



ILO EVALUATION

Title: “*Shan State: Peace, reconciliation and development through community empowerment (PRD)*”

- **ILO project reference code:** MMR/14/01/EEC
- **Evaluation type:** Independent evaluation
- **Evaluation timing:**
 - Internal evaluation preparation: March 2019
 - Evaluation implementation: March – July 2019
- **Country covered:¹**
 - Republic of the Union of Myanmar
- **Evaluation approved by EVAL on:** *Date to be added after approval*
- **Project start and end dates:** March 2015 2015 to March 2019
- **Name of evaluation consultants:**
 - Maria Zarraga – Managing Director, ForWaves Consulting (team leader)
 - Claude Hilfiker – ForWaves Expert, ForWaves Consulting
 - Angela B. Thaug – National Evaluation Consultant
- **Name and title of Evaluation Manager:** Belinda Chanda, Operations and Program Support Specialist, ILO-Dhaka, Bangladesh
- **ILO Office administrating the evaluation:** ILO – Myanmar
- **UN agency participating in the evaluation:** ILO
- **Donor & budget:** European Union (EU) - EUR 7’000’000
- **Cost of evaluation (at time of reporting)²:**
 - External costs: USD 29’424.-
 - Internal costs: Initially estimated at USD 5’011.- (Travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance)

This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO’s evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office.

¹ The country is hereinafter referred to as “Myanmar” to facilitate the text reading.

² International evaluation and national evaluation costs combined

KEY WORDS

- Behavioural change
- Child rights
- Child labour
- Child soldiers
- Civil society organizations
- Community based organizations
- Community empowerment
- Community infrastructure
- Community peace dialogues
- Community protection
- Conflict-affected areas
- Conflict resolution
- Capacity building
- Decent work
- Ethnic Armed Organization
- European Union
- Final evaluation
- Forced Labour
- Gender and diversity
- International labour standards
- Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM)
- Multi-stakeholder forums
- Non-formal education
- Participatory approach
- Peacebuilding
- Reconciliation
- Sensitive Interviewer Listening
- Shan State
- Skills training
- Systemic change
- Social protection
- United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
- Vocational training
- Vulnerable groups
- Youth platforms

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ACRONYMS	4
LISTS OF ANNEXES / FIGURES / TABLES	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
1. INTRODUCTION	10
1.A. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND CONTEXT	10
1.B. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND CLIENTS OF THE EVALUATION	14
1.C. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS	14
1.D. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS	15
2. FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENT	16
2.A. RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC FIT	16
2.B. EFFECTIVENESS (INCLUDING EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS).....	18
2.C. EFFICIENCY	23
2.D. SUSTAINABILITY	25
2.E. IMPACT	26
2.F. SPECIAL ASPECTS TO BE ADDRESSED.....	27
2.G. GENDER ISSUES ASSESSMENT	29
2.H. TRIPARTITE ISSUES ASSESSMENT	29
2.I. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS ISSUES ASSESSMENT	29
2.J. EMERGING LESSONS LEARNED.....	29
2.K. EMERGING GOOD PRACTICES	30
3. CONCLUSIONS.....	30
4. RECOMMENDATIONS	32
ANNEXES	35

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASG	AIDS Support Group
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CBY	Capacity Building for Youth
CLOs	Community Liaison Offices
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil society organization
CTMR	Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DWT	Decent Work Support Teams
EAOs	Ethnic Armed Organisations
EPRP	Ethnic Peace Research Project
EU	European Union
FLD	Foundation for Local Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
HQ	Headquarters
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KPIs	Key performance indicators
LCA	Local Conflict Assessment
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDCG	Maggin Development Consultancy Group
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MIPS	Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoV	Means of Verification
MP	Member of Parliament
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (Security Council Resolution 1612 mechanism)
MTE	Mid-term evaluation
MYMP	Meet Your Member of Parliament
NCA	National Ceasefire Agreement
NLD	National League for Democracy
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PAC	Programme Advisory Committee
PNLO	Pa-O National Liberation Organization
PRD	Peace, Reconciliation and Development Programme
PSF	Peace Support Fund
RCSS/SSA-S	Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army - South
ROM	Results-Oriented Management
SCI	Save the Children International
SO	Strategic Objective
SSPP/SSA-N	Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army -- North
TNLA	Ta'ang National Liberation Army
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VDC	Village Development Committee

LISTS OF ANNEXES / FIGURES / TABLES

ANNEXES

Annex 1	Terms of Reference (<i>attached to this document</i>)
Annex 2	Inception Report (<i>attached to this document</i>)
Annex 3	List of persons interviewed
Annex 4	Bibliography

Annex 5	Data collection instruments – Interview protocol and survey
Annex 6	Evaluation schedule and interviews
Annex 7	Evaluation survey results
Annex 8	SWOT analysis (Summary)
Annex 9	Project progress against PRD Specific Objectives
Annex 10	Project progress against PRD project targets
Annex 11	Project monitoring
Annex 12	ROM and MTE recommendations
Annex 13	Overview of Shan Consortium Partners' areas of expertise
Annex 14	Emerging Lesson Learned (1)
Annex 15	Emerging Lesson Learned (2)
Annex 16	Emerging Good Practice (1)
Annex 17	Emerging Good Practice (2)
Annex 18	Pictures

FIGURES

Figure 1	Sites of Consortium Partners Project Activity
Figure 2	Survey results – Question A
Figure 3	Survey results – Question B
Figure 4	Participation of women in the PRD programme (Y3)
Figure 5	Closing the cycles
Figure 6	When monitor?

TABLES

Table 1	List of persons interviewed
Table 2	Data collection plan worksheet
Table 3	Interview / protocol questions
Table 4	Evaluation schedule
Table 5	Number of stakeholders interviewed
Table 6	Survey results – Question A
Table 7	Survey results – Question B
Table 8	SWOT analysis (summary)
Table 9	Project progress against PRD Specific Objectives
Table 10	Project progress against PRD project targets
Table 11	ROM recommendations
Table 12	MTE recommendations
Table 13	Consortium Partners' areas of expertise
Table 14	Emerging Lesson Learned (1)
Table 15	Emerging Lesson Learned (2)
Table 16	Emerging Good Practice (1)
Table 17	Emerging Good Practice (2)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure

The “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community-Empowerment” (PRD) programme was a four-year (March 2015-March 2019) approximately €7 million European Union (EU) effort to promote the inclusion of community voices in Myanmar’s national peace process. The programme was based on an overarching theory of change (ToC) that “*ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.*”

The programme was delivered by a Consortium of organisations comprised of Aids Support Group (ASG), the Foundation for Local Development (FLD) / Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP), the Maggin Development Consultancy Group (MDCG), Save the Children (SC) and the ILO. The ILO was the coordinator of the Consortium. The five partners worked with a variety of stakeholders in different areas in Shan State, Myanmar. The programme supported 104 villages in Shan North, East and State-wide.

The project **three specific objectives** were following:

- To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged in the peace and reconciliation process, supporting inclusive peace processes;
- To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict, and;
- To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community Empowerment.

Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

The four main purposes of this independent final evaluation were:

“(1) to assess the impact and sustainability and identify factors (including challenges, opportunities) that enable the sustainability, particularly of the national stakeholders in Myanmar; (2) to demonstrate accountability to the key stakeholders and donor (in this case, the EU); (3) to enhance learning within ILO and among key stakeholders; and (4) to inform similar interventions in the future”. This evaluation covered all interventions under the programme from 15 March 2015 to 14 March 2019 and the focus of the final evaluation looked at the intervention since April 2017. The final evaluation covered all the geographical areas of the programme – security permitting for field visits. The evaluation examined the project’s performance in relation to ILO’s cross-cutting issues on gender, labour standards, social dialogue and environment. The primary clients of the evaluation findings are the programme management team and the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, the Consortium partners, and ILO technical departments. Secondary parties making use of the results of the evaluation include the EU and tripartite constituents.

Methodology of evaluation

Different evaluation tools were combined to ensure an evidence-based qualitative and quantitative assessment. The evaluators emphasized on cross-validation of data through triangulation and an assessment of plausibility of the results obtained. The methodological mix included document

review, semi-structured individual interviews, semi-structured interviews of focus groups and a short survey. Data was gathered from different sources, by different methods for each of the evaluation questions, and findings were triangulated to draw valid and reliable conclusions. Data was disaggregated, at a minimum, by sex and by other dimensions where available. Conclusions and recommendations were based on evaluation findings (deductive reasoning).

The evaluation work was conducted from March to July 2019 in close coordination with the ILO-Dhaka, Bangladesh and ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, and resulted in the following findings, conclusions and recommendations.

MAIN FINDINGS

The body of the evaluation report presents answers to all key evaluation questions, which represent the proper **findings** of this evaluation.

1. Relevance and strategic fit

- ➔ *Examine whether the programme has responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries and still is consistent and relevant to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar? Based on the revised intervention logic, the programme responded overall well to beneficiaries’ needs. However, the majority of beneficiaries mentioned that their needs were only partially addressed.*
- ➔ *Is the programme relevant to the donors’ priorities and policy, implementing partners’ need? Are the programme results or approach strategic and include the comparative advantage of the ILO? The programme was relevant to the donors’ priorities and policy and implementing partners’ needs. The programme built on the comparative advantage of all Consortium partners, including ILO.*
- ➔ *What are the current areas of interest of the key stakeholder’s vis-à-vis project original theme – whether there have deviated from the original design. What could have contributed to changes, if any? To what extent the project has adapted to those changes? The intervention logic was adapted due to the faltering peace process and intensified fighting in Shan State after the mid-term evaluation. Several groups of stakeholders would expect ILO to provide both continuous technical assistance and conduct more consultations with government.*

2. Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)

- ➔ *Has the programme achieved its planned objectives? Particularly the empowerment activity efforts – assess whether its approach is effective? The programme achieved most of its output targets despite a complex context and unforeseen roadblocks. Stakeholders were mostly somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with programme results. The programme was successful in empowering communities. The intervention’s participatory approach was in general well received but could have been strengthened during project design.*
- ➔ *If not, what are the main constraints, problems? The programme faced serious constraints related to the*

peace process faltering and the intensified fighting in Shan State. Travel authorizations related challenges, suspension of some activities (due to an investigation case) and delays in funding also affected the programme.

- *Have the Consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions? The majority of programme interventions were conducted in silos by Consortium members. Quarterly meetings were useful to share updates.*
- *The extent to which the recommendations of the midterm evaluation have been addressed? Most midterm review recommendations were addressed except for strengthening quality programme management.*
- *How have other stakeholders been involved in programme implementation? Consortium members seized various opportunities to engage other stakeholders notably in community dialogues and multi-stakeholder meetings.*
- *Does the programme monitoring plan exist and whether the baseline data has been collected and data collected over time? The programme made efforts to collect output data more regularly after mid-term reviews but did not collect all outcome-level data based on the monitoring plan. Most baseline data were at zero as the programme reported that activities conducted were new in the areas of implementation.*
- *What has been the role of the Consortium Programme Advisory Committee (PAC)? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed? The role of the PAC was well defined. Quality programme management, better communication and coordination would have allowed the PAC to achieve better results and be “greater than the sum of its parts”.*

3. Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)

- *Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve results? And have they been delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs? Any measures that has been put in place? The resource allocation allowed to achieve almost all expected outputs despite delays in funding. More budget allocated to CBOs, communities, local staff and programme monitoring would have been instrumental to achieve better results responding to beneficiaries’ needs.*
- *Have there been a coherent implementation approaches among the Consortium members? Given different geographical targeting by Consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the Consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches. Would it be possible for the Consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium? If so what and how? Based on the way the Consortium was structured, there was no strong coherent implementation approach*

among Consortium partners. All Consortium partners confirmed their strong interest in undertaking activities more collectively, capitalizing on complementary approaches and fostering diversity.

- *The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximize impact, if any? Project resources were leveraged with other related interventions on a demand-basis. There was no national coordination platform between organizations conducting peace building interventions at the time of the evaluation.*
- *Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant)? If not why? The programme received no backstopping from ILO HQ and limited technical backstopping from DWT-Bangkok. Management arrangements as well as communication across the programme were not perceived as optimal.*

4. Sustainability

- *The extent to which the results of the intervention are likely to be durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed. While local CBO partners and communities were grateful for the assistance received, a vast majority of interviewees mentioned that the intervention was too short to be truly sustainable in particular in such context.*
- *How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership? The programme was very effective in establishing national/local ownership but the duration was too short to make it possible to sustain the effort. All stakeholders mentioned their willingness to continue project activities.*

5. Impact

- *Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project’s interventions? If so, how has the project strategy been adjusted? Have positive effects been integrated into the project strategy? Has the strategy been adjusted to minimize negative effects? A positive unintended effect was the strong positive change in the mindsets of beneficiaries regarding their ability to build their new lives and/or contributing to their communities and a peacebuilding environment. The negative unintended effect was that while beneficiaries acquired such strong motivation, the fact that the programme stopped while not being yet sustainable created dissatisfaction or sadness.*
- *Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements? The intervention would require a second phase to consolidate achievements and facilitate the sustainability of actions. For this to happen, there would be a need for improved programme management.*

- *What are the possible long-term effects on gender equality and are the gender related outcomes likely to be sustainable?*

At the time of the evaluation, the programme had not achieved sufficient critical mass to trigger long-term effects on gender equality.

- *To what extent has the project contributed to its development objective at global and country levels? The PRD programme contributed to peace, reconciliation and development related objectives facilitating the path from conflict to peacebuilding, and to several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).*

6. Special aspects to be addressed

- *Have there been any synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives in the area? If so, is it likely to enhance the impact of the programme? Some synergies and collaboration between the programme and other initiatives took place on a demand-basis without creating longer term impact.*
- *The extent that the programme has promoted ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standard (taking into consideration the context of the project) Community dialogues and linking government, employers and employees allowed communities to share their concerns, notably with key leaders. The programme offered opportunities for dialogue on forced labour, under-age recruitment, and other issues.*
- *The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation. The programme primarily focused on the balance of women and men in project activities.*

7. GENDER ISSUES ASSESSMENT

Despite the project framework took gender into account, there was no evidence of specific operational guidelines used by the project team to integrate gender and diversity in the technical cooperation work. Several interviewees mentioned the distress of young women due to their broken family, gender-based violence, lack of education and risk of discrimination.

8. TRIPARTITE ISSUES ASSESSMENT

The programme operated in conflict-affected areas where trade unions were not present. Whilst not working to standard tripartism, the PRD programme connected the dots between government, employers and workers notably through multi-stakeholder forums and community dialogues.

9. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS ISSUES ASSESSMENT

The PRD programme contributed to promoting compliance with international labour standards, including the Protocol n°29 to ILO's Forced Labour Convention, 1930 and the C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1 on relevance and strategic fit

- *The programme provided useful technical assistance to beneficiaries but only responded partially to beneficiaries' real needs in such complex environment.*
- *The programme scope did not systematically address beneficiaries' needs holistically.*
- *Some initial programme objectives were no longer relevant in the context of Shan State's faltering peace process and intensified fighting in the North.*
- *The programme successfully brought on board Consortium partners with complementary areas of expertise and technical experience without capitalizing on ILO's expertise in strategically managing large programmes.*

Conclusion 2 on effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)

- *The PRD programme was overall successful in conducting a considerable number of project activities, reaching out to more than 150'000 beneficiaries across 104 villages in Southern, Northern and Eastern Shan State. The programme achieved most of its expected outputs despite a challenging context.*
- *Due to its large number of activities and limited coherence, more focus was given to output than outcome results, affecting the overall quality of the programme.*
- *The majority of Consortium members would have preferred to operate more as a programme (rather than as distinct projects working in silos) with robust management to support quality programme management overall to best serve beneficiaries.*
- *Stronger involvement of government and MPs would have been instrumental to achieve even better results.*
- *The programme adopted a participatory approach that was well received, in particular for initial needs assessments, and could be improved during project design.*
- *In general, programme design and management, monitoring, coordination, communication, advocacy, budget allocation and management and the lack of smooth operations were not satisfactory to many interviewees in all groups of stakeholders.*

Conclusion 3 on efficiency

- *While the resource allocation covered a large amount of project activities, revising the budget allocation for more in-depth technical assistance would allow to better respond to beneficiaries' priority needs (with a "less is more" approach).*
- *Sufficient budget and resources would also need to be allocated to regular multi-stakeholder meetings.*
- *Leveraging more programme resources with other interventions in the area would have strengthened programmatic impact.*
- *The issue related to the inability of smaller Consortium partners to pre-finance activities to close the gap before funding release was not solved, although the issue was stressed as urgent during mid-term reviews.*

- *The pre-funding issue, MDCG case and rejection of the no-cost extension request caused the programme to end with underspent budget. There were important remaining needs on the ground at the time of the evaluation.*

Conclusion 4 on sustainability

- *The overall one-off technical assistance approach and 4-year duration of the programme did not provide a solid ground for sustainability of programme interventions.*
- *Some programme interventions included exit strategies. Other interventions did not have an exit strategy and a solid business model to maintain and further develop activities.*
- *The programme provided numerous useful trainings across Shan State, notably allowing recipients to multiply them and/or utilize these skills in similar projects.*
- *While vocational training was useful for participants, the intervention lacked a systematic and consistent post-training follow-up to ensure concrete results leading to employability, employment opportunities and small business creation.*

Conclusion 5 on Impact

- *While it was too early to assess the programme impact, there were early signs of positive change in mindsets in communities facing hardship, and whose voice was not heard, at the time of the evaluation.*
- *As beneficiaries and local partners were strongly engaged in the intervention, the end of the programme after only 4 years created an adverse impact as they felt left with considerable challenges at an early time of implementation.*
- *A second phase or a similar intervention would allow to provide further support to beneficiaries, capitalizing on emerging PRD good practices, and improving technical assistance based on lessons learned.*

Conclusion 5 on Special aspects to be addressed

- *Stronger coordination among interventions on peace building operating in the area would avoid losing opportunities of strengthening the impact of their work.*
- *Promoting social and international labour standards would require continuous efforts not only at the ground level but also involving more and building mutual trust with key leaders.*
- *Gender-related biases would need more time and closer outcome-based monitoring to be successfully tackled.*

LESSONS LEARNED & GOOD PRACTICES

Lessons learned: (i) *Programme stakeholders perceived that better results could have been achieved, notably at the*

outcome level, through strengthened quality programme management (ii) A “less is more” approach could have been more relevant to answer beneficiaries’ needs.

Good practices: (i) *Investing in youth, gender and diversity and inclusive education has proven to be effective in contributing to peacebuilding. (ii) One significant achievement leading towards the peace process is a multi-stakeholder forum where the youth was able to raise their issues of concern to get direct support from key leaders.*

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order not to duplicate the effort already made in the MTE, only a few new recommendations are formulated hereunder. Recommendations of the MTE are useful as they could still be applied to further improve the intervention, should a similar intervention be implemented in the future. To operationalize the recommendations below, sub-recommendations have been formulated in the report.

