



FINAL EVALUATION

Bangladesh

Thematic window
Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment

Programme Title:

Joint programme to address violence against women in Bangladesh

Prologue

This final evaluation report has been coordinated by the MDG Achievement Fund joint programme in an effort to assess results at the completion point of the programme. As stipulated in the monitoring and evaluation strategy of the Fund, all 130 programmes, in 8 thematic windows, are required to commission and finance an independent final evaluation, in addition to the programme's mid-term evaluation.

Each final evaluation has been commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in the respective programme country. The MDG-F Secretariat has provided guidance and quality assurance to the country team in the evaluation process, including through the review of the TORs and the evaluation reports. All final evaluations are expected to be conducted in line with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network "Quality Standards for Development Evaluation", and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Standards for Evaluation in the UN System".

Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes. They also generate substantive evidence-based knowledge on each of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to other development interventions and policy-making at local, national, and global levels.

We thank the UN Resident Coordinator and their respective coordination office, as well as the joint programme team for their efforts in undertaking this final evaluation.

MDG-F Secretariat

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Programme or MDG-F Secretariat.

Bangladesh
Final Evaluation

Thematic Window: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment

Programme:
Joint Programme to Address Violence Against Women in Bangladesh



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Acronyms

AA	Administrative Agent
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BEF	Bangladesh Employers Federation
BLAST	Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust
BMET	Bureau of Manpower and Training
CP	Country Program
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Framework
GED	Planning commission
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GTG	Gender Thematic Group
HRBAP	Human Rights based approach to programming
IGA	Income generating Activities
ILO	International labor organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JP	Joint programme Management Office
JP VAW	Joint programme for violence against women in Bangladesh
JPMO	Joint Programme
LGD	Local Government Division
MDGF	MDG Achievement fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MoEWOE	Ministry of Expatriate Welfare & Overseas Employment
MTBF	Medium Term Budget Framework
MTE	Mid term evaluation
MoWCA	Ministry of Women and Children Affairs
NCCWE	National Coordination Committee for Workers Education
NCTB	National Curriculum and Textbook Board
NSC	National Steering Committee
PIC	Programme Implementation (monitoring) Committee
PMC	Programme management committee

PSC	Project Steering Committees
RC	UN Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator's office
RTPP	Revised Technical Project Proposal
SASH	Network of Students against Sexual Harassment
SWN	Sex Workers Network
TOR	Term of Reference
TPP	Technical Project Proposal
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNICEF	United Nations International Children in Emergency Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UP	Union <i>Parishad</i>
WHO	World Health Organization
WCG	Women Crew Group
WFH	Women Friendly Hospital

Executive summary

This report is the final evaluation of the MDG Achievement Fund joint programme “*Joint Programme to Address Violence Against Women in Bangladesh*” (JP VAW). It was commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), and managed by the Joint Programme Management Office (JPMO) under the guidance of UNFPA. Quality assurance was provided by the MDG-F Secretariat, in line with the monitoring and evaluation strategy of the Fund.

The JP VAW is part of the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment thematic window of the MDG Achievement Fund, which supports 13 joint programmes with a total budget of nearly US\$90 million.

The **objective** of the evaluation is to measure the joint programme’s contribution, or expected contribution, to solving the needs initially identified, degree of implementation and efficiency of resources used. It will also provide evidence-based knowledge through the identification of best practices and lessons learned.

The evaluation is of a summative nature and gives particular importance to knowledge building. It was based on a mixed-method approach including exploratory data analysis, formative assessment and the utilization focused theory. Data was triangulated through secondary data, first hand observations, bilateral interviews, focus group discussions and semi-structured questionnaires. It is in accordance with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network “Quality Standards for Development Evaluation”, and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) “Standards for Evaluation in the UN System”.

The JP VAW’s objective was to have a positive effect on the lives of women and girls in Bangladesh by reducing, preventing and responding to VAW through the promotion of (i) an adequate policy and legal framework; (ii) changes in behaviors and attitudes that condone gender violence and; (iii) comprehensive and culturally appropriate support to survivors through improved care and access to justice.

The JP VAW was approved in July 2008 with a total budget of \$7.9 million US dollars distributed amongst the nine UN implementing agencies who worked with 11 National counterparts. With twenty implementing partners, the JP VAW is the largest joint program to date in Bangladesh.

It was initially approved for a three year period, with three month no-cost extension approved in mid 2012. Implementation begun in January of 2010 and closed on June 30th of 2013.

Financial disbursement. At the time of the evaluation¹ the JP VAW had achieved 85% disbursement rate, although agencies estimate they will achieve a 96% disbursement rate by the end of June. Substantial financial disbursement is expected to be achieved, which would imply disbursement of 12% of the total budget in the last 2 months of implementation. While this can be partially explained by the nature of some activities, such as the End Line study or the Final evaluation, the quality of some are expected to suffer as a consequence.

¹ With financials as of May 31st 2013

Design. The evaluation was able to confirm relevance and external coherence of the Programme. The Prodoc identified clear goals to address VAW in a comprehensive manner addressing prevention, root causes and impact. It did, however, lack a theory of change or linkages to leverage specific expertise of the different partners. This limits evaluability and is further weakened by a limited human rights based approach to programming, with little meaningful participation of civil society, and some of the activities lacking alignment with CEDAW.

The team observed both benefits and challenges stemming from the inclusion of agencies and ministries that do not traditionally work in the area of gender based violence (GBV). It led to increased understanding of the challenges and multifaceted nature of GBV, increased visibility and a more comprehensive response. As a direct result of the JP VAW all 20 participants are aware of their role in the fight against VAW. The administrative complexities of coordinating 20 partners hampered efficiency as much of the JPMO staff's time was used for these purposes to the detriment of more in-depth and substantive analysis, limiting the benefits from joint programme, such as avoidance of duplication, better distribution of roles or strengthened response through coordinated response which only begun to emerge towards the end. While ideally all agencies would cover VAW in all regions, due to limitations of resources the team recommends that future initiatives limit the number of participants to facilitate the process and a more focused geographic coverage to ensure meaningful impact, oversight and ability to measure results. The UN Gender Thematic Group will play a key role to ensure alignment.

The team concludes the importance of the design process should not be underestimated but rather, it should be seen as the foundation towards efficient, results oriented programming. Overall guiding vision, the theory of change and management structure, as well as commitments for sustainability need to be agreed at this stage. Future joint programmes should ensure sufficient time and resources are allocated to this process.

Given its size and that it was the first joint program, **implementation** of the JP VAW provided a steep learning curve for the country team. It brought with it a series of challenges, the most salient being the need to manage and coordinate a multi-agency & multi-sectoral programme. The evaluation recognizes the ERD and the JPMO were key drivers for this process, with the PMC, the quarterly workshops and eventually the joint monitoring missions as the primary and more successful tools. Other management structures, such as the NSC or the outcome groups, seemed to have played a nominal role. **Human resources** needs were underestimated and the right expertise was not always available. This was particularly true for gender, M&E and communication. The profile of for M&E and administration officers in the JPMO staff was inadequate.

For the most part agencies maintained traditional work **methodologies** for implementing, monitoring, reporting and financial disbursement. The evaluation concludes that lack of coherence and flexibility of UN and Government procedures was an important barrier to efficiency. These together with the lack of adequate human resources; limited know-how on joint programming; late recruitment of JPMO staff and its weakened mandate led to parallel implementation. As such, many of the limitations and inefficiencies observed, such as duplication, dispersion or inconsistencies in approach, are not weaknesses of the joint programme, but rather pre-existing weakness which have been made evident through the joint programme. While inflexible administrative procedures increased transaction costs for

the UN, the JP VAW decreased transaction costs for the GOB by providing single forum to track and discuss UN activity on VAW, facilitating coordination and oversight, in line with the development aid agenda. And while a counterfactual cannot be proven, it could be assumed that the JP VAW would have achieved more of the benefits it achieved towards the end had it been working as a joint programme, with a fully staffed JPMO, joint monitoring and a results framework, from the beginning.

M&E was undertaken by each UN agency and only brought together at the level of reporting. As such it lacked methodological consistency or internal coherence. Additionally, it was undertaken by focal points regardless of previous expertise in this area. As a result, the M&E framework was unable to capture achievements adequately. The same can be said about **communications** related activities. There were many communication related activities, but no communications strategy² and in many cases the lack of expertise was made evident through inadequate planning and budgeting. As a result, significant opportunities were lost for increased visibility and awareness raising, particularly important given the objectives of Outcomes two and three. The evaluation concludes there was inadequate expertise for M&E and communications and recommends the inclusion of adequate expertise for both in future joint programmes from the design stage. If focal points are to be accountable for communications and M&E activities, these should count with the support of professionals and receive minimum training.

In spite of all the challenges, the evaluation team observed clear **benefits stemming from joint programming** emerging towards the end of the programme. Some of the benefits observed, described in more detail in the body of the report were: identification of existing inefficiencies such as duplication and visualization of existing gaps which led to costs savings and a more coherent division of labor amongst participants; visualization of opportunities and synergies; increased mutual accountability; increased visibility; increased gender capacity and; when expertise of the various participants was leveraged, more robust products.

The JP VAW comes across as an ERD-UN led process, with varied degrees of **ownership** from the ministries and, with the exclusion of the lead agency, very limited involvement from management. The team concludes the JP VAW would have benefitted from a management level strategy-focused structure to push for more meaningful ownership and strategic alignment, supported by an empowered and fully resourced coordination unit in place from the beginning. The evaluation team recommends future joint programmes carefully consider the resource requirements of a joint programme, ensure adequate management and accountability structures are in place able to move the joint programme beyond “progress tracking” to a more substantive and strategic collaboration.

Results. Significant delays at the start of the programme, mainly linked to negotiation of the TPPs, the lack of experience in joint programming and late recruitment of the JPMO staff had a significantly reduced the JP VAW’s implementation period, which was already short time given the nature of the objectives. While other MDGF programmes benefitted from up to 6 month no-cost extensions, the nearing closure of the MDG Fund meant it could not receive more than a 3 month extension. This reduced time limited its ability to produce and measure results and had a negative effect on the quality of some its products.

² A communications strategy was developed late in the programme but activities were never aligned to it

There are three main limitations to measuring results achieved: 1) a weak M&E framework with no baseline and poor indicators of progress; 2) the lack of internal coherence between the different interventions of the JP VAW and a theory of change linking progress to outcomes; and 3) the limited scale given the size and population of Bangladesh. As a consequence, most of the results achieved excluding policy work such as GRB, can only be seen as pilots which will require significant scaling up in order to have any substantive impact.

In spite of the many challenges faced by the JP VAW was able to achieve progress. Some of the main achievements for **Outcome 1** are: enhanced capacity of Government officials in 11 ministries and many civil society organizations; Increased awareness on specific lesser known areas of VAW such as VAW in the workplace, for vulnerable groups such as sex workers or persons infected and affected by HIV/ AIDS; Use of textbooks and education in defining gender roles; Increased awareness of existing gaps in the justice system together with recommendations for addressing these, and a better understanding of how to apply CEDAW; Pilot for a database on VAW which would provide evidence on causes, prevalence and needs to fight VAW in Bangladesh.

Outcome 2 had the largest percentage of the budget allocation, but it was also the most affected by the internal inefficiencies, with most initiatives considered too small to be able to achieve a significant impact. The following good practices were identified: Courtyard meetings on internal and international migration; Community drama session; Awareness raising with communities and parliamentarians on sex workers and victims of trafficking; 16 day campaign as a UN-wide model to build on; community dialogue addressing masculinity using positive deviance.

Important achievements under **Outcome 3** include strengthening of a culturally sensitive gender approach to healthcare making it more accessible for women, capacity building for a more adequate treatment for VAW survivors together with linkages to legal support and counseling services. In regards to the shelters, the evaluation team highlights the inconsistencies between the model proposed by MoSW and international standards, and strongly recommends for the UN to advocate for alignment of the shelters with CEDAW. Counseling should be prioritized over support to the structures. Any further work would require these issues to be addressed and revision of the IGA alternatives proposed for more realistic ones, such as training for work as domestic workers abroad or in the garment sector, where wages can compete with sex work wages and avoids issues of stigma and discrimination. Sustainability of the achievements in this area seems unlikely.

Given the scale of the problem, the limited resources and level of ownership **sustainability** remains a key challenge. Capacity built and awareness raised will remain as a support to future initiatives, the UN should strive to maintain and build on existing momentum. At the time of the evaluation the UN team was in the process of putting together a joint programme proposal to give continuation to key areas, and many of the participating agencies will continue to support VAW as part of their mandate. The website and the lessons learned exercise, together with the tool and studies developed will remain as building blocks for future interventions. Many of the interventions can serve as pilots which can be scaled up and replicated if funding is secured. The evaluation team recommends that future programming consider sustainability at the design stage, taking into account national budget cycles and actual capacity to absorb planned activities. Whenever possible concrete commitments should be secured from the beginning, for example, commitment to maintain

any new shelters for at least one year after the end of the programme, or to maintain trained staff within the shelters.

A key question is whether the proposed joint programme was more efficient or was able to deliver better results to traditionally bilateral programming. While this evaluation cannot give a definitive answer, it has strived to highlight concrete examples that would seem to indicate towards joint programmes' ability to produce a more coherent and robust response, which would in turn translate into a more efficient use of resources and greater impact.

The JP VAW has provided significant learning and it is reasonable to conclude that future joint programmes can benefit from it, with gains observed in the JP VAW expected to arise earlier implementation and in more significant manner. The work on internal and international migration comes across as an example of the benefits that can be expected from joint programmes. With various agencies collaborating towards an agreed goal with a clear distribution of roles, and able to address the different levels such as policy, legal and grass roots according to mandate and expertise. This level of inter-agency coordination was made possible by the JP VAW.

The JP VAW's main legacy is the awareness and understanding on the complex nature of VAW, coupled with increased capacity, evidence and tools to address gaps and weaknesses. Eleven ministries and nine UN agencies are now aware of their roles and responsibilities.



1. Introduction

1. This final evaluation is part of the MDG Achievement Fund's (MDGF) result oriented monitoring and evaluation strategy, developed to track and measure the overall impact of the Fund on the MDGs and multilateralism.

