



ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title:** **Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice and corn based farming communities in Leyete province of region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan.**
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This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Unit.



INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

DRAFT REPORT

Independent Final Evaluation of

Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan (PHI/14/01/UKM)

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Evaluation Manager: Pamornrat Pringsulaka

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CLGU	City Local Government Unit
CfW	Cash for Work
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
EE	Emergency Employment
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FMR	Farmer to Market Road
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
MAO	Municipality Agriculture Office
MEO	Municipality Engineering Office
MLGU	Local Government Unit
MT	Metric Tons
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NIA	National Irrigation Administration
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PhilHealth	Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
PMT	Project Monitoring Team
POW	Program of Work
PLGU	Provincial Local Government Unit
ROAP – Bangkok	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
SALT	Sloping Agriculture Land Technology
SCUK	Save the Children
SSS	Social Security System
ST	Skills Training
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overall the evaluation was highly impressed by the effective management employed by the ILO team to achieve and even exceed the physical outputs of the project. However the delivery of the inputs was significantly delayed, to the extent that the emergency activities became in effect transitioning activities. Weaknesses in the delivery mechanism of the two more complex transitioning activities reduced their impact. These nonetheless do provide worthwhile lessons that future natural resource response programs can learn from.

Background

Categorized as one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, **Typhoon Haiyan** (local name: Yolanda) made its landfall on 08 November 2013 in the Philippines, and wrought catastrophic damage throughout Samar and Leyte in the Visayas. The agriculture sector was severely affected as well as an estimated 5.6-million workers, of which 40 percent are women, with little or no access to social security. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment, were seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups in order to make up for the lost sources of income and livelihood.

In 2014, ILO implemented the PHI/14/01/UKM project with funding U\$D1, 636,570 from DFID in collaboration with SCUK and FAO. The project was designed to be aligned and support the response and recovery plan of government counterparts i.e. DA, DSWD, DOLE, and LGUs. Its overall objective was to contribute to the development impact as *“Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the four (4) selected municipalities”*. The ILO component of the project included: (a) Emergency employment (**EE**) creation through the clearing of debris and fallen trees, and preparation of cleared land for rice and corn fields. (b) Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production, Sloping Land Agriculture Technology (**SALT**), and (c) Skills training (**ST**) provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women.

The independent evaluation was conducted to comply with ILO requirements for all projects with budgets of \$1M. It included three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the Inception Phase; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholder and direct observation; (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings. The evaluation was conducted with a field mission 1-8 Feb, 2014. Given the spread of the project sites, single-visit interviews, with most information based on memory, but then triangulated desk review and field visits.

Evaluation Findings

The planned project start was early January. Administration procedures in processing the project delayed the MoU and mobilization until mid-March. This affected all activities, in particular the **Emergency Employment (EE)** for debris clearing. Special effort by the team delivered 50% within one month of mobilization, i.e. end-May, by which time it should have been fully completed. The remainder of EE was re-targeted and completed in Nov. As a result the EE as delivered could not be regarded as contributing to emergency recovery. Clearly the administrative procedures for processing approvals for natural disaster response programs should be reviewed.

The **Sloping Land Agriculture Technology (SALT)** has potential to provide an agriculture system for upland areas that will be resilient in the face of the violent storms that cross the Visayas region. This dominant message, beginning with the prodoc, and in its introduction to farmers, was ‘paid labor’ and ‘income generation’. These were established jointly by FAO (technical inputs) and ILO (management of social preparation and CfW).

The SALT sites observed during the evaluation all suffered from over-development (pathways, shelters and various decorative aspects), which distract from the ‘resilience’ message. The sites also had significant technical problems

(ineffective contour bunds; bunds that did not follow contours, sites on land with excessive slopes for annual cultivation; sites on degraded land, etc.), which would undermine their functionality. Finally the mechanism of contracting 'farmer associations' while good to spread the message, is unlikely to see group cultivation once project support ends, and would result in the sites being abandoned.

Despite the serious weaknesses in delivery described above, there were still an estimated 21 HHs in half of the 24 sites who have applied SALT on their own land. This indicates that farmers (the more innovative) do recognize the need to such approaches and if delivered effectively could well contribute to establishing resilient upland agriculture.

The **Skills Training (ST)** due to the delays and lack of staff, this was almost not completed. The training options provided were carpentry; food processing and handicraft- bamboo and grass weaving. To date only a small number have used these skills for income. Overall the evaluation had concerns with the handicraft option, as this requires elaborate support for the whole value-chain. Rather 'employment' options should be those with clear demand accessible to the trainees within their own areas. However the effects on character building (personal appearance and self-confidence) that trainees who attended live-in training provided by TESDA was most notable. Such personal changes are exceptional, and will stand the trainees in good stead in all their efforts to obtain employment.

The project was most effective in several **management strategies** that the team applied in an integrated way for each intervention. The social preparation in particular: established clear criteria for selection of beneficiaries; articulated the inputs beneficiaries should expect to receive; and the role the beneficiaries themselves needed to play for successful results. This prevented any later dissatisfaction and any particular group capturing the activity. CfW was applied for all interventions. The monitoring of work and payment of over \$0.5 M to 4700+ individuals was done in a transparent manner. This reinforces to beneficiaries that they themselves must complete tasks for payments, and prevented misuse of funds.

Disbursement of funds for CfW was made by DOLE under its national mandate. These were made up to 2 mth after completion of the work, thus undermining its purpose to inject income into effect HHs and to reinforce decent work standards. Combined with the 3 mth delay in startup this means that beneficiaries received funds at least 5mth later than planned. As CfW is a key intervention and delivery mechanism, ways to streamline standard procedures for natural disaster response programs needs to be found.

Lack of coordination also occurred with implementing partners FAO and SCUUK. For SALT, ILO initially expected this would use terraces and budgeted accordingly. It was only at the point of implementation that it was recognized that contour bunds would be used. As part of the skills training, SCUUK provided 1200 P start-up funds to trainees. These were provided before rather than on completion of training, with the result they were used for other activities. Clearly all agencies could have improved their joint planning for such an integrated project.

Conclusions

Strategic fit

The strategic fit of the project with three key natural disaster response initiatives was good; PHAP (Dec 2013); Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response plan (10 Dec. 2013) directly addressing the 1st and 3rd objectives, and DFIDs response to Haiyan. It was aligned with local government units and through the application of social protection orientation and minimum wages for CfW; it complied with and broadcast relevant aspects of 'decent work'.

Validity of Design

The project used the ILO 'natural disaster response' package. The three elements of this are appropriate to the real need of the beneficiaries, providing an initial emergency response (Emergency Employment), and moving into transitional recovery (contour farming or SALT, and Skills Training). The emphasis on and planned early delivery of, EE was appropriate. The emphasis for SALT appeared to be income generation (through EE and then group production of diversified crops), when it should be an attempt to introduce resilient form of upland agriculture.

Administration procedures between the donor and international partners, from submission of proposal and indicated approval (Dec), delayed mobilisation from *planned start*, of Jan, to Mid-march, approx. 2.5 mth. This delay resulted in the EE no longer having an emergency function, but rather a transitional recovery one.

Project resources were insufficient: the implementation time frame of 12 mth is not sufficient to provide adequate follow-up for the two more complex activities (SALT and ST). The limited time results in these activities being 'delivered' and then without support needed to ensure are well established. The need for value-chain development for these activities was also noted.

Due to application of their normal procedures, DOLE's CfW payments to beneficiaries were 1-2 mth after work completion. Such delays in payment defeats the purpose of the initiative; undermines the 'decent work' rationale; and creates tensions between the LGUs and their population. Given the dominant role of CfW in 'natural disaster response' programs this issue should be given some attention

Project effectiveness.

The EE work was managed well, and the project showed flexibility and the capacity to negotiate with local agencies to retarget this effectively. The EE activity had functional outcomes; land cleared was used for agriculture production, de-silting of irrigation canals did lift crop yields, etc. Overall this activity was impressive.

M+E is one of the 'unsung heroes' in effective delivery of EE. This was done in such a way that ensured transparency and so enabled the funds to be delivered as designed and to reinforce the 'decent work' message. That this often 'delicate' task was done well, is a credit to the ILO staff.

The SALT activity was impressive in the sites developed, but poor delivery mechanisms result in significantly limiting its impact; (a) sites were over-developed, thus distracting from their main function, and suggesting high inputs; (b) there were technical flaws (i.e. ineffective contour bunds, bunds not aligned with contours, poorly sited on slopes too steep for annual cropping, and degraded land); and (c) working through farmer associations which are unlikely to continue joint cultivation, and so result in the sites being abandoned. Despite the above issues, about 21 HHs in half of the 24 SALT sites have begun to apply SALT in their own land. There is thus a demand for such resilient approaches to cultivation, which should be built on.

Skills Training, aimed as non-agricultural HHs, achieved its outputs although delayed as noted above. It is likely that a high proportion of the carpentry and food preparation trainees will gain incomes from their new skills. The selection of handicraft items (bamboo and grass weaving) as an option is problematic due to need to deal with extended and complex supply chains, beyond beneficiaries capacity. The training course were delivered in such a way that the trainees gained great improvement in their own grooming and self-confidence, profound changes that will serve them well in accessing new employment, what ever that might be.

The approaches to social preparation the ILO team took to inform the broader population of target communities of criteria for selection; benefits to be provided, ensured that complaints did not arise, and no group could capture the activities. Monitoring procedures used for the EE were effective and were important in ensuring work was carried out effectively and that funds were not diverted. These management approaches should be documented in a brief form to ensure they are recognised as best practices, if not already.

Social protection and decent work characteristics that accompanied each intervention did make beneficiaries aware and appreciate these. On-going application of most aspects is unlikely. However their application in these sites will have provided a concrete experience of these, which they may attempt to call for in the future.

Efficiency

The delivery of interventions did lag due firstly to administrative procedures in start-up and later for the ST activity due to lack of staff to focus on this.

The project operated a 'lean team'. As noted earlier this may have been a false efficiency and an additional staff to facilitate the complex interventions (SALT, ST) including value-chain development, would be advisable to safeguard these activities.

Impact

The project did have impact with its beneficiaries from CfW both in terms of the income gained and enabling agriculture production through land cleared, de-silting etc.

The establishment of a new model for resilient upland cultivation cannot be claimed for the reasons described. At the same time ~ 21 HHs have begun to apply this on their land. These examples fragile, as the practices inevitably need adaptation to local conditions, and innovative farmers widely scattered need to exchange and reinforce each other.

New employment will develop from the ST, mainly carpentry workers and some food processing trainees. All the trainees do appear to have improved their self-image and self-confidence, which serve them in seeking employment opportunities

Sustainability

The functional outcomes of EE debris clearing will be sustained subject to normal on-going management and maintenance by individual HHs. Similarly for the trainees of ST.

The SALT initiative is of some concern. The sites are unlikely to continue to be cultivated as a group activity once project support ends. Abandoned they will create a negative message of the SALT approach and discourage other HHs to apply it. While there are HHs who have applied this (see above), they need on-going support in order for their application to mature, otherwise typically such scattered initiatives will also disappear.

Lesson Learned and emerging good practices

1# Standard administrative procedures, which continue to be applied as business as usual, significantly delayed delivery of project interventions. Factors responsible were: (a) Administrative procedures delayed signing of MoU between DFID and ILO, delaying project mobilisation by about ~3 mths; (b) DOLE standard procedures delayed payment for CfW up to 2 mth.

2# Delivery of complex activities (i.e. SALT and ST) requires additional project resources to what has typically been applied for natural disaster response program: (a) longer project timeframe (approx. 18 mth) to allow follow-up to ensure positive outcomes are achieved and so to reinforce on-going application; and (b) staff dedicated to the facilitation and follow-up these activities, and in particular to include value-chain development at the front-end of the activities.

3 The SALT activity offers an approach to upland agriculture resilient in the face of the violent storms that cross the Visayas. As such 'resilient upland agriculture' should be the dominate message to farmers, (rather than CfW and diversified incomes). Following from this, mechanisms to introduce it to farmers should foster application by individual HH on their own land.

4# Effectiveness of delivery of the interventions was ensured through consistent use of good management practices, often easily skipped over or not noted; (a) Social preparation ensured communities from which beneficiaries were drawn were aware of criteria for selection; participants understood the inputs to be provided and their role to play. This prevented later dissatisfaction or capture of activities by any group; (b) Monitoring of the emergency employment was consistent and transparent and ensure that beneficiaries performed their tasks and cash was not diverted.

Emerging Good Practices

1# supporting management activities to ensure well targeted and effective delivery of interventions should be noted. These include: (a) Social preparation to ensure that communities from which beneficiaries are to be drawn are aware of selection criteria; participants understand inputs they will receive; and the role they must play; (b) Monitoring of the emergency employment was consistent and transparent and ensure that beneficiaries performed their tasks and cash was not diverted.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the findings of the evaluation team during their field mission Feb 1-9. For convenience they are grouped under three of the headings in the ToR; Project design; Effectiveness; and Sustainability.

Project design

Complex activities (SALT and ST) and resources required:

Two of the activities SALT and ST common elements in 'natural disaster response' programs, are complex activities and require additional resources to be effective: (a) overall timeframe for these to be not only delivered, but to be well established, requires a minimum of **18 mth**. This will allow and then have adequate follow-up to ensure application is mentored and positive outcomes are recognised by beneficiaries and so reinforce continued application; (b) **Staff** committed to these complex activities should be assigned in the future; both the lengthy social preparation and then the follow-up, which should also include value-chain development.

Purpose of SALT

SALT is a transitioning activity, but its purpose and value are long term. It offers a resilient approach to upland agriculture in areas that are affected by violent storms each year. SALT activity will be applicable within 'natural disaster response' programs in areas affected mainly by typhoon type disasters in upland areas. Its role should be clarified by **donors, and implementers including FAO and ILO** at country level. It should also be clarified with **local GoP agencies** responsible for agriculture production, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction in the Visayas Region to ensure future projects align and reinforce local priorities

Effectiveness

Institutional linkages for timely and effective delivery

(a) Delayed project mobilisation:

The natural disaster response package is now well recognised. Processing of approval and mobilising of projects should not be an issue. This process should be seriously reviewed by the donor (DFID) and ILO to see what measures might be used to streamlining this process. Alternatives might include (a) assigning a task force to deal with processing and procedures (b) releasing a mobilising tranche to get teams on the ground for inception activities.

(b) Delayed payments in CfW

Similarly mechanism for payment for CfW should be made, with the aim that ideally payments would be made within one week and at the most 2 weeks, from completion of work.

Management strategies to safeguard effective delivery of interventions

A range of management procedures (social orientation, monitoring for transparency), were integrated into the delivery which were effective in ensuring they were effective and safeguarded them against misuse of funds and capture of activities by small groups. These should be noted and articulated in a manner

Implementing SALT for general application

Methods for implementing SALT should be consistent with its prime function, introduction resilient agriculture practices for the uplands; so foster application by individual HHs; and align with objectives at district and provincial levels to establish sustainable agriculture systems. Key implementing mechanisms should be reviewed are: (a) Site selection: sites should be on land owned or managed by single HHs with an interest in continuing application to that sites are maintained by the owner; (b) Broad community awareness should still be aimed at, possibly through farmer associations' (formal or non-formal). These can be engaged through CfW thus relieving the burden on the individual HH and exposing many HHs to the technique. As well as CfW they can be rewarded with a proportionate share (25-50%) In the harvest in the first year, so that they also have an interest in the outcome.; (c) Options for the bund construction and crops planted should be provides and further innovation by farmers, as long as the innovations are consistent with the key principals of SALT. Exchange events within each site and across sites should be conducted to share experiences.

Sustainability

Social protection inputs

These were considered to not have made a major impact on beneficiaries thinking, but at the same time set new benchmarks for what they should expect for minimum wage payments, and ways to protect their family incomes. These will be part of the overall picture in the Philippines establishing their own capacity to deal with natural disasters.

Salvaging SALT

Immediate action should be taken to salvage the existing sites and prevent negative messages developing. This can be done through: (a) Review of experiences and consolidation of key elements of SALT amongst MAO staff; (b) Consolidation amongst HHs at each SALT site to focus on (a) SALT as a resilient agriculture system for the uplands; (b) key element of the SALT that provide this resilience and (c) exchange and innovation of the details to enable SALT to fit local conditions.); (c) Participatory value-chain development to ensure HHs gain increased benefits from their produce and thus higher incentive to invest in establishing SALT areas. ***This fits well with the first of the three recommendations to DFID in its Rapid Review of DFIDs Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines to support 'climate change resilience'.***

2. BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

2.1 Background

Categorized as one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) made its landfall on 08 November 2013 in the Philippines and wrought catastrophic damage throughout Samar and Leyte in the Visayas, not to mention the overwhelming devastation in Tacloban City brought about by the storm surge. The NDRRMC reported that to date it was the costliest Philippine typhoon with total estimated damages pegged at US\$2.02-Billion (PhP89.6-Billion).

