

**COMMUNITY-BASED EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT  
PROJECT PHI/12/07/OCH**

**INTERNAL FINAL EVALUATION**

**INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION  
CERF - CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND**

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The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the author,  
which are not necessarily shared by the ILO

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The consultant benefited from a well organised and intensive series of field visits and interviews in Davao and Davao Oriental, prepared by the Programme Officer who was on secondment from the AusAID Washi Project in Cagayan de Oro [as well as transcribing and verifying the list of persons interviewed]. Essential background information has been shared by ILO staff members, partner organisations and other agencies in Manila and in the field. The consultant wishes to express his thanks to all those who have contributed their time, knowledge and experience to this evaluation.

**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACRONYM	FULL NAME
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
BBB	Building Back Better
CFW	Cash For Work
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAR	Department of Agrarian Reform
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DMT	Debris Management Team [at Regional, Provincial & Municipal level]
DRMO	Disaster Risk Management Officer
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EIIP	Employment Intensive Investment Programme
ENRO	Environment and Natural Resources Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
IP	Indigenous Peoples
LGU	Local Government Unit
LNGO	Local Non-Government Organisation
NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
OCHA	Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
PCA	Philippine Coconut Authority
PhiDHRRA	Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas
PhilHealth	Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SAC	Social Action Centre
SALT	Slope Agriculture Land Technology
SSS	Social Security System [of the Republic of the Philippines]
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1. OVERVIEW OF PROJECT AND EVALUATION

#### 1.1 BACKGROUND

In December 2012 eastern Mindanao was hit by typhoon Pablo [international name Bopha], the strongest tropical storm to ever to hit the region. Destruction was widespread and devastating to the local agriculture-based economy. The ILO response was to apply its local resource-based approach to economic recovery through cash-for-work. The objective was to inject cash into the local economy through wages and local purchase of materials and to help bring back sustainable sources of livelihood through debris clearance. ILO was granted US\$597,060 by CERF through OCHA to support this work, starting on Jan-15 and finishing on Jul-15 2013.

#### 1.2 OUTPUTS

In coordination with the livelihood cluster ILO focussed on the municipality of Baganga, assisting communities with short-term clean up activities to improve mobility, access to basic services and provide immediate income and social protection. Local teams were to be identified and through sub-contracts and 52,500 workdays were to be generated for 3,500 men and women in the affected Barangays. Living environments and essential community infrastructure was to be cleared, along with an increased local government capacity to respond to climate change impacts and to collaborate through emergency employment.

#### 1.3 EVALUATION

The evaluation is to describe and evaluate project progress, achievements and lessons from the implementation. This was to include interviews with ILO staff in Geneva, Bangkok, Manila, with the project team and with beneficiaries. An analysis of the data was to provide insights into what did and did not work well, identifying ILO and external factors that have impacted on the implementation, assessing if short-term humanitarian projects are an appropriate mechanism for ILO to contribute to crisis response and making recommendations for the project and ILO.

A visit was made to the project site from 24 to 28-June, where interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with stakeholders. Interviews with Manila, Geneva and Bangkok staff were held prior to and after the field visit.

### 2. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION ANALYSIS

#### 2.1 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was developed as an initiative of ILO Manila with technical assistance from EIIP, Bangkok based on several years of experience in the Philippines [and over 40 years internationally] in local resource based approaches to infrastructure development. The project did not begin in earnest until March 2013 with the delay since Jan 2013 caused by deferred decisions on human resources. Difficulties were encountered during the early stages of the project in identifying capable contracting partners.

#### 2.2 GENERAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The project achieved the immediate quantitative objectives as indicated by the number of workdays generated and the cash injection into the local economy in the testing circumstances of a shortened time frame, security and communication difficulties under

considerable pressure. Debris clearing had a positive impact on beneficiary's communities and helped restore essential public infrastructure.

### 2.3 RELEVANCE, APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFICIENCY

Contracted partners followed consistent organisational structures and monitoring approaches, ensuring productivity, efficiency and effectiveness through various different means. Achievement in terms of area of debris cleared were recorded but were not set as targets in the project proposal. Purchase of PPEs [Personal Protective Equipment] proved difficult for government agencies and time consuming for the ILO-CERF team. Fast-tracking of the loan of chainsaws from PCA was essential to meeting project targets. Nurses were provided, trained and monitored as required, however monitoring by the ILOE-CERF team was hampered by communication and travel difficulties. All beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the CFW and were appreciative of the PPEs. Partners lacked financial and technical capacity and experience however suitable guidance was provided by the ILO-CERF team.

### 2.4 ILO ADVANTAGES

ILO linkages with other agencies through the shelter cluster assisted in identification of contracting partners and enables ILO to advocate for common payment rates and social and health protection measures. Provision of accident insurance, SSS [Social Security System] and PhilHealth coverage is exclusive to the ILO and was very much appreciated by partners and beneficiaries alike. However partners and beneficiaries had difficulty in providing required documentation for PhilHealth and SSS because of loss of property. All stakeholders expressed strong doubts that beneficiaries would be able to continue SSS contributions.

### 2.5 GENDER RESPONSIVENESS

The project achieved the targeted ratio between men and women beneficiaries.

### 2.6 ILO IMPACTS ON IMPLEMENTATION

Delays in recruitment of staff led to long delays in the active initiation of the project. Limitations on contract values meant more partners had to be found. SSS and PhilHealth coverage was not included in the first contracts. Partners were happy with the level of technical and admin support from the ILO-CERF team, however without a 'crisis set-up' in CO-Manila there were difficulties with admin and financial policies and they could not act on the ground as fast as desirable. Halving the project time frame led to pressures on ILO-CERF staff and ILO Manila admin staff, also impacting on the objectives that could be achieved.

### 2.7 EXTERNAL IMPACTS ON IMPLEMENTATION

Terrain and travel combined with security restrictions led to long travel times for project staff. Communication was difficult and office accommodation was not available until the 5<sup>th</sup> month of the project.

### 2.8 ILO AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

The project achieved the ILO objectives of promoting decent working conditions. National recognition of the importance of emergency employment and ILO's role in the livelihood cluster leads naturally into a future role for ILO in CFW emergency employment. However without a strong link to sustainable livelihood recovery ILO would not be able to meet all its objectives.

### 3. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 3.1 PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

- Better ILO visibility could avoid local trust concerns [about CFW in general]
- PhilHealth and SSS coverage should be included in CFW sub-contracts from the outset [as well as the accident insurance already included].
- Sub-contract payments could be made in one tranche instead of two.
- Capacity building with beneficiaries, LGU's and partners on DRR should be possible.

#### 3.2 ILO RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop a roster of potential contracting partners and consider other alternatives.
- Better links with provincial debris management teams and training in debris clearance.
- Develop a roster of emergency staff or an emergency response team - to avoid relying on just a few key and capable staff members.
- Work with SSS and PhilHealth to advocate for relaxed requirements in emergencies.
- Provide only PhilHealth and accident insurance for CFW if a follow-up livelihood programme introducing SSS coverage is guaranteed.
- Consider developing emergency administrative guidelines and policies.
- Advocate for the provision of psycho-social services to CFW beneficiaries.
- Make clearer in project descriptions what are the longer term objectives of livelihood development, but which are not directly achievable in short time frames.

## B. INTRODUCTION

### 4. TYPHOON PABLO

Around 20 typhoons hit the Philippines each year with about half of these making landfall. The typhoon season usually reaches its peak between July and October each year and until recently Mindanao was spared the most severe tropical storms. However in December 2011 typhoon Washi hit northern Mindanao and in December 2012 typhoon Pablo [international name Bopha] made landfall in the Municipality of Baganga in the Province of Davao Oriental in Region XI, Eastern Mindanao. Pablo was the strongest typhoon to ever hit Mindanao with winds of up to 260km/hr.

Not having experienced severe typhoons before, local authorities and communities were not prepared for the strength of the storms. Pablo caused widespread destruction uprooting trees and destroying property. At the time the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council [NDRRMC] estimated that a total of 1,067 people were killed and 844 - mostly fishermen - were missing. Damage to infrastructure, property and crops was estimated as Php42.2 billion. More than 700,000 families were affected across 34 provinces.

The economy in region XI is predominantly agriculture based with exports of papayas, mangoes, bananas, pineapples and fish products and farming of coconut products including copra<sup>1</sup>. The Department of Agriculture reported that 115,575 ha. of cropland were affected with a production loss of US\$629 million. NDRRMC added that as much as 75% of infrastructure in the affected provinces was either totally or partially destroyed.

### 5. IMPACT ON THE LABOUR FORCE

ILO estimated that one million workers were impacted with almost 40% [375,000] based in the Region XI provinces of Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao del Norte. 35% of the impacted workers were women and 37% were in vulnerable employment, being self-employed or unpaid family workers. A more detailed review of the region's impacted workers, according to industry groups, reveals that 35% were from crop farming, 15% from the retail trade, 6% from the land transport sector, 4% from the construction industry and 3% from the fishing industry. Nearly a quarter of the affected workers are unskilled labourers in agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors and are particularly vulnerable given their low skills level, income and limited protection and security.

### 6. ILO ROLE AND RESPONSE

The ILO crisis and recovery strategy and local resource-based approach as applied in other typhoon affected areas was also applied to the Pablo affected areas. Economic recovery was to be supported by providing immediate short-term income earning opportunities for survivors through cash-for-work. The intention is that this would transition into medium to longer term sustainable employment and livelihood recovery.

The cash injection of about US\$380,000, through the wages of workers and local purchase of materials, will stay in circulation and help stimulate and revitalise the economy. The project proposal also mentions the application of appropriate agricultural production methods to help bring back sustainable sources of livelihood. Workers undertaking cash-for-work activities were also to go through hands-on on-site training to acquire practical skills in carpentry, masonry, welding and electrical installation, giving them a better chance to access other income generating opportunities.

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<sup>1</sup> Dried coconut kernels, from which oil is obtained



ILO was granted US\$597,060 by the CERF through the OCHA to support this work. The project started on Jan-15 and with a 6 months duration, is due to be completed on Jul-15, 2013.

## C. BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT INTERVENTION

### 7. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Typhoon Pablo brought massive amounts of debris into coastal communities. The immediate removal of debris from inhabited areas was urgently needed as the mud, rotting garbage, boulders, trees, wood, and metal roofing caused a hazard to both surviving residents and relief workers. In coordination with the livelihood cluster it was agreed that ILO would focus on the municipality of Baganga and UNDP would cover Compostela Valley and Cateel municipalities.

The objective was to assist communities through emergency employment and livelihood creation, with short-term clean-up activities to clear affected areas of debris. Activities were to include de-clogging of canals, drainage and irrigation and clearing of public infrastructure [such as schools]. The response aimed to help improve the community's mobility, access to basic services, improve access for relief agencies and most importantly provide immediate income and social protection ensuring the work is done with consideration to health and safety.