Background

2. In December 2006, the Government of Spain and UNDP signed a partnership agreement, which together with an additional pledge on 24 September 2008, amounted to a total contribution of approximately \$900 million US dollars towards the progress of the MDGs and to promote aid development agenda priorities such as the Paris Declaration and the ACCRA agenda for action.
3. The Fund currently supports 130 joint programmes in 50 countries with an aim to promote increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions. The primary focus is on addressing inequalities and having an impact at the local level through eight thematic windows which contribute towards the achievement of the MDGs, National Ownership and UN reform. These windows are: Children, food security and nutrition; Gender equality and women's empowerment; Environment and Climate change; Youth, employment and migration; Democratic economic governance; Development and the private sector; Conflict prevention and peace building; and Culture and development.
4. The *"Joint Programme to Address Violence Against Women in Bangladesh"* is part of the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment thematic window which supports 13 joint programmes³ with a total budget of nearly US\$90 million. This window's focus is on achieving progress for the MDG 3 *"promoting gender equality and women's empowerment adopting a more comprehensive approach that addresses issues of access to opportunities and the guarantee of rights"*⁴ through a rights based approach. Although the focus is on the MDG 3, these programmes are expected to have a positive impact on other MDGs such as maternal health (MDG 5), reduction on child mortality (MDG 4), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2) as well as fighting poverty and hunger (MDG 1), especially given the high percentage of poor households headed by women.
5. Another area of is participation and national ownership, at both local and national level, and increased participation of civil society organizations and NGOs to make governments more accountable.
6. The JP is one of two joint programmes by the MDG Fund in Bangladesh, with the other "Protecting and Promoting Food Security and Nutrition for Families and Children in Bangladesh" focused on food security and malnutrition, and belonging to the Children, Food Security and Nutrition thematic window. Together they amount to a \$16 million US dollars investment from the Fund in Bangladesh.

³ 2 in Africa, 3 in the Arab States, 3 in Asia and 5 in the Americas

⁴ MDGF website

7. The MDGF's M&E strategy is based on the principles and standards of UNEG and OEDC/DAC regarding evaluation quality and independence. The strategy builds on the information needs and interests of the different stakeholders, and places the same weight on accountability as it does on learning, seeking to compile evidence based knowledge and lessons learned to inform future interventions.
8. In line with the Fund's M&E strategy a mid-term evaluation was commissioned by the MDGF secretariat in April 2012, after which an improvement plan that addressed the recommendations was developed.

Purpose, Goals and Methodology of the Final Evaluation

9. **Purpose:** This final evaluation is of a summative nature and seeks to measure the level of implementation and achievement *vis a vis* the programme's initial goals or adjustments thereafter. The evaluation will also seek to generate evidence based knowledge and the identification of lessons learned and best practices which could be scaled up or replicated.
10. The evaluation's **specific objectives**, as per the TORs, are the following:
 - Measure the extent to which the JP VAW has contributed or is expected to contribute to solving the needs and problems identified during the design phase.
 - Measure the JP VAW's degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised, and measure the interrelationship and dynamics of the multi partner efforts.
 - Measure to what extent the JP VAW has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.
 - Identify lessons learned, good practices and also opportunities for scaling up of the JP VAW in Bangladesh.
 - Measure how the development results address the national context, as well as the lead agency role of UNFPA (relevance)
11. **Scope:** The final evaluation focused on assessing impact, effectiveness of coordination and implementation as well as the probability of that achievements will be sustainable, as opposed to reporting on activity level. It will cover from the programme's inception in January 2010 until the time of the evaluation, May 2013.
12. The **evaluation questions** define the line of inquiry and the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. They also help focus the areas and methodology for analysis. They have been grouped into three levels, mainly design, process, and results, and then broken down by five main criteria:
 - *Relevance:* The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals
 - *Efficiency:* Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results
 - *Ownership:* Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions

- *Effectiveness*: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.
 - *Sustainability*: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.
13. The **evaluation questions** put forth in the TORs were designed for a longer evaluation process. Given that the time allocated to the evaluation exercise was reduced, the approach to the evaluation questions was adapted accordingly. While all evaluation questions were included and addressed during the exercise, it was not possible to address all sub-questions with the same level of detail. Questions and sub-questions which would inform future programming (learning and utilization) were prioritized in line with the objectives agreed during the inception phase. The detailed evaluation questions can be found in Annex 3.
14. **Proposed Methodology** The evaluation used a utilization-focused approach, which stresses that an evaluation should be judged by how useful it is. This was done together with the use of contribution analysis, which recognizes that attributing development results to interventions is generally complex and sometimes unfeasible, as it takes time before an impact can realistically be achieved and measured. Furthermore, contribution analysis does not seek to prove contribution, but rather it seeks to provide plausible evidence to reduce the uncertainty about the 'difference' a programme is making⁵. The advantage of this approach is that it is not prescriptive and allows for a combination of different methods to be used, while recognizing that aid activities do not take place in a vacuum, but rather, that they are embedded within political, social and economic realities.
15. **Sampling strategy**: due to time limitations the evaluation reference group (ERG) was responsible for selecting the sample population as well as the locations for the field visit. The evaluation sought to ensure a balanced representation of the different types of implementing partners and beneficiaries. In practice this means the evaluation used non-probability samples, where sampling units (participants) were selected to reflect particular features within the context of the programme, rather than seeking to be statistically representative. This strategy was hampered by the socio-political challenges encountered during the in-country mission, which meant that often the evaluators' meetings were held with participants willing and able to move under opposition called general strikes.
16. The Final Evaluation consisted of four different phases:
- a) **Phase one, desk review, inception and agreement of methodology**:
- An initial literature review was undertaken to and an inception report was prepared to serve as guiding document between the consultant and evaluation managers.
 - An initial debriefing was held with the MDGF Secretariat
 - Methodology was agreed and the necessary instruments were developed.
 - A questionnaire with agency-specific questions was forwarded to agency focal points.
 - Due to the limited time frame, the in-country visit agenda and all the logistics were agreed in parallel during this phase.

⁵ Mayne, 2001

- Documents reviewed included, but were not limited to: the Programme Document, biannual monitoring reports, the M&E framework, the sustainability strategy, the communications strategy, MDG-F mission reports, Mid-term evaluation, color coded work plans, National Strategic Development plan, Improvement plan, CCA/UNDAF, CEDAW report, amongst others.

b) Phase two, in country visit:

- The second phase consisted of the in-country mission, which took place between May 10 and 23rd of 2013. Three initial districts were selected for field visits but due to recurrent *hartals*⁶ and Cyclone Mahasen the evaluation team had to adapt the agenda and the final mission was limited to Dhaka and Sylhet.
- The in-country visit included first hand observation, group discussions with implementing agencies, partners, national counterparts, civil society and beneficiaries. (see Annex 3 for full in-country visit agenda).
- A validation exercise was undertaken on the last day of the in-country mission with led by the PMC co-chairs, the UNFPA country representative and the Ambassador of Spain. All focal points for participating UN and Government agencies were invited to participate. (See annex 4 for full list of participants.)

c) Phase three, preliminary report and validation process for final report:

- During this phase the consultants revised the information collected in order to examine, map and triangulate the data obtained in the first two phases.
- A preliminary report was shared with the ERG for validation and to ensure accuracy.

d) Phase Four: Comments, corrections and observations made by the reference group were incorporated into the final report

17. The main **instruments** developed for this evaluation, included in Annex 5, were an open ended **questionnaire** for implementing partners and interview guide which was used for bilateral interviews and focus group discussion (and adapted as needed during the evaluation process).
18. **Analysis plan:** Data analysis followed the subsequent stages: Collection of data; Management of data; Search for patterns and consistency; Triangulation of findings; Validation (whenever possible); Conclusions and recommendations. Conclusions were based on multiple data sources to ensure completeness, coherence, reliability and validity of the findings. Key elements in the process of validation will be the initial in-country debriefing and the comments to the draft report.
19. The **unit of analysis** was the joint programme, understood as a set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs as reflected in the joint program document (PRODOC) and the corresponding changes made during the implementation. The evaluation did not seek to assess the progress and achievements of the participating agencies as stand alone products.
20. The recommendations generated are addressed to its main users, the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee, the UN Country team and

⁶ *Hartals* are opposition called general strikes which, for security reasons, limit mobility of staff and evaluation participants around the city and as well as travel

the Secretariat of the MDG Fund.

Constraints and Limitations on the Study Conducted

21. The following constraints and limitations were encountered during the evaluation process:

- As the final evaluation took place before the finalization of the JP, some of the activities were still ongoing and some products were not yet finalized.
- Due to staff rotation very few of the participants had taken part of the design process, others had only recently joined the programme, limiting their ability to provide feedback.
- Some of the *programmes*⁷ were already closed and it was not possible to interview the government focal points (for example this was the case with MOI and MOYS).
- This was also the case with the M&E officer who was no longer there when the evaluation exercise took place.
- As schools were not in session it was not possible to visit schools, speak to teachers or students.
- General strikes or *hartals* as well as Cyclone Mahasen had a negative impact on both the preparation phase and the in-country mission.
- The financial data presented in this report describes the programme situation as of May 31st 2013. The financial reports were unaudited.
- The evaluation questions put forth in the TORs were designed for a longer evaluation process, for this reason the report focuses only those with findings relevant to the agreed evaluation priorities. (see paragraph 13 for more detail).

Context

22. Bangladesh is situated on the Bay of Bengal, and shares borders with India and Myanmar. The Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers meet in Bangladesh to form the world's largest delta, making it extremely fertile, yet vulnerable to floods and cyclones. This low-lying country, the seventh most populous country in the world, supports a population of around 150 million people, of which nearly 40 per cent are children.

23. Bangladeshi **life expectancy** for women has seen an increase in recent years.⁸ An estimated 70% of women suffer from nutritional deficiency and an estimated one-third of women of reproductive age have a body mass index less than 18.5⁹, with 30 per cent of adolescent girls experiencing anemia. Health Ministry sources estimate that iron-deficiency anemia among women, which is the result of social practices based on lower value placed on a girl's life, discriminatory food distribution, and systematic violence against women, causes significant losses in agricultural production to the tune of 5 billion US dollars over a period of 10 years.

24. More than 14% of pregnant women's deaths are associated with injury and violence¹⁰. The MDG #5 seeks to reduce **maternal mortality** (MMR) by three fourths between 1990 to 2015. According to Bangladesh Maternal Health Services maternal mortality declined from 322 in 2001 to 194 in 2010- a 40 % decline in 9 years. The rate of

⁷ In the context of the TPPsbilateral programmes between an agency and its national counterpart were agreed for the implementation of the activities in the JP VAW.

⁸ BBS, Report on Vital Registration System 2010

⁹ National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT), Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2007, March 2009

¹⁰ <http://www.hsmdghs-bd.org/WFHI.htm>; Updated: February' 2013

decline was at an average of about 5.5% per year, compared to the average annual rate of reduction of 5.4% required for achieving MGD5. While this is a significant improvement, maternal causes continue to be responsible for 14% of all deaths among Bangladeshi women in reproductive age. The Maternal Mortality Survey of 2010 indicates maternal death is still the most common cause of death (about ¼) among women 20-23 years old and is also an important cause of death for women aged 35-39. After persisting at historically low level, the proportion of women delivering in a facility has begun to rise- from 9% in 2001 the figure has more than doubled to 23% in 2010.¹¹

25. Bangladesh's important advances in the area of maternal mortality are hampered by its lagging in other areas, particularly areas related to **violence against Women (VAW)**, which is widespread and permeates the social fabric at every level. It occurs both within the domestic and working arenas, but remains largely under-reported, investigated or prosecuted, and leads to a feminization of poverty. In addition, practices such as child marriage, dowry, lack of education, unemployment, wage discrimination and structural adjustment policies exacerbate women's vulnerability and dependency.¹²
26. Bangladesh's rates of **child marriage** and **adolescent motherhood** are among the highest in the world. In addition, while comparable data from the 2004 and 2007 BDHS shows that antenatal care has increased by 17 percent over the past few years¹³, antenatal care from a medically trained provider during the same period has increased by 7 percent only (from 51 to 55 percent, respectively).¹⁴
27. There is also an increasing recognition that **HIV/AIDS** and other sexually transmitted diseases, which are often a consequence of sexual violence, are having a devastating effect on women's health, particularly amongst adolescent girls more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence such as trafficking and rape.
28. In Bangladesh **marital violence** against women is also linked to women's individual attributes such as age and education.¹⁵ Research also shows that girls are regularly abused or harassed within educational premises or on the way to such institutions. The problem is so widespread it required action from the High Court of Bangladesh who, on 26 January 2011, declared stalking of girls and women illegal and directed the government to consider the offence as sexual harassment instead of the term "Eve Teasing". The court's ruling came amid growing incidences of stalking that led many victims to commit suicide, with 9 percent of deaths for women of reproductive age due to suicide¹⁶.
29. Due to poverty and limited opportunities, women in Bangladesh look to **international migration**, which make them vulnerable to abuse during the process of migration but also in the destination country. They may become victims of sexual

¹¹ Bangladesh Maternal Mortality and Health Care Survey 2010: Summary of key findings and implications; ICDDR

¹² Source: Asia Pacific human rights information center <http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2005/06/violence-against-women-bangladesh-context.html>. BBC country profile, CIA country profile, MDG Fund country profile

¹³ from 58 percent in 2004 to 68 percent in 2011

¹⁴ NIPORT: Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2011

¹⁵ According to the status review by UNDP on MDG#3 in Bangladesh, the ratio of girls to boys in primary education has increased from 0.83 (1991) to 1.02 (2010), and in secondary education from 0.52 (1990) to 1.14 (2010) – meeting the targets set under the goal. However, the ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education increased only marginally from 0.37 (1990) to 0.39 (2010).<http://www.undp.org.bd/mdgs/goals/MDG%20Goal3.pdf>

¹⁶ Bangladesh Maternal Mortality and Health Care Survey 2010: Summary of key findings and implications; ICDDR

harassment, physical abuse or denied basic rights by their employers and co-workers. Female domestic workers are the vulnerable as they are sometimes forced to accept conditions akin to a state of captivity. Migrant workers are often denied access to any form of redress in case of maltreatment or abuse in an alien country.¹⁷