- **Recommendation 1** (from conclusions 1, 2, 4 and 5) *proposes to ILO and Consortium members to adopt a “less is more” approach that is more holistic when designing a similar intervention to provide more in-depth and sustainable technical assistance to beneficiaries – setting up synergies among Consortium members and with other existing programs, supported by key leaders. Priority: High / Importance: High*
- **Recommendation 2** (from conclusion 2 and 3) *proposes to ILO and PAC members to improve communication and coordination among all organizations, (with a clear common understanding of roles and responsibilities, expectations and procedures), responsive management, budget allocation, knowledge transfer and regular updates. Priority: High / Importance: High*
- **Recommendation 3** (from conclusions 2 and 3) *proposes to ILO, Consortium members and PRD project staff to improve programme management, strategic planning, programme / project design, monitoring (including regular data collection at both output and outcome levels), knowledge of procedures, knowledge sharing and support to all Consortium and partner organizations. Priority: High / Importance: High*
- **Recommendation 4** (from conclusions 1, 2 and 4) *proposes to ILO, Consortium members, PRD project staff and programme key stakeholders (Government, EAOs, CBOs, CSOs, and youth platforms) to conduct regular multi-stakeholder platforms for conflict-affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, who are empowered and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process. Priority / Importance: High*
- **Recommendation 5** (from conclusions 5 and 6) *proposes to ILO, Consortium members, PRD project staff ILO and partner organizations to further integrate gender issues in the programme, reviewing the gender framework design and implementation and tracking outcome gender-related data. Priority: High / Importance: High*

1. INTRODUCTION

The ILO Liaison Office – Myanmar commissioned a final independent evaluation of its “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community-Empowerment” (PRD) programme. This final evaluation was conducted by ForWaves Consulting. The ForWaves evaluation team constituted of Ms. Maria Zarraga, team leader, and Mr. Claude Hilfiker. Both are ForWaves Experts in Evaluation. The team leader was also assisted by a national consultant, Ms. Angela B. Thaug.

Guided by the Terms of Reference (ToR), the independent evaluation work was undertaken between March and July 2019 in close coordination with the ILO Liaison Office – Myanmar and the Evaluation Unit of the ILO Regional Office based in Bangkok and its assigned Evaluation Manager, Ms. Belinda Chanda, Operations and Program Support Specialist, ILO-Dhaka, Bangladesh.

The evaluation team would like to thank the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, Ms. Piyamal Pichaiwongse, Deputy Liaison Officer, who also acted as an interim Project Manager following a premature departure of the Project Manager Mr. Matthew Maguire, Mr. Sonish Vaidya, Technical Officer, Ms. Nang Kham Ying Nonk, National Project Coordinator of the PRD Programme, Mr. Khun Saw Aung, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer of the PRD Programme as well Dr. Myint Aung, Director of the Aids Support Group (ASG), Ms. Ei Thandar Aung, Manager, ASG, and Mr. Saw Ricky Tun, Assistant Manager, ASG, for organizing the evaluation field mission. Their significant work allowed the evaluation team to visit multiple project sites despite Shan State’s ongoing conflicts, and security and travel authorization challenges.

The project team brought together 35 participants for the Evaluation Stakeholders’ workshop, which took place on 12 April 2019, despite challenges related to organizing a meeting one day before the Water Festival, one of the biggest festivals in Myanmar, and a national holiday in Myanmar. The field mission took place between 1 and 12 April 2019 in Southern Shan State, Northern Shan State and Eastern Shan State. We also thank all 128 interviewees (listed in Annex 3) representing the Delegation of the European Union to Myanmar, Consortium partners, namely Aids Support Group (ASG), the Foundation for Local Development (FLD)/Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP), Save the Children International (SCI) and the ILO, Members of Parliament (MPs), Liaison Offices of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army – South (RCSS/SSA-S), community-based organizations, village development committees, direct beneficiaries such as village committees and training participants, and other key stakeholders, for their time and precious contribution to this independent final evaluation.

1.A. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND CONTEXT

Description

The “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community-Empowerment” (PRD) programme was a four-year (March 2015-March 2019), approximately €7 million European Union (EU) effort to promote the inclusion of community voices in Myanmar’s national peace process. The programme was based on an overarching theory of change (ToC) that “*ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.*”

The programme was delivered by a Consortium of organisations comprised of Aids Support Group (ASG), the Foundation for Local Development (FLD)/Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP), the Maggin Development Consultancy Group (MDCG), Save the Children International (SC) and the ILO. The ILO was the coordinator of the Consortium. MDCG’s contract was terminated during the 4th year of programme implementation further to an investigation.

The five partners worked with a variety of stakeholders in different areas in Shan State, Myanmar. The programme supported 104 villages in Shan North, East and State-wide (based on proximity to Ceasefire Liaison Offices – CLOs). The programme focused its implementation in the following townships: Tachileik in East Shan, Kutkai and Namkham in Northern Shan and including Mansi in Kachin (across border from Northern Shan) and in areas of Southern and Central Shan State, including Southern Mawk Mai Township, Laikha and Mongshu.

Conceptual Framework of the Project

As described in the Terms of Reference, the overall objective of this programme was to contribute to peace, reconciliation and development through the empowerment of conflict affected communities in Myanmar.

The project had three specific objectives as follows:

- *To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged in the peace and reconciliation process, supporting inclusive peace processes;*
- *To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict, and;*
- *To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community Empowerment.*

*General context*³

Myanmar makes a record of 71 years of civil war counting from April 1948 until the time when this report was written. The internal conflict in Myanmar is a series of primarily ethnic conflicts that surfaced shortly after the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. For decades, an array of ethnic political movements and their armed wings sought political, economic, cultural, and social rights in opposition to the domination by Burman authorities, while the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw) asserted that its mission was to ensure the country's sovereign independence, territorial integrity, and unity. Majority-minority ethnic relations and the distribution of power and resources have been the most serious problems since independence. Achieving mutual trust and a system of governance agreeable to all of Myanmar's diverse people are the country's defining challenges.⁴

Myanmar's transition from decades of civil war and military rule to greater democracy began in late 2010. The ruling military junta conceded official rule over Myanmar and in 2011, numerous bilateral ceasefires and peace agreements were signed by various groups following political reforms by the government. Myanmar's declaration of reforms in 2010 produced dramatic changes in both domestic and international perceptions upon Myanmar. However, both bilateral and nationwide ceasefire agreements largely resulted into stagnation of political dialogues among signatories due to the fact that provisions of the agreements were not well respected and implemented by the signatories, or the parties to the agreement held different interpretation of those signed provisions. The interim arrangement post ceasefire is considered to be more difficult to arrange and gain common positions among the parties. Skirmishes and renewed conflicts in some areas, particularly in Shan State could undermine the achievement of development goals.

Today's Northern Shan State conflict is complex and defies easy classification. The dynamics of the fighting vary from place and time and between groups. Fighting sharply escalated in February 2015 when one faction of the former ceasefire group, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) attacked the border town of Laukkai, displacing tens of thousands of civilians and resulting in extensive government casualties. The conflict escalated further in November 2016 with coordinated attacks by the MDA, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army, and the Kachin Independence Army— formalized as the North Alliance-Burma (or North Alliance)— on towns and border posts along the China-Myanmar border in Muse township which resulted in a dozen civilian and security force casualties, thousands of civilians fleeing to China or South, and the suspension of border trade. Clashes are mostly thought to be over territory and economic interests, and have heightened tensions between Shan and Ta'ang communities across Northern Shan State.

According to a **review of peace and security for 2018** from Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS) released on April 2, a total of 490 armed conflicts occurred in 50 townships in ten states and regions in 2018 and Shan State became the hub of armed conflicts, including inter-EAOs conflict and over 12,000 locals fled away from the fighting in 2018. Conflicts between army and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) and TNLA occurred as well as fighting between coalition forces of the SSPP and TNLA and SSA-S occurred in Shan State. Most of the armed conflicts in Shan state occurred in Namtu and Kutkai townships.

While the road ahead will undoubtedly be difficult, there is room for cautious optimism. People strongly desire peace across Myanmar. There is profound hope and desire on the part of the people across the country to see Myanmar move genuinely towards peace making and the country overcoming long-overdue internal conflicts.

3 References: MIPS Annual Peace and Security Review 2018, Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, 2/4/2019; Internal conflict in Myanmar, from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; USIP- Burma's Northern Shan State and Prospects for Peace, Friday, September 29, 2017 / By: David Scott Mathieson; Frontier Myanmar: Controversy, progress at the third Panglong conference YE MON , July 16, 2018.

⁴ The Panglong Agreement of 1947 was negotiated between the Shan Leaders and General Aung San, a prominent founding father of Myanmar, which would have given the Shan the option to split from Myanmar a decade after independence if they were unsatisfied with the central government.

Given this background, the **context for programme implementation** was challenging posing **numerous protection concerns** in term of timely humanitarian intervention as well as ceasefire monitoring and access to assist communities affected by armed conflicts to realize ceasefire and move toward sustaining short and medium term livelihood, **in particular in Northern Shan State**, with the drivers of conflict remaining intractable. Shan State in 2017 and into 2018 has seen clashes between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA and the KIA and repeated clashes between the SSA-S and the TNLA, and to a lesser degree the SSA-S and the Tatmadaw. Back and forth transition between humanitarian, peace building and development needs and responses makes it challenging for any intervention to find a perfect fit and response to multiple needs in the volatile context of conflict-affected areas.


The map below (Figure 1) presents the **sites of Consortium partners project activity**.

“No one likes civil war. The youths hate wars and conflicts. They never wanted to take part in these conflicts. The main thing is that children do not want any more to accept the civil war, because they are the ones who suffer. Now, the youth has come to learn that, whenever there is a conflict between two ethnic groups, it is the problem of those who hold the gun. It is not related to their community.”

Statement by one project stakeholder interviewed during the field mission of the PRD Independent Final Evaluation (April 2019, Northern Shan State)



Myanmar Information Management Unit
EU SHAN STATE – PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Sites of Consortium Partners Project Activity



Disclaimer: The names shown and the boundaries used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 1 – Sites of Consortium Partners Project Activity

1.B. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND CLIENTS OF THE EVALUATION

Purpose of the evaluation

The four main purposes of this independent final evaluation were:

1. to **assess the impact and sustainability** and identify factors (including challenges, opportunities) that enable the sustainability, particularly of the national stakeholders in Myanmar;
2. to **demonstrate accountability** to the key stakeholders and donor (in this case, the EU);
3. to **enhance learning** within ILO and among key stakeholders; and
4. to **inform** similar interventions in the future.

Specifically:

- Assess the project implementation effectiveness including the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved, results and **impact** (including intended and unintended, positive and negative results and **impact**);
- The extent to which the recommendations of the midterm evaluation have been addressed
- To assess the effectiveness of management arrangements;
- Assess the project implementation efficiency;
- Provide recommendations and identify/document lessons learned and good practices that could be replicated.

Scope of the evaluation

According to the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, all projects over USD 1 million must undergo at least one independent evaluation. For projects over 30 months, annual reviews, a mid-term evaluation and a final evaluation, are required.

This evaluation covered all interventions under the programme from **15 March 2015 to 14 March 2019** and the focus of final evaluation looked at the intervention since **April 2017**. The final evaluation covered all the geographical areas of the programme – security permitting for field visits. The evaluation examined the programme’s performance in relation to the ILO’s cross-cutting issues on gender, labour standards, social dialogue and environment.

The evaluation covered expected (i.e. planned) and unexpected results and impact in terms of non-planned outputs and outcomes (i.e. side effects or externalities). Some of these unexpected changes could be as relevant as the ones planned. Therefore, the evaluators reflected on them for learning purposes.

It consisted of a thorough assessment by independent evaluators, with feedback from direct and indirect project stakeholders, including the Consortium partners and other key stakeholders and those who provided feedback during the mid-term evaluation (MTE).

Gender equality and non-discrimination dimensions in particular were reflected throughout the methodology, deliverables and final report of the evaluation. This required the involvement of men and women of all ages (between 16 and 71 years old), in the consultation, evaluation analysis and evaluation team. Moreover, the evaluation reviewed available data and information that was disaggregated by sex and other gender dimensions, and assessed the relevance and effectiveness of gender-related strategies and outcomes to improve the lives of women and men.

Clients of the evaluation

The primary end users of the evaluation findings are the programme management team and the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, the Consortium partners, and ILO technical departments. Secondary parties making use of the results of the evaluation include the EU and tripartite constituents.

1.C. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

The project quality was assessed against the following main evaluation criteria:

- ✓ **Relevance:** The extent to which project objectives were consistent with beneficiaries’ needs.
- ✓ **Efficiency:** How efficiently resources/inputs (e.g. funds, expertise, time) were converted into results.

- ✓ **Effectiveness:** The extent to which objectives were achieved.
- ✓ **Sustainability:** The likelihood of continuation of project benefits (outputs, outcomes) after the end of the project.

Key evaluative questions were translated into interview questions and protocols which are presented in [Annex 5](#) of this report. More detailed information on the evaluation questions, schedule and interviews undertaken to conduct this final evaluation is described in [Annexes 5 and 6](#).

1.D. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Methodology

This evaluation was elaborated in full compliance with relevant evaluation norms and standards, and followed ethical safeguards, as specified in the ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the UN system of evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

The evaluation balanced the need for organizational learning with the purpose of ensuring accountability to the project owners. While maintaining independence, the evaluators applied a participatory approach seeking the views of all groups of programme stakeholders. Enrolling key stakeholders in the evaluation process and in the discussions on key findings, conclusions and recommendations, facilitated organizational learning.

Different evaluation tools were combined to ensure an evidence-based qualitative and quantitative assessment. The evaluators emphasized on cross-validation of data through triangulation and an assessment of plausibility of the results obtained. The methodological mix included document review, semi-structured individual interviews, semi-structured interviews of focus groups and a short survey conducted with all groups of stakeholders. (See [Annex 5](#)) Data was gathered from different sources, by different methods for each of the evaluation questions, and findings were triangulated to draw valid and reliable conclusions. Data was disaggregated, at a minimum, by sex and by other dimensions where available. Conclusions and were based on evaluation findings (deductive reasoning).

Qualitative information was also obtained through field visits in Southern, Northern and Eastern Shan State⁵ and Skype calls with stakeholders who were not available for face to face meetings for geographic reasons.

The desk study included the analysis of existing project documents, progress reports and reviews including the independent mid-term evaluation (MTE) and the EU Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports, financial statements and budget revision, a no-cost extension requested by the project to the EU, the PRD gender framework, a Local Conflict Assessment and Programme Advisory Committee meeting minutes.

The list of persons interviewed and documents consulted are presented in [Annexes 3 and 4](#) to this report. The evaluators worked freely and without interference. All stakeholders interviewed were ready to openly share their views. Information obtained during data collection was comprehensive, consistent and clear. Information on stakeholders' views obtained through interviews is presented in this report in a way that it cannot be traced back to the specific source.

A total of 128 stakeholders were interviewed for this evaluation (with 39% of women and 61% of men) through key informant interviews or focus group discussions. The stakeholders included:

- ✓ The Delegation of the European Union to Myanmar;
- ✓ ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar;
- ✓ ILO PRD Project Team in Taunggyi;
- ✓ UNDP Office in Taunggyi;
- ✓ Consortium partner organizations;

⁵ The evaluation team conducted interviews in *Southern Shan State* (Bauk Wauk village, Taunggyi township; Laikha township where evaluators also met stakeholders from Nam Mo village, Nam Sam township and from Wan Pan village, Nam Sam township; and Taunggyi), *Northern Shan State* (Lashio where evaluators also met Community Based Organizations (CBOs) from Nam Kham township who conducted interventions in villages in Nam Kham and in the Mansi township in Kachin State; Nam Kham township; on the way back to Lashio from Nam Kham evaluators interviewed beneficiaries from Paju and Pan San villages; and two Members of Parliament from Hsenwi township were interviewed in Lashio), and *Eastern Shan State* (Tachileik township; Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township; Tarley township, Tachileik district; and Mong Koe village, Tachileik township). The final evaluation could not cover all geographical locations of the programme. Field visits were undertaken security permitting for field visits as mentioned in the TOR.

- ✓ Other key project stakeholders involved in the project implementation and/or in supporting project beneficiaries (such as EAOs, MPs, VDCs and CBOs / CSOs); and
- ✓ Beneficiary representatives (such as village committee members and trainees).

Further to receiving the lists of stakeholders to be interviewed, the evaluators interviewed additional interviewees, upon their request, namely representing UNDP, former ILO project staff and ILO staff providing technical backstopping. The evaluators also interviewed an additional interviewee to obtain more information about Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process in Myanmar.

More detailed information on the evaluation questions, schedule and interviews undertaken to conduct this final evaluation is described in [Annexes 5 and 6](#).

Main limitations to this evaluation

1. Given the tight time frame for conducting this evaluation, the main focus was on covering the project locations visited during the field mission in Shan State in Myanmar. To the extent possible, the evaluation drew conclusions for the entire project, adding examples from other locations based on desk review and interviews with key project stakeholders.
2. Due to the delay in the contracting process before the field mission, it was challenging to conduct inception phase activities while preparing, organising and conducting the field mission to a very tight schedule, and travelling to and in Myanmar.
3. Given the large number of stakeholders, it was not possible to meet them all individually. Focus group interviews were therefore conducted in addition to key informant interviews, with the caveat that some views may not be expressed as freely as they would in individual interviews. Although timing for interviews was sometimes too short, evaluators ensured views were collected from all participants. There was also a threat to ecological validity as translation was required for a large percentage of interviews.

2. FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENT

This section presents the findings of the evaluation and provides an assessment of project quality against the evaluation criteria. The assessments below are formulated based on a cross-section of opinions expressed by a majority of stakeholders and double-checked with the project frameworks and available data.

2.A. RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC FIT

- ➔ Examine whether the programme has responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries and still is consistent and relevant to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?

Based on the revised intervention logic, the programme responded overall well to beneficiaries' needs. However, the majority of beneficiaries mentioned that their needs were only partially addressed. The evaluators found no evidence that the intervention was based on a strategic approach to best serve beneficiaries' needs. Pre-conditions and initial assumptions did not match Shan State's reality throughout the programme implementation notably due to the faltering of the peace process.

Based on the desk study and other converging statements, the PRD programme was perceived as particularly relevant in providing vocational training and non-formal education, empowering women and youth, voicing the needs of local communities notably involving members of parliament, raising awareness on human rights, forced labour, good governance and protecting child rights, and providing basic infrastructure to villages across Shan State.

The intervention was hence useful to support beneficiaries in *empowering conflict-affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, and in engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process*. While the PRD programme was responsive at its outset in 2015, at the time of mid-term reviews, it was however only partially responsive to the needs of target groups and end beneficiaries as the peace process began to falter and the fighting in Shan State intensified. Following the ROM (April 2017) and mid-term evaluation (June 2017), the wording of the Specific Objective (SO) 1 was changed due to the worsening of the conflict context in Northern Shan State and a decision of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee to limit the engagement of civil society in the peace process. While the donor had made it clear that the intervention logic could be altered if circumstances so dictate, targets at the

time of the mid-term evaluation were no longer realistic. Community organisations could hence only engage with parties to the process *with no direct engagement in the peace process itself*.

The *Local Conflict Assessment (LCA)* was perceived as disappointing by Consortium partners due to the fact that it was a written exercise with limited interactions and findings on-the-ground. Consortium partners noted that the LCA should be a living document rather than a one-off exercise. The LCA was however neither updated since January 2017 nor linked to systematic and timely updating of the intervention logic. It should however be noted that Consortium partners were regularly updating each other on the conflict context in their areas of implementation during quarterly Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) meetings.