The local resource-based approach of ILO was to emphasise on the use of local capacities, including local labour, materials and planning and the use of community groups and residents formed into local contractors for implementation of clean-up works. The project focussed on cash-for-work [CFW] for the debris clearing activities, providing wages consistent with the rates set by DSWD guidelines, accident and health insurance, social security and protective gear to accomplish the work. The CERF funded work was intended to jumpstart activities leading to a second phase, with other sources of funding. Key elements of the strategy and activities were:

- Mobilise teams and conduct preliminary work [including identification of severely affected and least supported communities through discussion with key stakeholders].
- Organise the provincial cluster, train engineers to be deployed to give hands-on on-site and formal skills training to CFW workers on local resource-based infrastructure development;
- Conduct cash-for-work activities participated in by one member from the affected households;
- Mobilise, organise and develop community contractors from among the participants of CFW [as successfully demonstrated in the Philippines and including sub-contracts with DOLE].
- Use of local resource-based methods to ensure optimum labour content and good productivity standards.

### 8. TARGETS/EXPECTED OUTPUTS OF PROJECT

The project planned to produce the following outputs:

1. Generate 52,500 workdays and income for 3,500 women and men working in affected Barangays;
2. Stimulation of the local economies by a US\$ 383,250 cash injection through wages and the purchasing of local materials and supplies;
3. Recovered living environment and essential community infrastructure as the foundation for economic and social development;
4. Increased capacity at Barangay and Municipal level to adapt to the impacts of climate change and reduce future impacts on livelihoods and living conditions; and
5. Increased capacity and collaboration at regional and national level to respond in crisis situations, through emergency employment creation and community contracting.

## D. EVALUATION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

### 9. EVALUATOR TASKS

The role of the evaluator is to describe and evaluate the project progress, achievements, good practices, and lessons learned from the implementation. The following is a summary of the main tasks; the full ToR is included in Annex K:

1. Interviews with ILO staff in Geneva, Bangkok, Manila, project implementation team, partners and beneficiaries.
2. Analysis of quantitative and qualitative data from project documents and interview, reviewing overall achievements.
3. Providing insights into what has worked well and not well from identification, design and mobilisation to implementation.
4. Assess relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency and impact/sustainability of project components.
5. Assess and describe the additional benefits, costs and effects of the ILO approach for cash-for-work compared with other approaches in the area.
6. Use data gathering instruments that will disaggregate by sex to the extent possible and assess the gender responsiveness of interventions, including gender equality.
7. Identify factors within ILO and externally that have positively or negatively impacted on overall implementation.
8. Assess if short-term humanitarian projects are an appropriate mechanism for ILO to contribute to crisis response/recovery & if ILO is set up to implement such projects.
9. Make recommendations in relation to the project as well as for ILO as an institutional stakeholder in disaster response initiatives.

### 10. OUTPUTS

The evaluation outputs will comprise a draft evaluation report to be submitted on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2013, followed by a final evaluation report [incorporating comments and feedback] to be submitted on July 12<sup>th</sup> 2013.

## E. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS

### 11. METHODOLOGY

The methodological approach to the evaluation has been based on a desk review of existing documents, followed by interviews and project site visits as listed below. Annex M includes a list of people who attended meetings and interviews. Interviews, FGDs [Focus Group Discussions] and discussions were based around the key tasks listed in the ToR with a set of key questions prepared by the evaluator as a guide and reminder. This method is appropriate for this project as it allows the evaluator to review progress against planned outputs and targets, also giving the opportunity for personal and group inputs.

Limitations to the evaluation include: lack of time to interview all key stakeholders, especially the Director in Manila, before completion of the first draft. Also some stakeholders were not available in the field due to the closure of their humanitarian operations or timing difficulties.

### 12. EVALUATION SCHEDULE

Interviews, focus group discussions and project site visits have taken place over a period of several weeks as follows:

Date	From	To	Activity	Location
17-Jun-13	3:00 PM	5:00 PM	Skype meeting with EIIP Bangkok	Manila/Bangkok
19-21-Jun-13			Desk study review of existing documents	Manila
21-Jun-13	9:00 AM	11:45 AM	Interview with Senior Programme Officer ILO Manila	ILO Office Manila
24-Jun-13	9:00 AM	10:00 AM	Meeting with ILO-CERF Programme Officer	Davao City
24-Jun-13	10:30 AM	12:00 PM	Interview with partners PhilDHRRA and ALGEMCO	Davao City
24-Jun-13	1:30 PM	2:30 PM	Interview with DSWD region XI - livelihood cluster focal person	Davao City
25-Jun-13	9:30 AM	11:30 AM	FGD with CERF project staff	Baganga
25-Jun-13	1:00 PM	2:30 PM	Interview with partners Green Mindanao	Baganga
26-Jun-13	9:30 AM	11:00 AM	FGD with partners Baculin Fisherfolk Association	Baganga
26-Jun-13	11:00 AM	11:30 AM	Interview with DORECO	Baganga
26-Jun-13	11:30 AM	12:30 PM	Site visit with partners Baculin Fisherfolk association	Baganga
26-Jun-13	1:00 PM	2:00 PM	FGD with PhilDHRRA workers and Barangay captain	Baganga
26-Jun-13	2:30 PM	3:30 PM	FGD with partners Green Mindanao workers and Barangay captain & site visit	Baganga
27-Jun-13	9:00 AM	10:30 AM	Interview with SSS	Mati City
27-Jun-13	3:00 PM	3:45 PM	Interview with partners Social Action Centre Immaculate Concepcion Baganga	Mati City
27-Jun-13	9:00 PM	9:45 PM	Interview with UNDP	Mati City

Date	From	To	Activity	Location
28-Jun-13	2:00 PM	4:00 PM	Interview with partners DOLE region XI [regional and provincial teams]	Davao City
01-Jul-13	3:45 PM	4:45 PM	Skype interview with Senior Programme Officer ILO-AusAID Washi Project Iligan	Manila/Iligan
04-Jul-13	9:00 AM	9:30 AM	Skype interview with FAO	Manila
04-Jul-13	4:00 PM	5:00 PM	Skype interview with EIIP Geneva	Manila/Geneva
05-Jul-13	1:00 PM	1:30 PM	Skype interview with PARDEV Geneva	Manila/Geneva
05-Jul-13	4:30 PM	5:00 PM	Skype interview with CRISIS Geneva	Manila/Geneva
07-Jul-13	1:30 PM	2:45 PM	Interview with Deputy Director, ILO Manila	Manila

The main project site was in the municipality of Baganga, however meetings also took place in Davao and Mati at the offices of the various stakeholders and according to their availability.

## F. EVALUATION ANALYSIS

### 13. OVERALL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

#### 13.1 PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

The project was developed largely as an initiative of ILO Manila, as an urgent response to the worst typhoon to hit the Philippines - and when funding was approved at the end of 2012, PARDEV designated CRISIS to take the technical lead [despite the fact that the original concept note stated that “EIIP will technically backstop the project”. Although EIIP helped develop the initial US\$1.5 million project concept note<sup>2</sup> and knew the project was approved in January 2013 [as the Decent Work Team in Bangkok were to provide technical backstopping], they were not given an opportunity to peer review the final proposal or consider the impact that the revised resources [US\$600,000] may have on implementation. From January 2013 the ILO Senior Programme Officer working on the AusAID project taking place in Iligan<sup>3</sup> was re-assigned in Baganga to initiate the project. It wasn't until mid-March 2013<sup>4</sup> that a Programme Officer was recruited to the project and the CERF project team was completed with the lead taken by a second Cagayan de Oro-based ILO Programme Officer. Unfortunately the temporary staff reassignments also had a negative impact on the ongoing project in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan.

ILO use a ‘convergence approach’ to working with other humanitarian and development agencies and tapped into the resources of FAO to identify an early group of organised beneficiaries through the DAR and Agrarian Reform Communities. References are also made to working in partnership with UNFPA on gender mainstreaming - although a meeting was not held with UNFPA to discuss the details.

In support of the response to Pablo, ILO Country Office for the Philippines [CO-Manila<sup>5</sup>] have also sought other funding. This included re-allocating existing crisis response funds of about US\$50,000. They also received a further US\$50,000 from the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific [ROAP] in the form of RBTC<sup>6</sup> funds for IP's and requested support from the regional office in Bangkok and the Geneva HQ for US\$100,000 from the Director General Special Reserve funds [though the latter was not received]. However ILO received less funding from CERF than requested, even though the targets were not adjusted<sup>7</sup> accordingly. UNDP were also awarded US\$2million by CERF to do the same work in Boston and Cateel municipalities. The ILO-CERF team were surprised to find UNDP working in Baganga in early 2013, although later they withdrew from the area. The CERF project is also to be followed up by two AusAID livelihood projects in the same area.

#### 13.2 PREVIOUS ILO EXPERIENCE

Globally this is the first time that ILO has received funding from CERF although unsuccessful attempts have been made before. It is also one of the first times that ILO have responded to a calamity in the immediate emergency phase, rather than during

<sup>2</sup> This concept note was developed based on the EIIP experiences in Sendong.

<sup>3</sup> in northern Mindanao as a response to typhoon Washi/Sendong: The Community-Based Emergency Employment and Reconstruction Project (CBEERP), a collaborative undertaking of DOLE, ILO and Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

<sup>4</sup> Confusion on responsibility for technical backstopping came to light at a meeting in HQ that EIIP attended on 21 Feb 2013. A follow up meeting in HQ on 13 March 2013, called by ILO-EIIP, requested that all administrative matters be expedited and that a revised workplan be put together ensuring that work could be carried out without detriment to the EIIP projects financed by AusAid.

<sup>5</sup> Referred to from here onwards as ILO Manila

<sup>6</sup> Regular Budget for Technical Cooperation

<sup>7</sup> This needs to be clarified with ILO Manila staff

recovery and in development - having more experience with projects gestating over 1 or 2 years. Given the strict deadlines imposed by CERF, a rapid reaction in ILO HQ was required, responding to the faster flows of post crisis work - and although the project was quickly approved, as mentioned in later sections, internal confusion about responsibilities for technical backstopping deferred decisions on some matters.

EIPP has been working in the Philippines from as early as 1971 with several pilot projects and studies demonstrating that labour-based methods were suitable for the conditions there. In the field EIIP has developed a strategy in responding to calamities in the Philippines over several years, beginning with Typhoon Fengshen/Frank in Iloilo in June 2008 and including Ketsana/Ondoy of September 2009. Based this and experience in the response to Sendong, EIIP has developed a community contracting and local resource-based approach to infrastructure development, local economic development and immediate employment, transitioning slowly to longer term recovery. The CERF project concept note was developed by Honorio Palarca [Senior Programme Officer] with the involvement of other local staff and EIIP in Bangkok, in support of and aligned with the AusAID proposals that were also under development.

### 13.3 PROJECT PROCESSES

The preparatory process followed by the project was first to identify potential contracting partners [local NGOs, community contracting groups, People's Organisations, local government agencies etc.], who then prepared proposals for debris clearing in the areas they were working. Proposals followed a fairly standard format [formats were provided for monitoring, canvassing, reporting etc., but not for proposals]. One partner was not able to complete a proposal but instead submitted a letter of request with help from the ILO-CERF team. Pre-site validation visits were then made by ILO together with the Barangay Captain, proponent and the project engineer to review the work to be done and estimate the number of workers needed for 15 days. Finally contracts were signed between the ILO and the implementing partner.

Initially it was planned that at least some of the debris cleared and collected would be disposed of in local dump sites. However in March it emerged that the dumpsites were in need of upgrading and although UNDP took on this work, including levelling, leeching trenches, fencing etc., the dumpsite in Baganga was not ready for use by the CFW teams. The solution to this was to reduce the volume of debris by segregating, recycling and disposal through composting - this framework was also agreed with the cluster.

