3 (2013 – 2015) or ends in June 2013.

Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

7) The purpose of the evaluation is fourfold:

- I. To review the original project design, because the conditions have substantially changed in the past three years
- II. To review the project implementation towards longer-term goals rather than short-term post crisis response, as stated in the original project document (PRODOC)
- III. To identify constraints, achievements, best practices and failures and to make recommendations
- IV. To modify strategies to be reflected in the design of a second phase of the Local Empowerment through Economic Development (LEED) project.

8) The scope of the evaluation is to verify the project's implementation from the drafting of the proposal in March / April 2010 through to August 2012. The geographical scope of the evaluation encompassed project partners and stakeholders in Colombo and those in the three districts in the Northern Province in which the project is operational (*i.e.*, Vavuniya District, Kilinochchi District and Mullaitivu District).

9) The primary users of the evaluation will be the project management team in field, the ILO's Country Office (CO) in Colombo and ILO's technical and administrative backstopping units in the Decent Work Team (DWT) in New Delhi, the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) in Bangkok and ILO's Headquarters (HQ) in Geneva. Offices that will be responsible for preparing the revised PRODOC.

10) The secondary users of the evaluation are intended to be AusAID, the Ministry of Labour and Labour Relations (MoL&LR) and members of the PAC. AusAID will be provided with access to the findings of the evaluation, to demonstrate ILO's evaluation oversight and also to feed into AusAID's MTR of the ACRP3. The MoL&LR and other members of the PAC will review the findings of the evaluation and provide guidance to the ILO CO with respect to the formulation of the second phase of the project.

11) Representatives of the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries, the project's partners at the divisional, district and national level, including the other UN agencies, nongovernmental organisations and the private sector formed the five main stakeholder groups that contributed to the evaluation.

Methodology of Evaluation

12) The evaluation was guided by seven evaluation criteria (EC) and 28 key evaluation questions, as provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR). Supplementary of questions were added by the evaluator during the course of the evaluation. An evaluation matrix was developed for the evaluation by correlating the seven EC with the five categories of key stakeholder groups and other data sources identified by the evaluator in consultation with ILO's CO in Colombo.

13) A collection of standard evaluation methods and data collection instruments were used to gather information germane to the evaluation. The evaluation commenced with a review of relevant secondary data including the PRODOC, project progress reports, project annual work plans and AusAID's Technical Support Team (TST) evaluations. Primary data was gathered by the evaluation from representatives of all five categories of key stakeholders, using key informant interviews and focus groups discussions.

14) Twenty nine key informant interviews, focus group discussions and telephone conversations were used to gather qualitative and quantitative primary data from 82 Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and international contributors). Thirty five of the contributors to the evaluation were women (43%). Contributors to the evaluation included representatives of the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries, government and non government partners and the private sector.

Main Findings and Conclusions

15) The modified revised project design is providing development assistance¹ to conflict affected communities in seven DSD in three districts, based on a market driven approach to LED. Two main delivery systems (*i.e.*, reconstruction / development of economic infrastructure and BDS) have been adopted by the project to meet the development needs of communities emerging out of conflict. The project's use of sector studies, value chain analysis, territorial diagnosis and institutional mapping has enabled the project to identify new local economic development interventions (and flag potential constraints), beyond the traditionally important paddy and fisheries sectors. The project's modified revised project design is creating new income opportunities for recently resettled IDPs, including MSM entrepreneurs.

16) The project's process planning approach is germane to the immediate needs of the project's direct beneficiaries (*i.e.*, securing and or increasing daily household income and employment) and is strongly endorsed by the government at the district, divisional and local government level. The project's process planning approach has also been approved by the PTF. The project's sub project activities support district and provincial level departmental plans including the Northern Province Development Programme (*Wadakkil Wasantham / Uthuru Wasanthaya*) and the government's overall drive to develop economic infrastructure and create employment in the north.

17) The modified revised project design is relevant to the economic and social priorities of the project's partners and is significant in terms of being one of the first donor funded projects to respond to the need to replace humanitarian with development assistance, as the post conflict recovery continues in Sri Lanka. The project is consistent with and will contribute meaningfully to ILO's Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) SRL107 and SRL102 and to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Outcome 1 and Outcome 3.

18) The evaluation raises concerns regarding the soundness of the research undertaken to formulate the PRODOC; the effectiveness of the quality appraisal procedures conducted by ILO to evaluate the PRODOC and the suitability of the CB TREE concept in the immediate phase of post conflict recovery in northern Sri Lanka. The project's original conceptualization, re-conceptualisation and modified re-conceptualisation, are all consistent with ILO's core values and congruent with the goals and objectives of the ACRP3.

19) The original project design is invalid and the LFA matrix is not logical. The implementation plan and the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework are problematic and impractical. The project design as encapsulated by the LFA matrix does not reflect the activities, outputs, outcomes and component objectives that the project is delivering or the geographic areas now covered by the project.

20) The project has been successful in involving project partners in the implementation of project activities and in bringing about a sense of ownership at the local, divisional and district level. The project has been equally proactive in responding to the needs requested by the project partners and to changes in the project environment.

21) The project's effectiveness cannot be measured against the project's outputs, outcomes and objectives because the modified revised project activities are not causally linked to the LFA matrix. The project is contributing towards the project's overall objective and goal. The project's effectiveness cannot be measured against the project's target number of direct and indirect beneficiaries because the monitoring data collected is incomplete and the definition of indirect beneficiaries is flawed.

¹ as opposed to humanitarian assistance

22) It is not possible to draw reliable, independently verifiable conclusions regarding the efficiency of the project in terms of cost per beneficiary, because the monitoring data is incomplete and the definition of indirect beneficiaries is flawed. The cost variation of sub projects and the relatively higher cost of the most recently implemented / planned sub projects could be considered a concern, if the project ends in June 2013.

23) The quality of the infrastructure, equipment and training delivered by the project is high and project's implementation strategy has had a positive impact on the capacity, confidence and self respect of CBOs and project partners. The strategy has also ensured a high standard of design, construction and supervision. The project's cost efficiency is low and the project's plan to disburse 60% of programme delivery costs within the last nine months of the project could be considered a concern, if the project does not extend beyond June 2013.

24) As it often happens in a post crisis context, the project is overly dependent on the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) for planning and decision making and lacks the capacity to develop an adequate performance or results based M&E framework. The evaluation raises concerns regarding the extent to which equality is being addressed in sub project planning and implementation. The ILO's CO in Colombo could do more to assist the project with quality control of project reports.

25) The governance structure proposed in the PRODOC was unrealistic and is non-operational. The accountability of the project to the project's beneficiaries / partners at all levels is limited. The project's communication strategy is simple but effective and meets the needs of the MoL&LR. Although the project has had discussions with United Nations (UN) and other agencies and identified areas for collaboration and synergies, the project could do more to represent the ILO at UN and interagency meetings in the three districts.

26) The main impacts emerging from the project relate to poverty reduction, job creation and the development of economic infrastructure. The project is also contributing to capacity building of CBO, other civil society organisations (CSO), government authorities and nurturing north / south business cooperation. The project has had less impact on issues related to human resource development and attitudes and values relating to decent work and equality. The project is likely to have both positive and negative impacts on the environment.

27) The likelihood of sub projects that have been completed or are nearing completion being sustained is high. The evaluation's observation validates the project's Exit Strategy. There are concerns about the sustainability of a small number of recently commissioned sub projects. There are also concerns regarding the extent to which the project's emerging impacts are reaching the project's principal target group and if they are, whether these positive impacts will be sustained

Main Recommendations

28) **Recommendation 1:** The project's market driven LED design and implementation strategy, together with the experiences and the knowledge gained by the project in the context of the transition from humanitarian to development assistance in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka should be shared more widely with UN, other agencies and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). The project's achievements should also be used to leverage more support for market driven LED assistance to conflict affected communities, which are no longer in need of humanitarian assistance. **Responsibility:** ILO Country Office, ROAP and Headquarters. **Priority:** Medium, by December 2014.

29) **Recommendation 2:** ILO offices at the country, regional and headquarters level should reflect on the weaknesses in the quality appraisal process that led to the submission of a sub standard proposal to the AusAID's ACRP3. As appropriate, remedial action should be taken to strengthen the capacity of staff and internal procedures, to improve the quality assurance of

future concepts and proposals. **Responsibility:** ILO CO, ROAP and HQ. **Priority:** Medium, by December 2014.

30) **Recommendation 3:** The project's LFA matrix, implementation plan and M&E framework should be revised, updated and redesigned and incorporated as an addendum to the PRODOC. The revised, updated and redesigned project management tools should reflect all sub projects that have been completed, are ongoing and those that are planned to be completed before end of June 2013. The project's goal, overall objective and target numbers of direct and indirect beneficiaries should not change. The new M&E framework should encompass AusAID's six Domains of Change. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by January 2013.

31) **Recommendation 4:** If the project proceeds into the second phase of the ACRP3, a new PRODOC must be written. The new PRODOC should clearly set out the project's justification, geographic scope and the problem that the project is seeking to address during the second phase. The project's direct and indirect beneficiaries must be accurately defined. The project's modified revised conceptual framework and the assumptions and risks associated with the revised project design should be clearly set out. The activity and programme delivery costs for the second phase should be justified by an activity based budget, consistent with the new project design. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

32) **Recommendation 5:** The Country Director is advised to consider temporarily suspending the approval of any new economic infrastructure development projects until the revised LFA matrix is annexed to the PRODOC and the effectiveness and cost efficiency of all sub projects can be reliably and independently verified, using the redesigned performance or results based M&E framework. The project should continue to implement all ongoing sub projects and any new BDS sub projects in support of human resource development, decent work and equality during the revision of the LFA Matrix and the internal assessment of the project's effectiveness and cost efficiency. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, with immediate effect.

33) **Recommendation 6:** More support should be provided to the project with regard to M&E and for quality assurance of project reports. In the event that the project is extended until May 2015, the steps that will be taken to phase out the CTA and hand over project management responsibilities to a national member of staff must to be explained in the new PRODOC. The new PRODOC should consider a provision to recruit a senior female member of staff responsible for either BDS (decent work and equality) or M&E: a woman who has experience of incorporating the experiences, knowledge, and interests of vulnerable groups into programme and project plans. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

34) **Recommendation 7:** In the event that the project is extended until May 2015, the revised PRODOC should contain a new governance structure for the project at the district level. The new governance structure must be realistic. It should be linked to the ILO's tripartite constituents and key project partners at the district and the national level. The new governance should ensure that the PAC receives regular reports on the project's progress. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

35) **Recommendation 8:** The ILO could do more to keep AusAID updated on the project's communications outputs and ensure that the role of the MoL&LR in the project is disseminated widely among project partners at the district, divisional and local level. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** Medium, by end of each quarter.

36) **Recommendation 9:** The project needs to initiate more sub projects in support of BDS that focus on decent work and equality, within the time remaining under the first phase of the project. If the project proceeds into a second phase, greater emphasis should to be given to sub projects that focus on strengthening, challenging and changing attitudes and values of individuals, businesses and institutions to decent work and equality. New economic infrastructure development activities should be included under the second phase of the project. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

37) **Recommendations 10:** All sub project proposals should contain a brief analysis of the potential positive and negative impacts of the sub project on the environment. When potentially negative impacts are identified, appropriate measures to mitigate these negative impacts must be clearly set out in the sub project proposal. If the project continues into the second phase, the revised PRODOC should set out the environmental impact assessments procedures that will be followed by the project to plan and implement all new sub projects. **Responsibility:** ILO CO. **Priority:** High, by December 2012. Moderate, by March 2013.

Important Lessons Learnt

38) Concern regarding the appropriateness ILO's modified version of the CB TREE approach to meet the needs of recently resettled IDPs in conflict affected villages in the north of Sri Lankan, was the significant lesson learnt from the evaluation. Concise, brief listing of lessons learned, taken from main report.

Good Practices

39) The following five good practices were observed

- I. The prominence the project has given to the need to increase the pace of transition from short term humanitarian assistance to long term development assistance, in support of the social and economic recovery of post conflict communities in the north of Sri Lanka.
- II. The project's strategy of implementing sub projects through CBO and private sector partners, rather than contracting implementation to third party local non government organisations (NGO) or private contractors;
- III. The project's commitment to working closely with and in support of the government's administrative authorities and in accordance with local and central government development's priorities and plans;
- IV. The project's emphasis on sustainability by targeting economically viable sub project interventions, in association with established and or apex CBO;
- V. The project's facilitation and promotion of technology transfers and mentoring from the south to the north, through the private sector, contributing to dialogue and reconciliation.

Brief Background on the Project and its Logic

Contextual Background

40) Almost thirty years of armed conflict in Sri Lanka between the GoSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), hereafter referred to as the conflict, ended on 16th May 2009. During the course of the conflict millions of Sri Lankans were displaced, many of them on several occasions. Social and economic infrastructure was damaged and more often destroyed, particularly in the north and the east of the country: areas which for long period of time were under the de facto control of the LTTE. Tens of thousands of Sri Lankans died during the conflict, the majority of them from the north and east of the country.

41) The concluding 18 months of the conflict were particularly intense, as the security forces of the GoSL launched what became the final military offensive of the conflict, leading to the defeat of the LTTE at Mullivaikal in the Puthukuddieruppu DSD, in Mullaitivu District. During this final campaign the entire population of Kilinochchi District, Mullaitivu District and Vavuniya North DSD in Vavuniya District, over 300,000 people, were internally displaced. Internally displaced persons (IDP) were accommodated by the government at the Menik Farm Welfare Centre and provided with assistance by the GoSL, the UN, international government organisations (iNGO) and NGO, with financial assistance from the international community. The geographical sequence of displacement (*i.e.*, Vavuniya North DSD, Kilinochchi District and Mullaitivu District) was determined by the progress of the GoSL's military offensive and the concomitant retreat of the LTTE.

42) Within three months of the end of the conflict the GoSL commenced the return of the IDPs to villages that had been cleared of land mines and unexploded ordinance. The return of IDP began first in Vavuniya North DSD and was followed by the resettlement of IDPs in Kilinochchi District and finally to Mullaitivu District. Six months after the end of the conflict, *i.e.*, by October 2009, 25,474 IDPs had been returned to places of origin². At the time when the project was originally researched and written, the GoSL had begun to accelerate the process of resettlement. By March 2010 just under 50% of IDPs originally displaced to Menik Farm, 180,000 IDPs, had been resettled across eight districts in the north and east of the country³.

43) A multitude of UN agencies, iNGO and NGO, financed by multilateral and bilateral donors, provided a variety of humanitarian assistance in support of the resettlement process. Humanitarian assistance included temporary shelter, water and sanitation, social and economic infrastructure reconstruction and development, livelihood assistance, cash for work and cash grants.

44) While there may have been problems in terms of coordination, communication, coverage of target groups and differences of opinion on the resettlement process, the fact remains that less than two years after the end of the conflict 371,869 IDPs had been resettled by the GoSL with assistance from the international community (28th April 2011). In April 2011 20,153 IDPs were then awaiting resettlement at Menik Farm Welfare Centre⁴. Despite the many social, economic and simple human challenges facing resettled IDPs, economic activities have been resumed and the general standard of living of the vast majority of the population in the Northern Province has begun to improve.

² LKRN032 Report # 11: 10 – 23 October 2009

³ LKM0492 Arrivals since 01 April 2008 - Updated as of 11 March 2010

⁴ Joint Humanitarian and Early Recovery Update: January-March 2011 – Report # 30"

Funding Arrangements

45) The LEED project (hereafter referred to as the project) is an AusAID funded project under the ACRP3. The project is implemented by the ILO, under the auspices of the MoL&LR, in conflict affected districts of northern Sri Lanka.

46) The project was researched and designed in March and April 2010 as a two phase intervention to be implemented over a period of five years. The total budget for the five year project is AUD5.59 million. The project agreement was signed between the ILO and AusAID in May 2010. The duration of the first phase of the project is for a period of three years from June 2010 to June 2013⁵. The total budget allocation for the first phase of the project is AUD3.39 million. The second phase of the project is scheduled to commence from June 2013 until May 2015, subject to approval from AusAID, with a prospective budget allocation of AUD2.20 million.

Intervention Logic

47) The project set out to address a large number of problems faced by IDP resettling in villages affected by the conflict during the course of the past twenty six years. These included the relatively high number female-headed families and families with disabled members facing extremely vulnerable situations and the high levels of unemployment and under-employment among young women and men due their inability to complete formal education and or their involvement in the LTTE. Prevailing economic inequalities and the potential for ethnic tensions arising out of unequal business relations discriminative policies in the past were also to be addressed by the project, as well as the dependency of people on subsistence agriculture and the fisheries. The project also sought to address the lack of productive assets and the obstacles blocking access to markets. The project also set out to improve deteriorated social and economic infrastructure and ameliorate the limited access to and ineffectiveness of low quality business support services. The dearth of skills training and the fragmentation of value chains, which were perceived to be incapable of linking rural MSE to larger markets at the district, regional and national level, were also problems that the project set out to address according to the PRODOC.

48) The project's long term goal is 'to contribute to sustainable peace and conflict transformation by reducing conflict related economic inequalities through economic empowerment of the most vulnerable populations'. The project's overall objective, which is intended to contribute towards this goal, is "to contribute to poverty reduction, sustainable job creation and peace building through an improved environment with strengthened governance, effective community-based services and public-private partnership that economically empower vulnerable groups in conflict-affected populations'.

