

REPORT (FINAL)

Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)

Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of "Know About Business" in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine

PAL/08/01/UND

Independent Final Evaluation

March 2012

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Quick Facts

Country:	Occupied Palestinian Territories
Final Evaluation:	December 2011
Mode of Evaluation:	Independent
Technical Area:	Enterprise Development
Evaluation Management:	ILO ROAS
Evaluation Team:	one independent consultant
Project Start:	January 2009
Project End:	July 2011
Project Code:	PAL/08/01/UND
Donor:	UNDP with USD \$360,000,

Keywords: enterprise development, entrepreneurship education, know about business

Background & Context

Summary of the project, purpose, logic and structure

The project *Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of "Know About Business" (KAB) in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine* essentially is a piloting exercise for KAB in vocational and technical training in Palestine which, foremostly, consisted of a training of trainers (facilitators) exercise and a limited implementation of KAB in selected training organizations under the Ministry of Labor (MoL) and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE).

Present situation of project

While the pilot project has come to a formal end in July 2011, the nationalization of the KAB program is ongoing. By the time of the evaluation in December 2011, a combined total of 57 teachers under the MoL and the MoEHE have graduated as KAB trainers, and a total of 12 of them have been qualified as national key facilitators (NKF) for KAB.

Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

Final overall evaluation of the project is for the benefit of ILO ROAS and other stakeholders.

Methodology of evaluation

Review of project documents and monitoring results against standard evaluation criteria and key policies; collection of views held by various stakeholders; triangulation of all views obtained in order to obtain, as much as possible, an unbiased understanding of project implementation.

Main Findings & Conclusion

- The ILO has been highly successful in introducing a **relevant** addition (KAB) to technical training curricula in Palestine. Following the pilot testing, both the MoL and the MoEHE have officially included KAB training into their national training curricula and have set aside the resources required for the roll-out. KAB is enjoying support from the highest levels of the Palestinian Authority.
- Generally, the results from an impact assessment conducted indicate that significant changes in attitude do take place and that KAB is therefore **effective** in achieving its immediate objectives.
- The success of any project stands or falls with the achievement of outcome and impact indicators. While it is too early to measure impact indicators, the outcome of the pilot phase has been fully achieved by the integration of KAB into the national training curricula on the Palestinian side. This also provides a good foundation for the long-term **sustainability** of teaching KAB curricula.
- There is a prevailing **over-expectation** regarding the immediate employment effects that KAB may potentially generate. Although anecdotal evidence exists that new businesses in Palestine have been created by KAB graduates even during the piloting period, such business creation is clearly beyond the objectives of KAB (which is meant to raise awareness and change attitudes). A measurement of resulting employment effects therefore is not warranted. Furthermore, from a practical sense, it would be deceptive try to measure such effects because there is more required to successfully start a business than just a KAB training.
- The management of the project has gone through different phases which have not always been **efficient**. The reasons for the majority of these inefficiencies are rooted in the management structure for the project with ROAS (and the responsible ILO specialist) being located in a country that has no peace agreement with Israel, and therefore less able to directly follow-up and provide support as in other countries of the region. Furthermore, the ILO office in Palestine is not sufficiently staffed in order to take on diverse project management tasks. Other inefficiencies are attributable to vagaries of this particular project's implementation.

Recommendations & Lessons Learned

Main recommendations and follow-up

- ILO's focus on spearheading small business strategies and support mechanisms and introducing KAB in Palestine is **well targeted**. There is certainly much more that can be done in Palestine, but the ILO also needs to consider interventions by other agencies.
- More can be made by **combining, linking** KAB activities with other activities (ILO or not) in order to enhance the desired future employment effect. This includes opening channels to start-up training and financing.
- While acknowledging that inclusion of **Gaza** in any type of developmental activity has been difficult over recent years, it also needs to be stated that not sufficient efforts have been made to include Gaza during the pilot phases of many projects.

Important lessons learned

- Entry and exit **questionnaires** for students of KAB need to be shortened and simplified. The current standard entry and exit questionnaire, while containing many useful questions, is simply too long. The risk is that questions are misunderstood by students or that the questionnaires are completed in a hurry, resulting in measurement errors. (The issue is being addressed and the standard questionnaire has been shortened.¹)
- More needs to be made of **impact assessments** conducted. It is unclear to which extent the results of impact assessments are being used to influence the shape of KAB implementation and/or to review potential deficiencies. (The discussion focuses more on the quality of the research than on the potential implications of the research findings for the program.)
- There is a prevailing **under-estimation** of what is required to roll-out KAB within a national training system. This not only goes for the KAB exercise in Palestine, but also for similar projects in Syria and Yemen. The real challenge is not the pilot, but the roll-out following a successful pilot.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The ILO's entrepreneurship education programme "Know About Business" (KAB) responds to the needs of member countries that intend to introduce entrepreneurship at secondary, vocational and higher education levels. KAB encourages young people to consider self-employment as a career path. Learners exposed to KAB will become aware of the role of enterprises and entrepreneurs in society; and those who consider entrepreneurship as a career option will learn how to face the challenges of managing a small business.

In Occupied Palestine, there are eight vocational training centres in the West Bank and three in Gaza operating under the Ministry of Labor (MoL). Secondary vocational schools, technical colleges and a technical university operate under the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE).

In Palestine, the pilot project was meant to introduce KAB in English at the university and also at a number of technical colleges. For grades 11 and 12 of secondary vocational schools and vocational training centres, however, KAB was to be introduced in Arabic.

The ILO's youth employment initiatives fall within the broad aim of providing effective support to ILO constituents to adopt and implement employment, labour market and skills policies and development programmes that promote decent employment.

¹ Which questions to delete in a questionnaire is usually a delicate process that needs careful discussion. Some questions are understood differently in local contexts and some types of "repetition" are appropriate when they serve to verify or triangulate specific entries on related questions. Therefore, no specific recommendations are attempted in this report.

Logical Structure of the Project

Development Objective

- *The project will contribute to the creation of employment opportunities by fostering an enterprise culture in Palestine and promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth.*

The objective is in line with the PNA document entitled: "Building a Palestinian State: Towards peace and prosperity" (Paris, December 2007). Economic and private sector development and youth empowerment will focus on assisting young Palestinians to make the transition from schools into the work place through internship programmes, developing entrepreneurial skills and providing seed capital for business start-ups.

The project seeks to achieve this overall development objective by meeting the following immediate objectives:

Immediate Objectives (outcomes)

- Create awareness, enterprises and self-employment as a career option for young people.
- Provide knowledge and practice of the desirable attributes and challenges in starting and operating a successful enterprise.
- Facilitate the school to work transition of youth as a result of a better understanding of functions and operations of enterprises.
- Develop positive attitudes towards enterprises and self-employment among population by targeting youth.

Outputs

1. KAB curriculum introduced
2. KAB training capacity built in selected VTCs, secondary vocational schools and technical colleges.
3. KAB implemented in the selected VTCs, secondary vocational schools, and technical colleges.
4. Evaluation of KAB test phase for the selected VTC, secondary vocational schools and colleges.
5. KAB curriculum and schedule adapted to the needs of the selected technical university and the training capacity built.
6. KAB tested at the technical university selected.
7. Evaluation of the KAB test phase at the technical university

3 PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND CLIENTS OF THE EVALUATION

3.1 Purpose

This evaluation had two primary dimensions:

1. To review the project's performance with strict regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

The evaluation was to address the following:

- Provide a clear articulation of the main findings and 'lessons learned'.
 - Review the achievements of the project by assessing to what extent the stated objectives and major outputs have been achieved.
 - Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the project implementation framework; identify the linkages with nationalisation efforts.
 - Assess if the KAB nationalisation efforts are likely to be sustained. Particularly in light of the proposed next round of technical support to be provided under another ILO Technical Cooperation project. The linkage of ongoing KAB nationalisation outcomes to the proposed future cooperative efforts should frame the question of continued sustainability.
 - Review to what extent the programme is still relevant and is continuing to meet the needs of its original target group.
2. After a close examination of the regional cases studies performed in Palestine, Yemen and Syria, the evaluation will also recommend the kinds of responses that should be promoted by the programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at a national level.

The ILO ROAS wanted concrete and actionable recommendations on how to support the extension of entrepreneurship educational projects in the region.

The evaluation should document all lessons learned, record success stories and good practice in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and the constraints of the political environment.

3.2 Scope

The assessment is to evaluate the relevance and logical coherence of the project design and its implementation. Also, it is to examine the planning process, the agreed implementation strategies and the adjustments made the institutional arrangements and partnership.

In particular, the evaluation will examine the impact of project activities on the creation of employment opportunities, particularly promoting youth employment, and will recommend what response should be promoted by the KAB programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at the national level.

3.3 Clients of the Evaluation

The primary clients of the evaluation are the ILO Regional Office for Arab States (Beirut), the ILO constituents (MoL and MoEHE), the Project Management, local and national partners and the UNDP. Secondary clients include other units within the ILO

that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation (Employment Sector, CODEV, EVAL).

4 METHODOLOGY

The international evaluator was to be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan integrated into an inception report based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. The latter required approval by the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officer.

A statement on the methodology by the evaluator has been included in the Annex to this report.

While the evaluation was to be strictly external and independent in nature, the exercise would seek to be participatory to the extent possible, engaging the staff who worked under the Project, partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The evaluation would include but not be restricted to:

- an Inception Report conducted in home-country, of project documents and materials provided by the ILO Regional Office for Arab States to the international evaluator;
- presentations/ inductions with available staff who worked under the project, key stakeholders and partners to the project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation.
- interviews with staff who worked under the Project, project partners, constituents and key project stakeholders;
- phone interviews with ILO HQ and meetings with relevant focal points in the ILO Regional Office for Arab States;
- presentation of findings and recommendations to selected stakeholders and partners at the end of the evaluation mission.

5 IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW AND FINDINGS/ CONCLUSIONS FOR EACH CRITERION

5.1 Development Effectiveness

The term development effectiveness as understood for this evaluation refers to the extent to which the project's objectives and intended results were achieved. Development effectiveness, however, essentially asks whether we are good at reaching our goals.²

The **development objective** of this project, where impact would be measured, is to contribute towards the creation of employment opportunities by fostering an enterprise culture in Palestine and promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth. This formula is not clear cut in that different levels of objectives are being joined together ("creation of employment opportunities" as a higher level objective and "fostering an enterprise culture in Palestine" and "promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth" as lower level objectives or means to achieve the higher level objective).

² ...and not necessarily each and every intended *result* - a term that in modern M+E parlance usually refers to the output level

It should be noted that the further away the development objective is from the immediate objective, the less likely it is that an influence of the project on achieving the development objective can be properly attributed. This is usually referred to as the "attribution gap".

At the level of the **immediate objective**, or outcome level the achievement of which usually should be under control of the project, the project has also chosen to select several, presumably mutually reinforcing, objectives:

1. Creating awareness of founding enterprises and self-employment as a career options for young people;
2. Providing knowledge and practice of the desirable attributes for and of the challenges in starting and operating a successful enterprise;
3. Facilitating the school-to-work transition of youth as a result of a better understanding of functions and operations of enterprises;
4. Developing positive attitudes towards enterprises and self-employment among the population, by targeting youth.

These multiple objectives are not untypical of enterprise development programs, nor are multiple objectives as such uncommon in public investment programs and projects. Yet, the more objectives there are, the more needs to be monitored in order to ascertain whether these objectives are being attained, and it is therefore more useful to summarize such objectives into a single one or select the most important one of them as the key target to focus on.