### 13.4 IDENTIFICATION OF PARTNERS

The first partner quickly and easily identified in early 2013, was DOLE, the traditional partner of ILO in the Philippines. However DOLE faced problems with delays in payments because of incomplete paperwork and the bureaucratic and slow procurement and detailed auditing processes of the government. The contract with ILO also overlapped with DOLE's own programme of support and consequently human resources were stretched, some of their accomplishments were slightly below target and catch up work was required. DAR also found that audit procedures were not appropriate for an emergency situation, taking three weeks to complete liquidation reports. DOLE felt that the CFW gave beneficiaries a chance to air their problems and link up with DOLE and other government services.

Further partners were identified in March through interaction with the livelihood cluster, shelter cluster and the local knowledge of the project team. The principle criteria in

choosing partners was that they had to have a presence on the ground in Baganga [some partners had offices in Davao but field staff who came from the area]. However the process of identifying partners was slow and difficult, there was no roster or database of potential partners, background checks had to be made and while ILO was still in the process of organising, other agencies were busy undertaking debris clearing.

Apart from the Baculin Fisherfolk Association and the ARC's identified through DAR, the partners did not include pre-organised community groups with potential for the EIIP community contracting mechanism. The other contracting partners were largely local NGOs, religious groups or non-profit cooperatives. The contracting partners were only brought together during initial orientation and data gathering - otherwise having limited informal contact. However two partners interviewed said that the work had enabled them to establish good relations with local government and thus enhance their other development work. Even though after background checks when the team were not sure how untested partners would perform and monitoring was difficult in the short time frame, the team only encountered a significant problem, regarding suspect reporting and 'ghost names', with one Indigenous People's organisation which was run by only one person.

### 13.5 BENEFICIARY SELECTION

All partners identified beneficiaries in consultation with the Barangays - though to varying extents. However care had to be taken to avoid political favouritism [especially as project implementation was close to local elections]. Partners reported a lack of a centralised data base of beneficiaries and areas of work but at the same time referred to a master list largely managed by ILO - which was used to validate lists and to strictly avoid repetition of CFW by beneficiaries. Priority was given to workers who had not done any CFW before and equal opportunity was given to men and women. Other CFW programmes [ACTED, UNDP, DSWD] have a policy of allowing beneficiaries and areas of work to be selected by the Barangay captains, which appears to be unpopular because of suspected favouritism.

One contracting partner followed a community validation process for beneficiary lists, used text messaging for people to report on ghost workers and used photo IDs to prevent fraud in payouts.

## **14. PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS**

### 14.1 QUANTIFIABLE ACHIEVEMENTS

The emphasis from ILO CO-Manila was on achieving the target numbers of workdays to be generated [52,500] and number of women and men participating in the CFW [3,500]. It is a considerable achievement for the team to have reached these targets [99.9% of workdays target] given that after 3 months only 100 workers had been contracted. However with the shortened time frame and with the emphasis on achieving the first three targets, other objectives of the project [meaning increasing capacity at Barangay, Municipal and Regional levels] were underemphasised.

The following table indicates the quantifiable achievements:

Partner	Contracted number of workers	Number of workers employed			Number of work days generated
		F	M	Total	
DOLE [2 contracts]	440	131	295	426	6,390



Partner	Contracted number of workers	Number of workers employed			Number of work days generated
		F	M	Total	
PhilDHRRA [2 contracts]	592	245	375	620	9,300
DAR	100	27	78	105	1,575
ALGEMCO	208	83	136	219	3,354*
Green Mindanao [2 contracts]	562	206	361	567	8,505
DORECO	179	19	160	179	2,685
SAC-Sacred Heart of Jesus	292	95	212	307	4,605
SAC-Immaculate Concepcion [2 contracts]	292	230	74	304	4,560
SAC-Sto Nino Parish	292	62	236	298	4,470
Baculin Fisherfolk	150	53	111	164	2,460
MANDISA	286	65	210	275	4,125
<b>TOTAL [15 contracts]</b>		<b>1,216</b>	<b>2,248</b>	<b>3,464</b>	<b>52,029</b>
<b>Local level staff contracts</b>					
3 Excols	3			132	396
1 Excols	1			66	66
<b>SUB-TOTAL [staff]</b>					<b>462</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>					<b>52,491</b>

Table 1: Quantifiable results - contracts, numbers of workers and work days generated.

\* Some support staff of ALGEMCO were extended to work on SSS and PhilHealth and these additional days were included in the total workdays generated. The number of workers to be contracted was only included in the main part of the contract in the amended versions, this being incorporated in the partners proposals [also part of the contract] in the original versions. As noted above, in addition to the CFW work days generated 4 local level staff contracts were given, amounting to a further 462 work days.

The project also aimed to inject US\$383,250 into the local economy through wages and the purchase of local materials and supplies.

In the response to Washi/Sendong agencies implementing CFW paid different rates to workers and this caused conflict and confusion. Learning from this experience the livelihood cluster in the response to Pablo agreed at a national level that all CFW workers would be paid 75% of the minimum daily wage set by DOLE. This amounts to 75% of Php301 that is, Php226. All ILO-CERF workers were paid this rate for 15 days of work. The following table indicates calculations for the amount spent on contracts, labour and PPEs:

Sub-contracts	Number of workers	Duration [days]	Number of work days generated	Cost
<b>Partners contracts</b>	3,464	15	51,960	US\$432,626
3 Excols	3	132	396	US\$6,000
1 Excols	1	66	66	US\$1,500
			<b>52,422</b>	<b>US\$440,126</b>
<b>PPEs &amp; tools</b>				US\$55,263
<b>TOTAL [contracted costs]</b>				<b>US\$495,389</b>
Estimated cost of accident insurance				US\$10,392
Estimated cost of SSS and PhilHealth				US\$73,389
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENT INTO LOCAL ECONOMY</b>				<b>US\$411,608</b>
TARGET				US\$383,250
Achievement				107%
Combined PPE, insurance & SSS/PhilHealth and % of contracted costs				US\$139,044
				28%
Equivalent work days and % of total generated				24,610
				47%

Table 2: Calculation of investments into local economy.

Documents provided by the programme officer were used in the above calculation - noting that an exchange rate of US\$1 = Php40 was used, although the rate at the time of writing is closer to Php43. The amount of US\$432,626 is the total value of the contracts awarded to the partners - and includes wages, fuel, maintenance, administration support to partners and costs of SSS, PhilHealth and Accident Insurance. The estimated costs of accident insurance, SSS and PhilHealth are based on the amended contracts - in calculating the investment into the local economy these costs are excluded as the funding is directed to outside of the actual local economy. However even with this, as the project had set out to invest US\$383,250 into the local economy, the project achieved more than the target [107%].

The combined cost of the PPEs, tools, insurance and SSS/PhilHealth amounts to 28% of the total amount of funding directly spent on implementing the work [contracted costs]. This would amount a further 24,610 workdays - about 47% of the current total. This is equivalent to the cost difference between the safety and social protection approach by ILO compared to the basic cost of wages only which would be the cost of most other CFW programmes. Thus the ILO CFW approach is about one and a half times more expensive than other CFW programmes.

## 14.2 DEBRIS CLEARING

Debris clearance from public infrastructure, including highways, schools, terminals as well as secondary roads is essential to enable access for relief goods and for early recovery of livelihoods. The first contract with DOLE concentrated on clearing public infrastructure. However by the time other contracts were being awarded several agencies had already been working in this area with CFW and most of this work had been completed. One contract was awarded to DORECO for the specialist clearing of fallen electrical cables - essential for restoration of power supply in the areas affected. The work also enabled DORECO to collect and reuse materials. The clearing of debris has enabled the government to restore basic services.

The initial clearing work did not focus on the clearing of fallen coconut trees, although with a total of 5.5 million trees having fallen, this was a priority of the provincial government because of the threat of Rhino beetle infestation [and was even considered an urgent matter by the ILO programme officer]. This appears to have been because of the lack of equipment [chainsaws] and because of the lack of technical expertise in undertaking this more difficult work. However in March the Philippine Coconut Authority [PCA] loaned 43 chainsaws.

The project covered 18 different Barangays including IP [Indigenous Peoples] areas - with the award of 15 contracts to 11 different partners. The clearing of fallen coconut trees covered the land on each side of about 40km of highway. DPWH did clearing work along the roadsides and ILO-CERF concentrated on the private lands on either sides. Fallen coconut trees were cleared from small farm to market roads, roads to potential eco-tourism sites [beach access to mangrove areas] and some small farmland in preparation for planting of cash crops. Some beneficiaries have already planted corn and others plan to plant rubber trees, cacao and coffee in cleared areas. According to the ILO-CERF team all work was done properly according to ILO standards on segregation, composting etc. Each partner worked in one Barangay with 1 batch of workers for a period of 15 days. Some partners covered two Barangays and thus had two batches of workers.

The following table indicates the achievements in terms of areas covered and number of coconut trees cut:

Partner	Description of areas covered	Area covered [m2]	No. of coconut trees cut
DOLE [2 contracts]	Public areas (schools), shoreline, farm-to-market roads, national highway, farmlands	193,430	2,203
PhilDHRRA [2 contracts]	National highways, access roads	606,000	6,973
DAR	National highways, access roads	394,000	1,354
ALGEMCO	National highways, beaches/shorelines, residential, riverbanks	318,900	2,862
Green Mindanao [2 contracts]	Provincial roads, Barangay roads	890,912	8,663
DORECO	Electrical debris clearing along the national and local roads	119,000	494
SAC-Sacred Heart of Jesus	Access trails	36,168	1,876

Partner	Description of areas covered	Area covered [m2]	No. of coconut trees cut
SAC-Immaculate Concepcion [2 contracts]	Public areas, access trails	79,000	480
SAC-Sto Nino Parish	Access trails, island		
Baculin Fisherfolk	Access roads, farmlands	55726	2782
MANDISA	Access roads, farmlands		566
<b>TOTAL [15 contracts]</b>		<b>2,693,136</b>	<b>28,253</b>

Table 3: Quantifiable results - areas covered and number of trees cut.

Note: Blank cell are where results are as yet unreported by partners, at the time of writing. The table is based on information provided by the programme officer. It should also be noted that noting that targets were not set in the CERF project document, but were included in the individual proposals of the contracted partners and verified during initial site visits with the ILO-CERF project engineer.

Fallen coconut trees were cut into 10' and 12' lengths and stockpiled near the roads [covered in tarpaulins], ready to transport to sawmills. Stockpiles were to be raised off the ground as well. The agreement with the Provincial Debris Management Committee was that 20% of the fallen trees would be given by the private landowners, as 'payment' for the clearing and would be set aside for use in shelter construction. However some landowners did not allow the CFW teams to clear the timber and have instead sold it to private operators. What was left by private operators was not always suitable or of the right lengths for construction. Also the government and the shelter cluster have been slow in mobilising the removal and processing of the cut logs into lumber for construction. The coconut logs which cannot be processed for use in construction can be used to make charcoal but otherwise it is not clear what will happen to the stockpiles.

#### 14.3 LGU AND ABILITY TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Although this is an objective of the project, the project work had no direct impact on the Barangay, limiting contact to keeping them informed and regarding beneficiary lists. No capacity building took place with the Barangay and only one partner incorporated an element of Disaster Risk Reduction in their CFW. Partners limited linkages with the LGU because of concerns about the timing of the local elections and concerns about favouritism in beneficiary selection. There were also concerns about the poor working relationship between the municipal and provincial governments and the ILO-CERF team avoided this conflict and remained neutral.