49) To achieve this overall objective the project proposed the rapid deployment of an enhanced version of the ILO's CB-TREE approach, hereafter referred to as CB TREE *plus*. CB-TREE involves vocational skills training at the community level, followed by entrepreneurship development and the creation of group enterprises that are then provided with start-up capital to run their business.

50) The project's proposed CB TREE *plus* concept derives from ILO's observations that newly formed micro enterprises can be vulnerable, especially when trying to survive in conflict-affected economies if they lack of capital, if their clients have limited purchasing power of clients and if the MSE lack of access to markets and supplies and support services. Newly formed micro-enterprises therefore need the support of VCD inputs targeting the sectors where the new businesses will operate. According to the project's intervention logic, VCD was intended to enhance viability, increase market access and ensure supplies and services to the newly established businesses, operated by the most vulnerable community members.

⁵ The duration of the project was originally up to May 2013, but has been extended by one month with the approval of AusAID.

51) Local enterprises that were functioning prior to and during displacement, which were crucial in the value chain (e.g., collectors and transporters of produce) would also be re-activated and the capacity of local service providers would be strengthened to render permanent and higher quality services with respect to VCD. Larger businesses at the top-end of the value chain would also be encouraged to assist the project through corporate social responsibility and from a commercial perspective as buyers of primary producers, in their respective value chains. According to the project's intervention logic newly formed micro-enterprises and entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups would also be assisted further through the provision of community level common equipment (e.g., food-processing or packaging equipment) and given a voice at the local level through PPD Cells.

52) Recognising that not all FHH, PWD, Xcom and CAY in the project's target area might desire to become entrepreneurs, the project intended to meet these individuals' needs through the creation of a significant number of business placements. Business placements would be accompanied by financial injections into the respective local businesses, in order for them to grow and to employ more people. Placement of vulnerable people in the public and the private sectors was also envisaged by the project, especially for PWD and CAY. The project's intervention logic is summarised in a LFA matrix which comprises 74 sub activities and activities, 37 outputs and 17 outcomes, under six main project components.

Organizational Arrangements for Project Implementation

53) At a national level the project is implemented by the ILO in association with the MoL&LR. The project planned to adopt a four tiered, bottom-up governance structure consisting of

- i. Community level sector associations and CBOs
- ii. Divisional level PPD cells
- iii. District level MSE Forums
- iv. and a national level PAC

54) The Country Director of the ILO CO in Colombo is responsible for the overall implementation of the project. A project management team has been appointed to run the project activities under the guidance of the PAC. At the district and field levels the project is implemented through the ILO's field office in Vavuniya and a sub office in Kilinochchi. The project team is led by an international CTA. The CTA is supported by two national technical experts, two field coordinators, one assistant field coordinator, an administration and finance officer and three drivers. The project's management team receive technical and administrative support from the ILO CO in Colombo and technical assistance from international technical experts based in the ILO's DWT in New Delhi, the ROAP in Bangkok and the Crisis Response Programme in Geneva.

Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

55) The purpose of the evaluation is fourfold:

- V. To review the original project design, because the conditions have substantially changed in the past three years
- VI. To review the project implementation towards longer-term goals rather than short-term post crisis response, as stated in the original PRODC
- VII. To identify constraints, achievements, best practices and failures and to make recommendations
- VIII. To modify strategies to be reflected in the design of a second phase of the LEED project.

56) The scope of the evaluation is to verify the project's implementation from the drafting of the proposal in March / April 2010 through to August 2012: the time at which AusAID's MTR of the ACRP3 was expected⁶. The geographical scope of the evaluation encompassed project partners and stakeholders in Colombo and those in the three districts in the Northern Province in which the project is operational (*i.e.*, Vavuniya District, Kilinochchi District and Mullaitivu District).

57) The primary users of the evaluation will be the project management team in field, the ILO CO in Colombo and ILO's technical and administrative backstopping units in the DWT based in the ILO's CO in New Delhi, the ROAP in Bangkok and ILO's HQ in Geneva. These offices will be responsible for preparing the revised PRODOC.

58) The secondary users of the evaluation are intended to be AusAID, the MoL&LR and members of the PAC. AusAID will be provided with access to the findings of the evaluation, to demonstrate ILO's evaluation oversight and also to feed into AusAID's ACRP3 MTR of the project. The MoL&LR and other members of the PAC will review the findings of the evaluation and provide guidance to the ILO CO with respect to the formulation of the second phase of the project.

59) The ToR of the evaluation (see Annex 1) were drafted and circulated in August and finalised September 2012. The evaluation mission, amounting to a total of 25 person days, commenced on 15th October 2012 (see Annex 2). A summary of the main findings of the evaluation, conclusions and draft recommendations were presented to the ILO CO on 6th November 2012 and discussed on 8th November 2012. The findings were discussed with AusAID as part of the MTR of the ACRP3 on the 12th November and discussed with the PAC on 14th November 2012. A draft of the Final Evaluation Report was submitted to the ILO on 22nd November 2012. The evaluation was undertaken by Steve Creech, an independent evaluation consultant.

60) The evaluation was managed by Federico Negro, ILO's capacity building and knowledge development specialist based at ILO's CRISIS Response Programme in ILO's HQ in Geneva. The ILO Regional Evaluation Officer, based at ILO's ROAP was responsible for ensuring the quality and standard of process of the Final Evaluation Report. ILO's CO in Colombo handled all contractual arrangements with the evaluator and together with the project team in Vavuniya provided all necessary logistical and other assistance that was requested by the evaluator.

⁶ The MTR was subsequently delayed until November 2012.

Evaluation Methodology

61) The evaluation was guided by seven EC namely,

- EC1. Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention / ILO's Country Strategy and its influence on the project design
- EC2. Conceptualisation
- EC3. The logic and validity of project design
- EC4. Effectiveness
- EC5. Efficiency of resources use
- EC6. Effectiveness of management arrangements
- EC7. Emerging impact / Future direction.

62) A total of 28 key evaluation questions were associated with the seven EC (see Annex 1). In addition a number of supplementary of questions were added by the evaluator during the course of the evaluation (see Annex 2).

63) An evaluation matrix was developed for the evaluation by correlating the seven EC criteria with five categories of key stakeholder groups and other data sources identified by the evaluator in consultation with ILO's CO in Colombo (see Annex 2). The stakeholder groups represented the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries; the project's partners at the divisional, district and national level and encompassed the project's potential for partnerships with the private sector, NGO and other UN agencies. The evaluation matrix was used to assign EC and key evaluation questions to key stakeholder groups. The evaluation matrix ensured the evaluation achieved sufficient coverage of key stakeholder groups, adequately triangulated information and avoided unnecessary duplication of evaluation effort.

64) A collection of standard evaluation methods and data collection instruments were used to gather information germane to the evaluation. The evaluation commenced with a review of relevant secondary data including the PRODOC, project progress reports, project annual work plans and AusAID's TST evaluations. The review of secondary data subsequently included sector briefs and assessments, value chain development exercises, monitoring data and financial information provided by the project management and ILO's CO in Colombo.

65) Primary data was gathered by the evaluation from representatives of all five categories of key stakeholders, using key informant interviews and focus groups discussions. The evaluation mission spent six days in the project's field location, covering five DSD in three districts (*i.e.*, Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu) in the Northern Province (see Annex 3). The geographic scope of the evaluation was decided by the consultant. The field sites visited by the evaluation in each district were selected by project staff, based on the status and type of sub projects implemented and or completed. Additional primary data was sourced through telephone interviews with the private sector and by email from the ILO's ROAP in Bangkok and CRISIS Response Programme in Geneva)

66) Twenty nine key informant interviews, focus group discussions and telephone conversations were used to gather qualitative and quantitative primary data from 82 Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and international contributors (see Annex 2). Thirty five of the contributors to the evaluation were women (43%). Contributors to the evaluation included representatives of the project's direct beneficiaries (*i.e.*, vulnerable groups) including FHH, W, Xcom, PWD and CAY. Contributors to the evaluation also included representatives of the project's designated indirect beneficiaries (*i.e.*, micro and small entrepreneurs in the targeted conflict-affected communities, service providers and local government). Collectively the contributors to the evaluation were associated with 29 out of the 54 sub projects implemented to date by the project⁷

⁷ excluding the project management team and ILO staff in the CO in Colombo

67) The evaluation was inevitably limited by the time available to conduct interviews and meet representatives of the project's key stakeholder groups in the districts and in Colombo. The evaluation was unable to schedule interviews with the District Secretary (GA) in Mullaitivu District and the Divisional Secretary (DS) in Poonaryn DSD. The evaluation was also unable to meet the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO UN) and Zuidoost-Azië in Vavuniya, as representatives of these agencies were unavailable at the time of the evaluation in Vavuniya. Potential source of bias in the evaluation include the selection of field sites by the project management team. This risk was mitigated by the frankness of follow up interviews and discussions with the project management team, which explored both the positive and the negatives aspects of the project's implementation.

68) The evaluation was conducted in compliance with evaluation procedures and standards and following the ethical safeguards specified in the ILO's Policy Guidelines for Results Based Evaluations. The Final Evaluation Report was compiled in accordance with the instructions set out in the ILO's Evaluation Unit's Check List 5: Preparing the Evaluation Report.

Review of Project Implementation

69) The project agreement between the ILO and AusAID was signed in May 2010. The project commenced operation on 1st June 2010, for a period of three years concluding on the 30th May 2013⁸. In the first quarter of the project the ILO initiated compliance procedures with government protocols and guidelines for implementation of projects in Northern Province, through the Presidential Task Force (PTF) for Resettlement, Development and Security of the Northern Province. During discussions with the PTF the Ministry of Labour Resources & Manpower (MoLR&MP) was identified as the project's principal partner on behalf of the GoSL⁹. Discussions with the GA in Vavuniya led to the identification of Vavuniya North DSD as the principal geographic focus of the project's initial implementation.

70) Consultations and negotiations between the ILO and the MoLR&MP took three months to complete, during which time the ILO's CO in Colombo was operating without a Country Director and the MoLR&MP was reorganised and became the MoL&LR. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in respect of the PRODOC was signed between the ILO and the MoL&LR on 15th October 2010. The ILO and the MoL&LR formally launched the project on 24th October 2010, during a visit to Vavuniya by the Honourable Minister for Labour and Labour Relations, Gamini Lokuge. The MoU signed between the ILO and the MoL&LR was formally exchanged during the honourable minister's visit to Vavuniya. The ILO received official clearance from the PTF to commence project activities Vavuniya North DSD in Vavuniya District on 6th December 2011.

71) In parallel to the ILO's CO in Colombo's efforts to finalise the MoU with the MoL&LR and obtain security clearance from the PTF to operationalise the project, ILO's HQ in Geneva commenced the CTA selection process. International applications for the CTA post were called in June 2010 and candidates were short listed and interviewed in August and September of the same year. As a result of a delay in issuing a formal offer for the CTA's position to the most preferred candidate, the most preferred candidate undertook another mission restricting his earliest availability to January 2011.

72) In response to concerns expressed by AusAID regarding the delayed commencement of the project, the ILO's CO in Colombo recruited a short term consultant, specialising in the Training for Economic Empowerment (TREE) methodology and value chain develop, between September and November 2010. The short term consultant developed operational strategies and

⁸ As noted elsewhere the project's duration has been extended by one month to 30th June 2013.

⁹ In the PRODOC the Ministry of Labour Relations and Manpower, the Ministry of Vocational and Technical Training, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, the Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services and Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation were indicated as potential implementation partners of the project, but no lead partner was formally identified.

practical tools and guidelines needed to effectively and efficiently implement the project. The short term consultant also conducted district level workshop for representatives of nine potential partners of the proposed MSE Form in Vavuniya, focusing on participatory planning and preparation of project proposals. The short term consultant completed several environmental scans of potential project villages in Vavuniya North DSD during his assignment.

73) The district level workshop was used to gather recommendations on methodologies, proposal formats and service delivery for subsequent inclusion in CB TREE tools and instruments. In addition to these activities general support and logistic activities were also carried out by the ILO's CO in Colombo during this period. Preparations were made to set up the project office and procure vehicles and equipment for a field office in Vavuniya. A field coordinator was also recruited and the project completed the ILO's systems approach and standard operating procedures for development intervention in post conflict situations.

74) The project became fully operational on 19th of January 2011 following the arrival of the CTA and the recruitment of national experts on LED and VCD, a field coordinator, an assistant field coordinator, an administration and finance officer and drivers. The project's initial geographic scope of operation focused on one DSD in Vavuniya District. Three sub projects had commenced by the end of the project's first year (May 2011).

75) On 3rd June 2011 the project's first work plan (2011 – 2012¹⁰) was submitted by the ILO to AusAID, for activities to be implemented in Vavuniya North DSD in Vavuniya District and five DSD in Kilinochchi District. The project obtained approval from the PTF to implement the project in Kilinochchi District and in Mullaitivu District in August 2011. By the end of the project's second year, 43 sub projects had been initiated in three districts and at the provincial level. Eight sub projects (19%) had been completed by the end of project's second year *i.e.*, May 2012.

76) On 15 March 2012 the ILO submitted the project's second work plan to AusAID, for the period June 2012 to May 2013 describing the project's continued activities in Vavuniya North DSD and Kilinochchi District and the project's proposed expansion of interventions into DSD in Mullaitivu District. At the time of undertaking the evaluation 54 sub projects had been initiated by the project in three districts and at the provincial level. 25 sub projects had been completed (48%) at the time of the evaluation. One sub project had been terminated and one sub project has been suspended.

Presentation of Finding as per the Evaluation Criteria

EC1: Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention / ILO Country Strategy and its influence on project design

77) The project's relevance to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery in Sri Lanka and how the project contributes to ILO's DWCP outcomes (SRL 102 and SRL 107), UNDAF's outcomes (Outcome 1 and 3) and national development plans, formed the basis of the first sub section of the evaluation. The degree to which the project has played its role and created synergies among other UN implemented projects in conflict affected areas is addressed later under EC6: Effectiveness of management arrangements, which also covers inter-agency cooperation.

78) In this section of the evaluation 'the project' refers to the modified revised project design as opposed to the one described in the PRODOC. The modified revised project design is providing development assistance (as opposed to humanitarian assistance) to conflict affected communities, based on a market driven approach to LED with two main delivery systems. The first of these is the reconstruction or development of economic infrastructure in four key sectors of the local economy *i.e.*, paddy, other agricultural crops, coastal fisheries and micro, small and

¹⁰ AusAID's financial year runs from June to the following May.

medium enterprise (MSME) development. The second of the project's two delivery mechanisms is the provision of BDS, including technical, management, administrative and financial human resource development, decent work and equality. BDS are provided to producers and producer associations, local and central government, the private sector and to civil society organisations.

79) There are considerable differences in the nature of the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of IDPs resettled in conflict affected villages in each of the three districts in which the project is operational. These differences reflect the chronology of displacement of IDPs, the intensification and conclusion of the conflict in Mullaitivu District and the GoSL's programme of IDP resettlement, which have characterised the conflict and the post conflict recovery process since January 2009.

80) At the time of the evaluation the socio-economic recovery of IDPs was most pronounced and most widespread in Vavuniya North DSD. The recovery appeared to be more moderate and less extensive in Kilinochchi District and lowest and most restricted in Mullaitivu District. The project's delivery of sub project interventions reflects the differing degree of social and economic capacity to absorb development assistance, as opposed to humanitarian assistance, in each district. As of August 2012 the project has initiated 25 sub projects in Vavuniya North DSD (16 completed), 14 sub projects in Kilinochchi District (2 completed), six sub projects in Mullaitivu District (none completed) and nine at the provincial level (six completed).

81) The project's two main sectors for sub project intervention - paddy and fisheries - are consistent with the principal sources of employment and income immediately available to IDPs resettled in the three districts. According to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka the gross extent of land used for paddy cultivation in the Northern Province increased by 179% during the main (*maha*) paddy cultivation season in 2010/11. Paddy production increased by 112% to 205,507mt in 2010/11. The greatest increases in the extent of paddy cultivation were reported in Kilinochchi District and in Vavuniya District¹¹

82) In the fisheries sector fish catch in the Northern Province increased by 38% in 2011. However the relative contribution of the Northern Province to the total marine fish production in Sri Lanka remained only 12% in 2011, compared to 41% in 1983¹². According to the Central Bank the shortfall underlined the need to continue to increase the fishery fleet in the Northern Province, alongside the improvement in fishery infrastructure. The project is responding to these demands in Kilinochchi District and in Mullaitivu District.

83) The project's use of sector studies, value chain analysis, territorial diagnosis and institutional mapping has enabled the project to identify potential local economic development interventions (and flag potential constraints), beyond these traditionally important sectors (*i.e.*, fruit crops, agro-mechanical workshops, the construction sector). This has created new income opportunities for recently resettled IDPs, including entrepreneurs.

84) The project is germane to the immediate needs of the project's direct beneficiaries: securing and or increasing daily household income and employment. The project's reconstruction and development of private sector and cooperatively owned rice mills has reduced paddy producers' processing costs (*i.e.*, transport) and increased the farm gate price received by paddy producers by at least LKR 10 per kilo. The project's support of Multipurpose Cooperatives Societies (MPCS) in particular, has resulted in an increase in the funds received by the MPCS from the central government. These funds, millions of Sri Lankan Rupees, have been used by the MPCS to purchase paddy at government recommended prices.