These objectives are furthermore not achievable within the course of a pilot phase that seeks to test a specific training package, the implementation of which ultimately may lead or contribute to the stated objectives.

Nevertheless, the pilot phase has demonstrated that KAB is an effective tool for creating awareness of founding enterprises and self-employment as a career options for young people; providing knowledge and practice of the desirable attributes for and of the challenges in starting and operating a successful enterprise, and for developing positive attitudes towards enterprises and self-employment.

To which extent the school-to-work transition of youth as a result of a better understanding of functions and operations of enterprises is being facilitated is unclear at this stage. The general feedback obtained from KAB facilitators, officials of the MoL and MoEHE during the evaluation, as well as from the previously conducted impact assessment, however, seems to indicate that KAB is generally facilitating this transition. It is not without reason that KAB has been adopted by both ministries for inclusion in their national curricula

It is therefore reasonable to expect that the immediate objective(s) of the project will be reached during the roll-out phase that is following the formal nationalization of KAB by the Palestinian National Authority.³

To which extent the development objective will be contributed to is difficult to ascertain at this point in time. It would be useful (and more appropriate) to review this with ex-post impact assessments following the roll-out of KAB, or at least when a critical mass has been reached and sufficient time has elapsed to trigger impact.

³ Now would be time to design respective indicators and estimate their values for the roll-out phase. In this context, it is also worthwhile to observe the current Standard for Measuring Achievements in Private Sector Development of the of the *DCED (2010)*.

Regarding the validity of the design,

- The intervention logic is coherent and generally realistic (when neglecting the length of the results chain to the final impact). Outputs causally link to outcomes which in turn contribute to the broader development objective of the project (with the caveat that a net impact resulting from the causal links in enterprise development projects is not always discernible).⁴
- The objectives of the project were clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources). The problems and needs were adequately analyzed during the design phase of the project. (Arguably, a pilot phase serves the analysis which therefore could not have been comprehensive at the outset.)
- The content of the training was appropriate. KAB is a useful choice to enrich the training delivered to students of technical schools and colleges as well as vocational training centers.
- As monitoring and evaluation cost need to be proportional to the volume of a project, an elaborate monitoring and evaluation system could not be expected for this project (pilot phase). Indicators were therefore not elaborate, and the project was implemented according to an activity schedule that was adjusted in line with progress which is appropriate/ sufficient for a pilot phase of this volume. Indicators were related to the success of KAB and were in line with standard KAB measurements. Means of verification (survey) was appropriate to the indicators measured.
- The choice of project partners and stakeholders in terms of mandate influence, capacities and commitment was highly strategic. It is unlikely that any more capable partners with similar mandate, influence, capacities, and commitment could have been found to implement this project.

With regard to project progress and effectiveness,

- The project made sufficient progress towards its planned outputs and activities insofar as the pilot phase has been successfully completed. Benefits, according to the data collected, apparently did not accrue equally to men and women, but it is difficult to determine whether this difference constitutes a disadvantage of either gender (see separate discussion under 5.3). Medium and long-term benefits are meant to accrue to youth given that the project is designed to work with youth and directly prepares youth for the school-to-work transition. Non-youth teachers as intermediaries by definition also (and more immediately) benefit from the project in seeing their didactic skills being enhanced and acquiring knowledge about business.⁵
- The project essentially had two "components", one working with the MoL and another working with the MoEHE. Both components followed the same structure and, considering the size of the project, it is therefore difficult to consider them as full-fledged components. The results achieved are comparable in both components. Differences were not significant and therefore do not merit any deeper discussion.

⁴ It should be noted that delivering the ultimate proof that supply-sided interventions of enterprise development lead to additional employment and income generation thus far remains elusive. There are many reasons for this. The ILO is fully aware of this, and has been/ is actively participating in the respective discussion processes of the Donor committee on Enterprise Development that seek to improve on the measurement of the respective development impacts. Actually, staff of ILO ROAS have published contributions to this international discussion, cf. *Dar & Tzannatos (1999)*.

⁵ There is anecdotal evidence of several cases where training to become a KAB facilitator led to teachers opening a sideline business next to their teaching activities.

- It is difficult to conceive of any alternative strategies that would have been more effective in achieving the project's objectives. With the exception of the (somewhat out-of-the-box) possibility of seconding an enterprise specialist to the ILO Office for the West Bank and Gaza for more direct support and backstopping, all strategic ingredients required to make the project effective had been considered from the outset. Any shortfalls in effectiveness were attributable to pitfalls of implementation, and fortunately did not significantly diminish the results achieved.
- Ideally, more progress could have been achieved in Gaza which as a consequence of the blockade is in a dismal economic situation. However, it may have been reasonable not to target Gaza during the pilot phase where, by definition, the basic approaches first should to be tested under "normal" conditions. (Obviously, there are no normal conditions prevailing even in the West Bank, but they are more manageable than in Gaza.)

5.2 Resource Efficiency

Resource efficiency in this evaluation as elsewhere describes the extent to which resources were economically converted into results. Efficiency is usually measured between input and output and sometimes outcome levels. Typical methods for establishing the efficiency of a public investment project are cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. While the first is usually applied when units of benefit can be expressed in monetary terms and yields a net present value or an internal rate of return for the project, the second method is used when this is not the case and requires comparison with similar projects in order to determine efficiency levels.

For a KAB project with multiple objectives, one would usually apply cost-effectiveness analysis and express this efficiency in terms of, for example, a unit cost as "USD per additional job created". Where the measurement of benefit becomes even more unwieldy, least-cost analyses could also be used, e.g. comparing the total cost of introducing an established package like KAB with the total cost of a package that would need to be developed from scratch in order to facilitate the school-to-work transition.

Full-fledged analyses of efficiency go beyond the scope that is achievable within the framework of this assignment that is meant to focus on the pilot phase. However, they should normally be calculated for a roll-out phase (because it is here that the cost and benefit values should usually rise to more significant levels).

From the overall figures, the project will probably not be considered the most efficient of KAB projects in the region. When comparing the overall budgets for several recent KAB projects, the project in Palestine seems to be the most costly.

ROAS KAB project budgets	Jordan	Palestine	Syria	Yemen
Total budget in USD	74,467	360,000	231,650	220,915
Duration (months)	12	15	13	17
Average budget in USD per month	6,206	24,000	17,819	12,995

Source: Project documents

This must not be a reason for immediate concern because the comparison is one of overall amounts, disregarding the detailed content of implementation, and because it is not always possible to compare costs between different countries. Nevertheless, it would be useful to look into the matter more closely and possibly compare the

pattern with other project types so as to review whether there are any cost-related patterns that emerge for the different countries or whether KAB in Palestine has, for any specific reason, simply been more costly than elsewhere.

- One reason for the higher cost was the fact that an ILO coordinator needed to be recruited to support the implementation in Occupied Palestine when in other countries apparently selected counterpart staff was trained and remunerated to undertake this work.⁶
- In practical terms, resource efficiency during the implementation of the pilot has been particularly affected by the fact that travel between ROAS and Occupied Palestine is not easily organized because Lebanon and Israel (which controls access to the Occupied Palestinian Territories) have not signed any peace agreement. This situation effectively bars most Arab ILO staff members (even when using a UNLP) from traveling to the project area. At the same time, entry into Occupied Palestine for staff members and consultants of *any* nationality coming from ROAS needs to occur via third countries that maintain relations with Israel. As a result, following up on the project in the field was a cumbersome task for the responsible specialist at ILO ROAS.

Obviously, there is no practical way for ILO to reduce inefficiencies resulting from the question of access in the current setting. It should be contemplated, however, whether this particular situation for Occupied Palestine does not warrant a different managerial approach at ILO ROAS. For example, specialists for specific areas of intervention could be seconded to ILO's West Bank and Gaza Office instead of being based in Beirut. While possibly more costly and at odds with the regional approach to Arab states of ILO, the situation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (being itself at odds with most human development approaches) may warrant such a special effort.

Otherwise, there were some inefficiencies resulting from staffing issues (difficulties in finding, recruiting, securing appropriate staff) as well as specific managerial issues (longer than necessary response times from ROAS possibly compounded by insufficient delegation).⁷

However, the net effect of these inefficiencies is difficult to assess. For one, a certain amount of "micro-management" by qualified staff during a pilot or start-up phase of a branded ILO program that draws its success from high-quality implementation is useful in order to instill the proper amount of attention and understanding for the level of quality required with partner organizations and implementing agents. It firmly conveys that ILO is serious about the quality of its services and triggers responsible attitudes at the recipient end. Secondly, lack of coordination (due to lack of an ILO coordinator in the Occupied Palestinian Territories for some of the time) has put ILO's Palestinian partners very much in the driving seat from the start. While this was unplanned and did not match the resources set aside by the partner organizations (MoL and MoEHE) at the time, it forced early seizure of ownership by the Palestinian side, and thereby firmly rooted the program in Palestine.

⁶ Note that an approach where counterpart staff is being remunerated by a donor to assimilate knowledge and coordinate activities does not automatically guarantee good results because the knowledge anchored in people does not necessarily stay with institutions, and the attraction related to the remuneration does not always lead to optimal selection of candidates (candidates may have mixed motivations).

⁷ Note that these issues were unanticipated and therefore are unrelated to the higher average cost emerging from the comparison of planned budgets above.

When it comes to the cost-efficiency of implementation, recruiting and deploying the local ILO coordinator late into implementation of the pilot phase, when the major coordination functions already were assumed by the Palestinian partners, probably was not a most efficient move because it generated frictions with the working structure that had emerged in the absence of this coordinator. It may have been wiser to reallocate the funds earmarked for this purpose to other purposes (training of counterparts, training of trainers, and production of manuals) as far as that is permissible. Arguably, cautiously refraining from recruiting the coordinator after a long effort of identifying and securing her may have also been difficult to sell to diverse stakeholders and may have ultimately invited criticism that the project is being left at risk because allocated resources are not made available. It would therefore be inappropriate to criticize the move of deploying the coordinator late into implementation.

With regard to administering the KAB training courses, a reasonably efficient solution has been found in deploying an expert based in Jordan. The fact that high-quality training courses were directly administered in the Arabic language by native speakers, in combination with the respective specialist of ILO ROAS, certainly ensured a maximum of resource efficiency in the given circumstances. It is likely that this, in sum, counterbalanced inefficiencies that resulted from above-mentioned management issues and therefore also ensured successful implementation of the pilot exercise.

On the whole, with regard to resource efficiency,

- Resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) had been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes.
- Resources have been used as efficiently as feasible in the context of working from Beirut with the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The implementation of activities has been cost-effective, and the results achieved justify the costs. It is unlikely that the same results could have been attained with fewer resources.
- Project funds and activities have been delivered in a timely manner; while major delays occurred in recruiting the local ILO coordinator, the project managed to deal with resulting delays by transferring responsibility to the counterpart institutions.

With regard to effectiveness of management arrangements,


- The project was conceived to make strategic use of an available and time-tested ILO service product (KAB) in order to achieve high effectiveness and impact. At this stage, following the pilot, it is too early to measure impact.
- Planned management capacities were adequate, but were affected by practical difficulties to put a local ILO coordinator in place and partially by insufficient delegation once the coordinator was in place. The project governance structure facilitated good results and efficient delivery in that the Palestinian side could quickly be mobilized to make up for the shortfall in local ILO project coordination.
- Communication between the project team and the regional office was not always effective to the extent that response times from ILO ROAS were not always adequate.
- Project management monitored performance and results at a level that is commensurate with the volume of the project. The monitoring and evaluation in place systematically used standardized KAB questionnaires to evaluate the output of the pilot training courses, and organized an impact assessment based

on these questionnaires and focus group discussions. The respective questionnaires have been systematically collected and analyzed. However, the collection rate during a pilot phase should have been at census level (i.e. 100%). Also, labeling of questionnaires was not optimized for posterior analysis leading to some uncertainties in the analysis of the data. Considering the size of the pilot project, no elaborate reporting system was required to document progress and inform management decisions.