The programme was in general useful in supporting stakeholders *to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by the conflict*. The training of SCI of 5 community-based organisations (CBOs) on how to effectively monitor and report on the use of child soldiers was perceived as useful by many interviewees. Reaching project targets set for SO 3 was however challenging in the context of frequency of fighting in Northern Shan State and the heightened risk of engaging EAOs on United Nations Security Council Resolution 612 causing under-age recruitment issues to remain. According to some CBO representatives, this could on some occasions put their security at stake as they were mistaken as armed group by the military. Due to the Article 17/1 associating with an illegal group, they were afraid to be caught and put into jail. It was also reported that communities did not always dare to officially inform CBOs on under-age recruitment cases.

All trainings and non-formal education provided by the PRD programme were perceived as very useful, in particular as the vast majority of interviewees mentioned that effective training and education were *key cornerstones contributing to a peacebuilding environment*. Trainings for CBOs were then multiplied through the youth platforms they had set up. According to CBOs, youth will be able to contribute to the peace building process if they are well educated and have decent lives. Many stakeholders and end beneficiaries mentioned that the training provided was not yet sufficient and/or its duration was too short in order to be sustainable and allow participants to integrate the labour market.

Evaluators found no evidence of systematic and consistent post-training follow-up and small business advisory support to concretely facilitate youth's access to the employment market and improve their livelihoods. Several stakeholders also reported a strong need for computers (some being broken or taken away – as they were rented – after the intervention) making it challenging to sustain programme activities while demand was created, based on a sustainable business model.

The programme did not adopt any strategic approach when tackling beneficiaries needs at the community level. For example, based on converging statements, schools faced a drastic shortage of teachers and school staff. Former and still unexperienced students were teaching on a voluntary basis (or received a very low wage depending on “whatever the school could provide”). Students also mentioned that they faced challenges related to a shortage of clean drinking water affecting their health, electricity, security (due to the absence of fencing), teaching materials and funds in general. The space allocated to toilets and to class rooms are too small. Several stakeholders involved in different school building projects mentioned that the walls or a simple wooden separation between two classrooms did not allow to conduct two classes in parallel.

More generally, bad roads, difficult access and dangerous transportation conditions to school for most youth in Shan State (as they often need to travel to other locations to study) were mentioned as serious issues by many interviewees to be tackled by such a programme. In the case of one school building project, village development committee members mentioned that they would have like to build a separate dormitory for boys as the current one for boys and girls did not correspond to their wishes. Furthermore, they needed more space for the children, because when 40 children came, there was not enough space for them.

For all infrastructure development projects, VDCs or village committees mentioned their additional and important needs. They also mentioned that, although they were involved at the time of the project design, they had to adapt to the available fixed budget and limited time available for decision making. For example, communities that badly needed a road and a school finally opted for *the most important priority as there was no sufficient budget to cover all their needs*. Now that that the programme was over, beneficiaries continued facing challenges in particular in finding additional funding to further develop their activities and infrastructures, ensure maintenance and manage longer-term maintenance risks.

In general, the programme still needs to *achieve scale*. A four-year programme was considered as *too short* in addressing beneficiaries' needs by all interviewees, even more in a context of ongoing conflicts and the limited readiness of government to support the PRD effort. *A majority of stakeholders stressed that a minimum of 8 years would be reasonable for such an intervention*.

While the programme took into consideration various relevant factors to be addressed independently by Consortium partners, the project document did not define a common outreach plan and strategy to scale activities across the

programme – notably based on a robust feasibility study on the ground that would have been essential, in particular in such complex environment.

- ➔ Is the programme relevant to the donors' priorities and policy, implementing partners' need? Are the programme results or approach strategic and include the comparative advantage of the ILO?

The programme was relevant to the donors' priorities and policy and implementing partners' needs. The programme built on the comparative advantage of each Consortium partner including ILO comparative advantage in areas such as Skills, Employment, Enterprise Development as an entry point for community development (livelihoods) and the complaints mechanism on forced labour. (See Annex 13) ILO comparative advantage as a large organization managing and monitoring the overall performance of large-scale programmes was not included. This was due to the initial Consortium structure, where each partner organization acted independently and was responsible for managing their own monitoring frameworks.

- ➔ What are the current areas of interest of the key stakeholder's vis-à-vis project original theme – whether there have deviated from the original design. What could have contributed to changes, if any? To what extent the project has adapted to those changes?

As mentioned above, the intervention logic was adapted due to the faltering peace process and intensified fighting in Shan State after the mid-term evaluation. Many interviewees reported that children are the ones who suffer and do not want to accept anymore the civil war. The majority of statements mentioned the importance for this type of programme to seriously consider the ground reality of children and youth, for example not only providing school buildings through a one-off intervention, but also encouraging the local counterparts to invest in education due to the drastic shortage of teachers and need for safe transportation of children to their schools. Several groups of stakeholders would expect ILO to provide both continuous technical assistance and conduct more consultations with government.

Several stakeholders mentioned that they either did not know what ILO is doing for them or would encourage the organization to get more involved in advocacy activities and in consultations with authorities to further contribute to the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar and the reduction of child soldiers.

2.B. EFFECTIVENESS (INCLUDING EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS)

- ➔ Has the programme achieved its planned objectives? Particularly the empowerment activity efforts – assess whether its approach is effective.

Based on data cross-validation and triangulation, the programme has achieved most of its output targets at the time of the independent final evaluation. The programme was able to implement a large amount of activities despite a complex context and unforeseen roadblocks⁶. Stakeholders were mostly somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with project results. Regarding the programme achievement against outcome targets, evaluators found no evidence of the project monitoring systematically and consistently project progress at the outcome level. The programme was successful in empowering communities.

The programme's participatory approach was in general well received but could be strengthened during project design, after conducting needs assessments.

- › *In March 2018, the programme had served some 85'853 (51% women) across Shan State. In February 2019, it had reached more than **154,000 beneficiaries (54 % women) across 104 villages** in Shan State.*
- › *Initially, the programme aimed to provide around 35'000 work days in more than 40 villages resulting in community-led and community-managed infrastructure with 200 people trained in constructed related skills. This target then decreased to 20'000 work days. The programme documents indicated that up to February 2019, **19'890 workdays were generated in 52 villages**. However, laborers did not always take their wages in order to ensure their village benefit from an infrastructure that corresponded better to their needs. This allowed communities to have more resources for infrastructure development projects, and in two cases to construct a longer road. The programme trained **1137 people constructed related skills**.*

⁶ Such as the MDCG case and the worsening Northern Shan conflict context. (Due to the worsening of the conflict context, although activities under Specific Objective 1 remained useful in empowering people in relation to peace issues, the contribution of the programme to the official peace process was limited.)

- Overall, according to the programme, it provided **more than 350 trainings to 82'859 people (60% women)**. A significant amount of project activities was organized by Consortium partners who altogether managed to conduct a **large number of activities in a complex conflict-affected context**. (See [Annex 10 for more detailed information](#))

Up to February 2019, the intervention included numerous activities such as: (i) 883 community dialogues, 124 multi-stakeholder forums and/or mechanisms at the community and township level on local issues brought to the attention of parties engaged in the peace process, 105 government staff and 197 EAO members trained on governance, rights and responsibilities, 67 CBOs that had received subgrants, 50 Ceasefire Liaison Officers and/ or community volunteers trained in Sensitive Interviewer Listening, 973 participants trained in conflict resolution, international humanitarian law and basic media skills; 5 CBOs trained to carry out community monitoring (MRM), 40 issues monitored and raised by CBOs to key leaders, 184 members of EAOs sensitized on issues of child use and recruitments; and (iii) 41'072 community members and members of 6 communities that had received sensitization on forced labour, child protection and child rights, 61 youth platforms established by CBOs, 11'001 youth who had attended trainings provided by CBOs, 49 issues that were monitored and raised by Youth Platforms to key leaders, 52 community contractors trained in project management, 66 Village Development Committees (VDCs) trained in project management, 125 skilled and semi-skilled worker trained, 174 community members involved in construction who attended training in vocational training, 18 operation and maintenance committee members trained, 849 individuals provided skills training or entrepreneurship training (among which 70%), and 347 youths identified who were made aware regarding safe migration and labour rights.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: Conflict-affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, are empowered and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process. (*Wording revised in Year 3 reporting period)

- An average of 70 % of issues (with a range from 50% to 100% across Consortium partners) raised by community representatives in multi-stakeholder forums at the township level were acknowledged by duty bearers or key leaders. The initial target of 20% was exceeded during the third year of implementation. However, the number of issues resolved or remedied remains at around or less than 20% as an average. There was no updated data for the last year of implementation.

One of the key events under this objective was a multi-stakeholder forum organized with members of the Shan State Parliament, SCI youth CBO partners and wider youth from conflict-affected areas. The youth raised their concerns regarding protecting children in armed conflict. They also raised the issue of the importance of youth voices being heard in the peace process. The forum had to be approved by the General Administration Department and the Union Parliament – with meeting minutes shared with both after the forum took place. Whilst onerous and organized in a complex context, this had the effect of widening dissemination of these issues. This meeting was believed to be the first of its kind, bringing together youth groups and Shan State Parliamentarians to discuss issues related to youth, peace and children affected by armed conflict. This event (under activity 1.1.3) formed a sound basis for follow-up action.

Based on interviews and ASG latest draft Interim Report, most authorities initially refused to participate in meetings on issues raised in community dialogues and multi-stakeholder meetings. Only some authorities and EAOs participated in such meetings. They however refused to take part in discussions, answer questions or acknowledge issues raised by communities. ASG then approached media groups and, thanks to their support, high traffic tax collecting was stopped by authorities at Crony U Tun Aung Gate in March 2019. Further to the independent mid-term evaluation commissioned by ILO in June 2017, ASG introduced the “Meet Your Member of Parliament” (MYMP) programme, allowing communities to raise issues directly with MPs. As a result, 6 issues were solved through MPs’ mediation. This included the land grabbing issue in Mongphyat and reducing initially high electricity charges in Tachileik. Based on desk review and interviewees’ statements, the majority of communities were initially afraid to discuss about peace and politics. They acquired the capacity to actively engage in community dialogues and to raise their concerns to key leaders.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2: To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict (*Wording revised in Year 3 reporting period)

- There were 32 cases subject to EAOs’ actions towards demobilization of child soldiers in their armed groups or other grave violation. (There was no specific target for this objective as this is incident-based).⁷
- No updated data was provided to the evaluators for the second target, namely 40 % of communities in which children and adults reported an increased perception of a protective environment for children affected by armed conflict.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 3: To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment.

- The programme reported in its latest Interim Report (for Year 3) that 100% (all) beneficiary communities to date had adopted participatory approaches in their action plans. No data in % was provided to evaluators for Year 4.

All interviewees mentioned that the programme had systematically adopted a participatory approach in conducting needs assessments. However, VDCs, village communities and beneficiaries involved in 60% of community infrastructure projects mentioned they would have appreciated to be more thoroughly involved during the design of the school buildings or road constructions, notably to consider alternative solutions to the project design (and subsequent cost reduction). For this objective, it

⁷ PRD progress report (for Year 3) mentioned that, based on the formal Country Task Force for Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) system, there were 8 Shan-based discharges over the course of the 3rd year of implementation and the preference/direction of the Tatmadaw for peace support actors to not engage EAOs on UNSCR1612. Under-age recruitment issues remained.

would have been sound to add an indicator assessing to what extent communities perceived the project as being participatory. This could have helped identify certain issues earlier by seeking regular feedback and undertake necessary corrective or preventive measures.⁸

The majority of beneficiaries were grateful and overall somewhat satisfied (51%) or very satisfied (41%) with the project outcomes and notably in gaining skills and knowledge in English, computer, sewing, masonry, construction planning and management, bookkeeping, peace building, democracy and human rights, women and child rights, and forced labour. Overall, interviewees were somewhat satisfied (49%) or very satisfied with project outcomes (44%). 47% of interviewees considered the project had achieved 51-75% and 36% considered it had achieved 76-100% of its outcomes.

The table below presents the overall satisfaction rate of interviewees regarding project outcomes based on a short survey. Interviewees answered the questions only referring to the scope activities they were involved in. In case they were not enough involved in the project, they were asked not to answer these questions. 112 interviewees submitted their responses to the evaluation survey. This represents 88% of 128 interviewees who participated in the PRD final evaluation between March and May 2019. Additional efforts were done to include relevant project stakeholders in the evaluation process despite very tight deadlines, notably through teleconferences, during and after the fieldwork. (See more details in [Annex 7](#) – Evaluation survey results)




Figure 2 – Survey results – Question A




Figure 2 – Survey results – Question B

⁸ One interviewee shared the advice, based on experience in similar projects, to ensure that village committees or VDCs as well as end beneficiaries have sufficient time to understand what a building and site design entail with images and explanations accessible to all, including to children who will use the facilities. For example, girls, potential future school students, could have hence expressed, at a much earlier stage shared their feeling of insecurity if toilets would be far away – before any important decision was taken. The programme design could include some flexibility to take into consideration all the priority needs of beneficiaries in terms of road length and thickness, in order to avoid having only part of the road needed, that is not thick enough to support heavy tracks passing in the village, with no road yet leading to the school and wages donated for a better road, as reported for example by a village committee. Sufficient time and resources need to be carefully allocated, taking into account budgeting processes, risks related to possible administrative or other roadblocks and the organizations of meetings bringing together beneficiaries in different groups (VDC, school girls, school boys, teachers, etc.)

Several interviewees mentioned that communities felt in general more protected with the presence of Consortium partner organizations and CBOs. Based on an anecdotal statement, communities had less reasons to be upset at the government as they had the proof that authorities were doing something for them. Working in collaboration with a UN organization such as ILO was seen as a strength by some interviewees as it is a recognized organization.

Through its staff, the programme involved local resources and different communities in intervention areas. Communities who knew their geographical area, existing expertise and needs were involved in the programme. This allowed to provide relevant support to end beneficiaries to improve their living standards. Communities, youth, women and local CBOs / CSOs were empowered through capacity building and awareness raising activities. They displayed more confidence and assertiveness as a result of programme activities. Vocational training contributed to decrease to some extent youth unemployment. There is no evidence of consistent post-training follow up across the programme. Several beneficiaries (training participants) and stakeholders mentioned that the vocational training provided by the programme allowed participant to seize work opportunities, some of them being unpaid but allowing them to gain experience.

More detailed project progress against PRD Specific Objectives and targets are presented in [Annexes 9 and 10](#). The “Table of project progress against target indicators” ([Annex 10](#)) presented mainly the intervention’s progress against output-based indicators.⁹ At the time of the ROM and the mid-term reviews, evaluators already mentioned that monitoring data was incomplete and that this information should in principle be available at all times. Although programme staff mentioned that additional efforts were made in collecting centralized monitoring data across the programme further to mid-term reviews, not all data was available and consolidated for evaluators to perform a complete review during the final evaluation. One of the reasons advanced was that the former Chief Technical Advisor had left in 2018 and that other ILO Liaison Office staff could not dedicate as much time to the PRD programme. It should be noted that evaluations are meant to review available programme data and not to collect monitoring data instead of the programme. Progress reports should also include updated project plans with initial and updated deadlines, progress status and dates of completion, notably to allow the readers to have a clear understanding of remaining activities.

Management arrangements were not perceived by several interviewees as very effective. Updates between all organizations involved in the programme, notably among Consortium partners and programme staff were not considered as sufficient by them. They also mentioned that this could affect the quality of the programme. Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) for monitoring field missions was not sufficient and the lack of administrative support and direct access to the information system did not facilitate implementation.

➔ If not, what are the main constraints, problems?

The programme faced serious constraints related to the peace process faltering and the intensified fighting in Shan State. Travel authorizations related challenges also affected the programme. The MDCG case caused programme activities to be suspended during several months. Some Consortium partners could not conduct activities during up to 6 months, due to the late fund release each year and no available funds for pre-financing. Staff turnover and poor knowledge transfer also affected various stakeholders across the programme.

As described above, Consortium partners needed to revise the intervention logic after mid-term reviews to reflect realities on the ground. Although the programme managed to achieve almost all its targets, remaining activities did not take place notably due to the case of MDCG and the rejection by the donor of ILO request for a no-cost extension. Based on desk reviews and converging statements, it has also been very difficult for the programme to conduct efforts to engage EAOs on the demobilization of child soldiers in Northern Shan State (as going conflict meant ongoing recruitment), to verify reports and issues related to under-age recruitment due to the potential repercussions of unlawful associations.

Further to the MDCG case, ILO headquarters decided to terminate the contract with MDCG. A no cost extension was then submitted to the EU with a revised workplan until June 14, 2019. This request was however not accepted by the EU, as the donor considered that the request had no sufficient value for money. Programme staff were able to work one more month, in order to complete the evaluation.¹⁰ Some project activities, such as a final multi-stakeholder meeting bringing together PRD stakeholders from Southern, Eastern and Northern Shan States, and a bamboo structure training workshop could not be finalized as the programme has ended. Turnover in different organizations was an issue, as reported by different stakeholders. Change in staff at the EU, Consortium partners’ and CBO levels and in

⁹ See first column with numbers from 1 to 36 in [Annex 10](#). Outcome-based indicators were not visible (or “hidden”).

¹⁰ In the opinion of the evaluators, it would have been better to conduct the evaluation in January, as initially planned, taking into consideration the risk of the no-cost extension not being accepted and the challenge of organizing an evaluation right before the start of the Water Festival on April 13, 2019. The programme staff however explained that they had strong expectations that the no-cost extension request would be granted based on communication exchange or perhaps possible misunderstandings between the ILO and the donor.

some cases poor knowledge transfer, as reported by several interviewees, did not allow smooth programme implementation. A few statements also mentioned the fact that the programme included a large amount of various activities in a limited time frame and complex environment. This made Consortium's partners' focus more on delivering a large amount of outputs rather than on achieving expected outcomes. This is also reflected in the programme reporting that is mainly output oriented and vaguer at the outcome level. Finally, other constraints faced by CBOs are the difficulty to engage the youth in this type of programme due to their disinterest, as they face distress and have to make ends meet. Furthermore, youths of 16-17 years who have dropped out of school at grade 7 or 8 were no longer considered as youths by their communities. Getting them on board was challenging as they also displayed a diminished sense of self. As mentioned above, a vast majority of interviewees stressed the fact that such programme would require more time to be effective.

- ➔ Have the Consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?

The majority of programme interventions were conducted in silos by Consortium partners. While PAC meetings were useful to update each other on project activities, conflict situations in their areas of intervention and sharing to some extent some good practices, the programme only conducted joint planning for a few activities after mid-term reviews.

The majority of Consortium members and other stakeholders however expressed strong interest in identifying opportunities of complementing one another, and collaborating through joint planning. This would, according to them, also contribute to strengthening diversity across the programme and indirectly contribute to a positive peacebuilding environment.

- ➔ The extent to which the recommendations of the midterm evaluation have been addressed

Most mid-term review recommendations were addressed except for strengthening quality programme management. Additional efforts could have been made in adopting a Consortium-wide monitoring system, continuing to involve members of parliament and adopting a "less is more" approach (or reducing the programme's ambitions) and hence moving further away from one-off technical assistance.