85) In the fisheries sector the project's interventions have reduced the costs of purchasing 19½ft coastal fishing craft, created new employment opportunities and increased the availability of credit to boat owners and fishermen through Fishermen's Cooperative Society Unions (FCSU). Income and employment opportunities have been created through the papaya cultivation, MSME

¹¹ Press Release, Economic Research Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, May 2011.

¹² Annual Report. Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011.

development and job placements in association with the Chambers of Commerce (CoC) in Vavuniya District and in Kilinochchi District and the Employers Federation of Ceylon (EFC) in Colombo.

86) The project is strongly endorsed by the government at the district, divisional and local government level and has been approved by the PTF. The project is working in close cooperation with the GA and in accordance with district level development plans. DS and Grama Niladhari (GN) have been involved in the identification of sub projects and beneficiary selection. Implementation of sub projects is undertaken through central and provincial level government departments (e.g., Department of Cooperative Development, Department of Agriculture, Department of Fisheries, and Provincial Department of Cooperatives). The project's sub project activities support district and provincial level departmental plans, including the Northern Province Development Programme (*Wadakkil Wasantham / Uthuru Wasanthaya*) and the government's overall drive to develop economic infrastructure and create employment in the north.

87) The project is contributing to the outcomes of both SRL 107 and SRL 102 of the ILO's DWCP in Sri Lanka. The project is increasing employment opportunities in conflict-affected areas through value chain and sustainable enterprise development (SRL 107) by creating an enabling environment the establishment of sustainable enterprises in conflict-affected areas (Output 7.1); by improving the capacity of local and central government for development planning and implementation (Output 7.1); by conducting participatory value chain development exercises and sector studies in selected growth sector (Output 7.3) and by strengthening and expanding outreach business development services (Output 7.4).

88) The project is also enhancing access to more and better jobs in economically crisis affected areas (SRL 102) by promoting skills development and vocational training strategies/systems to improve access to better jobs (Output 2.1) and through the development of a Vocational Education and Training plans for the Northern Province (Output 2.1). The project is also contributing towards achieving Outcome 1¹³ and Outcome 3¹⁴ of the UNDAF (2008 – 2012).

EC2: Conceptualization

89) The theoretical framework underpinning the project's design (*i.e.*, the project's concept) provides the focus for the second section of the evaluation. The project's design is evaluated in the next section (EC3), while the project's approach to the implementation of the project design (*i.e.*, the project's strategy) is assessed in sections EC4, EC5 and EC6.

90) The evaluation of the project's concept is complicated by there being not one but three conceptualisations of the project since April 2010. The original project concept was based upon ILO's CB TREE framework, in which vocational skills training at the community level would be followed by entrepreneurship development and the creation of group enterprises. Community based MSE would then be provided with start-up capital, according to the project's original concept.

91) The CB TREE model was enhance in the project's original conceptualisation with the provision of community level common equipment, to ensure that MSE entrepreneurs could add value to their products and VCD activities. The main focus of the VCD activities was on promoting PPD to provide a voice for local entrepreneurs and links to larger businesses at the top-end of the value chain. The project's original concept also foresaw the reactivation of local enterprises crucial to the value chain of MSE development, which were functioning prior to and during displacement. The ILO's CB TREE model was further expanded in the project's original concept to include the provision of business placements into the local businesses, supported by financial injections to encourage these businesses to grow and employ more people. Lastly the

¹³ Outcome 1: Economic growth and social services are pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable in fulfillment of the MDGs and MDG plus, and focus in particular on the rural areas

¹⁴ Outcome 3: An improved environment for a sustainable peace anchored in social justice and reconciliation

project's original concept included capacity building and quality improvement of local BDS service providers, to support MSE development.

92) The Work Plan submitted by ILO and approved by AusAID in June 2011 explains the necessity to change from a 'partnership' to 'ownership' paradigm to sustain development as part of the recovery process. This necessity was advanced as the justification for a revision of the project's original theoretical framework. The argument was based on a strategic review of ground situation Vavuniya North DSD between January and March 2011, which found that infrastructure was being rehabilitated, houses and roads were being rebuilt, small businesses were opening and the agriculture sector was witnessing a rapid increase in crop production.

93) The project's revised concept was constructed around four types of project intervention focusing on capacity and institutional building sub projects (Type 1); strategic interventions in priority productive sectors (Type 2); interventions to support MSE / Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) growth and development (Type 3) and (Type 4) targeted interventions focused on FHH, PWD, Xcom and CAY). The revised conceptualisation retained elements of CB TREE (Type 4), expanded the scope of VCD to include SME as well as MSE (Type 3) and retained BDS (Type 1). Most importantly it introduced the concept of market driven LED, by means of strategic interventions in priority productive sectors (Type 2).

94) After a further six months of implementation the project added 'sustainability at the sector, village, household and individual level' to the earlier local ownership and responsibility paradigm¹⁵. At the same time the project reduced the number of sub projects Types from four to two. The project's revised commitment to support MSE / SME growth and development (Type 3) and targeted interventions focused on FHH, PWD, Xcom and CAY (Type 4) were discontinued. The project's modified revised concept retained the earlier Type 1 (BDS) interventions and rephrased Type 2, LED based interventions as being 'in support of sustainable and inclusive development and growth'. The modified revised conceptualisation effectively dropped the project's original concept based on CB TREE and MSE development, replacing it with a market driven LED approach to SME development, supported by BDS. VCD was also retained in the modified, revised concept, in support of SME development.

95) The key questions that are addressed in this section of the evaluation include the strategic reasons why ILO decided to develop the project; the inputs that were received from ILO's HQ, ROAP in Bangkok and DWT in Delhi in relation to the strategic context and design; the nature and quality of engagement between ILO and AusAID in the conceptualisation pre-design phase and the alignment of ILO's core values and strategic policy with the objectives of AusAID's ACRP33 programme.

96) In January 2010 the ILO's CO in Colombo was the UN lead agency (Chair) of the Sub Committee for the Coordination of the Livelihoods Cluster under the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, under the Ministry of Economic Development. The project proposal was formulated to enable the ILO to continue to provide financial and technical assistance to would be MSE entrepreneurs and to the GoSL, in support of MSE development in conflict affected areas of Sri Lanka.

97) The pre-design phase for the project was short. AusAid's closed call for concepts invited previous partners under the earlier ACRP2 and new potential partners such as ILO to submit concept papers in January 2010. Twelve agencies were invited to submit concepts, out of which seven agencies were requested to submit full proposals in February 2010. The project is ILO's first formal interaction with AusAID. Dialogue between ILO and AusAID was limited to the normal formal exchanges between donor and applicant during the processes of calling for concept notes, requesting proposals and approving proposals, during a period of five months between January and May 2010.

¹⁵ Project Progress Report in October 2011

98) The ILO CO in Colombo requested assistance from the ILO's CRISIS Bureau in Geneva to research, conceptualise, design and write the proposal. In accordance with recommendations received from the CRISIS Bureau an external international consultant with experience of the rehabilitation of ex-combatants was recruited by ILO's CO in Colombo to research, conceptualise, design and write the proposal. The international consultant was supported by three national sector specialists with experience of skills training and MSE development. The draft proposal was shared with ILO specialists in the DWT in New Delhi, ROAP in Bangkok and in ILO's HQ in Geneva. Comments and feedback on the proposal were received but not major concerns were expressed about the project's concept, the narrative content, the project's design, the LFA matrix or the M&E framework proposed for the project.

99) The proposal was screened and selected by AusAID. The proposal was scored highly by AusAID evaluators as it emphasised a large numbers of vulnerable groups as direct beneficiaries of the programme¹⁶. However the ACRP3 selection committee expressed concern that community based development, focusing on vulnerable groups, was not 'a core strength of ILO'. At the same time ILO's CO in Colombo had its own reservations about the proposal, including the weakness of the project design, particularly the LFA matrix and the M&E framework proposed for the project.

100) The first of ILO's priority outcomes under the DWCP 2008 – 2012, to enhance access to more and better jobs in economically disadvantaged and crisis affected areas, is highly relevant to the first (improving socio-economic development in vulnerable and disaster-affected communities) and fourth (strengthening the role of community-based organisations in socio-economic development and community reconciliation) foci of AusAID's ACRP3. The first of ILO's priority outcomes under the DWCP 2008 – 2012 is also relevant to the overall ACRP3 objective, which is to strengthen communities by increasing the levels of trust, awareness, capacity and confidence on the part of, men, women and children from different ethnic and religious groups to initiate and participate in activities that improve their economic and social condition, in a manner that reduces the factors that have contributed to conflict.

101) The ACRP3's main focal areas and overall objective are less tangibly linked to the core values of the ILO *i.e.*, promoting and realizing standards and fundamental principles and rights at work; creating greater opportunities for women and men to decent employment and income and enhancing the coverage or effectiveness of social protection for all and strengthening tripartism and social dialogue.

102) The evaluation acknowledges that post conflicts projects are viewed by ILO as key 'entry points' for long term development of labour and employment issues in countries, or the present context an area of a country, which have not been exposed to decent work. From this perspective the project's short term activities through sub-projects can be considered as delivering both peace dividends and stimulating local interest and involvement in longer term decent work initiatives, thus contributing not only to employment creation but also social inclusion, participation and dialogue between employers and employees.

¹⁶ 2,400: 1,100 FHH, 200 PWD, 300 Xcom, 800 CAY

EC3: Logic and Validity of Project Design

103) Six key questions were examined in relation to the logic and validity of the project's design beginning with an assessment of the level of involvement of key stakeholders and ILO tripartite constituents in the design of the project and the relevance of the contextual analysis of the local environment undertaken during the project's design. The evaluation moved on to assess the logic of the project's design in addressing the needs of the key stakeholders and beneficiaries and the effectiveness of the alternatives strategies that have been adopted to achieve the project's objectives. This section of the evaluation concludes with an appraisal of the appropriateness of the indicators described in the PRODOC and the need, if any, for the project's original design to be modified in the remaining project period.

104) Representatives of key stakeholder groups and ILO's tripartite constituents were met during the design phase of the project (March – April 2010), but were not involved in the original design of the project. ILO had no field presence in the north during the project's formulation, which limited the extent of ILO's engagement with government officials at the field level. Workers organisations such as trade unions were not (and are still not) established in the Northern Province, while employers' federations, which were met, were limited to the newly formed CoC.

105) At the national level there was no input from the government to the original proposal during the original design phase because of uncertainties about the nature of the ministry most appropriate to the activities, outputs and objectives set out the original project design (*i.e.*, the Ministry of Labour Relations and Manpower or the Ministry of Vocational and Technical Training or the Ministry of Rural Industries and Self Employment Promotion). The Ministry of Labour Relations and Manpower¹⁷ (MoLR&MP) received the PRODOC after the agreement was signed between ILO and AusAID.

106) In contrast to the project's original formulation the involvement of key stakeholders and the ILO's tripartite constituents in the modification and revision of the project's design, as set out in Work Plan for 2012 – 2013, was considerable. The Work Plan for Vavuniya District and Kilinochchi Districts was prepared following consultations with the respective GA, District Directors of Planning, various provincial ministries and departments, the Office of the Governor of the Northern Province, the private sector, current project partners, UN agencies and with NGOs. In Mullaitivu District the 2012 – 2013 Work Plan was prepared based on several assessment missions to the district and discussions with government officials, other agencies, the Chamber of Commerce, fishermen, farmers and local producers. The Work Plan for 2012 – 2013 was presented to and approved by the PAC, chaired by the MoL&LR.

107) The contextual analysis of the local environment undertaken during the project's original design was largely irrelevant to the needs of the key stakeholders and the ILO's tripartite constituents, in terms of the emerging post conflict environment in the north of Sri Lanka. The contextual analysis highlighted the dependence of recently resettled IDP on agricultural and fisheries based livelihoods throughout the Northern Province. Furthermore it identified the multiple social and economic constraints faced by resettled rural communities. However the contextual analysis was not used as a the basis from which to generate a realistic project design relevant to the immediate and medium term needs of the project's principal beneficiary groups, local and central government and potential employers at the local and national level.

108) The project's original design was further compromised by failing to incorporate sufficient flexibility that would have enabled the project to respond to the fluid nature of post conflict environment in the north of Sri Lanka. The geographic scope of the project was too restrictive. Of the three districts proposed in the original project design (*i.e.*, Vavuniya, Mannar and Jaffna), the project is operational in only one of the three. The project has instead commenced operations in Kilinochchi District and in Mullaitivu District, in response to requests from the government for assistance in these districts. The project's original design, based on the CB TREE *plus* concept was too narrow in seeking to promote MSE development at the community level and overly

¹⁷ Subsequently the Ministry of Labour and Labour Relations (MoL&LR)

confident in the belief that the 74 sub activities and activities, 37 outputs and 17 outcomes proposed under the project's original six components, were an accurate reflection of the needs of the project's beneficiaries and could be implemented and achieved.

109) The original project design is neither logical nor addresses the needs of the project's direct beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. The problem with the project design stems largely from the PRODOC's failure to clearly state the problem that the project is seeking to address, in relation to the project's principal stakeholder group. The project's overall goal, to contribute to the reduction of conflict-related economic inequalities, one of the root-causes of the conflict is at best not meaningful. Furthermore economic inequalities (of any sort) are not generally considered to be one of the root causes of the conflict in Sri Lanka¹⁸. The project's goal, to contribute to sustainable peace and conflict transformation by reducing conflict related inequalities through economic empowerment of the most vulnerable populations implies that the poverty of FHH, PWD, Xcom and CAY is key obstacle to sustainable peace and conflict transformation in Sri Lanka. This too is an inadequate analysis of the true obstacles to sustainable peace and conflict transformation in Sri Lanka.

110) The problems with the project's original design are compounded by the solutions proposed by the project to reduce socio-economic exclusion and economic inequality. These are based on economic empowerment and decent employment of the most vulnerable groups and conflict affected communities. The original project design proposed skills and entrepreneurship development, enterprise start-up support, business development services, business placements and the creation of an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and job-creation through VCD to reduce socio-economic exclusion and economic inequality. In contrast the needs of direct beneficiaries met during the course of the evaluation were clear and concise: immediate daily / monthly household income. The government's priority continues to be the development of economic infrastructure, while the private sector's demands are for economic infrastructure and services to develop business opportunities.

111) The project's overall objective, to contribute to poverty reduction, sustainable job creation and peace building through an improved environment with strengthened governance, effective community-based services and public-private partnership that economically empower vulnerable groups in conflict-affected populations, is a broad based, catch all statement that seeks to meet three very worthy, but quite different aims. The project's overall objective is not specific, measurable or time bound and as such is unlikely to be realistic or achievable.

112) The original project design has six component objectives, which according to the PRODOC are interlinked and correlated to the project's three parts conceptualisation (*i.e.*, CB TREE *plus*). How the components are interlinked and which components corresponds to which part of the project's original conceptual framework is unclear. None of the component objectives are specific, measurable or time bound, which makes it impossible to judge if they are realistic or achievable. Two of the four component objectives are not objectives to be achieved, but activities to be implemented.

113) As noted above the lower levels of the project's original design consists of 74 sub activities, 37 activities, 37 outputs and 17 outcomes, contained within six main project components. At this point the project's narrative summary simply breaks down. There are no headings or descriptions for the main activities and thus it is not possible to judge the causal relationship between activities and outputs. Neither is it possible to establish the causal relationship between the project's outputs and the outcomes: there are 37 outputs but only 17 outcomes. Either some outputs are not expected to have outcomes or two or more outputs combined are expected to

¹⁸ Ethnic politics, interpretations of recent and ancient history, land rights and the politics of language and education are broadly agreed to be the root causes of the conflict in Sri Lanka. See World Bank Country Assessment Strategy based on The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline", by Dr. Sasanka Perera, of the Department of Sociology, the University of Colombo, December 1999

contribute to an outcome. However which of these statements is true cannot be ascertained from the project's original design.

114) The location of activities, outputs and outcomes are not specified, nor is it evident when any of the outputs or the outcomes are expected to be achieved. The assumptions linking activities to outputs, outputs to outcomes and outcomes to objectives are generic and repetitive. The LFA matrix annexed to the PRODOC runs to 14 pages, which is twice as long as the narrative description of the project's activities in the main body of the PRODOC. The LFA matrix is supposed to be a summary of the project design, not an elaboration.

115) The project's response to project's original design has been to move away from the original CB TREE *plus* based approach, towards a market driven LED approach. The project's LED approach is based on identifying local, divisional and district level economic development opportunities in collaboration with conflict affected communities and local, central and provincial authorities. The market viability of these potential economic development opportunities are then assessed use value chain analysis. Opportunities that are validated economically are provided with support to development economic infrastructure. BDS interventions are used to address technical and management constraints and ensure decent work and equality. The effectiveness of the alternative strategy adopted by the project to overcome the constraints inherent in the project's original design is assessed in the next section.

116) The indicators described in the LFA matrix are inappropriate as a means of assessing project's progress. The indicators are not realistic and many are simply repeated for successive outputs in the project design. The means of verification are equally inappropriate, generic and repetitive. Indicators and means of verifications for the project's outcomes are not described.

117) The evaluation understands that no project design, as encapsulated by a PRODOC is perfect. The evaluation appreciates that this is particularly the case in a post conflict scenario, where assessment are of necessity rapid and may thus lack access to or understanding of key information. As a result a project design developed in response to an evolving post conflict situation often requires some changes or modifications by the CTA and his or her team, to adapt or adjust the project's inputs / activities / outputs / outcomes according to situation and needs in the field.