The agriculture sector was severely affected with Government estimates for damages pegged at 600-hundred hectares of agriculture areas, with 1.1-million MT of crops lost, of which 80 percent had been reported in Region VIII. Urgent attention in terms of vegetative debris clearing, cleaning and replanting was appropriated, including 80 kilometers of communal irrigation canals that needed de-silting.

An estimated 5.6-million workers were directly affected by the typhoon of which 40 percent (2.2-million) are women. Further, 44 percent (2.4-million) of those affected were vulnerably employed with limited income and have little or no access to social security prior to the disaster. Of the vulnerable workers, 52 percent were from the agriculture sector, 42 percent from service sector and the remaining 6 percent from industry.

Vulnerable workers had either entirely or partially lost their livelihoods and sources of income. In the province of Leyte, an estimated 446-thousand families and 2.4-million persons of which 940-thousand were affected. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment was seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups in order to make up for the lost sources of income and livelihood. The rice and corn farmers were identified to belong amongst the group of vulnerable workers.

2.2 Description of the Project, Objectives, Expected Outputs, and Management

In 2014, ILO implemented the project with funding support worth US\$1,636,570 from DFID in collaboration with SCUK and FAO, the latter being ILO's co-lead of the FSAC and of the Livelihoods and Early Recovery Cluster, with SCUK as a member. The project design was such that it supports and aligns with the response and recovery plan of government counterparts i.e. DA, DSWD, DOLE, and LGUs.

2.2.1 Integrated Approach of ILO, FAO, SCUK

The integrated approach of ILO-FAO-SCUK was directed at responding to the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team's Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan specifically Strategic Objective 1: *"Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services"*; and Strategic Objective 3: *"Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries"*.

A portfolio of immediate and longer-term livelihood support was provided to the targeted small scale rice and corn farming communities. It was however stressed that these joint efforts of the three institutions can address only a portion of the response gap. Responsibilities per institutions were defined to complement each other as outlined on the table below:

Table 1: Institutional Responsibilities

FAO	Responsible for the provision of the inputs and training for intercropping and alternative agricultural subsistence and income-generating activities to help restore food self-sufficiency, food sources, and restart livelihoods of small-scale rice and corn farmers.
ILO	Responsible for the provision of emergency employment for immediate income generation along with tools and materials, and additional skills training on alternative non-agriculture livelihood activities to poor and vulnerable rice and corn growing households whose sources of employment and livelihoods were destroyed.
SCUK	Responsible for the provision of immediate cash support to vulnerable community members who will be unable to participate in emergency employment activities and will not receive agricultural inputs (including pregnant and/or lactating females, elderly, disabled individuals, child-headed households, among others) as well as conditional cash grants and business skills training to small scale market traders to support market development.

Overall objective of the integrated approach is to contribute to the development impact as *“Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the four (4) selected municipalities”*.

2.2.2 ILO Component's Objectives and Management

For the ILO component, the UK Government appropriated funding support worth US\$1.6-million for the implementation of the project. It operates in three (3) municipalities and one (1) city, namely: Kananga, Villaba, San Isidro, and Ormoc.

Table 2: Immediate Objectives of the ILO Component and Expected Outputs

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTPUTS
Emergency employment creation through the clearing of debris and fallen trees, and preparation of cleared land for rice and corn fields.	Area to be cleared: 650 ha (end March), 1300 Ha (end May) No psns. employed: 1750 (end March), 3500 (end May) with 40 women Cash disbursed: USD 196,875(end March), \$393,750 (end May)
Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production.	Area prepared (Ha) : 8 (end June); 21 (end Sept) Persons employed: 240 (end June), 630 (end Sept) Cash disbursed USD: 54,240 (end June) ; 127,860 (end Sept.)
Skills training provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women.	No trainees: 17 (end April),350(end July) No trainees used skills : 40 (und Aug); 86 (end Nov)

Note: Expected outputs from prodoc dated early Dec 2013. These were later revised , late May. See Table 4#)

The ILO-CTA based in Manila has the overall responsibility for all ILO projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, assisted by an Early Recovery and Livelihood Specialist. For the DFID funded project, the ILO Field Office based in Ormoc City is directly managed by a Project Coordinator supported by a Skills Officer and Admin/Finance Assistant. A Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work Support Team in Bangkok provides technical backstopping while ILO Manila provides administrative support to the project.

3. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

For all ILO projects and as indicated in the standard ILO evaluation policy, it is mandatory to conduct at least one independent evaluation for projects implemented with budget of more than US\$1-million, hence the impetus for the evaluation exercise.

Central to the conduct of the independent final evaluation is the assessment of the following: a) key achievements of the project as per project framework; b) the extent of sustainability of the project's benefits; c) the extent to which project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project; and d) the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful. Evaluation of the results in terms of their prospects for sustainability and impact encompasses the economic, environmental and social change arising from the project interventions. Forward looking recommendations is highlighted to improve future performance, sustainability, lessons learnt and good practices.

3.1 Evaluation Principles, Criteria, and Methodological Framework

3.1.1 Principles and Criteria

The evaluation complies with the norms, standards, and ethical safeguards set out in ILO's evaluation procedures as well as the OECD-DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. In compliance with these standards, the evaluation criteria employed in the assessment of the project are set out, viz:

Table 3: Evaluation Criteria¹

Main Cluster of Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Criteria	Definition
1. Performance of the Project	1.1 Relevance and strategic fit	Extent to which the project is in line with the local needs and priorities, national and local plans and policies, and post-disaster reconstruction and rebuilding plans
	1.2 Validity of the project design	Extent to which the design is logical and coherent
	1.3 Project effectiveness	Extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.
	1.4 Efficiency of resource use	Extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, benefits commensurate with inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.
2. Impact on target groups	2.1 Impact orientation and sustainability of the intervention	The strategic orientation of the project towards making a significant contribution to broader, long-term, sustainable development changes. The likelihood that the results of the intervention are durable and can be maintained or even Scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed.
3. Institutional Partnerships	-	Extent to which collaboration and complementation amongst the partners has benefitted the project; value added of the partnership

¹ Sources: Evaluating Humanitarian Actions using OECD-DAC Criteria, 2006; ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-based Evaluation, 2nd Ed., 2013; IFAD Methodological Framework for Evaluation, 2003

In addition, the evaluation looks into the extent to which the project has addressed the following cross-cutting themes: a) Application of results-based management; b) Gender equality; c) Adoption of human rights-based approach; d) Capacity development; and e) Environmental sustainability.

The utility of the evaluation results is specifically directed at promoting accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO. The scope of the evaluation covers all the components' activities and results specific to the project covering the period from February 2014 to February 2015. Physical coverage encompasses the project sites that ILO has worked in. ILO's institutional partners in the project implementation (i.e. FAO and SCUK) are involved as key informants in the assessment of the impact of their combined initiative.

The clients of the evaluation are the ILO Country Office and Project Team; Technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and Headquarters; tripartite constituents; and the donor (DFID).

3.1.2 Methodological Framework

The methodological framework comprised of a set of criteria which are assessed by asking a number of key questions (See Annex I). The criteria have their origin in the OECD-DAC Evaluation Guide for Humanitarian Agencies and are consistent with the emerging consensus on evaluation criteria amongst international development institutions. The use of the same criteria, for this particular exercise, and across all other evaluations of ILO projects, intends to help reduce variations in approaches and reporting format among evaluators and evaluations. It is reckoned that consistency in the application of this methodological framework ensures that project results are systematically assessed, performance and implementation modality are comparable across projects and project components/categories, generic lessons are more easily identified and a consolidation of the performance and results of a group of similar projects (i.e. humanitarian context) implemented by ILO evaluated periodically is more feasibly provided.

The evaluation includes three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the Inception Phase; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholder and direct observation; (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings.

Given the geographical spread of the project sites, duration of the evaluation mission, and resources available the definitive sites visited were determined through purposive sampling.

The Evaluation team has prepared a data collection plan and this is included as Annex II. This indicates data to be collected against each of the evaluation questions. In operation of the evaluation, the team met stakeholders at three levels and the evaluation questions were adapted for each level.

3.2 Limitations of the Evaluation

The resources for the evaluation and tight time scale meant data collection was restricted to single-visit interviews. Information was based firstly recall of the respondents and this was cross-checked documents and site visits.

The project finishes end-February 2015, and the final progress report was not available during the evaluation mission. As a result data was still not fully systematized.

No stakeholder workshop to review findings was held due to the short time available. Interpretations of the data was checked with respondent at the end of interviews.

4. FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

4.1 Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention

4.1.1 To what extent has the project contributed to the a) Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan (PHAP) 2013-2014; b) Typhoon Haiyan Response Plan; c) DFID overall response to Typhoon Haiyan?

The Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan was added to the PHAP in Dec 2013, which already included three programs; (i) HAP/ Midanao; (ii) Zambaonaga Cit and Basilian Action plan; and the (iii) Bohol Earthquake Action Plan. Haiyan was by far the largest of these with 14 M persons affected and requiring an estimated \$791M for recovery².

DFID was one of the earliest responders and eventually the largest single donor committing a total to GBP 63 M or 15% of the total donor funds for Haiyan recovery. Of this, DIFD allocated about GBP 1M to ILO within the FAO/ILO/SCUK program, about 2% of the total DFID support to Haiyan recovery³. The ILO components of the DFID funded integrated FAO/ILO/SCUK program addressed the first and third of the strategic objectives of the PHAP (10 Dec. 2013), namely:

PHAP Strategic Objective 1: *“Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services”* and

PHAP Strategic Objective 3: *“Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries”*.

The overall objective of the integrated FAO/ILO/SCUK program incorporates PHAPs Strategic Objectives 1# and 3# as below:

“Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the four (4) selected municipalities”.

The Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda or RAY,⁴ (16 Dec 2013) articulates ‘core principals’ for implementing PHAP. These include coordination between government agencies, international donors, civil society organisations and private sector, while at same time overall responsibility lies with local government; that recovery shall be inclusive and enable sustainable livelihoods; fast tracking and flexibility must be employed along with effective monitoring. It emphasised the need for strategies to enable meaningful participation for women. The immediate objectives and interventions for the ILO component directly address the needs of the population as articulated by the RAY. RAY’s core principals are well addressed in the ILO concept note (even though this preceded RAY).

² Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plans 2013-2014 (18 Dec. 2013)

³ “Rapid review of DFID’s Humanitarian response to typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines”, ICAI, Report 32# - March 2014

⁴ Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda – Build Back Better”, National Economic and Development Authority, 16 Dec. 2013.

Table 1: Project contributions to the RAY articulate needs

Recovery Needs in the RAY for Economic Sector and Cross-sectorial	Contributions of the Project
Emergency Phase	
1. Emergency income support	Immediate Objective 1: Emergency employment through clearing of debris and fallen trees, and preparation of cleared land for rice and corn fields.
2. Clearing of fields and plantations	
3. Improvement of damaged farm to market roads; agricultural infrastructures	
Transition Phase (Short- to medium-term)	
4. Seeds and fertilizers for farmers to re-establish plantations, with intercropping in the short- to medium-term;	Immediate objective 2: Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production.
5. Skills training and development to prepare for self-employment; alternative source of income; and replacement of livelihood productive assets	Immediate Objective 3: Skills training provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women.
6. Opportunities for women to participate in livelihood activities	

4.1.2 Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units (LGUs)? Has the project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients?

Extent of alignment with LGU strategic thrusts

The government generated two documents that articulated the total damages, losses, and needs in the aftermath of Yolanda: 1) Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) prepared by the Office of Civil Defence (OCD); and 2) Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) prepared by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). The former reflects estimates focusing only on the government financing needs, mostly physical reconstruction costs, while the latter provides an overall estimate of the total economic damages, losses and needs covering both public and private sectors, hence is more comprehensive (RAY Implementation for Results pg. 29). As such this was regarded as the blueprint for the government’s recovery and reconstruction agenda on Yolanda. An implementation framework for the RAY is instituted to ensure close alignment between the objectives of the recovery and reconstruction of the affected LGUs and the Philippine Development Plan (PDP). Both PDNA and RAY are informed by the recovery and reconstruction needs of all the LGUs affected by the disaster.

While the project was not designed to address all the needed assistance indicated in the RAY, its strategic response is directly aligned with the local government’s thrusts for specific sectors as 1) economic (agriculture and livelihood); and 2) cross-sectorial (gender and environment) .

4.1.3 Extent of addressing needs of ultimate beneficiaries

The real needs of the affected population were well articulated by RAY;

- *“immediate need for recovery is to provide assistance to farmers to establish field/annual and plantation crops... through clearing of fields and coconut plantations... and... repairing damaged infrastructure (irrigation systems, fish ports, offices)”*, and
- *The cash-for-work programs of DSWD, DOLE, and DA will all play an important role in helping families through the immediate aftermath of the disaster and until income flows to households from agriculture and enterprises recover to levels that are sufficient to secure resources for basic needs, and*
- *Complementary programs for the medium term can help households... provide training programs to equip households with new marketable skills; and support the transition to established social protection programs, such the Pantawid Pamilya program.*

The immediate objectives directly respond to these needs well, (Table 1#).

Decent Work agenda: One important concern of ILO in its post-disaster interventions is the integration of decent work. Key approaches employed in the project’s employment generation are aligned with the strategic pillars of decent work agenda, namely: full and productive employment; rights at work; and social protection--- all consistent with the state policy set forth under the Philippine constitution and in the labour law. Specific to the livelihood cluster anent to the standardized approach to post-disaster recovery programme for livelihood, an MOU was set. Instituted in the agreement is the utilization of local resource-based approach and application of decent work principles that were all duly complied by the project, viz: a) 100% of the regional minimum wage for a minimum of 15 work days per person; b) hands-site training when necessary; c) observance of occupational safety and health standards through provision of appropriate ⁵Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); d) deployment of on-site nurse to provide first aid to the workers (one in every 150 workers); and e) social protection benefits (SSS, Philhealth, and 1-year accident insurance coverage).

4.2 Validity of design

4.2.1 Was the project design realistic and adequate to meet the project objectives? To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners?

The Project design employed the ILO ‘natural disaster response package’, previously used in areas affected by typhoons Washi (Dec 2011) and Pablo (Dec 2012). The three interventions are: emergency employment (EE); contour farming (or SALT) sites, for upland areas; and skills training (ST), for non-agricultural HHs. These are all implemented as Cash for Work (CfW), designed to provide incomes for affected HHs in the emergency period, as well as rebuilding a sense self-sufficiency. Each activity provides basis for longer term recovery.

The RAY sub-title is “build back better”, and this was echoed by the ILO, as stated by ILO Country Director, “the project should not simply return HHs to their earlier *status quo*, but have transformational effects to set beneficiaries on new paths”. As part of this, each intervention is accompanied by social orientation and training packages. Thus all the CfW activities act as vehicles to develop awareness and appreciation amongst communities for ‘decent work’ and ‘social protection’. Safe work is also promoted through provision of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

⁵ A set of PPE is comprised of hat, dust mask, hand gloves, long-sleeved shirt, and rubber boots. Variations to the PPE are appropriately made depending on the type of work to ensure safety of the workers.

The bulk of the ILO resources i.e. target HH (3,500) and funds (\$0.39M) is devoted to **Emergency Employment (EE)** for clearing of debris. Its early planned delivery, within the first 4 months of the project (i.e. to be completed by end-May) would ensure HHs gained funds at the critical time when lives were still severely disrupted, and to make land available for production, thus contributing to both food production and return to livelihoods.

The **SALT activity** is a long term recovery activity. Severe storms are endemic in the Visayas causing farmers to lose crops from 'washouts' requiring them to replant, as well as suffering the long term effects of erosion of their top soil. Introduction of cultivation practices to mitigate such effects would contribute to more resilient livelihoods for upland farmers. The introduction of SALT following such an event as Haiyan could be expected to find farmers receptive to this. The prodoc does refer to SALT's potential to "reduce risk of erosion and landslides"⁶ However this single reference is lost in other statements which tend to emphasise diversification of crops and income generation. Certainly during the field review most MAO staff and farmers focussed this and had not got the resilient agriculture message. To achieve a convincing model, effective follow-up beyond establishment of a demonstration site, including value-chain development (so farmers receive higher returns for their produce to compensate SALT establishment costs), are needed, but were not planned or budgeted for.

The SALT activity was planned to occur later in the program (8 ha/sites by end-June and all 22 ha/sites by September), giving HHs time to re-engage in normal production before introducing this novel system. Establishment of SALT necessarily consumes considerable staff effort in social preparation⁷ and funds, for relatively small number of sites (22 sites) and HHs (i.e. 660 HH c.f. 3,500 HH for EE, and \$218/HH, about double that for EE). As such, the activity must be justified not just for its direct benefits for farmers in a sites, but that the sites would act as a springboard for the introduction of resilient upland agriculture to many HHs to apply it themselves on their own land. Such scaling-out is not achieved through the establishment of a demonstration site. These are just starting points, and committed follow-up activities are needed. Again this was not articulated in the prodoc and resources not available for this. While such follow-up is too much to expect from a recovery project, the basis for such scaling out, and links with mandated agencies can be made to build on the investment.