At the outset of the project in January the Philippine Armed Forces in the form of the ICP [Incident Command Post]<sup>8</sup> were more active and supportive [they were disbanded after the election], facilitating links with Barangay officials. Because of their previous experience with CFW from UNDP and DSWD some Barangays expected the ILO to pass the funding and CFW payouts directly through them. Some Barangays also pre-selected work areas [perhaps

<sup>8</sup> The Philippine Army, 10th Infantry Division, in coordination with the Davao Oriental provincial government also distributed packs of food supplies in the municipality of Baganga, covering all 18 Barangays under the leadership of Lt. Col. Krishnamurti Mortela, commander of Incident Command Post (ICP)

with political bias] and had initiated CFW, expecting ILO to foot the bill. This caused some tension and difficulties soon after the ILO-CERF team began work in March and they had to be careful to see through these issues with a careful interpretation of local politics.

#### 14.4 IMPACT ON REGIONAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND CAPACITY TO COLLABORATE

The only impact on regional and national government was through the advocacy work of ILO Manila in the livelihood cluster and in the inter-cluster meeting held in Manila in April 2013. At such cluster meetings ILO promoted a resource based approach to livelihood recovery and the implementation of short-term debris clearance, with a transition to sustainable livelihood. A consistent approach to cash-for-work was agreed, including decent work standards [social protection, occupational safety, insurance cover, nurse care on site, standard wage rates], age and gender mix of workers, working hours, selection of workers with LGU and use of protective gear. It is doubtful however how consistently such agreements are applied by national government, especially as even other UN agencies [UNDP] have not followed the same standards in CFW in the same locality.

### **15. RELEVANCE, APPROPRIATENESS, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION**

#### 15.1 PRODUCTIVITY AND MONITORING

All partners followed largely the same process for cutting of coconut trees as guided by the ILO-CERF team - in forming work teams of about 30 persons with a leader, chainsaw operator and assistant, nurse and monitor. According to PCA [Philippine Coconut Authority] standards such a team can cut at least 30 trees/day. However this is based on 4 litres of fuel/day, whereas ILO provided 8 litres of fuel - thus if they have the resources they can go beyond, with one partner claiming to have cut more than three times the PCA minimum.

The partners' methods of ensuring productivity and efficiency varied - not all had daily quotas for the labour teams. Some required leaders to make up time for periods of chainsaw maintenance. Others had 'petty meetings' with team leaders to monitor and discuss challenges or did random spot checks with a roll call and to avoid ghost workers. The main incentive for the workers is of course their salary but partners also relied on a sense of responsibility in that the clearance was being done in their own Barangays and communities.

Some partners over-targeted due to lack of experience in debris clearing. In meetings partners referred to the targets areas in the proposals and scope of works agreed in each Barangay with the ILO-CERF team, sometimes claiming they had achieved more than the proposed amount, though this was not verifiable during the evaluation because of a lack of time to review all the proposals or an easily read summary of such.

Given the terrain, number of contracts and security concerns, monitoring of the partners by the ILO-CERF team was difficult. If partners were not able to meet their target, they were asked to explain why. The ILO-CERF team reported that the achievements were sometimes 20% less than planned because of rain, hot weather [the work was carried out during the hottest season and work slows as a consequence], problems with the chainsaws, difficulties with terrain not seen during the site validation or security concerns [there were armed groups in Mikit for example]. DOLE reported that only 50% of their labourers worked hard and responded well with 20% being complacent.

## 15.2 PPE'S AND EQUIPMENT/TOOLS SUPPLY

In the first contract with DOLE, the partner had difficulty in purchasing the PPEs because they had to follow government rigid accounting and procurement processes requiring a long time frame for canvassing, posting adverts etc. Consequently the start of their CFW was delayed, although under their second contract they were able to facilitate the procurement using an emergency procurement process.

Under the later contracts the ILO-CERF team bought the PPEs from local suppliers [who purchased from Davao] injecting cash into the local economy as planned, the beneficiaries also being aware of this approach. Long sleeved shirts as protective clothing were printed following the same format but with each partner having their own logo included it as well as that of ILO. Purchase of the PPEs was considered a major task that had to be completed before contracts could start. The ILO-CERF team had to closely monitor the partners and workers to ensure that the PPEs were used and people were reprimanded if they didn't use them. Again they faced challenges in communication, security and terrain.

As mentioned earlier during the first contracts and first few months chainsaws were not readily available however when the Programme Officer from CDO joined in March she was able to fast-track the purchase of both PPEs and arrange for the use of chainsaws. Chainsaws were loaned by PCA on the basis of a verbal agreement and ILO was responsible for maintenance and purchase of fuel. Management of the chainsaws and limiting down time for maintenance was facilitated by keeping communication channels between partner workers and the ILO-CERF team open. One group of beneficiaries also reported a lack of sufficient tools to carry out the work, but resolved this by borrowing and using their own tools.

## 15.3 HEALTH

All partners followed the same team structure including the provision of a nurse to ensure that workers are fit for work and to provide emergency first aid if needed. When there seemed to be a shortage of qualified nurses they used Barangay Health Workers and mid-wives, supplementing their experience with some additional training and guidance, including an 'accident flow chart' so they would know how to respond in an emergency. A general orientation for all nurses and health workers included an occupational hazard briefing. They also ensured that they could administer first aid and check blood pressure.

The ILO-CERF team included two nurses whose role was to monitor partner nurses. Only minor accidents were reported and the ILO-CERF team kept a record of incident reports on accidents and monitored the daily usage of the medical kit. The most often used medicine was pain relievers [mefenamic acid] - though the ILO nurses advised that this should not be dispensed automatically as it is normal to feel muscle pain after undertaking heavy labour work. In another non-ILO project, a traffic accident resulted in the death of at least one person - ILO and partner nurses were able to respond to this as they were doing debris clearing nearby. As with other monitoring and coordination was done through text messaging.

One partner included 'healing' seminars and character building sessions. DOLE also reported that at least 5% of their workers were traumatised and had trouble coping.

## 15.4 BENEFICIARY SATISFACTION AND IMPACT

All beneficiaries met reported satisfaction with their involvement in ILO's CFW. The main benefits they see are the immediate cash - which gives them personal freedom and choice

of what to buy - having become used to receiving canned goods and food for work. People feel proud to work for money, rather than receiving dole outs, saying that the money has more than its face value because it is the 'fruit of their labour'. Cash was used for immediate food needs [many people still being in survival mode] but also for school supplies and enrolment. Beneficiaries also reported that their cash was bringing back business and new businesses were emerging because of their buying power. DOLE also reported that enterprising sari-sari store owners who given goods on credit, attended payouts to collect on debts.

People were also 'amazed' by the support given through use of protective gear and social/health protection - saying that they felt like they were treated like professionals [and would thus work like professionals] and given proper attention, dignity and identity. One group saw the immediate benefit of boots and gloves after finding snake nests in coconut trees several times. News of the benefits of the ILO approach has spread to other adjacent municipalities with people expressing a desire to do CFW with the ILO. One partner and their beneficiaries organised culmination activities, which included composing and singing jingles or songs which were an expression of their gratitude. Another partner reported that the work united and bonded the community and they even enjoyed working together under the sun.

#### 15.5 TRAINING AND EXPERT SUPPORT/CAPACITY BUILDING

Most of the partners lacked previous experience in debris clearing and lacked financial capacity. To support the 11 partners the ILO-CERF team gave an orientation and prepared checklists and forms - giving them step-by-step training in identifying beneficiaries, setting up the work teams and contracts. Technical guidance relied on the experience of the labourers and chainsaw operators themselves.

Some beneficiaries reported that after having worked with ILO they consider themselves more employable in other CFW or construction unskilled labour work. This was particularly the case with labourers who worked with DORECO, who got significant on-the-job training, DORECO saying that they might use some of the workers again because of their experience.

#### 15.6 CONCLUSIONS

The project was relevant and appropriate in that clearance of debris [particularly fallen coconut trees] was a top priority of Provincial government and CFW is a tried, tested and locally accepted approach in undertaking this clearance work and in providing emergency employment and livelihood assistance. The project was efficiently implemented and effective in that the main targets were achieved in a shortened project time-frame with a small but effective project team, who were able to monitor and supervise the work through well oriented and trained counterparts in the contracted partner organisations. Removal of debris has clearly assisted local communities in accessing farmlands and public infrastructure, also opening up possibilities for longer term livelihood development.

### **16. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF ILO CASH-FOR-WORK COMPARED TO OTHER APPROACHES**

#### 16.1 SOCIAL AND HEALTH PROTECTION

Provision of accident insurance, SSS and PhilHealth is the major difference and advantage of the ILO programme, cited by all beneficiaries and partner organisations as a major benefit. Although ILO has also been advocating for a common approach in this to the livelihood cluster as mentioned earlier, the requirement for SSS enrolment and PhilHealth coverage was not included in the original contracts and was only added in a later

amendment to all contracts, when partners had already mobilised workers on the ground [and therefore had no option but to agree]. All partners had no difficulty in granting beneficiaries Red Cross accident insurance before work began, although one partner said that they had to advance their own funds to do this because of delays in cash transfers. Partners and the ILO-CERF team see accident insurance and PhilHealth being the most practicable and useful coverage in an emergency situation, when people are recovering from a calamity.

Even though the requirement was added later the partners agreed on the necessity of including SSS/PhilHealth and think that a way should be found to put this into effect. Partners reported that people realise the importance of health and social coverage because of the typhoon - particularly because if they had been previously enrolled they could have availed of a calamity loan. Two partners said that following their experience with ILO-CERF they would now promote SSS/PhilHealth coverage with other CFW programmes including UNDP and even consider incorporating it as their counterpart contribution.

However all partners said that they had difficulty with beneficiaries being able to provide required documentation. SSS requires a birth certificate or baptismal certificate or if this is not available two valid IDs and were inflexible about this requirement. As people have suffered the destruction of their houses and loss of possessions many of them are unable to provide such documentation. Costs would be incurred in getting new documents and affidavits including travel to Mati. PhilHealth has the same requirements however they agreed to waive this if the beneficiary could provide a certification of address, age and civil status from the Barangay Captain. With ILO-CERF encouragement SSS undertook a coverage drive in Baganga making it easier for beneficiaries and partners to submit documents, raise questions [instead of travelling to Mati] and for SSS to process applications, however they stuck to their requirements at this time. More recently one partner said that SSS were willing to give a temporary number with a list of names, meaning that people could enrol but that benefits would be held until full compliance. Most partners have not yet completed enrolment in SSS and PhilHealth because of the long and time consuming process [even though ILO-CERF assisted in the leg work] and lack of time since it was included in their contracts. All partners expressed strong doubts about being able to achieve anywhere near full coverage of beneficiaries in SSS/PhilHealth because of the lack of documentation.

ILO-CERF provided 1 month contribution towards SSS and 6 months coverage under PhilHealth. Some doubts were expressed about the capacity of SSS and PhilHealth to manage the large influx of enrollees. Concerns were raised that SSS would see the enrolment of beneficiaries with only 1 month of contributions guaranteed [and some doubt about future contributions as this depends on more sustainable livelihoods] as disadvantageous because after 20 years [for example] people would be able to claim for burial benefits amounting to much more than the 1 month investment. Although SSS did not express this reservation themselves in their interview and in fact seemed pleased to be able to increase their coverage, ILO-CERF said they had to convince SSS that debris clearing is linked to longer term livelihood recovery to get their eventual agreement to the process.