118) However in the current context, the project's original design, as set out in the LFA matrix attached to the PRODOC, does not need to be modified, it need to be completely re-written. The new LFA matrix should describe the two core complements of the project's modified, revised conceptual framework based on economic infrastructure development and business development services. New indicators linking activities to outputs, outputs to outcomes and outcomes to the component objectives and their means of verification need to be designed and described. The assumptions and the risks associated with the project's modified, revised design need to be investigated and explained. The project's overall objective and goal should remain unchanged.

EC4: Effectiveness

119) The evaluation's assessment of the project's effectiveness initially investigated stakeholder involvement in project implementation and the project's success in establishing local, district and national ownership. The assessment moved on to look at the project's responsiveness to changing needs and priorities of local, district and national project partners, as well as the political, legal, economic and institutional changes in the project environment. This section of the evaluation concludes with an assessment of the progress that the project has made towards achieving the objectives, outcomes and outputs described in the PRODOC and a reflection on the constraints and problems faced by the project, highlighting areas that need needs to attend to in the future.

120) The project is working in close association with local (*i.e.*, Pradeshiya Sabha and Governor's Office) and central (*i.e.*, GA, DS, GN, PTF) government authorities and with a number of central and provincial government departments, including the Department of Cooperative Development (DoCD), Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DoFAR) at the district and divisional level. The project has made funds available to both Pradeshiya Sabha and DSD offices to contract staff to assist not only the implementation of the project's sub project activities, but also to support the day to day activities of the respective authorities.

121) The majority of sub project activities are initiated by the project in association with either local or central government authorities, often in direct response to requests from assistance from a particular authority. Sub project implementation is executed through the respective government departments (*i.e.*, DoCD, DoA, DoFAR), including the submission of detailed budget breakdowns for sub project activities. Sub projects are implemented in coordination with the GA, with inputs and recommendations, for example for beneficiary selected, from the relevant DS and GN.

122) At the local level the implementation of sub project activities, such as the reconstruction and development economic infrastructure, purchasing of equipment and training are executed directly by the projects partners *i.e.*, Fishermen's Cooperatives Societies (FCS), FCSU, MPCS,, private mill owner, MSME entrepreneurs, CoC and the EFC. The project's commitment to working openly and collaboratively with project partners is strongly appreciated by the partners. The project's approach is widely accredited with ensuring more appropriate building design and a higher quality of construction. The project's approach has also contributed to a strong sense of ownership at the community level, in contrast to assistance received from other government and non government agencies that contracted similar projects to private contractors or local NGO.

123) The project's approach has ensured that the project is appropriately responsive to the needs and changing priorities local constituents and beneficiaries. The project's approach is sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes in the broader project environment, for example the request received from the PTF to commence project operations in Kilinochchi District and in Mullaitivu District. As the social and economic recovery continues in the Northern Province, the project's approach means the project is able to respond to new economic opportunities as and when they arise.

124) The effectiveness of the project in terms of the project's original outputs, outcomes, and component objectives cannot be evaluated because the project's design, as represented in the original LFA matrix and in the monitoring and evaluation framework, is no longer valid (see EC3 above).

125) In response to this constraint the evaluation's attention switched to examining the project's effectiveness in terms of the project's principal target groups as set out in the PRODOC *i.e.*, 2,400 direct and 6,00 indirect beneficiaries. Using monitoring data provided by the project the evaluation assessed the project's effectiveness in delivering benefits to 1,100 FHH, 200 PWD, 300 Xcom and 800 CAY (direct beneficiaries) and 6,000 MSME entrepreneurs, BDS service providers and local government officers (indirect beneficiaries).

126) The evaluation's analysis of the project's monitoring data highlighted a number of problems in relation to assessing the project's effectiveness in delivering benefits to the project's target beneficiaries. To begin with the quantitative data collected by the project to monitor the project's effectiveness in terms of direct and indirect beneficiaries is incomplete. Furthermore, the definition of indirect beneficiaries provided in the PRODOC is flawed. The indirect beneficiaries described in the PRODOC are direct beneficiaries of the project's activities and interventions.

127) Monitoring data collected by the project indicates that the project has provided direct benefits to 3,246 individuals (1,691 men and 1,555 women). Unfortunately the data describes conflict affected individuals (Table I) and not the project's direct beneficiary groups (*i.e.*, FHH, PWD, and CAY). Data for Xcom is not recorded and it is also not clear how the project has dealt with the issue of direct beneficiaries falling into one or more categories of direct beneficiary, for example a female beneficiary who is the head of her household and disabled. An analysis of the monitoring data collected by the project focusing only on FHH, PWD, and CAY indicates that the project may have benefited as few as 447 or as many as 14,132 direct beneficiaries.

128) Discussion with project staff indicated that the project's understanding of 'direct beneficiaries' is too limited. For example in the case of sub project VAV 14 (assistance to the privately owned VSN rice mill), the number of direct beneficiaries is given as three (see Table I). These three individuals are the employees of the rice mill. All households / individuals who make use of or sell their paddy to the rice mill, for which they receive a higher price than if they sold the same paddy to other paddy purchasers, could justifiably be considered as direct beneficiaries of the renovated and improved rice mill.

Table I: Data collected to monitor sub project direct and indirect beneficiaries

Sub Project	Direct Beneficiaries			Indirect Beneficiaries			Classification				
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	HH	FHH	PWD	CAY	SME
VAV05	730	487	243	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	550
VAV14	3	3	-	186	86	100	62	7	3	176	
VAV31	200	-	200	1240	618	622	-	-	-	-	-
VAV35	200	60	140	800	436	364	200	140	32	-	-

129) Monitoring data collected by the project to measure the project's impact on indirect beneficiaries indicates that the project has benefited 42,199 individuals (22,465 men and 19,709 women). However here too the data describes conflict affected individuals and not to the project's designated indirect beneficiaries (*i.e.*, MSME entrepreneurs, BDS service providers and local government officers): notwithstanding the fact that these are direct beneficiaries of the project.

130) The information made available to the evaluation by the project describing the project's sub project activities, strongly suggests that the project has delivered considerable benefits to both direct and indirect beneficiaries¹⁹. However the quantitative data that is available is insufficient to enable this observation to be reliably verified by the evaluation. Furthermore the project has not collected any qualitative forms of data that would enable the project to corroborate these findings and or elaborate on the nature of the less tangible social and human benefits that also seem highly likely to have been delivered by the project.

131) The main constraints faced by the ILO in terms of measuring the project's effectiveness are twofold. Firstly the absence of a valid LFA matrix through which to (a) plan and implement sub project activities; (b) monitor the project's achievements and (c) evaluate the project's impacts. Secondly the lack of an adequate performance or results based monitoring and evaluation framework, which would enable the last two tasks to be performed in an independently verifiable manner.

¹⁹ Defined as individuals who benefit as a result of improvements made to the direct beneficiaries or more broadly as all those living within the zone of influence of the project

EC5: Efficiency of Resources Use

132) In addition to the standard parameters used to measure the efficiency of resource use - cost, quality and time – the evaluation was also tasked with assessing if the project's resources have been allocated strategically, to achieve the project's outputs, outcomes and objectives.


133) The total approved budget for the project is AUD 3.39 million (US\$ 3.35 million), which was planned to be disbursed in three instalments (AUD 1.19 million, AUD 1.1 million and AUD 1.1 Million) over the course of the three year time frame of the project. The release of the second and third instalments was dependent on the successful expenditure of 90% of the preceding funds received by the project.

134) As of the end of the ninth quarter of the project (August 2012), the project had received the total approved budget of AUD 3.39 million (US\$ 3.35 million). The project's actual expenditure by the end of the ninth quarter amounted to US\$1,391,632, was equivalent to 43% of funds received. 41% of project's actual expenditure (US\$571,249) was spent to meet activity personnel, travel, support costs and ILO's overheads. 59% of project's actual expenditure (US\$820,383) was spent on programme delivery costs.

135) As of August 2012 a total of 54 sub projects had been initiated or were planned by the project. Twenty five sub projects had been completed, 25 were ongoing, one had been suspended, one had been terminated and two had yet to be signed at the time of the evaluation. The total programme delivery cost of the 25 sub projects completed by August 2012 (US 421,133) was equivalent to 28% of the expected programme delivery cost. Of the 54 sub projects that had been initiated or were planned, 25 were located in Vavuniya District, 14 were located in Kilinochchi District, six were located in Mullaitivu District and nine have been implemented at the provincial level. The twenty sub projects initiated or planned in Kilinochchi District and in Mullaitivu District accounted for 66% of the project's programme delivery costs (US\$1,035,769).

136) The programme delivery cost of individual sub projects ranged from US\$1,140 (Mayruan Mixture Enterprise VAV10) to US\$200,000 (Oddusudan Tile Factory VAV54). The average programme delivery cost of individual sub projects initiated or planned as of August 2012 was US\$27,957. An overview of individual sub project programme delivery cost is presented in Figure I. Strategically the project has deployed project resources to meet the project's overall objective by allocating 75% of the programme delivery costs (US\$1,128,836) to fund 26 sub projects targeting economic infrastructure development. The balance 28 sub projects were concerned with the delivery of business development services, with a total programme delivery cost of US\$380,833.

Figure I: Sub Project Programme Delivery Cost (US\$)



137) The evaluation attempted a number of calculations of the project's cost efficiency based on different interpretations of the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries (Table II). The evaluation was unable reliably verify the project's cost efficiency in terms of cost per direct beneficiary and cost per indirect beneficiary because of the limitations of the data collected by the project to monitor the project's beneficiaries and the flawed definition of the project's indirect beneficiaries. The information available describing the project's sub project activities suggests that the project is highly likely to be cost effective in terms of benefiting direct and indirect beneficiaries²⁰, however the quantitative data that is available is insufficient to enable this observation to be independently verified.

138) The quality of the economic infrastructure, equipment and training delivered by the project is higher than similar development assistance provided by government and non government sponsored projects. The project's commitment to delivering sub project assistance through CBO (e.g., FCS, FCSU and MPCS) and project partners (e.g., DoA, DoCD, the Institute for Post Harvest Technology, EFC, the CoC and Neil Marine Boatyard) has had multiple positive impacts. These include more appropriate design, the use of quality of building materials and better construction practices, more cost efficient purchasing of materials and equipment and higher standards of technical training.

Table II: Calculations of the project's cost efficiency based on different interpretations of the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries

Interpretation	Cost Efficiency (US\$)
Direct Beneficiaries - PRODOC	1,467
Direct Beneficiaries – Project Estimate	651
Direct Beneficiaries – Evaluation Estimate I ²¹	150
Direct Beneficiaries – Evaluation Estimate II ²²	4,728
Indirect Direct Beneficiaries - PRODOC	681
Indirect Direct Beneficiaries – Project Estimate	50

139) The project's commitment to delivering sub project assistance through CBO, providing only technical and financial backstopping support, has also had a positive impact on CBO management capacity. As a result CBO are better able to plan and manage sub project implementation, including tendering, procurement, supervision and financial management. In addition to raising the profile of the respective CBO at the community level, the project's trust in and support of CBOs has provided a positive stimulus to CBO managers and board members to improve management systems and has contributed to a sense of pride and increased self respect among staff and workers engaged in the implementation of project sub activities.

140) Despite the project's achievements in indentifying and initiating 54 sub projects in three districts and at the provincial level by August 2012, the project's actual disbursement of project activity (see Figure II) and programme delivery costs (see Figure III) is behind schedule, according to the project's own revised project expenditure plans. The project's actual disbursement of project activity and programme delivery costs falls considerable short of a model disbursement schedule, when calculated over the course of the three year period of the project.

²⁰ Defined as individuals who benefit as a result of improvements made to the direct beneficiaries or more broadly as all those living within the zone of influence of the project


²¹ Based on the reported numbers of FHH, PWD and CAY divided by the total programme delivery cost as of August 2012 plus 40% project activity costs.

²² Based on a comparison of the number of direct beneficiaries and the corresponding number of FHH, PWD and CAY, divided by the total programme delivery cost as of August 2012 plus 40% project activity costs.

141) The project's actual expenditure of project activity costs (i.e., travel, staff costs and ILO overheads) in August 2012 (Q9) was equivalent to 79% of the project's proposed expenditure. The project's actual expenditure of project activity costs was equivalent to 91% of evaluation's model expenditure, based on constant expenditure on project activities, travel, staff costs and ILO overheads throughout the duration of the project (see Figure II)

142) The project's actual expenditure of programme delivery costs in August 2012 (Q9) was equivalent to 84% of the project's proposed expenditure²³, but only 47% of the evaluation's model expenditure, based on a hypothetical 'ideal' expenditure curve. Figure III clearly demonstrates the project's plan to rapidly increase the rate of disbursement of programme delivery costs during the concluding months of the project, to achieve the project's programme delivery targets by the end of the project June 2013.

143) The data presented in Figure II and Figure III suggests that, despite the best efforts of the project management team, the project has not been able to make up for the deferred commencement of the project's field operations, caused by the delay in signing the MoU with the MoL&LR (October 2010), the delayed receipt of clearance from the PTF to work in Vavuniya District (December 2010), the delayed recruitment of the CTA (January 011) and the delayed receipt of clearance from the PTF to work in Kilinochchi District and Mullaitivu District (August 2011).



²³ Note: The project's proposed expenditure by Q9 was only 44% of the total programme delivery costs

EC6: Effectiveness of Management Arrangement

144) The effectiveness of the project's management arrangements was assessed in relation to the project's overall management capacity including M&E and whether the project's management facilitates good results²⁴. The evaluation also assessed the project staffs' understanding of the project and the roles and the responsibilities of the parties concerned. The effectiveness of the PAC and other project management arrangements were also reviewed and the level and effectiveness of support received by the project from other ILO offices was investigated. The actions taken by the project to disseminate information about the project and the extent to which there has been any inter agency cooperation and synergies with other UN implemented projects, were also considered as attributes of effective project management.

145) Eleven full time and part time staff (excluding drivers) were proposed to manage the project's implementation in the PRODOC²⁵. Out of this total staff allocation, nine full time staff (excluding drivers) have been recruited. Eight of the nine staff are men. Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims are presented among the national staff members. A national expert on gender / disability / child protection was not recruited. The reduction in the number of field coordinators and field assistants (from six to four) is consistent with the project's actual area of operation (8 DSD in three districts), compared to the broader geographical scope set out in the PRODOC (17 DSD in three districts). The assistant field officer, the youngest, least experienced and only female member of the team, is responsible for mainstreaming gender, disability and vulnerability including ethnicity and caste issues, throughout sub project planning and implementation and for assisting field coordinators with the collection of monitoring data.

146) The PRODOC contains an eleven page M&E framework for the project's original outputs and objectives. The original M&E framework makes no reference to the project's outcomes. Indicative statements for the project's outputs and objectives, for each of the three system elements (*i.e.*, data, people and time), are generic, not quantified and highly repetitive. The original M&E framework is broadly accepted by the project's partners to have been unrealistic and has not been used to monitor the project's implementation.

147) The need to introduce a realistic M&E framework is repeatedly acknowledged in the project's Work Plans and Progress Reports. Potential indicators including group enterprise products, value chain enterprise products, individual beneficiary enterprises, vocations training projects for wage employment, job placements or apprenticeships in public and private enterprises and the revival of affected enterprises are set out in the project's Progress Report 2011. The need to introduce a realistic M&E framework is highlighted by AusAID's Technical Support Team reports in May and again in November 2011.

148) A revised M&E framework is proposed in the Work Plan for 2011 / 2012 inclusive of indicators that concentrate on the less tangible outputs and outcomes of inclusiveness, local empowerment and ownership and the quality of the engagement between the project and the various local partners and between the various partners and stakeholder. The Work Plan for 2011 / 2012 proposes to engage the services of the University of Jaffna to provide monitoring and evaluation services on a real time basis. The University of Jaffna is not mentioned in the Progress Report submitted in October 2011 or thereafter.

149) The Work Plan prepared for 2012 – 2013 asserts that a comprehensive M&E system has finally been put in place. The M&E system includes gathering of baseline information, regular field monitoring and systemic reporting. Measurable indicators proposed include pricing surveys, quality testing, household income surveys, random price checking, interviews with collectors, processors, federation, transporters, assemblers, members, individuals, sales records and MSME interviews.

²⁴ Efficient delivery of results, as set out in the TOR, is dealt with in the preceding section.

²⁵ CTA – 01; national experts - 03; field coordinators – 03; field assistants – 03; administration and finance officer - 01

150) According to the Work Plan prepared for 2012 – 2013, provision has also been made to address the measurement of less tangible outputs such as empowerment and attitudes, through training of field staff in evaluation methodologies. The proposed M&E framework is set out in Annex K of the Work Plan for 2012 / 2013.

151) Unfortunately none of the indicators in the proposed M&E framework are specific, quantified or time bound. The six main sector headings²⁶ in the M&E framework are different from the four main sector headings²⁷ set out in the Activity Plan (Annex H) and the coding system used to identify sub project, implies that all the projects are implemented in Vavuniya District (*i.e.*, VAV14, VAV 34, VAV 51). In project budget AUD 67,800 has been allocated for M&E activities over a period of three years. ILO also receives 10% of the project budget for project support costs, which it is assumed include technically backstopping M&E and reporting (see below).