There was some confusion in exactly what technology would be applied, with, in the prodoc, contour farming stated by FAO and terracing budgeted for by ILO. Briefly, terracing, requires a high labour input to dig level terraces from slopping land. Initially soil fertility across the terrace will be uneven due to topsoil dug from the hillside to form the terrace leaving the insides of the terraces with sub-soils exposed and the edges of the terraces with fertile topsoil. This gradually resolves with several years cultivation. Contour farming as practiced in SALT, (see 4.3.2) has a relatively low labour input, and leaves the soils relatively undisturbed. The bunds capture soil eroded from the hillside, so that terraces self-form over several years. Thus SALT is a slower but less expensive system to attain sustainable upland cultivation, and as such more able to be replicated by farmers themselves. SALT then would be preferable, but then it should be combined with activities that will foster its replication by individual HHs.

The **skills training (ST)** provides non-agricultural HHs opportunity for CfW and as well as addressing the objective of improving employability and sustainable livelihoods for this group. This is the most complex to deliver effectively and the beneficiaries are the least (350HH) with costs the highest (\$450/HH). Substantial preparatory work is required (identifying products/services with demand, trainers, adapting courses) and accounts for the higher cost. As ST attempts to provide income to this group it is worthwhile that it occurs early in the program along with as does EE. The preparatory work necessarily delays this somewhat, (175 HH trained by end-May and 350 HH by end Nov). Enabling trainees to exercise their new skills and gain income requires a well-developed exit strategy, where the trainees can be linked to jobs/markets; incl. participatory value-chain support, and mentoring or exchange opportunities. Given the challenges of this project it was understaffed, (designated staff budgeted for 4 mth only) and no exit work planned or budgeted.

⁶ Activities for output 2#, 2.1#, on p6.

⁷ In practice all novel agriculture production systems require effective extension messages to engage farmers. Beyond this the SALT sites furthermore required careful site identification, assessment of land ownership and or tenancy agreements and consolidation and registration of farmer associations'.

4.2.2 Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?

The Project objectives were based on ILO's integrated approach for Livelihoods under the UN Flash appeal, (Nov 2013). Together the three interventions provide support for early recovery (CfW) and longer term recovery, and target both agricultural and non-agricultural HHs. In this sense they are relevant and coherent.

The ~3 mth delay between Project approval (made verbally Jan.) and signing of MoU resulted in the mobilisation of the team and delivery of the prime intervention, EE for debris clearing, to begin late. Some targeted sites were cleared by other means and new sites and activities (irrigation canal clearing) were identified. Through this shift in targeting the Project continued to reach affected communities and deliver effective outcomes (see 4.3.1)

While the delayed EE activity was completed well and provided direct and functional benefits, this occurred after the crisis period and so arguably less real impact. While the delay was not so much due to situations 'on the ground' it is a serious issue. Similar administrative delays are reported in earlier typhoon relief operations. Cognant reasons are raised outside the control of the project, e.g. Christmas break and staff absent for processing documentation. Given this appears to be a characteristic of relief operations, strategies should be put in place to avoid such delays.

DFID authorised an external review of its Haiyan relief and recovery program conducted by ICAI in March 2014⁸. ILO is listed as one of the programs funded, but was not one of the agencies consulted (Annex 6#). However it is notable that given the delay in fund disbursement and mobilisation of the project would have been very clear, that this was not noted in the review.

The ST addresses a separate group (non-agricultural HHs) and so should attempt to be mobilised early when these beneficiaries are most in need of income and hope, not at its tail end as happened. ST is a complex activity requiring; selection of trainees, matching skills to market demand; identifying service providers development of curriculum, to begin with. Disruption to services immediately following the typhoon would inhibit this detailed work. Nonetheless, provision of only a part time staff for this (4 mth) played a major role in its delay. A full time staff for ST and VCD would mobilise ST to be delivered in first half of the Project.

The project provided an enabling environment for women's participation in activities. The projects objective was that women's participation to activities be not less than 40%. Given the labour-intensive type of activities for EE debris clearing, women's participation was only at 32%, but not insignificant. For the land preparation of SALT sites and ST, the project achievement is at 41% and 52% respectively.

Women's involvement not only placed income directly in women's hands where it has higher likelihood of being used for livelihood needs, but through the SP orientation and membership in SSS and philHlth, women as home cares were directly made aware of these opportunities. The project was proactive in enabling women to participate; child-minding stations were set up at every SALT site, and at the ST venue. In the case of ST venues (TESDA) , the duty nurse provided the mothers guidance in good child care practices (sanitation, nutrition etc.). This attention to detail by the project was impressive and is indicative of the ILO perspective of 'decent work'.

⁸ Rapid Review of DFID's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Report 32, Mar 2014.

4.2.3 Was the capacity of various project's partners taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action? Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project?

Collaborative Partnership of ILO-FAO-SCUK

The strategic cooperation of ILO with FAO and SCUK is to accomplish more than it could alone if their expertise and resources are combined. This is precisely the key consideration during the inception of the project. The collaboration is essentially directed at distributed ways of working. For the emergency employment and land preparation components, FAO distributes planting materials for the areas which were cleared from debris/prepared for planting through CFW by ILO. For the skills development component, SCUK provides conditional cash grants to the beneficiaries of ILO's training package. Across all components, the three agencies observe compliance to their convergence priorities: 1) farmers with agricultural potential [FAO]; 2) vulnerable population [SCUK]; 3) decent work generation [ILO].

Partnership with DOLE and LGUs

DOLE is the traditional partner of ILO as the Philippines coordinating arm in the field of labour and employment. As for Washi (2012) and Bopha (2013) Projects, ILO contracted emergency employment were contracted out to DOLE for implementation, (Ormoc City and Kananga). There were definite weaknesses in DOLE capacity for such an implementation role, and the project attempted to bolster this through assigning three (3) additional personnel to assist DOLE in fast tracking the preparation of the documentary requirements. This still did not resolve the issues.

The LGUs are involved in all ILO's post-emergency projects, mostly for technical monitoring and assistance through the MEO or MAO as appropriate. During this project, LGUs for San Isidro and Villaba districts were made responsible for monitoring CfW and disbursement of funds. This proved to be successful with the LGUs providing sufficient technical backstopping during the implementation and counterpart contribution as afforded in the contract. Further, given their devolved fiscal administrative functions their documentary procedures are not as layered as that of DOLE, the processing of pay-out takes shorter time, at two weeks the most.

Farmer Associations and Capacity Buildings

Community contracting employed in the development of SALT sites involved farmer associations. The intent is to mobilize farmer groups for climate adaptive agricultural endeavours (SALT application) while at the same time provide them short-term employment opportunities. The project provided capacity building training for financial literacy, basic bookkeeping and accounting, progress monitoring, and systematic filing of documentary requirements for pay-out. Further coaching of the farmer associations was still needed for successful completion of the subproject within the given period.

4.2.4 Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project?

The prodoc listed 3 risk areas and actions to mitigate these were as follows:

a) Occurrence of another strong typhoon in the region: Two strong typhoons hit the region in December 2014, namely: Ruby (Hagupit) and Seniang (Jangmi). Ruby in early December led ILO to request from DFID for a two-month project extension from January to February 2015. Project implementation was stalled in December as roads leading to the sites were made impassable and residents in the threatened areas were evacuated. Towards the

end of December, tropical depression Seniang brought heavy rainfall causing landslides in several areas at Leyte province. Damage to the subprojects was reportedly minimal.

b) Target farmer groups might be less interested in taking up emergency employment schemes: The project did not have difficulty in involving the targeted farmers in this as it is now a familiar activity practiced in the aftermath of every big disaster in the country. Further, involvement of DSWD and DOLE facilitated selection of suitable beneficiaries to include the poor and vulnerable.

c) The capacity of implementing partners is lower than assessed: Close working relationship between the project staff and the implementing partners paved way for the satisfactory project completion within the agreed duration.

Not noted in the prodoc as a 'risk', the disbursement of >\$0.5 M to over 4000 beneficiaries for CfW does in fact risk being ineffectively and non-transparently applied if not managed effectively. However the motoring mechanism put into place and committed to by the project ensured that this was done effectively without misappropriation. (see also 4.2.5, M+E)

4.2.5 Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?

The project is implemented by a 'lean team' comprised of a project manager; an engineer; a skills development specialist; an administrative/finance officer; and a driver that doubles as logistics officer. A monitoring consultant was added to the team in September 2015. Another one was hired the following month. The respective contracts of the monitoring consultants expired in December 2014. In early January 2015, an overall monitor was hired to consolidate the workers database and update the enrolment in social protection.

For the EE activities contracted out to DOLE-8, monitoring was taken on by the ILO Project Manager and the Project Engineer, with NIA and CAO providing technical monitoring functions. At the subproject level, the monitoring structure was composed of three people who were directly part of the line-up of CfW beneficiaries: 1) one on-site monitor who directly reports to the Project Engineer, is tasked to check the physical progress of the activity vis-a-vis daily targets set in the Program of Work and checking of attendance; 2) one Safety officer tasked to check compliance of the workers with rules like wearing of PPEs and proper uniform; and 3) one on-site nurse for the daily health check of the workers. In the two district where EE was managed by the LGUs; Villaba and San Isidro (September to November), where EE was FMRs, the same monitoring structure was applied only that the respective Municipal Engineers of the LGUs acted as monitors for the technical progress.

For the land preparation activities, the monitoring structure and functions at the subproject level are the same as that of the EE, with the MAOs of the LGUs concerned and FAO monitoring farmers application of the technology for the SALT sites. As earlier mentioned, two monitoring consultants were hired on External Collaborator status, each is assigned to San Isidro and Ormoc City respectively, where the land preparation activities are heavily concentrated between September – November 2014. The on-site monitor across SALT sites within a municipality, reports to the assigned monitoring consultant, with the latter reporting to the Project Coordinator.

For the EE and SALT activities, the monitoring mechanism did provide a transparent and systematic tracking progress and worker performance. A monitoring template prepared by the ILO PM was used. The reporting hierarchy (subproject monitors to monitoring specialists) was efficient enough for issues and concerns to be acted upon as they arose. For example, in San Isidro Municipality specifically Barangay Banat-i, an issue was raised involving three (3) people listed as "ghost workers", one of them is the Barangay Captain. Had it not for the

monitoring mechanism in place, this could not have been detected at the earliest time. Such was duly acted upon by the LGU concerned and the Project Management.

For the skills development training, minimal monitoring is required from ILO and Save the Children who shared the responsibility. Attendance sheets and performance assessment produced by the training institution (TESDA) sufficed for the needed monitoring data.

While it can be reckoned that the monitoring responsibility at the subproject level is a shared responsibility across agencies involved, it is notable that there are no uniform monitoring guidelines among them. While each agency uses its own established monitoring tools in tracking the subproject progress, the final results are reckoned from ILO’s monitoring report.

Presented on the succeeding table is a snapshot of the sharing of monitoring responsibilities across agencies involved in the project corresponding to the activity type.

Table 2: Sharing of monitoring responsibility across agencies concerned

COMPONENT	ACTIVITY	Agency tasked to monitor activities						
		DOLE	C/MAO	MEO	NIA	ILO	FAO	SCUK
Emergency employment	De-silting of irrigation canal	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	-
	FMR improvement	✓	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
	Coconut debris clearing	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-
SALT Application	Land preparation	-	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-
Skills Development	Trainings	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓

*DOLE: Department of Labor and Employment; C/MAO: City/Municipal Agriculture Office; MEO: Municipal Engineering Office; NIA: National Irrigation Administration; FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization; SCUK: Save the Children

Gender disaggregated data was maintained across all project activities. The project employed simple “input-output” monitoring to keep track of the physical and financial progress. In January 2015, an overall monitor was hired, to consolidate workers profiles on the ILO data base, and attend to enrolment of workers in the social protection. A semi-annual progress report (June and December) was generated, describing overall achievement within the period in review, perspectives on the current status of the implementation, issues and actions, and a quantitative summary of achievements vis-à-vis targets. The report intends to inform the ILO-CO and DFID on the project updates. The financial monitoring report is prepared separately.

All the physical targets set out in the log frame were achieved within the project life. However the project could have employed outcomes monitoring parallel to each immediate objective so that within the project duration, a clearer alignment of the outputs to the overall intended outcome and impact can be sufficiently articulated.

4.3 Project Effectiveness

4.3.1 To what extent the project has achieved its objectives?

The Project has achieved the outputs according to the log frame, indeed exceeding these both in areas and beneficiaries (see Table 2). At the same time there are issues with the timing of delivery and the quality of the interventions delivery which have affected or place at risk the impact, particularly its sustainability.

Emergency Employment

All EE was delivered outside of project milestones; 100% to be completed by end-May. As previously noted this meant the income received and the rehabilitation of agricultural land for food and income generation did not occur when most needed. (Other program or the communities themselves proceeded with land rehabilitation). When the EE was applied with new activities and sites, this fulfilled the overall project objectives, but cannot be considered as an 'emergency' activity as planned, but rather a contribution to longer term 'recovery'.

The outcomes or functional impact of the debris clearing was not directly assessed by the evaluation team. ILO staff stated that of the 220 ha where debris clearing was conducted, this area was then planted with maize and vegetables, and the de-silting of canals at the tail-end of the Bao irrigation system servicing 2307 ha, raised yields by 25%, returning them to normal. The Farmer to Market Roads, reviewed in Kananga both repaired access damaged by Haiyan and also provided improved access, e.g. shorten access from communities to college by nearly an hr. (50%). These activities were thus well targeted, managed transparently and generated expected outcomes, and we can infer that the debris clearing was similarly effective.

SALT site establishment

SALT, is one of several systems designed to enable sustainable cropping in upland areas. It is worthwhile to mention its main characteristics as these were not prominent with many practitioners and farmers, and affects the efficacy of this intervention.

The system uses vegetative contour bunds to halt downward flow of water. Reduced flow reduces erosion of the top-soil, (due to reduced speed of water flow) and soil carried by the water is captured at the bunds. Over the years the cropped area between the bunds, through tillage and soil captured at the bund will form a terrace. The **contour bunds then are the key element for it is they that halt the runoff and erosion.** What plants are used to form the bunds (grass strips, trash, brushwood trees, etc.), and what crops are planted between them depends on local conditions and the farmers' preference.

The potential benefits of SALT to upland farmers beginning even in its first year are several: reduced loss of fertile top soil and thus enabling sustained use of plots; increasing water infiltration so that uplands crops suffer less from drought; ensures fertilizer is retained to benefit crops and further encouraging its use; reduced washouts caused by from storms frequenting the Visayas - causing loss of crops already planted, and requiring reinvestment (labor and cash) to replant. Finally the gradual terrace formation can encourage sense of land ownership, and so lead to investment in higher value crops (vegetables fruit trees etc.).

As noted earlier (4.2.1) general application of SALT by farmers is an important justification for the investment in SALT. Thus the assessment of the SALT examined both establishment of the sites, and their role in gaining application by farmers on their own land. The evaluation visited three sites. Overall all sites were over-developed with pathways, shelters, and various decorative aspects, (see Fig. 1, and 2, annex IV). This produces an impressive spectacle, but, (a) distracts from the key functional elements (e.g. contour bunds), and (b) suggests a prohibitive input of labour is needed to replicate. This works against the sites having an expansion effect. This overdevelopment was due in some part to the need to generate additional work, when the sites were converted from terrace construction (as originally budgeted by ILO) to contour bunds with lower labour requirements.

Significant technical issues were noted in the two of the three sites visited:

- Contour bunds non-functioning – planted but no existing grass or trash to stop water flow and capture soil (Sto Domingo).
- Contour bunds not following contours - will cause concentration of water and gully formation, repairable, but resolving this can affect overall site layout (San Isidro).
- Access to land was through tenancy agreements, which cost farmers 25% of crop, thus discouraging continued management of the site and replication
- Poor soils; little of no topsoil remaining which would ensure unimpressive crop yields from the site (San Isidro)
- High slopes - unsuitable for annual cropping and should be converted to tree crops if and ownership will permit (Sto Domingo).

These technical faults observed in the sites visited would affect the functionality of SALT. A self-assessment of other sites for key characteristics was requested from the ILO team. They reported that of the 24 sites (a) only 2 suffered from ineffective bunds (i.e. those visited) , the remaining judged as ‘effective to highly effective’, and (b) three sites depended on tenancy for use of the land.