30. Similar situation of rights violation and exposure to violence prevail in cases of **internal migration** of women. More than 2.8 million people work in the Bangladeshi garments sector, 80 percent of whom are young women, but the majority of the migrants find jobs in the informal economy as casual labors, street vendors, domestic workers etc.¹⁸ The grievances of domestic workers involve:¹⁹ lack of education opportunity, physical torture, sexual harassments, lack of Security, threat of unemployment, amongst others. **Child migration** leads to heightened vulnerability to exploitation and sexual and gender-based violence. In Dhaka 71 percent of the girls are migrants. A large proportion of children migrate alone and in most cases the children did not decide freely to migrate but rather migrate due to natural disaster, loss of land or death of earning member of the family. Along with poverty and survival pressure, children also migrate to escape abuse.²⁰
31. In 2005 Bangladesh had about 674,000 **street children** of which Dhaka alone hosted about 250,000. Nearly half of these children were 10 years or under, and nearly 80 percent were boys.²¹ In Bangladesh children are falling victims of **trafficking** mainly for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC), forced begging, sexual abuse, forced labor, camel jockey, cheap labor, bonded labor, domestic servitude, traffic of organs, fishing²² and marriage. For the most part the girls are trafficked abroad, with India being the primary destination.²³
32. The JP identifies **social attitudes** that condone certain behaviors as the root cause of VAW. More than one-third of both men and women in Bangladesh believe beating their wives in specific circumstances, such as arguing, is justified²⁴. The practice of dowry, a lower age at marriage, and poverty are all associated with women's higher likelihood of experiencing and condoning violence²⁵.
33. Social acceptance of VAW translates into an **unfavorable policy and legal frameworks**, where in spite of existing laws, protection given to women and girls who are victims of violence continues to be inadequate.
34. The Penal Code of Bangladesh contains provisions that protect women from various forms of violence²⁶. Although it does not specifically define 'sexual assault', offences

¹⁷ CEDAW and Female Labor Migrants of Bangladesh; www.mfasia.org

¹⁸ Climate Change Related Migration in Bangladesh, Briefing Paper No-2, April 2013, RMMRU

¹⁹ BILS

²⁰ INCIDIN Bangladesh; The Dreaded Demand: Study on the Demand-Side of Trafficking of Women and Children in Bangladesh; ILO, 2005

²¹ BIDS, survey

²² After trafficking some of the boys are forced to work in the fishing sector, fish drying in Sundarban- the mangrove forest of Bangladesh. Risky and demanding work

²³ INCIDIN Bangladesh, *Misplaced Childhood: A short study on street child prostitutes in Dhaka*, Red Barnet; 1997.


²⁴ National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT), Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2007, March 2009

²⁵ World Bank, *Whispers to Voices: Gender and Social Transformation in Bangladesh*, 2007

²⁶ such as Dowry Prohibition Act 1980 and its amendment in 1986 make dowry practice an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment. / Prevention of Women and Child Repression Act 2000 provides for effective and efficient way of dealing with cases of violence against women such as rape, acid attacks, forced prostitution and trafficking. / The Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act 1933 provides for detention of women under 18 years of age if found in a place where prostitution is being carried out. / The Family Court Ordinance 1985 provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the court on matters relating to marriage, dowry, maintenance and guardianship, and custody of children. / The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance 1983 amends relevant section of the Penal Code and provides the penalty of life imprisonment for kidnapping, abduction, trafficking in women, cruelty because of dowry, and rape as well as abetment of such offenses. / Trafficking in Women and Children Act 1993

related to rape, kidnapping, abduction of women, acid throwing, attempt to cause death or grievous injury because of dowry are treated as specific crimes of serious nature, with capital punishment prescribed for kidnapping, abduction, acid throwing and rape. These sentences are hardly if ever passed.

35. On 14th May 2009 the Honorable High Court (HC) delivered a Judgment on Sexual Harassment. A significant feature of this action is that it will be treated as law until a law relating to prevention of sexual harassment is in place. In the last month of 2010 the “Domestic Violence (prevention & protection) Act” was passed. This act states that any type of physical, psychological, sexual torture or financial loss of a women or children by a family member will be a punishable offence. Very recently, the Human Trafficking Deterrence and Suppression Act 2012 was passed. This Act identifies all individuals below the age of 18 as children and devised a special definition to ensure additional protection.²⁷ Other discriminatory practices due to personal law have been identified but remain unaddressed.
36. General instability hinders coordination efforts for the UN. The increasing number of *hartals* (general strike, most of the time country-wise) during the first and last year of the JP VAW posed difficulties for UN operations broadly, as they have the ability to stop most commercial and official activity due to the resulting security situation and significantly impair mobility of both UN and partners.



provides a maximum penalty of up to three years for forced prostitution and its abetment./ The government enacted a law primarily to restrict import and sale of acid in open market and death penalty for acid attack offences./ A law has recently been enacted to address the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace./ Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have prepared a guideline to be followed by universities to protect women-students from sexual harassment./ The government has also signed the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children.

²⁷ MoWCA; Country Progress Report: Bangladesh; SAIEVAC 2012

JP Description

37. The Joint Programme (JP) to address violence against women, with a total of 9 UN agencies and 11 National counterparts²⁸, is the largest joint program to date in Bangladesh. UNFPA acts as lead agency for the UN while on the government side, there was an agreement²⁹ to have the ERD act as facilitator, ensuring coordination between development partners and implementing partners, in line with its mandate³⁰. Together they act as co-chairs of the PMC (Programme Management Committee.)
38. The JP was approved in July 2008 with a total budget of \$7.9 million US dollar for a three year implementation period. A three month no-cost extension was approved in May of 2012. See figure 1 for distribution of the initial budget.
39. In accordance with Bangladeshi law all the agencies that work with the GoB, with the exception of ministries like MoHFW³¹, are required to sign a TPP. A total of 11 TPPs or RTPPs were negotiated and agreed with 9 different Ministries to align the JP with the implementing Ministries' work plans. This cause considerable delays in the start up of the programme.

Figure 1: Total budget distribution by Agency (PRODOC)

Agency	Initial Allocation	% of total
UNFPA	4,889,867	61%
UNDP	385,200	5%
UN WOMEN	590,212	7%
ILO	470,800	6%
UNAIDS	337,050	4%
IOM	569,899	7%
WHO	171,200	2%
UNICEF	321,000	4%
UNESCO	262,150	3%
Total JP VAW	7,997,378	100%

Source: PRODOC

40. The JP was designed to address the issues of VAW in a comprehensive manner through a three tier strategy³²:
 - Policy and legal framework: The Joint Programme sought to address issues related to policies, the implementation of laws and conventions. Activities were

²⁸Ministries of: Women and Children Affairs; Health and Family Welfare; Education; Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; Religious Affairs; Labor and Employment; Youth and sports; Social Welfare; Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment; Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives; Information

²⁹ After the first PMC meeting of June 2010, it was agreed unanimously that there would be no lead Ministry. Source, PMC minutes

³⁰ The ERD's mandate is to manage and coordinate external assistance in Bangladesh, as well as to ensure aid effectiveness. Source: ERD

³¹ sector programme/ SWAP has a different modality

³² as per the PRODOC

aimed at adopting and implementing policies to prevent VAW and protect victims, and included enhancing the capacities of GoB, improving information, and providing support to NGOs and civil society.

- Changing behaviors related to violence against women/girls: The Joint Programme sought to address attitudes and behavior at the root of VAW. Activities were aimed at promoting social and behavioral changes to reduce VAW and included awareness raising, sensitization, promoting networks and developing capacities of both gatekeepers and stakeholders.
- Protection of survivors of gender-based violence. The Joint Programme sought to provide survivors of VAW with immediate care, relief and rehabilitation through a comprehensive package, which included the expansion, renovation, and improvement of the existing shelter system.

41. Detailed Outcomes and Outputs as per the PRODOC can be found in Annex 6.
42. Initial **geographic coverage** included implementation in 30 districts and was later revised to include 38 different locations.
43. The governance of this Joint Programme is done through a two-tier management in accordance with the MDG Fund's guide lines, with a National Steering Committee (NSC) and a Programme Management Committee (PMC). The NSC was in charge of oversight and strategic guidance and included the Resident Coordinator (as co-chair), the Secretary of the Economic Relation Division (ERD) from the Ministry of Finance (Co-chair), as well as the Country representative for UNFPA, as lead agency. Due to staff rotation these posts were filled by different staff over the lifetime of the JP VAW³³.
44. In addition, a Joint Programme Management Office (JPMO) and three Outcome working groups³⁴ were established at the technical working level. The team also participated of the UN Gender Thematic Group (GTG). Bilateral Project Steering Committees (PSC) and Project Implementation Committees (PIC) were established between the implementing UN agencies and their implementing partners to manage specific activities.
45. Monitoring of the JP activities was undertaken by each agency, while the framework and reporting was done centrally by the JPMO's M&E officer. The JPMO was in charge of monitoring progress and reporting to the MDGF Secretariat for the joint programme as a whole. An independent mid-term evaluation was commissioned by the MDGF Secretariat in April of 2012, and this final evaluation commissioned by the lead agency.
46. A communications strategy was developed in October of 2011, but the communications officer was only recruited in June of 2012. Agencies had their own communication related activities with no linkage between them, and this remained the case throughout the JP with the sole exception being the 16 day campaign. At the

³³ there was rotation of staff and the actual composition included different members over time a). As Secretary, Economic Relation Division (ERD), Ministry of Finance (role of Co-chair) the participating members were Mr. M. Musharraf Hossain Bhuiyan, Mr. Iqbal Mahmood and Mr. Md. Abul Kalam Azad (current). b) As UN Resident Coordinator, UN System in Bangladesh (role of Co-chair) Mr. Arthur Erken (RC, a.i.) and Mr. Neal Walker (from April 2011 to till date); c) Ambassador, Spain Embassy in Bangladesh (role of member) H.E. Mr. Artour Perez Martinez and H.E. Luis Tejada Chacon (current)

³⁴ Outcome one led by UNWOMEN, and the other two led by UNFPA as the JP's lead agency

time of the final evaluation the JPMO was in the process of centralizing existing materials into a website which will be maintained by MoWCA, and had also engaged a consultant to identify and document best practices.



2. Levels of Analysis: evaluation criteria and questions

Initial findings Design level (relevance and coherence)

47. This section seeks to analyze the relevance, robustness and internal coherence of the initial project design and to identify lessons learned from the process.
48. A limitation to analyzing the design is that very few of the participants in the evaluation exercise were part of the project during the design stage, which initiated in 2007 and extended over two years, with approval of final proposal in January of 2010.

Coherence of Design

49. An initial concept note was put together by the Resident Coordinator's office with input from the different participating agencies. Approval of the concept paper led to the development of a more detailed proposal, this time led by UNFPA as lead agency. During this part of the process each agency consulted with their respective national counterparts. While this ensured that participating agencies looked at their activities from the perspective of VAW in order to identify existing gaps, it also meant that the JP VAW was not designed as one programme, but rather as a collation of bilateral activities.
50. There was no clear methodology for the allocation of funds. Agencies submitted proposals, but once the programme was approved, some found that their activities and funding had been curtailed without them being consulted. As one participant expressed it *"I applied for something and got something else"*. This in turn raised question in regards to the process, and weather the needs of the agencies (supply) had been prioritized over those of the target beneficiaries (demand).

51. Some other gaps identified by the participants at the design stage were:
- *Insufficient understanding of each other's comparative advantages in the context of Bangladesh.* Some agencies felt those with a gender mandate had been given priority, without a proper assessment of their ability to implement.
 - While many of the activities built on existing initiatives such as the support to shelters, many felt that there had been insufficient consideration to the context and already existing initiatives outside the UN, for example the existence of OCCs.
 - Little to no participation of service providers, especially critical for outcome 3. For the most part the Government was involved in the process but only at central level.
 - Some capacity gaps and their concurrent costs were not identified, especially in regards to M&E and communications.
 - Most agreed that human resource needs were underestimated.
52. During the MTE some participants felt small budgetary allocations might have a negative impact on the level of ownership, and in particular ownership of the process. During the final evaluation this issue was raised again to question if small amounts justify the investment that an agency needs to make in order to be part of such a time intensive process.
53. Participants also acknowledged that at the time of design they did not fully understand joint programmes, as one participant put it “*(we) did not have the slightest understanding of what joint programming entailed or how the programme would be managed.*” The evaluation team concludes this impacted the team’s ability to plan adequately, and is probably most evident in the lack of adequate human resources and linkages between agencies’ work.

To what extent was the design and strategy of the development intervention relevant?

54. The initial proposal (Prodoc) clearly identified the link between the JP objectives and the problem identified. The evaluation confirmed the JP VAW continues to be highly relevant in the existing socio-economic context where pervasive levels of violence persists, reinforced by cultural acceptance and normalization of violence, and weak or unclear laws.
55. The evaluation team was able to confirm alignment with UN priorities. This was particularly evident as most of the activities were ongoing before the JP VAW, and in that the country team has incorporated a specific pillar to address gender in the National Development Framework (UNDAF 2012-2016, pillar 7 on Gender Equality and Women’s Advancement) with the JP VAW as one of it’s outcomes. Although Pillar 7 accounts for only 2% of the total country team budget, effectively all participating agencies will continue to have a formal commitment to VAW at least until the new UNDAF.
56. Similarly the government counterparts reiterated their commitment to fighting VAW during discussions with the evaluation team. These commitments were backed through specific actions which took place during the implementation of the JP VAW such as the approval of the National Women’s Advancement Policy in March of 2011, the 6th Five Year Plan and the National Budget which identifies GRB through the

Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF)³⁵ with specific reference to the application of CEDAW by the police, administration and judiciary in the handling of VAW related cases and women's rights. No changes to budgets in relation to these commitments were reported.