- The project received more than adequate political, technical and administrative support from its national partners at the highest level. It needs to be emphasized that the pilot project's success is also clearly a result of an excellent partnership between ILO and the MoL and MoEHE that is being continuously nourished by the ILO office for the West Bank and Gaza.

Finally it should be noted that, given their somewhat particular nature, pilot projects do not very well lend themselves to assessments of resource efficiency. Pilot projects are meant to test the grounds for the implementation of a full-fledged project. Emerging difficulties, in fact, may even be welcoming because they may reveal where adjustments need to be made, in order to achieve smooth implementation of the project.

A comparison of a simple but useful efficiency indicator may illustrate the point above. When comparing the overall efficiency of KAB teachers in Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, efficiency in the two pilot projects (Palestine and Yemen) is significantly lower than in the project which is in course of implementation (Syria). This is bound to change as KAB is going to be rolled out in both Palestine and Yemen in the future.



5.3 Impact

By definition, impact is outside the directly achievable results of any project intervention. It usually refers to the development objective in particular when it comes to intended effects, but it also includes unintended effects that may or may not bear any relation with the development objective. Impact can occur at different times and with different dynamics and dimensions. Because impact is at the end of the result chain, however, it usually takes a comparably longer time to materialize.⁸ Because it often depends on additional factors that are external to the project's intervention, there usually also are questions regarding the proper attribution between impact and project outcome.

With regard to impact orientation,

- Students in KAB classes are changing their attitudes with regard to entrepreneurship. In particular, students feel they have gathered substantial knowledge about business and they are considering entrepreneurship as a career. Students who find out that entrepreneurship is not for them during KAB training on the whole also display a change in attitude in the sense that their behavior with regard to other subjects becomes more mature.



There are some potential differences between female and male students regarding changes in attitudes if the data from the output assessment⁹ is representative of the whole. These differences should be explored in more detail (or clarified, explained otherwise if they are not representative of the actual changes in attitude that took place).

The following charts illustrate the changes in attitudes as recorded in the output assessment of February 2011, disaggregated by sex. The shift in attitude (positive, indifferent, negative) in this analysis is expressed as negative when the attitude shifts away from a specific value and as positive when it shifts *towards* a specific value. For example: In the first chart below, the first aspect measured is the attitude of the students regarding the role of entrepreneurs and small business in society(left). The shift in attitude that occurred between the beginning of the KAB training course and the end of the course is from "indifferent" > -30% to "positive" >10% and "negative" >20%. In other words, students who previously were indifferent or did not have an opinion formed an opinion about the role of entrepreneurs and small business in society, namely a positive or a negative one.

While male participants tended to develop positive attitudes more than negative attitudes about the role of entrepreneurs and small business in

⁸ It is for this reason that it is often fashionable to seek quick wins so as to not lose stakeholder interest until the point in time when impact can reasonably be expected to occur.

⁹ Cf. *ILO (2011a)*. While the title of the study carries the word "impact", the measurement is effectively taking place at "output" level in indicator speak.



society and entrepreneurship as a career option, Female participants developed a more negative attitude about the role of entrepreneurs and small business in society and thus became more undecided about entrepreneurship as a career. While the

difference in results may be explained by referring to the traditional division of labour and cultural values, the aim of KAB should normally be to increase the career options available (by adding entrepreneurship as an option) and not to reinforce existing patterns or even reduce perceived career options. Therefore, this difference in attitudes needs to be followed up, and measures devised to ensure that female participants are not discouraged from considering entrepreneurship as a career option.

Both male and female participants felt they strongly increased their knowledge about business, but the effect on female students has been twice as strong as for male participants. This highlights the importance of enrolling female participants into KAB classes.

The fact that both female and male students changed their attitude to a negative one regarding the difficulties associated with entrepreneurship and their personal ability to succeed in starting a business, is a reflection of the fact that they have now learned what it takes to be an entrepreneur and to start a business, and therefore become more realistic about this career option. Nevertheless, it will be useful to closely monitor KAB students' judgments regarding their personal ability to start a business more closely in order to identify in which area they may need additional support.

- Both the development of Palestinian KAB training capacities and the institutionalization of KAB, by ways of its integration into national curricula both by MoL and MoEHE, can be causally linked to the project's pilot phase interventions.
- There is anecdotal evidence that some students of KAB start creating a business as a direct result of participating in KAB. This evidence, expectedly, is scant. It would be useful to specifically monitor such cases in order to learn whether there are any specific business formation patterns emerging that could be encouraged or supported if there be any need.
- Impact on youth employment and income generation cannot usefully be measured at this stage.

5.4 Relevance

While "effectiveness", "efficiency", and "impact" (above) and "sustainability" (below) ask about whether we are doing things the right way, relevance asks about whether we are doing the right things. This is typically measured against overall policies, strategies (strategic fit), and priorities of the key stakeholders of the project. Alternatively, it could also be measured against an established need or priority from a more scientific and/ or political and/ or moral point of view.

In the context of cooperation programs, relevance needs to be ascertained from the perspectives of all cooperating partners. In this project, the partners are the Palestinian National Authority (MoL, MoEHE), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Regarding relevance and strategic fit,

- The target group selected, based on the country needs, was very relevant given the socio-economic need to significantly reduce graduate/ youth unemployment.
- KAB is an integral part of the Decent Work Strategy for the Occupied Palestinian Territories and therefore is going to contribute to its implementation.¹⁰
- KAB is an integral part of the TVET Strategy of the Palestinian National Authority.¹¹
- The explicit social sector national targets under the Palestinian National Development Plan 2010-13 include a reduction of the higher education graduate unemployment rate from 23 to 20% and of the youth unemployment rate from 32.5% to 28.0% by 2013. One of the explicit economy sector national targets is to double the employment rate among vocational and technical training graduates. Strengthening TVET, including development of the TVET curriculum and developing the skills of TVET educators and trainers, inter alia to tackle youth unemployment, in this context is a high priority.¹² KAB strategically fits these targets. It is therefore fair to say that the project aligns well with local and national plans for youth employment and development.
- The United Nations Consolidated Plan of Assistance 2012-14 under Focus Area 4 is foreseeing initiatives that are meant to improve the international competitiveness for MSME especially for women and youth-owned businesses.¹³ Rolling out KAB in technical schools and colleges under MoEHE and vocational training centers under MoL will dovetail with these initiatives.
- The UN Millennium Development Goals include, since 2009, a target to achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people.¹⁴ The KAB project emphasizes productive employment and young people and therefore is strongly relevant to achieving this target. The degree to which KAB contributes to achieving this MDG target still needs to be established by ex-post impact research. From a technical perspective, it is not likely, however, that the contribution of KAB as an isolated measure will lead to significant changes in the indicators that have been agreed to monitor target 1.B. With the caveat that an attribution gap in the result chain is bound to remain, the indicator most likely to be influenced by KAB in the medium to long term is the employment-to-population ratio.
- Official Palestinian stakeholders (MoL and MoEHE) have taken ownership of the project concept and approach since the pilot project started. It would be useful to involve additional stakeholders, however, during the roll-out phase of KAB in order to ensure that KAB training is embedded in a framework or network of enterprise development support. I.e. given that KAB is meant to create business awareness (only), it should be linked to other organizations or facilities that may provide additional support if an individual who has become aware of entrepreneurship as a career option

¹⁰ Cf. *PNA MoL (2011)*, p.17.

¹¹ Cf. *PNA MoEHE and MoL (2010)*, pp.30, 58.


¹² Cf. *PNA (2011)*, pp.22, 36, 41-42, 51, 83.

¹³ Cf. *UNDP/ PAPP (2011)*, p.21.

¹⁴ Cf. *ILO (2009)*.

wishes to translate this into practice. Potential partners in such a network include the Palestinian employers organizations (in particular local chambers) as well as providers of business development service (BDS) and finance (banks and other financial intermediaries, including any specialized funds).

It needs to be stressed that, in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, there is no immediate need for ILO (or other partners in the implementation of this project) to come in with additional enterprise support measures. ILO, for example, could normally come in with a whole set of other enterprise development interventions, including "off-the-shelf" SYB, IYB, and EYB training, and local economic development (including value chain analyses) or funding. There are already numerous initiatives by other stakeholders to develop the business development services that are useful to support business start-up and growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. There are also more financial resources available than arguably can be absorbed by the Palestinian economy, and specific programs seek to make financial resources available to micro and small enterprise.



The graph above, taken from the MENA Global Entrepreneurship Monitor for 2009,¹⁵ illustrates the point with regard to start-up training. A substantial share of the Palestinian population is already receiving some type of business start-up training. If only early-stage entrepreneurs are being considered (and not the working age population as in the graph above), the share of those in Palestine who have already benefited from start-up training following completion of their formal education increases to 30%.¹⁶ This clearly indicates that start-up training (that could usually follow the raising of awareness) is not a bottle-neck for enterprise development in Palestine. The priority, therefore, is to properly link KAB to any further support measures available in Palestine, and not to add onto the existing measures.

5.5 Sustainability

The question of sustainability is one of the key issues in development projects because it addresses the long-term perspective. This perspective is usually much more important than the short-term perspective which only prevails where sudden

¹⁵ IDRC (2010), figure 45 on page 63.


¹⁶ Cf. IDRC (2010), figure 37 on page 49.

crises need to be addressed by emergency measures. While the current state of the Palestinian economy, essentially operating under conditions of siege, resembles a crisis environment from many perspectives, and many interventions do adopt the shape of emergency measures, it is in the interest of Palestinian state building to develop functioning institutions, i.e. solutions that have a long-term development potential.

With regard to sustainability,

- National partners (here MoL and MoEHE) are willing and committed to continue working towards the goals of the project. The project has been highly effective in building national ownership for KAB. As a direct result of the pilot phase, both national partners have integrated KAB into their national policies and have allocated funding for KAB in their national budgets.
- The project has not focused on building or strengthening an enabling environment (laws, policies, people's attitude, etc.), but it has been designed with explicit consideration for its own enabling conditions and with the potential to achieve a maximum outreach for changing people's attitudes about entrepreneurship by becoming an integral part of the standard curricula in national vocational and technical training systems.
- That being said, there should be another phase of the project not to consolidate the pilot phase achievements, but to ensure that the roll-out of KAB on a large scale can be implemented with the appropriate level of quality. As KAB moves into roll-out, the risk level is increasing and needs to be properly mitigated.


The chart below is one of many existing attempts to classify risk levels for such projects where risk is not easily quantified because of difficulties to calculate frequencies of occurrence and the exact extent of damage resulting from occurrence, i.e. the typical elements used in quantified risk assessments. It is based on three criteria, (1) the degree of technology ("low" being associated to known technologies or approaches and "high" being associated to new or to-be-developed technologies or approaches), (2) the project management structure ("strong" or "weak"), and (3) the size of the project ("small" or "large"). As the project configuration moves along a scale beginning with "low technology + strong structure + small size" to "high technology + weak structure + large size", the risk of the project increases.



The risk for the pilot phase of KAB in Palestine was limited: KAB is a time-tested ILO service product, and the technology level therefore classifies as "low". KAB structures in Palestine were non-existing at the outset and therefore structure is "weak". The size of the pilot project, which tested the implementation in selected schools and centres, classifies as "small".