As mentioned above, all stakeholders interviewed expressed strong doubts about whether CFW workers would be able to continue to make contributions to SSS [and also PhilHealth



although this was not such a concern because 6 months cover was given]. However the benefits of at least introducing people to the system were appreciated - though again doubts were expressed about whether emergency response CFW is the best mechanism to introduce and promote SSS, with several interviewees saying that livelihood recovery work would be a more appropriate vehicle.

Under the DOLE contract as CFW labourers are employed by the government they would have to enrol in GSIS instead and this caused some difficulties/confusion. One partner also had difficulty with SSS rates to be paid according to the salary range but was able to adjust to this financially through the length of PhilHealth coverage given. Another partner reported that 20 people could not enrol in SSS because of the 55 year age limit, even though the ILO approach to CFW even includes a provision to allow beneficiaries over 60 to participate if they want.

Under the “4 P’s” poverty alleviation programme of the national government<sup>9</sup> some workers are already automatically enrolled in PhilHealth and SSS.

## 16.2 SAFETY AND PPE’S

Provision of protective gear and clothing was also cited as a major benefit of the ILO-CERF CFW programme. See earlier section for beneficiary feedback regarding this.

## 16.3 OTHER CFW PROGRAMMES

All beneficiaries and partners interviewed commented that in other CFW programmes undertaken [including DOLE, UNDP, DSWD, CRS, WFP, The “Global Fund”<sup>10</sup> - originally part of WHO - and LWS] they do not use any PPEs and do not include any accident insurance, PhilHealth coverage or SSS enrolment. The main programmes of DSWD and UNDP had set the tone for how CFW was implemented in Davao Oriental when the ILO-CERF project began in earnest and this presented some problems in the different expectations particularly of Barangay Captains.

UNDP reported themselves that they do not include accident insurance because it takes too long to comply. However they do provide some protective gear [including boots, masks/goggles hats and gloves - although they dispensed with the use of masks and gloves when they found CFW workers not using them], medical kits and medical assistance in the form of Barangay Health Workers.

Another difference is the way that beneficiaries and work sites are selected - other programmes, because of their work more directly through Barangay Captains, face rumours of corruption, political favouritism and ghost workers. One partner and UNDP also reported the misuse of their name in signing up CFW labourers or for political gains.

## 16.4 GOOD LINKAGES AND REPUTATION

ILO has good links with other UN agencies such as FAO and UNFPA through the livelihood cluster, which also facilitated links to and coordination with local NGOs. Long established relations with DOLE also enabled the first contract to be set up quickly. ILO also has the

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*9 Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of DSWD: this is a human development program of the national government that invests in the health and education of poor households, particularly of children aged 0-14 years old. Patterned after the conditional cash transfer scheme implemented in other developing countries, the Pantawid Pamilya provides cash grants to beneficiaries provided that they comply with the set of conditions required by the program.*

*10 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: This is an innovative financing institution that provides funding to countries to support programs that prevent, treat and care for people with HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria - <http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/>*

advantage of being able to tap into chambers and workers organisations [including unions] - however these links were not utilised in the ILO-CERF work<sup>11</sup>.

ILO also has an established and reliable reputation - in comparison to other CFW programmes where people reported difficulties in being paid on time [or at all]. For example one partner reported that the media see CFW as ‘fly by night’ with negative connotations as some communities have reported that they have done CFW but have not been paid. Therefore they felt that there is a need to gain trust by tapping religious groups and the Barangay captain so people can see their legitimacy and can be sure of the promise of payment.

## 17. GENDER RESPONSIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS

The target for the number of women beneficiaries in the project document was 35% - however in meetings all partners cited that the target was 30% women. Nevertheless an average of 35% women in the labour teams was achieved across all contracts. No particular difficulties were reported in achieving this - except for DORECO who said they didn’t include many women in their team because 15 men are needed to carry one pole and they discouraged women’s involvement for safety reasons. ALGEMCO also reported in their interview that they could not achieve the target because women “have other priorities” and that they cannot “force them to join”, however this is in contrast to the reported numbers below.

Partners and beneficiaries reported that tasks were divided amongst the women and men - with women doing the lighter detail oriented work and men doing the heavy lifting. Partners reported that division of labour in this way didn’t slow the work down but in fact made it more efficient. No reports were made of any change to the relation between men and women because of the CFW.

The following table shows the % of women included in the CFW - with those who did not reach the target highlighted:

Partner	Number of workers employed			% of women workers
	F	M	Total	
DOLE [2 contracts]	131	295	426	31%
PhilDHRRRA [2 contracts]	245	375	620	40%
DAR	27	78	105	26%
ALGEMCO	83	136	219	38%
Green Mindanao [2 contracts]	206	361	567	36%
DORECO	19	160	179	11%
SAC-Sacred Heart of Jesus	95	212	307	31%
SAC-Immaculate Concepcion [2 contracts]	230	74	304	76%
SAC-Sto Nino Parish	62	236	298	21%

<sup>11</sup> It was not apparent to the evaluator why these links were not used

Partner	Number of workers employed			% of women workers
	F	M	Total	
Baculin Fisherfolk	53	111	164	32%
MANDISA	65	210	275	24%
<b>TOTAL [15 contracts]</b>	<b>1,216</b>	<b>2,248</b>	<b>3,464</b>	<b>35%</b>

Table 4: Percentages of women employed under CFW.

## 18. FACTORS WITHIN ILO WITH POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON IMPLEMENTATION

### 18.1 STAFF RECRUITMENT AND ADJUSTMENT

As highlighted earlier recruitment of staff was prolonged and this meant there was a long gap between the initial contract with DOLE [awarded on 15 Jan] and the next contract with DAR [awarded on 22 April]. When staff were taken on some were inexperienced in ILO rules and administrative policies - so they spent the first month or so adjusting and trying to adjust ILO normal policies to an emergency situation - and deliverables were somewhat left behind. Engineers taken on also need to have experience with EIIP approaches and green/climate change technology but seemed to lack this. Although programme managers had experience in managing a similar programme responding to Washi/Sendong the context there [in Iligan and Cagayan de Oro] was urban, as opposed to rural in Davao Oriental, and the different kind of debris clearing in Baganga needed more technical expertise.

### 18.2 CONTRACTS AND VALUE LIMITATIONS

Sub-contracts with partners were limited by the maximum signing authority of the ILO Manila Director to a value of US\$30,000 beyond which approval was required in HQ. Because of the small size of contract the solution was to look for more partners [which was proving to be difficult] and award more than one contract to some partners. Amendments to contracts to include SSS/PhilHealth increased at least three contract values to more than US\$30,000 and eventually a waiver for the limit was granted. However up until this point the limitation must have imposed administrative burdens on the ILO team in Manila.

### 18.3 TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO PARTNERS

All partners praised the inputs and assistance given during the project set up and during implementation. Partners appreciated the inputs given on how to manage their systems and were thus able to exceed their individual targets [in terms of coverage - meaning areas covered and No. of trees cut]. Partners reported that they got good support [even late at night] and prompt responses, working in good partnership with the ILO-CERF team and in Manila. DOLE also expressed that the programme officer was able to help them in establishing contacts with key people and officials in the area, even though this should be their own role.

### 18.4 ILO MANILA ADMIN AND FINANCE

In the field the ILO-CERF project team had to adjust to normal internal procedures to an emergency situation and also to a situation of having half the expected time to complete the work. Consequently the ILO-CERF team had to regularly explain the situation to administrative staff in Manila and put pressure on to fast track decisions. The time spent in

undertaking administrative work was undertaken instead of scouting for additional beneficiaries and partners. Additional and dedicated administrative support from ILO Manila was requested but not received.

Difficulties faced included response times for partner contract approvals. Also the ILO-CERF policy was to pay partners in two tranches, with the second tranche only being available on reporting of liquidation of at least 70% of the first tranche, which covered the first 10 out of the 15 days of work. This provided some financial check on implementation but also increased the administrative burden on both ILO Manila and on partners some of whom had difficulty in completing liquidation reports and some of whom had to advance their own funds to pay workers or ask them to wait. The cut off of payments on the 25<sup>th</sup> of the month, when further releases had to wait until the 1<sup>st</sup> of the next month also caused some difficulties.

Although based on learning from the experience in the Washi/Sendong response where beneficiaries had to wait several days to get paid, ILO wanted to ensure that workers were paid on time, several partners reported delays in the transfer of funding from ILO Manila to their bank accounts and consequently in payments to the workers.

### 18.5 TIME FRAME

A significant issue that has impacted on the implementation is the gap between the initial contract with DOLE and the latter contracts with other partners. The main reason for this was the protracted staff recruitment as mentioned earlier. Key staff who were reassigned from other projects to fill the gap were also tied up with preparing proposals for other projects and were unable to give the CERF project their full attention. The effect was that the project time-frame was halved - three months had passed before a full project team was on the ground. All staff and partners have mentioned difficulties with the short time frame and the impact it has had on their ability to achieve all the objectives of the project and increases in personal stress.

As mentioned under the section on project development, internal confusion on which department of the ILO was responsible for taking the lead in the project, may have exacerbated the protracted process of recruiting and agreeing on assignment of appropriate staff. It was not until March when PARDEV followed up with CRISIS on progress with implementation rates that this was clarified and EIIP became more actively involved and the formation of the project team was fast-tracked.

## **19. EXTERNAL FACTORS WITH POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON IMPLEMENTATION**

### 19.1 CLIMATE, TOPOGRAPHY, TERRAIN & ENVIRONMENT

Some of the work took place in remote upland areas - where access was difficult for the teams, equipment and for technical and health monitoring. The ILO-CERF team recognised that accessibility is difficult in some areas thus provided some transport support for partners support staff as part of their budget. Debris clearance work was also undertaken in the hot season - which made work slower - with at least one partner adjusting work times to early morning and late afternoon, avoiding the heat of the day. During early implementation travel distances between the hub in Cateel, Davao and Baganga imposed unavoidable geographical constraints. During the development of the project programme staff also faced long travel times having to shuttle between Baganga, Mati and Davao [to attend the first cluster meetings].

## 19.2 COMMUNICATION

Some communication problems were faced by the nurses and monitoring team because of weak mobile signals - with text messaging being the most common form of communication between partners mobiles, team leaders and the ILO-CERF team. Weak signals meant that if there was an emergency the deployed workers [nurses] could not always communicate back to the ILO team. Also some areas of work areas were far from provincial roads and the nearest health centre. However the ILO nurse and monitoring team kept track of the work by visiting about 3 to 4 Barangays/day. This was a challenge, but in response each partner was given some communication support [Php2-300 load/support staff for 15 days of work].

## 19.3 ACCOMMODATION

Living conditions for the ILO-CERF team were difficult - especially as the area was rural and recently devastated by the typhoon - and this impacted on the efficiency of the team's work. They also had difficulty in arranging an office space to work in and didn't get an office space until May [the 5<sup>th</sup> month of a 6 month project] - having to use the humanitarian hub in Cateel or at small cafeterias around the area, where feasible, until this time. The delay was because of difficulties in finalising the contract in Manila and the business district-like ILO conditions which were not realistic to apply in rural devastated Davao Oriental. Staff had to adjust to the physical challenges, with the drivers sleeping in the cars within the hub compound, for example.