Scope and size

57. With 20 partners (9 UN agencies and 11 Government ministries) and 38 geographic locations, the JP VAW was the largest joint programme to date in Bangladesh. The evaluation team sought to assess the lessons stemming from size and geographic coverage.
58. The findings indicate there are both benefits and disadvantages. The primary benefit was inclusiveness which allowed agencies with no gender mandate or who have not traditionally worked in VAW to seek areas within their work where VAW could be addressed. This was the case for UNAIDS and UNDP. In the case of UNAIDS it led to the inclusion of their international gender policy at national level. In the case of UNDP, who did traditionally deal with gender but not VAW, inclusion led to identification of the areas within their mandate to address VAW. Ultimately, this inclusive approach has led the country team to a more comprehensive understanding of the problem and the role the UN can play. The same applies to the agencies on the Government side, for example, one of the staff from the Imam Training Institute reported this was the first time they had been trained to see how some of the existing cultural practices are not supported by religion. Another benefit stemming from its large size and wide geographic coverage was visibility.
59. The main downside to this inclusive approach was coordination, especially as it is now clear that both the UN and the partners are still in the process of understanding how joint programmes work. The learning process was hampered by the sheer size which increases administrative burdens. The JPMO's time was taken up by administrative tasks to the detriment of more substantive inputs stemming from in-depth analysis or the identification of synergies.
60. In regards to geographic coverage, it was interesting to observe how it had different impact depending on the objective. For example, outcome one looks at national policy and is not affected by coverage, although training related to this was affected by dispersion as much as outcome two was. Geographic coverage was a key challenge for outcome two, as it was difficult to achieve significant impact in such a large scale, while for outcome three it was seen as a positive, as quality service and access for survivors would ideally be available in all locations, but services did not necessarily benefit from the awareness raising and capacity building activities. This dispersion dilutes impact and makes it more challenging to demonstrate results.
61. Most participants felt the JP VAW was too short for the goals set out to achieve. While the overall goal remains, the design would have benefitted from clear, time bound achievable goals. This problem was made worse by the delays linked to TPPs and recruitment, *de facto* shortening the programme further. This impacted its ability to produce and show results, for example, in regards to IGA initiatives one participant

³⁵ Bangladesh's Gender Budget Report (2012-2013); Finance Division Website: www.mof.gov.bd

mentioned “it should have been 4-6 years. (this way) we cannot do follow up to know what happens with the seed money”, but more importantly, in some cases it had a negative impact, such as the case of the training in shelters, “when they (programmes) are short it is not effective, rather, it demoralizes some of the women. When they start to dream and start to pursue a new aspiration the project ends. Only when it is long it can make a difference, if not it’s even worse.”

62. The evaluation concludes that inclusiveness has given way to important benefits and should be the ultimate goal through the UNDAF. When designing future initiatives the UN will need to weigh these with the limitations it puts on learning and management. In regards to geographic spread, the main conclusion is that the nature of the objectives should determine geographic spread. While ideally all locations would be reached, a realistic assessment of resources should be made so that meaningful impact can be achieved, together with adequate monitoring and quality control. The evaluation team concludes the JP VAW would have achieved more meaningful and measurable impact had all initiatives been concentrated in a few locations.

To what extent was JP VAW the best option to respond to development challenges stated in the programme document?

63. The initial design put forward a clear and comprehensive strategy focused on three areas which address root causes, prevention and response, but lacked a clear theory of change linking activities proposed to the outcomes. During the exercise both UN and Government counterparts noted the importance of having conceptual clarity around the theory of change and the identification of programmatic synergies across agencies. As a government employee put it “next time we have to be very careful from the very beginning that there should be a guideline on how to coordinate amongst ourselves. Maybe each have their own clarity, putting them together, how to ensure synergies, that area is grey, we need to set and define some common goals.”
64. A strategic gap identified by the evaluation team was a limited human rights based approach to programming (HRBAP):
- (i) *it lacked meaningful participation of rights holders.* Some of those interviewed outside of the Ministries at central level, in particular service providers, had not participated in the design and felt that with their input the activities might have had more relevance or been more sustainable.
 - (ii) Some of the activities failed to look at the whole picture and what other rights were in play, for example, support to the shelters for former underage sex workers (in line with the Bangladeshi *Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act* in 2000) are in conflict with the new *Human Trafficking Deterrence and Suppression Act* (2012), CRC and CEDAW, where they would be identified as victims of violence rather than in conflict with the law. The centers lack a clear policy for how long a girl will remain in the center, do not address the issue of women turning 18 (when their consent would be required), leaving the victims in a legal limbo, with the average stay in center, as stated by one participant during the exercise, of four years, during which time they are deprived of their rights and liberties, effectively treated as inmates as opposed to victims. Supporting with money for subsistence needs and training for economic

livelihood in this context fails to meet key HRBAP standards where rights are indivisible.

65. Lastly, the JP VAW would have benefitted from the identification of linkages between the agencies' activities and accountability mechanisms toward joint programming.

To what extent did JP VAW have a useful and reliable M&E strategy that contributed to management and to measure results?

66. The PRODOC identified an M&E officer based at the JPMO. Unfortunately, and as highlighted in the limitations to the exercise, the M&E officer was no longer part of the JP VAW at the time of the evaluation, which significantly limited the team's ability to undertake a comprehensive analysis and triangulate information.
67. The M&E officer was recruited approximately one year after the start of the JP VAW, and resigned in December of 2012, which means the JP VAW had a full time M&E officer for only half of its implementation time. Given the difficulties in finding a qualified person for such a short period of time, during the remaining time, the M&E officer from UNFPA provided support to the JPMO.
68. The initial results framework was developed by an external consultant, and the indicators identified were unrealistic or difficult to measure, with some of the data simply not available. Once the M&E officer and the rest of the JPMO were recruited, nearly a year after, the framework was revised in line with the MDGF's proposed indicators for the Gender equality thematic window. Some changes were linked to initial delays, as some of the activities proposed were no longer relevant³⁶.
69. Although the framework was revised, focal points continued to use their agency's internal monitoring mechanisms, coming together only at the level of reporting where the information had to be aligned with the required MDGF format. Many participants expressed concern over a lack of alignment between the JP VAW's monitoring framework and the one used by their agencies which, given that monitoring was done at agency level, made it difficult for them to track progress for the purposes of the JP VAW. They also reported lack of alignment between their activities and the framework outcomes, which further highlights the lack of a clear theory of change.
70. While it is reasonable to assume the JP VAW and the agencies' own M&E will need to co-exist, there should be alignment between the two in order to avoid duplication of work and methodological consistency.
71. Delays linked to TPPs and recruitment also delayed the start of the baseline, which was only finalized after the mid-term evaluation. The End Line Study was on its way during this evaluation exercise which meant the team was not able to assess it, but given the small lapse of time between the two exercises, it was seen more as a baseline for future programming rather than a means to measure the JP VAW's impact.
72. During the last year the JP VAW begun undertaking joint monitoring visits. Participants reported many benefits from these exercises which allowed them to understand better the JP VAW as a whole, gave them an opportunity to receive inputs

³⁶ Source: MTE for detailed examples

from other agencies and reflect on their own activities.

73. Both partner agencies and government counterparts highlighted the lack of analysis and feedback stemming from the monitoring systems as a weakness. Peer-to-peer feedback was reported in the context of management structures such as the PMC, and during the last year through the joint monitoring missions, but was limited to participating agencies (for example, since the government did not take part of joint monitoring missions they would not have benefited from this). The programme would have benefitted from in-depth analysis and more substantive feedback.
74. The JP VAW M&E function seemed to have been viewed mostly as upwards reporting (to HQ and donor) rather than a management tool to ensure quality and self-analysis. The evaluation team concludes the JP VAW lacked a robust M&E strategy, methodological consistency or theory of change. It was inefficient in that it required double reporting. There was no in-depth analysis or mechanisms to feed back into the decision making structure.

To what extent did this programme have a useful communication & advocacy strategy?

75. The PRODOC did not identify a communications and advocacy strategy but did highlight the need to “strengthen advocacy and public awareness on VAW³⁷” and the need for a communications officer within the JPMO. In line with the requirements of the MDGF a Communications Strategy was developed in October of 2011, nearly two years after implementation begun, but the communications officer was only recruited in June of 2012, six months before the scheduled end of the programme, (and nine months before the actual end, due to the no-cost extension).
76. After the entry of the Communications officer, an update on the communications strategy was attempted, which comes across more as a formal exercise to fill a requirement than a real strategy, which would have required a great degree of commitment and flexibility on the part of all the participants, as well as a degree of flexibility from the MDGF and the TPPs which might not have been possible at that stage. *“It (the strategy) should have been there from the design, then it can lead you to reach (your goals). That was missing. There should be room for inputs (during the design) from communications”.* An in-depth analysis of the communications strategy shows that this is not a working document, nor was there any attempt reported to align the implementing agencies’ activities to it. The evaluation team concludes the JP VAW did not have a communications strategy, but rather a conglomerate of individually proposed activities with no internal coherence.
77. Another weakness stemming from the absence of communications expertise during the design stage is reflected in lack of planning and budgeting for communications related activities, for example, one agency had planned for a publication but not for its distribution. Another agency prepared a video documentary, but did not budget for it to be aired. The communications officer was able to take the documentary, shorten it to a adequate size and have it aired on a TV channel for free. This is thanks to the technical expertise and networks that come together from having an experienced professional.

³⁷ PRODOC pg. 58, Outcome II, Output 1, activities 1-3 under the lead of UNFPA

78. As with M&E, there appears to be an underlying assumption that focal points can design, budget and implement communication activities without prior experience or in-house support, (neither UN Women nor UNAIDS have in-house expertise.) Attempts to bring the agencies' communications officers on board reportedly yielded varying degrees of results.
79. Many participants highlighted the 16 day campaign of 2012, bringing together the activities of all the agencies and increasing visibility, as an achievement of the JP VAW. But more important than the actual 16 day campaign was the process that was put forward which, if replicated and built on, could yield significant results.
80. Other good practices in the area of communication were underway during the time the evaluation took place, mainly the creation of a website to centralized existing materials and a best practices compilation exercise. Both of which were finalized in June 2012.
81. The objective of the Site is to house the studies and products of the JP VAW. This would respond to a demand raised by civil society during the MTE to facilitate access. MOWCA has agreed to maintain the site for a few years going forward. Although there was no specific launch it was publicized during the final dissemination workshop which took place on June 18. The best practices exercise was finalized in June and sought to document successful experiences that could be replicated or scaled up.
82. The evaluation team concludes that delays in recruitment coupled with the lack of communications expertise during the design significantly hampered the JP VAW's ability to advocate against VAW. This is seen as a missed opportunity, especially for outcome two, which aims to change people's behavior, communications could have played a critical role. While many valid activities took place.

"We need a massive campaign. What we are doing is just a drop in the ocean"
government employee.

Initial findings: process level (Efficiency & ownership)

What was the progress of the JP VAW in financial terms, indicating amounts committed and disbursed

83. A budgetary summary as of May 31st 2013 (Figure 2) shows final disbursements at 85%, with UN women, ILO, WHO, UNICEF and UNESCO having achieved over 94% expenditure of funds, with UNFPA, UNAIDS and IOM show expenditure at 82%, 88% and 84% respectively, and UNDP showing the lowest level at 60%³⁸. In the case of UNDP this can be partly explained by the fact that \$100,000 unspent funds from UNFPA's budget were transferred to it only in February of 2013.

³⁸ Figures provided fro UNDP are as of April 30th

84. Given that UNFPA accounted for 61% of total budget, it's delays are proportionately also more significant. With nearly 18% of its original budget unspent and a consistent lag during implementation would indicate insufficient capacity to implement its share of the budget, and support the recommendation that actual in-country capacities, in addition to mandate, are taken into consideration when deciding on budget distributions. Given the MDGF 70% rule³⁹ this lag⁴⁰ translated into delays in disbursement and had a negative impact on other agencies' activities.

Figure 2: Overview of expenditure by Agency (ministry) as per May 31st 2013.

Agency		Total allocation	Cumulative actual expenditure as of May 31, 2013	% spent
UNFPA	MoWCA	1,446,171	1,261,305	87%
	MoSW	935,000	691,769	74%
	MoRA (1)	150,000	135,237	100%
	MoI	334,964	278,064	83%
	MoYS	100,000	42,239	42%
	JPMO (2)	1,701,156	1,388,102	82%
Total UNFPA (3)		4,667,290	3,810,901	82%
UNDP (4) (5)		485,200	290,486	60%
UN WOMEN (6)		712,789	703,781	99%
ILO		470,800	440,453	94%
UNAIDS		337,050	295,472	88%
IOM		569,899	478,706	84%
WHO		171,200	163,821	96%
UNICEF		321,000	320,013	100%
UNESCO (7)		262,150	256,699	98%
Total JP VAW		7,997,378	6,759,732	85%

Source: JPMO

(2) MoRA figure is as of April 30, 2013

(3) Excluding \$122,577 transferred to UN WOMEN

(4) excluding amounts transferred to UN Women & UNDP total \$222,577

(5) including \$100,000 from UNFPA's unspent funds

(6) as of April 30, 2013

(7) including \$122,577 transferred from JPMO

(8) source UNESCO

³⁹ The MDGF disbursed budget allocations on a yearly basis. The rule states that 70% of all previously disbursed funds must be committed before the new tranche can be requested.

⁴⁰ source: Mid-term evaluation

85. The agencies provided estimates for their expected disbursement by end of June. According to these total expenditure would rise to 96%, with all but UNAIDS and UNFPA expecting to achieve full financial expenditure. Assuming this is achieved it would imply that 12% of the total budget would be disbursed in the last 2 months of implementation. While this can be partially explained by the nature of some activities/expenditures which are linked to the end of the programme, such as the End Line study or the Final evaluation, or to last minutes transfers (as per figure 2), it does raise questions as to whether or not there is sufficient capacity for adequate disbursement in such a short time.
86. The evaluation team concludes the JP VAW is likely to achieve substantial financial disbursement. It should be noted that this does not immediately reflect that initial objectives were achieved, nor is it guarantee of quality. The team observed some cases where the quality is likely to suffered as a direct result of significant delays, for example, one consultancy to identify the state The Domestic Violence Act (institutional capacity and costing for implementation), as well as training of the 11 participating ministries on VAW, together with analysis and recommendations on gender responsive budgeting. This consultancy was scheduled to take place in under two months, with key players involved in the activity stating this was insufficient time to complete the task *“with some amount of standard and satisfaction”*.⁴¹ While there are plans to continue supporting the GRB initiative after the JP VAW, this could have played a key role had it been available at the beginning of the JP.