The technical knowledge of the MAO staff at one of the evaluation sites (Sto Domingo) re. the function of SALT was non-existent, and here farmers saw SALT as simply a CfW activity. In the two sites where MAO staff were effective (at Lake Danao, most impressively so), farmers had already begun to apply SALT on their own land, with some innovation. The same staff self-assessment indicated that there were 1-3 HHs in 12 of the 24 SALT sites where farmers had applied SALT on their own land. Innovation by farmers is both necessary (to accommodate local conditions), and is also an indication of farmers’ engagement. The farmers met who had applied SALT gave their reasons for doing so, that; (a) it was to prevent washouts, and (b) gradual development of terraces, both valid reasons. In San Isidro the farmers had employed labour and so a rough assessment of the cost of SALT establishment (essentially the contour bund building), of approximately 30 m/days per 1 ha. Farmers considered this acceptable and labour investment would not be a serious obstacle for replication.

It should be noted there was shared responsibility for the SALT sites. FAO was responsible for the technical design and training of the SALT and later diversified cropping on the sites. Once sites had been selected, ILO was responsible for social preparation; incl. assessing land availability, tenancy agreements, and formation of legal Farmer Associations (FA). These steps were time consuming but highly necessary . ILO then continued to work with the FA in the management of labour for actual site establishment.

This community approach through the FA is an effective way to gain community awareness of SALT. However it poses real issues for ‘sustainability’ of the intervention. Cultivation and management of the sites by the groups is highly unlikely once project oversight ends. Firstly the financial returns from crops planted and harvested were initially low⁹. But generally community cultivation of SALT plots requires too much management and is not a realistic model. Exit training and meetings were conducted, but these were not aimed at, or sufficient to restructure ownership of the sites at such a late date.

A model for introduction of SALT that could combined community learning as well as continued cultivation could include: (a) identification of individual HHs interested in trialling a system of resilient upland cultivation on their own land, to ensure continued application, combined with; (b) community effort (supported through CfW) to construct an effective site. The community could then share in the first harvest, so that no unfair advantage would be gained by the site owner, and to capture community interest in the outcome.

⁹ One estimate (by ILO technical section visiting other sites), crops harvested and marketed, returned about PhP.75/HH/season. While there may have been various factors contributing to such a low figure (e.g. poor productivity in first year, oversupply of some vegetables in local markets), such returns would certainly not encourage continued collective cultivation.

Skills training

This activity is also on the verge of achieving its target with the last groups of trainees attending food processing courses at TESDA. This will achieve 364 against the 350 target, with 86 to be earning income by end-Nov.

Delays in implementation already referred to (later start up, and lack of committed staff to ST almost prevented the project completing this intervention. It was the time extension due to typhoon Ruby until end Feb., that allowed it to do so.

The evaluation met with handicraft trainees; both bamboo and grass weavers; and men and women (95). These trainees had been recipients of the 'conditional' start-up grant of 12,000 P. These were disbursed ahead of the training (SCUK). Trainees did not retain these funds for their business start-up's, but applied them to other more familiar activities; sarai sari shops, pig raising. When queried, how they would respond to orders, they raised common constraints of not having materials and equipment. Clearly the start-up fund should have been disbursed 'following training', to give it a chance to support application of the new skills. However, that trainees have used funds for self-identified enterprises, is still worthwhile.

At the time of the evaluation 5 of the 95 handicraft trainees had obtained small jobs for a hotel, but none of the carpentry trainees. For consistent work for the handicraft much would need to be done in addition to the ST itself: sourcing of materials and tools, quality control to ensure item from various weavers was consistent and to spec etc. This illustrates the well-known difficulties with handicraft production and marketing.

The above illustrates two marketing related issues:

- (a) fostering links to markets for such items is well recognised. Conducting ST at the end of the project left no time for this. However this is not simply a time issue. from this consultants experience, value-chain activities with the trainees should be done ahead of the training, so that real demand is noted, drives their commitment to training, and immediate planning and preparation to produce
- (b) handicraft products have markets which require an intermediary. Such market linkages may well emerge, but trainees need to apply new skills quickly to reinforce them, as well as to generate income. Other items related to carpentry/rehabilitation (i.e. bamboo partitions, sleeping mats etc.), with market demand in trainees' own communities might have been included in the curriculum.

Application of skills for the carpentry workers (114) is not expected to be a problem and links have been established with other recovery programs. Food processing trainees (151) should have opportunities to apply their skills in their own communities. A few handicraft trainees have obtained contracts. Other trainees have begun to gain income at the time of the evaluation. If the carpentry trainees begin work within the next 304mth, then the project will have exceeded its 86 trainee working target.

This intervention with its attempt to enable new occupations and incomes, is in some ways the most ambitious, and potentially the most transformative. As indicated above, the outputs have been gained, and expected outcomes; skills applied to generate income (86) likely in the near future. Several informants (TESDA staff, ILO staff) noted significant change in trainees appearance and self-confidence through the training. On their arrival to the training they generally paid little attention to their personal appearance and hygiene, and displayed a listless attitude. At the end of the courses all were well presented, and confident coming forward to greet staff. This was evident with the handicraft trainees met. This change was due to the overall approach of the TESDA staff to both expecting the trainees to comply with standards and at the same time providing support. *This transformation is perhaps more profound and will serve them well in finding employment, irrespective of the particular skills learnt.*

Table 4: Summary of Accomplishments

Objective	Target	Accomplishment	Percent Complete
1. Emergency employment through debris clearing			
1.1a Area cleared in hectares	1,300	2,527	194%
1.1b Farm to Market Roads (km)	0	49.2	
1.1c irrigation channel de-silting (km / ha affected)	0	102km (2,307 ha)	
1.2 Number of people employed	2,805	3,081	110%
1.3 Total income paid to workers (USD)	393,750	Not available	Not available
2. Employment created through land preparation			
2.1 Sites (AREA?) prepared for contouring (ha)	31	32	103%
2.2 Number of people employed	1,325	1,364	103%
1.3 Total income paid to workers (USD)	137,860	Not available	Not available
3. Skills training provided			
3.1 Number of trainees	350	363	104%
3.2 Number of trainees who applied the trng.	86	N/a as of this writing	Most milestones on track

Note: The targets are those according to the revised log frame, of late May)

Decent work and Social Protection

Social Protection: Consistent with addressing its decent work agenda across all its interventions, ILO provides productive employment and social protection, be it in short-term and in post-disaster context. For this project, the CFW beneficiaries were appropriated with the regional standard minimum wage per day amounting to Php260, including a set of PPE. The composition of the latter varies depending on the type of work. A set of working tools is also provided for every group of workers as appropriate.

The project funded the first three months premium payment of the beneficiaries to SSS and Philhealth. During the social preparation activities, the project emphasized that the provision of which is in support to the state policy of extending social protection to the workers and their beneficiaries. However, during the round of interviews with the FMR workers in Barangay Tabunoc reveal that some of them (3 people) were not aware of their enrolment to SSS or Philhealth. When probed further, the aspect that impressed them most is the provision of PPEs and wage per day that is higher compared to the average Php100-120 which they normally receive as tenant workers. Most of them expressed hope that ILO's work days should have lasted longer than 15 days. On the other hand, the beneficiaries that were interviewed in Barangay Cabungaan have a deeper appreciation of the social protection package. One worker there who had a vehicular accident (not during work) was able to claim Philhealth assistance for his operation. Interviews conducted with the beneficiaries in other areas (i.e. Lake Danao, Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Calubian Municipality) have similar positive impression, with most of them grateful for the social protection package. However, not all of them expressed commitment to continue pay the premium. Limitation in regular access to income, priority to appropriate funds for food and other household needs were among the reasons.

4.3.2 What have been major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

The project achieved and indeed exceeded its outputs. This is due primarily to the ILO Team and in particular the Program Manager Ms Martha Espano. Her experience enabled her to identify issues ahead of time and position the project so that they were addressed as due process before they became problematic. Her personal energy was important in dealing with the range of stakeholders, from project partners, LGUs, to farmer associations.

The team employed two mechanisms that ensured the effectiveness of delivery which should be noted:

‘Social orientation’ was conducted before each activity. This ensured that target communities understood criteria for selection of recipients, and what they were entitled to. In general this prevented any later disaffection by those not selected, as well as preventing capture of the activity and corruption. It is easy for agencies to rush to delivery, but without investing in suitable ‘social orientation’ it is easy for pitfalls to occur and then time later spent to resolve them. The role for social orientation was particularly important in the SALT activity where complicated issues of land access and registration of ‘farmer associations’ were managed. Such issues if not dealt with comprehensively could easily have undermined these activities.

Effective and Transparent monitoring of CfW. CfW was provided to a total of 4710 persons and over \$0.5M disbursed. This offers great opportunity for confusion and counter claims, if not corruption. The ILO monitoring of this along with GoP agencies ensured transparency. Its rigorous application, (where one case of attempted corruption was revealed and reversed), was critically important to both ensure that recipients received their ‘cash’ and that they did in fact complete the work required. This was no small undertaking.

Staff coordination with partners and GoP agencies. The ILO was effective and proactive and clearly had good relations with the GoP agencies in particular. This was important to ensure that the social orientation was included and transparency, as well as general mobilisation of activities at a time when there were high demands on staff time.

As noted earlier, while the outputs were achieved, several factors caused the delivery of these to be significantly delayed.

- Administrative procedures resulted in the MoU and thus mobilisation of the project to be delayed by 2-3 mth. As a result the EE for debris clearing shifted from an ‘emergency activity’ to a ‘transitional activity’.
- Limited staff to facilitate ST delayed this so that it took place at the end of the project, so late that only the extension due to Ruby enable this to completed its targets, but with no time for follow-up.

Both the SALT and ST are complex activities that require committed follow-up to ensure that the outputs achieved are firmly established and functional, and so able to generate the expected outcomes. Such follow-up was not in the program design, and so time and resources were not provided.

4.3.3 Examine the effectiveness of project institutional framework, its management arrangement ad coordination mechanism with other relevant ILO projects, and with other implementing partners (FAO and Save the Children)

In 2007, the cluster approach to disaster management was institutionalized in the Philippines. Since then, ILO being the cluster co-lead for livelihood has strategically responded in the aftermath of every big disaster in support of its government counterpart i.e. DSWD, with DOLE as member. ILO’s action agenda for this project was patterned from its experience working in the Washi affected areas in Iligan and Cagayan de Oro. The initial phase of the emergency employment then was implemented through a contract with DOLE. The same mechanism was employed in this project particularly in Ormoc City and Kananga Municipality.

As previously mentioned, the working arrangement between ILO and DOLE is complementary and their individual roles are clear at the onset. However, as in the case with the project in Washi affected areas, problems in liquidation are encountered in this project too. The workers' pay-out is unreasonably delayed by at most two months despite additional personnel (2 at the province and 1 at the region) were appropriated by the project to assist. Such delays mean the activity does not fulfil its prime purpose of providing income flows in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. It has follow-on effects in that it undermines the concept of decent work (i.e. payment for work delivered) and generates sore points between local agencies and the disaffected recipients.

Partnering with the concerned LGU is figured as an alternative option for the implementation of the succeeding batch of emergency employment, specifically in Municipalities of Villaba and San Isidro. The working relationship between ILO and the respective LGUs is harmonious. The workers' pay-out and documentary requirements were prepared in a timely manner. As appropriate, the LGU designated offices that will closely work with ILO in the operations. For the FMR improvement, the MEO and MAO are designated.

In the tripartite partnership of ILO, FAO, and SCUUK, constant coordination and sharing of expertise sufficed for the smooth project implementation. A Project Management Team (PMT) comprised of the respective project managers and the key staff of each agency was formed to suffice having a systematic structure for coordination. They met at least once a month for updating and feed backing. Communication is key to resolving issues and challenges as they occur. It also helps that at the onset, their roles and responsibilities are clearly set out.

Engaging the farmer associations in the implementation of the SALT site development is challenging for the following reasons: 1) most of them have no experience handling contracts (documentary requirements); 2) the officers and members have varied absorptive capacities in handling paper works (preparation of supporting documents for the pay-out; liquidation report); 3) majority has no background in financial management; 4) needs constant and close mentoring, among others. Each association has a set of officers tasked to manage the project funds downloaded to them and do the administrative work. ILO designated one on-site monitor who reports to ILO's excol-monitor.

4.3.4 Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to changing situation on the ground or challenges faced

The project made several adjustments to its activities according to the changing situation. Such changes were managed transparently and suitable.

- The project operations commenced at a time when the significant number of debris clearing activities have already been covered by early humanitarian responders. After a series of consultations with the LGUs, the project identified other relevant transitional activities that are labour intensive yet consistent with the RAY priorities--de-silting of irrigation canals and FMR access improvement. Hence these activities were pursued by the project. The degree of the latter's flexibility is best demonstrated when it pursued activities that were not originally planned but remain beneficial to the community at large.
- In the case of the land preparation activities for the SALT sites, ILO's design is informed by its experience working in the Washi affected areas where terracing was employed as a method. However with FAO, contouring was preferred for minimal soil disturbance and easier to execute for the farmers. The adoption of the latter enabled the project to generate savings sufficient to fund supporting facilities like nurseries, paths, and water catchment funds, which in the end resulted in their overdevelopment.
- Incident to the slow fund mobilization in the DOLE-managed CFW activities in Ormoc City and Kananga, the project shifted to partnering with the LGUs (Villaba and San Isidro) for the implementation of the FMR access improvement which is part of the emergency employment component. DOLE remains actively involved in the conduct of OSH trainings.

- Further, during the peak of the project implementation, additional external collaborators were procured tasked to provide technical monitoring and assistance as required.

4.4 Efficiency

4.4.1 Has the Project been implemented in the most efficient way vis-a-vis its financial and human resources. Have activities been implemented in a cost efficient manner and have project objectives been achieved on time and with planned budget.

Lean Project Team

The project is operated by five (5) full-time staff, of which three (3) are into the technical operations (Project manager, Engineer, Skills Development Specialist). Each component of the project is designed such that a portion of the work is taken on by ILO's collaborative partners i.e. FAO and SCUK. Technical personnel from LGUs like the MAO and MEO were also tapped for technical assistance specifically in progress monitoring. Excol consultants were added only for a certain period during which the bulk of work for land preparation is executed. Given that the project managed to exceed physical targets and considering the spread of the project sites with only a small team to cover them, indicates an efficient use of human resources

However, incident to contracting-out to DOLE-8 the implementation of the emergency employment in Ormoc City and Kananga, the project procured three (3) people to assist in the preparation of the documentary requirements for the payout release. As earlier mentioned, it did not help expedite the processing of payments. Learning from that, the project modified its approach by contracting the LGUs of San Isidro and Villaba for the emergency employment activities in their respective areas. With DOLE-8, a mandatory 3% administrative cost was included in the contract, none was stipulated under the contract with the LGUs. In fact with LGU Villaba, they committed a counterpart contribution of USD5,567 (PhP244,950) for materials, equipment, technical supervision and monitoring expenses anent to the subproject implementation.

Said experience proved that engaging with the LGUs is more efficient in terms of timely output delivery (including payout distribution) and technical human resource and equipments (when available) can be tapped without added expense on the part of the project.

Cost for Safety and Social Protection

For a 15-day work of each individual, the project appropriated USD168.32 (PhP7,406) for wages, Philhealth and SSS coverage for three months, accident insurance, PPE, and tools. Compared to regular CFW activities implemented by government agencies, ILO's approach is about 60% more expensive, as more often than not, the former only covers for the minimum wage and accident insurance. The difference is the cost of ILO's appropriation for the safety and social protection package (SSS, Philhealth, PPE, and tools), which is equivalent to one person's 14-day CFW with accident insurance coverage under regular government programme.

Enlarging the comparison as to how much more workers could have been covered by the cost difference (as compared to the 3,081 workers under the emergency employment component of the project), a total of 1,848 more workers can be employed or 27,729 more work days generated under the regular CFW programme of the government.


It is significant to note here that while the cost difference is substantial, this is ILO's investment to embed decent work values both with the beneficiaries and DOLE. This in fact is in compliance with the standards for decent work mandated by international labour treaties and provisions under the Philippine labour law. In October 2013, an MOU amongst the livelihood cluster members was signed indicating the standard uniform approach for the implementation of CFW in post-disaster situations, which was duly adopted by DSWD and DOLE.

Project Achievements and timing of implementation

The immediate results of the project were achieved within the planned budget. The appropriated amount for items that are no longer relevant to the project activities were realigned to other items as long as it is within the same budget line. For example under subprojects, the appropriation for chainsaw packages (not needed in the EE activities) was added to the budget for the land preparation activities. Also the provision for cost increase was added to another line item where it can be utilized most.