The Senior Programme Officer informed ILO Manila about the difficult living conditions for the CERF team but received no response. Eventually they had to disobey the policy of staying at the hub because their productivity level was affected.

## 19.4 SECURITY AND TRAVEL

The main problem faced by the team was that they had to request UNDSS approval 5 days before travelling. Because in Baganga it was security level 4 and everything changes daily, they didn't get a green light until the day before travelling, which didn't leave enough time for admin staff to process travel requests. Consequently the team were reprimanded by ILO Manila for putting admin staff under pressure. The 5 days lead time also made it difficult to arrange for meetings with partners which were often arranged in a hurry by text messaging. Security concerns made it more of a challenge to travel around to monitor the work.

A further challenge was in cash security. Bank transfers from Manila to the local bank in Baganga would take 15 days [as there is not a corresponding bank in Manila]. So partners had to have bank accounts outside of Baganga that have partners in Manila. With such banks the clearance is only 3 days. The partners then had to physically transfer the cash from Davao to Baganga which presented a security problem. However partners addressed this either by managing to arrange bank to bank transfers or by insuring the person transporting the cash. Local banks also lacked loose change and didn't have enough cash - imposing a withdrawal limit.

## **20. ILO AND SHORT TERM HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PROJECTS**

### 20.1 FIT WITH STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF ILO

This project fits with the ILO's strategic objective to improve working conditions, to promote decent work and to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social protection

for all. To a lesser extent the project fits with the objective of enhancing sustainable employment opportunities. The project does not address the objective of strengthening and promoting social dialogue and tripartism, because of the short project time frame.

The social protection, health and safety promoted in the cluster meetings and applied in the project are appreciated very much by beneficiaries and partners and have been taken up as a common strategy at the national level. The project, although short term, has been able to at least demonstrate the immediate benefits of protection and partners and beneficiaries are more likely to push for this in further humanitarian and development work. The longer term impact of enrolment in PhilHealth and particularly SSS has yet to be seen because of the doubts about the continuation of contributions beyond the allowance of ILO.

## 20.2 ILO AND EMERGENCY CFW RESPONSE

The Philippines government have officially recognised that livelihood recovery is part of humanitarian emergency response and should begin in the first few days following a calamity. Although ILO usually works in recovery and development, their role as co-chair of the livelihood cluster [with DSWD] leads naturally and inevitably into undertaking emergency livelihood work.

People have expressed that, although the initial food-for-work provided by WFP [for example] was appreciated, they need more than food and need cash to replace other things they have lost. Given ILO's previous experience with using the local resourced-based approach, emergency CFW is a thus natural response. However during the implementation of the project some internal ILO administrative policies, as mentioned above, were a hindrance to smooth progress.

## 20.3 LINK TO SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

Although it was not one of the specific objectives of the project, the link to longer term and sustainable livelihoods was mentioned by all interviewees as crucial, and is implicitly necessary to achieve the wider objectives of the ILO. Although it is not possible to achieve such an aim in a six month emergency project, it is important to link the work to longer term livelihood recovery. Although this link cannot be guaranteed, the CERF project is fortunate in that it is complemented by the follow up of two AusAID livelihood projects in the same area [though it must be noted that there is no guarantee that the same CERF partners/workers will benefit from the work of the AusAID projects]. Some integrated programmes, ILO-EIIP among them, provide opportunities for bridging this kind of work and creating synergies between emergency interventions and longer term development work.

During the implementation, project sites for clearance were chosen with the benefits to the wider public in mind but were also considered as a prelude to restored livelihoods, hoping that the wider community infrastructure clearing under CERF would facilitate new livelihoods and cover everyone. So, aside from clearing public highways, community priority sites were chosen to restore livelihood assets such as clearing of farmlands of small-holders, farm to market roads and beaches with links to potential eco-tourism sites.

As mentioned under the section on debris clearing the shelter cluster has been slow in mobilising the removal and processing of the cut logs into lumber for construction. Given nationwide government logging bans in the Philippines and the value of coco-lumber the lack of clarity about the use of trees cut and stockpiled by the ILO CFW teams seems to be a lost income earning opportunity. UNDP appear to have addressed this more directly in

their CFW programme and are planning carpentry workshops, managed by community organisations registered under CDA [Cooperative Development Authority], including a materials recovery facility and training for workers from TESDA. However at least one partner has made links with IFRC for the construction of housing in their village using coccolumber and one partner referred to the logs being donated to the governments BBB<sup>12</sup>[Building Back Better] shelter programme.

The social protection vision is also that it links up to livelihood recovery - as an ideal set up. However there is no assurance that their livelihoods will recover and thus as mentioned earlier doubts that people will be able to afford to continue to contribute to SSS and PhilHealth. A number of interviewees reported that some NGOs want to tap ILO workers because they have enrolled in SSS and PhilHealth - so it will save them money. Unless all agencies undertaking CFW provides SSS [as agreed in principle at a national level but not followed through] then the ILO system will remain exclusive.

As noted earlier only a few of the contracts awarded were to pre-organised communities with potential as community contractors. One group of labourers through the DOLE contract did plan to take on this role, however they found that did not have the capital [Php10,000] to open a bank account [needed this to have a 'legal personality'], therefore their plan did not push through. It is questionable given that people are trying to recover and are in survival mode whether the community contracting term is appropriate - even the pre-organised DAR ARCs were not considered cohesive after Pablo hit. Without organised communities a community contracting methodology was not feasible, and as the team lacked direction from other colleagues, the adaptation to CBOs, CSOs and LNGOs was a fitting solution given their time limitations.

ILO has the advantage that they straddle longer term development and crisis response - especially in the Philippines where ILO is co-chair of the livelihood cluster. This gives them the opportunity to, in theory, easily make the link between humanitarian aid and development work. Adjustments to the internal systems of ILO and clarity on responsibilities for technical backstopping projects such as the CERF project might be aided by the internal restructuring of the ILO presently ongoing. The link between humanitarian aid and development is missing at times however and is an issue for donors who tend to have separate funds and departments for each. This gap tends to contribute to the lack of potential synergies that could be created between pre-disaster, post-disaster and long-term development work.

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<sup>12</sup> BBB is the flagship rehabilitation framework of the provincial government [<http://bbbdavaaoriental.blog.com>]

## G. LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned in the project include:

1. In an emergency response situation it is too much to expect to be able to establish contracts with organised communities as they are often lacking cohesiveness and are in survival mode. The term “community contractor” is not applicable in this context. The solution is to work with local NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, POs etc.
2. Clearance of electrical debris with DORECO was an innovative idea - clearance of electrical debris assisted in the restoration of a basic essential service, whilst workers were given strong on-the-job training and a genuine opportunity for possible further employment.
3. Better links could be established with other organisations with technical expertise, particularly with the shelter cluster for the processing and use of fallen coconut trees could lead to income earning opportunities.
4. Further promotion of health, safety and social protection for cash-for-work is needed at the cluster level and particularly with other UN agencies, as the commonly agreed standards are not being followed.



## H. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### 21. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was developed largely as an initiative of ILO Manila with technical assistance from EIIP and based on several years of experience in the Philippines [and over 40 years internationally] in local resource based approaches to infrastructure development. Although staff were re-assigned to initiate the project in January 2013 the work did not begin in earnest until March 2013 when a full team was in place. Activities in January were limited to establishing links with traditional government partners. As this is the first time ILO have received CERF funding, there is a desire to perform well and demonstrate ILO's ability to respond rapidly to an emergency, however internal confusion about responsibilities seems to have led to deferred decisions and debates on human resources, delaying the arrival of the full CERF team and thus the beginning of significant activities.

In the mobilisation phase the team encountered difficulties in identifying appropriate and capable partners and the traditional partners of ILO had difficulty in implementing the work in the short time frame. This was resolved through the link with the shelter cluster, local knowledge of the team and the eventual contracts set up with local NGOs, CBOs, CSOs etc. A lack of dumpsites also meant a change in approach - which the team adapted to easily with a debris segregation and composting approach. Contracting and procurement processes were protracted also delaying the start of actual CFW.

### 22. GENERAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The project achieved the immediate quantitative objectives [as indicated by the number of workdays generated and the cash injection into local economy] to a level of 99.9-107% - a significant achievement given the shortened time frame. Debris clearing had an obviously beneficial impact on the communities - clearing essential public infrastructure and smaller roads to farms and potential eco-tourism sites. Clearing of fallen coconut trees was a priority for the LGU from the outset of the project but was not started until March because of a lack of equipment and technical know-how. However some of the objectives were not met such as impact on the Barangay capacity and ability to adapt to climate change and any impact on regional and national government. Only one partner included an element of DRR in their work and the relationship with the Barangays was limited to validation and selection of beneficiaries.

### 23. RELEVANCE, APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFICIENCY

All partners followed largely the same team structures and monitoring processes. Approaches to ensuring productivity varied and mostly relied on achieving the overall targets that were included in project proposals. Although the evaluation cannot assess whether these were achieved, most partners interviewed claimed that they had more than met their targets. In contrast the ILO-CERF team said that achievements were sometimes 20% less.

Purchase of PPEs was a difficulty for the rigid procurement systems of the contracted government agencies. The solution in other contracts for the purchase to be undertaken by the ILO-CERF team is most appropriate. Linkages with PCA and the fast tracking of provision of chainsaws was crucial in achieving the project objectives, however this happened very late in the project time-frame.

The lack of qualified nurses was easily overcome by the involvement of Barangay Health Workers who were given supplementary training. However monitoring of health conditions as with technical monitoring was hampered by security and travel restrictions and difficulties with communication, all overcome through the perseverance of the ILO-CERF team.

All beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the cash-for-work seeing this as giving them personal freedom, dignity and pride in their labour. People were also very appreciative of the protective gear provided seeing this as appropriate attention and giving them a strong identity [ILO workers being easily recognisable along roadsides].

Most partners lacked experience in debris clearing and lacked financial/organisational capacity. The ILO-CERF team was able to address the latter concern with orientation, prepared templates and step-by-step guidance - entailing extensive leg work from the team. Technical guidance was limited, as was any capacity building of beneficiaries given that the work was largely unskilled labour.

## **24. ILO ADVANTAGES**

ILO has good links with other agencies through its work in the shelter cluster. This enabled the identification of contacting partners and enabled ILO to advocate for common payment rates for CFW and common practices on social and health protection. Provision of accident insurance, SSS and PhilHealth is the major advantage of the ILO CFW approach compared to that of other agencies, which largely do not include this, although a common principle of doing so has been agreed at a national level.

Providing accident insurance was not a problem, however all partners had difficulty with SSS and PhilHealth because of the lack of documents that beneficiaries have access to in a post disaster situation - even though the necessity of including this coverage was agreed upon. Partner organisation felt strongly enough about the inclusion of SSS and PhilHealth to consider promoting it themselves in other CFW projects. All stakeholders expressed strong doubts that beneficiaries would be able to continue to make SSS contributions unless their livelihoods quickly recovered, which is without any guarantee.

No other CFW programmes provide SSS, PhilHealth and accident insurance or use even adequate PPEs. Other programmes also face rumours of political favouritism in beneficiary and site selection, whereas ILO has a more trustworthy reputation.