Given that KAB in Palestine, following the success of the pilot phase and its nationalization, needs to move into roll-out, the configuration of the project changes by increasing the size factor from "small" to "large". The technology (KAB) does not change and remains "low", and the structure for implementing KAB continues to be "weak" because it needs to be developed at a different scale and with more inbuilt redundancies than during a pilot phase. As a result, the risk level changes from "low risk" to "medium risk" and mitigation will be essential in order to ensure sustainability.

It would seem that the risks associated to KAB roll-out to increasing the size of KAB projects are currently being underestimated. Nationalization implies significant changes in project size, and usually at a fast rate because nationalization within the framework of a technical education and training system usually needs to ensure equal levels of implementation across the whole nation so as to not place students in specific regions at a disadvantage compared to students in other regions. In order to grasp the implied shift in size, it is probably best to illustrate this graphically.



The charts display the gaps between the amount of teacher training (above) and student training (below) that need to be bridged between pilots and nation-wide roll-out.

Syria is the country where KAB roll-out in ROAS countries would seem the most advanced at this time. Its population is smaller than Yemen's and larger than the population in Occupied Palestine, and its figures therefore would need to be adjusted for more accurate comparison. However, national roll-out in Syria as depicted in the graphs on the current status is not yet completed. At the end of May 2011, roughly only half of the country has been covered if official population figures for the governorates where KAB is being implemented in the meantime (Damascus, Aleppo, Lattakia, Homs, Deir az-Zor and Quneitra) are being used as a reference.



In other words, for nationalization of KAB, we are talking about multiples in size increases, and not only such increases that we still comfortably measure in percentages. So even if the absolute numbers for roll-out in Occupied Palestine must be lower than for Syria, the size increase will be tremendous.

Besides the quantitative shift, there are qualitative implications. For the implementation of pilot projects, usually the most qualified and appropriate staff are being mobilized in order to ensure that pilot testing occurs at the highest level of implementation (in order for a pilot test not to fail due to negligent or inappropriate implementation). This is also achievable because the small size of a pilot project is easily managed.

By the time of the evaluation in December 2011, a combined total of 57 teachers under the MoL and the MoEH have graduated as KAB trainers in Occupied Palestine and a total of 12 of these have been qualified as national key facilitators (NKF) for KAB. (Cf. Annexes A6 and A7.) These form the core of a well qualified team to lead the task of rolling out KAB in Occupied Palestine.¹⁷

When the pilot experience needs to be transferred to the whole, there will be no more privileged selection of an "elite" of trainers, but the project will need to work with any teachers available in technical and vocational training, independent of their attitudes about entrepreneurship and small businesses, their motivation to perform for the benefit of their students, and the level of their basic didactic qualifications to administer KAB training. While, obviously, all teachers will be trained by the established core of KAB facilitators, it is unrealistic to expect that the average teacher

¹⁷ An assessment of the qualifications of the KAB trainers and the KAB national key facilitators (NKF) is not part of a project evaluation exercise, but occurs as a matter of routine within the scope of the global KAB program which specifies the requirements for each level and certifies the qualifications obtained.

would have the same dedication, knowledge, and talent as those who were selected to participate in the pilot phase.

In the words of the staff involved with the roll-out of KAB in Syria "KAB succeeds because of the trainers". Out of 100 trainers, 20-25 are considered *really good* and 30-40 are *good...*" -- a reflection of an unavoidable decline in quality.

Achieving sustainability, therefore, cannot be taken for granted. While the formal nationalization of KAB is a first and essential step for achieving sustainability, the roll-out needs to be properly accompanied in order to ensure that minimum quality standards are being applied throughout the national system, to develop solutions for any specific issues that may emerge during the roll-out, and to firmly establish all necessary routines. In order to deal with this, a proper monitoring and evaluation mechanism needs to be put in place (so that deviations can be quickly identified), and technical support from ILO (or any KAB network) should be made available during this important phase. With a view on enhancing sustainable impact ("jobs created") efforts also should be made to better integrate KAB with other networks of business support.

Nationalization of KAB in its first stage, arguably, even implies internationalization to the extent that key facilitators and facilitators of KAB need to benefit from exchanges of experience with other KAB specialists/ facilitators until the critical mass of KAB specialists that will ensure fully sustainable operations has been reached in the country concerned. The Arab region has a particular advantage for organizing such exchanges and mutual support because communication is possible between a large number of Arab-speaking countries. At the same time, particular efforts need to be made to involve Palestinian facilitators in such activities due to the mobility restrictions imposed upon them by the occupying force.

5.6 Partnerships

According to the terms of reference for this evaluation, partnerships refer to the extent to which the project's stakeholders absorb the importance of promoting an entrepreneurship culture in the country.

There is no doubt that the project's key stakeholders agree on the importance of promoting an entrepreneurship culture in Palestine. This agreement has been reinforced during the implementation of the pilot phase.

More partnerships, i.e. with further stakeholders, should be developed during the roll-out phase in order to establish firm links between KAB training and other business development services in Palestine. Employer organizations (or business membership organizations) are the first stakeholders that come to mind when expanding partnerships is concerned. Partnerships can also be built in line with local structures because suitable partners may vary from location to location in the Occupied Territories.

In the current situation, partnerships with other organizations may also be important to deliver KAB training in Gaza. Ideally, of course, KAB should be administered via the same system in Gaza as in the West Bank, namely TVET. Due to the severity of the Israeli siege on the economy of Gaza¹⁸ as well as differences between

¹⁸ Economic effects of the restrictions on movement and access imposed by Israel on the West Bank and Gaza have *inter alia* been extensively documented by the World Bank, e.g. *World Bank (2007)* q.v..

Palestinian factions, it is more difficult to bring KAB to Gaza than to the West Bank. Partnering with organizations that have better access to Gaza, such as UNWRA, may be useful in this context. However, it needs to be remembered that KAB is an awareness raising program that cannot be equated with a business creation/ start-up program. In other words, if there are means to deliver KAB training to TVET students in Gaza by teaming up with other organizations, this opportunity should naturally be seized for the benefit of youth in Gaza.

5.7 Specific Emphasis

The terms of reference for this evaluation requested that the following aspects receive sufficient emphasis to the extent relevant information availability. For the ease of reference, these aspects have been grouped in this subchapter and not integrated with other evaluation subchapters.

5.7.1 Options for increasing effectiveness and efficiency of KAB with regard to youth employment at national level

The question whether levels of effectiveness and efficiency of KAB can be increased with regard to youth unemployment in Palestine, Syria or Yemen is difficult to answer on the basis of this evaluation.

- "Effectiveness" in this context of KAB would most likely refer to the absolute number of youth put into sustainable new jobs as a result of KAB, either by ways of self-employment or by creating enterprises, or because employability has been enhanced otherwise.
- "Efficiency" would compare these absolute numbers with other measures than KAB, for example cash-for-work programs or other enterprise development measures, in order to determine whether money spent on one KAB yields more youth employment per unit of currency than money spent on alternative measures.

For Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, to this day, there only is anecdotal or at best scant evidence of youth starting business as a direct result of KAB training. With little evidence of immediate employment impact, comparing money spent on KAB with other types of programs that focus on immediate employment impact would most likely result lower degrees of effectiveness being observed for KAB. This, however, would not come as a surprise because job creation is not the immediate objective of KAB training in the first place.

To which extent the degree of comparative effectiveness would change if a longer-term perspective that is adopted is unclear because the KAB projects in Palestine and Yemen have not been rolled out for a sufficiently long time to be evaluated for employment impact. (And with regard to Syria, the impact assessment came a little too early.¹⁹)

The higher severity of these restrictions in Gaza, including the poor management of Karni crossing point, also emerges from these documents.

¹⁹ Cf. *Syria Trust for Development (2010)*. Issues included that a large number of male students still had to go thru military service between KAB training and pursuing their education and/ or business ideas.

Whether the resulting efficiency is low would not only depend on the benefits obtained, but also on the cost of the measures compared. Here, KAB probably will score better because its cost is comparably low.

On the whole, asking whether we can increase effectiveness and efficiency of KAB with regard to youth employment at national level is probably too technocratic, deterministic a question to ask in the complex context of creating employment in a globalized world. It essentially refers to KAB as an isolated measure. Such a technocratic, deterministic assessment would ignore that sustainable job (or, as a matter of fact, business) creation (in a context where we expect the private sector to be the main driver in job creation) usually does not come as a result of any isolated measure, but is, if anything,²⁰ a result of a combination of several factors (including labour market supply and demand features, business cycles and structure of the economy, an enabling business environment, and, *inter alia*, entrepreneurship) and possibly complementing measures (tax exemptions, business development services, finance, etc.).²¹

It may be a useful question, however, (in a more holistic or systemic line of thought) to find out whether our KAB projects are sufficiently linked with other measures that in their combination will, hopefully, be able to trigger additional youth employment. Experiences in China where KAB has gone quite large scale (compared to other countries, not compared to programs in China) would seem to indicate that additional youth employment for university graduates can be created where KAB is linked to other support programs and where the local economy is growing.

5.7.2 Appropriateness of introducing KAB at different education levels

Introducing KAB at the levels of technical and vocational training in Occupied Palestine was very relevant and appropriate. Generally speaking, the more imminent the labour market entry, the stronger the effect KAB seems to have on the participants. According to the impact assessment conducted for Palestine,

*Most students developed ideas about the business world through KAB; however, there were two main views on how this knowledge could be used. For school students under the MoEHE, the idea was new and more theoretical than practical. In the Vocational Training Centers (VTC) under the MoL, there was a more concrete effect as the programme helped improve an existing business idea and helped the students to execute this idea in the real world.*²²

From this perspective, it is not so important at which level of secondary or vocational education KAB is actually being introduced. It is much more important that

²⁰ A valid proof that active labour market programs working on the supply side, to this date, actually are able to significantly influence net job creation remains somewhat elusive.

²¹ As most YEN publications would probably also emphasize.

It should be noted that according to the science of cybernetics, complex situations require complex responses. Partial approaches will not lead to any solution. This insight is based on the law of requisite variety described by Ross Ashby in the 1950s. Therefore the question, emanating from the field of strategic planning, which single measure is key, can be declared "wrong".

That being said, cross-impact analyses can help to identify the most influential factors that can be used to trigger the strongest responses in a given system (paying due regard to the analysis of existing feedback loops). A cross-impact analysis for youth unemployment in Palestine or the Arab region goes beyond what can be delivered within the framework of this evaluation report. It is otherwise quite feasible, however, when drawing on modern decision-support software.

²² ILO (2011), p.4.

participants are in a situation where they feel a certain amount of urgency to think about labour market entry. For participants in training centres at the MoL in Palestine, labour market entry is imminent -- there is no other choice, in fact. Those enrolled in technical schools and colleges under MoEHE did not feel the same amount of urgency because they could afford to postpone their decision on going into business to a later point in time.

If this understanding of the forces governing the degree of success of KAB participation is correct, the most important point for maximizing results from KAB would be proximity to labour market entry. I.e. the type of secondary or vocational school or possibly even tertiary education matters less than the timing of the course proper. KAB could therefore be usefully administered at any institution of learning as long as the timing is relatively close to graduation and this should provide ample opportunities for developing additional (and not alternative) entry gates in future KAB projects.

5.7.3 Effectiveness of the project in supporting national policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation

With exceptions proving the rule, it would be unusual for a program such as KAB (which is very down-to-earth and close to the beneficiary) to trigger major changes in policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation. That being said, the experience with KAB has not gone unnoticed and had its effect on policy level thinking in Occupied Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. These three countries have decided to institutionalize KAB as an important element in specific areas of their education systems according to what they see is the best fit.