152) The project's management approach is distinctive, based on a flexible, process planning approach to sub project identification and implementation. The overall presentation of the project's activities and outputs is characteristically positive and technically rigorous, but the lack of reliable quantitative data persistently undermines independently verifiable judgements on the effectiveness of the project's process planning approach (see preceding section).

153) Sector studies, territorial diagnosis, institutional mapping and value chain analyses are used to support and verify the economic viability of potential sub project interventions, requested by local and central government, suggested by the project's partners or identified by the project itself. Sub projects are not initiated unless their economic viability can be substantiated. Requests for interventions in support of dairy, poultry and honey production have all been rejected by the project, based on such economic analyses. Unfortunately the project's annual work plans do not adequately reflect the project's flexible, process planning approach, the likelihood of new sub project interventions commencing at any time.

154) As a result, the implementation of project activities has not followed the Work Plans that have been prepared and approved for each of the past two years of the project (*i.e.*, 2011 / 2012 and 2012 / 2013). Ten sub projects were described in the Work Plan prepared for 2011 / 2012, yet 21 sub projects are described and a further six sub projects are indicated to be in preparation in the Progress Report submitted six months later. Similarly, two of the four sub project Types set out in the Work Plan for 2011 / 2012, were discontinued in the Progress Report submitted six months later. Little or no explanation was given for this decision, even though the decision to discontinue project interventions providing support for MSE/SME growth and development (Type 3) and direct assistance to FHH, PWD, Xcom and CAY (Type 4), would likely have had a significant impacts on the outputs and outcomes of the project.

155) The project's process planning approach is both a strength and a weakness of the project's implementation. The project's process planning a strength in the sense that the project is flexible and open to new economically viable opportunities. Yet the project's reliance on the presence of the CTA to make decisions and take the responsibility for new sub project interventions, which have not been planned for and approved in the annual work plan, is a weakness of the project's process planning approach. The national LED expert deputises for the CTA during the CTA's regular breaks from the project. In the absence of the CTA the national LED expert is primarily responsible for overseeing the implementation of ongoing and planned activities. The national LED expert is much less likely to be involved in sub project decision making and management in the absence of the CTA. Project staff have a clear overall understanding of the project and the roles and the responsibilities of the parties concerned.

156) The project has received technical support from the ILO's CO in Colombo, DWT in New Delhi, ROAP in Bangkok and HQ in Geneva, including the CRISIS Response Programme and its

²⁶ Paddy, fisheries, cooperative development, job placements, agro processing & improving markets for fruit and vegetables and construction & building suppliers

²⁷ Paddy, fisheries, agro processing and building & supplies

national and implementing partners. The ILO's CO, DWT, ROAP and HQ were all involved in technically backstopping the process of conceptualising, drafting and finalising the PRODOC, a document that is deficient on multiple levels. The project has subsequently received technical assistance on cooperative development and disability from ILO's HQ and on gender, vocational training and LED from the DWT in New Delhi. The DWT in New Delhi has also provided comments on the project's revised work plans. The DoA and the Institute for Post Harvest Technical in particular, have also provided technical assistance to the project.

157) The project has received financial and administrative support from the ILO's CO in Colombo, HQ in Geneva and its national implementing partner. The financial and administrative support received by the project from the ILO's CO has enabled the project to disburse funds smoothly. The ILO's CO in Colombo also facilitated the project's clearance from the PTF to commence work in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. The project has received less support from the CO in terms of M&E and for reporting. Although the project's Progress Reports contain detailed information about the project, this information is not presented in an easily accessible format, nor does it correspond to the project's annual Work Plan. ILO's HQ has assisted the project in expediting procurement procedures. The MoL&LR has provided support to the ILO to convene PAC meetings.

158) The PAC is chaired by the Secretary to the MoL&LR and comprises a representative of AusAID and representatives of other relevant ministries and departments (e.g., cooperatives, state resources, youth affairs, MSME enterprises, skills development). The PAC also includes representatives of other project partners including the EFC, trade unions and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka and of course the ILO. Between the commencement of the project in June 2010 and evaluation mission in August 2012, the PAC had met only twice. A third meeting of the PAC was held during the evaluation mission.

159) The bottom three tiers of the project's proposed 'bottom up governance structure' are not operational. The proposed community level sector based associations involving CBO, the divisional level PPD cells and the district level MSE Forums, which collectively were to be inclusive and representative of ethnic religious, gender and generational background, have not been formed. At an operational level the project works in close association with the offices of the GA in Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts and with the respective DS and relevant departments at the district and divisional level. Representatives of the cooperatives movement, district CoC, the EFC and the District Enterprise Forum, together with large and small private businesses are also involved in the project's implementation. However the project is not accountable to any of the above at the district, divisional or local level.

160) Project's communication strategy is simple and effective at the local level. The strategy is based on submission of sub project proposal and progress reports to the DS, GA, the PTF and the Governor of the Northern Province at the local level. The project provides half yearly progress reports to AusAID. Members of the PAC are provided with project updates during the PAC meetings. The ILO's CO in Colombo has produced and disseminated two enewsletters and uploaded a visual presentation of the project's describing the project's activities on the ILO's website. At the field level the project's visibility is good. Road signs at sub project field sites display the logos of the MoL&LR, AusAID and ILO. The name of the project and the location are also represented in Sinhala, in Tamil and in English. During the evaluation mission project partners and beneficiaries quickly identified AusAID and or the Australian government as the source of project finance.

161) The project's level of inter agency cooperation and the synergies created with other UN agencies is relatively low. This is partly attributable to the project's commitment to delivering development assistance, in contrast to almost all other UN agencies and NGO, which are providing humanitarian assistance. The project is also not a regular participant in UN cluster meetings. The project's sub project cut across several UN clusters (e.g., housing, livelihoods) and operates with a small number of staff in three districts, from an office in Vavuniya. This

makes it difficult and time consuming for the project staff to participate frequently in the relevant UN cluster meetings in the three districts operational.

162) The project is working in collaboration with The Asia Foundation, which provided books to the Information & Business Centres of the CoC in Vavuniya and Kilinochchi and with the United Nations' Development Programme's Transition Recovery Programme, which is in the process of constructing a rice mill in Karachchi DSD in Kilinochchi District. The project will install rice milling equipment, once the building is completed. The project has sought and received technical assistance from the FAO UN regarding agricultural sub projects. The project has identified a potential future synergy with UN's Human Settlements Programme regarding future housing construction programmes, through a sub project that plans to support of the Mullaitivu Thrift and Credit Cooperative Society (TCCP) to restart clay brick and roofing tile production at Oddusuddan Tile Factory.

EC7: Emerging Impact / Future Direction

163) The final section of the evaluation set out to assess the emerging impacts of the projects and the sense of ownership that has been achieved by the project at the local, divisional, district and national level. The evaluation also looked at the likelihood that the project's interventions will be sustained and the key inputs that are still necessary to strengthen the project's approach if the project ends in June 2013. The project's Exit Strategy was also evaluated. The evaluation of the project's emerging impacts and future direction concludes with a consideration of whether the second phase of the project should be pursued and if so, what should the project focus on and how does the project's design need to accommodate these changes.

164) The principal impacts emerging from the project are financial and physical. The project's support for privately and cooperatively owned rice mills has raised the farm gate price for paddy through a mixture of public sector finance for paddy purchasing through the MPSC²⁸ and increased local private sector demand for paddy, to meet the new processing capacity installed by the project. Farm gate prices for paddy typically range from LKR 16 to 18 per kg immediately following the main *maha* season harvest. As a result of the project's assistance (e.g., 200 FHH in Poonaryn) and the support from the government, project beneficiaries have received between LKR 28 and 30 per kg for their paddy (*nadu* and *samba* varieties respectively). The project's support for privately and cooperatively owned rice mills has also increased the profits of paddy producer by reducing costs incurred for milling and selling paddy (i.e., transport) and reduced losses associated with selling to outside paddy purchasers, such as under-weighting and quality / variety related issues that tend to result in lower prices being paid for locally paddy.

165) Other financial impacts emerging from the project include increased incomes for papaya growers and MSME entrepreneurs, as well salaries for manual and semi skilled employees (i.e., farm labourers, mechanics, food processors and boat yard technicians) employed in project assisted local economic development interventions. The project has provided or is in the process of providing considerable support to CBO and the private sector to reconstruct and or develop economic infrastructure. Impacts include private and cooperatively owned rice mills and cooperatively owned boatyards, a crab processing factory, a papaya processing factory and a tile factory.

²⁸ government allocations to purchase paddy released to the MPSC from the GA

166) The project's emerging social impacts range from increased level of self esteem at community level, to addressing a major threat to long term peace and reconciliation, the perceived threat to local, Tamil and Muslim business interests in the recently liberated north, from Sinhalese business interests from the south. The project has contributed to an increased sense of self respect among CBO at the level, who are now able to provide relevant and effective services to their members. FCSU and MCPS demonstrated considerable social awareness about their role in providing economic assistance to the most vulnerable households among their members and the broader local community.

167) The project is addressing the widely perceived threat posed Sinhalese business interests from the south by promoting north / south business partnerships with southern companies Neil Marine, CR Exports and Taprobane Sea Food Ltd. Each of these is committed to engaging in fair profit sharing agreements and or trading relationships, without exploitation and or discrimination, with conflict affected communities in the north. The project has not provided support to southern businesses who have not been able to demonstrate such commitments (e.g., no assistance to acquire land for eco-tourism development).

168) It should be noted that at the time of the evaluation mission neither the economic infrastructure nor details of the business agreements in respect of both papaya and crab processing had completed or finalised by the project. The commitments to decent work, occupational health and safety and fair trading agreements have as yet to be tested at the field level. Other emerging social impacts include stronger and better managed CSO (*i.e.*, CoC) and a strong sense of sense of ownership of the project's sub projects by government authorities at the local, divisional and district level.

169) The project's emerging human resource impacts include vocational training for Xcom and PWD and entrepreneur development training for MSME entrepreneurs. Vocational training has not only increased the knowledge and skills of trainees, but also increased the self respect and confidence of the Xcom and PWD who took part in the vocational training programmes. The project has had a lower level of impact on other areas of human resource development, for example equality. Not the 'box ticking, number of direct and indirect beneficiaries' interpretation of equality, but in terms of changing attitudes about equality. Equality measured in terms of providing credit to the poorest members of MPCPS and FCSU. Equality measured by purchasing paddy from the poorest producers and not allocating government subsidy to wealthiest landowners or to outsiders. Equality measured by employing people with disability and not restricting access to CBO membership, employment or services due to ethnicity or caste.

170) The project's emerging impacts on the environment are both positive and negative. The project's support to papaya growers is likely to have a localised impact on ground water extraction. Agro wells used to water tens of acres of papaya plants on a weekly basis, in an area characterised by water scarcity towards the end of each dry season and occasionally drought, is likely to have a low level impact on water availability. The project's plan to reconstruct and develop the Tile Factory in Oddusudan is likely to have both positive and negative impacts on the environment. Reductions in diesel emissions associated with the transport of tiles from the south to the north; a reduction in the demand for river sand if clay blocks replace cement blocks for housing construction and greater irrigation storage capacity in the tank used to source clay, are all likely positive environmental impacts associated with the sub project. Increased local demand for firewood is likely to be the main negative environment impact of reconstructing and developing the Oddusudan Tile Factory.

171) Several resource management issues are associated with the project's support for boatyards in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu and the crab processing plant in Iranaimathanagar (Poonaryn DSD). These include contributing to the overcapacity of the coastal fishery *per se* and overfishing of the blue swimming crab population in the Palk Strait in particular. However, the likely environmental impacts of the project's interventions are dwarfed by the negative impact on coastal fisheries caused by Indian bottom trawlers fish illegally in Sri Lankan waters and the

increasing number of migrant southern fishermen who fish along the north east coast during the southwest monsoon.

172) The evaluation found strong evidence to suggest that assistance provided by the project to small and medium rice mills, MSME and boatyards and the BDS provided to the CoC will be sustained if the project closes at the end of the first phase in June 2013. The project's Exit Strategy, which is based targeting economically viable sub project interventions in association with established CBO, has played a key role in ensuring the sustainability of the project's sub project interventions. Key inputs that are necessary to strengthen the project's approach if the project ends in June 2013 all relate to BDS. These include the need for more institutional strengthening and capacity building of CBO management; advocacy to ensure decent work and conditions of employment for people working in enterprises supported by the project and advocacy to ensure the equal treatment of members of CBO and employees of MSME.

173) A number of outstanding issues need to be resolved by the project before the same level of confidence in sustainability can shown towards the project's sub projects in support of papaya and crab processing and the Oddusudan Tile Factory. In each of these sub projects the project is introducing a new level of sophisticated economic, social and potentially political relations, between the local community and the private sector. Each of these sub projects is pushing the boundaries of development assistance to conflict affected communities, by building assets for the community with the concurrence of the private sector.

174) The sustainability of these sub projects is dependent on agreements between the private sector and the asset owners to enter into joint ventures, lease property, employ local people and share equally the benefits of the project assistance with conflict affected communities. A considerable degree of risk is attached to each of these sub projects. This risk is currently mitigated to some degree by the presence of project staff. If the project concludes in June 2013, there is cause for concern regarding the sustainability of these projects.

175) The evaluation found compelling evidence to suggest that the second phase of the project should be pursued. Key areas that need to be addressed by the project under the second phase include technical, management and institution human resource development, as part of a continuation of the project's support for BDS. To ensure compliance of sub projects and project partners with ILO commitment to decent work and equality, more investment is needed under the second phase of the project to strengthening positive attitudes and values of individuals and institutions to decent work and equal employment opportunities. During the second phase of the project sub project activities should seek to broadly to challenge and change negative attitudes and perceptions among employers regarding productive work, fair income and job security. Future sub projects should also directly address issues related to social protection, personal development, social integration and freedom of expression and advocate against discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, religion or caste.

Conclusions

176) Sixteen conclusions relating to the merit and worth of the project were drawn by the evaluation in accordance with ILO's guidelines for evaluation. Each of these judgements is considered to be fair, impartial and consistent with the findings of the evaluation presented above.

177) **Conclusion 1:** The project is relevant to the economic and social priorities of the project's partners. The project is also significant in terms of being one of the first donor funded projects to respond the need to replace humanitarian assistance with development assistance, as the post conflict recovery continues in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. The different levels of demand for and capacity to absorb the project's development assistance reflect the chronology of displacement and resettlement of IDPs in the three districts in which the project is working. The project is consistent with and will contribute meaningfully to SRL107 and SRL102 of the ILO's DWCP and to UNDAF Outcome 1 and Outcome 3.

178) **Conclusion 2:** The evaluation raises concerns regarding the soundness of the research conducted on behalf of the ILO by the team of consultants who contributed to the PRODOC; the effectiveness of the quality appraisal procedures conducted by ILO to evaluate the PRODOC and the suitability of the CB TREE *plus* concept in the immediate phase of post conflict recovery in northern Sri Lanka. The project's original conceptualization, re-conceptualisation and modified re-conceptualisation, are all consistent with ILO's core values and congruent with the goals and objectives of the ACRP3

179) The project's original concept drew heavily on ILO's experiences of implementing CB TREE with post tsunami communities in Ampara District, funded by the Belgium Government. The Skills Development for Economic Empowerment and Creation of Livelihoods project (SRL/05/08/BEL) worked with communities living in a narrow coastal belt (<1,000m), affected by a high level of devastation caused by the 2004 Asian tsunami, within a very short period of time (<30 minutes). The original project concept assumed that a modified version of CB TREE would be suitable for serially displaced IDPs resettling in isolated agricultural and fishing villages. Villages that were located in divisions and districts where economic and social infrastructure, human resources and social and finance capital had been extensively damaged or more often totally destroyed by 26 years of relentless civil conflict. Divisions and districts that had been disconnected from the rest of the country for over two decades. This assumption has not been borne out by the project's implementation.

180) The re-conceptualisation of the project in June 2011 was a compromise. It maintained ILO's prior commitment to CB TREE, but redirected the project towards a market driven approach to LED. The re-conceptualisation retaining VCD and BDS but used them in support of LED rather than CB TREE. The modified re-conceptualisation of the project undertaken in March 2012 dispensed with the compromise and focused exclusively on meeting the economic needs of project partners in the Northern Province through market driven LED, supported by VCD and BDS for SME development in place of MSE development and mainstreaming vulnerability.

181) **Conclusion 03:** The original project design is invalid and the LFA matrix is not logical. The description of the project presented in the PRODOC is difficult to understand and the geographic scope proposed for the project was too restrictive. The Implementation Plan and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework annexed to the PRODOC are problematic and impractical.

182) The project design as encapsulated by the LFA matrix does not reflect the activities, outputs, outcomes and component objectives that the project is delivering or the geographic areas now covered by the project. The project is not being implemented in accordance with the implementation plans set out in the PRODOC and only loosely follows the work plans formulated in 2011 and 2012. The project's monitoring and evaluation framework is inadequate.

183) **Conclusion 04:** The project has been successful in involving project partners in the implementation of project activities and in bringing about a sense of ownership at the local, divisional and district level. The project has been equally proactive, through its process planning approach, in responding to the needs and changes requested by the project partners and to the broader political, economic, legal and institutional changes in the project environment.

184) **Conclusion 05:** The project's effectiveness cannot be measured against the project's outputs, outcomes and component objectives because the modified revised project activities are not causally linked to the outputs, outcomes and component objectives set out in the LFA matrix. The project is however contributing towards the project's overall objective and goal.