## **25. GENDER RESPONSIVENESS**

The project achieved the targeted ratio between women and men beneficiaries with work tasks divided appropriately.

## **26. ILO IMPACTS ON IMPLEMENTATION**

Delays in the recruitment of project staff and their lack of experience with ILO procedures led to a long delay in the real initiation of the project. Lack of experience with debris clearance - particularly with issue of fallen coconut trees - was a problem faced by many agencies as such a massive number of fallen trees and the subsequent problems were unexpected by all agencies.

Limitation on value of contract meant more partners had to be found which was proving difficult. Despite the importance of this inclusion to ILO, SSS and PhilHealth coverage was not incorporated in the first contracts and contracts had to be amended creating an additional administrative burden.

Without a formalised 'crisis set-up' the normal administrative and financial procedures in ILO Manila seemed to have difficulty in adjusting to an emergency situation and they could not take action on the ground as fast as desirable. Problems reported by staff and partners included slow response times for contract approvals and difficulties with cash transfers. However the contracted partners were happy with the level of technical and administrative support given

during the implementation - and it is positive that administrative issues between the ILO-CERF team and ILO Manila did not cascade down to the partners.

The fact that the project implementation time was effectively halved, because of delayed staff recruitment, had a serious negative impact on the project staff and put pressure on administrative staff in Manila. It also impacted on the time for preparation with contracting partners and the training and guidance they could have been given, and meant that objectives regarding LGU capacity building were overlooked. Confusion in HQ regarding responsibility for technical backstopping may have also exacerbated recruitment delays.

## **27. EXTERNAL IMPACTS ON IMPLEMENTATION**

Terrain and travel combined with security meant long travel times [especially at beginning of project] and difficulty in accessing some areas where work was being done. This was improved at least for partners by including transportation costs in contracts.

Communication was also a problem for technical and health monitoring - even though this was addressed with additional financial support for partners, there are still dead areas where there is no or a very limited mobile signal.

Accommodation for office and living was not resolved early on in the project - staff were not prepared for such living situation and found it impacted negatively on their work.

Security and travel in the area proved to be difficult. However this is the same problem faced by all UN agencies - though some may have emergency rules and also seem more prepared to cope with it.

## **28. ILO AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE**

The project easily maintains the ILO strategic objectives of promoting decent working conditions and enhancing social protection through the application of PPE and PhilHealth/SSS coverage.

A combination of the Philippine Government's recognition of the importance of immediate livelihood recovery, through emergency employment, and ILO's role in the livelihood cluster, leads naturally into ILO working in CFW as a response to emergency employment needs.

However without a strong link to sustainable livelihood recovery ILO would not be able to meet the objective of enhancing sustainable employment opportunities, especially in short term 6 month projects.

## I. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE PROJECT

In regard to the overall project management and implementation it is recommended that:

1. Better ILO visibility [such as exposure on local radio and TV, rather than the internet] and promotion could avoid early trust issues with beneficiaries, communities and leaders.
2. It should be ensured that PhilHealth and SSS are included in all sub-contracts for CFW from the outset of the project [as well as the accident insurance already included], to avoid the administrative burden of preparing contract amendments.
3. Sub-contract payments could be made in 1 tranche instead of 2. Two releases for each 15 day contract is an admin burden for ILO and was difficult for partners, causing payout delays. However accountability issues would still have to be addressed.
4. If the full project time frame had been possible, capacity building with beneficiaries, LGUs and partners on DRR would have been possible. This would be particularly important in any follow up livelihood development activities to make the work sustainable.

## J. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ILO

In regard to ILO Manila and ILO HQ it is recommended that:

1. As the ILO-CERF team had difficulty in identifying partners, if this work is to continue there is a need to develop a roster of potential partner organisations. Alternatives to mobilising groups of labourers more directly, rather than through NGOs, could also be investigated bearing in mind contracting constraints and accountability. Sub-contracts directly with LGUs could also be considered.
2. A roster of potential partners could be developed in parallel to better linkages with Provincial Debris Management Teams and training in debris clearance using OCHA Disaster Waste Management Guidelines
3. A roster of potential staff to be reassigned in emergency situations could also be developed - or alternatively a separate emergency response team in the ILO Manila office could be formed. This should at least include a dedicated administrative staff member to assist teams in the field and would avoid having to depend on only a few key and capable staff members
4. ILO should work with SSS and PhilHealth to develop an approach to emergency coverage for CFW labourers - advocating for relaxed documentation requirements, and including plans and resources for coverage drives.
5. ILO could consider only providing PhilHealth and accident insurance coverage to CFW beneficiaries in emergencies - but only if there is a guarantee that a follow-up livelihood recovery programme will work with the same beneficiaries and introduce SSS coverage then.
6. If ILO is to continue a role in emergency response it should look first at developing a set of emergency administrative policies and guidelines. This could at least include flexibility on office and personnel accommodation and travel. ILO may be able to learn from the experiences of UNDP and UNHCR in such situations. Likewise the ongoing organisational development/restructuring of ILO could help improve rapid response mechanisms at HQ.
7. Psycho-social services are an important response to disasters. ILO should advocate for such services to be provided by government institutions or integrated as part of the nurses training. Partners in Davao Oriental and agencies responding to other typhoons have reported stressed victims who cannot move on, but who still want to benefit from CFW.
8. The original project description wrote substantially about longer term livelihood development such as appropriate agricultural production, DRR, hands on training, acquisition of practical skills and improving access to income generating opportunities. It should be made clearer that this is a longer term objective rather than an immediate objective of the project, as longer term livelihood development is not directly achievable in the short time frame of 6 months.

## REPORT ANNEXES

## K. TERMS OF REFERENCE

*Terms of Reference*

for

an international consultant evaluator

**Internal Final Evaluation**Project Title: **Community-based Emergency Employment**TC Code: **Project PHI/12/07/OCH**Project Budget: **US\$ 597,060**Fund Source: **United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)**Start and End Dates: **15 January 2013 – 15 July 2013**Administrative Unit: **CO-Manila**Technical Unit: **EIIP/DWT-Bangkok****Background**

On December 4, 2012 Typhoon Pablo (International Code-Name: Bopha) made landfall on the town of Baganga, Davao Oriental in Eastern Mindanao. This typhoon was the strongest tropical cyclone to ever hit Mindanao with its 160 mph (260 km/h) winds. It uprooted coconut trees and destroyed houses within its reach, including those in the neighbouring towns of Cateel and Boston. It roared into Compostela Valley, then across Central and Northern Mindanao before leaving the Philippines on December 7 through Palawan.

The storm caused widespread destruction in Mindanao, just like what Typhoon Sendong (Washi) did a year ago. The National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council said that a total of 1,067 people were killed and 844 – mostly fishermen, were missing. Total damage to infrastructure and property, including crops, was estimated at PhP42.2 billion, or US\$1.04 billion. The NDRRMC also said Typhoon Pablo affected 711,682 families or 6,243,998 people in 3,064 villages in 318 towns and 40 cities in 34 provinces.

The ILO crisis and recovery strategy as applied in other typhoon-affected areas is now also applied in the Typhoon Bopha affected areas. Economic recovery is supported by providing immediate but short-term income earning opportunities to survivors through cash-for-work. This will then transition into medium- to longer-term sustainable employment and livelihood recovery focused on creating (green) jobs in the agriculture sector. The cash inflows, through wages of workers and purchase of materials locally, will tend to remain in circulation and revitalize the local economy. In addition, the application of appropriate agricultural production methods will help bring back sustainable sources of livelihood for the affected communities. While waiting for their traditional sources of livelihood to recover, the workers from the initial cash-for-work activities will go through hands-on on-site training to acquire practical skills in carpentry, masonry, welding and electrical installation. The acquired skills will provide them with better chances of accessing other income-generating opportunities.

The ILO was granted US\$ 597,060 by the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) through the Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to support this work. The CERF project started on January 15 and has a completion date of July 15, 2013 (6 months duration).

The project will have to produce the following outputs:

1. Mobilize teams and conduct preliminary work. Organize the provincial cluster, train engineers that will be deployed hands-on, on-site training to workers on local resource-based infrastructure development;
2. Conduct cash-for-work activities participated in by one member from the affected households;
3. Mobilize, organize and develop small community contractors from among the participants of cash for work activities;
4. Generate 52,500 workdays and income for 3,500 women and men working in affected barangays;
5. Stimulation of the local economies by a US\$ 383,250 cash injection through wages and the purchasing of local materials and supplies;
6. Recovered living environment and essential community infrastructure as the foundation for economic and social development;
7. Increased capacity at barangays and municipal level to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change and reduce future impacts on livelihoods and living conditions; and
8. Increased capacity and collaboration at regional and national level to respond in crisis situations through emergency employment creation and community contracting modalities.

### **Evaluation Tasks**

An independent evaluator will be hired to describe and evaluate the project progress, achievements, good practices, and lessons learned from the implementation.

The evaluator will:

1. Interview ILO staff in Geneva (PARDEV, CRISIS and EMP/INVEST), Bangkok (DWT/EIIP) and Manila. Interview the project implementation team, project implementation partners and beneficiaries/workers.
2. Analysing both quantitative and qualitative data from project documents/reports and interviews, review the overall project achievements and assess if the above outputs have been achieved;
3. Provide insights into what has worked well and not well from identification, design, mobilization and actual implementation of the CERF project;
4. Assess the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact/sustainability of project components;
5. Assess and describe the additional benefits, costs and effects of the ILO approach for Cash-for-Work compared to other approaches in the affected area;
6. Use data gathering instruments and methods that will disaggregate by sex to the extent possible and assess gender responsiveness of interventions, including contribution to gender equality and gender-related needs;
7. Identify factors within ILO that have positively or negatively impacted on overall implementation;
8. Identify external factors that have positively or negatively impacted on overall implementation;
9. Assess if the implementation of short-term humanitarian response projects (CERF type of projects) is an appropriate mechanism for ILO to contribute to crisis response and recovery work and if the organization is set up to implement such types of projects.
10. Make recommendations (limited to not more than 6-10) in relation to the project as well as for ILO as an institutional stakeholder in disaster response initiatives.

## Outputs

The evaluator will produce and submit the following:

1. Draft evaluation report
2. Final evaluation report

The Evaluation Report should include the following headings:

*Title and opening pages*

*Table of contents*

*List of acronyms and abbreviations*

*Executive summary*

*Introduction*

*Background and description of project intervention*

*Evaluation scope and objectives, evaluation approach and methods*

*Analysis (following the 8 evaluation tasks described above)*

*Lessons learned*

*Findings and conclusions*

*General Recommendations related to the specific project*

*Specific recommendations for ILO*

*Report Annexes*

The following documents from ILO EVAL are attached for the evaluator's guidance:

- Checklist 5: Preparing the evaluation report
- Checklist 6: Rating the quality of evaluation reports
- Guidance Note 4: Integrating gender equality in monitoring and evaluation of projects
- Guidance Note 7: Stakeholder participation in ILO evaluations
- Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the ILO
- Templates for Lessons Learned and Emerging Good Practices

## Duration

The evaluation will have to be carried out during the first half of July. Total time allocated is 19 working days:

- Desk study, review existing documents and interviews ILO Manila (retrieving project information and financial data and budgets) 19, 20, 21 June (3 days).
- Sunday 23 June – Saturday 29 June – Davao, Davao Oriental (Mati, Baganga) (7 days)  
Sunday 23 June (pm travel Manila - Davao City)  
Monday 24 June a.m. Davao City meetings; p.m. Proceed to Mati.  
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday 25,26,27,28 Davao Oriental (Mati-Baganga)  
Friday 28 June (p.m. travel Davao Oriental – Davao City)  
Saturday 29 June (travel Davao City – Manila), report writing
- Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday 30 June, 1,2,3,4,5 July Report writing and follow up interviews with Bangkok, Geneva and Manila, Cdo and Baganga by phone and skype (6 days).
- Friday 5 July submission of draft report. Waiting for comments due by July 10. July 11 and 12 integrating comments. Submission final report on July 12 (3 days).