Further to ROM recommendations, the project revised the intervention logic taking into consideration the changed context and the stalled involvement of government and EAOs in peace and reconciliation activities. A no-cost extension was also submitted to the donor and the project revised the project budget. At the time of the independent final evaluation, pre-financing difficulties were not solved and had caused serious challenges to be tackled by Consortium partners, in particular for the smaller organizations such as ASG and EPRP. Efforts were also made to address each mid-term recommendation. (i) Although the programme conducted some joint planning activities, it did not adopt a more unified and coherent approach across its implementation (including joint planning, monitoring, and implementation) – notably due to the existing Consortium structure. (ii) Despite the reluctance of government to engage in the intervention, the programme managed to involve more Members of Parliament, in accordance with the MTE recommendations. The programme witnessed some early indication of success through for example the Meet Your Member of Parliament Program (MYMP) conducted by Aids Support Group (ASG). MYMP allowed communities to present their issues directly with MPs. Furthermore, the multi-platform meeting organized by Save the Children International (SCI) proved to be successful to voice youths' concerns to MPs. (iii) The programme successfully reduced its collaboration from more than 20 to 6 CBOs. A "less is more" approach was not fully adopted to best serve beneficiaries' needs.

- ➔ How other stakeholders been involved in programme implementation?

As mentioned in project documents and in interviews, Consortium members seized various opportunities to engage other stakeholders in formal and informal discussions, community dialogue meetings, and multi-stakeholder meetings. This notably allowed communities to express their concerns and increase to communities' confidence.

- ➔ Does the programme monitoring plan exist and whether the baseline data has been collected and data collected over time?

Although the programme made efforts to collect output data more regularly after mid-term reviews, outcome data continued to be collected only before the yearly report. Most baseline data were at zero as the programme reported that activities conducted were new in the areas of implementation. As for monitoring data, it was not clear how existing baseline data was collected as there is no Consortium wide monitoring arrangement.

The Consortium developed a comprehensive MEAL plan¹¹. While output data was more consistently collected after mid-term reviews, evaluators found no evidence of the project monitoring on a systematic and consistent way project progress against outcome-based target indicators. Updated data continued to be collected by the project prior to writing the report. At the time of the final evaluation, not all data provided was consolidated and some data was missing. Some Important indicators regarding, for example, non-formal education and livelihood skills training, such as the target of “50% of those who received entrepreneurship training are able to start their own livelihoods” were not centrally tracked. Same for the target of “80% of youth trained in NFE who score a minimum of xx¹² in the post test”. Evaluators did not receive training evaluations or reports to review, while they were initially mentioned as sources and means of verification (MoV) in the logical framework. Some useful outcome indicators such as “at least 50% of those who received NFE and skills training are engaged in productive and paid employment” or “several economic sub-sectors are strengthened for employment and livelihoods creation” were not included in the MEAL. In many instances, the powerful “and so what?” question remains unanswered based on available monitoring data provided to evaluators. The Consortium leader (ILO) had to rely on the monitoring data provided by other partner organizations, as the latter were responsible for monitoring their framework – with no robust Consortium-wide monitoring to manage the overall programme performance. Certain issues, such as low wages of CBO staff were neither identified nor managed earlier¹³. (See [Annex 11](#) on project monitoring)

➔ What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed?

The role of the PAC was well defined, namely to update committee members on ongoing activities, highlighting challenges and issues that may impact the programme, to agree on opportunities for collaboration and joint working and/or sharing of expertise and to agree on principles on ways of working in a Consortium. The PAC took place quarterly. Despite regular meetings, the PAC members displayed different conceptions and understandings of roles and responsibilities within the committee up to the end of the intervention. They reported several times that they were not aware either of issues faced by the programme intervention, what other partners were doing, or why they did not better collaborate. Based on several converging statement quality management, better communication and coordination would have allowed the PAC to achieve better results and be “greater than the sum of its parts”. According to a few interviewees, this would not be possible due to the Consortium structure and philosophy.

As reported by several project staff, after mid-term reviews, Consortium members worked more closely on some activities. For example, this allowed ILO to continue monitoring joint activities planned with MDCG during the MDCG investigation. There was still room for improvement for Consortium members to work more jointly together across the PRD programme. Interviews with the different Consortium members revealed different levels of expectations, satisfaction and understanding of ILO’s role in the Consortium. While one Consortium partner voiced clearly its satisfaction of working independently, for the majority of Consortium members, the organization serving as Consortium lead should not just have the role of grant administrator. The lead partner would be hence expected to ensure quality programme management, robust programme design, management and coordination, strong contribution to advocacy activities and linking with government. According to interviewees, it would also regularly monitor the budget and programme activities across the programme. Several interviewees also would welcome stronger knowledge / best practices sharing led by the coordinating partner. According to these Consortium partners, this would contribute to quality programme management. Stronger joint planning, collaboration and support would be also expected, notably for multi-stakeholder meetings. Interviewees displayed different views on whether quality programme management would be desirable or possible, considering the existing Consortium structure and the willingness not to adopt a leading role that would subsequently entail a top-down approach (or “masters” position). Some interviewees clarified that they speak about managing a programme effectively without adopting a top-down leadership approach. The misconception might have come from their wording of effective management or good programme governance as ILO adopting a “leading role”.

2.C. EFFICIENCY

(A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)

¹¹ The MEAL was overall well designed. There was however some confusion sometimes between # and % when monitoring data – as indicated during interviews and illustrated in the table on project progress against targets (see [Annex 10](#): 2.1.b., 2.2.2.b or 3.2.2.). The programme also used various indicators (number of participants or communities; number of trainings or participants), which did not always facilitate data analysis. Furthermore, the project had set a target as # of communities to measure the # of community members. (2.2.1.a.) This could be confusing for the reader.

¹² The minimum score in the post test was not defined by the project.

¹³ (for example, by requesting more regular feedback from the field at all levels and/or conducting regular surveys including satisfaction rates and a continuous improvement mechanism)

- Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve results? And have they been delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs? Any measures that has been put in place?

The resource allocation allowed to achieve almost all expected outputs. The pre-defined budget allocation for sub-grants did not allow for flexibility once the programme had engaged with communities. More budget allocated to CBOs, communities, local staff and programme monitoring would have been instrumental to achieve better results responding to beneficiaries' needs.

Significant resources were allocated to a large amount of activities¹⁴ that the programme was able to conduct across Shan State. Strong budget constraints were faced by smaller Consortium organizations, as they did not have sufficient funding to bridge the gap between the end of the fiscal year, in March, and the disbursement of funds by the EU. Organizations could not work up to 6 months to serve beneficiaries. This also caused some budget to be unspent and organizations not being able to pay their staff their wages while the funds were not yet released. The evaluators collected mixed opinions about the possibility for the ILO to share the 7% eligible overhead costs with Consortium partners to allow them to pre-finance project activities.

Many stakeholders mentioned that the budget allocated to CBOs and community members involved in infrastructure projects was not enough – resulting in wages used to respond to additional community needs or high turnover among CBO staff working full time (instead of part time – 25%) to achieve ambitious targets. Many CBO representatives mention that they left their paid jobs to support communities who relied on them and “looked at their face”. This caused a high turnover because they could not make ends meet.

The MDCG case hindered the programme to deliver several outputs. The evaluators received mixed opinions whether more could have been done to continue to serve beneficiaries while MDCG was requested to freeze its activities during 6 months of investigation. ILO proposed a mitigation methodology to the EU and monitored some ILO-MDCG joint activities during this time. Other Consortium partners concentrated on achieving remaining output targets. As mentioned above, the no-cost extension, notably allowing to finish all MDCG programme activities, was finally not granted by the EU. While beneficiaries had still important needs, the programme displayed unspent budget.

Based on the project budget forecast and follow-up, at 75% of programme implementation period, the programme had spent or committed 67% of total funds (about EUR 7'000'000). It had committed additional 20% of funds for the fourth year of implementation. Based on cumulated costs, PRD programme allocated only 8% of total funds (or 12% of committed or spent funds) to CBOs. As mentioned before, this amount was not sufficient to provide acceptable working conditions while responding to communities' needs. An anecdotic statement mentioned that the PRD budget allocation to CBOs was perceived on the ground as following: “whenever a donor gives a buffalo, the first parts are given at the state level, then at the township level and finally, at the community level, they only receive the bones”.

Several Consortium partners were of the opinion that the resources allocated to ILO local project staff were insufficient, in order to allow them to be able to monitor the programme¹⁵, provide technical expertise, perform logistical and administrative work, and support Consortium partners most effectively. It was reported during interviews that an additional full time Finance and Administrative Officer could have taken out some of the burden of multitasking, which fell on the shoulders of two full-time staff based in Taunggyi. Staff had also several times to cancel field visits or their participation in all PAC meetings, based on insufficient DSA budget, that was underestimated during project design.

- Has there been a coherent implementation approaches among the Consortium members? Given different geographical targeting by Consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the Consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches. Would it be possible for the Consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium? If so what and how?

Based on the way the Consortium was structured, the informal agreement between partners that each of them would be given a high degree of autonomy, the design and the management of activities, there was no strong coherent implementation approach among Consortium partners. All Consortium partners confirmed their strong interest in

¹⁴ As mentioned above under Effectiveness (see [Annex 10](#)).

¹⁵ This refers to the insufficient DSA budget.

undertaking activities more collectively, capitalizing on complementary approaches and fostering diversity, working with different ethnic groups in conflict-affected areas.

There would have been room for more coherence and synergies. The programme created more synergies after mid-term reviews. Several statements mentioned that earlier and stronger and more convergence activities would have been instrumental. They added that the programme would notably need to adopt a more unified approach, strengthen coordination, regular communication, joint planning and monitoring, as well as clearly (re)define roles and responsibilities. According to several PAC members, strengthened collaboration would be feasible despite working in different geographical areas. As the programme staff also experienced some protectionist attitude, a few interviewees mentioned that there should be a willingness of all Consortium members to act more as a programme rather than distinct projects.

➔ The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximize impact, if any?

As mentioned by programme staff, ILO SME, Forced Labour, Value Chain, Child Labour, Migration and other team resources based in Yangon were utilised to good effect and on a demand-basis. At the country level, based on interviews and desk review, there was no national coordination platform between organizations conducting peace building interventions at the time of the evaluation.

➔ Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (Liaison Office (LO), HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant)? If not why?

The programme received no backstopping from ILO HQ and limited technical backstopping from DWT-Bangkok with one field visit from the Senior Specialist for the Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP). The reason mentioned during interviews was that one of the Technical Officers working on EIIP was already based in Yangon, and involved in the PRD programme. As mentioned above, management arrangements as well as communication across the programme were not perceived as optimal.

Local project staff were mostly updated on programmatic issues on a quarterly basis during PAC meetings (but limited DSA did not allow them to participate in all meetings). The programme staff took the initiative to create a Facebook group with other staff based on Yangon to get more updates. However, the flow of communication remained limited. The lack of DSA did not allow the project staff to conduct several field visits to monitor the programme. Facebook groups were also created among M&E staff in different organizations to try to counteract the lack of resources. Monitoring was overall not perceived as optimal by various stakeholders. As already mentioned, more adequate resources and administrative support would have been instrumental to conduct field visits for the quality of the programme.

2.D. SUSTAINABILITY

➔ The extent to which the results of the intervention are likely to be durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed?

The programme included exit strategies for some project activities. However, not all project interventions were likely to be sustainable. While local CBO partners and communities were grateful for the assistance received, a vast majority of interviewees mentioned that the intervention was too short to be truly sustainable in particular in such context.

It should however, be mentioned that, thanks to strong ownership and engagement of all stakeholders and beneficiaries, they were actively seeking for solutions to make their activities further develop and last. Many beneficiaries mentioned the fear of losing momentum and the risk of not being able to sustain the intervention – notably due to a lack of funding. Regarding training participants, the evaluation found no evidence of systematic and consistent post-training follow-up ensuring the training would lead to economic empowerment, working in coordination with other local partners through a coordinating unit, such as defined for example in ILO Training for

Rural Economic Empowerment (TREE).¹⁶ Schools did not have a robust business model and strategy to further develop their infrastructure and activities. Several interviewees also mentioned that by involving more the communities in the project design, they could have advised the programme on alternative solutions based on their knowledge expertise about other available local materials, and invest more in education for a more sustainable programme. They also mentioned that having a “fancy” school was not always well perceived by communities, as basic needs of students were unmet and they face a drastic shortage of teachers. When interviewing a group of students, 100% said they preferred a less fancy school, using alternative and more simple local materials, and more funding for education. While village committees had funds for infrastructure maintenance, funds remain limited considering other important and unmet development needs. Several interviewees stated that technical assistance would need to be extended, to a minimum of 8 years in total to be sustainable.

➔ How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?

The programme was very effective in establishing national/local ownership but the duration was too short to make it possible to sustain the effort. All stakeholders mentioned their willingness to continue project activities. They notably wanted to further study, develop their community infrastructures, schools and other interventions covered by the programme, and to contribute to peace building (process or environment).

2.E. IMPACT

➔ Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project’s interventions? If so, how has the project strategy been adjusted? Have positive effects been integrated into the project strategy? Has the strategy been adjusted to minimize negative effects?

A positive unintended effect was the strong positive change in the mindsets of beneficiaries regarding their ability to building their new lives and/or contributing to their communities and a peacebuilding environment.

Beneficiaries, in particular the vulnerable groups of youth, were able to avoid the scourge of drugs, in order to truly start having new dreams, not only for their own lives, but to better serve communities in an inclusive way, fostering diversity. Students now wanted to become for example computer teachers, a school founder, language teachers, interpreters, a doctor, and most importantly continue to study, despite conditions not always being good and some basic needs unmet (security wise or for example drinking clean water). They dreamt of being able to study abroad and help their communities have better livelihoods.

The negative unintended effect was that while they acquired such strong motivation and new dreams, the fact that the project stopped while it was fairly sustainable created dissatisfaction or sadness, and the feeling of being left while they just started to engage in the programme – with big challenges ahead for all groups of beneficiaries to achieve their goals, maintain and develop programme activities.

For example, based on converging statements, among youth CBOs, only one was able to secure a new fund. Evaluators observed strong grit, commitment and motivation of the youth. A clear difference could obviously be observed between the youth who underwent longer training and those who underwent shorter training or were new students – in their ability to assert themselves and fight for their dreams.

“The youths are talented and intelligent. There should be something for them after such programme intervention run by big organizations”.

Partner organization

¹⁶ A useful ILO methodology is the Training for Rural Economic Empowerment (TREE). Knowledge and skills would be part of an integrated package of actions to create new economic and employment opportunities for conflict-affected communities, leading towards employability and employment. Collateral support would foster entrepreneurship. This systems approach could contribute to the sustainability of the intervention.

➔ Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?

The intervention would require a second phase to consolidate achievements and facilitate the sustainability of actions. It would be however important to take measures to improve, as mentioned in several converging statements of key stakeholders, the programme design, management and coordination and advocacy, financial and human resource allocation, in order for a second phase to achieve expected outcome and be sustainable.

➔ What are the possible long-term effects on gender equality and are the gender related outcomes likely to be sustainable?

It is too early to assess possible long-term effects on gender equality. The project made conscious efforts to ensure that both men and women participated in the interventions and to collect gender disaggregated data. At the time of the evaluation, the programme had not achieved sufficient critical mass to trigger long-term effects on gender equality. Achieving gender related outcomes would require more time and to monitor change related to gender-related biases and mindsets.

As mentioned in the section below on gender mainstreaming, communities, and in particular women, still faced significant challenges and to some extent, discrimination. According to interviewees, rare were the women who really dared to speak up, in particular in peace dialogues. Through training and education, girls became more confident and assertive. There were early signs of women being empowered to contribute to the development of their village and to raising concerns to key leaders.

➔ To what extent has the project contributed to its development objective at global and country levels?

The PRD programme contributed to peace, reconciliation and development related objectives that facilitate the path from conflict to peacebuilding. As mentioned by many interviewees, there is no peace without development and no development without peace. Furthermore, the programme contributed to several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as described below.

The programme contributed to: Goal 1 - Fight against poverty notably through improving communities' livelihoods, Goal 4 - Inclusive and quality education and promotion of vocational and livelihood trainings through the trainings conducted by the programme in conflict-affected areas, Goal 5 - Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls through PRD's distinct focus on women and youth and PRD's conscious effort to include both men and women in the intervention, Goal 8 – Promotion of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all notably through the provision of alternative livelihoods options through non-formal education (NFE), vocational orientation based on market assessments and skills training for livelihood or entrepreneurship, Goal 10 - Reduced inequality within and among communities notably through serving conflict-affected communities and PRD's distinct focus on women and youth and Goal 6- Access to affordable, reliable, sustainable water supply through community infrastructure projects, and Goal 16 – Promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies notably by promoting opportunities for communities and local actors (including women and youth) to be engaged in the peace and reconciliation process and building capacity of local CBOs and civil society to respond to protection needs and the peace process. Furthermore, the vast majority of interviewees mentioned that effective training and education were key cornerstones contributing to a peacebuilding environment.

2.F. SPECIAL ASPECTS TO BE ADDRESSED

➔ Has there been any synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives in the area? If so, is it likely to enhance the impact of the programme?

As mentioned above, there have been synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives without creating longer term impact. As also mentioned by a few interviewees, a more systematic approach through a

coordinating platform on peace building (conducted for example by UNDP), could have allowed to set a more effective and consistent mechanism to identify and conduct synergies to enhance the impact of the programme.

➔ The extent that the programme has promoted ILO’s mandate on social dialogue and international labour standard (taking into consideration the context of the project) – *and environment and sustainable development (added)*

Community dialogues and linking government, employers and employees allowed communities to share their concerns, notably with key leaders¹⁷. It is key for communities to acquire the necessary confidence to raise their voice in tackling issues notably related to international labour standards. The programme offered opportunities for dialogue on forced labour, under-age recruitment, and other issues. The PRD community infrastructure model replaced the practice of forced labour. Furthermore, the programme included a sustainable development approach, for example in school building and water tank constructions incorporating solar panels.

➔ The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation

The programme primarily focused on the balance of women and men in project activities. This was also regularly discussed during PAC meetings. There is no evidence of regular monitoring of gender-related outcomes to assess to what extent changes have occurred related to gender bias or discrimination.




Figure 4 – Participation of women in the PRD programme (Y3)

¹⁷ The “Meet Your MP” programme is an example of social dialogue effort conducted by the programme.

Overall, based on available data provided at the time of the final evaluation, as mentioned above, the programme reached out to more than 154'000 beneficiaries, among which 54% were women. More than 350 trainings were provided to 82'859 with 60% of women. During the 3rd year of implementation, 49% of women in project activities were women, and in 2019, 54% were women. Women had also equal wages and were included as key members of village development committees. The figure above shows that the target of serving 40% of women has been achieved in 2019, except in activities organized for EAOs and in construction or in the infrastructure development projects or training workshops.

Based on converging statements of interviewees, the number of women participating in meetings, discussions or trainings did not reflect their ability to raise their concerns, opinions and to be heard. Several women reported that it was still often very difficult for women to experience gender equality, in particular as soon as they went into politics. The support of their husband and children was perceived by them as a pre-condition to be able to contribute to peacebuilding. Regarding issue-based political dialogues, covering political, social, economic, land and environmental issues, as the majority of women often did not display any political knowledge, women were expected to contribute mainly to child care, education, health, food security and other social issues. Interviewees mentioned they faced some discrimination. Even if now women were involved in the peace process and political dialogues, their lives were not facilitated through, for example, providing child care services allowing them to participate in meetings. Their chances to acquire experience were limited, depending on their various responsibilities. An anecdotic statement mentioned how challenging it was for women to ensure gender equality was equality was fully taken into consideration across the work done in peace related conferences.