185) **Conclusion 06:** The project's effectiveness cannot be measured against the project's target number of direct and indirect beneficiaries because the monitoring data collected is incomplete. Furthermore the definition of indirect beneficiaries proposed in the PRODOC is flawed.

186) **Conclusion 07:** The project faces two principal constraints in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of sub projects to deliver benefits to direct and indirect beneficiaries. Firstly the absence of a valid LFA matrix against which to plan the project's implementation, monitor the project's achievements and evaluate the project's impacts. Secondly, the lack of an adequate performance or results based monitoring and evaluation framework, which would enable the last two tasks to be performed.

187) **Conclusion 08:** It is not possible to draw reliable, independently verifiable conclusions regarding the efficiency of the project in terms of cost per beneficiary, because the data collected describing the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries is incomplete and the definition of indirect beneficiaries proposed in the PRODOC is flawed. The cost variation of individual sub projects and the relatively higher cost of the most recently implemented / planned sub projects (compared to the average cost of sub projects) could be considered a concern, if the project ends in June 2013.

188) **Conclusion 09:** The quality of the infrastructure, equipment and training delivered by the project is high due to the project's strategy of implementing sub project through CBO and project partners: as opposed to contracting implementation to third party local NGOs or contractors. The responsibility and experience gained by CBO and project partners during implementation has had a positive impact on the capacity, confidence and self respect of CBOs and project partners. The strategy has also ensured a high standard of design, construction and supervision.

189) **Conclusion 10:** The project's cost efficiency in terms of the rate of disbursement of programme delivery costs is low. The project's plan to disburse 60% of programme delivery costs (24% already committed) within the last nine months of the project period could be considered a concern, if the project does not extend beyond June 2013.

190) **Conclusion 11:** The project is overly dependent on the CTA for planning and decision making and lacks the capacity to develop an adequate performance or results based monitoring and evaluation framework. The evaluation raises concerns regarding the extent to which issues related to equality (*i.e.*, ethnicity, gender, disability, caste) are being addressed in sub project planning and implementation. The ILO's CO in Colombo could do more to assist the project with quality control of project reports.

191) **Conclusion 12:** The four-tiered, bottom-up governance structure proposed in the PRODOC was unrealistic and is non-operational. The accountability of the project to the project's beneficiaries / partners at the local, divisional and district level and to the ILO's tripartite constituents at the national level (*i.e.*, the PAC) is limited.

192) **Conclusion 13:** The project's communication strategy is simple but effective at the local, divisional and district level and meets the needs of the MoL&LR at the national level.

193) **Conclusion 14:** Although the project has had discussions with UN and other agencies and identified areas for collaboration and synergies, the project could do more to represent the ILO at UN and interagency meetings in the three districts.

194) **Conclusion 15:** The main impacts emerging from the project relate to poverty reduction, job creation and the development of economic infrastructure. The project is also contributing to capacity building of local and apex CBO, local and central government authorities and CSO and nurturing north / south business cooperation. The project has had less impact on issues related to human resource development and attitudes and values relating to decent work and equality. The project is likely to have both positive and negative impacts on the environment.

195) **Conclusion 16:** The likelihood of sub projects that have been completed or are nearing completion being sustained is high. The evaluation's observation validates the project's Exit Strategy – *to target economically viable sub project interventions, in association with established and or apex CBOs*. There are concerns about the sustainability of a small number of recently commissioned sub projects, where it is less clear if both of these requirements have been met. There are also concerns regarding the extent to which the project's emerging impacts are reaching the project's principal target group and if they are, can and will these positive impacts be sustained by socially responsible local societies, unions, MSME, CSO, local businesses and national companies, once the project's presence is withdrawn?

Recommendations

196) Ten recommendations are made to the ILO in respect of the project. Each recommendation as been framed in accordance with ILO's criteria for drafting recommendations, specifying who is called upon to act and recommending an appropriate time frame for follow up.

197) **Recommendation 1:** The project's market driven LED design and implementation strategy, together with the experiences and the knowledge gained by the project in the context of the transition from humanitarian to development assistance in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka should be shared more widely with UN, other agencies and the GoSL. The project's achievements should also be used to leverage financial assistance in support of more market driven LED assistance to conflict affected communities, which are no longer in need of humanitarian assistance. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO, ROAP and HQ. **Priority:** Medium, by December 2014.

198) **Recommendation 2:** ILO offices at the country, regional and headquarters level should reflect on the weaknesses in the quality appraisal process that led to the submission of a sub standard proposal to the AusAID's ACRP3. As appropriate, remedial action should be taken to strengthen the capacity of staff and internal procedures, to improve the quality assurance of future concepts and proposals. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO, ROAP and HQ. **Priority:** Medium, by December 2014.

199) **Recommendation 3:** The project's LFA matrix, implementation plan and M&E framework should be revised, updated and redesigned and incorporated as an addendum to the PRODOC. The revised, updated and redesigned project management tools should reflect all sub projects that have been completed, are ongoing and those that are planned to be completed before end of June 2013. The project's goal, overall objective and target numbers of direct and indirect beneficiaries should not change. The new M&E framework should encompass AusAID's six Domains of Change. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by January 2013.

200) **Recommendation 4:** If the project proceeds into the second phase of the ACRP3, a new PRODOC must be written. The new PRODOC should clearly set out the project's justification, geographic scope and the problem (considering post conflict sensitivities) that the project is seeking to address during the second phase. The project's direct and indirect beneficiaries must

be accurately defined. The project's modified revised conceptual framework and the assumptions and risks associated with the revised project design should be clearly set out. The activity and programme delivery costs for the second phase should be justified by an activity based budget, consistent with the new project design. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

201) **Recommendation 5:** The Country Director is advised to consider temporarily suspending the approval of any new economic infrastructure development projects until the revised LFA matrix is annexed to the PRODOC and the effectiveness and cost efficiency of all sub projects can be reliably and independently verified, using the redesigned performance or results based M&E framework. The project should continue to implement all ongoing sub projects and any new BDS sub projects in support of human resource development, decent work and equality during the revision of the LFA Matrix and the internal assessment of the project's effectiveness and cost efficiency. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, with immediate effect.

202) **Recommendation 6:** More support should be provided to the project with regard to M&E and for quality assurance of project reports. In the event that the project is extended until May 2015, the steps that will be taken to phase out the CTA and hand over project management responsibilities to a national member of staff must to be explained in the new PRODOC. The new PRODOC should consider a provision to recruit a senior female member of staff responsible for either BDS (decent work and equality) or M&E: a woman who has experience of incorporating the experiences, knowledge, and interests of vulnerable groups into programme and project plans. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

203) **Recommendation 7:** In the event that the project is extended until May 2015, the revised PRODOC should contain a new governance structure for the project at the district level. The new governance structure must be realistic. It should be linked to the ILO's tripartite constituents and key project partners at the district and the national level. The new governance should ensure that the PAC receives regular reports on the project's progress. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

204) **Recommendation 8:** The ILO could do more to keep AusAID updated on the project's communications outputs and ensure that the role of the MoL&LR in the project is disseminated widely among project partners at the district, divisional and local level. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** Medium, by end of each quarter.

205) **Recommendation 9:** The project needs to initiate more sub projects in support of BDS that focus on decent work and equality, within the time remaining under the first phase of the project. If the project proceeds into a second phase, greater emphasis should to be given to sub projects that focus on strengthening, challenging and changing attitudes and values of individuals, businesses and institutions to decent work and equality. New economic infrastructure development activities should be included under the second phase of the project. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by March 2013.

206) **Recommendations 10:** All sub project proposals should contain a brief analysis of the potential positive and negative impacts of the sub project on the environment. When potentially negative impacts are identified, appropriate measures to mitigate these negative impacts must be clearly set out in the sub project proposal. If the project continues into the second phase, the revised PRODOC should set out the environmental impact assessments procedures that will be followed by the project to plan and implement all new sub projects. **Responsibility:** ILO's CO. **Priority:** High, by December 2012. Moderate, by March 2013.

Lessons Learnt and Good Practices

Lessons Learnt

207) Concern regarding the appropriateness ILO's modified version of the CB TREE approach to meet the needs of recently resettled IDPs in conflict affected villages in the north of Sri Lanka, was the significant lesson learnt from the evaluation. Reservations about the suitability of the CB TREE methodology in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in northern Sri Lanka arose as a result of the major changes made to the project's design and implementation strategy; the prioritization of daily household income and employment by project beneficiaries as their most immediate needs and the absence of an enabling local economic environment for MSE development in newly settled villages.

208) The findings of the evaluation raised questions about the suitability of the CB TREE *plus* approach in the context of the social environment faced by returning IDPs. In newly resettled villages community structures and institutions had been damaged or completely destroyed by prolonged conflict. The findings of the evaluation also raised question as to whether the most vulnerable members of recently resettled IDP communities are suitable participants for entrepreneurship training. FHH, Xcom, PWD and CAY typically have limited or restricted human, social and or financial capital. In the north of Sri Lanka FHH, Xcom, PWD and CAY and are also highly likely to be suffering from psychosocial and or physical trauma due to serial displacement, bereavement and the emotional impacts of the final phase of the conflict.

209) The findings of the evaluation also question of the economic viability of village level MSE formed through the CB TREE approach, when national and district value chains have yet to penetrate the divisional or village level due to land issues, lack of investment incentives and the absence of local partners with sufficient capital and business experience at the local level.

210) The lesson learnt by the evaluation does not question the validity of the CB TREE methodology *per se*, rather it questions whether a community based training approach for economic empowerment is more suited to post conflict situations where the transition from humanitarian to development assistance has been completed. Post conflict situations where community structures have been re-established and the priority needs of project beneficiaries for immediate household income are already met. The lesson learnt by the evaluation suggests CB TREE is more appropriate later in the recovery process, following the end of the Sri Lankan conflict: once national, district and divisional value chains have been linked. At which point, MSE developed through CB TREE can link to divisional, district and national markets.

Good Practices

211) Five strategies adopted by the project, which have been directly responsible for enhancing the project's overall performance and delivering positive benefits beyond the outputs and outcomes in the project design, were identified during in the evaluation. The following good practices are considered likely to be useful approach to be replicated in other ILO projects.

- I. The prominence the project has given to the need to increase the pace of transition from short term humanitarian assistance to long term development assistance, in support of the social and economic recovery of post conflict communities in the north of Sri Lanka.
- II. The project's strategy of implementing sub projects through CBO and private sector partners, rather than contracting implementation to third party local NGOs or private contractors;
- III. The project's commitment to working closely with and in support of the government's administrative authorities and in accordance with local and central government development's priorities and plans;
- IV. The project's emphasis on sustainability by targeting economically viable sub project interventions, in association with established and or apex CBOs;
- V. The project's facilitation and promotion of technology transfers and mentoring from the south to the north, through the private sector, contributing to dialogue and reconciliation.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Midterm Evaluation

Title of Project	Local Empowerment Through Economic Development (LEED)
TC CODE	SRL/10/04M/AUS
Administrative Unit	ILO Colombo
Technical Backstopping Unit	DWT Delhi with inputs from ILO/CRISIS
Type of Evaluation	Mid - term Independent Evaluation
Timing of Evaluation	Mid July to End of August 2012
Project budget	AUD 3.9 million
Project duration	26 May 2010-30June 2013

INTRODUCTION AND RATIONAL FOR EVALUATION

The evaluation is a mid-term independent evaluation in accordance with the ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation (2012). An independent project evaluation is a mandatory exercise for all ILO projects with budget of more than USD 1 million. The independent evaluations are managed by ILO official who have no prior involvement in the projects and conducted by external independent consultant(s). Key stakeholders, ILO constituents, partners and the donor will however be consulted throughout the evaluation process.

The midterm independent evaluation of the LEED project is planned for August 2012, with a final report being completed by September 2012. Its objective is to review the original project design, review the implementation progress, identify constraints, achievements, best practices and failures and to make recommendations to support the design of a second phase of the LEED project. This will contribute to the AusAID Mid-Term Review (MTR) which will take place in October/November 2012. One of the purposes of the MTR consist in taking a decision whether or not to fund a second phase (June 2013 to June 2015) of the LEED project. While indications at present are positive it is felt that the completion of an ILO independent evaluation prior to the MTR would give the correct message in terms of ILO institutional support and would also provide valuable inputs to design a project document reflecting the changes occurred in the operational environment since 2010.

The evaluation will be managed by Federico Negro, capacity building and knowledge development specialist at ILO/CRISIS in ILO HQ.. The ILO Regional Evaluation Officer, who is based at ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) will ensure quality standard of the process and of the evaluation report. The project will bear the cost of the evaluation, including the cost of the consultant. The evaluation report will be in English. The evaluation will comply with evaluation procedures and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in ILO's evaluation procedures.

I. BACKGROUND ON PROJECT AND CONTEXT

Contextual background

Sri Lanka has experienced conflict of various intensities over the past 30 years. This has caused large scale displacement of populations, destruction of infrastructure, loss of livelihoods, and loss of life throughout the island.

However Northern Sri Lanka which was the stronghold of the LTTE was the most affected area. In 2008 the Sri Lanka Defense Forces launched a military offensive which culminated in the final military defeat of the LTTE at Mullaitivu. During this campaign the entire populations of Vavuniya North, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts were displaced. The displaced persons were mainly accommodated at the Menik Farm IDP (Welfare Camp) camp. The order of displacement in terms of districts was determined by the line of advance, progress of the military offensive and the subsequent retreat of the LTTE. The order of displacement and now resettlement was/is Vavuniya North, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu district.

In August 2009 the GOSL commenced the return of the displaced populations to their original home areas. A multitude of agencies and NGOs, financed by a plethora of donors provided a variety of resettlement assistance in terms of temporary shelter, livelihood assistance, cash grants etc., to support the government resettlement efforts. While there may have been many short comings in terms of coordination, coverage of target groups, etc. that fact is that two years later the vast majority of the displaced population have been resettled and while there are many challenges, economic growth is occurring and the general standard of living of the vast majority of the population is gradually improving.

Project background

The Local Empowerment through Economic Development (LEED) project is a 3.9m AUS\$ AUSAID funded project implemented by the ILO in conflict affected Districts of Northern Sri Lanka. It is currently (June 2012) operational in Vavuniya and Kilinochchi districts and intends to extend its operations to Mullaitivu District in July 2012. The duration of phase 1 of the project is from June 2010 to June 2013. It is likely that a second phase at similar funding levels will be financed for a further 2 years by AUSAID until June 2015.

The overall goal of the project is **“to contribute to poverty reduction, sustainable job creation and peace building through an improved environment with strengthened governance, effective community-based services and public-private partnership that economically empower vulnerable groups in conflict-affected populations”**²⁹

The project was designed in April 2010 and an agreement signed with AUSAID in May 2011. This was a time of acute humanitarian crisis and this is reflected in the design of the project. However the project only became fully operational in February 2011 some 10 months later. During that period (19th September to 30 Nov 2010) a short term consultant was hired to initiate project activities. In addition, general support, logistic activities were also carried out to set up project office and accommodations in Vavuniya and a field coordinator was recruited. It should be noted that concerns were expressed by the donor regarding the delays in launching full implementation by the donor on a number of occasions.

The project became fully operational in January 2012 with the appointment of a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA). His initial assessment was that the operational environment had changed significantly since the design of the project. While there were humanitarian needs, there were many agencies and NGOs already addressing them. It was felt that the LEED projects resources and ILO institutional

²⁹ LEED Project Document

technical support would be more effectively utilized by investment in strategic / turnkey investment initiatives in economic sectors with growth potential to create employment, sustainable livelihoods and thus reduce the needs for humanitarian assistance rather. This was substantially different from the community based initiatives than had been originally planned in the prodoc. In simple term shifting the emphasis from a humanitarian approach and needs to one of recovery and development by creating concrete income opportunities.

This obviously raised the issue of the relevance of the Prodoc into question. In an ideal situation it would have been sensible to substantially revise the PRODOC. However this would have had contractual implication that would most probably have resulted in the termination of the agreement between ILO and AUSAID. At this time the donor was continuing to express his concerns over the lack of project delivery and had threatened to withhold and withdraw funding if significant progress could not be made (a condition of AusAID funding replenishment is that 90% of the previous year budget is expended by the end of the financial April). It was therefore agreed that rather than carry out a project revision it would possible to retain the original prodoc but to change the implementation strategy so as to maintain the relationship with AusAID and simultaneously fulfill ILO's contractual obligations in terms of outputs.

The project contributes to:

- Sri Lanka DWCP (2008 – 2012) outcome 1,
- ILO OBM CPOs LKA102 and LKA107 as well as
- UNDAF outcome 1 and 3

(A timeline for main actions attached in Annex X - Reference note of meeting with AusAID 22/02/2012)

THE DONOR

The ILO LEED project is one of eight projects of the US\$ 30 million AusAID funded Australian Community Rehabilitation Programme Phase 3 (ACRP3). (Reference ACRP docs and AusAID Strategy for Sri Lanka)

AusAID administrative arrangement document no. 55235 detail the obligations, financial reporting auditing, and obligations of each party. They also provide guidelines on formats for work plans, progress reports and visibility. (Reference Administrative Arrangement Document No. 55235)

The ACRP Programme cycle (financial year) is from the 31st of May to the 1st of June, the following year. All AusAID ACRP implementing partners must align their programming with this cycle. This means that annual work plans are submitted by April the 1st and project progress reports by the 30th of October of each year.