As to the mobilization of workers per component, the bulk of which was carried out in May under the emergency employment component with 1,712 workers for the de-silting of irrigation canals and coconut debris clearing. The momentum thinned out until September to December when the full-swing mobilization of workers resumed to take on the bulk of land preparation activities for the SALT sites and the remaining emergency employment activities for FMR access improvement. Within this period, the initial batch of skills trainings participants were engaged with the remaining batches to finish off within the remaining two months of the project life.

Figure 1: Number of workers employed per Subproject per month



Note: The figure is based on project data showing when activities were 'mobilised' and budget made available. Actual work then follows a little later.

4.5 Impact

4.5.1 What has happened as results of the project? To what extent the project has made its contribution to broader and longer term crisis response and decent work goal in the Philippines

The project completed all outputs successfully, resulting in upward of \$0.5M being provided as income to 4700+ beneficiaries. This provided immediate relief and assistance to those beneficiaries; built morale; and enabled agriculture infrastructure to become productive again. Impacts from SALT and ST are less clear cut.

As described earlier, SALT if implemented effectively with adequate follow-up does appear to have the potential to offer more resilient agriculture production system for the uplands, particularly for the Visayas subject to storms and rain downpours. Such an impact is there but extremely fragile and scattered. These would need to be consolidated and expanded to play such a transformative role.

From the ST intervention there does appear a good chance for most of the carpentry worker will gain employment and thereby have built a new livelihood for their families. A proportion of the food production trainees undoubtedly will continue to generate income from their training. Together this is impressive. However it is difficult to see that more than a handful of the handicraft trainees (bamboo and grass weavers) will persist. Overall the change in all the ST trainees in their appearance and self-confidence was regarded as remarkable and such change underlies their own ability to forge new livelihood, whatever they may choose it to be.

The application of social protection mechanism and minimum wages for all CfW activities did raise an awareness of these with the beneficiaries. But this is just a step in the right direction, as the beneficiaries regarded these as a special case under UN support. However it may prompt some beneficiaries to begin to claim their rights for minimum wage and social protection packages in the future.

While the minimum wage and social protection packages are part of the DOLE mandate, they do not appear to have advanced this actively in the past. The opportunity to demonstrate this to communities through the disaster relief appears to have shown DOLE (meeting with Assist. Regional Dr. Mr Ronnie Guzman) that they can be proactive in promoting these without waiting for a new disaster. If this could be fostered it would indeed be capitalising on the Haiyan relief experience.

4.5.2 What real difference that the project has made to the ultimate beneficiaries, capacity of local authorities, and to gender equality?

The closest that the project can extend support to the local authorities is through enhancing the capacity of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council established in every province, city/municipality, and barangay responsible for the direction-setting, development, implementation and coordination for disaster risk management program within their territorial jurisdiction (RA 10121 Sec. 12). As pointed out in the Bopha Project evaluation report, the design of ILO's post-disaster response as in the case of this project, does not extend influence over capacitating the LGUs (nor their respective LDRRMCs) as no verifiable indicator in the log frame that points collaboration with the latter.

The project was proactive in providing and facilitating equal opportunity for women to participate in all activities and this resulted in significant women's participation in the activities, As such they directly received and managed the income from CfW. In the ST, the facilities provided by TESDA also impacted on the women attending's self-knowledge in women's health and child care, which will serve them well in their lives and likely to be passed on to other women within their communities on their return home.

4.6 Sustainability

4.6.1 To what extent the project's benefit continue after the project ended?

What are the major factors which will have or will influence the continuity of the project's benefit?

The benefits from CfW would to be largely transient as the beneficiaries used these funds for their daily lives, as intended. Certainly the outcome from EE, in clearing debris from agricultural land and de-silting, will persist with those sites, and their upkeep will be part of normal management practices.

A number of factors suggest the SALT intervention as it is currently established would be unlikely to persist: The SALT sites themselves are on common land, managed by 'farmer association', with minimal benefits to be shared, and so likely to be abandoned once project support ends. Poor application of the SALT technology renders some sites unable to demonstrate their function as a resilient form of agriculture for the uplands to farmers and so confounding their role as a demonstration. At all sites the over-development of the sites will distract farmers from the key elements and suggest it to be too expensive for an individual HH to apply on their own land.

Sustainability here should not be considered in terms of 'the sites' being sustainable, but whether the SALT technology itself continues to be applied by upland farmers in the area. Despite the points made above at sites where the messages did get through, there is uptake by a small number of HHs on their own land: 1-3 HHs on 12 (or half) of the 24 sites. This number is not unreasonable reasonable given the short period following the site establishment. However the sites are scattered and thus the lessons these individual HHs gain are unlikely to be shared and reinforce each other, as a novel technology generally requires. Follow-up activity that would consolidate and expand this individual HH uptake would include:

- Review of experiences and consolidation of key elements of SALT amongst MAO staff
- Consolidation amongst HHs at each SALT site to focus on (a) SALT as a resilient agriculture system for the uplands; (b) key element of the SALT that provide this resilience and (c) exchange and innovation of the details to enable SALT to fit local conditions.
- Participatory value-chain development to ensure HHs gain increased benefits from their produce and thus higher incentive to invest in establishing SALT areas.

These types of activity could have been designed into the activity, but would certainly require a time frame longer than 12 mth. It would be highly worthwhile for ILO to foster such activity to build on the results to date, which otherwise are likely to dissipate, with the resulting abandoned SALT sites sending a very negative message to farmers.

Within the ST activity, it does appear that most of the carpentry trainees will find employment and thus have a new employment option. A proportion of food processing trainees should succeed in gaining income from their skills also. And again it must be stated that the change in trainee's appearance and self-confidence is a profound change and will continue to serve them to establish new livelihoods.

The project took specific measures in all activities to provide beneficiaries perspectives and skills to use the funds and skills effectively, through short course on financial management. These were noted but did not appear to be applied directly by the few ST beneficiaries where this was queried, but other factors were also at work here. Given the recall of this input they should provide a reference point for some beneficiaries in their fund management.

5. Conclusions

The project has achieved all its outputs under difficult conditions and with the associated social protection activities in place. There were delays in delivery and some aspects of implementing procedures would reduce the actual impact and sustainability.

5.1 *Strategic fit*

The strategic fit of the project was good with three key strategies: PHAP (Dec 2013); Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response plan (10 Dec. 2013) directly addressing the 1st and 3rd objectives, and DFIDs response to Haiyan. It was aligned with local government units and through the application of social protection orientation and minimum wages for CfW, it complied with and broadcast relevant aspects of 'decent work'. These met the real needs of the beneficiaries as articulated in the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda.

5.2 *Validity of Design*

The project used the ILO 'natural disaster response' package. The three elements are appropriate to the real need of the beneficiaries, providing an initial emergency response (Emergency Employment), and moving into transitional recovery (contour farming or SALT, and Skills Training). The emphasis on, and planned early delivery of, EE was appropriate, with lesser funds and delayed delivery for the other two interventions.

Project resources were insufficient: the implementation frame of 12 mth is not sufficient to provide adequate follow-up for the two more complex activities (SALT and ST). The limited time results in these activities being established, but then without support to ensure are they generating positive outcomes that will reinforce continued application. Value-chain development has a big role to play in enhancing outcomes and staff would be needed for this.

Administration procedures between the donor and international partners, from submission of proposal and indicated approval (Dec), delayed mobilisation from *planned start*, of Jan, to Mid-march, approx. 2.5 mth. This delay resulted in the EE no longer having an emergency function, but rather a transitional recovery one.

DOLE was responsible for implementation of EE. Due to application of their normal procedures, payment to beneficiaries was made 1-2 mth after work completion. Similar delays have been noted for WASHI and PABLO. Such delays in payment defeats the purpose of the initiative, (to provide funds for daily living); undermines the 'decent work' rationale; and creates tensions between the LGUs and their population. The Regional DOLE unit themselves stated they are not comfortable with this implementation role. The project then piloted downloading funds directly to LGUs along with suitable monitoring (primarily by ILO team, with payments then made 1-2 weeks of work completed. Given the dominant role of CfW in natural disaster response programs this issue should be given some attention.

5.3 *Project effectiveness.*

The EE work was managed well, and the project showed flexibility and the capacity to negotiate with local agencies to retarget this effectively. The slow disbursement of payment for labour did undermine its effectiveness as noted above. The activity did have functional outcomes; land cleared was used for agriculture production, de-silting of irrigation canals did lift crop yields, etc. Overall this activity was impressive.

M+E is one of the 'unsung heroes' in effective delivery of EE. This was done in such a way that ensured transparency and so enabled the funds to be delivered as designed and to reinforce the 'decent work' message. That this often 'delicate' task was done well, is a credit to the ILO staff.

The SALT activity was impressive in the sites built, but suffered in several ways in their implementation:

- over-developed sites; thus distracting from their main function, and suggesting high inputs. Overall this compromised what should be its prime purpose - to provide a model for resilient upland agriculture.
- 2 of the 3 sites had serious technical flaws; ineffective contour bunds, bunds not aligned with contours, poorly sited on slopes too steep for annual cropping, and infertile soils.
- The arrangement working through farmer associations was good in that it exposed many HH to the approach, but it unlikely to persist as a group activity, with the result the sites are likely to be abandoned and leave negative messages.

Despite the above issues, about 12 of the salt sites do already have 1-3 individual HHs who have begun to apply SALT in their own land. This indicates that there is a demand for this, which should be built on.

Skills Training, aimed at non-agricultural HHs, achieved its outputs although delayed as noted above. It is likely that a high proportion of the carpentry and food preparation trainees will gain incomes from their new skills. The selection of handicraft items (bamboo and grass weaving) as an option is problematic due to management of supply chains needed. The disbursement of start-up funds prior to the training however inevitably lead to these being used for other purpose and no longer being available for business start-ups. No value chain development was made to link participants or lead to efficiencies in marketing. Apart from this the training course were delivered in such a way that the trainees gained great improvement in their own grooming and self-confidence, profound changes that will serve them well in accessing new employment.

The social orientation to inform the broader population of target communities, criteria for selection and what benefits would be provided, ensured that complaints did not arise, and no group could capture the activities. The social orientation activities were well applied and integrated into each activity.

To gain higher outcomes from Skills Training (i.e. application of the skills to gain income) the delivery process design should consider the following:

- employ value-chain development as early as possible, to enhance commitment of trainees and establish links with markets
- start-up funds should be provided once training is completed, and provisional plans made for the use of the funds
- options for the 'skills' to be trained, should be products or services that have markets within the communities so trainees can apply and reinforce these without delay
- follow-up after training is needed to exchange experiences and reinforce skills found to be weak.

The two further unsung heroes of implementation; social orientation and monitoring of activities for transparency, should be noted. These should be documented to ensure they are recognised as best practices, if not already.

Social protection and decent work characteristics that accompanied each intervention did make beneficiaries aware and appreciate these. On-going application of most aspects is unlikely. However their application in these sites will have provided a concrete experience of these, which they may attempt to call for in the future.

5.4 Efficiency

The project operated a 'lean team'. As noted earlier this may have been a false efficiency and an additional staff to facilitate the complex interventions (SALT, ST) including value -chain development, would be advisable to safeguard these activities.

The delivery of interventions did lag due firstly to administrative procedures in start-up and later for ST due to lack of staff to focus on this.

5.5 Impact

The project did have impact with its beneficiaries from CfW both in terms of the income gained and enabling agriculture production through land cleared, de-silting etc.

The establishment of a new model for resilient upland cultivation cannot be claimed for the reasons described. At the same time ~ 21 HHs from half of the SALT site, have begun to apply this on their land. These examples fragile, as the practices inevitably need adaptation to local conditions, and innovative farmers widely scattered need to exchange and reinforce each other.

New employment will develop from the ST, mainly carpentry workers and some food processing trainees. All the trainees do appear to have improved their self-image and self-confidence, which serve them in seeking employment opportunities

MOE staff understanding a capacity to establish SALT sites has been gained. At the same time, the overdevelopment of the sites might dilute their appreciation of the key technical elements that make this function.

5.6 Sustainability

The functional outcomes of EE debris clearing will be sustained subject to normal on-going management and maintenance by individual HHs. Similarly for the trainees of ST.

The SALT initiative is of some concern. The sites are unlikely to continue to be cultivated as a group activity once project support ends. As these are abandoned they will create a negative message of the SALT approach and discourage other HHs to apply it themselves. While there are HHs in ½ the sites who have applied this, they would continue to need support in order for their application to mature, otherwise typically such scattered initiatives will also disappear.

6. Lessons Learnt and Emerging Best Practices

6.1 Lessons Learnt

ILO Lesson Learned Template

Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan

Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM

Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date:

Feb.2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	<p>Standard administrative procedures which continue to applied as business as usual, significantly delayed delivery of project interventions. Factors responsible were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Administrative procedures delayed signing of MoU between DFID and ILO, and hence delayed project mobilisation by about ~3 mths (b) DOLE standard procedures delayed payment for CfW activities to beneficiaries of up to 2 mth. As a result these funds did not fulfil their purpose as 'emergency incomes, tension arose between LGUs and the population, and overall payment was de-link with the work thus compromising the messages of 'decent work'. <p>Delay in payment for CfW has been noted in earlier natural disaster response program.</p>
Context and any related preconditions	<p>These issues arose during the natural disaster response program. All agencies have standard procedures to ensure standards etc. These become counterproductive when maintained in emergency context.</p>
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	<p>Those affected are the agriculturally based HHs targeted for CfW of a major natural disaster.</p>

Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	To address these issues will require the agencies concerned to review their procedures to see whether these can be streamlined.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	In regard late payments for CfW, the issue is well recognised by DOLE at regional level who recognise the need for some change.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The delay in MoU and disbursement does not appear to be due to ILO at the Regional level. It would appear to be due to procedures at head offices, whether either or both of ILO and DFID cannot be determined by this evaluation.

ILO Lesson Learned Template

Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan

Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM

Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date:

Feb.2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
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Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	<p>Delivery of complex activities (i.e. SALT and ST) requires additional project resources that have typically been applied for natural disaster response program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) a longer project timeframe (approx. 18 mth) to allow not simply the delivery of the intervention, but also follow-up to ensure positive outcomes are achieved that will reinforce and anchor the activity; and (b) staff f dedicated to the facilitation and follow-up these activities require, and in particular to include value-chain development.
Context and any related preconditions	<p>Complex activities, such as SALT and ST, do have a place within a natural disaster response program. They can have immediate benefits, (through CfW etc.) but primarily aim at transitioning or long term recovery.</p>
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	<p>Those affected are all HHs affected by the natural disasters.</p>
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	<p>The SALT and ST activities require substantial social orientation prior to delivery, and this was provided although later than schedule. These activities require smallholders to make significant behaviour and livelihood changes. Training inputs are the start of such change, but typically further support to mentor application of the training, and to accrue benefits is needed for beneficiaries to continue to apply them. Value-chain development interventions would stimulate add value, thus increasing reasons for participants to persist application.</p>
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	<p>In the case of ST, the training program provided by TESDA was structured to include personal and livelihood skills. That they did achieve changes in participants’ self-worth and confidence is impressive.</p>

ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The lean team for ILO did not have a full time staff to manage the complex activities, and this contributed to their delay and follow-up support, but even so sufficient time is need for full activity to be completed and lessons learnt and reinforced with the beneficiaries.
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ILO Lesson Learned Template

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Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM

Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date:

Feb.2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	The SALT activity does offer an approach to upland agriculture that will be resilient in the face of the violent storms that cross the Visayas. This need for this was evident in that a small group of smallholders began to apply this on their own land. The opportunity for resilient upland agriculture is should be the dominate message to farmers, (rather than CfW and diversified incomes). As part of this, the mechanisms to introduce it to farmers should aim to foster application by individual HH on their land.
Context and any related preconditions	Upland farmers suffer from washouts and economic losses following many storms in the Visayas. SALT could reduce these effects. It should be part of a general GoP program within in the region.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	Smallholder farmers cultivating land in upland areas in the Visayas region frequented by violent storms.

<p>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</p>	<p>Implementation of SALT suffered from</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The message of 'resilient farming' was not prominent, and even overlooked by many staff and so then by farmers - The over-development of the sites distracted from the resilient farming aspect, and also suggested high labour needed to replicate. - Various technical errors were noted on 2 of the 3 sites visited, which would undermine the functional aspects of the SALT. - The Farmer Association base for management of the site, while good to inform many HHs is unlikely to continue once project support ends, with the result the sites would be abandoned.
<p>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</p>	<p>Despite the negative influences noted above, a significant number of HHs applied SALT on their own land. This indicates that farmers see the need for such approaches. It applied in a manner consistent with this, it is likely to become more generally applied by farmers in the region.</p>
<p>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</p>	<p>While FAO was responsible for technical aspects of SALT, the management of the activity through social orientation and CfW was mainly up to ILO. There was confusion between ILO and FAO over whether SALT would use contour bunds to limit erosion or build terraces. However from the start the pressing role for SALT, as described above, was not explicit in the prodoc.</p>

ILO Lesson Learned Template

Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan

Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM

Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date:

Feb.2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	Effectiveness of delivery of the interventions was ensured through consistent use of good management practices, often easily skipped over or not noted <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Social preparation ensured that communities from which beneficiaries were draw were aware of criteria for selection; participants understood the inputs to e provided and their role to play. This prevented later dissatisfaction or capture of activities by any group (b) Monitoring of the emergency employment was consistent and transparent and ensure that beneficiaries performed their tasks and cash was not diverted.
Context and any related preconditions	Natural disaster response programs, where material benefits will be distributed.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	All communities affected by the natural disaster
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Social preparation, and monitoring do take up project resources (staff time and funds), and must be integrated into the plans rather than being applied as after thoughts. Transparent management gained through monitoring may be resisted and requires diplomatic skills in persistent to have applied.

Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	Where well applied the benefits are as described above and activities generally proceed without having to recover misunderstandings.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The application of these management practices will in the first instance, be a prime duty of the ILO team leader.

6.2 Emerging Best Practices

ILO Emerging Good Practice Template

Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan

Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM

Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date:

Feb.2015

The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

GP Element	Text
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	Supporting management activities to ensure well targeted and effective delivery of interventions should be noted. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (c) Social preparation to ensure that communities from which beneficiaries were draw are aware of selection criteria; participants understand inputs they will receive; and the role they must play. This prevents later dissatisfaction or capture of activities by any group (d) Monitoring of the emergency employment was consistent and transparent and ensure that beneficiaries performed their tasks and cash was not diverted.
Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	Natural disaster response programs generally and in particular (a) where there will be selection of beneficiaries according to some criteria and (b) where there will be CfW activities and/or disbursement of funds, or other material items.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	Social preparation: where the general communities from which beneficiaries will be drawn are aware of selection criteria; the participants understand inputs they will receive; this prevents later dissatisfaction or capture of activities by any group Monitoring of activities, especially ' emergency employment' in a consistent and transparent manner, ensures beneficiaries perform their tasks, and cash is not diverted.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	All group s indicted satisfaction with the selection of beneficiaries and appreciation of the criteria Monitoring of emergency employment did reveal diversion of funds on sites. The person responsible was confronted and funds returned to the Farmer Association. This demonstrated to all parties that the activity was implemented effectively and transparently.

Potential for replication and by whom	These practices should be an integral part of all similar natural disaster response programs. In particular the ILO team leaders should be aware of these practices and ensure they are complied with by all staff.
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	Both these management approaches reinforce 'decent work' in that smallholders recognise that they have to perform task and they will be compensated according to their performance.
Other documents or relevant comments	

7.0 Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the findings of the evaluation team during their field mission Feb 1-9. For convenience they are grouped under three of the headings in the ToR.

7.1 Project design

The three interventions in the current 'natural disaster response package are suitable and should be retained. They do address the real need of the communities affected, both emergency and transitioning periods, and agricultural and non-agricultural based HHs.

7.1.1 Complex activities (SALT and ST) and resources required

Two of the activities SALT and ST are complex activities and require additional resources to be effective:

- The overall timeframe for these to be not only delivered, but to be well established, requires a minimum of **18 mt**. This will allow and then have adequate follow-up to ensure application is mentored and positive outcomes are recognised by beneficiaries and so reinforce continued application.
- **Staff** committed to these complex activities should be assigned in the future; both the lengthy social preparation and then the follow-up, which should also include value-chain development.

The issue of resources will need to be recognised by both **donors** and **ILO**. There will always be a tension between assigning funds to delivery of inputs. However it should be recognised that if interventions are not able to be done effectively the benefits will be compromised, and that for transitioning activities, benefits should continue to accrue within communities beyond the direct beneficiaries

The issue is not of immediate urgency, but certainly one that should be addressed prior to future natural disasters. The principals that emerge should affect not only responses to typhoons but other types of disasters, in other parts of the world

7.1.2 Purpose of SALT

The role of SALT within 'natural disaster response' programs should be clearly articulated to be offering a resilient approach to upland agriculture in areas affected by violent storms. This role should be clarified by **donors and implementers, including ILO**. It should also be clarified with local GoP agencies responsible for agriculture production, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction in the Visayas Region to ensure future projects align and reinforce local priorities.

It should also be noted that this is in line with the Rapid Review of DFIDs Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, where the first of the three recommendations were: "In the Philippines DFID should support the Philippines governments reconstruction plan in a strategic areas, such as climate change resilience. "

The issue is of **high importance** to long term development in the region, but not of immediate urgency, but certainly one that should be addressed prior to the next typhoon season.

(Targeting ILO, FAO, and local GoP agencies)

7.2 Effectiveness

7.2.1 Institutional linkages for timely and effective delivery

- (a) Delayed project mobilisation

The natural disaster response package is now well recognised. Processing of approval and mobilising of projects should not be an issue. This process should be seriously reviewed by the donor (DFID) and ILO to see what measures might be used to streamlining this process. Alternatives might include (a) assigning a task force to deal with processing and procedures (b) releasing a mobilising tranche to get teams on the ground for inception activities.

This review should be conducted by the **donor and ILO, both at country and regional levels**. As the natural disaster response projects are generally integrated and involve other agencies, the **FAO and SCUK** should also be included.

This is of high importance as the delays undermine firstly the emergency activities, and then following this the other interventions. If structural obstacles cannot be resolved then this brings in to question whether the agencies concerned can claim to respond effectively to disaster during the emergency period.

(b) Delayed payments in CfW

Similarly mechanism for payment for CfW should be made, with the aim that ideally payments would be made within one week and at the most 2 weeks, from completion of work.

Rigid procedures within DOLE appear to be the problem. While their role for this is mandated at a national level, both (a) the payment procedures and (b) suitability of DOLE in this implementation role should be reviewed. This should involved **DOLE at both regional and national levels along with ILO** and possibly other agencies working in a similar manner.

This is of high importance the CfW is one of the most effective interventions and slow payments undermine the purpose of it, to provide injection of funds to affected families. This is not of immediate importance but should be addressed well before the next typhoon season so new mechanisms and roles can be put into place.

(Targeting DOLE and ILO)

7.2.2 Management strategies to safeguard effective delivery of interventions

A range of management procedures (social orientation, monitoring for transparency), were integrated into the delivery which were effective in ensuring they were effective and safeguarded them against misuse of funds and capture of activities by small groups. These should be noted and articulated in a manner

These application of these measures should be noted and used as a set of guidelines for ILO teams in conducting similar natural disaster response programs. This could be prepared by the **'technical section of ILO's regional office**, Bangkok along with the **Philippines country office and relevant staff**.

This is a highly worthwhile activity, to ensure that good practices within individual staff become part of corporate knowledge.

7.2.1 Implementing SALT for general application

Methods for implementing SALT should be consistent with its prime function, introduction resilient agriculture practices for the uplands; so foster application by individual HHs; and align with objectives at district and provincial levels to establish sustainable agriculture systems. Key implementing mechanisms should be reviewed are:

- Site selection: demonstration plot should be one land owned or managed by single HHs with an interest in continuing application, if judged effective.
- Broad community awareness should still be aimed at, possibly through farmer associations' (formal or non-formal) who can be mobilised through CfW (thus relieving the burden on the individual HH), with a proportionate share (25-50% depending on degree of group labour input in crop management through the season) in the harvest in the first year to capture their interest in the outcome.

- Options for the bund construction and crops planted should be provided and further innovation by farmers, as long as the innovations are consistent with the key principals of SALT. Exchange events within each site and across sites should be conducted to share experiences.

This technical review should be conducted with all relevant partners; **ILO; FAO at country level** and **local GoP agencies** responsible for agriculture production, environmental sustainability, and poverty reduction in the Visayas Region.

This is considered of high importance, particularly for long term recovery and development of resilient agriculture against storm damage in upland areas of the Visayas.

7.3 Sustainability

7.3.1 Social protection inputs

These were considered to not have made a major impact on beneficiaries thinking, but at the same time set a new benchmark for what they should expect for minimum wage payments, and ways to protect their family incomes. These will be part of the overall picture in the Philippines establishing their own capacity to deal with natural disasters.

The effectiveness of the 'social protection' inputs should be reviewed with **DOLE at regional and national levels** with **ILO** support. This should also seek opportunities for similar pilot application (i.e. without waiting for natural disasters to demonstrate their mandate). These might include:

- Various CfW activities where social protection measures would also be applied.
- Cooperation with the agriculture sector to support establishment of wider SALT application in upland areas, with CfW being supported by DOLE with social protection inputs, (such cross agency activities might be challenging, but should not be an obstacle).

The above is not of critical or immediate importance, but should be considered as long term strategy for social protection development in the Philippines.

7.3.2 Salvaging SALT

The current set of SALT sites have not emphasised the resilient agriculture message, and can be expected to be abandoned once project support ends, thus leaving decaying sites ending negative messages. Yet already there are scattered cases of farmers who have applied the SALT on their own land.

Immediate action should be taken to salvage the existing sites and prevent negative messages developing. This can be done through:

- Review of experiences and consolidation of key elements of SALT amongst MAO staff
- Consolidation amongst HHs at each SALT site to focus on (a) SALT as a resilient agriculture system for the uplands; (b) key element of the SALT that provide this resilience and (c) exchange and innovation of the details to enable SALT to fit local conditions.).
- Participatory value-chain development to ensure HHs gain increased benefits from their produce and thus higher incentive to invest in establishing SALT areas.

This will lie outside of the DFID/FAO/ILO/SCUK program and so funding will be an issue. However **combined agency** influence should enable a review of SALT and commitment to further action. Sources of funding for these actions should be sought where possible including national funding within relevant agencies MAO. Again it should be noted that such an initiative would fit with the first recommendation to DFID in its 'Rapid Review' quoted earlier.

ANNEXES

I. Terms of Reference

Final Independent Evaluation

Terms of Reference

(Nov. 18, 2014)

“Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan”

Donor	UK Government
TC code	PHI/14/01/UKM
Administrative unit	ILO Country Office for the Philippines
Technical Unit	Employment Intensive Investment Programme
Project budget	USD1,636,570
Type of evaluation	Independent final evaluation
Evaluation Manager	Pamornrat Pringsulaka
Date of evaluation	Oct-Dec 2014

1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONAL FOR THE FINAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

This Terms of Reference cover the final evaluation of the project. The project is implemented by ILO and funded by the UK Government. It is a one year project that started officially in March 2014. The project will end at the end of December 2014.

The final evaluation is a mandatory exercise for all ILO projects and as per ILO Evaluation policy, all ILO projects with budget of more than USD 1 million at least one independent evaluation is required. The independent final evaluation is thus required. The evaluation will be conducted by an independent evaluation team (one international and one national consultants). The evaluation process will be participatory and will involve ILO tripartite constituents, stakeholders, and beneficiaries throughout the process.

The evaluation aims at examining the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and at assessing what have been the impact of the project particularly on the beneficiaries. The evaluation will also report on the lessons learnt and possible good practices. The evaluation findings, recommendations and lessons learnt will provide valuable information regarding ILO response to Typhoon like type of crisis in the Philippines and also in other countries.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

Typhoon Haiyan severely damaged and disrupted agriculture, especially crop production. Agriculture provided 40.5 percent of national employment for men and 21.8 percent for women. In the affected areas, according to the Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), 45 percent of the sampled communities reported farming as their primary income. Agriculture, especially crop production, was severely damaged and disrupted. Estimates from the Government indicated that about 600 000 ha of agriculture land have been affected with 1.1 million MT of crops lost¹⁰, of which 80 percent has been reported in Region VIII, requiring urgent attention in terms of clearing, cleaning and replanting. This included 80 km of communal irrigation canals that needed desilting. Based on results of the MIRA 1.77 percent of farming communities indicated that their main income source was severely affected by the typhoon and an average 74 percent of their standing crops lost. The total losses for the agriculture sector, as mentioned in the RAY were about PhP 31.13 million (USD712,520).

Typhoon Haiyan had a direct impact on an estimated 5.6 million workers. Of these, 40 per cent (2.2 million) are women and. Moreover, 44 per cent (2.4 million) of those affected were vulnerably employed with limited income and social security prior to the disaster. Of the 2.4 million affected vulnerable workers, 52 per cent were from the agriculture sector, 42 per cent from service sector and 6 per cent from industry; 42 per cent were women and 20 per cent (1.1 million) are youth aged 15 to 24, wherein three-fifths belong to the 25 to 54 age group. Vulnerable workers had either entirely or partially lost sources of income and livelihoods. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment was seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups in order to make up for lost sources of income and livelihood to provide immediate income support for the poor and vulnerable while rebuilding sustainable livelihoods. In the Leyte Province 445,821 families and 2,371,796 persons of which 943,378 workers (including 354,849 vulnerable workers) were affected. The rice and corn farmers were amongst the group of vulnerable workers.

FAO, ILO and Save the Children's Integrated Approach

FAO and ILO, as the co-leads of the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) and of the Livelihoods and Early Recovery Cluster respectively, and SC as a member, were committed to support and align with the response plans of government counterparts, particularly those developed by the DA, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE), and Local Government Units (LGUs). As such, the three agencies planned to collectively prioritize support activities which complement or help to fill gaps, where the government has identified it further assistance to

¹⁰ Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), 16 December 2013, Government of the Philippines.

meet the identified needs of target populations. They also ensured to take closely into account existing government policies and delivery systems. Moreover, the three agencies planned to work closely with government counterparts to validate the targeting and selection of intended beneficiaries, and to identify, design, implement, supervise, monitor and report on the project activities, particularly with regards to technical aspects.

This joint FAO, ILO and SC integrated programme spanned across the FSAC and the combined Early Recovery and Livelihoods cluster, to directly support the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team's Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan, specifically Strategic Objective 1 *"Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services"* and Strategic Objective 3 *"Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries"* by providing a full spectrum of complimentary immediate and longer-term livelihood support to the targeted small scale rice and corn farming communities, whereby:

- FAO will provide agricultural support through provision of inputs and training for intercropping and alternative agricultural subsistence and income-generating activities to help restore food self-sufficiency, diversity food sources and restart livelihoods of small-scale rice and corn farmers;
- ILO will provide emergency employment for immediate income generation, along with tools and materials, and later provide additional skills training on alternative non-agriculture livelihood activities to poor and vulnerable rice and corn growing households whose sources of employment and livelihoods were destroyed; and
- SC will provide immediate cash support to vulnerable community members who will be unable to participate in emergency employment activities and will not receive agricultural inputs (including pregnant and/or lactating females, elderly, disable-bodied, child heads of households, etc.) as well as conditional cash grants and business skills training to small scale market traders to support market development.

The combined results of 3 agencies (plus favourable external factors) aimed to contribute to the development impact as "Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have an impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the 4 selected municipalities".

For the ILO component on *"Generating Emergency Employment and Recovering Sustainable Livelihoods"* - the project received contribution from the UK Government of USD 1.6 million. The project aimed to address the problem of lost income and livelihood opportunities due to the impact of the typhoon. It supported poor and vulnerable rice and corn farmers and their communities to recover. It has 3 immediate objectives as follows:-

- *Immediate Objective 1:* Emergency employment creation through the clearing of debris and fallen trees, and preparation of cleared land for rice and corn fields

- *Immediate Objective 2:* Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production
- *Immediate Objective 3:* Skills training provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women

The ILO project performance framework is reflected in the project proposal and attached as **Annex 2** which provides detailed information about project objectives, outputs, performance indicators, and targets.

As of 31st of July, 2014, a total of 1,710 people were able to work with a basic benefit package of minimum wages, accident insurance, and enrolment in social security and health insurance. The UK Government funded sub-projects benefited not only these individual emergency workers and their families with their basic human needs met. Cleaning debris in corn farms enabled a further 220 small corn-based to resume their farming in the municipality of Kananga; as well, an additional 2,567 small rice-based farmers were able to benefit from cleared canals in Ormoc City. A total of USD 209,815.00 in the form of payment of wages of the workers, and procurement of supplies and materials, was injected into the local economy.

The project management – ILO Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) based in Manila has the overall responsibilities for all ILO projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, assisted in the country office by an Early Recovery and Livelihood Specialist. For the DFID funded project, the ILO Field Office based in Ormoc City is directly managed by a national Project Officer with the support of a Skills Specialist and Admin/Finance Clerk. The project technical support is also provided by Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work Support Team, Bangkok. ILO Manila provides administrative backstopping to the project.

3. Purpose, objective and scope of the evaluation

Purpose: The evaluation seeks to assess the key achievements of the project as per project framework, the extent of sustainability of the project's benefit. It is aimed to highlight recommendations for sustainability, lessons learnt and good practices.

While this evaluation will seek to address a set of relevant evaluation questions, the findings of the evaluation will be used for promoting accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO.

Scope: The scope will cover ILO component's project activities and results from February 2014 to the end of the project (Dec 2014). Geographical coverage will be all project sites that ILO has worked in. The evaluation may need to involve FAO and Save the Children when assessing the impact of the combined ILO, FAO and Save the Children initiative.