The final PRD report did not include a separate section on how the programme addressed gender related issues based on the PRD Gender Framework (October 2015) and did not document how gender-related challenges were tackled on the ground.

2.G. GENDER ISSUES ASSESSMENT

Equality of gender is a priority to the ILO. The ILO policy on equality between women and men that is expressed in the Director-General's Circular no. 564 (1999), calls for integrating gender equality into all aspects of ILO work. Despite the project framework took gender into account, there was no evidence of specific operational guidelines used by the project team to integrate gender and diversity in the technical cooperation work. As mentioned above, challenges go beyond ensuring an equal number of men and women participating in the programme. Several interviewees mentioned the distress of young women due to their broken family, gender-based violence, lack of education and risk of discrimination.¹⁸

2.H. TRIPARTITE ISSUES ASSESSMENT

The programme was operating in conflict-affected areas where trade unions were not present. Whilst not working to standard tripartism, the PRD programme connected the dots between government, employers and workers notably through multi-stakeholder forums and community dialogues.

2.I. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS ISSUES ASSESSMENT

International labour standards are legal instruments drawn up by the ILO's constituents. These standards set out basic principles and rights at work. The PRD programme contributed to promoting compliance with international labour standards, including the Protocol n°29 to ILO's Forced Labour Convention, 1930 and the C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), notably building on the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1989, and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its follow-up, adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 86th Session in 1998.

2.J. EMERGING LESSONS LEARNED

¹⁸ One stakeholder mentioned the importance of not forgetting the distress not only of girls but also of boys who faced the threats linked to migration and issues of employment and decent work.

- i. Despite facing major contextual challenges, in particular due to the faltering peace process and intensified fighting in Shan State, the project team was able to achieve most of output targets. *However, better qualitative and quantitative results could have been achieved, notably at the outcome level, through strengthened project management.*
Robust monitoring and evaluation and grant management, joint planning, stronger coordination and consistent communication across the project, and among Consortium partners, would have contributed to a more successful and coherent programme supporting peacebuilding. This would have allowed to manage change and complexity in a more strategic way and to ultimately better serve end beneficiaries of the intervention.
- ii. The 4-year programme managed to achieve a significant number of outputs across Shan State, reaching out to more than 154'000 beneficiaries across 104 villages in Shan State. More than 350 trainings were delivered to 82'859 people, among which 60% were women. However, the majority of beneficiaries remained somewhat satisfied with the programme outcomes due to the short duration of the programme operating in complex conflict-affected areas and the one-off nature of the technical assistance received. *A "less is more" approach could have been more relevant to answer beneficiaries' needs.*

Communities would rather be involved in a more holistic community development intervention, tackling their needs more strategically for a longer-term impact. (ii) Schools would benefit from a robust and feasible business plan allowing them to develop their activities in the long-run, tackling the multiple issues in the start-up phase. (iii) Students and training participants would benefit from a consistent post-training follow-up ensuring they concretely improve their livelihoods based on sufficient training duration, small business advisory, and coordinated action with local partners.

2.K. EMERGING GOOD PRACTICES

- i. *Investing in youth, gender and diversity and inclusive education has proven to be effective in contributing to peacebuilding.* This was perceived by all project stakeholders as a key building stone that is impossible to circumvent when contributing to and working towards a lasting peace process.

In order to jointly conduct this intervention, the programme worked closely with or formed local community-based organizations, civil society organizations, village development committees and youth platforms. The programme strengthened involvement of government staff, members of parliament and ethnic armed organizations.

This allowed to work together towards notably educating and raising the voice of women and the youth. The intervention included vocational training, non-formal education and inviting communities, women and youth to participate in multi-stakeholder forums, community dialogues and workshops notably on human rights and child rights and protection.

- ii. One significant achievement leading towards the peace process was the *multi-stakeholder forum* that took place in Taunggyi, in September 2018. While community organizations could not assume direct engagement in the process itself, the programme could contribute to empowering communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, to engage with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process.

The programme brought together three prominent groups, namely the Shan state government and Members of Parliament (MPS), the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the government, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) and Shan youth groups. The youth was able to raise their issues of concern to get direct support from key leaders.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The findings and assessment above lead to the following conclusions:

Conclusion 1 on relevance and strategic fit

- *The programme provided useful technical assistance* to beneficiaries but only responded partially to beneficiaries' needs in such complex environment.
- *The programme scope did not systematically address beneficiaries' needs holistically.* In order to be most relevant for beneficiaries, the programme would need to consistently take more into consideration the ground level realities of beneficiaries, notably of children, in order to better impact their lives.
- *Some initial programme objectives were no longer relevant* in the context of Shan State's faltering peace process and intensified fighting in the North. However, the programme revised its intervention logic after mid-term reviews. Evaluators collected mixed views over its promptness in being responsive.
- The programme successfully brought on board Consortium partners *with complementary areas of expertise* and technical experience *without capitalizing on ILO's expertise in centrally managing large programmes.*

Conclusion 2 on effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)

- *The PRD programme was overall successful in conducting a considerable number of project activities,* reaching out to more than 150'000 beneficiaries across 104 villages in Southern, Northern and Eastern Shan State. The programme achieved most of its expected outputs despite a challenging context and an unexpected investigation case that caused some activities to be suspended.
- *Due to its large number of activities and limited coherence, more focus was given to output than outcome results, affecting the overall quality of the programme.* The PRD intervention worked with local partner organizations, community infrastructure committees, village development committees and successfully established youth platforms.
- *The majority of Consortium members would prefer to operate more as a programme (rather than distinct projects working in silos) supported by quality programme management to best serve beneficiaries.* All Consortium members would need to agree on roles and responsibilities. Protectionist attitudes would not be permitted based on prior formal agreements preceding programme implementation. Organizations would need to also clarify the distinction between top down leadership and quality programme management that requires robust monitoring from a purely technical standpoint.
- *Stronger involvement of government and MPs is key to achieve successful results.* This would require considerable efforts, in particular of bigger organizations, in order to build trust and buy in. More involvement from ILO in engaging more with the government and MPs would be expected in this regard from key leaders, Consortium partners and partner organizations.
- *The programme adopted a participatory approach that was well received, in particular for initial needs assessments, and could be improved during project design.* A more flexible budget and more thorough involvement of all beneficiaries during the project design could notably save costs based on their local knowledge and best respond to their needs. This would require allocating sufficient time in addition to taking into consideration that possible delays may occur due to unforeseen roadblocks.
- *In general, programme design and management, monitoring, coordination, communication, advocacy, budget allocation and management and the lack of smooth operations were not satisfactory to many interviewees in all groups of stakeholders.* This was mainly due to poor communication and misunderstandings among programme stakeholders, the lack of quality management, protectionist attitudes of those who wanted to operate independently, and very opposite views on roles and responsibilities and on what could be realistically expected. Without any stakeholder being right or wrong, better collaboration and communication on all sides could have contributed to a more successful programme – ultimately serving beneficiaries. A large number of them would welcome further support, notably due to funding challenges and a longer-term strategy based on “teaching how to fish rather than to be given the fish” (mentioned twice in interviews). The lack of systematic monitoring during and across the entire programme, in particular collecting outcome data, and of regular feedback collected on the ground, as well as the limited amount of field visits impacted the success and quality of the intervention, as this could have contributed to address certain issues (more) timely and effectively.

Conclusion 3 on efficiency

- *While the resource allocation covered a large amount of project activities, allowing budget revision for more in-depth technical assistance (“with a less is more” approach) would better respond to beneficiaries’ priority needs, in particular related to vocational training, education and infrastructure development. A fixed sub-grant budget allocation proved not to be adapted to the realities on the ground, notably for CBOs, children and communities in general.*
- *Sufficient budget and resources would also need to be allocated to regular multi-stakeholder meetings.*
- *Leveraging more programme resources with other interventions in the area¹⁹ would have strengthened programmatic impact.*
- *The issue related to the inability of smaller Consortium partners to pre-finance activities to close the gap before funding release was not solved, although the issue was stressed as urgent during mid-term reviews. Key stakeholders displayed opposite views on whether sharing the 7% eligible overhead costs reserved by ILO would have been possible, in order to solve the issue.*
- *The pre-funding issue, MDCG case and rejection of the no-cost extension request caused the programme to end with underspent budget. There were important remaining needs on the ground.*

Conclusion 4 on sustainability

- *The overall one-off technical assistance approach and 4-year duration of the programme did not provide a solid ground for sustainability of programme interventions – in particular in a conflict-affected environment that was more fragile and difficult to operate in.*
- *Some programme interventions included exit strategies. Other interventions did not have an exit strategy and a solid business model that beneficiaries could apply to maintain and further develop their activities.*
- *The programme provided numerous useful trainings across Shan State, notably allowing recipients to multiply them and/or utilize these skills in similar projects (such as for basic infrastructure development)*
- *While vocational training was useful for participants, the intervention lacked a systematic and consistent post-training follow-up to ensure concrete results leading to employability, employment opportunities and small business creation.*

Conclusion 5 on Impact

- *While it is too early to assess the programme impact, there are early signs of positive change in mindsets in communities facing hardship and whose voice was not heard. The PRD programme proved to have an impact on changing communities’ and in particular youths’ mindsets to create better lives for themselves and their community.*
- *As beneficiaries and local partners were strongly engaged in the intervention, the end of the project after only 4 years created an adverse impact as they feel left with considerable challenges at an early time of implementation.*
- *A second phase or a similar intervention would allow to provide further support to beneficiaries, capitalizing on emerging PRD good practices, and improving technical assistance based on lessons learned.*

Conclusion 5 on Special aspects to be addressed

- *Stronger coordination among interventions on peace building operating in the area would avoid losing opportunities of strengthening the impact or their work.*
- *Promoting social and international labour standards would require continuous efforts not only at the ground level but also involving more and building mutual trust with key leaders.*
- *Gender-related biases would need more time and closer outcome-based monitoring to be successfully tackled.*

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order not to duplicate the effort already made in the MTE, only a few new recommendations are formulated hereunder. The evaluation team is of the opinion that the recommendations of the MTE are still valid and would need to be addressed in case of a future intervention.

¹⁹ To be defined with other actors on the ground (such as for example UNDP and other organizations involved in peace building interventions)

Recommendation 1 (from conclusions 1, 2, 4 and 5) proposes to ILO and Consortium members to adopt a “less is more” approach that is more holistic when designing a similar intervention to provide more in-depth and sustainable technical assistance to beneficiaries – setting up synergies among Consortium members and with other existing programs, supported by key leaders. Priority: High / Importance: High

- **R.1.1.** Ensure programme design includes less but more in-depth technical assistance based on viable business models (for example for schools), community development strategies (tackling priority needs in a holistic way) and post-training follow-up allowing to concretely link training to income-generating activities. Such programmes conducted in conflict-affected areas should at least last 8 years.
- **R.1.2.** Adopt a systems approach to the intervention providing a coordinated package of assistance (i) within the programme through convergence activities and joint planning, (ii) at the local level with local partners, and (iii) among similar or complementary interventions (for example, to be coordinated by UNDP).
- **R.1.3.** Conduct feasibility studies prior to project implementation and regular risk assessment.
- **R.1.4.** Involve partner organizations and beneficiaries in the project design at an early stage allowing sufficient time for decision making. Information should be accessible to all and participants brought together in different groups (i.e. schoolgirls). Plan sufficient time to implement a fully participatory approach – taking into account risks of delays or of short deadlines due to possible roadblocks.
- **R.1.5.** Support systematically all partner organizations in defining an exit strategy and ensure they have full capacity to implement.
- **R.1.6.** Continue efforts in involving consistently key leaders in the PRD programme.

Recommendation 2 (from conclusion 2 and 3) proposes to ILO and PAC members to improve communication and coordination among all organizations, (with a clear common understanding of roles and responsibilities, expectations and procedures), responsive management, budget allocation, knowledge transfer and regular updates. Priority: High / Importance: High

- **R.2.1.** Formalize roles and responsibilities of each PAC members and clearly communicate expectations. A programme charter formally signed by all members would be instrumental.
- **R.2.2.** Provide responsive management in all organizations, ensure all key procedures serving the programme are well understood by the staff and make sure robust knowledge transfer is conducted for smooth programme implementation (in case of turnover).
- **R.2.3.** Provide regular updates at all levels of implementation.

Recommendation 3 (from conclusions 2 and 3) to ILO, Consortium members and PRD project staff to improve quality project management, strategic planning, programme / project design, monitoring (including regular data collection at both output and outcome levels), knowledge of procedures, knowledge sharing and support to all Consortium and partner organizations. Priority: High / Importance: High

- **R.3.1.** Define who is going to provide quality programme management and how. Ensure the Consortium structure provides the authority for staff to monitor the programme effectively and on a regular basis.
- **R.3.2.** Collect (output and outcome) data on a regular basis across the programme and request for regular feedback on the ground – for example through surveys – in order to tackle (more) timely upcoming issues. Data should be available at all times at the central and local levels (not only before writing the annual report).
- **R.3.4.** Include more field visits and DSA in the project plan and budget allocation. Include sufficient DSA for all participants to join PAC meetings. Have sufficient budget for interpretation costs during PAC meetings to avoid separate discussions due to participants speaking different languages.
- **R.3.5.** It could be within the task of an additional full-time Finance and Admin. Officer to support the M&E Officer and National Project Coordinator. This would allow them to provide all the requested programme monitoring and support to Consortium members.
- **R.3.6.** Revise and harmonize project target indicators and collect data accordingly.²⁰

²⁰ As mentioned above, it would be sound to add an indicator assessing to what extent communities perceive the project has a participatory approach.

- **R.3.7.** Include a section in project reports with consolidated results based on similar and comparable indicators (number%/communities/participants) as a powerful communication tool for programme achievements.
- **R.3.8.** Include a section in project reports on how the programme addressed gender related issues based on the PRD Gender Framework (October 2015) and document how gender-related challenges were tackled on the ground. This could feed lessons learned and good practices.
- **R.3.9.** Be constantly updated in key procedures serving the programme.
- **R.3.10.** Regularly update the Local Conflict Assessment (LCA) and link this to systematic and timely updating of the intervention logic (for timely corrective measures regarding conflict sensitivity).

Recommendation 4 (from conclusions 1, 2 and 4) to ILO, Consortium members, PRD project staff and programme key stakeholders (Government, EAOs, CBOs, CSOs, and youth platforms) to conduct regular multi-stakeholder platforms for conflict-affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, who are empowered and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process. Priority / Importance: High

- **R.4.1.** Ensure adequate budget allocation for multi-stakeholder platforms
- **R.4.2.** Carefully plan activities taking into account possible roadblocks, adopting a conflict-sensitive approach
- **R.4.3.** Clearly define roles and responsibilities – notably having the bigger organizations linking with key leaders and authorities, and supporting each other.

Recommendation 5 (from conclusions 5 and 6) to ILO, Consortium members, PRD project staff ILO and partner organizations to further integrate gender issues in the programme, reviewing the gender framework design and implementation and tracking outcome gender-related data. Priority: High / Importance: High

- **R.5.1.** Review gender framework design and implementation plan, involving all organizations;
- **R.5.2.** Include more gender-related markers and project outcomes in the logframe; and
- **R.5.3.** Monitor on a regular and consistent basis gender equality related achievements against targets – notably measuring behavioural change.

ANNEXES

- Annex 1 Terms of Reference (*Attached to this document*)
- Annex 2 Inception Report (*Attached to this document*)

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

N°	Name, title, department, organization
1	Mrs. Annick Schubert, Programme Manager – Peace Support, Delegation of the European Union to Myanmar
2	Mr. Augustine Hti San, Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Myanmar
3	Mr. Manuel De Rivera Lamo De Espinosa, Delegation of the European Union to Syria (DDAS-Damascus)
	Ms. Piyamal Pichaiwongse, Deputy Liaison Officer, ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar
5	Mr. Bas Athmer, Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Investments Programme (EIIP), ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team for East and South-East Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok
6	Mr. Sonish Vaidya, Technical Officer, ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar
7	Mr. Matthew Maguire, former Chief Technical Adviser, PRD Programme, ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar
8	Ms. Win Yu, former Finance & Administration Officer, ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar
9	Ms. Nang Kham Ying Nonk, National Project Co-ordinator, PRD Programme, ILO, Taunggyi
10	Mr. Khun Saw Aung, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, PRD Programme, ILO, Taunggyi
	Southern Shan State (SSS)
11	Mr. Philip Tun Hla Aung, Operations Manager, EPRP
12	Ms. Nang Kay Si, Coordinator, EPRP
13	Mr. Khun Paw Wan, VDC member, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
14	Mr. Khun Paw Khe, VDC Chairperson, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
15	Mr. Khun Tun Sein, VDC Community contractor, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
16	Mr. Khun Aye, VDC Community Contractor, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
17	Mr. Khun Kyoke, VDC Secretary, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
18	Ms. Kyin Htwe, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
19	Ms. Nang Kham Rweit , VDC member, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
20	Ms. Mya Kyi, student, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
21	Ms. Bwar Kyuu, student, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
22	Ms. Kham Nweit, VDC member, Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township
23	Mr. Khun Khit San, Supervisor, Taunggyi Youth Center (TYC)
24	Mr. Khun Zaw, Democracy for Ethnic Minorities Organization (DEMO)
25	Ms. Nang Nu Nwe, Democracy for Ethnic Minorities Organization (DEMO)
26	Mr. Khun Win Oo, Kaung Rwai Social Justice and Development Organisation
27	Ms. Nang Htwe Htwe Hlaing, Taunggyi Youth Center (TYC)
28	Ms. Nang Zin Nwe, Pa O Women's Union (PWO)
29	Ms. Nang Kham Phong, Chairperson, Sujata, Taunggyi
30	Ms. Nang Tar Moon, member, Sujata, Taunggyi
31	Mr. Sai Win Htwe, We are Tai, Mong Pawn
32	Mr. Phillip Htun, Member of Shan Literature and Cultural Organization
33	Mr. Khun Min Thein, Liaison Office, PNLO
34	Mr. Sai Oo, Liaison Office, RCSS
35	Ms. Nang Lao Yaung , RCSS
36	Mr. Lone Te Wein, VDC member, Laikha Capacity Buidling Youth (CBY) Center
37	Mr. Sai Pi, VDC member, Laikha CBY Youth Center
38	Mr. Sai Tun Aung, Chairperson, NaungPan village, Laikha CBY Youth Center
39	Mr. Sai Pe Thein, Counsellor, Laikha CBY Youth Center
40	Mr. Sai San Lin, Dy. Chairperson, Laikha CBY Youth Center
41	Ms. Nang Lao Kham, CBY, VDC Accountant, Laikha CBY Youth Center
42	Mr. Sai Aung Hsi, Staff, Laikha CBY Youth Center
43	Ms. Ying San Ein, Staff, Laikha CBY Youth Center
44	Mr. Sai Maung, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
45	Mr. Sai Tun Sein, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
46	Mr. Sai Mai Pan, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
47	Mr. Sai Yee Tip Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
48	Mr. Sai Hseng Mong Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
49	Mr. Sai Khun Hseng Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
50	Mr. Sai Noom Khar, Staff, Laikha CBY Youth Center
51	Ms. Nang Ying Kham, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center