These two dates coincide with the arrival of an AusAID Technical Support Team who review plans and progress and reconcile both with the ACRP 3 strategic goals and with the puts, outcomes and objectives of the individual projects (Reference AusAID TST reports).

Although at times the reporting and monitoring demands are onerous (3 TST missions in 14 months), AusAID has proven to be a very understanding and flexible donor in relation to the ILO and the LEED project. It has retained faith in ILO long after many other donors would have done so. In relation to Sri Lanka, it is a very strategic ILO partner.

PARTNERS

At a national level the project is implemented in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour and Labour Relations. A Project Advisory Committee (PAC) has been established / it is chaired by the Secretary to the Ministry and includes donor representative, representatives of other relevant ministries and

departments, The Employers Federation of Ceylon, trade unions and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka. (Reference TORs and Minutes of PAC)

On an operational level, the main partners include the offices of the District and Divisional Secretaries, relevant government ministries and departments, the cooperatives movement, local chambers of commerce, the Employers' Federation of Ceylon and private large and small businesses.

The project has made a conscious decision to directly support and contract with identified private and public sector partners rather than to implement through intermediary agents such as NGOs.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

As previously mentioned the project was designed during a period of acute humanitarian needs and when there were restrictions on access to many areas of operation. Assumptions were made and an implementation strategy developed based on the information available and the conditions prevailing at that time. Between the project design period and the commencement of activities the situation had changed. It was therefore necessary to review the implementation strategy.

The main points considered were as follows:

- Local ownership of the recovery process is tenuous with external agencies still seen as the main service providers to the poor.
- There is a multiplicity of actors already working in the same areas of operation and often targeting the same vulnerable groups.
- Coordination is poor, and in the absence of area based integrated economic recovery plan, is reactive rather than proactive.
- There are no agreed common approaches, understandings or policies to address issues of sustainable job creation, SME development, vulnerability and vulnerable groups.
- There is a need to strengthen District and Divisional Secretariats through technical support to develop pro poor and inclusive policy, establish systems and tools to assist with implementation and coordinate activities in their respective areas of responsibility.
- Production in the agricultural sector, on which the economy of the North is dependent, is growing. Markets are weak and have to be developed. There is no policy or plan as to how markets will be developed.
- Community-based initiatives on livelihoods and employment must be linked to the wider economic recovery and to markets within the division, district and region. This is not happening at the moment.
- There is an opportunity to contribute to systemic change and ensure that issues of gender, female-headed households and disabilities are integrated into policies and the economic recovery process.
- The LEED project can play a key role by using its resources to lever partnerships with other agencies and NGOs who are already active in the economic development sector and/or are targeting vulnerable groups. By doing so, resources can be combined, rationalized and used more effectively.

- The LEED project must not become just another project implementing sub projects but rather focus on capacity building of local institutions and systemic change using the process and outputs of sub projects to build local ownership and responsibility.

The refocused project implementation strategy has changed from one of direct community based village level interventions to one that focuses on support to public and private sector initiatives and institutions that are identified through a combination of sectoral and value chain studies of key economic sectors with growth potential to enhance inclusive and equitable development . It is based on the following principles;

- Ensure that the concept of sustainability is placed at the forefront of decision making process and that efforts are focused on achieving outcomes that will remain in the post project period;
- Ensure that the concept of local ownership and inclusion is reinforced;
- Avoid direct implementation but rather enter into agreements with beneficiaries, individual or institutions, to allow them meet their own needs.
- Operate at a number of levels: village, division, district, regional and national levels and link at all levels.
- Manage risk by a policy of inclusion;
- Develop and promote partnerships between big and small, north and south business
- Be innovative and flexible
- Give Priority to initiatives that can be significantly up scaled.

PROGRESS TO DATE (as of MAY 2012)

The project has made significant progress in year two. It is now operational in Vavuniya and Kilinochchi It is currently managing a total of ----- no sub projects to a value of US\$ 1 million. A full description of activities, expenditure and outputs is contained in Annex 4.

The most significant challenge has been to balance the demands of delivery with the demands of the necessary analysis, dialogue and preparatory work to maintain quality and focus on long term outcomes. The Project has managed to do this and have initiated sub projects and committed funding in accordance with the original budget and expenditure requirements. As a result there has been a continuation of activities from year two into year three. By the end of year three (June 2013) there will be complete alignment between the planned and actual outputs and outcomes as described in the project document.

One of the achievements of the LEED project has been the fact that it has brought a different dimension to the recovery agenda in the North. Through its implementation of sub projects it has to various degrees introduced the concept of inclusive development with a market focus or at times a market development with an inclusive focus. In its dealings with local authorities, other agency and, local implementing partners it is felt that it has contributed to them adopting a more long term developmental approach.

By far the most significant achievement so far is the quality of partnership between the project and the local authorities and implementing partners (District and Divisional Secretariats, Coops, Chambers etc.). A true partnership has developed that provides the platform and the atmosphere to tackle more systemic and institutional issues and constraints.


MANAGEMENT SET UP

At national level, The Director of the ILO Colombo office is responsible for the overall implementation of the project. A project management team is appointed to run the project activities under the guidance of the national Project Advisory Committee (PAC), in accordance with standards that shall ensure management for development results, best value for money, fairness, integrity and transparency.

At district and field levels the project is implemented through its ILO field offices in Vavuniya and a sub office in Kilinochchi. The team is led by an international Chief Technical Advisor, two national technical experts; one on Local Economic Development and one on Value Chain Development, two field coordinators, one assistant field coordinator an administration and Finance Officer and three drivers.

The field project activities are backstopped by the ILO Colombo and supported with technical assistance from international technical experts based either at the ILO Decent Work Team in New Delhi, the Regional Office in Bangkok and/or other relevant technical departments in ILO Headquarters in Geneva.

At District Level coordination of project activities is through the office of the District and Divisional Secretariats.



II. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

Purpose: The objective is to review the original project design because the conditions have substantially changed in the past three years, review the project implementation towards longer-term goals rather than short-term post crisis response as stated in the original prodoc, identify constraints achievements best practices and failures and making recommendations to modify strategies to be reflected in the design of a second phase of the LEED project.

Clients: The primary user of the evaluation will be the ILO Project Team, Technical and Administrative backstopping units who will be responsible for preparing the revised Prodoc.

The secondary users will be AUSAID who will be provided with access to the findings of the evaluation so as to demonstrate ILO s evaluation oversight and also feed into their ACRP 3 Mid Term Evaluation of the LEED project. This is expected after the evaluation has been completed.

The other secondary users will be the Ministry of Labour and the PAC who will review the findings of the evaluation for their guidance in the second phase of the project.

The findings of the evaluation will also form the basis for the preparation of revised PRODOC for phase two.

III. EVALUATION SCOPE

The scope of the evaluation is to verify project implementation from the drafting of the proposal until August 2012 (the time when midterm evaluation is expected).

The geographical coverage will include Colombo, Vavuniya North, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts of Sri Lanka.

IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

It is felt that the evaluation should examine the following:

Relevant and strategic fit of the intervention ILO Country Strategy and its influence on Project design	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To what extent the project has been relevant to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of the conflict in Sri Lanka• The extent to which project has played its roles and synergies among other UN implemented projects in conflict affected areas• How has the project contributed to Sri Lanka DWCP outcomes (SRL 102 and SRL 107), UNDAF (outcome 1 and 3) and the national development plans?
Conceptualization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• For what strategic reasons did ILO decide to develop the LEED project?• What was the nature and quality of engagement between ILO and AUSIAID in the pre-design phase?• What were the inputs from HQ / Regional Units in relation to strategic context and design• How are ILO core values and strategic policy aligned with the objectives of the USAID ACRP 3 programme?
Logic and Validity of project Design (PRODOC and	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Does the project design (i.e. objectives, outputs, and activities) logical in addressing the need of the key stakeholders and beneficiaries as initially identified? Were the key stakeholders including ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design of the project?

coherence with ILO capacities and values)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the design need to be modified in the remaining project period? • How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document in assessing project's progress? Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender-sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate? • How relevant was the contextual analysis of the local environment undertaken during the project design? Given the fluid nature of post conflict environments how were the possibility of a changing environments or scenarios incorporated in the project design? • What, if any, alternative strategies have been adopted, are they more effective in achieving the project objectives?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the project making sufficient progress towards its planned objectives? Will the project be likely to achieve its planned objectives upon completion? What are the main constraints, problems and areas in need of further attention? • How have the stakeholders been involved in project implementation? How effective has the project been in establishing national ownership? • Has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs and changing priorities of the national and local constituents and beneficiaries? • Has the project been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional changes in the project environment?
Efficiency of resources use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve project objectives? • Have project resources been used efficiently? Have activities supporting the strategy been cost-effective? In general, do the results achieved so far justify the costs? • Has the project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
Effectiveness of Management arrangement (the extent to which management capacities and arrangements put in place support the achievement of results)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are management capacities adequate? • Does project management facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Is there a clear understanding of project objectives, roles and responsibilities by project staff and all parties involved? • Does the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from the ILO (Colombo office, DWT-India, Regional Office, and HQ) and its national and local implementing partners? If so, what and how effective and useful have the technical inputs and support been? • How effective does the project management monitor project performance and results? Is there adequate a monitoring system? • How effective is the Project Steering Committee in supporting the project team to deliver this project? How effective is communication between the project team, the ILO and the implementing partners? • Has there been any inter-agencies cooperation with the agencies operate in the same geographical areas to increase project effectiveness? • How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? • With other agencies? • With national partners? • In regard to project visibility?

Emerging Impact/future direction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent the project has so far contributed to the institutional development of the local governments and implementing partners? • How the project's benefit including the building of national ownership can be sustained? The likelihood that the project benefit will likely be sustained vis-a-vis the approach and strategies adopted by the project so far? If not what more should be done? • What is the project exit strategy? Should the project second phase be pursued? If so, what should the project phase II be focused on? Or how will the design of phase II be modified?
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V. METHODOLOGY

The ILO will engage an external independent consultant to undertake the evaluation. The Consultant will report to the evaluation manager. The ILO Evaluation Focal Point at the ILO Country Office will help facilitate the evaluation process and the evaluation mission.

The Consultant will:

- review relevant documents; concept note, PRODOC, internal and external correspondence, annual work plans, annual progress reports, donor reports, Technical Support Team reports and other relevant documentation
- meet with the project team and with relevant staff of ILO Colombo
- consult relevant ILO staff in DWT New Delhi and ILO/CRISIS in Geneva (facilitated by LEED Project)
- meet with the donor
- meet with the Ministry of Labour and Labour Relations
- meet with the District Secretaries and Divisional Secretaries in the relevant areas in which the project is active
- meet with the project's various implementing partners
- travel to various project sites to visit all project activities in maximum one-week field visit (transport will be arranged by the LEED Project).

Suggested methodology:

- plan for information gathering is interviews and focus groups discussions.
- Data collection and presentation must be sex-disaggregated and the different needs of women and men should be considered in all the evaluation process.
- A stakeholder workshop will be held in Colombo to present the preliminary findings for verification by key stakeholders.
- A draft evaluation report will be submitted to the Evaluation Manager who will circulate and obtain feedbacks from key stakeholders
- The Consultant will prepare the final evaluation report and incorporate the inputs and comments deemed appropriate into the final report.
- The format of the report will be in accordance with ILO standard guidelines.

VI. MAIN DELIVERABLES

The main outputs will be the followings:-

- 1) **An inception report:** Preliminary finding on project activities /outputs to be presented at the stakeholders workshops at the end of evaluation mission

- 2) **A draft evaluation report** containing content as per the evaluation TOR later will be transformed into a final report. The “Evaluation report “should contain the following contents:

- ILO standard title page
- Executive summary
- Brief background on the project and its logic
- Purpose, scope and clients of evaluation
- Methodology
- Review of implementation
- Presentation of finding as per evaluation criteria
- Conclusions
- Recommendations (Including to whom they are addressed to)
- Lessons learnt
- Possible future directions
- Annexes

Quality recommendations in the evaluation report must meet the following criteria: -

The ILO Evaluation guidelines to Results-based Evaluation: Principles and rationale for evaluation – Version 1 includes the following criteria for drafting quality recommendations in evaluation reports: (1) recommendations are based on findings and conclusions of the report, (2) recommendations are clear, concise, constructive and of relevance to the intended user(s), and (3) recommendations are realistic and actionable (including who is called upon to act and recommended timeframe). In addition to The ILO Guidelines, EVAL has also issued guidance for formatting requirements for evaluation Reports, establishing the following criteria for the drafting of recommendations: (1) actionable and time-bound with clear indication of whom the recommendation is addressed to, (2) written in two to three sentences of concise text, (3) numbered (no bullet points) and (4) no more than twelve. Also, recommendations must be (5) presented at the end of the body of the main report, and the concise statement should be (6) copied over into the Executive Summary and the Evaluation Summary (that is, the concise statements of recommendations should be verbatim identical in the recommendation section of the main body of the report, the Executive Summary, and the Evaluation Summary).

- 3) **Final evaluation report** – (to be submitted in word file) when comments of the ILO, and other stakeholders have been received on the draft. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ‘Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports in the ILO’ which will be provided to the team leader. The final report is subject to final approval by ILO Evaluation Unit.

- 4) **Evaluation summary (as per ILO standard format):** (in word file) the evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluation team leader after the evaluation report has been finalised. The evaluation manager will finalise the evaluation summary.

- 5) **Project scoring matrix** (to provide scoring of the project based on ILO evaluation matrix)
The evaluation reports and its contents are the property of the ILO.

ILO management will prepare management response to the evaluation recommendations and action to act upon the recommendations will be undertaken and report to ILO Evaluation Unit.

I. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT, WORK PLAN AND TIME FRAME

7.1 Evaluation management and roles of evaluators and stakeholders:

The **evaluation manager** is Mr. Federico Negro of ILO/CRISIS. He will finalise the TOR and be in charge of the selection of the evaluation consultant. ROAP will approve the TOR and choice of consultant. The project office in Sri Lanka will handle all contractual arrangements with the evaluator and provide any logistical and other assistance as may be required.

The evaluator(s) reports to the evaluation manager,

Evaluator's roles: The international or national independent consultant who has no prior involvement in the project will undertake the evaluation and will be responsible for delivering the above evaluation outputs using a combination of methods mentioned above. National consultant provides support to the team leader particularly during the evaluation mission as requested by the team leader.

Selection/Qualifications of Evaluator: One independent international evaluation specialist with degree. He/she should have a proven track record in the evaluation of similar complex projects, experience with country situations similar to that of Sri Lanka. Experience in the local economic development field will be an advantage.

Stakeholders' role: All stakeholders in Sri Lanka particularly the project teams, ILO CO-Colombo, ILO/Crisis at HQ, ILO DWT-Delhi, ROAP, key constituents and partners including donor will be consulted and will have opportunities to provide inputs to the TOR and draft evaluation report.

The tasks of the Project: The project management will provide logistic support to the evaluation and will prepare a more detailed evaluation mission agenda. Also the project needs to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluator.

7.2 Proposed workplan and time allocation

1	Consultant/ evaluation manager	Brief by evaluation manager (by phone) Briefing with ILO Colombo Desk Review of project – related documents	4	0
2	Consultant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consultation with project team in Vavuniya Consultation with project partners in Vavuniya 	6	0+7
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field visit in selected areas Consultations with project partners ,and other beneficiaries 	5	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders workshop in Colombo 	2	0+15
3	Consultant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft report in English based on all activities/tasks under taken above 	5	0+17
4	Evaluation manger and Evaluation Focal Point	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Circulation of draft report to key stake holders Consolidate comments of key stakeholders 	3 weeks after evaluation is completed	0+24
5	Consultant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalize the report 	2 days	0+29
6	Consultant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Present the report and complete assignment 	1 Day	0+31

II. RESOURCE REQUIRED: The following resources are required from the project.

- Cost of External evaluator (Fee+ travelling expenses)
- Cost of local transportation in the field
- Cost of Stakeholders workshop
- Cost of interpreter, if needed

Appendix 2: Data collection instruments

2.1 Evaluation Matrix

	Categories of Key Informants									
	ILO					AusAID	GOSL	BEN PSP	UN NGO	2° Data
	HQ	RO	DWT	CO	LEED					
<u>MIE Evaluation Criteria (EC)</u>										
EC1. Relevance of the Project Design / ILO strategy on PD			X	X	X		X	X	X	
EC2. Conceptualization	X	X	X	X		X				
EC3. Logic and Validity of Project Design			X	X	X	X	X			X
EC4. Effectiveness of Implementation					X		X	X		X
EC5. Efficiency of Implementation					X		X			X
EC6. Effectiveness of Management	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X
EC7. Emerging Impacts / Future Direction					X		X	X		

2.2 Evaluation Criteria and Key Questions by Stakeholder Group

ILO Head Quarters in Geneva

- EC2 Conceptualisation: For what strategic reasons did ILO decide to develop the LEED project?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: What were the inputs from HQ / Regional Units in relation to strategic context and design
- EC2 Conceptualisation: How are ILO core values and strategic policy aligned with the objectives of the USAID ACRP 3 programme?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Does the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from the ILO (Colombo office, DWT-India, Regional Office, and HQ) and its national and local implementing partners? If so, what and how effective and useful have the technical inputs and support has been?