## L. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

The following guide questions were prepared by the consultant for general use during interviews, meetings and focus group discussions:

### 1.1. REVIEW OF OVERALL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

- General background to development of the project, how and why it was drawn up, who participated?
- Previous ILO experience of cash-for-work in response to crises [relatively new field of work for the ILO], plus ILO role in livelihood cluster and how this related to the project.
- How were beneficiaries selected/prioritised, what role did local local partners have in the selection process and setting of criteria? [1 member per household in affected areas]
- How were community contracting groups set up/identified, what kind of training did they undergo, what were the objectives of the training, were expectations met?
- Difficulties faced during the mobilisation/preparatory/training stages?, what could have been done better, what worked well? What was most difficult in implementing?

### 2. REVIEW OF OVERALL PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS

- Did the project achieve its objectives in terms of number of workdays created and numbers of beneficiaries reached? [achievements disaggregated against gender, age etc.]
- What actual debris clearing work has been undertaken through the project [recovered living environment and community infrastructure]?
- Has the project had an impact on the local economy as intended through salaries and materials purchased]? Has this been monitored or measured, how?
- How will the Barangay/LGU adapt to climate change and minimise the impact of disasters on livelihoods in the future/as a result of the project? What did they learn?
- What have regional and national government learnt from the process - how has their capacity to collaborate and respond to crisis through employment improved?
- What lessons [positive/negative insight on operational effectiveness] can be identified? How it reduces/eliminates deficiencies & builds sustainable practice?
- What examples of good practices [tools, guidelines, procedures, use of capacities etc.] could be recommended in interventions in the livelihood/cash-for-work sector?

### 3. RELEVANCE, APPROPRIATENESS, EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY & IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTATION

- How was productivity and quality of work of labourers during cash-for-work monitored, were there any difficulties faced?
- Are the beneficiaries satisfied with the results in terms of training given, impact on their community, salaries and long term impacts on their socio-economic situation?
- How have things changed for the beneficiaries since participating in the project? Have their lives improved and in what ways?
- If the participants were to do this again would they change the way things were done - what could be improved upon, could things have been done in a better way?
- Do beneficiaries feel that cash-for-work is the most effective way of addressing livelihood in response to a natural disaster/crisis? Why? If not, what to do instead?
- Was the project time frame of 6 months appropriate - did this fit with the normal cash-for-work process, did changes have to be made?
- Were there any time related concerns [payment issues, efficient and timely financial and project management]? Could things have been done more efficiently?
- Was the funding sufficient to do what was planned, how was cost effectiveness addressed in the implementation?

- What local expert support was needed in training, monitoring etc.? How is sustainability addressed in the project [capacity building, future employment prospects]?
  - Is cash-for-work in response to crisis appropriate to the context of the Philippines? What are the livelihood recovery priorities of local and national government?
- 4. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF ILO CASH-FOR-WORK COMPARED TO OTHER APPROACHES**
- What are the main comparative advantages in ILO cash-for-work compared with other donors/humanitarian or development actors with whom you have contact/knowledge?
  - What are the special characteristics of the ILO programme - is it really special? How different is the programme compared to what others are doing?
  - What are the disadvantages/weaknesses of the ILO cash-for-work approach? Are there negative or positive impacts on economy, job markets, materials costs, salaries etc.?
  - Does ILO have a strategic advantage in this work - do others do it differently or better? How, what can we learn from others?
- 5. GENDER RESPONSIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS**
- How was gender mainstreamed into the project activities - what disaggregated data is available in selection and monitoring processes to show impacts?
  - What impact has the project had on power relations between men and women and the goal of creating more gender equality - negatively or positively?
- 6. FACTORS WITHIN ILO THAT HAVE POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY IMPACTED ON IMPLEMENTATION**
- What factors within the ILO have had a positive or negative impact on the implementation of the project?
  - What have been the main [ILO] institutional bottlenecks in the implementation of the project?
  - What support was provided by ILO to achieve the results in the project implementation [funding, expertise, management, monitoring, reporting]? What impact did this have?
- 7. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT HAVE POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY IMPACTED ON IMPLEMENTATION**
- What external institutional/strategic challenges are faced by humanitarian actors in providing livelihood support/cash-for-work as a response to humanitarian crises?
  - What external challenges have been faced in implementing cash-for-work programmes in the Philippines - and in this project in particular?
  - What factors [government, climate, local context, cultural, social etc.] have impacted on the implementation of the project? How did the project adapt?
- 8. ILO AND SHORT TERM HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PROJECTS**
- How does cash-for-work as response to humanitarian crisis fit into the overall strategic objectives of ILO [decent work agenda] and its global priorities?
  - Do other donors/actors apply approaches that are better adapted/more suited to livelihood support in humanitarian emergencies that ILO could learn from?
  - How does the project address the sustainable livelihood recovery strategy of ILO? How does the project link to longer term recovery?
  - Is it appropriate for ILO to be taking a humanitarian agency role? Is this an appropriate entry point for future funding - should ILO continue to seek funding for such projects?

**M. LIST OF PERSONS OR ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED**

Date	Name	Designation/Office
17-Jun-13	Chris Donnges	Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Investments, ILO EIIP Bangkok
21-Jun-13	Ma. Concepcion Sardaña	Senior Programme Officer, ILO Manila
24-Jun-13	Sulbanon D. Quimpo	Vice-President, ALGEMCO Foundation
	Ruth Sophia A. Tarona	Secretary, ALGEMCO, Foundation
	Glenn S. Bais	Regional Coordinator, PhilDHRRA
	Abner Ganoy	Project Coordinator, PhilDHRRA
	Rene Villafuerte	Project Development Officer 11, DSWD Region XI
25-Jun-13	Errol A. Merquita	Programme Officer, ILO
	Lenji Ayodelle P. Veroy	Project Support Staff-Nurse, CERF
	Aimel Jean D. Reyes	Project Support Staff-Nurse, CERF
	Juana Marie Yu	Project Support Staff-Monitor and Documenter, CERF
	Martha D. Espano	Programme Officer, ILO
	Kenneth Adonis Del Rosario	Project Support Staff-Engineer
	Roel Casenas	Project Coordinator, Green Mindanao Association, Inc.
26-Jun-13	Ardie Israel	Secretary, Baculin Fisherfolk Association (BFA)
	Eric S. Manginlaud	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Renelina M. Bandayanon	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Rosario M. Bandayanon	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Rosalinda S. Abendano	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Linda M. Salang	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Calurico D. Fernando, Sr.	Purok Leader, Baculin
	Jennifer I. Garcia	Member, BFA
	Marissa E. Bebe	Member, BFA
	Adelia Alimong	Worker, Baculin
	Rolando C. Cambong	Worker, Baculin
	Noel M. Dela Cruz	Member, BFA
	Analou M. Penaranda	Member, BFA
	Edwin C. Garcia	Chairman, BFA
	Mary Ann G. Santos	Human Resource Development Executive, DORECO
	Ferdinand P. Hernaez	DORECO
	Richard N. Lague	DORECO
	Joseph G. Siblos	DORECO
	Mera A. Ching	Barangay Captain, Ban-ao
Reynaldo Peregrino	Foreman, DOLE CFW	

COMMUNITY-BASED EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROJECT PHI/12/07/OCH - INTERNAL FINAL EVALUATION

Date	Name	Designation/Office
	Ben Albarico	Worker, PhilDHRRRA CFW
	Deodita S. Liguez	Worker, PhilDHRRRA CFW
	Dahlia D. Sango	Worker, PhilDHRRRA CFW
	Rosalie A. Fontillas	Worker, PhilDHRRRA CFW
	Vilma L. Sumaligpon	Worker, Green Mindanao CFW
	Eulito E. Maca	Worker, Green Mindanao CFW
	Crisologo A. Oronan	Barangay Captain, Mikit
	Rosalia L. Adao	Barangay Kagawad, Mikit
	Felimon M. Liwana	Barangay Secretary, Mikit
	Gildo L. Liwana	Barangay Kagawad, Mikit
	Angel B. Pedrezo	
	Reynilda M. Tabucsan	Green Mindanao
27-Jun-13	Julious J. Wales	Branch Head, SSS, Mati City
	Ramona M. Carpiano	Section Head, SSS
	Nash Sherwin L. Naduaran	Account Officer, SSS
	Abigail G. Lachica	PhilHealth, Mati City
	Mark Oliver S. Zamora	PhilHealth, Mati City
	Fr. Joel L. Vidal	Parish Priest, Social Action Center-Immaculate Concepcion
	Misuari "Jake" Abdullah	Project Officer, UNDP
28-Jun-13	Albert E. Degamo	Provincial Head, DOLE-Davao Oriental Field Office
	Allan R. Baban	Head, Technical Division DOLE R-XI
	Norie Jane Belarmino	Accountant II, DOLE RXI
	Angelina A. Talingting	Chief, Admin, DOLE RXI
	Joseph D. Vingno	LEO III, DOLE, Davao Oriental
01-Jul-13	Honorio Palarca	Senior Programme Officer ILO-AusAID Washi Project Iligan
04-Jul-13	Alberto Aduna	Emergency Coordination Office, FAO, Philippines
	Mito Tsukamoto	Senior Specialist, EIIP, ILO Geneva
	Terje Tessem	Chief, EIIP, ILO, Geneva
05-Jul-13	Peter Rademaker	Coordinator Resource Mobilization, Partnerships and Field Support Department [ParDev], ILO Geneva
	Federico Negro	Capacity Building and Knowledge Development Specialist, CRISIS, ILO Geneva
	Donato Kiniger-Passigli	Senior Specialist, Strategic Partnerships and Crisis Response Coordination - Employment Policy Department, ILO Geneva
7-Jul-13	Akiko Sakamoto	Deputy Director & Skills and Employability Specialist, ILO Manila

N. PHOTOGRAPHS



*FGD with CERF-ILO staff 25-Jun-13*



*Payout to workers at Green Mindanao Offices 25-Jun-13*



*FGD with Baculin Fisherfolk Association 26-Jun-13*



*Interview with DORECO 26-Jun-13*



*Visit to site cleared by Baculin Fisherfolk 26-Jun-13*



*Cut logs at Baculin Fisherfolk site 26-Jun-13*



*Cleared beach [Baculin Fisherfolk] to Mangrove/eco-tourist area 26-Jun-13*



*Coco-lumber bring processed privately at Baculin Fisherfolk site 26-Jun-13*



*FGD with PhilDDHRRRA workers and Barangay Captain 26-Jun-13*



*FGD with Green Mindanao workers, Mikit 13-Jun-26*



*Use of Green Mindanao cleared coco-lumber in IFRC shelters, Mikit 26-Jun-13*