⁴¹ The consultancy was scheduled to start in June of 2012 and had been delayed by internal procedures of the agency. Due to errors in design, this funds were initially allocated to the JPMO

To what extent the governance of the fund at programme level (PMC) and at national level (NSC) contributed to efficiency, effectiveness, ownership and jointness? Did they enable management and delivery of outputs and results?

87. As mentioned before, the governance of this Joint Programme was done through a two-tier management set-up as per the MDG-F directives which envisioned a National Steering Committee (NSC) and a Programme Management Committee (PMC).
88. The National Steering Committee's role was that of strategic oversight and alignment with national priorities. In line with the Implementation Guidelines for MDG Achievement Fund Joint Programmes (Article 3.1 page-6) only one NSC would function for all MDG-F Joint Programmes (JP VAW and JP Food Security and Nutrition) in Bangladesh. The PMC was in charge of operational coordination, was expected to include management and meet on a quarterly basis.
89. The NSC had an initial meeting before the start of implementation in 2008. It did not meet during 2010, met as scheduled during 2011, and only once in February of 2012. No further meetings were reported. (see figure 3). Electronic endorsement was requested for remaining bi-annual monitoring reports.

Figure 3: NSC meetings held

NSC Meetings	Date Held
2008	13-May-08
2010	None
2011	26-Jan-11 25-Aug-11
2012	29-Feb-12 5 May 2012 (by e-mail) 3 September 2012 (by e-mail)
2013	None

Source: RCO

90. The team concludes that members of the NSC felt their role was unclear or disagreed about the nature of it. This appears to have led the NSC to play a very nominal role with little strategic substance. With a very technical PMC, many felt the gap between the NSC and the PMC was too wide for it to be in a position to fulfill this role. The team concludes the JP VAW would have benefitted from a management/ strategic level structure such as the Programme Implementation & monitoring Committee (PIMC) initially proposed in the PRODOC, envisioned to be led by MoWCA and which included the participation of UN agency and Ministry heads, who would have met to discuss strategic substance on a bi-annual basis. The PIMC would have been able to fill some of the gaps identified by the participants and strengthened ownership. As such, management of the JP VAW was mostly technical and lacked strategic guidance.

Figure 4: PMC meetings held

PMC meetings	Date Held
2010	07-Jun-13
2011	25-Oct-11
	15-Jun-11
	14-Jul-11
	16-Oct-11
2012	11-Jan-12
	19-Apr-12
	17-Jul-12
	16-Oct-12
2013	17-Jan-13
	10-Feb-13
	17-Apr-13
	24-Jun-13 ⁴²

Source: JPMO

91. The PMC met only once in the first year of implementation (2010), but met quarterly as envisioned in the PRODOC after the incorporation of the programme coordinator (see figure 4).
92. Participants reported the PMC to be a good mechanism for coordination, which helped to promote ownership of the programme, helped to strengthened their knowledge of each other and to mobilize the government. It was praised as a mechanism that allowed agencies to use each other's resources, although some felt it lacked focus on results, with focus on progress leaving little time for more in-depth discussions. Participants to the PMC changed frequently, affecting continuity and ability to make decisions. Many felt it was an ERD-UN led process with less buy-in from the government implementing partners. The team concludes that participation of the UN seems to have been more consistent as were the benefits reported from it.
93. In addition to the NSC and the PMC the country team put in place a series of structure to facilitate management of the JP VAW, mainly the Joint Programme management office (JPMO) which acted as a central coordination and oversight mechanism; three outcome groups which included only the UN counterparts, and bilateral Project steering committees (PSC) or Project Implementation Committees (PIC) which acted as bilateral management mechanisms between the UN agency and its Government counterpart, very much in line with 'business as usual'.

“the UN did not have the mechanism to call on someone from another agency, (here) you can be called upon” (UN staff)

94. The Joint Programme Management Office (JPMO) was set up to act as a central coordination and oversight mechanism. It included a national program coordinator, which was changed to an international; an M&E officer; a finance officer; a communications officer; an administrative and finance assistant; a secretary and a liaison officer envisaged to be based at the RC's office. Recruitment of its members was slow⁴³ with the coordinator joining in August of 2011, over a year after the start of the project. The last member to join the team, the communications officer, joined in June of 2012. The liaison officer was scrapped, and duties handed over to the joint programme focal point in the RCO. The administrative and finance officer was replaced by a finance officer. It is unclear in what instances these decisions were made. In addition, the M&E officer and the administrative assistant were gone by the time the final evaluation took place⁴⁴, which means that for most of the implementation of the JP VAW the JPMO was understaffed.
95. Participants highlighted the positive impact of the JPMO on the JP as the “glue” that strengthened the programme, and many highlighted the importance of having this structure in place, with full staffing and at the appropriate level, from the beginning. Further, some felt that key roles such as M&E or administration would have merited a stronger profile with more expertise. A stronger M&E profile would have increased the quality of the reports and possibly provided analysis and feedback to the team, while a stronger administrative officer might have liberated core staff from administrative procedures to focus on more substantive matters. The team concludes that the JPMO performed in line with the resources and mandate it was given.
96. From conversations held with the management a strategic decision was made to limit the coordination structures to a minimum, and with an administrative focus rather than a more managerial one. For this reason the PIMC was not established and the JPMO received limited staffing. This evaluation team concludes that while this had the desired effect of streamlining the structure, it also facilitated ‘business as usual’ and gave way to some of the gaps identified in the report, such as increased feedback for quality control and decision making, strategic guidance and the identification of synergies.
97. Three outcome groups were formed on November 2011, two led by UNFPA and one by UN Women. They were limited to the UN partners participating in that outcome, effectively they functioned as a UN working level structure which together with the PMC facilitated the ‘building of bridges’ and gave way to a strengthened network of gender focal points, “we are all friends now”. Common TORs were agreed, all groups held one initial meeting and then joint meetings towards the end of the JP. Although the outcome groups have been good at providing reflections of the progress, these do not appear to have played a significant role in the management structure of the JP VAW.

⁴³ Date that each staff member joined the JPMO: Joshua Bryant, Interim Programme Manager: 23 May – 22 August 2011; Marianne Berner, International Programme Manager: 1 August, 2011; Sazidur Rahman, M&E Officer: 19 April 2011; Padmaja Sarker, Secretary: 1 June 2011; Shah Alam Talukder, Finance Officer: 4 September 2011

⁴⁴ The M&E Officer's last day was 31 December 2012. The administrative assistant's last day was 30 April 2013, and the new administrative assistant (Mr Harun Khan) joined on 1 May 2013.

Efficiency of the proposed working and management model.

98. In addition to the tools proposed by the MDG Fund, such as the programme coordinator and the bi-annual reports, the JPMO developed a series of tools to track implementation and financial progress, mainly the color coded workplan and the quarterly coordination workshops.
99. The color coded workplan included all activities of the JP VAW and was used as a visual aid to track progress of activities and financial implementation. While the quarterly coordination workshops sought to promote a more strategic approach such as yearly planning, the development of the sustainability strategies or agreement on joint monitoring visits. These initiatives were highly valued by the participants and to some degree sought to fill the vacuum left by the lack of a PIMC. As with most of the other coordination mechanisms, a more consistent participation of the UN counterparts was reported. In this regard it must be highlighted that reporting and progress tracking focused on UN commitments, whether this is as a result of the Government's level of involvement or due to the structure of the JP VAW –where funds go through and are reported by UN agency- is unclear, but may have also had a negative impact on the level of ownership from the Government counterparts.
100. With the exception of the methodologies proposed by the MDGF, such as those mentioned above, agencies' maintained traditional work practices such for monitoring, reporting and implementation. Financial practices too were in line with each agencies' requirements. This, together with a lack of flexibility in UN procedures, proved to be a key barrier to "jointness".
101. In addition to the limitations in **human resources** for the JPMO already mentioned many participants felt that not sufficient thought had been given to the real requirements of implementing a joint Programme which, in addition to implementing, required regular participation of coordination mechanisms such as the PMC meeting. The JP VAW felt to many as an add on to their regular job, as another participant put it *"I have to do it, but I don't get paid for it."* As a result it led to stretched human resources.
102. Furthermore, it appears that the right expertise was not always available, with some agencies and ministries not having gender as a traditional part of their mandate, they struggled more to identify in-house resources *"we realized our focal point did not know so much about gender. It was civil society that called us out"*. Moreover, the JP VAW design assumed both M&E and communication functions would be undertaken by the focal points, while for the most part they had no previous training on these. In spite of this, participants were quick to highlight the commitment of the focal points as key to the success of the programme despite limited staffing and all the challenges related the steep learning curve.

"we put the whole burden on ourselves, we count on each other, we drag others. One of the best things (from the JP VAW) is solidarity on VAW"

To what extent was the joint implementation more efficient in comparison to what could have been achieved through a single agency's intervention? Was there a clear added value of the participating agencies?

103. One key question is whether the proposed joint programme was more efficient in comparison to what could have been achieved bilaterally. While this evaluation cannot give a global and definite answer, there are indications that highlight the potential to joint programming.
104. Initially, the joint programme brought with it a series of challenges and a steep learning curve, with the most salient being the need to bring together and coordinate a multi-agency & multi-sectoral programme. Given that this was a first, the JP VAW bore the brunt of the learning process of which it is reasonable to expect future programmes should benefit.
105. Other challenges observed, such as limited information flow and dispersion, seem to be a pre-existing weakness that have been made visible by the joint programme, rather than a consequence of it.
106. While there are increased transaction costs, such as delays in fund transfers or double reporting, these are a consequence of the lack of alignment and flexibility of UN procedures. Those specifically related to the joint programme, such as the need to participate of coordination structures and joint monitoring, fulfill the objectives of a more coordinated aid, and decreased transaction costs for the host country, in that they can be updated on the UN's work on VAW through one meeting as opposed to nine bilateral meetings.
107. What is important when trying to answer this question is to separate the limitations of the joint programmes from those inherent to the UN and Government, such as administrative lack of coherence in the case of the UN or administrative inter-ministerial limitations stemming from the TPPs. *"Even within the same UN agency, ensuring the coherence across the projects (within one Ministry) with its multiple implementing partners was often a challenge."* It is also important to differentiate limitations related to the fact the JP VAW was not functioning fully as a joint programme from the beginning, i.e. while a counterfactual cannot be proven, it can be reasonable assumed that the JP VAW would have achieved more of the type of benefits seen towards the second half had it benefitted from the beginning of a fully functional JPMO, joint monitoring visits, workshops and other tools and know how developed over time.
108. In spite of the challenges highlighted, the evaluation team was able to extract a series of concrete examples of how the joint programme might lead to a more robust and coherent response, such as:
 - **Identification of duplications**, this led to cost savings and ability for to sustain support longer, for example, participants recounted how 2 of the agencies had planned to develop a hotline for victims of VAW. The JP VAW allowed them to visualize this and a decision was made to support the existing one in BMET (which had been supported with UN Women core funds), when these funds ran out IOM was able to give it continuity.

- Different agency expertise led to a **more robust and holistic approach**: In addition to the support to the costs of maintaining the shelters running and training for livelihood undertaken by UNFPA, towards the end of the programme IOM designed psychosocial training for staff at UNFPA supported shelters, and extended the training to Women Friendly Hospitals supported by UNICEF.
- **A more strategic division of labor**: during the MTE it was seen that two agencies were undertaking awareness raising sessions for potential internal migrants. As a result an internal division of labor was made where IOM would focus on external migration and ILO on internal migration. JP VAW allowed both agencies to learn from each other's approach.
- Increased awareness and response to the **multi-dimension of VAW**: agencies and ministries who did not previously address VAW are now aware of their role and have identified specific areas where they can make a difference.
- **Visualization of gaps and increased capacity for VAW**: the JP VAW made visible existing gaps, for example one agency, which previously addressed gender although not VAW specifically, was made aware that their in-house capacity was insufficient, *"(the JP VAW) made us realize that each agency needs a gender focal point. Now this is recognized"*. In addition, there is more support for VAW *"there has been a realization you have to address VAW, the boss no longer gives us a blank look (when we talk about VAW)"*.
- **Increased quality** of products through mutual revision, for example, the psychosocial training manual developed by IOM for shelter staff with support from other agencies.
- Increased **visibility with a more UN-wide coherent message**, for example, through the 16 day campaign
- **Identification of opportunities and synergies**: for example, participant recounted how the existing Café Mukti, an initiative to provide former victims of VAW with a viable livelihood, would be extended to some of the women in the UNFPA supported shelters, *"the most important thing is that they know each other's position, plans and objectives, (now) they can coordinate"*.



Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions

To what extent did the targeted population, citizens, participants, local and national authorities make the programme their own, actively participate and how did it affect efficiency and effectiveness?

109. Some participants felt the JP VAW was too short to achieve ownership and more time would be needed to secure this. Others highlighted that the process, mostly geared around the UN, to some degree discouraged national ownership. While most agreed that the leadership of the ERD had played a key role, most of the decision making and accountability rested with the UN, which may have thwarted ownership and participation from national counterparts.

110. The challenges related to design (limited inclusion and only at central level) and especially shortcoming in M&E may have further hampered ownership, *"(the) government needs a more evidence based result"* to buy into the work of the JP VAW.

111. Ownership cannot be easily measured, and for the most part it is done through proxy indicators such as participation, increased funding or incorporation of the initiatives. In this regards, participation from national counterparts of coordination and strategy meetings was limited, and none took part of the joint monitoring missions. No increases in funding allocation were reported and many of the UP VAW activities will cease once the programme finishes. In some instances ministries allocated resources such as office space, for example, the BMET will be providing office space for the returnee migrant workers network, and MoWCA has agreed to maintain the JP VAW website. But many Ministries whose JP VAW activities had finalized were not available to meet with the evaluation team, and others had already lost their staff who –as the JP VAW's end date approached- had found other more long term options, which meant the staff in charge was unfamiliar with the JP VAW and had little scope of being effectively engaged in or of building ownership. For example, this was the case for the Ministry of Social Welfare, who kindly met with the evaluation team, but the entire team had changed in March of 2013.