ILO Regional Office in Bangkok

- EC2 Conceptualisation: For what strategic reasons did ILO decide to develop the LEED project?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: What were the inputs from HQ / Regional Units in relation to strategic context and design
- EC2 Conceptualisation: How are ILO core values and strategic policy aligned with the objectives of the USAID ACRP 3 programme?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Does the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from the ILO (Colombo office, DWT-India, Regional Office, and HQ) and its national and local implementing partners? If so, what and how effective and useful have the technical inputs and support been?

Decent Work Team in New Delhi

- EC2 Conceptualisation: What were the inputs from HQ / Regional Units in relation to strategic context and design?

Supplementary Question

- EC7: What further inputs from and to the HQ / Regional Units would further improve the project's implementation, should the project proceed into the second phase?

ILO Country Office in Colombo

- EC2 Conceptualisation: For what strategic reasons did ILO decide to develop the LEED project?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: What was the nature and quality of engagement between ILO and AUSIAD in the pre-design phase?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: What were the inputs from HQ / Regional Units in relation to strategic context and design?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: How are ILO core values and strategic policy aligned with the objectives of the USAID ACRP 3 programme?
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: Were the key stakeholders including ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design of the project?
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: How relevant was the contextual analysis of the local environment undertaken during the project design? Given the fluid nature of post conflict environments how were the possibility of a changing environments or scenarios incorporated in the project design?
- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: To what extent the project has been relevant to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of the conflict in Sri Lanka
- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: How has the project contributed to Sri Lanka DWCP outcomes (SRL 102 and SRL 107), UNDAF (outcome 1 and 3) and the national development plans?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? With other agencies? With national partners? In regard to project visibility?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Does project management facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Is there a clear understanding of project objectives, roles and responsibilities by project staff and all parties involved?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Are management capacities adequate?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective does the project management monitor project performance and results? Is there adequate a monitoring system?

ILO Project Office in Vavuniya

- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: To what extent the project has been relevant to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of the conflict in Sri Lanka
- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: The extent to which project has played its roles and synergies among other UN implemented projects in conflict affected areas
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: Is the project design (i.e. objectives, outputs, and activities) logical in addressing the need of the key stakeholders and beneficiaries as initially identified?
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: Does the design need to be modified in the remaining project period?
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document in assessing project's progress? Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender-sensitive? Are the means of

- verification for the indicators appropriate?
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: What, if any, alternative strategies have been adopted, are they more effective in achieving the project objectives
- EC4 Is the project making sufficient progress towards its planned Objectives / Outputs? Will the project be likely to achieve its planned Objectives / Outputs upon completion?
- EC4 Effectiveness: What are the main constraints, problems and areas in need of further attention?
- EC4 Effectiveness: How have the stakeholders been involved in project implementation?
- EC4 Effectiveness: How effective has the project been in establishing national ownership?
- EC4 Effectiveness: Has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs and changing priorities of the national and local constituents and beneficiaries?
- EC4 Effectiveness: Has the project been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional changes in the project environment?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Are management capacities adequate?
- EC6 Does project management facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Is there a clear understanding of project objectives, roles and responsibilities by project staff and all parties involved?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Does the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from the ILO (Colombo office, DWT-India, Regional Office, and HQ) and its national and local implementing partners? If so, what and how effective and useful have the technical inputs and support been?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Steering Committee in supporting the project team to deliver this project? How effective is communication between the project team, the ILO and the implementing partners?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Has there been any inter-agencies cooperation with the agencies operate in the same geographical areas to increase project effectiveness?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? With other agencies? With national partners? In regard to project visibility?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: To what extent has the project has so far contributed to the institutional development of the local governments and implementing partners?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: How can the project's benefit including the building of national ownership can be sustained? The likelihood that the project benefit will likely be sustained vis-a-vis the approach and strategies adopted by the project so far? If not what more should be done?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: What is the project exit strategy? Should the project second phase be pursued? If so, what should the project phase II be focused on? Or how will the design of phase II be modified?

AusAID in Colombo

- EC2 Conceptualisation: What was the nature and quality of engagement between ILO and AUSIAID in the pre-design phase?
- EC2 Conceptualisation: How are ILO core values and strategic policy aligned with the objectives of the USAID ACRP 3 programme? *and vice versa*
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? With other agencies? With national partners? In regard to project visibility?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Does project management facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Is there a clear understanding of project objectives, roles and responsibilities by project staff and all parties involved?

Supplementary Questions

- Capacity of staff is sufficient – gender, disability? (EC6)
- AusAID's position on the many changes to the PRODOC and comments in the TST. Is the current PRODOC valid? (EC3)

- Conceptual change away from community based development to 'economic literate' beneficiaries – who are not poorest of the poor – is AusAID OK with this, if so why? (EC2)
- M&E Evaluation. Is AusAID satisfied with how ILO is managing M&E. PRODOC, Work Plans, no baseline data. What are AusAID expecting to measure?(EC6)
- Visibility – is AusAID happy with the coverage they receive, the extent to which LEED project acknowledged AusAID?
- Reporting Issues: is AusAID happy with ILO reports? If not, why not?
- The role of CTA – two years increased to three. What about years four and five? Continue with CTA or hand over to local staff? Capacity building of local staff? (EC6)
- Domains of Change. What are these and why are they important?
- Outcome orientated reporting? In the TST? How can the project do this with no valid PRODOC?
- Gender: are numbers enough or does AusAID expect something more. How to measure this?
- Environment?
- Peace / social cohesion / conflict mitigation – how does AusAID define this?
- The switch to sectors from sub projects – is AusAID happy with this?

Government of Sri Lanka

- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: To what extent the project has been relevant to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of the conflict in Sri Lanka
- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: Were the key stakeholders including ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design of the project?
- EC4 Effectiveness: How effective has the project been in establishing national ownership?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Steering Committee in supporting the project team to deliver this project? How effective is communication between the project team, the ILO and the implementing partners?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? With other agencies? With national partners? In regard to project visibility?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: To what extent has the project has so far contributed to the institutional development of the local governments and implementing partners?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: How can the project's benefit including the building of national ownership can be sustained? The likelihood that the project benefit will likely be sustained *vis-a-vis* the approach and strategies adopted by the project so far? If not what more should be done?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: What is the project exit strategy? Should the project second phase be pursued? If so, what should the project phase II be focused on? Or how will the design of phase II be modified?

Beneficiaries, Implementing Partners and the Private Sector Partners

- EC1 Relevant and ILO Country Strategy: To what extent the project has been relevant to the post conflict environment and the socio-economic recovery of the conflict in Sri Lanka
- EC4 Effectiveness: Has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs and changing priorities of the national and local constituents and beneficiaries?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: How can the project's benefits including the building of national ownership can be sustained? The likelihood that the project benefit will likely be sustained *vis-a-vis* the approach and strategies adopted by the project so far? If not what more should be done?
- EC7 Emerging Impact / Direction: What is the project exit strategy? Should the project second phase be pursued? If so, what should the project phase II be focused on? Or how will the design of phase II be modified?

Supplementary Questions

- What is good / effective / different (compared to other NGO or government) about the manner in which ILO engages with the partner / co-op / business? (EC4)
- What have been the key impacts (economic, social, and institutional) of the sub project? (EC7)
- What more needs to be done to ensure that the sub project will be sustainable once ILO ceases assistance / operation? (EC7)
- Visibility: Is AusAID's assistance to the sub project visible at the project location and does the beneficiary / interview know AusAID's role in support of the sub project (EC6)
- Why has the private sector company got involved in the project? What was the motivation, incentive, reason for working with the project?
- What is the company's policy on / commitment to decent work – labour rights, occupational health and safety, employment rights – can they give any examples.

Other UN agencies and Non Government Organisations

- EC1 Relevant of the Project and ILO Country Strategy: The extent to which project has played its roles and synergies among other UN implemented projects in conflict affected areas
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Has there been any inter-agencies cooperation with the agencies operate in the same geographical areas to increase project effectiveness?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective is the Project Communication strategy; with government, district etc.? With other agencies? With national partners? In regard to project visibility?

Secondary Data from the PRODOC, Work Plans, Progress Reports, AusAID TST, M&E data and financial data

- EC3 Logic / Validity of Project Design: How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document in assessing project's progress? Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender-sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?
- EC4 Effectiveness: Is the project making sufficient progress towards its planned Objectives / Outputs? Will the project be likely to achieve its planned Objectives / Outputs upon completion?
- EC5 Efficiency: Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve project Objectives / Outputs?
- EC5 Efficiency: Have project resources been used efficiently? Have activities supporting the strategy been cost-effective? In general, do the results achieved so far justify the costs?
- EC5 Efficiency: Has the project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: Are management capacities adequate?
- EC6 Effectiveness of Management: How effective does the project management monitor project performance and results? Is there adequate a monitoring system?

Appendix 3: List of persons interviewed and completed work schedule

Date	Day	Location	Tasks Completed / Interviews Planned / people met
15.10.12	MON	Colombo	am: Review of the TOR / Assigned draft Key Questions to Key Informants / Draft Evaluation Matrix / Draft a work schedule and interviews
16.10.12	TUE	Colombo	am: Review of project documents pm: draft evaluation report format
17.10.12	WED	Colombo	am / pm: Review of project documents
18.10.12	THU	Colombo	am: Review of Project Documents 1400: KII No. 1: ILO Staff Colombo - Rasika Somaweera
19.10.12	FRI	Colombo	am: Review of Project Documents 1400 KII No. 2: AusAID - Steven Wawrzonek, Fisrt Secretary, Development Cooperation; Sweta Velpillay, Senior Programme Officer
20.10.12	SAT	Vavuniya	am: Reporting and preparation of Field Evaluation documentation pm: travel to Vavuniya (Nelly Inn) / dinner with CTA @ 1900
21.10.12	SUN	Vavuniya	<i>Field Visit Vavuniya North DSD and Oddusudan DSD (Mullaitivu District)</i> 1. VSV Rice Mill (S. Vihundanathan Owner) 2. Par Boiling Rice Project (P. Nagapushani, Entreprenuer) 3. Private Papaya Growers (S. Chandrabalasingham, Grower) 4. Lelin Agro Equipment Works (E. Lelin and Gnayanlakshi Owners) 5. Vavuniya North MPCs (K. Thevaraja - President; P.Somesethananathan - General Manager) 6. Mayuran Mixture Enterprise (Jadeeswaran Owner and three workers) 7. Mullaitivu Thrift & Credit Cooperative Society
22.10.12	MON	Vavuniya	8. UN Habitat Vavuniya (A.H. Mohammed Jazeer, Dep. PM) 9. UNDP Vavuniya (Nagarasa Kamalathas, Head of Office) <i>Field Visit Vavuniya North DSD (continued)</i> 10. Divisional Secretary DS Vavuniya North (K. Paranthaman) 11. Vavuniya North Women's Fruit Processors Cooperative (Subandini Secretary and seven members) 12. Chief Technical Adviser (Joe Connelly)
23.10.12	TUE	Vavuniya	<i>Field Visit Kilinochchi District / Poonaryn DSD</i> 13. Chamber of Commerce (S. Thanabalasunderan Chief Operating Officer; A Janagan Business Development Officer) 14. District Secretary (Mrs Ketheeswaran plus Planning Officer) 15. DoFAR (K. Nakkeeran, Fisheries Inspector) 16. Poonayn MPCs (K. Senduran – CDO; S. Pradeepan – Accountant; N. Shantilingam Branch Supervisor; Rahini DSD Gender Officer and 10 beneficiaries) 17. Poonaryn FCSU (R. Kiruba, Genral Manager and 08 employees) 18. Iranaimathanagar FCS (Michael – Treasurer; Luis Raj – Secretary; Kennedy - Accountant and three members)
24.10.12	WED	Vavuniya	<i>Field Visit Mullaitivu District / Puttukuddieruppu & Maritimpattu DSD</i> 19. Vishvamadu MPCs (Dr. Padmanathan – Chairperson) 20. Mullaitivu FCSU (Mr. Shivalingam General Manager)
25.10.12	THU	Vavuniya	0830 – 1030: Debriefing with LEED Project Team (CTA and three staff) 21. Chamber of Commerce Vavuniya (M. C. Uwais – President; Suthainathan - Secretary; Stalin - Manager Information & Business Centre)
26.10.12	FRI	Colombo	am: Meeting with Paul Comyn (DWT Delhi) @ 10 am am: Telephone interview with Dr. Upali Ranasinghe, President, CR Exports (PVT) LTD
27.10.12	SAT	Colombo	am Data analysis
28.10.12	SUN	Colombo	-

29.10.12	MON	Colombo	am / pm: Data analysis (<i>note P B M Holiday – Poya / long weekend</i>)
30.10.12	TUE	Colombo	am: emailed questions to ILO Head Office in Geneva (Federico Negro) and ILO Regional Office in Bangkok (Pamornrat Pringsulaka) am / pm: Data analysis
31.10.12	WED	Colombo	am: Data analysis 1430 - 1530: Upali Wijayaweera, Secretary; Mrs. Pamini Rathnayake (Coordinating Secretary to the Secretary) MoL&MP pm: Telephone Interview with Taprobane Seafoods Pvt Ltd
01.11.12	THU	Colombo	am: Data analysis pm: Data analysis & telephone Interview with Neil Marine Pvt Ltd
02.11.12	FRI	Colombo	Data analysis
03.11.12	SAT	Colombo	Draft PowerPoint Presentation (Conclusions & Recommendations)
04.11.12	SUN	Colombo	Final PowerPoint Presentation
05.11.12	MON	Colombo	am / pm Report writing
06.11.12	TUE	Colombo	am: Reporting writing 1430 – 1830: PowerPoint Presentation outlining major findings. Donglin Li (Country Director), Shafinaz Hassandeen Senior Programme Officer, Ayoma de Silve (Finance), Shyama Salgado (National Project Coordinator), Pramodini Weerasekera (Programme Assistant), Rasika Somarwera (Programme Assistant).
07.11.12	WED	Colombo	Revisions based on discussions
08.11.12	THU	Colombo	1030 – 1430: Final PowerPoint Presentation outlining major findings. Donglin Li (Country Director), Shafinaz Hassandeen Senior Programme Officer, Ayoma de Silve (Finance), Shyama Salgado (National Project Coordinator), Pramodini Weerasekera (Programme Assistant), Rasika Somarwera (Programme Assistant).
09.11.12	FRI	Colombo	0900 - 1030: Meeting with Kanishka Weerasinghe (Deputy Director General), Mrs. Meghamali Aluwihare (Head of Plantation Services), Employers Federation of Ceylon pm: Report writing
10.11.12	SAT	Colombo	-
11.11.12	SUN	Colombo	-
12.11.12	MON	Colombo	am: Report writing 1400 – 1500: Meeting with AusAID: Steven Wawrzonek, First Secretary, Development Cooperation; Sweta Velpillay, Senior Programme Officer
13.11.12	TUE	Colombo	am / pm: PAC PowerPoint Presentation
14.11.12	WED	Colombo	am: Report writing 1400: Presentation to the Project Advisory Committee
15.11.12	THU	Colombo	am / pm: Report writing
16.11.12	FRI	Colombo	am / pm: Report writing
17.11.12	SAT	Colombo	am: Report writing
18.11.12	SUN	Colombo	am: Report writing
19.11.12	MON	Colombo	am / pm: Report writing
20.11.12	TUE	Colombo	am: Revised PowerPoint for AusAID MTR pm: Editing Final Draft Report
21.11.12	WED	Colombo	All day power cut
22.11.12	THU	Colombo	am: Editing Final Draft Report pm: Revised PowerPoint for AusAID MTR
11.12.12	TUE	Colombo	am. Comments and Corrections from ROAP
12.12.12	WED	Colombo	am. Comments and Corrections from CRISIS HQ

Appendix 4: List of publications cited

The following documents and publications were reviewed by the consultant during the course of the evaluation:

- a. LEED Project Proposal: Community-based confidence building among different ethnic and religious groups through integrated skills training and SME development for the poorest of the poor and most vulnerable in Sri Lanka. Australian Community Rehabilitation Program Phase 3 (2010 – 2015)
- b. LEED Project: ILO Progress Report (June to October 2010)
- c. LEED Project: LEED Work Plan 2011 – 2012 (3rd June 2011)
- d. LEED Project: ILO Progress Report 2011 (30th October 2011)
- e. LEED Project: LEED Work Plan 2012 – 2013 (15th March 2012)
- f. ILO Policy Guidelines for Results Based Evaluations: principles, rationale, planning and managing for evaluations. Evaluation Unit, ILO.
- g. ILO Project Evaluation Scoring Matrix. Evaluation Unit, ILO
- h. Check List 5: Preparing the Evaluation Report. Evaluation Unit, ILO
- i. Checklist 6: Rating the Quality of the Evaluation Report. Evaluation Unit, ILO
- j. LKRN032 Report # 11: 10 – 23 October 2009. *Joint Humanitarian Update: North East Sri Lanka*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 23 October 2009. Retrieved 29 October 2009.
- k. LKM0492 Arrivals since 01 April 2008 - Updated as of 11 March 2010". *Vanni IDP Camps and Resettlement Information*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 16 March 2010. Retrieved 16 May 2010.
- l. Joint Humanitarian and Early Recovery Update: January-March 2011 – Report # 30". *Joint Humanitarian Update: North East Sri Lanka*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Retrieved 30 April 2011.