5.7.4 Effectiveness with regard to supporting beneficiaries to generate income

When it comes to analyzing how effective the project was in supporting beneficiaries in starting income generating activities, and how effectively have they increased their income, no valid statement can be made at this point in time.

The effectiveness of KAB in Occupied Palestine in creating additional income could probably be measured with reasonable accuracy in ca. 5 years from now if KAB trainees and other graduates are systematically being track of so that random KAB and control group samples can later be drawn and interviewed for purposes of establishing the additional income created. (If schools, however, do not keep track of their graduates, the exercise will become more cumbersome and costly, or may fail all together.)

5.7.5 Efforts made to involve worker and employer participation, and promoting the normative function of the ILO

To this date, no specific efforts have been made by the project to involve worker and employer participation. This is not necessarily a reason for concern because a pilot phase by definition should be managed more tightly in order to ensure that an adequate level of quality can be achieved during roll-out. That being said, and the pilot having been successful, it is now time to involve worker and employer participation to the extent this is meaningful in achieving development outcomes.

Here, the most natural link would be to work with employers' organizations at the local level who may be able to assist KAB graduates in obtaining business services and other support they may need to move from positive attitudes and basic knowledge of entrepreneurship and small enterprise to actually developing their own businesses.

It is unclear why a KAB project should be effective at promoting the normative function of the ILO, and the respective question (from the terms of reference) will therefore not be pursued.

5.8 Lessons Learned and Good Practice

The following major lessons are being proposed by the evaluator to be learned from:

- KAB is not a silver bullet that will solve the youth unemployment problem. It is not even a suitable item on a list for quick fixes because it is not able (and not designed) to provide immediate employment impact. This implies that KAB should ideally be combined with other interventions to maximize the likelihood of positive impact. These further interventions need not be implemented by ILO, but can also result from multi-stakeholder approaches in a given environment. There should be a relatively high potential for establishing links between KAB projects and business development services offered by employers organizations. This would, however, require active forging of such links.
- Rolling out KAB is not less important than implementing KAB pilot projects. In fact, rolling KAB out on a country-wide scale is a task that should not be underestimated. ILO cannot afford to seek an early exit in such processes and assume that nationalization of KAB is a self-starter as long as everyone is committed. There are enough critical issues that are related to the scale of implementation that can (and will) emerge even if KAB has been successfully tested and adapted during the pilot phase.
- KAB needs to develop lighter-weight monitoring and evaluation tools so that reasonably accurate data become available in due course. There is nothing wrong about in-depth impact research, of course. But it is better to have timely information that is roughly right than exact and complete information that comes too late or is wrong because the technical requirements for producing accurate research results could not be met in the field. In such circumstances less is always more.
- Once there are results from KAB research, it is important to thoroughly review them and make the most of them to improve performance. It appears there is a strong tendency to discuss the accuracy and validity of the research results and less inclination to follow up on potential leads emerging from the same research. While the discussion of the technicalities of the research is, of course, important, it sometimes may be more pragmatic to just verify if there is anything to the results emerging from the possibly inaccurate research and inquiring into the matter to ensure that errors only occur on the side of caution.
- Managing projects for Occupied Palestine from the location of ILO ROAS is posing significant challenges. The ILO Office for the West Bank and Gaza cannot be expected to solve all practical difficulties that emerge from this regional political setting, at least not within the resources currently made

available. Exceptionally seconding specialists to the ILO Office for the West Bank and Gaza would be an option for increasing the effectiveness of ILO operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories because follow-up would not be delayed by the administrative and logistical issues of travelling between Beirut and Occupied Palestine. While this would contradict ILO's regional approach to a certain extent, it would address some of the contradictions inflicted upon implementation of projects by occupation.

- The project was late, for a number of reasons, in recruiting the local ILO coordinator. Due to the delay incurred, an interim project management structure which placed more responsibilities than originally foreseen on the Palestinian government for implementing the pilot phase emerged. Given that the emerging structure very much corresponded to the basic structure required for nationalizing KAB, the need for deployment of the local ILO coordinator should have been reviewed. Terms of reference could have been altered, or the function could have been cancelled and resources re-allocated to other activities instead. A little more courage (by both the ILO and the Palestinian government) to alter the implementation concept for the pilot phase could have reduced unnecessary frictions and released additional resources. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that it may have been difficult for ILO to sell such a solution to the Palestinian government following a previous refusal to accept honorary fees and a secondment, and requesting for a local coordinator to be in place.
- Micro-management of projects that require high quality and are associated with "trademark" service products of the ILO is useful until the desired level of quality is achieved. ILO specialists do need to pay attention to detail in these cases. Such micro-management, however, needs to be prompt and should not lead to any unwarranted delays in communication. Where micro-management leads to delays in communication, there is an obvious need for stronger delegation of tasks. If quality cannot be ensured when tasks are being delegated, then ways need to be found to ensure this (e.g. special training of staff that the tasks are being delegated to, specific backstopping procedures, reorganization of tasks, quality management manuals).

The following good practices have been identified and are recommended for similar programs and projects:

- Other than in Syria and Yemen, the KAB project in Palestine has worked directly with the government to implement the pilot program. In both Syria and in Yemen, quasi-governmental organizations (special funds) have been the main counterparts for ILO. Both approaches seem to be workable for setting up nation-wide training systems for KAB in TVET. The strong involvement of government from the beginning is an essential ingredient for nationalizing the KAB curriculum following the piloting phase.
- An excellent practice is working directly in Arabic language with the target group and the PNA. This was possible due to the staffing of all key positions with native Arabic speakers. From ILO ROAS over ILO West Bank and Gaza to ILO coordinator and the international facilitator. This is not only cost-efficient (because it saves time and translation costs), but enhances the identification of the trained facilitators with the project and KAB as such.

- The international facilitators have paid strong attention to providing their trainees with a host of suggestions on how to deal with shortages of material supplies during KAB training. This prepares trainees for any shortfalls they may encounter during training delivery in real-life and stimulates an entrepreneurial attitude about delivering KAB training courses.
- The pre and post tests for KAB participants have been reduced in length in order to make their administration less cumbersome. With the caveat that the reduced questionnaire should probably be still be peer-reviewed, this is an important step in developing lighter-weight tools for monitoring and evaluation.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

- ILO ROAS needs to invest more resources into the national roll-out that is following the successful piloting of KAB exercises. While roll-out is a task assigned to the national counterparts by definition, the challenges of such a roll-out (in particular quality management and monitoring and evaluation as the program grows large) entails need the continuous support of KAB or enterprise specialists.
- At ILO ROAS, unless additional resources can be mobilized, rolling out nationalized KAB projects should be assigned a higher priority than launching new KAB projects. These roll-outs should consider any available impact assessments in more detail, independent of their quality, in order to reflect whether any adjustments to the programs are useful and what complementary measures may increase the overall success.
- In the Arab region, growing, deepening national programs should encompass the organization of an intra-regional exchange of resources and joint learning exercises that can be supported by ILO ROAS. The (key) facilitators that have been trained in the different countries need to constitute the core of a regional pool of KAB specialists that will create a community of practice and enhance quality management of KAB across the region.
- KAB in general (ILO Geneva, ITC Turin) needs to develop simplified, light(er) weight monitoring and evaluation tools, and these need to be consistently implemented. Recent experiences with KAB monitoring and evaluation and Palestine's impact assessment would suggest that current tools are "too heavy" to be administered in such a way by implementing partner organizations that accurate and comparable results can be ensured.
- Occupied Palestine requires a special commitment by ILO (Geneva/ ROAS) to the extent that activities are not as easily implemented there as in other countries of the region. While the possibility to tap donor funding for this purpose should not be excluded, it is clear that this commitment needs to be properly anticipated and translated into specific budgets. Running projects in Occupied Palestine from the location in Lebanon in the current situation entails higher costs than elsewhere.
- It is about time (for MoL and MoEHE) to include Gaza in the KAB-related activities. Ideally this should occur within the framework of the roll-out:
 - Where this still seems difficult to implement, other organizational settings than with MoL and MoEHE can be envisaged, possibly with assistance from ILO (ROAS). However, it is important to properly pool all KAB

- resources for Occupied Palestine and not subject them to local turf battles.
- Also, it is important to remember that KAB awareness training is not a substitute for start-up training. Where the promotion of start-ups is the main objective of planned activities, it should be reviewed whether there are not any start-up training providers available (in Palestine) to transfer the appropriate skills (See also paragraph on linking KAB below.). This also holds for beneficiaries in Gaza.
 - As with all training programs, it is important to ensure that KAB remains properly targeted. Successful implementation of KAB does not imply it can be extended to any target group. KAB is not a panacea for self-employment. Implementing KAB in Gaza does not imply implementing it with any target group. Therefore, even if *prima facie* opportunities seem to exist, as in the *Skills Development and Employment Services for the Construction Sector in the Gaza Strip* project,²³ it is important to ascertain whether members of the target group possess the minimum qualifications required for successful KAB participation.
- Linking KAB to other small business support mechanisms that are likely to enhance employment and business creation will enhance the ultimate likelihood of employment impact.
 - There is a particular potential for more systematically teaming up with some of the more successful employers' organizations in Palestine (e.g. specific local chambers) that should be tapped during the roll-out phase. ILO (ROAS) could assist with building these links.
 - There would be no immediate need to introduce other ILO tools for enterprise development (SIYB, VCA, LED) given the abundance of programs available in Palestine. Proper linkage to such programs (organized by MoL and MoEHE) will instead be more efficient than introducing further ILO packages (that would be at risk of duplicating other efforts).
 - The likelihood that KAB alone will generate significant youth employment impact is not very high. In fact, the likelihood is low that any type of stand-alone activity will significantly enhance youth employment. Bearing this in mind, future KAB (or other entrepreneurship education) programs could more actively anticipate linking KAB measures with other enterprise development activities (ILO Geneva, ILO ROAS, other stakeholders), be they implemented by ILO or not. Cross-impact analyses would be useful to more systematically analyze any given setting (country, region, etc.) with regard to youth unemployment, and define the specific thrusts (or instrument mixes) youth employment initiatives should take in the respective settings.

²³ See also *ILO (2011b)*.