N°	Name, title, department, organization
52	Ms. Nang Mon Sein, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
53	Ms. Nang Kham Oo, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
54	Ms. Nang Seng Kyin, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
55	Ms. Nang Yoom Wan, Student, Laikha CBY Youth Center
56	Ms. Nang Oam Phway, Teacher, Laikha CBY Youth Center
57	Mr. Sai Kyaw Win, VDC member, Nam Mo village, Nam Sam township
58	Ms. Nang Seng Tun, VDC member, Nam Mo village, Nam Sam township
59	Mr. Sai San Myint, VDC member, Nam Mo village, Nam Sam township
60	Ms. Nang Hseng Li, VDC member, Nam Mo village, Nam Sam township
61	Mr. Lone Kaw Lain, VDC member, Wan Pan village, Nam Sam township
	Northern Shan State (NSS)
62	Mr. Shain Min Han, Program Manager, Save the Children International (SCI)
63	Mr. Sai Tun Maung, Former SCI-EU staff, Nam Khan, Northern Shan State (NSS)
64	Ms. Nang Hwan Aye, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
65	Mr. Sai Soe Aye, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
66	Mr. Sai Mao Khey, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
67	Mr. Sai Chit Oo, Naung Moon village, Man Si, Kachin state, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
68	Mr. Sai Swan Main, Man Eike Tike village, Man Si, Kachin, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
69	Mr. Sai Haing Tai, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
70	Mr. Sai Lain Kham, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
71	Ms. Nang Hom Khay, Saung Sae CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
72	Ms. Nang Than May, Moon Leng CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
73	Mr. Sai Hsen Fa, Moon Leng CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
74	Mr. Sai Hsaiwon Leng, Moon Leng CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
75	Ms. Lway Ai Nau Wine, TLCA Taang CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
76	Ms. Lway A Moe Lin Aung, TLCA Taang CBO, Nam Kham, NSS
77	Mr. Than Kyaw, TaAng Literature and Cultural Association, Nam Kham, NSS
78	Mr. Mai Hla Aung, TaAng Literature and Cultural Association, Nam Kham, NSS
79	Mr. Sann Mone, TaAng Literature and Cultural Association, Nam Kham, NSS
80	Mr. Aik Tun, Shan Literature and Cultural Association, Nam Kham, NSS
81	Ms. Nang Ying Mwe, Moon Leng CBO and Shan Literature and Cultural Association, Nam Kham, NSS
82	Mr. Aung Linn, Area Office Coordinator, UNDP Taunggyi Field Office
83	Mr. Aik Pu, Man Maung village
84	Mr. Tun Maung, Man Maung village
85	Mr. Naw Hsam, Paju village
86	Ms. Saing Khwang, Paju village
87	Mr. Zaw June, Paju village
88	Mr. Aik Yee Hpote, Pan San village
89	Ms. AeDet, Pan San village
90	Mr. Aik Ngote, Pan San village
91	Mr. Aik Nyote, Pan San village
92	Mr. Aik Hsam, Pan San village
93	Mr. Sai Oo Kham, Member of Parliament, Hsenwi township, Northern Shan State
94	Ms. Nang Khin Htar Yee, Member of Parliament, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Hsenwi township, Northern Shan State
	Eastern Shan State (ESS)
95	Dr. Myint Aung, Director, ASG
96	Ms. Ei Thandar Aung, Manager, ASG
97	Mr. Saw Ricky Tun, Assistant Manager, ASG
98	Ms. Khin Khin Pan, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
99	Mr. Kyar Shaw, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
100	Mr. Wi Hsann, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
101	Mr. John Paul, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
102	Mr. Maw Yoe, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
103	Mr. Ah Phee, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,

N°	Name, title, department, organization
104	Mrs. Carmela, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
105	Ms. Mi Nwei, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
106	Mrs. Bu Doh, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
107	Ms. Emilia, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
108	Mr. Yah Par, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
109	Mr. Ye Htut, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township,
110	Mr. Than Taik, Thiri 2 ward 1, Administrator, Tarley township, Tachileik district
111	Mr. Zaw Aung, VDC member, ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
112	Mr. Moses, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
113	Mr. Khawng Lunn, VDC member, ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
114	Mr. Aung Myat, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
115	Ms. Chan Lwan, VDC member, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
116	Ms. Naw Mu Grey, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
117	Ms. Thein Myaw, VDC member, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
118	Ms. Nar Ee Mar, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
119	Ms. Na War Hsee, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
120	Ms. Swe Swe Linn, Ward 1, Tarley township, Tachileik district
121	Ms. Stella, VDC Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
122	Mrs. Bu Phawt, VDC Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
123	Mr. Li Byak, Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
124	Ms. Nang Thwee, Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
125	Mr. Hsaar Hu, Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
126	Mr. Ah Gaw, Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
127	Mr. Ah Lote, Hway Ta (2) village, Mong Koe village track, Tachileik township
128	Ms. Nang Phyu Phyu Lin National Advisor, Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process

Table 1 – List of persons interviewed

ANNEX 4: BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ILO Evaluation Guidelines and Check-Lists;
2. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, OECD-DAC, OECD 2010;
3. United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation (latest version: June 2016);
4. “Support to Peace, Reconciliation and Development in Myanmar” (Full application form, Reference: EuropeAid/135602/DD/ ACT /MM);
5. “EU – Shan State peace, reconciliation & development through community empowerment programme” Interim Reports for years 1, 2 and 3; and
6. Independent mid-term evaluation report, June 2017.

Additional documents / links received

7. Consolidated Results-Oriented (ROM) Report (Project reference: C-353766), April 2017;
8. “EU Funded Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation and Development Programme - Inception Period – Internal Review », October 2015;
9. “EU PRD programme gender framework”, October 2015;
10. “Local Conflict Assessment – Work in progress”, March 2017;
11. “EU Funded Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation and Development Programme – List of local partners and beneficiaries”;
12. “Shan Consortium Partners – Expertise areas and Locations”
13. “Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Programme Advisory Committee (PAC)”;
14. Programme Advisory Committee meeting minutes, 2017-2018;
15. “Proposed Logframe Revisions”, January 2018;
16. Financial statements for years 1, 2 and 3;
17. “Budget revision update - Addenda or use of contingencies”, February 2019;
18. No-cost extension request to the EU;
19. “Year-4 Consortium table of progress against project indicators”;
20. Updated Year-4 Consortium table of progress against project indicators”;
21. www.eprpinformation.org; and
22. Multi-platform meeting record and video documentary.

Based on the initial documents provided by the project for the desk review, the consultant requested for the following documents (if available) in consultation with national project team members:

- | | |
|--|--|
| – Project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan; | – Project progress / activity reports and training evaluations submitted to ILO Liaison office in Myanmar; |
| – Revised logframe; | – Updated Year-4 Consortium progress; |
| – Full risk analysis and management plan; | – Gender strategy; |
| – Local Conflict Assessment (Version January 2017); | – Communication strategy and material; |
| – Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Programme Advisory Committee (PAC); | – Modification of implementing partner amendment request to the EU |
| – Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) review; | |

ANNEX 5: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL & SURVEY

EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS:

The evaluation addresses the following ILO evaluation criteria (based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria) as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2017. A complete set of questions by each criterion is outlined below:

Relevance and strategic fit

- Examine whether the programme has responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries and still is consistent and relevant to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?
- Is the programme relevant to the donors' priorities and policy, implementing partners' need? Are the programme results or approach strategic and include the comparative advantage of the ILO?
- What are the current areas of interest of the key stakeholder's vis-à-vis project original theme – whether there have deviated from the original design. What could have contributed to changes, if any? To what extent the project has adapted to those changes?

Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)

- Have the programme achieved its planned objectives? Particularly the empowerment activity efforts – assess whether its approach is effective.
- If not, what are the main constraints, problems?
- Have the Consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?
- The extent to which the recommendations of the midterm evaluation have been addressed?
- How other stakeholders been involved in programme implementation?
- Does the programme monitoring plan exist and whether the baseline data has been collected and data collected over time?
- What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed?

Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)

- Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve results? And have they been delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs? Any measures that has been put in place?
- Has there been a coherent implementation approaches among the Consortium members? Given different geographical targeting by Consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the Consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches. Would it be possible for the Consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium? If so what and how?
- The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximize impact, if any?
- Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant)? If not why?

Sustainability

- The extent to which the results of the intervention are likely to be durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed
- How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?

Impact

- Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project's interventions? If so, how has the project strategy been adjusted? Have positive effects been integrated into the project strategy? Has the strategy been adjusted to minimize negative effects?
- Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?
- What are the possible long-term effects on gender equality and are the gender related outcomes likely to be sustainable?
- To what extent has the project contributed to its development objective at global and country levels?

Special aspects to be addressed

- Has there been any synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives in the area? If so, is it likely to enhance the impact of the programme?
- The extent that the programme has promoted ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standard (taking into consideration the context of the project)
- The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation.

Description of data collection instruments:

The main data collection instruments used in this evaluation are following: project data, semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The evaluation also included a short survey including a SWOT analysis that was distributed to interviewees.

Protocols : (V) ILO - (W) Tripartite stakeholders, consortium members and donor representatives - (X) National project team - (Y) Beneficiaries - (Z) Others

code	Evaluation questions	Criteria	Sources	Method Interview (individual / groups = I, Document review = DR, Survey = S)	Interview / Protocol Questions	Group protocol
REL1	Examine whether the programme has responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries and still is consistent and relevant to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?	Relevance and strategic fit	i) ILO constituents (Government, social partners and beneficiaries); ii) ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant); and iii) ILO national project team	I / DR	To what extent has the project responded to beneficiaries' needs / Do you feel that your needs have correctly been understood and addressed? (Y) How well did the programme respond to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?	V-W-X-Y
REL2	Is the programme relevant to the donors' priorities and policy, implementing partners' need? Are the programme results or approach strategic and include the comparative advantage of the ILO?	Relevance and strategic fit	i) ILO constituents (Government, social partners and beneficiaries); ii) ILO offices; iii) ILO national project team; and iv) donors	I / DR	How well did the project respond to the donor's priorities and policy, implementing partners' needs (taking also into consideration ILO comparative advantage)?	V-W-X
REL3	What is the current areas of interest of the key stakeholder's vis-à-vis project original theme – whether there have deviated from the original design. What could have contributed to changes, if any? To what extent the project has adapted to those changes?	Relevance and strategic fit	i) ILO constituents (Government, social partners and beneficiaries); ii) ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant); and iii) ILO national project team	I / DR	What are the areas of the project that correspond most to key stakeholders' / your needs? Have actual areas of interest changed during the project? If yes, why and how did the project adapt to these changes?	V-W-X
EFF1	Have the programme achieved its planned objectives? Particularly the empowerment activity efforts – assess whether its approach is effective. If not, what are the main constraints, problems?	Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)	i) ILO constituents (Government, social partners and beneficiaries); ii) ILO operational staff at Headquarters; and (iii) National Project Coordinators (NPCs).	I / DR	What activities have been implemented and tools provided to achieve the project objectives? How effective were the empowerment activity efforts? What were the main constraints and how were they addressed by the project?	V-W-X-Y
EFF2	What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed? Have the consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?	Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)	ILO staff, national project team, Consortium Programme Advisory Committee and other relevant stakeholders	I / DR	What has been the role of the Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? What went well and what could be improved?	V-W-X
EFF3	The extent to which the recommendations of the midterm evaluation have been addressed?	Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)	ILO staff and national project team	I / DR	Have all MTE recommendations been addressed and to what extent? If not, why?	V-X
EFF4	How other stakeholders been involved in programme implementation?	Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)	ILO staff, national project team, Consortium Programme Advisory Committee and other relevant stakeholders	I / DR	What mechanisms were in place to involve other relevant stakeholders?	V-X
EFF5	Does the programme monitoring plan exist and whether the baseline data has been collected and data collected over time?	Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I / DR	Does the monitoring plan exist? Has the baseline data and data been collected over time?	V-X
EFFIC1	Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve results? And have they been delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs? Any measures that has been put in place?	Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)	i) ILO constituents (Government, social partners and beneficiaries); ii) ILO operational staff at Headquarters; and (iii) National Project Coordinators (NPCs).	I / DR	To what extent has the project efficiently managed its resources? Were outputs delivered in a timely manner? If not, why?	V-W-X

EFFIC2	Has there been a coherent implementation approaches among the consortium members? Given different geographical targeting by consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches. Would it be possible for the consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium? If so what and how?	Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I	To what extent has the consortium of project partners contributed to project results? How well did they work together? Given different geographical targeting by consortium partners, could they undertake more convergence activities in a collaborative manner? If yes, how?	V-W-X
EFFIC3	The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximise impact, if any?	Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I / DR	To what extent did the project maximize its impact through leveraging its resources with other related interventions?	V-X
EFFIC4	Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT-Bangkok, and HQ if relevant)? If not why?	Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I	Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices? If not why?	V-X
SUST1	The extent to which the results of the intervention are likely to be durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed	Sustainability	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I	To what extent is the intervention likely to be sustainable, could be scaled up and replicated after the project ended?	V-W-X
SUST2	How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?	Sustainability	ILO HQ, NPCs and stakeholders	I	ibid	V-W-X
IMP1	Can any unintended or unexpected positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project's interventions? If so, how has the project strategy been adjusted? Have positive effects been integrated into the project strategy? Has the strategy been adjusted to minimize negative effects?	Impact	ILO staff and national project team	I	Has there been any positive or negative effects related to the intervention? If yes, how did the project adapt its strategy to these effects?	V-X
IMP2	Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?	Impact	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I	ibid	V-W-X
IMP3	What are the possible long-term effects on gender quality and are the gender related outcomes likely to be sustainable?	Impact	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I	Ibid	V-W-X
IMP4	To what extent has the project contributed to its development objective at global and country levels?	Impact	ILO staff and national project team	I / DR	Ibid	V-W-X
SPA1	Has there been any synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives in the area? If so, is it likely to enhance the impact of the programme?	Special aspects to be addressed	ILO staff, national project team, Consortium Programme Advisory Committee and other relevant stakeholders	I / DR	How did the project connect the dots between programme and other initiatives to enhance the impact of the intervention? How well did it work?	V-X
SPA2	The extent that the programme has promoted ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standard (taking into consideration the context of the project)	Special aspects to be addressed	ILO staff and national project team	I / DR	To what extent did the intervention contribute to promote ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standards?	V-X
SPA3	The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation.	Special aspects to be addressed	ILO staff and national project team	I / DR	What gender mainstreaming strategy did the project design and implement? What were the outcomes?	V-X
SWOT	What went well an further will	General / SO	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I / DR / S	Ibid / What will remain	V-W-X-Y
SWOT	What went ill and can change / further will (if issue not tackled)	General / WT	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I / DR / S	Ibid / What major risks did the project take into consideration and should if a second phase takes place?	V-W-X-Y
LL	Which lessons learnt at the country level could serve similar interventions in other countries?	General / LL	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I	Ibid	V-X
GP	What good practices could be replicated in other ILO / country projects or programmes?	General / KM	ILO staff, national project team and key stakeholders	I	Ibid	V-X

Table 2 – Data collection plan worksheet

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL:

Key questions for ILO (V) / Donor, tripartite and other stakeholders and Consortium members (W) / National project team members (X) / Beneficiaries

code	Interview / Protocol Questions	Group protocol
REL1	To what extent has the project responded to beneficiaries' needs / Do you feel that your needs have correctly been understood and addressed? (Y) How well did the programme respond to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?	V-W-X-Y
REL2	How well did the project respond to the donors' priorities and policy, implementing partners' needs (taking also into consideration ILO comparative advantage)?	V-W-X
REL3	What are the areas of the project that correspond most to key stakeholders' / your needs? Have actual areas of interest changed during the project? If yes, why and how did the project adapt to these changes?	V-W-X
EFF1	What activities have been implemented and tools provided to achieve the project objectives? How effective were the empowerment activity efforts? What were the main constraints and how were they addressed by the project?	V-W-X-Y
EFF2	What has been the role of the Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? What went well and what could be improved?	V-W-X
EFF3	Have all MTE recommendations been addressed and to what extent? If not, why?	V-X
EFF4	What mechanisms were in place to involve other relevant stakeholders?	V-X
EFF5	Does the monitoring plan exist? Has the baseline data and data been collected over time?	V-X
EFFIC1	To what extent has the project efficiently managed its resources? Were outputs delivered in a timely manner? If not, why?	V-W-X
EFFIC2	To what extent has the consortium of project partners contributed to project results? How well did they work together? Given different geographical targeting by consortium partners, could they undertake more convergence activities in a collaborative manner? If yes, how?	V-W-X
EFFIC3	To what extent did the project maximize its impact through leveraging its resources with other related interventions?	V-X

EFFIC4	Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices? If not, why?	V-X
SUST1	To what extent is the intervention likely to be sustainable, could be scaled up and replicated after the project ended?	V-W-X
SUST2	How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?	V-W-X
IMP1	Has there been any positive or negative effects related to the intervention? If yes, how did the project adapt its strategy to these effects?	V-X
IMP2	Should there be a second phase of the project to consolidate achievements?	V-W-X
IMP3	What are the possible long-term effects on gender equality and are the gender related outcomes likely to be sustainable?	V-W-X
IMP4	To what extent has the project contributed to its development objective at global and country levels?	V-W-X
SPA1	How did the project connect the dots between programme and other initiatives to enhance the impact of the intervention? How well did it work?	V-X
SPA2	To what extent did the intervention contribute to promote ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standards?	V-X
SPA3	What gender mainstreaming strategy did the project design and implement? What were the outcomes?	V-X
SWOT	What went well and further will?	V-W-X-Y
SWOT	What went ill and can change / further will? What major risks did the project take into consideration and should if a second phase takes place?	V-W-X-Y
LL	Which lessons learnt at the country level could serve other ILO / country projects or programmes?	V-X
GP	What good practices could be replicated in other ILO / country projects or programmes?	V-X

Table 3 – Interview / protocol questions

PRD Final Independent Evaluation:

Document to be distributed and collected at the end of meetings

➔ ENGLISH VERSION

PRD Final Independent Evaluation:

Document to be distributed and collected at the end of meetings

What is your role in the project? (Please mark your answer with a cross)

- ILO Office staff (Liaison Office, HQ technical department or DWT-Bangkok)
- National project team member
- Donor representative
- Consortium Programme Advisory Committee member
- Other project stakeholder
- Beneficiary representative

A. *How satisfied are you overall with the project outcomes? (Please mark your answer with a cross.)*

1 = Very dissatisfied	2 = Somewhat dissatisfied	3 = Somewhat satisfied	4 = Very satisfied

Comments:

B. *To what extent do you consider the project has achieved its expected outcomes?*

0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%

Comments:

C. *Please provide any additional comment in the SWOT table below:*

STRENGTHS (S)	OPPORTUNITIES (O)
WEAKNESSES (W)	THREATS (T)

Thank you for your participation!

➔ BURMESE VERSION

Document to be distributed and collected at the end of meetings

ဤစာရွက်စဉ်ပေး၍ အစည်းအဝေးအပြီးတွင် ပျံ့နှံ့ညွှန်ကြားရေးဌာနသို့ ပို့ပေးရန်အတွက် အတည်ပြုပေးပါ။ ။

What is your role in the project? (Please mark your answer with a cross)

12.04.2019	
15 - 30.04.2019	Stakeholders interviewed by Skype and
30.04.2019	Draft evaluation report
20.05.2019	Final evaluation report
31.05.2019	Evaluation Manager submits revised report to EVAL

Table 4 - Evaluation schedule

The table below presents the repartition of interviewees by category: 39% female – 61% male

128 Stakeholders	Numbers
Donor representatives	3
ILO	5
ILO Project team (Taunggyi)	2
Consortium partners	7
Other project Stakeholders	56
Beneficiary representatives	55

Table 5 – Number of stakeholders interviewed

ANNEX 7: EVALUATION SURVEY RESULTS

→ A. “How satisfied are you overall with the project outcomes?”