112. The team concludes the level of ownership varied significantly depending on the agency, ministry or civil society organization and as such it is not possible to generalize for the programme as a whole but, as highlighted above, the proxy indicators point towards weak and limited levels of ownership of the process. Some observations in this regards are:

- Stronger ownership was observed when the JP had come in to support and build on already existing initiatives;
- Ownership was stronger when gender was already a part of the organization's mandate, so while UNAIDS has put forward some successful activities and have now incorporated into international UNAIDS gender policy at the national level, it was not clear if the activities would be incorporated into their regular programme, even though under the UNDAF they have committed themselves to VAW. The same could be said about the Imam Academy. Those interviewed stressed they would be happy to continue training with outside funding, but had

no intention of including VAW into their regular curricula⁴⁵. Meanwhile, organizations whose mandate already included the activities covered, such as UN Women, UNFPA, MOWCA or the BMET had at least a partial strategy for sustainability;

- Weaker ownership was sometimes observed when the actual implementing agencies within the specific ministry had not part of the designing phase.

Initial findings: Results level (impact and Sustainability)

113. This section seeks to assess progress achieved and results or likely results stemming from the JP VAW actions.

114. Initially, the evaluation team would like to highlight the difficulties associated to measuring impact or sustainability. There are limitations linked to the nature of VAW. While progress in areas such as nutrition can more easily be linked to a formula-like indicators, for example, measuring the impact of policy related initiatives or advocacy campaigns is more complex and requires more extended periods to see be able to observe results, which means most observations at this stage are limited to process and expected results. Additional limitations were:

- Many activities were still on-going or had only recently finished at the time of the evaluation;
- Some activities had been finalized and no beneficiaries or implementing partners were available for interview (such as activities related to the Ministry of Youth and Sports);
- The evaluation team was unable to meet with either students or teachers benefitting from school related activities, due to timing of the evaluation, as school was not in session;
- Limitations linked to instability, which reduced the evaluation team's mobility and ability to meet with counterparts, beneficiaries and/or implementing partners;
- The field visit to Sylhet was cancelled due to Cyclone Mahasen;
- Limitations already mentioned linked to a weak M&E system

115. For these reasons the evaluation team relied heavily on secondary data provided.

116. Taking the JP VAW as a unit of analysis, and given the lack of linkages between activities, results still very much come across as "shopping list" without clear linkages between them.

⁴⁵ The evaluation team was informed that UNFPA has been working with the Training Institute over the past 10 years on the gender issues, and that it has included a population & development chapter, which also address gender issues, in their training manual. Incorporation was done prior to JP-VAW, the MoRA project under JP-VAW simply expanded the coverage/outreach using this manual. The lack of consistency could reflect how some areas of expansion have not been fully integrated and are not yet fully aware. The evaluation team cannot confirm this.

Outcome 1: Policies and legal framework aimed at preventing violence against women (VAW), protecting and supporting survivors adopted, implemented and monitored (ILO/WHO/UNFPA/UNWOMEN)

- **Output 1:** Enhanced capacity of GOB officials and civil society to implement CEDAW
- **Output 2:** Capacity strengthened for implementation of laws and policies aimed at preventing VAW and protecting the victims
- **Output 3:** Information systems on VAW improved

Key issues:

- Many key products from this outcome were still unfinished at the time of the evaluation (i.e. GRB, WHO studies)
- As a result of JP VAW action laws are being revised, recommendations have been put forward and studies have been provided to inform policy decision making but, to ensure ultimate outcomes are achieved, both UN and Government partners will need to give continuity to these initiatives.
- The time and resources available for this evaluation did not allow for assessment of quality, and are based on the secondary information provided with validation and triangulation whenever possible.

Primary Achievements identified for Outcome 1 (12% of total budget)

1. Contributed at national level towards increased awareness and tools to address VAW in the workplace. Unlike other areas of VAW such as trafficking, VAW in the workplace was not widely seen as a priority. Through the project partners such as Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE), Bangladesh Employers Federation (BEF) as well as trade unions (National Coordination Committee for Workers Education) are becoming more aware about the gender discrimination and GBV at workplace. Some key achievements are:

- Revision of the ILO code of Practice to Address Workplace Violence in the Bangladesh context. As a result of advocacy, for the first time MoLE has included a session on VAW within its own training module.
- The program of Technical Training Centre of the government has expressed their interest to incorporate “preventing violence against women at the workplace” in their existing training curricula.
- The Bangladesh Employers’ Federation (BEF) has developed a gender equality policy which incorporated issues of VAW /sexual harassment at workplace that will be applicable for the private sectors employers.
- NCCWE has included VAW issues within their trade union agenda and women leadership program.
- The Bangladesh Employers Association has already incorporated VAW in their policies related with work-place safety. The trade unions have already included VAW within their leaders training programs. Better work program and Indigenous Peoples’ Capacity Development project also include the issue of VAW at workplace. Based on the ILO labor law review report- some of the recommendations were also placed during the labor law reform process.

2. Contributed at national level towards increased awareness and tools to address VAW

- UNAIDS worked with parliamentarians and civil society to address VAW in the context of HIV/AIDS. The JP VAW worked with 50 parliamentarians, identified as a key constituency, with an aim to enhance their awareness and understanding on issues related to rights, stigma, violence and discrimination against female PLHIVs, sex workers and sexual minority groups, the most marginalized groups among women and girls. As a result, parliamentarians developed common understanding of emergent socio-medical-legal

issues of women from HIV positive and sex work constituencies and have improved knowledge and skills about their role to address these issues in various capacities. They also raised issues of these marginalized populations in the parliament and contribute in drafting AIDS issues in post MDG agenda.

- Provided support to the Sex Workers' Network to improve their awareness on HIV prevention, violence and responsibilities, and linked them with district human rights cell of Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust (BLAST).

As a result of JP VAW support the Sex Workers Network obtained legal registration from the Social Welfare department, which will enable them to work with multiple donors. The programme also provided support to strengthen the actual organizational through a series of operations manuals, in the areas of finance, human resources & administration.

- Under the UN Women's project, a Caucus of Women MP was formed in April 2013 to initiate internal discussion and identify issues for lobbying. The caucus will also work to increase capacity of the women MPs on legal tools and procedures on gender equality inclusive of the issues concerning VAW. As of the evaluation the Caucus had 14 members, but no meetings had yet been organized as of the evaluation date. However, the Speaker has formally approved the Caucus and approved it to work until a new parliament is formed. Moreover, the parliamentary secretariat has agreed to support the caucus. UN Women expressed their intention for continued support to the caucus through issue based events.

3. Increased capacities to facilitate proper legal processes for the victims of VAW (UN Women-MoLPA-IOM)

- The programme trained 960 Judges and 320 Prosecutors to enhance their understanding of issues related to VAW to facilitate proper legal processes for the victims of violence.
- The CEDAW Benchbook was created to act as a reference guide on CEDAW for judges, police and key stakeholders, and can be used in all court cases regarding VAW. The evaluation team was informed that the Bench book would be made available on-line, this together with adequate advertising of it, will be key to ensuring access for civil society.
- CEDAW Booklet, an accessible Bangla version of CEDAW, was created for judges, the police and other related stakeholders to facilitate access and understanding, and with it its application and use.

4. Increased awareness and capacity to address VAW stemming from internal and international migration through:

- The project assisted in setting up housekeeping facilities for preparing women for domestic work at abroad and developed a three day pre-departure orientation module was developed and trainers trained in the government institutes to provide a mandatory 3 days orientation to all potential women migrants prior to their departure. There are many barriers linked to access and costs, which make this alternative difficult for many potential migrant workers. Further work will need to be undertaken in order to ensure that this becomes a protection mechanism rather than a barrier to legal migration. Some of the TTCs provided accommodation at their premises which is a good example of how to address some of the issues around access.
- The programme supported the development of a **web-based Database** developed to disseminate information regarding the training facilities available in the TTCs. Interested employers can get information on skilled workers and potential trainees can easily access the information about trainings through internet. It is a comprehensive online resource with detailed information regarding all the 38 TTCs under the BMET.
- Programme helped promoted the opening of Hong Kong as a job market for migrant workers through an exposure visit for the Government Officials. An MoU was signed between the GoB and the Recruiting Association of Hong Kong which incorporates

<p>protection issues such as insurance, security etc. A country specific booklet was developed for the Hong Kong bound migrant.</p>
<p>5. The following studies were created to support informed policy-making and increased knowledge on gaps and how to address them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situational Analysis of Sexual Harassment at Tertiary Educational Institutes, the first baseline study on sexual harassment at tertiary educational institutes in Dhaka which gives insights into the prevailing situation and will assist in formulating programmes to end sexual harassment at tertiary educational institutes. • Situation analysis of female internal migrants and domestic workers. Findings provided some policy and programmatic direction, especially as studies on workplace VAW issues are scarce. • Social and economic base line study on women infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. • Baseline Survey on Public Private Partnership (PPP) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Violence against Women, intended for use by the UN, CSOs and corporations with CSR practices. This study will open opportunities for UN Women to engage in public-private partnerships with real potential to advance women's empowerment and gender equality. • During the evaluation an analysis on GRB of the 11 participation ministries was underway. • Research on returnee women migrants conducted to provide enhanced understanding for academics, policy makers and practitioners on the situation of women migrants and their needs for return and reintegration. • WHO-DGH are at the time of the evaluation undertaking a review to update existing guidelines and tools on how to cope with battered women and for handling victims of VAW in local clinics and hospitals. The results of the Research study on help seeking behavior of victims of violence is expected to contribute to enhancing the development of policies for addressing VAW. • The project conducted a scoping study which included including mapping of existing initiatives, and drafted a proposed strategy for establishing a comprehensive national database on VAW, which would allow to better understand root causes and inform policy decisions. • A study to monitor the progress of implementation of High Court's guideline for prevention of sexual harassment has been carried out and findings have also been disseminated. • A survey with ICDDRDB on "Men's Attitude and Practice regarding Gender and Violence against women in Bangladesh" was conducted, which provided knowledge on masculinity and is likely to contribute to national statistics in this area.
<p>6. The programme supported the development of a series of tools to address VAW and capacity gaps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training Manuals, for Labor Attaché • Training Manual on Psychosocial Counseling for Victim Care and Support for Shelter Home Staff (not yet finalized) • Training manual for Judges and Prosecutors on Violence against Women which may be incorporated in the Judicial Administration Training Institution's main curricula. • Income Generating Activities (IGA) training manual which can be used for further IGA training in other programs. • Sex Workers Network capacity building training manual: Sex workers belong to different self help groups are the beneficiary. This manual is first of its kind in Bangladesh; and
<p>7. Data base for VAW in partnership with NGO: JP VAW conducted a pilot study to collect data on VAW incidents building on already existing mechanism developed by BRAC. This data was collected by women in 44 unions of 6 selected <i>upazilas</i> in 6 districts. It was compiled by BRAC and submitted to <i>upazila</i> and district women affairs officers. Further support from JP VAW was provided to replicate the pilot in all 388 unions of the 6 districts.</p>

This pilot has visualized potential to link information being collected at district level with the national level for a more reliable national database. Pilot was endorsed by MoWCA, who was part of the scoping mission, and would be the guardian of the database.

The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) currently has no database on VAW. Linkages between government, UN and civil society could lead to a more comprehensive and transparent/reliable database. UNDP-BRAC will continue to work on creating a VAW nationwide data base building on the pilot of the JP VAW. This was seen by the evaluation team as a best practice.

Outcome 2: Social attitudes and behavior changes effected to reduce VAW and discriminatory practices (ILO/IOM/UNAIDS/UNESCO/UNDP/UNFPA/UNWOMEN)

- **Output 1:** Strengthened advocacy and public awareness on VAW
- **Output 2:** Established a national network of gatekeepers and stakeholders to prevent VAW and protect the victims of VAW
- **Output 3:** Develop the capacity of gatekeepers and stakeholders for preventing VAW

Key issues:

- Most challenging to asses given the time frame
- Most affected by geographic spread
- The penetration was less than 10 percent⁴⁶ at Divisional level and the frequency of communication was low, a major constraint in effectively bringing about behavioral change.
- Many of the products developed were not properly implement (communication materials, module etc.) due to lack of budget or/ and inadequate planning (see communication section for more detail).

Primary Achievements identified for Outcome 2 (38% of total budget)

1. **Capacity building, awareness raising and development of IEC & ICT Materials to address VAW and knowledge gaps:** Nearly 24,000 stakeholders (such as Journalists, employers, trade union leaders, civil society member, district officials, teachers, religious leaders, curriculum developers, parents, sex workers, judges and prosecutors) directly received awareness training on VAW. Insufficient detail was provided as to the type, quality or linkages, if any, to be able to undertake an adequate assessment of these. In addition to examples already mentioned (such as union leaders and judiciary) other examples are:
 - Community Dialogue Facilitation Tool (CDFT) and Action Research materials were developed, in collaboration with Dhaka University and Rokeya Begum University, to capitalize positive deviance to change men's gender discriminative practices (e.g., domestic violence, child marriage, etc.). This is helpful for any organizations who would like to replicate the approach and mobilize commitment from communities and men in particular. Implementation of CDFT, in the form of Action Research, aimed to develop effective strategies to initiate community dialogue on women empowerment and ending VAW, involved 7,000 men and women in Rangpur, Sirajganj, Natore and Pabna in community dialogue on women empowerment issues (birth of girl child, girls education, dowry, wife battering, health care during pregnancy, marriage registration, early marriage, marriage

⁴⁶ As per calculations of the country team

registration, polygamy and household work). The research findings suggest that such processes may initiate changes and there are immense possibilities of using university and college students as community dialogue facilitators on women empowerment issues in a cost effective way.