7 ANNEXES

A1 List of persons met (or interviewed over the phone)

(by order of organizational affiliation)

Name	Organization	Function
Nour, Nassim	Department for International Development	Private Sector Team Leader
Jaber, Samih	Independent Expert	ILO KAB Key Facilitator
Asanbaeva, Gulmira (☎)	ILO Geneva	Youth Entrepreneurship Specialist
Rose-Losada, Virginia (☎)	ILO Geneva	KAB
El-Shurafa, Rasha G.	ILO Office West Bank and Gaza	Programme Officer West Bank and Gaza
Kleibo, Mounir	ILO Office West Bank and Gaza	Representative for the West Bank and Gaza
Bhattacharya, Manas	ILO ROAS	Chief Technical Advisor "Labour Market Information System in Yemen"
Bikhazi, Rania	ILO ROAS	Enterprise Development Specialist
Bussi, Maurizio	ILO ROAS	Deputy Regional Director
Daru, Patrick	ILO ROAS	Skills Specialist
Irani, Alexandra	ILO ROAS	Assistant Enterprise Development Specialist
Kawar, Mary	ILO ROAS	Skills Specialist
Klein, Jean François	ILO ROAS	Chief Regional Programming Services
Rynhart, Gary	ILO ROAS	Senior Employers Specialist
Said, Mustapha	ILO ROAS	Senior Specialist in Workers' Activities
Tabbara, Rasha	ILO ROAS	Programme Officer for Occupied Palestine
Tzannatos, Zafiris	ILO ROAS	Senior Regional Advisor Employment Policy and Macroeconomics
Weibel, Laetitia	ILO ROAS	Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor
Mahmoud, Afnan	International Youth Foundation	(former) ILO KAB Coordinator oPT
Al-Mbaid, Mohammed	International Youth Foundation	Country Director
Hazboun, Jalil	International Youth Foundation	Program Officer
Jweiles, Ziad	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	Director General Technical and Vocational Education
Shabaneh, Raief	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	KAB Coordinator
n.n.	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	KAB National Key Facilitator candidate
Majdalani, Ahmed	Ministry of Labor	Minister of Labor
Al-Selawi, Abdallah Ismail	Ministry of Labor	KAB Coordinator and National Key Facilitator
Yacoub, Shaheer Rasheed Hamdan	Ministry of Labor	KAB National Key Facilitator
Ayesh, Nidal Fahmi	Ministry of Labor	KAB National Key Facilitator

Name	Organization	Function
Abdelmunem		
Zughaiar, Khawla Mahmoud	Ministry of Labor	KAB National Key Facilitator
Al-Zarou, Shehdeh Mohammad Ismail	Ministry of Labor	KAB National Key Facilitator
Abdulbary, Ahmed (☎)	Small Micro Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS), Sana'a	KAB Coordinator Yemen
Kishek, Ghassan S.	Solutions for Development Consulting Co.	Senior Consultant
Kabbani, Nader	Syria Trust for Development	Director of Research
Khasrouf, Wissam (☎)	Syria Trust for Development, Damascus	KAB Coordinator Syria
Faqih, Nasir	United Nations Development Program	
Zaish, Yaid M.	United Nations Population Fund	Assistant Representative
Piazza-Georgi, Barbara	United Nations Population Fund	Representative
Madyeh, Lubna	United Nations Relief and Works Agency	Chief Relief and Social Services Officer West Bank
Samamreh, Sami	United Nations Relief and Works Agency	Micro Credit Community Support Officer West Bank
Sanchez, Felipe	United Nations Relief and Works Agency	Director of UNWRA Operations West Bank
Eddin, Nur Nasser	World Bank	Local Economist
Nasir, John	World Bank	Lead Economist

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Tzannatos, Zafiris 2011. *Labour demand and social dialogue: Two binding constraints for creating decent employment and ensuring effective utilization of human resources in the Arab region?* Presentation at Expert Group Meeting on "Addressing Unemployment and Underemployment in the Islamic Development Bank Member Countries in the Post-Crisis World", Jeddah 9-10 May 2011 (hect., rev. 2011-06-07).

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A4 Statement on methodology

The evaluation of the project *Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of "Know About Business" in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine* (PAL/08/01/UND) will be conducted based on the application of standard criteria for the evaluation of enterprise development projects and the typical issues addressed under aid effectiveness considerations.

The standard criteria for evaluation have been mentioned in the terms of reference (q.v.) and correspond to the generally accepted list of aid effectiveness criteria. A specific standard for enterprise development projects has been developed by the DCED. This standard certainly cannot fully apply to a pilot project which is meant to test whether the envisaged results chains actually technically can materialize, but should apply to any roll-out phase.

The amount of preparatory and background research that can be undertaken within the framework of such an evaluation is limited by the period of notice between signature of contract and the planned deployment in the field of the evaluator, the budget for the evaluation (which needs to be in proportion to the total budget of the project), the time available in the field and the availability of interlocutors at these times.

In the light of the circumstances given for this evaluation, the evaluator will adopt a highly pragmatic and flexible approach, and

- review existing documentation on the program in the form of project documents and reports (including studies and impact assessments) against the evaluation criteria as well as against key policies documented that the project is meant to contribute to
- request additional information from stakeholders as necessary or useful for the purpose of judgment against the evaluation criteria (and depend on their timely provision during the duration of the assignment)
- try to convey the need for evaluation and relieve interlocutors of any potential fears of evaluation by communicating a modern understanding of evaluations, namely as joint learning exercises which serve the management of project quality
- explore the views held by (a maximum of) the various stakeholders concerning the implementation of the project (as well as similar projects in Syria and Yemen), both at ILO ROAS as well as in the field, while being guided by the evaluation criteria, a preference will be given to open-ended questions so as to not to run the risk of overlooking any important aspects by narrowing in on the evaluator's limited perspective of the project at the outset
- where relevant, seek to eliminate any misunderstandings potentially resulting from interpretation during interviews by triangulation
- in an iterative procedure, triangulate all views obtained in subsequent discussions including debriefing meetings in order to obtain an unbiased (as can be) overview of the features of project implementation and to identify potential differences in opinion
- seek to determine the reasons for diverging opinions (if any)

- assess the overall picture emerging from the discussions and the documentation against the evaluation criteria and independently formulate a view on the achievements of the project in this context
- propose measures for improvement where necessary or useful

The evaluator cannot

- field a team and distribute tasks to team members as stipulated in the terms of reference (because he is being deployed as an individual)
- provide an inception report prior to signing the contract
- collect data that has not been collected prior to the evaluation (as the time available in the field is limited)
- "audit" existing documentation or data (though selectively probing should be possible)
- demand compliance with any of his requests, but depends on the follow-up by the ILO ROAS if there is any need
- document what possibly has not been properly documented with the resources made available for this assignment

A5 Terms of Reference

Independent Final Evaluation

Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of 'Know About Business' in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine

PAL/08/01/UND



Terms of Reference

1. Introduction and Rationale for the Independent Final Evaluation

Since January 2009, the International Labour Organization has implemented the project '*Entrepreneurship Education Introduction of Know about Business in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine*' (KAB) funded by UNDP with a total budget of \$360,000 USD. The project started in January 2009 for an initial period of 24 months scheduled to end on 31 December 2010, it was subsequently extended until end of July 2011 in order to finalise the implementation of planned activities. As of today and as a result of the project, the ILO is going ahead with the nationalisation of the KAB which will be funded through a separate technical cooperation budget.

The development objective of the project was to contribute towards the creation of **employment opportunities** by fostering an enterprise culture in Palestine and promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth. It seeks to achieve the development objective by meeting the following immediate objectives:

- Create awareness and enterprise and self-employment as a career option for young people.
- Provide knowledge and practice of the desirable attributes for and challenges in starting and operating a successful enterprise.
- Facilitate the school-to-work transition of youth as a result of a better understanding of functions and operations of enterprises.
- Develop positive attitudes towards enterprises and self –employment among the population, by targeting youth.

This document describes the Terms of Reference for an independent final evaluation to be undertaken at the end of the project's current phase, adhering to ILO's policies and procedures on evaluations. It will be conducted by an external evaluator and managed by the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor at the ILO Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS) in Beirut.

The evaluation will have two important aspects:

1). The Project's performance will be reviewed with strict regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The evaluation is expected to:

- § Provide a clear articulation of the main findings and 'lessons learned'.

- § Review the achievements of the project by assessing to what extent the stated objectives and major outputs have been achieved.
- § Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the project implementation framework and link them to the nationalisation efforts.
- § Assess if the KAB nationalisation efforts is likely to be sustained within the next round of technical support, which will be initiated under another ILO Technical Cooperation project
- § Review to what extent the programme is still relevant and is continuing to meet the needs of its original target group.

2). With reference to case studies of Palestine, Yemen and Syria, the evaluation will also draw conclusions and recommend the type of response(s) that should be promoted by ILO ROAS to have greater effectiveness and tangible impact on youth employment at the national level.

It should be carefully noted: The desire and aim of ILO ROAS is to *increase* opportunities for employment creation in the region, particularly youth employment. Therefore, the recommendations resulting from this evaluation, combined with a careful review of the mentioned case studies, must **specifically address how to support the extension** of 'Entrepreneurship Education' for future projects in the region.

2. Background and Project Context

The ILO's entrepreneurship education programme 'Know About Business' (KAB) responds to the needs of member countries that intend to introduce entrepreneurship education at secondary education, vocational education and higher education levels. KAB encourages young people to consider self-employment as a career path. Learners exposed to KAB will become aware of the role of enterprises and entrepreneurs in society and those who consider entrepreneurship as a career option will learn how to face the challenges of managing a small business.

There are eight (8) vocational training centres in the West Bank and three (3) in Gaza operating under the Ministry of Labour (MOL). Secondary vocational schools, technical colleges and a technical university operate under the Ministry of Education and Higher Education.

In Palestine, the project will introduce the KAB in English at University. In a number of technical colleges; in grades 11 and 12 of secondary vocational schools and vocational training centres the KAB will be introduced in Arabic.

This evaluation will examine the appropriateness and *relevance* for the project to introduce KAB at secondary, and vocational levels. Keeping in mind the overall goal, which is to contribute to the creation of youth employment.

As noted above, for future projects the evaluation will also identify and recommend possible entry gates for KAB introduction. The evaluation should advise ILO about new, or alternative, approaches within the contexts of secondary education, vocational education and/or higher education.

The ILO's youth employment initiatives fall within the broad aim of providing effective support to ILO constituents to adopt and implement employment, labour market and skills policies and development programmes that promote decent employment. Therefore, considering the case studies done in Palestine, Yemen and

Syria, the evaluation will propose responses that could be promoted by future 'Entrepreneurship Education' projects to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at the national level.

Logic Structure of the Project

Development Objective

The project will contribute towards the creation of employment opportunities by fostering an enterprise culture in Palestine and promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth.

The objective is in line with the PNA document entitled: "Building a Palestinian State: Towards peace and prosperity" (Paris, December 2007). Economic and private sector development/youth empowerment will focus on assisting young Palestinians to make the transition from schools into the work place through internship programmes, developing entrepreneurial skills and providing seed capital for business start-ups.

The project seeks to achieve this overall development objective by meeting the following immediate objectives:

Immediate Objectives (outcomes)

- § Create awareness and enterprises and self-employment as a career option for young people.
- § Provide knowledge and practice of the desirable attributes for and challenges in starting and operating a successful enterprise.
- § Facilitate the school to work transition of youth as a result of a better understanding of functions and operations of enterprises.
- § Develop positive attitudes towards enterprises and self –employment among population, by targeting youth.

Outputs

Output 1: KAB curriculum introduced

Output 2: KAB training capacity built in selected VTCs, secondary vocational schools and technical colleges.

Output 3: KAB implemented in the selected VTCs, secondary vocational schools, and technical colleges.

Output 4: Evaluation of KAB test phase for the selected VTC, secondary vocational schools and colleges.

Output 5: KAB curriculum and schedule adapted to the needs of the selected technical university and the training capacity built.

Output 6: KAB tested at the technical university selected.

Output 7: Evaluation of the KAB test phase at the technical university

The evaluation will review the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the KAB implementation in the oPT.

The evaluation will examine the relevance of the KAB programme regarding the following aspects:

- § How relevant was the target group selected based on the country needs?
- § How appropriate were the management arrangement?
- § How appropriate was the training content?
- § What has been its impact on promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among youth?

The evaluation will also examine the relevance of the expansion strategy of the KAB programme and will make recommendations to the ILO regarding sustainability of the project. Therefore, the recommendations resulting from this evaluation, combined with a careful review of the mentioned case studies, must **specifically address how to support the extension** of 'Entrepreneurship Education' for future projects in the region.

Project Partners

The programme partnered with the following organisations to implement the 'Know About Business' programme initiatives:

§ Ministry of Labour (MoL)

§ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE)

§ ILO International Training Centre

Management Arrangement

The project is jointly funded by UNDP and the ILO and is technically implemented by ILO in coordination with and the support of UNDP.