ILO			
1 = Very dissatisfied	2 = Somewhat dissatisfied	3 = Somewhat satisfied	4 = Very satisfied
0%	0%	67%	33%
Consortium partners			
1 = Very dissatisfied	2 = Somewhat dissatisfied	3 = Somewhat satisfied	4 = Very satisfied
0%	0%	86%	14%
Other stakeholders and donor			
1 = Very dissatisfied	2 = Somewhat dissatisfied	3 = Somewhat satisfied	4 = Very satisfied
2%	5%	42%	51%
Beneficiaries			
1 = Very dissatisfied	2 = Somewhat dissatisfied	3 = Somewhat satisfied	4 = Very satisfied
0%	2%	51%	47%

Table 6 – Survey results – Question A

→ B. “To what extent do you consider the project has achieved its expected outcomes?”

ILO			
0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%
0%	0%	67%	33%
Consortium partners			
0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%
0%	14%	86%	0%
Other stakeholders and donor			
0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%
2.5%	26%	38%	33.5%
Beneficiaries			
0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%
0%	5%	50%	45%

Table 7 – Survey results – Question B

STRENGTHS (S)	OPPORTUNITIES (O)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regular PAC meetings – coordination platform - Project activities (including more than 100 trainings) well received by communities – as the project responds to their needs - Through its staff, the project involved local resources and different communities in project areas - Needs assessment conducted in a systematic way, involving communities who know their geographical area, existing expertise and needs; this allowed to provide relevant support to communities. - Working in collaboration with a UN organization is a strength as it is a recognized organization. - Communities, youth, women and local CBOs / CSOs empowered through capacity building and awareness raising - Communities are grateful and overall somewhat / very satisfied for the project activities implemented in their communities, and for notably gaining skills and knowledge on peace building, democracy and human rights, women and child rights, and forced labour. - Strengthened capacity of women and youth (more confidence and assertiveness) - Roads are no longer slippery (safer for children); water tanks allow to save time. - Contributes to decrease of youth unemployment; training, even of limited time, allowed to provide (voluntary or paid) work opportunities for some youth. - Youth empowerment – they realize that education can help them to have a better life. - More education contributes to socio-economic development and health, and to peace building. - More transparency through knowledge and education - The project is supportive of women development and peace. - Improvement of living standards in communities - The project brings together youth and representatives from different ethnic groups – contributing to reduce discrimination. - Inclusive education supports peace building. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Willingness to collaborate from CBOs and EAOs in project areas - High demand and active participation of the conflict affected communities for their development activities - Willingness of stakeholders to engage in national peace and reconciliation by providing educational opportunities and vocational training - Strengthened education, unity and network - More opportunities for women and youth - Trust building with EAOs and government - Learn from external expertise.
WEAKNESSES (W)	THREATS (T)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Effectiveness of management arrangement - Project lead, monitoring and communication across the project; lack of systematic approach; report writing - Coordination between all Consortium partners; limited communication among partners - Intervention is too short to be sustainable; activities stop when people are getting motivated. - Late ILO involvement; stakeholders not always informed about other project activities and that this is an ILO project - Late implementation - Funding not available in a timely manner; unspent budget and some activities were not conducted - Project “not human-centered, designed at a higher level” - not always matching the needs of those at the ground level, implementing the project (i.e. need to leave earning jobs and to focus on the success of the 4-year project; unpaid salary) - A better project could be done with more impact. - Small funding compared to communities' needs - Building design (top-down approach): VDCs not always involved in the building design and decision making; additional needs not tackled (i.e. need to improve the ceiling) - Shortage of teachers and funding for education; lack of training tools and school materials - Training provided in some cases insufficient (training time too short) - Difficulty to communicate due to different languages; large majority of teachers only speak Burmese while beneficiaries are not fluent in Burmese. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political climate, local culture and threats by armed forces – not favorable to the project objectives - Conflict in project areas – travel restriction, security issues (travel restrictions increased since 2018) - Uncertain and complex peace process - Low capacity / technical knowledge (communities), weak community organization, lack of property rights in rural areas, and lack of viable livelihood options - Lack of awareness / interest in the project by parents / elderly - Drug abuse is a threat for youth involvement. - Insufficient salary for survival of CBOs and staff: high turnover.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Other important needs not covered for youth centers / communities (such as road construction or expansion, fencing, security, and electricity, classrooms are too small and noisy, shortage of food and computers (some are not working). There are many requirements for a sustainable youth center.- Women participation is perceived in several cases as still weak.	
---	--

Table 8 – SWOT analysis

- ✓ Achieved or exceeded
- Work in progress (WIP) or no target (NT)
- Not achieved or ND

Y3 Interim Report = “Interim Report – (Year 3) Reporting Period 15 March 2017 to 14 March 2018 (DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766)”

N/D = No data provided at the time of the independent final evaluation

<p>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: <i>Conflict-affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, are empowered and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process. (*Wording revised in Year 3 reporting period)</i></p> <p>➔ (1) Target: 20 % of issues raised by community representatives in multi-stakeholder forums at township level were acknowledged by duty bearers or key leaders.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (1) Target exceeded during the third year of project implementation (based on Y3 Interim Report): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Target exceeded as an average of Consortium partners’ assessments of acknowledgement of duty bearers – 70% - with a range from 50% to 100% across Consortium partners. However, the number of issues resolved or remedied remains at around or less than 20% as an average.” “Another key event was a forum with members of the Shan State Parliament where SCI youth CBO partners and wider youth from conflict-affected areas raised their protection concerns relating to children in armed conflict and also on the issue of the importance of youth voices being heard in the peace process. The forum had to be approved by the General Administration Department and the Union Parliament – with meeting minutes shared with both after the forum took place. Whilst onerous this had the effect of widening the dissemination of the issues raised. This meeting is believed to be the first of its kind between youth groups and Shan State Parliamentarians solely on issues of youth and peace and children affected by armed conflict and has formed a sound basis for follow-up action.” (Y3 – Activity 1.1.3) ○ (1) N/D (%) for Year 4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ASG reports in a draft Interim Report – (Year 4) Reporting Period 15 March 2017 to 14 March 2018 - that initially most authorities refused to participate in meetings where issues raised in community dialogues and multi-stakeholder meetings were presented. Only some authorities and EAOs participated in such meetings. They however refused to participate in discussions, answer questions or acknowledge issues raised by communities. ASG then approached media groups and, thanks to their support, high traffic tax collecting was stopped by authorities at Crony U Tun Aung Gate in March 2019. Further to the independent mid-term evaluation commissioned by ILO in June 2017, ASG introduced the “Meet Your Member of Parliament” (MYMP) programme, allowing communities to raise issues directly with MPs. As a result, in total 6 issues were solved through MPs’ mediation. This includes the land grabbing issue in Mongphyat and reducing initially high electricity charges in Tachileik.
---	---

<p>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2</p> <p><i>To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict (*Wording revised in Year 3 reporting period)</i></p> <p>➔ (1) # of actions undertaken at the state, regional or national level that address child rights issues, under-age recruitment and/or forced labour. Target – not applicable as incident based/i.e. responsive.</p> <p>➔ (2) Target: 40 % of communities in which children and adults reported an increased perception of a protective environment for children affected by armed conflict. Target – 40%</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (1) Based on the formal Country Task Force for Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) system: 8 Shan-based discharges over the course of the Action and in Year 3 reporting period and the preference/direction of the Tatmadaw for peace support actors to not engage EAOs on UNSCR1612 and under-age recruitment issues remains. (See Y3 Interim Report) ○ (2) N/D (%)
<p>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 3</p> <p><i>To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment.</i></p> <p>➔ (1) 40% of conflict affected communities adopting participatory processes in their community action plans.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project reports in its Y3 Interim Report that 100% (all) communities worked with <i>to date</i> have adopted participatory approaches in their action plans. ▪ <u>Based on the Independent Final Evaluation findings:</u> It should be noted that, while the project has systematically adopted a participatory approach in conducting needs assessments, VDCs, village communities and beneficiaries for 60% of community infrastructure projects mention they would have appreciated to be more thoroughly involved during the design of the school buildings or road constructions, notably to consider alternative solutions to the project design (and subsequent cost reduction).

Table 9 – Project progress against PRD Specific Objectives

Annex 10 –Project Progress as reported by the project (*Based on Table of Progress against PRD target indicators*)

- ✓ Achieved or exceeded
- Work in progress (WIP) or no target (NT)
- Not achieved or ND

Y3 Interim Report = “Interim Report – (Year 3) Reporting Period 15 March 2017 to 14 March 2018 (DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766)”

N/D = No data in the table of progress against target indicators

1. To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged in the peace and reconciliation process, supporting inclusive peace processes			
	1a % of issues raised by community representatives in multi stakeholder forums at township level that were acknowledged by duty bearers or key leaders	20% (Consortium)	○ N/D (%)
1.1 Conflict affected communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, are empowered and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process			
	1.1a # and % increase of average participation of women and youth participants in multi stakeholder forums	40% (Consortium)	○ ND (# and %)
	1.1b % of issues in the multi stakeholder forums that reflects the concerns that are specific to women, youth and/or children	50% (Consortium)	○ N/D (%)
	1.1c Average % of women who express their views in community peace dialogues	40% (Consortium)	▪ There has been incremental improvement – up from both Year 1 and Year 2 – on women raising issues in the community dialogue sessions, but remaining just below the target of 40%. (Y3 Interim Report)
1.1.1 Community dialogue in each project location to hear local concerns and establish possible ways to engage the community in the peace (R1.1)			
1	1.1.1a # of community dialogues conducted in the community	MDCG, SCI, EPRP, ASG, ILO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 50/50 ✓ SCI: 117/100 ✓ EPRP: 53/50 ▪ MDCG: 182/215 ✓ ASG: 481/480
1.1.2 Sensitive listening to hear and record personal and community stories to feed into conflict analysis (Activity 0.1), and development of communication materials (Activity 1.1.4.)			
2	1.1.2a # of community stories fed into conflict analysis	EPRP, ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ EPRP: 155/150 ✓ ASG: 20/20
	1.1.2b # and types of communication materials developed	Proposed to be dropped	N/A
1.1.3 - Establishment of multi-stakeholder dialogue forums at community and township level that feed into regional and national forums, including Ceasefire Liaison Offices, and existing complaints mechanisms and can call for feedback and follow up on issues raised			

3	1.1.3a # of multi-stakeholder forums and/or mechanisms developed at community and township levels that will highlight the importance of local issues, bringing these to the attention of parties engaged in regional and national forums under or related to the peace process political dialogue.	ILO, MDCG, ASG, EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 10/10 ✓ SCI: 53/50 ✓ EPRP: 7/4 ▪ MDCG: 4/5 ✓ ASG: 50/48
1.1.4 – Production and dissemination of information materials to share community perspectives and knowledge about the peace process			
4	1.1.4a # and types of information materials produced and disseminated	EPRP, MDCG, ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPRP: 2/3 listening books, 13/16 web-DVD, 17/16 community videos ▪ MDCG: (i) 500/2500 pamphlets +283 T-shirts (16 Days), 115 T-shirts (IDP); (ii) 0/240 wall sheets with peace information and logo ▪ ASG: 3855/6000 Newsletters, 5131/21600 pamphlets + 1000 T-shirts, 400 jackets
5	1.1.4b # of EPRP web-site visitor/Month	EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ EPRP: 135482 / 120000 (5645/5000 per month for 24 months in Y3 and Y4)
6	1.1.4c # of visitor reach EPRP radio program through Facebook, sound cloud and Web site)	EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPRP: 51538/72000 (2147/30000 per month for 24 months in Y 3 and Y4)
	1.1.4b # and types of information materials disseminated	proposed to be combined with 1.1.4a	N/A
1.1.5 - Training on governance, rights and responsibilities for i) Government (Home Affairs, DSW, Education Departments) and ii) on EAOs (ethnic administrations - welfare/ social/education departments) with particular focus on issues including children and women and protection of civilians in conflict			
7	1.1.5a # of government staff trained on governance, rights and responsibilities	ILO, ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 60/50 ✓ ASG: 45/40
8	1.1.5b # of EAO members trained on governance, rights and responsibilities	ILO, ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 170/150 ✓ ASG: 20/20
1.2 Local CBOs and civil society are resourced and capacitated to respond to protection needs and the peace process			
	1.2a % of sampled CBOs who state they are high or very confident in self-reported confidence levels in their activities completed to date by the end of the action	40% (Consortium)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ N/D (%)
	1.2b % of communities who recognize and state the role of the CBO as important to protection and/or peace affecting community life	60% (Consortium)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ N/D (%)
1.2.1 - Identification of locations, CBOs and community leadership structures at village level where Consortium partners have access for collaboration			
9	1.2.1a # of locations identified	ILO, ASG, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 4 (village track covering population of 42002) / over 130 locations shared ▪ SCI: 52 / 130 locations shared ▪ MDCG: 30 VDCs, 6 CBOs / 130 locations shared ▪ ASG: 50 communities and 10 CBOs / 130 locations shared

	1.2.2 Assessment of CBO needs and capacity, to inform required areas of support		
10	1.2.2a # of CBOs assessed for needs and capacity	ASG, ILO, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 14-6/14-4 Peace related CBOs and 10/10 VDCs ✓ SCI: 5/5 ▪ MDCG: 6/6-2 peace related CBOs and 0/4 VDCs ✓ ASG: 10/10
	1.2.3 Sub-granting mechanism set up		
11	1.2.3a # of CBOs receiving subgrants	ILO, ASG, MDCG, SCI, EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 38/20 ✓ SCI: 5/5 ✓ EPRP: 12/12 CBOs with 20/20 grants ▪ MDCG: 2/4 (for Y3 and Y4) ✓ ASG: 10/10
	1.2.4 Technical skills training to support CBOs in peace related activities for the benefit of communities		
12	1.2.4a # of CBOs trained in skills for peace related activities	ILO, ASG, MDCG, SCI, EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 24/6 (<i>focus on 6 CBOs after MTE</i>) ✓ SCI: 5/5 ✓ EPRP: 24/20 CBOs and 15/12 topics ▪ MDCG: 6 communities (with 378 participants) / <30 VDCs; 6 "Peace" CSOs> ✓ ASG: 10/10
	1.3 CLOs are informed about the peace process, fulfilling the role of information hubs for their communities		
	1.3a % of CLOs who fulfil their roles and responsibilities as information hubs	70% (Consortium)	N/D (%)
	1.3.1 - Develop training curriculum for EAG Ceasefire Liaison Officers (CLO) to include good governance facilitation, negotiation and communication skills		
13	1.3.1a Training curriculum completed	ASG, ILO, EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 4/4 + 7 shorter curricula ✓ EPRP: 12/12 Training curricula and 12 /12 web-based & face to face modules ✓ ASG: 10/10
	1.3.2 – Sensitive interviewer listening training to Ceasefire Liaison Offices, especially around gender and youth, to ensure greater inclusion of marginalised voices (R1.3).		
14	1.3.2a # of Ceasefire Liaison Officers and/or community volunteers trained in Sensitive Interviewer Listening	EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ EPRP: 50/50
	1.3.3 – Training on conflict resolution, international humanitarian law, basic media skills (R1.3)		
15	1.3.3a # of participants trained in conflict resolution, international humanitarian law and basic media skills	EPRP, ILO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 155/150 ✓ EPRP: 818/720
	1.3.4 - Assist the ceasefire LO to develop communication strategies to regularly maintain two-way communication among LO and the community on conflict related matters and develop practical strategies for conflict reporting and mitigation (R1.3)		
	1.3.4a # and types of communications mechanisms set up between CLO and communities	Proposed to be Dropped	N/A

	# of Community to EAOs information mechanism and # of EAOs to community information mechanism	Proposed to be Dropped	N/A
2. Stakeholders create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict			
	2a # of actions undertaken at the state, regional or national level that address child rights issues, underage recruitment and/or forced labour across Shan State	N/A (as it is incident based)	N/A
	2b % of communities in which children and adults reported an increased perception of a protective environment for children affected by armed conflict	40% (Consortium)	N/D (%)
4.1. Presence of Consortium partners enables enhanced appreciation and understanding of issues faced by children, informing more effective CTFMR responses across Shan State			
	2.1a Evidence of conflict sensitive approaches that are adopted by CTFMR in Shan state, including EAOs operating in the state	<i>targets outside of control of action</i>	N/A
	2.1b # and % increase of grave violations and/or forced labour issues reported	50% (50) (Consortium)	N/D (# and %)
2.1.1 – CBOs trained and carry out community monitoring of Tatmadaw and EAOs on UNSCR1612			
16	2.1.1a # of CBOs trained to carry out community monitoring (MRM)	MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SCI: 5/5 ○ MDCG: 0/30 (not commenced yet)
17	2.1.1b # of issues that are monitored that are raised by community-based organizations to key leaders	SCI	? SCI: 40/20%
2.1.2 – Sensitisation of EAOs on issues of child use and recruitment as well as alternatives to lay the ground for action plans and demobilisation			
18	2.1.2a # of EAO members sensitized on issues of child use and recruitments	ILO, SCI, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – ILO: 90 (subject to EAO) – SCI: 94 (Subject to EAO) – MDCG: 0 (subject to EAO)
2.2. Children are demobilised into a protective and rights-based environment, and have received social and economic reintegration support			
	2.2a % of demobilised children/youth who report that reintegration has been successful	60% (Consortium)	○ N/D (%)
2.2.1 – CBOs carry out dialogue and sensitization to communities on forced labour, child protection and child rights			
19	2.2.1a # of community members receiving sensitization on forced labour, child protection and child rights	ASG, ILO, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 342/300 ✓ SCI: 29830/27000 ▪ MDCG: 6/30 communities ✓ ASG: 10900/8000

	2.2.2 – CBOs support social reintegration practices, including tracing and monitoring of children and families affected by armed conflict		
20	2.2.2a # of cases subject to EAOs' actions towards demobilization of child soldiers in their armed groups and # of other grave violation cases	ILO, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 60 located and 9 identified (18%) / 60 (shared by ILO, MDCG and SCI) ▪ SCI: 23/60 (shared by ILO, MDCG and SCI) ○ MDCG: 0/60 (shared by ILO, MDCG and SCI)
21	2.2.2b % of demobilized children reintegrated with their families	SCI	? SCI: 18/90%
	2.2.3 Identify demobilised youth for referral to NFE, vocational orientation and livelihood skills training (see Activity 3.2 below)		
22	2.2.3a % of demobilized, released youth and/or youth affected by conflict identified and referred to NFE/FE vocational orientation, livelihood skills training and other appropriate support services	ILO, MDCG, ASG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 80%/90% ✓ SCI: 100%/90% ○ MDCG: -- /50% (not commenced yet) ○ ASG: -- /50% (not commenced yet)
	2.2.4 - Youth Platforms established by CBOs and provided with training to enable youth themselves to advocate for non-recruitment of children, including monitoring of child rights situation, and non-stigmatization of youth in reintegration		
23	2.2.4a # of youth platforms established by CBOs	ASG, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ SCI: 50/50 ▪ MDCG: 1/30 ✓ ASG: 10/10
24	2.2.4b # of youth attending trainings provided by CBOs	ASG, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ SCI: 3637/3200 ✓ MDCG: 30/30 ✓ ASG: 7334/4800
25	2.2.4c # of issues that are monitored that are raised by Youth Platforms to key leaders	ASG, MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SCI: 49 (demand based) - MDCG: N/D (demand based) - ASG: N/D (demand based)
	3. To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment		
	3a. % of conflict-affected communities (project villages) adopting participatory processes (incremental milestones over project life cycle)	40% (Consortium)	N/D (%)
	3.1. Communities have vision and capacity leading to the identification, planning and implementation of village development activities, including village infrastructure and livelihoods expansion, based on an inclusive and transparent consultation process		
	3.1a # of villages including participatory processes in their community Action Plans	25 (Consortium)	N/D (%)
	3.1.1 Community design, planning and construction of infrastructure through Village Development Committees (VDCs)		
26	3.1.1a # of workdays of work generated	ILO, ASG, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 16340/1700 (shared by ILO and MDCG) ○ MDCG: -- (N/D) /1700 (ILO and MDCG) ✓ ASG: 3550/3000
	3.1.2 Capacity building of Village Development Committees and community contractors in project management		