Client: the clients of the evaluation are ILO Manila Office and project team, technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and HQ, tripartite constituents, and the donor (DFID).

The evaluation findings and recommendations will be primarily addressed to the implementing partners and the ILO units directly involved in backstopping the project.

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY QUESTIONS

This final evaluation will assess the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful. The evaluation should address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2012 (http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_176814/lang--en/index.htm).

The following OECD/DAC evaluation criteria will be applied.

- Relevance and strategic fit of the project;
- Validity of the project design;
- Project effectiveness;
- Efficiency of resource use;
- Sustainability of project achievements/results;
- Impact orientation;

The suggested analytical framework for the final evaluation of the project is set out in Annex 1.

A more detailed analytical framework of the questions and questions/sub-questions may be modified by the evaluation team in consultation with the evaluation manager.

In addition the evaluation is expected to be based on the following principles:

- Application of result-based management;
- Gender equality;
- Adoption of human rights-based approach;
- Capacity development;
- Environmental sustainability;

Gender equality issues shall be explicitly addressed throughout the evaluation activities by the consultants and all outputs including reports need to mainstream gender equality.

To achieve the above mentioned purposes, this final evaluation will address the following questions:

- The extent to which that the final progress has been made in relation to the planned achievements of the results and the immediate objectives;
- the effectiveness of the measures taken to ensure results-based management in the project implementation;

- the extend of the effectiveness of the project management, coordination mechanisms among various stakeholders in the project areas including 1) coordination with other ILO projects that respond to Typhoon Haiyan; 2) coordination with FAO and Save the Children;
- What has been the added value of partnering with FAO and Save the Children? And to what extent the collaboration or complementation between efforts with FAO and Save the Children benefitted the project, the community, and ILO
- what has been the level of collaboration and cooperation with relevant technical and local government agencies to ensure quality control and sustainability
- project experiences that can be learned with regard to promoting decent work, gender equality, rural access and environmental sustainability, promoting indigenous knowledge and skills;
- the project's direct and indirect impact across socio-economic variables as well as environmental variables;
- the feasibility and scope for the replication of the activities demonstrated by the projects and well received by the ultimate beneficiaries;

5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will comply with evaluation norms and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

In order to enhance usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation will be adopted. A combination of tools and methods will be used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time will be allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information. The methodology for collection of evidences will include:

- Review of documents related to the project, including the initial project document, progress reports, technical assessments and reports, project monitoring and evaluation documents.
- Review the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) and other related documents of the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster that was co-led by the ILO and UNDP.
- Review of technical products (training manuals, technical guidelines, etc.) and other publications used or developed by the project, if any.
- Review of other relevant documents such as the Decent Work Agenda of Philippines, the Central Emergency Response Fund, the national employment policy and programme strategy, national laws and regulations on employment, an Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014, the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team's Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response, UNDAF (Philippines) 2012-2018 and the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016.
- Conduct field missions, interview and focus group discussion in Villaba, San Isidro, Kananga and Ormoc City with key stakeholders.
- Conduct stakeholders' workshop to validate information and data collected through various methods.
- Pro-active and informed consultation with and participation of the key stakeholders in the evaluation process and the finalization of the report will be ensured.

Sex-disaggregated data will be collected and different needs of women and men will be considered through-out the evaluation process. At the completion of the field mission, a meeting will be organized by the Project with assistance from the ILO Country Office for Philippines to share the preliminary findings with local stakeholders in the project municipalities. The draft terms of reference for the evaluation and a draft evaluation report will be shared with relevant stakeholders

6. Deliverables

The evaluation team will provide:

1. A short inception report, including the work plan and details on methods, data sources, interviews, participatory methodologies, draft mission schedule and draft report format. This report should also provide a review of the available documents. It should set out the evaluation instruments (which include the key questions, participatory workshop and data gathering/and analysis methods) and any changes proposed to the methodology or any other issues of importance.
2. A power-point presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation mission at a stakeholders' meeting to be held at the end of the evaluation mission, for the purpose of providing the project's stakeholders a chance to jointly assess the adequacy of the findings and emerging recommendations as well as recommend areas for further considerations by the evaluators.
3. A draft evaluation report of no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ILO's 'Quality Checklists 4 and 5' for Evaluation Reports which will be provided to the evaluator.
4. A final evaluation report, which integrates comments from ILO and project stakeholders. The evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluator together with the finalised evaluation report.

The evaluation report should include

- Title page (**standard ILO template**)
- Table of contents
- Executive summary (**standard ILO template**)
- Acronyms
- Background and project description
- Purpose of evaluation
- Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
- Project status and findings by outcome and overall
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Lessons learnt and potential good practices (**please provide also template annex as per ILO guidelines on Evaluation lessons learnt and good practices**) and models of intervention
- Annexes (list of interviews, overview of meetings, proceedings stakeholder meetings, other relevant information)

The deliverables will be circulated to stakeholders by the evaluation manager and technical clearance for the deliverables will come from the evaluation manager. The evaluation report will be in English.

All draft and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided in electronic version compatible with WORD for Windows. Ownership of the data from the evaluation rests with the ILO. The copyright of the evaluation report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentation can only be made with notification and agreement by the ILO. Key stakeholders can make appropriate use of the evaluation report in line with the original purpose with appropriate acknowledgement

7. Management arrangement and workplan

The evaluation will be funded from the project budget. The evaluation is being managed by Ms. Pamornrat Pringsulaka, Evaluation Officer, based at the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. She will be in charge of developing the evaluation ToR, the selection of the consultants in consultation with ILO's Evaluation Office and in consultation with the ILO's Office in Manila.

ILO Manila Office and the project handles all contractual arrangements with the evaluation team and provide any logistical and other assistance as may be required.

The evaluation team reports to the evaluation manager. The team leader (or evaluator) is an international consultant selected through a competitive process from a list of available and qualified consultants. If required, a national consultant can be hired who will be chosen from a list of qualified consultants to assist the team leader.

The international consultant will lead the evaluation and will be responsible for delivering the above evaluation outputs using a combination of methods as mentioned above. The national consultant provides support to the team leader particularly during the evaluation mission as requested by the team leader. The national consultant reports to the evaluation team leader.

Specific tasks of the national consultant are as follows:

- To review relevant project documents;
- To provide support to the International consultant throughout the evaluation process particularly during the evaluation mission. This includes assisting in local language translation where necessary.
- To jointly facilitate the stakeholders workshop with the team leader; local beneficiaries and staff
- To contribute to the draft and finalization of the evaluation report to be written by the International consultant.

Evaluation team

- One independent international evaluation specialist with a relevant degree. He/she should have a proven track record in the evaluation of complex projects, experience with country situations similar to that of Philippines and with arrangements as used in the set-up of the current project.

Experience in a community-based employment intensive programme or project in a post crisis condition will be an advantage.

- One national consultant with expertise in environmental engineering or environmentally sustainable development models. Knowledge of the post conflict/ natural disaster mitigation programme and associated local institutions and government structures is required. Familiarity with employment creation and poverty reduction schemes in rural areas will be a distinct advantage.

Depending on the evaluation team, translators may be recruited to assist in interviewing community members.

Stakeholders' role: All stakeholders in Philippine particularly the project teams, ILO CO-Manila, DWT/CO-Bangkok, ILO technical unit at HQ, and donor will be consulted and will have opportunities to provide inputs to the TOR and draft final evaluation report.

The tasks of the Project: The project management will provide logistic support to the evaluation team and will assist in organising a detailed evaluation mission agenda. Also the project needs to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluation team.

Time frame and responsibilities (Tentative)

Task	Responsible person	Time frame
Preparation of the TOR –draft	Evaluation Manager	Oct 2014
Preparation of list of stakeholders with E-mail addresses	Project Manager	Nov. 15, 2014
Sharing the TOR with all concerned for comments/inputs	Project Manager Evaluation Manager	First week of Nov. 2014
Finalization of the TOR	Evaluation Manager	Mid Nov. 2014
Approval of the TOR	Evaluation Office	20 Nov. 2014
Selection of consultant and finalisation	Evaluation Manager/ Evaluation Office	Mid Nov. 2014
Draft mission itinerary for the evaluator and the list of key stakeholders to be interviewed	Project Manager	Mid Nov 2014
Ex-col contract based on the TOR prepared/signed	Project Manager /ILO Director, CO-Manila	24 Nov 2014
Brief evaluators on ILO evaluation policy	Evaluation Manager	End Nov. 2014
Inception report submitted to Evaluation	Evaluators	First week of Dec. 2014

Task	Responsible person	Time frame
Manager		
Evaluation Mission	Evaluators	Feb 1-8, 2015
Draft report submitted to Evaluation Manager	Evaluators	Feb 19, 2015
Sharing the draft report to all concerned for comments	Evaluation Manager	Feb 22, 2014 to mid - Mar 2015.
Consolidated comments on the draft report, send to the evaluator	Evaluation Manager	22 Mar 2015
Finalisation of the report and submission to Evaluation Manager	Evaluator	26 Mar 2015
Review of the final report	Evaluation Manage	29 Mar 2014
Submission of the final report to EVAL	Evaluation Manager	31 Mar 2015
Approval of the final evaluation report	Evaluation Office	Early Apr 2015

The evaluation is estimated at the total of 20 workdays for the evaluation team leader, and at 15 days for the national evaluator as indicated below:

Time frame	Tasks
Last week of November 2014	Desk review of documents and preparation of the inception report.
First week of Feb 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with ILO staff at ILO Manila Office • Field work in Ormoc with ILO and the project staff would prepare a programme of meetings that the consultants could amend to suit their needs. Visits to the affected municipalities would be arranged and facilitated by the project staff. Meetings with the stakeholders will be arranged so that the consultants could have a better understanding of the perspectives of the key stakeholders. • The evaluation team will review its findings and prepare a presentation on the preliminary findings, including verification of the findings with the project team. • End-of-evaluation mission stakeholder meeting and debriefing, including the presentation of the preliminary findings and associated discussion.

Feb 2015	Produce a draft report for submission to the evaluation manager. Receive comments from evaluation manager and finalise the report. Submit evaluation summary.
Mar 2015	Finalization of report

8. Resource required

The following resources are required from the projects:

- Cost of External International Evaluator (Fee+ travelling expenses) - 20 working days
- Cost of National Evaluator (Fee+ travelling expenses) – 14 working days

	Team leader	National Evaluator
Document reviews + inception report preparation	3 days	2 days
Mission	7 days	7 days
Drafting of report	8 days	4 days
Finalisation of report	2 days	1 day

- Cost of local transportation in the field
- Stakeholders' meeting

9. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Suggested Evaluation Criteria and analytical framework

Annex 2: Project Document with project performance framework/logframe

Annex 3: Tentative mission schedule

Annex 4: List of documents to be reviewed

Annex 5: List of ILO staff and key stakeholders to be interviewed

Annex 1: Suggested Criteria and Analytical framework

1) Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention

- To what extent have the Project contributed to a) the Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014? b) Typhoon Haiyan Response?; c) DFID overall response to Typhoon Haiyan
- Has the Project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients? Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units?
- The extent to which it has supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes, the needs and priorities of the ILO's social partners in Philippine and the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes?

2) Validity of design

- Was the project design realistic and adequate to meet the project objectives? To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners?
- Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?
- Was the capacity of various project's partners taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action? Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project?
- Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project?
- Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?

3) Project Effectiveness

- To what extent the project has achieved its objectives?
- What have been major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- Examine the effectiveness of project institutional framework, its management arrangement and coordination mechanism with other relevant ILO projects, and with other implementing partners (FAO and Save the Children)
- Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to changing situation on the ground or challenges faced

4) Efficiency

- Has the project been implemented in the most efficient way vis-à-vis its financial and human resources?
- Have activities been implemented in a cost efficient manner and have project objectives been achieved on-time and with planned budget?

5) Impact

- What has happened as a results of the project? To what extent the project has made its contribution to broader and longer term crisis response and decent work goal in the Philippine
- What real difference that the project has made to the ultimate beneficiaries, capacity of local authorities, and to gender equality?

6) Sustainability

- To what extent the project's benefit continue after the project ended?
- What are the major factors which will have or will influence the continuity of the project's benefit?

Annex 2: Project performance framework

(See enclosed)

Annex3: Tentative mission itinerary

Date/Time	Activity
Day 0	Arrive Manila
Day 1	Meeting with ILO colleagues in Manila Office
Day 2	Fly to Ormoc. Arrival in Ormoc, hotel billeting
Day 3	<p data-bbox="415 1224 716 1255">Briefing with Ormoc Team</p> <p data-bbox="415 1278 1211 1310">Meeting with partners (Save the Children, Food Agriculture Organization)</p> <p data-bbox="415 1339 1338 1398">Meeting with implementing partners: Emergency employment in Ormoc (DOLE, and National Irrigation Administration)</p>
Day 4	<p data-bbox="415 1486 630 1518">LGU and site visits</p> <p data-bbox="464 1547 570 1579"><u>San Isidro</u></p> <ol data-bbox="464 1608 1024 1686" style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Meeting with mayor, municipal agriculture officer 2) SALT & FMR sites in Basud 3) Meeting with farmer beneficiaries
Day 5	<p data-bbox="415 1745 630 1776">LGU and site visits</p> <p data-bbox="415 1801 513 1829"><u>Kananga</u></p>

Meeting with municipal agriculture officer

Debris clearing site in Sto Domingo

Meeting with beneficiaries

Ormoc City

De-silting of irrigation canals

Meeting with farmer beneficiaries

Day 6 **LGU and site visit**

Villaba

Meeting with mayor and municipal engineer

FMR rehab site

Meeting with beneficiaries

Skills training courses

Site visit at Calubian National Vocational School

Meeting with beneficiary-trainees

Day 7 **Fly back to Manila**

Day 8 **Stakeholders Meeting/debriefing with the team in Manila**

Annex 4: List of documents to be reviewed

- Government's Recovery Assistance to Yolanda (RAY) Plan
- Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan
- ILO Conceptual Framework on Typhoon Haiyan Integrated Livelihood Approach
- Project Document on "Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan"

- Progress Reports
- Mission Reports
- List and Profiles of Sub-Project Reports implemented under the project
- Sub-Project Accomplishment Reports per Implementing Partner
- Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) Report

Annex 5: List of ILO staff and key stakeholders to be interviewed

- Lawrence Jeff Johnson, ILO Country Director
- Simon Hills, Disaster Response and Livelihoods Development Officer
- Ruth Georget, Technical Cooperation and Coordination Officer/former Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster Coordinator
- Jonathan Price, Chief Technical Adviser
- Chris Donnges, Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Investment. (by skype – please contact donnges@ilo.org)
- Ayako Kaino, Early Recovery and Livelihood Officer
- Martha Espano, National Programme Officer
- Representatives from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Save the Children (StC) on field and in Manila
- Community Leaders and Local Partners

Annex 6: All relevant ILO evaluation guidelines and standard templates

Code of conduct form (To be signed by the evaluators)

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206205/lang--en/index.htm

Checklist No. 3 Writing the inception report

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165972/lang--en/index.htm

Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm

Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm

Template for lessons learnt and Emerging Good Practices

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206158/lang--en/index.htm

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206159/lang--en/index.htm

Guidance note 7 Stakeholders participation in the ILO evaluation

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm

Guidance note 4 Integrating gender equality in M&E of projects

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm

Template for evaluation title page

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_166357/lang--en/index.htm

Template for evaluation summary:

<http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-summary-en.doc>



INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

INCEPTION REPORT

(less ToR)

**Independent Final Evaluation of
Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and
food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming
communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan
(PHI/14/01/UKM)**

Type of Evaluation: Independent Final Evaluation

Administrative Unit: ILO Country Office for the Philippines

Technical Unit: Employment Intensive Investment Programme

Donor country: UK Government

Project Budget: US\$1,636,570

Date project ends: 28 February 2015

Evaluation Manager: Pamornrat Pringsulaka

Name of international consultant: John G. Connell

Name of national consultant: Arvy Orígenes

Date of the evaluation: October 2014 - March 2015

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CLGU	City Local Government Unit
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
MLGU	Local Government Unit
MT	Metric Tons
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NIA	National Irrigation Administration
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLGU	Provincial Local Government Unit
ROAP - Bangkok	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
SC	Save the Children
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority

1. Rationale and Objectives of the Evaluation

1.1 For all ILO projects and as indicated in the standard ILO evaluation policy, it is mandatory to conduct at least one independent evaluation for projects implemented with budget of more than US\$1-million, hence the impetus for this evaluation exercise.