At the national level, the KAB programme is managed by both the MOL and MEHE.

3. Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

Purpose

This evaluation has two primary dimensions:

1). To review the project's performance with strict regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The evaluation must address the following:

§ Provide a clear articulation of the main findings and 'lessons learned'.

§ Review the achievements of the project by assessing to what extent the stated objectives and major outputs have been achieved.

§ Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the project implementation framework; identify the linkages with nationalisation efforts.

§ Assess if the KAB nationalisation efforts are likely to be sustained. Particularly in light of the proposed next round of technical support to be provided under another ILO Technical Cooperation project. The linkage of ongoing KAB nationalisation outcomes to the proposed future cooperative efforts should frame the question of continued sustainability.

§ Review to what extent the programme is still relevant and is continuing to meet the needs of its original target group.

2). After a close examination of the regional cases studies performed in Palestine, Yemen and Syria, the evaluation will also recommend the kinds of responses that should be promoted by the programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at a national level.

The ILO ROAS wants concrete and actionable recommendations on how to support the extension of Entrepreneurship Education projects in the region.

The evaluation must document all lessons learned, record success stories and good practice in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and the constraints of the political environmental.

Scope

The evaluation will evaluate the relevance and logical coherence of the project design and its implementation. It will also examine the planning process, the agreed

implementation strategies and the adjustments made the institutional arrangements and partnership.

In particular, the evaluation will examine the impact of project activities on the creation of employment opportunities, particularly promoting youth employment, and will recommend what response should be promoted by the KAB programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at the national level.

The evaluation will be guided by the following core evaluation questions:

- § **Development Effectiveness:** The extent to which the Project's objectives and intended results were achieved
- § **Resource Efficiency:** The extent with which resources were economically converted into results, including the mention of alternative, more cost-effective, strategies when applicable.
- § **Impact:** Positive and negative, intended and unintended long-term effects.
- § **Relevance:** The extent to which Project interventions met beneficiary requirements, country needs, global priorities, as well as partner and donor policies.
- § **Sustainability:** The immediate benefits and probability of continued long-term benefits after the Project has ended.
- § **Partnerships:** The extent to which the Project's stakeholders absorb the importance of promoting an entrepreneurship culture in the country.
- § **Lessons Learned and Good Practice:** Good practices identified by the Project, key lessons learned from project implementation, and recommendations for similar programmes/projects.

Clients of Evaluation

The primary clients of the evaluation are the ILO Regional Office for Arab States (Beirut), and the ILO constituents namely the MoL and the MoEHE, the Project Management, the local and national partners and UNDP. Secondary clients include other units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation (Employment Sector, CODEV, EVAL).

4. Suggested Analytical Framework

The evaluator should draw conclusions, recommendations and identify lessons learned and good practices based on the specific questions presented below, which will be addressed in the final evaluation report:

4.1. Relevance and Strategic Fit

- a. How did the Project contribute to national priorities as identified in the United Nations Assistance Strategy for Palestine, the Palestinian National Development Plan and UN Millennium Development goals?
- b. How have the stakeholders taken ownership of the project concept and approach since the project started?
- c. How does the project align with local and national plans for youth employment and development?
- d. Does the project contribute to the DWCP?

4.2. Validity of the Design

- a. Was the intervention logic coherent and realistic? Do outputs *causally* link to outcomes, which in turn contribute to the broader development objective of the Project?

- b. Were the objectives of the Project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed during the design phase of the project?
- c. How appropriate and useful were the indicators described in the Project progress documents for monitoring and measuring results? Were the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- d. How strategic was the choice of project partners and stakeholders in terms of mandate influence, capacities and commitment?

4.3. Project Progress and Effectiveness

- e. Has the Project made sufficient progress towards its planned outputs and activities? Do the benefits accrue equally to men and women? Do the benefits accrue to youth?
- f. Which components of the Project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? How can the Project build or expand on these achievements?
- g. What alternatives strategies would have been more effective in achieving the Project's objectives?

4.4. Efficiency of Resource Use

- a. Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- b. Have resources been used efficiently? Has the implementation of activities been cost-effective? Will the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results have been attained with fewer resources?
- c. Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner? Were there any major delays? What were the reasons, and how did the Project deal with this delay in the work plan?

4.5. Effectiveness of Management Arrangements

- a. Has the project made strategic use of other ILO projects to increase its effectiveness and impact?
- b. Were management capacities adequate? Did the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery?
- c. How effective was the communication between project team, the regional office, and the responsible technical department?
- d. How effectively did the Project management monitor performance and results? What M&E system were put in place, and how effective was it? Was relevant data systematically being collected and analyzed to document progress and inform management decisions?
- e. Did the Project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its national partners?

4.6. Impact Orientation and Sustainability

- a. What observed changes (attitudes, capacities, institutions, etc) can be causally linked to the Project's interventions?
- b. Are national partners willing and committed to continue working towards the goals of the Project? How effectively has the Project built national ownership?

- c. Has the Project successfully built or strengthened an enabling environment (laws, policies, people's attitude, etc.)?
- d. Should there be another phase of the Project to consolidate achievements?

4.7. Specific Emphasis

In the final Evaluation Report, the lead evaluator will make sure that the following aspects receive sufficient emphasis in the report, under the appropriate evaluation domain and to the extent relevant information availability.

- a. Looking at the cases studies of Palestine, Yemen and Syria, recommend what responses should be promoted by the KAB programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at national level.
- b. Examine how relevant and appropriate was the introduction of KAB principles at secondary, vocational and higher education levels; and make recommendations for improved KAB introduction in secondary, vocational and higher education levels. Identify new or alternative entry gates in future projects that support KAB goals.
- c. Examine how effective the project was in supporting the development of national policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation.
- d. Analyse how effective was the project in supporting beneficiaries in starting income generating activities, and how effectively have they increased their income.
- e. Analyse what were the specific efforts made by the project to involve worker and employer participation, and determine how effective the project was at promoting the normative function of the ILO.
- f. The evaluation recommendations should correlate to the 5 main focus areas of the evaluation, (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability) and the related key questions.

5. Methodology

The international evaluator will be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan integrated into an inception report based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. This will need to be approved by the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor.

While the evaluation will be strictly external and independent in nature, the exercise will seek to be participatory to the extent possible, engaging the staff who worked under the Project, partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The evaluation will include but will not be restricted to:

- a. An Inception Report conducted in home-country of project documents and materials provided by the ILO Regional Office for Arab States to the international evaluator.
- b. Presentations /inductions with available staff who worked under the Project, key stakeholders and partners to the Project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation.
- c. Interviews with staff who worked under the Project, project partners, constituents and key project stakeholders.

- d. Phone interviews with ILO HQ and meetings with relevant focal points in the ILO Regional Office for Arab States.
- e. Presentation of findings and recommendations to selected stakeholders and partners at the end of the evaluation mission.

6. Main Outputs

The expected outputs to be delivered by the international evaluator are:

- a. Evaluation Inception Report including Statement of Methodology** — these statements are requested from the evaluator before proceeding with the full-fledged evaluation exercise. The Inception Report should detail the evaluator's understanding of what is being evaluated and why; it should articulate how each aspect of the evaluation will be addressed by way of proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection procedures. The Inception Report should detail the evaluation methodology, a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, and designate a team member with the responsibility to lead each task or product. The evaluation Inception Report and evaluation methodology will need to be submitted, and approved, prior to the start of the evaluation exercise.
- b. Draft Evaluation Report** — the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, the ROAS Programme Unit and key internal stakeholders will review the draft report to ensure that the evaluation meets the required criteria. Special attention will be given to the quality and quantity of the recommendations.
- c. Final Evaluation Report and cover page** — the final report should include key project and evaluation data, and follow the structure noted below:
 1. Executive Summary
 1. Description of the Project
 2. Purpose, Scope and the Clients of the Evaluation
 3. Methodology
 4. Implementation Review
 5. Clearly identified findings for each criterion
 6. Conclusions
 7. Recommendations (including tracking table with relevant follow-up responsibilities)
 8. A statement addressing lessons learned good practices and effective models of intervention drafted in user-friendly language for publication and circulation to wide audiences.
 9. Summary of potential areas for further investigation and implications for global/regional strategies.
 10. Annexes, including TORs, persons contacted, etc.
 11. Standard evaluation matrix
 12. Summary evaluation report according to ILO guidance.

The final evaluation report will be circulated to key stakeholders for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the ROAS Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor and provided to the international evaluator. In preparing the final report the international evaluator should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

7. Management Arrangements, Work Plan and Timeframe

The evaluation will be conducted by a senior external evaluator. The ILO Regional Office in Beirut and the project management will be responsible for providing all logistical support to facilitate the evaluation process. The evaluation will be managed by the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor at ROAS Beirut.

Evaluation Team and Responsibilities

The evaluation team will consist of an international independent evaluator. The evaluation team is responsible for conducting the final evaluation, as per the terms of reference.

The International Independent Evaluator Responsibilities

- § Review the TOR and provide input, as necessary
- § Review all project documents and materials; this task includes a comprehensive review of the following documents:
 - a. Project Document
 - h. Progress Reports
 - i. Related Work plans
 - j. Consultant mission and training reports
- § Prepare an Inception Report including the evaluation methodology, instruments and plan.
- § Reserve one week for a field mission including induction and interviews with direct and indirect stakeholders, and other methodological component the evaluator might chose to apply.
- § Conduct a debriefing on preliminary findings, conclusion, and recommendations of the evaluation with Key stakeholders in the form of a workshop.
- § Draft evaluation report and finalize it based on comments from stakeholders.

The Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor Responsibilities

- § Drafting the final evaluation TOR
- § Finalizing and approving the TOR with input from the stakeholders and the independent evaluator
- § Organize relevant documentation
- § Ensuring proper stakeholder involvement
- § Providing Project background materials and information
- § Providing logistical and practical support, as needed
- § Participating in preparatory meeting prior to the evaluation mission
- § Assist in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings
- § Coordinating exchanges of comments of the evaluation team with the partners during the evaluation
- § Circulate draft and final report to stakeholders
- § Reviewing and providing comments on the evaluation report
- § Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation
- § Ensure follow- up to the evaluation recommendations

The Chief Regional Programming Services Responsibilities

- § Reviewing the TOR and providing input, as necessary

- § Provide a briefing to the evaluation team on the project's background, history, and highlight issues to be considered
- § Participating in debriefing/ workshop on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation
- § Reviewing and providing comments on the draft evaluation report

The ILO Backstopping Officer and National Project Manager

Responsibilities

- § Reviewing the TOR and providing input, as necessary
- § Provide project background materials
- § Participate in preparatory meetings prior to the evaluation mission
- § Assist in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in interviews, review documents) and in such a way as to minimize bias in evaluation findings
- § Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the final evaluation
- § Reviewing and providing comments on the evaluation report

Estimated Duration of the Evaluation Exercise

The total duration of the evaluation process is 17 working days. The expected starting date of the evaluation is estimated to be November 2011. The final report should be submitted no later than End of December 2011, while the draft report is expected no later than early December.