- To build capacity of the teachers on the new curricula, teachers from 28 schools (4 schools per division) were selected for piloting the new textbooks (4 to 5 teachers per school). There were two training phases (each of two days). NCTB also carried out one training on gender issues for 250 primary teachers and instructors. NCTB provided training to 60 NCTB staff involved in curriculum development and textbook writing.
- WHO under the JP VAW ensured that while advocating to and raising awareness among various stakeholders and the public, it was also advocating and building awareness amongst their own staff (both local staff and international staff).
- Over 2,000 religious leaders and female religious minded women were trained on VAW, together with 3 interfaith meetings (in Sylhet, Jessore and Rajshahi) with an estimated 300 participants. All participants who discussed this area agreed that this was a key initiative but would require a significant scale up in order to achieve significant impact, and should be seen as a pilot.
- **Masculinity** trainings were conducted for 1,290 male elected Union *Parisad* (UP)
- Local artists performed 39 interactive drama shows on VAW issues with 13,000 community people watching and a 26 Episode drama serial was produced to sensitize the upper class and social elites.
- Under the UNiTE campaign, 50 batches of training were ensured at union level where 873 male UP members were present.
- Inter-generational dialogue on gender equality and VAW was organized in each division and at national level

Some reported results of these actions are:

- 6 District Legal Aid Committees under the leadership of district judges conduct regular meetings and support victims referred by the JP VAW project. UP's Standing Committees on Family Conflict Resolution.
- Women and Children's Welfare, hold regular meetings and the majority of elected leaders are capable of conducting local arbitration (Shalishi) in a proper manner.

2. Awareness raising on Internal and International migration

- Community level awareness raising sessions (courtyard meetings) were held under for potential female migrants and domestic workers in Khulna, Gazipur, Dhaka city and adjoining areas to raise awareness about their rights (ILO) as well as the migration process, their rights, work conditions, sources for obtaining accurate information, etc. to prevent them from being exploited by agents and unscrupulous middlemen.(IOM). The communities have also been sensitized through community meetings and theatre shows to extend their support to the female domestic workers and potential migrants for their safe migration. These have led to a positive change in the communities' attitude especially towards the vulnerable domestic workers.
- IEC materials such as leaflets, posters, calendars and a feature film were developed for awareness campaign targeting potential migrants; especially women, on the migration process, their rights, working conditions, sources of accurate information, available training facilities, protecting themselves from being exploited by agents and unscrupulous middlemen. Door to door campaign was conducted in migration prone areas and wall boards were hosted in all the 38 Technical Training Centres. The feature

<p>film was telecasted on the International Migrants Day 2012 in a private TV channel and was distributed to TTCs. IOM plans to continue airing it for wider coverage of mass population. (IOM-BMET)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A further 8 types of promotional materials were developed with standardized information and administrative procedure for safe internal migration, and were disseminated among different stakeholders such as MoE, MoWCA, MOI, NGOs, Media and other CSOs . (ILO-BRAC) • A poster on VAW service providers was created in English and Bangla (UNDP-BRAC) for LGs, Local organizations and community people • Studies on the migration situation of the female RMG workers, domestic workers, chatal workers (rice mill workers) and construction workers contributed in development of information-package to be used by NGOs and local elected government officials (UP). The booklet identifies vulnerable areas, destinations, harms and risks so that the NGO and UP representatives can inform the prospective female migrants on prospect and procedures of organizing migration. This resulted in increase of awareness among women in making migration-decisions. Information in the booklet is sector specific (such as RMG sector, domestic work etc.). The booklet also provides the NGO and UP actors with information on what to do or whom to contact if the rights of the migrant female workers are violated at work locations. (under outcome 2) (ILO_BRAC).
<p>3. 16 day Joint Campaign: The JP VAW was able to promote a UN-wide coordinated 16 days activism campaign. The experience was praised as pilot particularly in that it set out a mechanism and process which could be used in the future to further the model of join initiatives.</p>
<p>4. JP VAW website. The website is still under construction and is expected to be completed before the end of project. MoWCA has been communicated and the focal person have agreed to takeover the responsibility of maintaining the website once JPMO launches it (meets the costs of developing and hosting the webpage initially). The knowledge products, scoping report, evaluation, lessons' learned will be hosted in the website. It will also hold links of partner agencies' and partner ministries' websites. MoWCA can update the links and place the database on VAW on the website.</p>
<p>5. Partnership with NGOs: through the JP VAW many UN agencies, such as ILO, IOM, UNFPA and UN Women, built and strengthened existing partnership with NGOs and civil society. Some outcomes of this are the legalization of the Sex Workers Network or the institutionalization of internal migration as an area of work for BRAC. In addition BRAC, the largest NGO in Bangladesh and a key partner, has involved other specialized NGOs such as BNWLA, ASK and Mahila Parishad in VAW activities.</p>
<p>6. Sensitization of Media:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A reported 128 orientations took place to sensitize journalists on VAW in 64 districts. 840 film shows and community meetings were carried out. • JP VAW under the UNDP-BRAC project developed a Draft Code of Conduct of Media Professional on VAW. The target of this tool involves Key Policy makers of GoB, media professionals, Development Partners and civil society members. The project also published report on Media Workshops (Bangla & English) targeting the key policy makers of GoB, media professionals, Development Partners and civil society members. • It was reported that the media coalition envisioned as part of the progarmme with the Ministry of Information was formed but not enacted due to political antagonism.

<p>7. Activities with students to promote awareness amongst youth:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The findings of the study to monitor the progress of implementation of High Court's guideline for prevention of sexual harassment were followed-up by SASH, a network named Students against Sexual Harassment which comprises 15 students at each of the five universities, to raise awareness through poster show, orientation session for faculty and administration, advocacy session with university grant commission etc. • The secretariat of the Men Engage Network organized a human chain, speech competition and a cultural program in 12 male dormitories of Dhaka University and conducted 4 similar programs in Sirajganj, Rajshahi, Natore and Pabna. • Awareness raising campaigns with the Ministry of Youth and Sports through banners on VAW during sports tournaments. • The programme supported 58 school level debate competitions in 7 districts and two essay contests on ending VAW. • Discussion on CEDAW was held with 6000 school and college (grade 5 to grade 12) students in Gazipur Sadar Upazilla by BRAC • A countrywide debate competition on end violence against women (EVAW) issues was organized by Bangladesh Debate Federation. • Youth groups participated of the 16 day campaign.
<p>8. Promotion of policy dialogue such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seven intergeneration policy dialogues were organized on the situation of VAW at national level with the presence of ministries, journalists and women activists in which policy and legal gaps were identified. (Under the UNDP-DWA) • Seven advocacy workshops were held at seven Divisions. For advocacy posters and leaflets were developed by NCTB with feedback from JP VAW project team. (UNESCO-NCTB) • 4 national level consultation took place on safe migration and on Violence against Migration workers related issues. (BMET-UN Women). Moreover, UN Women held 6 policy discussion with Women MPs on existing policies and international obligations connected with gender equality, women's empowerment and EVAW, issues.
<p>9. Prevention through awareness raising with a focus on vulnerable populations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 23,638 Ex REOPA women Crew Members, 2,335 local youth of 388 unions, 41 <i>upazillas</i> and 6 districts received training and attended awareness raising events on VAW. • REOPA women were linked to BRAC services which provides them free effective access to legal support and counseling.
<p>10. The UNESCO-NCTB project has set a milestone by supporting the first revision with a gender lens of curricula and textbooks. The two key components of the project of UNSCO-NCTB were (i) review which involved a national workshop on masculinity issues and action research to find out the hidden causes of the drop-outs of girls (ii) revision of curricula and (iii) building the capacity of the curricula developers and textbook writers on the issue of gender equity through training and guidelines. Similarly the knowledge gap of teachers was identified as the main barrier for gender friendly classroom approach and practice. This was addressed through training of the teachers on the newly developed textbooks and curricula.</p>

While this is a significant milestone, an internal evaluation undertaken by UNESCO praises the achievements while highlighting that there are still many gaps. This should be seen as a first step and which will require extensive scale up as well as on-going revisions in order to achieve impact.

11. UN Women and BMET created a platform to help women migrant workers: With UN Women's technical support, BMET created and supported the Network of Advocacy, Research, and Information (NARI) for Women Migrant Workers which is a platform and support system for women returning from migrant work who are dealing with violations they have faced during the migration process. NARI serves as a base for all aspiring and returning women migrant workers to communicate with one another and learn from each other's experiences. NARI currently has 30 members, who are all returnee women migrant workers and now understand the entire migration process and how dangerous it can be.



Outcome 3: Conducive environment created, and capacities enhanced for providing support to women and girls vulnerable to/have survived, violence (IOM/UNAIDS/UNFPA/UNICEF)

- **Output 1:** Increased availability of and access for victims of VAW to shelter, medical, psychological, legal support and vocational training.

Key issues:

- Sustainability most challenging for this outcome.
- Designed without stakeholder consultation, which sometimes puts into question relevance and adequacy.
- Lacking Human rights based approach to programming i.e. shelters do not address underlying human rights questions, such underage victims of VAW treated as in conflict with the law, with no protection in a legal limbo.

Primary Achievements identified for Outcome 3 (34% of total budget)

1. Economic empowerment of survivors through decent employment opportunities and seed money:

- A baseline study was conducted (UNAIDS-Network of PLHIVs) which, revealed that women affected by HIV/AIDS are suffering VAW along with the women who are infected

by the disease. On the basis of the baseline study, 146 vulnerable women affected or infected by HIV/ AIDS and with low levels of income were identified along with feasible entrepreneurial opportunities. Income generating activities (IGA) trainings were organized in 4 divisions of the country to equip them with necessary skills and information. Grant supports of BDT 10,000 (\$128.3) were provided to each participant after successful completion of IGA training. With the grant support, they have started businesses such as cattle raising, small shops, handicrafts etc. The evaluation team was able to meet with various beneficiaries and attest significant impact and sustainability from this initiative.

- Income Generating Activities (IGA) training manual: IGA training beneficiaries are expected to be the main beneficiaries and this manual can be used for IGA training for stakeholders in other programs.
- The fact that it as done in consultation with beneficiaries is seen as a best practice.

2. Increased Access to Protection Services:

- JP VAW together with the BMTE established Help Desk for female **migrant workers** in three main airports (Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet), and in a key destination country.
- Provided basic training and **smart card** to more than 23,000 REOPA Women Crew Group members which gave them access to BRAC's hotline, legal aid and counseling. As a results, 908 community Members solicited and received legal, medical and counseling services from District Legal Aid Committee, BRAC, Legal Aid and Union *Parishads*. They also received basic training and are now familiar with basic information and process to get support from different service providers. (UNDP-BRAC).

3. Support to Women Support Centers for victims of VAW:

- Support to 9 women support centers for survivors of VAW, of which 5 were created by the JP VAW. The project was implemented together with DWA (MoWCA) and built on previous projects. Out of the five were created by the JP VAW, which were selected based on vulnerability and as a pilot, none will be maintained after the end of the programme.
- The support provided included IGA training, health care, legal services and arbitration. No psychosocial counseling was provided. Support to 685 mothers and 635 children was provided during the Programme. Linkages were made with legal support through which 2,093 cases were resolved via arbitration and 834 cases via court. A new SOP for victims of MoWCA shelters was developed and for the MoSW shelters was under review.
- The evaluation team feels this was a weak proposal, which appears more focused on the centers than the girls. Given this focus a sustainability strategy from the beginning was particularly critical as little other than the new SOP⁴⁷ will remain from this activity. Counseling and healthcare should have been prioritized. DWA reported increased internal capacity of their staff as a result of the JP VAW. Linkages made to legal counseling is seen as a best practice.

4. Support to shelters for underage sex workers.

- Building on previous projects, the JP VAW supported 6 existing shelters for under aged sex workers run by the Ministry of Social Welfare. Support to the shelter homes included funds for food, fuel, bedding, clothing, medication, healthcare, cosmetics, education and IGA training for the creation of decent job opportunities. Some other provisions, such as televisions, were also included.

⁴⁷ At the time of the evaluation the SOP was still unfinished. Participants reported no major changes with previous SOP

- Training was provided on beautification, traditional and industrial sewing, and vegetable gardening. It was reported that a total of 19 survivors were able to secure employment as a result of the JP VAW.⁴⁸ Participants on the ground felt that this low number reflected the fact that the staff on the ground had not been included in the selection of areas for training, and that areas selected had not taken into account the community who rejected the girls which meant it was difficult for them to find work but even if they found it, they were unable to secure housing. The evaluation team feels this is a good example of how meaningful inclusion during the design process is key for effectiveness.
- A number of community awareness meetings were held to sensitize the community to girls' situation, although deemed insufficient by those on the ground to make a difference, who felt more work needed to be made with the communities.
- At the time of the evaluation IOM was in the process of training shelter staff on psychosocial care for the victims of VAW through a psychosocial training manual designed with support from other UN agencies. Training of all staff (including guard, cooks, etc) is seen as a best practice and was lauded by the staff on the ground. However, JP VAW staff will not be retained, and although the remaining 108 staff will be absorbed into the government, only 2, the manager and the pharmacist, will be kept for each center⁴⁹. At the same time of the evaluation only two of the centers had a pharmacist, which raises questions about the sustained impact of the training for staff at the centers, especially as at least one of the centers will only receive the training in the last month of the JP VAW. IOM is trying to ensure inclusion of the module in the regular training of staff at the Department of Social Services, this would give some sustainability to the initiative.
- Most Government counterparts felt that the JP VAW length was inadequate to work at the shelters, with limited support possibly having a negative effect on the women. The evaluation team feels the support to these shelters was inadequate from a HRBAP perspective, which are in direct conflict with CEDAW, as the model presents the girls as "in conflict with the law" as apposed to victims of child trafficking, and as such are deprived of their liberty. Moreover, girls remain on a legal limbo if their families are not located or do not want the girls back. Although at Dhaka level it was reported that the average stay in a shelter was 6 to 12 months, manager on the ground reported an average stay of 4 years, with some women having been there longer. Additionally, it is unclear why women over the age of 18 remain in the centers against their will as they compliance is needed by law.

5. Support for better services for victims of VAW

- **Women friendly Hospitals initiative** was initiated before the JP VAW and continued under JP VAW. A women friendly hospital certificate states that the hospital provides decent gender socio-appropriate care, such as separate lines for women or breastfeeding areas, as well as link to legal support and counseling. Committees for the hospitals to include key local stakeholders in the discussion, which included female lawyers.
- The main components of the WFH are 1) Quality care; such that at health facilities women's dignity, privacy and confidentiality are maintained and the voice of the women is heard. 2) Mother and baby package – in a way it is the major component. This involves both emergency and routine care facility for the mother along with neonatal care and breast feeding facilities. 3) Management of VAW- which includes treatment, medico-legal certificate with confidentiality/ separate bed/room/examination table/toilet and closet along with two trained doctors and two trained nurses (both are female). The provisions of medico-legal counseling and referral for the victims of VAW are in-built within the project.