27	3.1.2a # of community contractors trained in project management	ILO, ASG, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ILO: 27/41 (shared by ILO, MDCG and ASG) - MDCG: 5/41 (ILO, MDCG and ASG) - ASG: 20/41 (ILO, MDCG and ASG) ✓ <u>Total: 52/41</u>
28	3.1.2b # of VDCs trained in project management	ILO, ASG, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 18/11 ✓ MDCG: 30/30 ▪ ASG: 18/20
29	3.1.2c # of skilled and semi-skilled workers trained	ILO, ASG, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 100/100 (shared by ILO and MDCG) - (MDCG: not commenced yet) ▪ <u>Total: 100/100</u> ▪ ASG: 25/30
3.1.3 Vocational skills training for target communities involved in the construction of rural infrastructure			
30	3.1.3a # of community members involved in construction who attend trainings on vocational skills	ILO, ASG, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 112/100 (shared by ILO and MDCG) - (MDCG: not commenced yet) ✓ <u>Total: 112/100</u> ✓ ASG: 62/30
3.1.4. Training of Operation and Maintenance Committees on their roles and responsibilities			
31	3.1.4a # of Operation and maintenance committee members trained	ILO, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ILO: 18/20 (shared by ILO and MDCG) ○ (MDCG: not commenced yet) ▪ <u>Total: 18/20</u>
3.2. In identified target areas, vulnerable, conflict-affected youth (up to 25 years) have received Non- Formal (NFE) and livelihood skills training			
	3.2a % of youth who are trained in NFE who score a minimum of xx in the post test	80%	N/D (%)
	3.2b % of those who received entrepreneurship training are able to start their own livelihoods	50%	N/D (%)
3.2.1 Provision of alternative livelihoods options through NFE, vocational orientation based on market assessment, skills training for livelihoods or entrepreneurship			
32	3.2.1a # of individuals are provided with skills training or entrepreneurship training	ILO, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ILO: 764/750 (shared by ILO and MDCG) - MDCG: 85/750 (shared by ILO and MDCG) ✓ <u>Total: 849/750</u>
33	3.2.1b # and % of the women trained in skills training or entrepreneurship training	ILO, MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 76%/40%
3.2.2 Non-formal education (NFE) training provided to targeted conflict-affected youth identified as vulnerable			
34	3.2.2a # and % of youth trained in NFE	MDCG, SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ SCI: 66%/65% ? MDCG: 2 youths / 50%
35	3.2.2b # and % of targeted women trained in NFE	MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? MDCG: 2 women / 50%
3.2.3 Safe migration and labour rights awareness provided to vulnerable youth (i.e. identified as wishing to migrate for works elsewhere outside of the conflicts zone) (R3.2)			
36	3.2.3a # of youth identified who are made aware regarding safe migration and labour rights	ILO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ILO: 347/250

Table 10 – Project progress against PRD project targets

Annex 11 – Project monitoring




Figure 5 – Closing the cycles



Figure 6 – Why monitor?

Annex 12 – ROM and MTE recommendations

ROM Recommendations, April 2017	
R1	Re conclusion 1 - Relevance - Priority 1 - Consortium and EUD: Revise the intervention logic to take into consideration the changed context and the stalled involvement of government and EAOs in peace and reconciliation activities. Drop activities where no progress can be expected anymore and replace them by alternatives. Consider extension in time.
R2	Re conclusion 4 - Efficiency - priority 2 - Consortium: Submit a revised budget in accordance with the expenditure observations made so far and in line with a new intervention logic, to be approved by the EUD.
R3	Re conclusion 4 - Efficiency - priority 3 - Consortium: find an effective and immediate solution for the cash flow issue that affects three of its partners, and mitigate the effects of this on implementation.
R4	Re conclusion 4 - Efficiency - Priority 4 - ILO: Enhance Consortium-wide monitoring arrangements and negotiate with its partners for better access to their respective monitoring data. Improve reporting based on data, as well as narrative reporting.
R5	Re conclusion 2 - Relevance - priority 5 - Consortium: refine indicators where required, adjust target data, formulate revised logical framework on the basis of the outcome of negotiations on the intervention logic.
R6	EUD: There are no additional recommendations at this stage. The absolute priority is for the intervention logic to be re-negotiated. This will take quite some effort and especially time because of the Consortium structure. This issue, along with the pre-financing difficulties and the likely impact on activities, is big enough to keep the Consortium busy for the foreseeable future. Once the addendum is signed, commission a ROM Review 3 to 6 months after the start of the revised work plan with a minimum of 10 to 12 field days across all intervention areas (likely to be scheduled December 2017- January 2018).

Table 11 – ROM recommendations

MTE Recommendations, June 2017		
1. PRD should scale back its ambitions on the targets and results feasible in Myanmar’s current peacebuilding context.	PRD should update its programming assumption and revise its targets and intended results to better reflect its current operating environment. The programme should also adopt a more unified and coherent approach to implementation. This should include increased joint planning, monitoring, and implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Responsible entity: PRD Partners and EU. – Priority: High – Timeframe: 0-6 months.
2. PRD should consider focusing more effort on promoting the participation of MPs as part of the program’s effort to encourage “duty bearer” response.	The programme should focus on encouraging and supporting MPs to meet regularly with their constituents in project areas and provide workshops to community members about how they can get in touch with their local MPs to express concerns. This will provide a new avenue to encourage government participation and help improve the prospects for government buy-in and strengthen the sustainability of results.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Responsible entity: PRD Partners. – Priority: High – Timeframe: 0-6 months.
3. PRD should consider working with fewer local partners and instead provide more in-depth and sustained engagement, including conducting fewer but more joint and high visibility events and awareness-raising platforms.	PRD should consider adopting the approach implemented by SCI where it has identified five main CBO partners that it then engages, supports, and capacitates over the life of the programme. Additionally, PRD should look to support larger joint events, seminars, and platforms to bring more visibility. ILO and SCI should look to utilise their “convening authority” to encourage the participation of government and MPs, as well as EAGs members to the extent that laws allow.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Responsible entity: PRD Partners. – Priority: High – Timeframe: 0-6 months

Table 12 – MTE recommendations

Annex 13 – Overview of Shan Consortium Partners’ areas of expertise

Organization	Areas of Expertise
ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive experience working with target communities to create buy-in, including conducting participatory stakeholder, and baseline, assessments to identify development needs and beneficiaries. These will contribute to the stakeholder mapping.

ILO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The complaints mechanism on forced labour; • Prevention of underage recruitment and demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers; • Technical, vocational education and training; training and support to small and medium-sized enterprises; • Information and training on international human rights and international humanitarian law and norms; • Supporting all stages of community-owned infrastructure development including employment creation.
MDCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDCG has good experience in community engagement and empowerment for the rural development and yet still using these skills in the project with German Government. • MDCG expert in WASH, as we have been implementing the WASH project in Kutkai area for IDPs since 2013. • MDCG expert in infrastructures. MDCG implemented a shelter construction project with FSD funded by ECHO in N.Shan and still doing providing community basic infrastructures in WASH, Education and some other small infrastructures in villages level. • MCG expert in MRE. MDCG implemented a MRE project in N.Shan, S.Kachin, Kayin and Kayah twelve months with FSD funded by ECHO from 2013 to 2014.
FLD/EPRP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community consultation, • Gender awareness, • ‘listening’ to the community • political capacity building re peace process, • strategic planning for ethnic parties • Constitutions and federalism, • Relations with EAO liaison offices • Relations with media and citizens’ journalism • Computer and internet training
SCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict sensitivity and DNH • Child Rights monitoring and awareness and child rights governance, training media • Child Protection/MRM/reintegration – awareness, reporting and support • Child Participation • Forming and supporting child and youth groups • NFE • Media literacy with children • MEAL

Table 13 – Consortium Partners’ areas of expertise

Annex 14– Emerging Lesson Learned (1)

Evaluation Title: Independent Final Evaluation of the PRD programme	Project TC/SYMBOL: MMR/14/01/EEC
Name of evaluators: Maria Zarraga, Claude Hilfiker, and Angela B. Thaug	Date: 30 April 2019
The following Lesson Learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the conclusions of the full evaluation report.	

LL Element

Text

<p>Brief summary of lesson learned (link to project goal or specific deliverable)</p>	<p>Despite facing major contextual challenges, in particular due to the faltering peace process and intensified fighting in Shan State, the project team was able to achieve most of output targets. However, better and more sustainable qualitative and quantitative results could have been achieved, notably at the outcome level, through strengthened quality project management.</p> <p>Robust monitoring and evaluation, grant management, joint planning, stronger coordination and consistent communication across the project, and among Consortium partners would have contributed to a more successful and coherent programme supporting peacebuilding.</p> <p>This would have allowed to manage change and complexity in a more strategic/systematic way and to ultimately better serve end beneficiaries of the intervention.</p>
<p>Context and any related preconditions</p>	<p>Programme coherence and synergies among Consortium partners requires good programme governance. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities and effective use of quality programme management tools would be key to ensure programmatic success in any intervention in general.</p> <p>Enough time, capacity and resources should be allocated to conduct systematic and consistent monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and budget monitoring. The programme should also ensure that project staff and key stakeholders display a common approach and understanding of the programme strategy, operating processes and quality management.</p>
<p>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Implementing staff and partners would welcome strengthened programme governance and grant management to ensure the success of such intervention, in particular in a complex context.</p>
<p>Challenges / negative lessons – Causal factors</p>	<p>Programme governance should not become burdensome or subject to protectionist attitudes. Such programme should ensure that all implementing staff and partners display the willingness and capacity to work together with a common programmatic approach and M&E tools at an early stage of the intervention.</p>
<p>Success / positive issues – Causal factors</p>	<p>Most project stakeholders expect stronger programmatic coherence rather than working independently without effective programme oversight. This does not hinder the programme adopting a participatory and empowering approach.</p>
<p>ILO administrative issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</p>	<p>The Consortium structure design would need to be revised as well as allocation of staff and resources.</p>
<p>Other relevant comments</p>	

Table 14 – Emerging Lesson Learned (1)

Annex 15 – Emerging Lesson Learned (2)

Evaluation Title: Independent Final Evaluation of the PRD programme	Project TC/SYMBOL: MMR/14/01/EEC
Name of evaluators: Maria Zarraga, Claude Hilfiker, and Angela B. Thaung	Date: 30 April 2019
The following Lesson Learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the conclusions of the full evaluation report.	

LL Element	Text
Brief summary of lesson learned (link to project goal or specific deliverable)	<p>The 4-year programme managed to achieve a significant number of outputs across Shan State, reaching out to more than 154'000 beneficiaries across 104 villages in Shan State. More than 350 trainings were delivered to 82'859 people, among which 60% are women. However, the majority of beneficiaries remained somewhat satisfied with the programme outcomes due to the short duration of the programme operating in complex conflict-affected areas and the one-off nature of the technical assistance received. A “less is more” approach could have been more relevant to answer beneficiaries’ needs.</p> <p>(i) Communities would rather be involved in a more holistic community development intervention, tackling their needs more strategically for a longer-term impact. (ii) Schools would benefit from a robust and feasible business plan allowing them to develop their activities in the long-run, tackling the multiple issues in the start-up phase. (iii) Students and training participants would benefit from a consistent post-training follow-up ensuring they concretely improve their livelihoods based on sufficient training duration, small business advisory, and coordinated action with local partners.</p>

<p>Context and any related preconditions</p>	<p>The complexity of the context would need to be carefully taken into consideration, notably with regards to strategic planning and risk management. The programme would need to consider working in close collaboration and create synergies with other interventions, to notably leverage project resources and maximize programme impact.</p> <p>The quality of the programme design would be key to conduct more in-depth technical assistance. Such projects would need to be preceded by feasibility studies and ensure enough budget is allocated to each intervention, leaving room for flexibility based on needs assessments.</p> <p>It would be essential to adopt a systems approach were all elements as part of one system interact towards a common goal. This requires to very clearly define roles and responsibilities, robust monitoring, adopting a responsive project management approach with a strong focus on project outcomes. Enough time should be allocated to adopt a fully participatory approach.</p>
<p>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Implementing staff, partners and beneficiaries would welcome a “less is more approach”.</p>
<p>Challenges / negative lessons – Causal factors</p>	<p>Such programme would require more robust monitoring, complexity management and time than interventions adopting a less holistic approach, constantly being updated on realities on the ground. This also requires an adequate budget allocation and management.</p>
<p>Success / positive issues – Causal factors</p>	<p>Such approach would allow to avoid unintended negative effects due to the nature of the programme and its short duration, leaving beneficiaries with limited capacity to tackle upcoming challenges that can put sustainability at stake.</p>
<p>ILO administrative issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</p>	<p>A strategic plan to achieve less in quantity and more in quality could be tackled during the project design, ensuring administrative processes are well understood by all, and that resources are not underestimated. A feasibility study would be useful prior to programme implementation.</p>
<p>Other relevant comments</p>	

Table 15 – Emerging Lesson Learned (2)

Annex 16 – Emerging Good Practice (1)

Evaluation Title: Independent Final Evaluation of the PRD programme	Project TC/SYMBOL: MMR/14/01/EEC
Name of evaluators: Maria Zarraga, Claude Hilfiker, and Angela B.Thaug	Date: 30 April 2019
The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.	

GP Element	Text
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	<p>Investing in youth, gender and diversity and inclusive education has proven to be effective in contributing to peacebuilding. This was perceived by all project stakeholders as a key building stone that was impossible to circumvent when contributing to and working towards a lasting peace process.</p> <p>In order to jointly conduct this intervention, the programme worked closely with or formed local community-based organizations, civil society organizations, village development committees and youth platforms. The programme strengthened involvement of government staff, members of parliament and ethnic armed organizations.</p> <p>This allowed to work together towards notably educating and raising the voice of women and the youth. The intervention included vocational training, non-formal education and inviting communities, women and youth to participate in multi-stakeholder forums, community dialogues and workshops notably on human rights and child rights and protection.</p>
Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	<p>Relevant conditions would entail sufficient security conditions to conduct such activities, in particular when the latter are related to good governance, federalism and child rights. The buy in of local authorities and armed forces is also essential. There should be sufficient alignment between the project objectives and local authorities and armed forces' agendas to avoid putting the intervention and implementing partners' security at stake.</p> <p>Achieving scale in education and vocational training is essential. Such programmes should ensure schools are able to implement a viable business model for the intervention to be sustainable. The training provided should also be long enough to provide participants with concrete employment opportunities, ensuring tangible results with regards to improving their livelihoods. Systematic and consistent training evaluation and post-training follow up is therefore key for successful results.</p> <p>For example, another useful ILO methodology is the Training for Rural Economic Empowerment (TREE). Knowledge and skills would be part of an integrated package of actions to create new economic and employment opportunities for conflict-affected communities, leading towards employability and employment. Collateral support would foster entrepreneurship. This systems approach could contribute to the sustainability of the intervention.</p>
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	<p>Health services, access to markets, job opportunities are described by the programme as key challenges the youths face in remote conflict-affected areas. Through stronger education and training, they are less likely to get into drugs, amidst the scourge of drugs occurring in Shan State. Women facing distress are notably economically empowered through vocational and leadership training.</p> <p>Women and youth hence gain confidence, improve their livelihoods, raise their voice and concerns, and contribute to the betterment of their communities and to a peacebuilding and inclusive environment.</p>

Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	<p>A measurable outcome and impact include significant number of youth and women economically empowered, actively contributing to the development of their communities and engaging with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process.</p> <p>In order to ensure scaling up, it is necessary not to act as a stand-alone programme, but in cooperation with other existing programmes and national partners.</p>
Potential for replication and by whom	Investing in youth, gender and diversity and inclusive education can be replicated and be effective in contributing to peacebuilding in other similar interventions.
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	This emerging good practice is in line with ILO Outcome N°1 on “More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth prospects”, to ILO thematic areas N°2 on Child Labour, N°6 on Equality, N° 7 on Forced Labour, N°10 on Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, N°20 on Skills and Employability, and N°24 on Youth Employment.
Other documents or relevant comments	

Table 16 – Emerging Good Practice (1)

Annex 17 – Emerging Good Practice (2)

Evaluation Title: Independent Final Evaluation of the PRD programme	Project TC/SYMBOL: MMR/14/01/EEC
Name of evaluators: Maria Zarraga, Claude Hilfiker, and Angela B. Thaug	Date: 30 April 2019
The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.	

GP Element	Text
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	<p>One significant achievement leading towards the peace process is the multi-stakeholder forum that took place in Taunggyi, in September 2018. While community organizations could not assume direct engagement in the process itself, the programme can contribute to empowering communities, with a distinct focus on women and youth, to engage with conflict parties under the auspices of the peace process.</p> <p>The programme brought together three prominent groups, namely the Shan state government and Members of Parliament (MPS), the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the government, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) and Shan youth groups. The youth was able to raise their issues of concern to get direct support from key leaders.</p>
Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	Relevant conditions for such regular (quarterly or bi-annual) important meetings entail sufficient resources, strong coordination and collaboration among Consortium members, building trust with government and MPs, and good planning.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	By putting forward the issues of concerns of the youth, the parliament can hence become the voice of the people and the youth, while the latter's voice was not heard before. Regular multi-stakeholder meeting can contribute to empowering communities and engaging with key leaders who can support them.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	A measurable outcome and impact include a significant number of issues settled to help communities improve livelihoods and tackle important issues such as for example land grabbing, and other situations creating distress.
Potential for replication and by whom	It would be important to conduct such multi-stakeholder meeting on a regular basis to ensure continuous empowerment and support to communities, with a distinct focus on women and the youth.
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	This emerging good practice is in line with ILO Outcome N°1 on "More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth prospects", to ILO thematic areas N° 2 on Child Labour, N°7 Forced Labour, N°10 on Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, and N°19 on Rural Economy.
Other documents or relevant comments	

Table 17 – Emerging Good Practice (2)

Annex 18 – Pictures



Schoolgirls - Pa O Bauk Wauk Youth Center, Taunggyi township, April 2019



Schoolboys, CBY Youth Center, Laikha, April 2019



Schoolgirls, CBY Youth Center, Laikha, April 2019



Village community, Har Kyarh Hone village, Mong Phyak township, April 2019