Table 1: The Evaluation Timetable and Schedule

Responsible Person	Tasks	Timeline
International Evaluator	Desk review of project documents. Submission of evaluation Inception Report, including evaluation's methodology and instruments	3 days
International Evaluator.	Interviews with relevant focal points in the ILO Regional Office for Arab States	2 days
International Evaluator.	One week for field mission including induction and interviews with direct and indirect stakeholders, including Programme Management Conduct debriefing on findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the evaluation with Key stakeholders in the form of a workshop	5 days
International Evaluator	Draft Final Eval Report	5 days
International Evaluator.	Integration of comments and finalization of the Evaluation Report	2days

8. Qualifications

The international evaluation consultant shall have:

- § Relevant background in social and economic development and enterprise development, with particular focus on youth employment projects;
- § At least 10 years experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects;

- § Experience in evaluations in the UN system, and in the evaluation of the UN system, preferably as team leader;
- § Relevant regional and thematic experience; particularly in the area of youth employment, right based approaches, and capacity building/training initiative will be appreciated,
- § Experience of the ILO system will be a strong advantage
- § Fluency in spoken and written English
- § Strong editorial skills in English are necessary
- § Experience in facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

A6 KAB teachers and schools under MoL

KAB Teachers trained from MoL VTCs in 2011/2012:

VTC	NF	Nr.
Hebron VTC	Wesam Sameeh Sabri Sultan	1
Hebron VTC	Sulaiman Dassan Moh. Taweel	2
Hebron VTC	Tariq Saade Khalil Najjar	3
Hebron VTC	Shehdeh Ismail Alzarou (NKF)	4
Hebron VTC	Murad Mohammad Al-Shahateet	5
Qalqyia VTC	Mohamad Jawad Ahmed Haddad	6
Qalqyia VTC	Saad Tarek Jawad Zead	7
Qalqyia VTC	Shaheer Rasheed Yakoub (NKF)	8
Qalqyia VTC	Jafar Abdallah Ahmad Yaseen	9
Qalqyia VTC	Ahmad Maher Ahmad Radwan	10
Beit-Jala VTC	Mustafa Isaa Moh. Algroz	11
Beit-Jala VTC	Nidal Fahmi Ayesh (NKF)	12
Beit-Jala VTC	Sahar Hamad Mohmoud Al Azzah	13
Beit-Jala VTC	Mustafa Ahmad Srasra	14
Beit-Jala VTC	Fatin Moh. Abd Alhamed Rabba	15
Halhoul VTC	Mahmoud Abd Alhaleem Issa	16
Halhoul VTC	Fadwa Mohammad Abu-Rayyan	17
Halhoul VTC	Hatem Moh. Khamis Amro	18
Tulkarem VTC	Fadi Zuhair Ahmad Abu Saa	19
Tulkarem VTC	Tamer Fared Mahmoud Ata Allah	20
Tulkarem VTC	Raid Mahmood Said Thyab	21
Tulkarem VTC	Suhad "Mohammad Ali " Abu Alteen	22
Tulkarem VTC	Waleed Rashid Qasem Atatra	23
Beit Oor Vtc	Mayada Mahmoud Attallah	24
Beit Oor Vtc	Imteyaz Mahmoud Hosein	25
Nablus VTC	Dalal Ahmad Ibraheem Mosleh	26
Nablus VTC	Manwa Ali Hafez Tabooni	27
Nablus VTC	Nada Jaber Yosef Jawabereh	28
Nablus VTC	Abed El-Hafeez Mahmoud Salahat	29
Nablus VTC	Abdallah Yaseen	30
Jenin VTC	Asad Tawfeeq Moh. Zaid	31
Jenin VTC	Mustafa Damen Yosef Albzoor	32
Jenin VTC	Mahmoud Saleh Hasan Nearat	33
Jenin VTC	Burhan Salman Ahmad Azamtah	34
YWCA	Khawla Mahmod Zughair (NKF)	35

KAB Graduates of MoL VTC's in 2009/2010:

No. of students graduated	VTC	NF	No.
64	YWCA	Khawla Mahmod Zughair/ Natsheh	1
13	Beit-Jala VTC	Nidal Fahmi Abdelmunem Ayeshe	2
30	Beit-Jala VTC	Sahar Hamad Mohmoud Al Azzah	3
26	Hebron VTC	Fadwa Mohammad Abu-Rayyan	4
23	Hebron VTC	Shehdeh Mohammad Ismail Alzarou	5
18	Hebron VTC	Murad Mohammad Al-Shahateet	6
25	Tulkarem VTC	Raid Mahmood Said Thyab	7
27	Tulkarem VTC	Suhad "Mohammad Ali " Abu Alteen	8
10	Jenin VTC	Samer Farid Yousef Yousef	9
19	Jenin VTC	Batoul Atef Mohammad Homran	10
9	Nablus VTC	Manwa Ali Hafez Tabooni	11
33	Nablus VTC	Nada Jaber Yosef Jawabereh	12
13	Nablus VTC	Abed El-Hafeez Mahmoud Salahat	13
28	Qalqyia VTC	Shaheer Rasheed Hamdan Yakoub	14
338	Total		

KAB Graduates of MoL VTC's in 2010/2011:

No. of students graduated	VTC	NF	No.
62	YWCA	Khawla Mahmod Zughair/ Natsheh	1
22	Beit-Jala VTC	Sahar Hamad Mohmoud Al Azzah	2
23	Hebron VTC	Shehdeh Mohammad Ismail Alzarou	3
18	Hebron VTC	Murad Mohammad Al-Shahateet	4
20	Tulkarem VTC	Raid Mahmood Said Thyab	5
27	Tulkarem VTC	Suhad "Mohammad Ali " Abu Alteen	6
19	Jenin VTC	Mahmoud Saleh Hasan Nearat	7
9	Jenin VTC	Samer Farid Yousef Yousef	8
9	Nablus VTC	Manwa Ali Hafez Tabooni	9
33	Nablus VTC	Nada Jaber Yosef Jawabereh	10
13	Nablus VTC	Abed El-Hafeez Mahmoud Salahat	11
49	Qalqyia VTC	Shaheer Rasheed Hamdan Yakoub	12
304	Total		

Source: MoL

A7 KAB teachers and schools under MoEHE

	KAB Teachers	Technical Colleges	Location	Students 1st Pilot 2009-10	Students 2nd Pilot 2010-11
1	Naim Fayez Awni *	Palestine Technical University-Khadouri	Tulkarem	18	27
2	Hashem Rateb Yousef *	Palestine Technical College-Ramallah Girls	Ramallah	25	20
3	Raed Zawahreh *	Palestine Technical College-Al-Arroub	Hebron-Al-Arroub	20	21
4	Sa'ad Jaber *	Al Ummeh College	Ramallah	26	17
5	Zeinab Hussein	Ramallah Community College-Girls	Ramallah	23	24
6	Jamal Rabei	Ramallah Community College-Boys **	Ramallah	20	-
7	Samira Abu Ghalyoun	Palestine Polytechnic University **	Hebron	64	-
8	Fouad Dawood	Hisham Hijjawi College **	Nablus	31	-
9	Malath Abdel Hadi	Al-Rawda College **	Nablus	10	-
Total				237	109

	KAB Teachers	Vocational Schools	Location	Students 1st Pilot	Students 2nd Pilot
1	Raed Abu Minshar *	Hebron Industrial School	Hebron	20	17
2	Ahmad Samhan *	Qalqilieh industrial school	Qalqilieh	31	16
3	Oban Barghouthi *	Deir Dibwan Industrial school	Ramallah-Deir Dibwan	26	28
4	Mohammed Awad *	Al Arroub Agricultural School	Hebron-Al-Arroub	16	19
5	Iman Tamimi	Dura Vocational School for girls	Hebron-Dura	15	10
6	Moath Ishteiwi	Nablus Industrial School	Nablus	38	30
7	Rami Dawood	Jenin Industrial School	Jenin	26	17
8	Abdel Baset Tafesh	Seilt Al-Thaher Industrial School	Seilt Al-Thaher	32	14
9	Mohammed Salman	Tulkarem Industrial School	Tulkarem	32	16
10	Najeib Jaber	Salfit Industrial School	Salfit	20	16
11	Ihab Abu Eita	Salizian Industrial School	Bethlehem	17	17
12	Marwan Shalloudi	Jerusalem Industrial School **	Jerusalem	24	-
13	Bilal Jom'a	Al-Eizarieh Industrial School **	Al-Eizarieh	26	-
Total				323	200
Grand Total				560	309

Observations:

* ... KAB National Key Facilitators (NKF)

** ... Institutions with KAB not implemented

Source: MoEHE

A8 Case study of business creation by KAB graduates from Qalqilyah

Suhaib, Ahmad, Hazem and Musa'ab Daoud (Qalqilyah Vocational Training Centre)

Business profile	
KAB entrepreneurs:	Suhaib, Ahmad, Hazem and Musa'ab Daoud
Years of birth:	n.a.
Place of origin:	Qalqilyah
Field of study:	sewing
Year of graduation:	
KAB participation:	
Name of business:	n.a.
Type of products/ services:	sewing services
Location:	Qalqilyah
Number of employees in 2011:	4
Annual turnover (USD):	n.a.
Year of establishment:	
Registered as:	not yet registered
Year of registration:	n.a.
Source of initial start-up finance:	friends and family

Four young cousins, in their early twenties, unemployed for almost a year, and with no source of income in Qalqilyah, a province in the northern parts of the west bank, where working inside Israel is the first option for many people, but in recent years working in Israel was not as easy as it used to be, and many are unemployed.

After almost a year of unemployment, they decided to participate in Qalqilyahs' vocational training centre, and decided with the help of their aunt to sign up for the sewing course. The aunt has been working in the sewing business for almost 25 years, and she encouraged her nephews to apply for the course, so they can at least have a chance in finding a job in the future, and their plan was to finish the sewing course and find a job in any sewing shop.

Entrepreneurship runs in their family; as they see that most of their uncles are entrepreneurs, one of their uncles used to own a portable selling table, he used to sell animals like rabbits, chickens, ducksetc, and introduced pet birds to increase his revenues, and it turned out to be a very good decision. Currently his main focus is on pet birds. Of course they consider their aunt as an entrepreneur as she was the driving force behind the project and pushed them into going to the vocational training centre, and at a later stage gave them guidance on how to start their business.

Six month after graduating from Qalqilyah Vocational Training Centre (QVTC), they started their business, with the help and experience their aunt offered. They bought their first two machines. After a while the business started to flourish, and they bought two machines to help cover the increasing demand. Currently their customers are from Israel, but they hope to capture a small amount of the local market especially from Nablus.

During the course of their study, they were introduced to the KAB program. Their first objective in attending the VTC was to learn a skill that can be a source of

income in the coming future, and no one thought about owning their business. During the KAB course, they were introduced to the business world, and they learned how to become successful entrepreneurs and how to start and manage a business. During that period the idea of opening their own sewing shop started to formulate in their heads, with the help of their aunt. They say that without KAB they wouldn't be where they are now.

To them what was interesting about the course was learning how to evaluate and calculate the risks they would face when starting and managing the business. They took on debt which they consider the hardest part in starting a business, from friends and family to start their business, and they did not apply for a loan because in their opinion it is haram. And now, not only did they repay the debt; they bought additional machines to help them cover the demand.

The work flow is divided between the four of them, where one is responsible for the negotiations, another one is responsible for the supply of the necessary raw materials, and the other two are responsible for the financial and quality assurance.

The KAB course taught them how to plan, and currently they are planning to expand their operations by buying new machines that will qualify them to attract more sewing business. They are also thinking about diversifying their work as one of them mentioned that they are currently studying the feasibility of leasing a school cafeteria.

They haven't registered their business yet, and will try to do that in the coming future.

They aspire that in the near future they would be able to get a degree that can help them secure permanent jobs if their business fails.

From their experience they advise more young people to follow their footsteps, and encourage them to participate in the KAB course, and try and get working experience that will in addition to their business knowledge allow them to start and operate their business.

[As recorded by Solutions for Development Consulting Co. during the impact assessment for Palestine, finalized in February 2011, cf. ILO (2011a).]