⁴⁸ 12 were employed by NGO, 3 in a beauty parlor, 1 opened a business with vegetable and fish, and one started joined a family business, and 2 survivors were appointed as cooks in the centre following a competitive process.

⁴⁹ Min. of Social Welfare informed the evaluation team that only a manager and a pharmacist would stay at the centers, but the team was informed that only 2 of the centers currently had a pharmacist.

The health professionals also provide evidence at court. 4) Gender Equity – at women friendly hospitals the women have separate process to access health care services to ensure equity (the provisions for women patients are responsive to the women’s needs within the cultural environment).

- Additionally the targeted facilities were provided support for infrastructure, supplies, water/electricity supply, and “VAW room”. Nurses and support staff were recruited locally to fill up vacancies, although budget for sustainability of trained staff remains uncertain.
- As a result, hospitals reported increased number of women, including survivors of violence, received medical treatment and counseling. The victims are linked to local legal aid agencies for support. Six public hospitals (out of total 13 under JP VAW) were granted the Women Friendly Hospitals recognition, and 5 more expected to receive it by June 2013. It was reported that during the JP 257 female survivors of violence received treatment, as well as counseling through linkages established with 12 legal aid, in addition to legal aid provided to 582 survivors. Committee stakeholders participated of 28 meetings and the 16 days activism campaign.
- The WHO-DGH-project under JP VAW, developed training modules for Doctors and nurses, will be used by the Stakeholder Participation Unit (GNSPU), the NGO acting as focal point for this programme.
- MoWCA awarded identified Good Practices to address VAW in order to recognize efforts and re-energize their commitment. A small booklet was put together which is helpful to inform the public, programmers, planners and policymakers.

Sustainability:

117. Likelihood of sustainability of specific activities can be found in the results section above, while this section looks at the likelihood of sustainability stemming from the different strategies adopted.
118. Generally speaking, different strategies have led to varied degree of sustainability depending on context and objective, for example training, while government officials have a higher turnover, meanwhile community actors are much stable both geographically and in terms of their mandates.
119. Sustainability status varies across different project implemented under JP VAW. The team concludes that progress in terms of sustainability is directly linked to:
 - **Type of activity:** The type of activity determines the amount of resources necessary to maintain, for example, while awareness raising activities with parliamentarians have inherent sustainability, activities such as shelters activities would require a more robust sustainability strategy. Initially MoWCA had agreed to absorb these centers, but towards the end of the JP VAW they indicated their inability to do so. 110 staff in the seven centers but MoWCA has no policy of absorbing them in revenue budget. The project design does not also have any such provision.
 - **Level of ownership achieved-** while certain NGOs such as the Sex Workers Network or the Steps Toward Development stated their determination to continue regardless of the JP VAW, the team observed that many of the

Government counterparts perceived their role as that of implementers, with many expressing their hope for a phase 2 of JP VAW. Civil society was not invited to participate of management process (such as planning, PMC, joint monitoring and other such activities), and while government was, it would appear that participation was inconsistent at best. Moreover, when the actual implementing agencies within government are not part of the designing phase, such as the NTCB for example, ownership appears to be weakened.

- **Quality-** Sustainability is also directly linked to quality, this is particularly true for training whereby adequate training has inherent for the textbook developers was not adequate- a refresher was needed. This would also apply to studies.
- **Funding** was recurrently presented as the primary barrier towards sustainability of activities which required continued support, including activities which required limited if any such as inclusion of gender and VAW issues in regular discussion of Imams at the Imam Academy.

120. The team concludes that for the most part sustainability is most likely when Project introduces VAW into existing activities: for example, while the “VAW room” was introduced by the JPVAV, UNICEF it has been incorporated into an already ongoing activity which will continue, and while the room itself may not be sustained, the training and principles around it could easily be made a permanent part of the initiative.

121. The team also concludes there was no adequate planning at the design. For many lack of forward planning has now led to “damage control”. The main gaps highlighted are:

- **TPP did not adequately consider sustainability:** although it was reported TPPs include a section for this, many sustainability strategies proposed lacked funding, partly because this was not envisioned in the TPPs. In other cases it went beyond the funding to more strategic sustainability, for example, process of institutionalizing a gender review within NCTB, or continued training of book editors. Similarly, in the initial plan only MoI was expected to disseminate its materials the potentiality of having broader dissemination via JP VAW partners was not fully utilized.
- **Did not take into account government planning cycles:** For example, some of the government OPs linked to JP VAW activities will be not be reviewed until 2014, until then there is no opportunities to find revenue or donor money.
- **Many activities “too expensive” to be sustainable:** a proper design should be in a position to assess if the proposed activities are sustainable. While some activities, even if not sustainable with government funding, can be justified, others, such as training of staff for centers that will be closed down, reflect poor planning, and in extreme circumstances, such as the case of the IGA training for underage sex workers, can have a negative effect on the intended beneficiaries.

122. The evaluation team concludes that the sustainability plan of JP VAW is important and mainstreaming the achievements into the existing system will be critical. There is a need to develop and deploy effective tools and mechanisms to mainstream the

achievement of JP VAW (as for One off event will not lead to sustainable impacts (for example, the training of the religious leaders will have to be institutionalized and budgeted for so that the annual budget has continuous provisions for training).

3. Conclusions

123. The Evaluation exercise was able to confirm alignment to MDG priorities and national priorities, both at Government and UN level. External coherence was confirmed, together with a clear focus on three key areas that to VAW at both impact and root-cause levels, clearly linked to the problem identified.
124. The design did not, however identify links between the different activities, synergies, competitive advantages of the partners or mechanisms to promote joint implementation or cross fertilization beyond those proposed by the MDG fund and lacked internal coherence. Similarly, a theory of change, although implicit, was never fully developed, as a result, the link between activities and outcomes remains unclear.
125. A strategic gap identified by the evaluation team was the absence of a human rights based approach to programming (HRBAP) which lacked meaningful participation of civil society and beneficiaries (both in design and management) and in some instances failed to respect the inherent indivisibility of rights (for example the case of the shelters, described in more detail in the body of the report)
126. A strategic decision was made to limit coordination structures to the minimum, with the JPMO seen as playing more of an administrative coordination role. Many participants felt a more strategic role would have strengthened the programme.
127. Human resource identified for the JP VAW were often insufficient and sometimes inadequate.
128. Design weaknesses coupled with late recruitment and diminished mandate for the JPMO led to parallel implementation and business as usual.
129. The JP VAW helped to visualize existing gaps and inefficiencies within the UN's existing approach, highlighting duplications and inconsistencies. Towards the end the JP VAW benefits stemming from joint programming begun to emerge, such as a better distribution of roles and synergies
130. While an inclusiveness of agencies has given way to important benefits, when designing future initiatives the UN will need to weigh these with the limitations and pressures it puts on its ability to coordinate strategically.
131. The PMC led by the ERD, UNFPA and the JPMO, were the main drivers of the process. The NSC played a nominal role with little strategic substance. Most strategic decisions were made bilaterally at agency level.
132. The JP VAW lacked a clear **M&E** strategy and methodological consistency. Lack of a baseline and measurable indicators makes it difficult to assess level of achievement.

133. The JP VAW lacked a **communications** strategy. This is perceived as a missed opportunity to advocate for VAW, particularly important given the objective to raise awareness and affect behaviors.
134. In spite of the many challenges the faced, clear examples of benefits derived from joint programming leading to a more coherent UN response were also observed, such as: Identification of duplication which led to cost savings; more robust products, and holistic approach; A more strategic division of labor; Increased awareness of the multi-dimension of VAW and how the different expertise can affect it; Visualization of gaps; Increased capacity; Increased quality of products through mutual revision; Increased visibility; Identification of opportunities and synergies. Specific examples described in the body of the report.
135. Much of the progress was achieved through the team's willingness to learn, for example, outcome group mechanism, joint monitoring activities, were introduced as a result of MTR recommendations. Lessons learned from JP-VAW have been incorporated into the new design.
136. Leadership and ownership of the ERD and commitment focal points was a key driver. Ownership from management and government focal points seems to have been less consistent.
137. The primary limitation in regards to results is scale. Given the enormity of the problem and the size of the population of Bangladesh, most of the results achieved, possibly excluding policy oriented work such as GRB, can only be seen as a pilot with the need for massive scale up in order to achieve any significant impact. As such, possibly the most significant achievement is the awareness raised on VAW, coupled with increased capacity, information and Tools to fight VAW in 11 ministries and 9 UN agencies.

4. Lessons Learned

138. Key lessons learned on Design:

- Design process is key for joint programming. Adequate time and participation needs to be ensured.
- Programme strategies need to be agreed at the design stage (for advocacy, communications, monitoring, coordination, etc), this will help to identify synergies and ensure clear division of roles (to avoid duplication) among partners and outcomes-clusters.
- Geographic spread has different impact depending on the nature of the activity, while it might benefit service provision and not affect policy level interventions, it poses a significant challenge to awareness raising or behavior change interventions. Quality control and measuring of impact is easier if interventions are together
- The program goals need to be specific, measurable and time bound. They also need to be adequate to programme resources, mainly time, staff and funds. This needs to be reflected into how achievements are measured (M&E framework).
- Need to agree and develop a monitoring and evaluation strategy from the beginning, and ensure adequate and sufficient capacity to implement it.

- Sustainability of programme activities needs to be looked at the design stage. Commitments need to be agreed at this stage and included in TPPs so they can be included in planning cycles.

139. Key lessons learned on Joint programmes

- The UN is still learning how to do joint programmes. Benefits of inclusiveness (number of agencies) are off set with challenges to coordination and hamper the learning process towards real joint programming. Limiting the number of partners would facilitate the learning process.
- In-country capacity, in addition to expertise and mandate, should be taken into consideration when looking at responsibilities and budget distribution.
- Joint programming helps to avoid duplication and identify opportunities for synergies, but only when partners participate of the process.
- For successful joint programming adequate and realistic assessment of human resource, which takes into consideration requirements for coordination, needs to take place.

140. Key lessons learned on Management and Coordination

- Role of JP structures can be different, from more administrative to more managerial and strategic. This needs to be assessed and agreed at the design phase.
- Joint structure (JPMO) needs to be fully in place from the beginning. Inadequate resources for M&E lead to weak reporting, analysis and quality control.

141. Key lessons learned on Synergy

- If planning is not based on comparative advantage and linkages are not identified it is difficult to ensure synergy at implementation level.
- The communications strategy needs to be agreed at the design stage with support of a specialist. Only if objectives are clear can they guide the different activities.

5. Recommendations for Future Joint Programmes

i. DESIGN

- Ensure sufficient time and resources are allocated to the process of design, with meaningful participation of implementing staff as well as duty bearers to ensure relevance and adequacy and ensure alignment to women's groups priorities in line with aid effectiveness principles.
- The government should explore its own policies when presented with joint programme opportunities and promote inter-ministry coordination in place of ministry-based segmented projects.
- Limit participants in future joint programmes to 4-5 agencies and equal amount of ministries, in line with recommendations from recent studies, to facilitate a more strategic approach, identification of comparative advantages and linkages. Ensure linkages to existing initiatives.
- Roles, responsibilities and human resources of the coordination unit (the equivalent of the JPMO) need to be agreed at the very onset, along with monitoring and feedback mechanism. Sufficient and adequate resources should be secured, including for M&E and communications.

ii. PROCESS

- Both the UN, Government and donors should continue to advocate with UN headquarters for greater harmonization of internal procedures.
- Whenever possible work within existing mechanisms, seek to build capacity and mainstream or institutionalize. This is particularly important in Bangladesh specially given the size of population and the high level of rotation within government.
- If agency focal points are going to be the implementing M&E and communications, capacity building should take place.
- Internal feedback and accountability mechanism should be built in.

iii. OWNERSHIP

- Use design stage to develop a common vision, agree on definitions and management structure.
- Whenever possible, and ensuring alignment with CEDAW, planned activities should build on existing government initiatives.
- Promote broad based ownership and buy-in through participation and capacity development of participants, especially of management.

iv. SUSTAINABILITY

- The evaluation recommends a one-day session of the UN, government counterparts and civil society to discuss lessons learned and share products widely.
- Linking to or build on existing initiatives, will strengthen sustainability.
- Commitments for sustainability should be agreed at the design stage.

v. RESULTS

- Ensure full alignment between initiatives supported and international human rights standards, including CEDAW and UNCRC. Advocacy to address any discrepancies should be part of the JP.
- Include measures to ensure mutual accountability to key areas of process such as joint monitoring and performance reporting.
- Advocate for results oriented accountability.

vi. Recommendations to donors:

- Continue to advocate for a more coherent and efficient UN response to VAW through support initiatives with:
 - a. Strategic designs that leverage on existing comparative advantages
 - b. Results oriented, realistic and measurable results (not process)
 - c. Clear accountability mechanisms that go beyond reporting
 - d. Mechanisms for quality control
 - e. Continue to advocate for internal administrative barriers to be addressed

vii. Recommendations related to specific activities of the JP VAW:

- Promote institutionalization of textbook revision, training of external editors and inclusion of primary education when gender identity develops.
- Support government for a better conceptualization of shelters for underage victims of sexual exploitation which ensures protection and basic rights in line with CEDAW. Shelters would benefit from IGA activities such as the ones by UNAIDS (poultry, gardening, etc).

- Whenever possible expand IGA initiatives which have proven to be an efficient and sustainable way to promote empowerment of vulnerable populations, (for example, in the shelters).
- Ensure awareness of products and website by civil society to facilitate access to JP VAW products.



6. Annexes:

Annex 1- Agreed Time table including deliverables*

DATES	BANGLADESH/GENDER TIMELINE
29 April- 9 May	Desk Review
10 May	Inception Report (IR)
12-24 May	Bangladesh in-country visit
27 May- 14 June	Data analysis Draft Report
14 June	Draft Final Report
21 May	ERG comments to draft report to be sent to the evaluators
28 May	Final Evaluation Report

*deliverables in bold