1.2 As set out under sections 3 and 4 of the Terms of Reference, central to the conduct of the independent final evaluation is the assessment of the following: a) key achievements of the project as per project framework; b) the extent of sustainability of the project's benefits; c) the extent to which project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project; and d) the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful. Evaluation of the results in terms of their prospects for sustainability and impact shall encompass the economic, environmental and social change arising from the project interventions. It is also aimed to highlight forward looking recommendations to improve future performance, sustainability, lessons learnt and good practices.

Criteria, Scope, and Client of the Evaluation

1.4 The evaluation shall comply with the norms, standards, and ethical safeguards set out in ILO's evaluation procedures as well as the OECD-DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. In compliance with these standards, the evaluation criteria to be employed in the assessment of the project are set out, viz:

Table 1: Evaluation Criteria¹¹

Main Cluster of Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Criteria	Definition
1. Performance of the Project	1.1 Relevance and strategic fit	Extent to which the project is in line with the local needs and priorities, national and local plans and policies, and post-disaster reconstruction and rebuilding plans
	1.2 Validity of the project design	Extent to which the design is logical and coherent
	1.3 Project effectiveness	Extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.
	1.4 Efficiency of resource use	Extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, benefits commensurate with inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an

¹¹ Sources: Evaluating Humanitarian Actions using OECD-DAC Criteria, 2006; ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-based Evaluation, 2nd Ed., 2013; IFAD Methodological Framework for Evaluation, 2003

Main Cluster of Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Criteria	Definition
		output to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.
2. Impact on target groups	2.1 Impact orientation and sustainability of the intervention	<p>The strategic orientation of the project towards making a significant contribution to broader, long-term, sustainable development changes.</p> <p>The likelihood that the results of the intervention are durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed.</p>
3. Institutional Partnerships	-	Extent to which collaboration and complementation amongst the partners has benefitted the project; value added of the partnership

In addition, the evaluation will also look into the extent to which the project has addressed the following cross-cutting themes:

- Application of results-based management;
- Gender equality;
- Adoption of human rights-based approach;
- Capacity development;
- Environmental sustainability.

1.5 As set out under Section 4 of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation is directed to give evidence-based findings on the following factors (which for purposes of the inception report) are grouped per main cluster of the evaluation criteria:

On the project performance	<p>the extent to which the final progress has been made in relation to the planned achievements of the results and the immediate objectives;</p> <p>the effectiveness of the measures taken to ensure results-based management in the project implementation;</p> <p>the extent of the effectiveness of the project management, coordination mechanisms among various stakeholders in the project areas including: a) coordination with other ILO projects that respond to typhoon Haiyan; b) coordination with FAO and Save the Children;</p>
On the Impact on target groups	<p>project experiences that can be learnt with regard to promoting decent work, gender equality, rural access and environmental sustainability, promoting indigenous knowledge and skills;</p> <p>the project's direct and indirect impact across socio-economic variables as well as environmental variables;</p>

	the feasibility and scope for the replication of the activities demonstrated by the projects and well received by the ultimate beneficiaries.
On the institutional partnerships	<p>the added value of partnering with FAO and Save the children; the extent to which the collaboration or complementation efforts of FAO and Save the Children benefitted the project, the community, and ILO;</p> <p>the institutional arrangements and capacities within the Governments at various levels to monitor the implementation of the projects during and beyond the timeframe of funding;</p>

1.6 The utility of the evaluation results is specifically directed at promoting accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO.

1.7 The scope of the evaluation shall cover all the components' activities and results specific to the project covering the period from February 2014 to February 2015. It is significant to note that the project is originally slated to end in December 2014, but a no cost extension for two months (from 01 January to 28 February 2015) was appropriated by the United Kingdom - DFID. This is in consideration of the unforeseen occurrence of Typhoon Ruby (international name Hagupit) that hit the Central Visayas on 4-7 December 2014 affecting the project areas.

1.8 Physical coverage of the evaluation shall encompass all project sites that ILO has worked in. ILO's institutional partners in the project implementation (i.e. FAO and SC) may be involved when assessing the impact of their combined initiative.

1.9 The clients of the evaluation are the ILO Country Office and Project Team; Technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and Headquarters; tripartite constituents; and the donor (DFID).

NOTE: The previous versión of this inception report reflected earlier dates for the conduct of the evaluation mission from 7 to 15 December 2014. Due to fortuitous event as a result of Typhoon Ruby that struck Central Visayas in early December 2014, the mission was indefinitely postponed until it was ascertained safe to resume activities on the ground.

In early January, the ILO-CO Manila finalized the schedule for the evaluation mission set at 2-10 February 2015 upon concurrence with the evaluators. This revised inception report reflect the adjusted schedule for the entire evaluation mission and respective itineraries of the evaluators.

2. Context of the Evaluation¹²

2.1 Categorized as one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) made its landfall on 08 November 2013 in the Philippines and wrought catastrophic damage throughout Samar and Leyte in the Visayas, not to mention the overwhelming devastation in Tacloban City brought about by the storm surge. The NDRRMC reported that to date it was the costliest Philippine typhoon with total estimated damages pegged at US\$2.02-Billion (PhP89.6-Billion).

2.2 The agriculture sector was severely affected with Government estimates for damages pegged at 600-hundred hectares of agriculture areas, with 1.1-million MT of crops lost, of which 80 percent had been reported in Region VIII. Urgent attention in terms of vegetative debris clearing, cleaning and replanting was appropriated, including 80 kilometers of communal irrigation canals that needed desilting.

2.3 An estimated 5.6-million workers were directly affected by the typhoon of which 40 percent (2.2-million) are women. Further, 44 percent (2.4-million) of those affected were vulnerably employed with limited income and have little or no access to social security prior to the disaster. Of the vulnerable workers, 52 percent were from the agriculture sector, 42 percent from service sector and the remaining 6 percent from industry.

2.4 Vulnerable workers had either entirely or partially lost their livelihoods and sources of income. In the province of Leyte, an estimated 446-thousand families and 2.4-million persons of which 940-thousand were affected. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment was seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups in order to make up for the lost sources of income and livelihood. The rice and corn farmers were identified to belong amongst the group of vulnerable workers.

3. Project Description

Integrated Approach of ILO, FAO, SC

3.1 The ILO and FAO, as co-leads of the FSAC and of the Livelihoods and Early Recovery Cluster respectively, with SC as a member, identified and prioritized activities that support and complement those indicated in the response plans of their government counterparts (i.e. DOLE, DA, and DSWD). Those activities were aligned with or filled the gaps where the government needed further assistance to meet the identified needs of the affected vulnerable populations.

¹² Facts and figures mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 are mostly derived from the Terms of Reference

3.2 The integrated approach of ILO-FAO-SC was directed at responding to the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team’s Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan specifically Strategic Objective 1: *“Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services”*; and Strategic Objective 3: *“Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries”*.

3.3 A portfolio of immediate and longer-term livelihood support was provided to the targeted small scale rice and corn farming communities. It was however stressed that these joint efforts of the three institutions can address only a portion of the response gap. Responsibilities per institutions were defined to complement each other as outlined on the table below:

Table 2: Institutional Responsibilities

FAO	Responsible for the provision of the inputs and training for intercropping and alternative agricultural subsistence and income-generating activities to help restore food self-sufficiency, food sources, and restart livelihoods of small-scale rice and corn farmers.
ILO	Responsible for the provision of emergency employment for immediate income generation along with tools and materials, and additional skills training on alternative non-agriculture livelihood activities to poor and vulnerable rice and corn growing households whose sources of employment and livelihoods were destroyed.
SC	Responsible for the provision of immediate cash support to vulnerable community members who will be unable to participate in emergency employment activities and will not receive agricultural inputs (including pregnant and/or lactating females, elderly, differently-abled individuals, child-headed households, among others) as well as conditional cash grants and business skills training to small scale market traders to support market development.

3.4 Overall objective of the integrated approach is to contribute to the development impact as *“Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the four (4) selected municipalities”*.

ILO Component’s Objectives and Management

3.5 For the ILO component, the UK Government appropriated funding support worth US\$1.6-million for the implementation of the project -- “Generating Emergency Employment and Recovering Sustainable Livelihoods”.

Table 3: Immediate Objectives of the ILO Component

Immediate Objective 1	Emergency employment creation through the clearing of debris and fallen trees, and preparation of cleared land for rice and corn fields.
Immediate Objective 2	Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production.
Immediate Objective 3	Skills training provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women.

3.6 The ILO-CTA based in Manila has the overall responsibility for all ILO projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, assisted by an Early Recovery and Livelihood Specialist. For the DFID funded project, the ILO Field Office based in Ormoc City is directly managed by a National Project Officer supported by a Skills Specialist and Admin/Finance Clerk. A Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work Support Team in Bangkok provides technical backstopping while ILO Manila provides administrative support to the project.


Project time line

3.7 *(The complete set of relevant project documents, specifically monitoring and quarterly progress reports, were not yet furnished to the National Consultant as of this writing. Details for this particular section shall be filled out and integrated in the draft evaluation report).*

Project Sites and Maps

3.8 The project covers 35 barangays across three (3) municipalities and one (1) city: Kananga, San Isidro, Villaba, and Ormoc-- all are located in the Province of Leyte.

Map¹³ 1: Municipalities of Kananga, San Isidro, and Villaba



¹³ Source: UN-OCHA Reference Map for typhoon Haiyan as of 19 November 2013

Map 2: Ormoc City



List of Sub-projects Implemented

3.9 *(The complete set of relevant project documents, specifically sub-project profiles, monitoring and quarterly progress reports were not yet furnished to the National Consultant as of this writing. Details for this particular section shall be filled out and integrated in the draft evaluation report).*

Key Elements of the Project Strategy

3.10 The key strategies employed in the project operations are:

- identification of severely affected rice and corn farmers through consultations with stakeholders at different levels
- use of local resource based methods to ensure optimum labour content, good productivity standards and improve agriculture production areas with quality and sustainable support infrastructures
- help ensure that affected rice and corn farmers recover during coming production season by providing inputs and through clearing of debris and preparation of farm lands
- provide on-site hands-on training for workers engaged in recovery and construction works, ensuring that women and able-bodied youth are able to participate.
- create work through community sub-contracting (whenever applicable) modalities
- inject cash into the local economy through payment of wages and local purchase of materials and services
- develop the work in the context of climate change adaptation especially in the agriculture production areas, to build resilience of the communities and local governments
- demonstrate productive partnership among members of the livelihood cluster and harmonize approaches with that of the UN agencies' standards

Stakeholders Analysis

3.11 As indicated in ILOs Policy Guidelines for Evaluations, stakeholders are determined by their involvement in design and delivery of the project being evaluated. For purposes of this evaluation, the stakeholders' involvement is twofold: 1) as participants in the project planning, design, and implementation; and 2) as primary informants.

Table 4: Stakeholders Analysis

Stakeholder	Interest in the Project	Involvement in the Evaluation	Who
ILO INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS			
ILO Country Office	Responsible for the planning at the country level and implementation of the project, is an important stakeholder of this evaluation. Has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making.	Main Stakeholder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key informant • Main user of the evaluation results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country Director • Dep. Country Director • M&E • Project Unit • Adfin/Logistics
Project Manager / Project Management Office	Responsible for the planning at the project level as well as for the execution of project activities. Accountable to ILO as well as to the beneficiaries and partners for the performance and project results.	Main Stakeholder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key Informant • Main user of the evaluation results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Manager
ROAP - Bangkok	Responsible for providing technical backstopping to the project. Has an interest in learning from the project experiences as basis for the furtherance of the strategies to be employed in similar projects across other country offices.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main user of the evaluation results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional M&E Officer • Regional technical advisor
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS			
Local government units; regional and local government agencies	The PLGU of Leyte, CLGU of Ormoc, MLGUs of Kanaga, San Isidro and Villaba, and the regional and local counterparts of DOLE, DA and DSWD have a direct interest in the alignment of the ILO activities with their local plans and priorities. Harmonization of project deliverables with the reconstruction and rehabilitation actions of these agencies is central to the integrated approach toward full recovery. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest.	Main stakeholder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information to the evaluation team in regard to extent of their partnership with ILO and sustainability of relevant assets created through the project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local officials (P/M/CLGUs; Head and/or technical staff of DSWD, DA, DOLE, NIA, TESDA)
Beneficiaries	Regional agencies provide support in scaling up intervention process between various development actors. Have stake in the appropriateness and effectiveness of the ILO project as ultimate recipients of the support/assistance provided. Maximum level of their participation (women and men across different groups, tribe, age, gender) in the evaluation is determined in that their respective perspectives will be sought.	Main Stakeholder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receivers of assistance through the project. • Provide information as key sources of insights on relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community members; • community or neighborhood associations/organizations contracted by the project
International and national NGO partner/s	INGO/s and NGOs are ILO's partners in the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own respective interventions.	Main Stakeholder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information to the evaluation team • Value added of the partnership shall be of particular interest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country director and/or Technical staff of ILO partner/s specifically SC
UN Country team	The results of the evaluation shall inform future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships. The Cluster Approach provides for a coherent and complementary action among humanitarian actors working in the disaster-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information to the evaluation team • Value added of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO

Stakeholder	Interest in the Project	Involvement in the Evaluation	Who
	affected area. ILO operation is thus expected to harmonize with and contribute to these concerted efforts.	partnership will be of particular interest	
Donors	FAO and ILO are direct partners at policy and activity levels in this project. ILO operations are funded by a number of donors. The latter have interest in knowing whether their funds were efficiently spent and whether ILO's implementation has been effective and has contributed to their own strategies and programmes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information to the evaluation team • Users of the evaluation results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID-UK
Other Donors	Value for money shall be of particular interest. Not funding the project but working in the same area where ILO operates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information to the evaluation team 	

4. Evaluation Principles, Methodological Framework for Evaluation

Evaluation Principles

4.1 Specifically indicated under Section 5 of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation shall comply with evaluation norms and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD-DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

4.2 In order to enhance usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation will be adopted. A combination of tools and methods will be used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time will be allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information.

Framework for Evaluation

4.5 The evaluation matrix or analytical framework for the final evaluation of the project set out in the Terms of Reference shall guide the assessment of each strategic component of the project. The evaluation will address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation.

4.6 As previously emphasized, the methodological framework comprised of a set of criteria which are assessed by asking a number of key questions. The criteria have their origin in the OECD-DAC Evaluation Guide for Humanitarian Agencies and are consistent with the emerging consensus on evaluation criteria amongst international development institutions. The use of the same criteria, for this particular exercise, and across all other evaluations of ILO projects, intends to help reduce variations in approaches and reporting

format among evaluators and evaluations. It is reckoned that consistency in the application of this methodological framework ensures that project results are systematically assessed, performance and implementation modality are comparable across projects and project components/categories, generic lessons are more easily identified and a consolidation of the performance and results of a group of similar projects (i.e. humanitarian context) implemented by ILO evaluated periodically is more feasibly provided.

4.7 As specifically set out in Annex 1 of the Terms of Reference, the set of questions under each criterion to be addressed by the evaluation is noted, viz:

4.7.1 Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention

- To what extent have the Project contributed to a) the Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014? b) Typhoon Haiyan Response?; c) DFID overall response to Typhoon Haiyan
- Has the Project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients? Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units?
- The extent to which it has supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes, the needs and priorities of the ILO's social partners in Philippine and the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes?

4.7.2 Validity of design

- Was the project design realistic and adequate to meet the project objectives? To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners?
- Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?
- Was the capacity of various project's partners taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action? Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project?
- Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project?
- Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?

4.7.3 Project Effectiveness

- To what extent the project has achieved its objectives?
- What have been major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- Examine the effectiveness of project institutional framework, its management arrangement and coordination mechanism with other relevant ILO projects, and with other implementing partners (FAO and Save the Children)
- Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to changing situation on the ground or challenges faced

4.7.4 Efficiency

- Has the project been implemented in the most efficient way vis-à-vis its financial and human resources?
- Have activities been implemented in a cost efficient manner and have project objectives been achieved on-time and with planned budget?

4.7.5 Impact

- What has happened as a results of the project? To what extent the project has made its

contribution to broader and longer team crisis response and decent work goal in the Philippine

- What real difference that the project has made to the ultimate beneficiaries, capacity of local authorities, and to gender equality?

4.7.6 Sustainability

- To what extent the project's benefit continue after the project ended?
- What are the major factors which will have or will influence the continuity of the project's benefit?

Evaluation Methodology

4.8 The evaluation will include three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the Inception Phase; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholder and direct observation; (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings.

4.9 Prior to the beginning of the mission the international consultant took advantage of other travel to obtain a briefing with the evaluation manager (Ms Pamornrat Pringsulaka) and technical operations specialist (Mr. Chris Donnges) in Bangkok.

4.9.1 Desk study: The desk study phase aims will be used by the Evaluation Team to familiarize themselves with the progress of the work to date and to identify documents and field sites where data can be collected that will answer the evaluation questions listed above. The documents in this desk review included:

- the initial project document, progress reports, technical assessments and reports, project monitoring and evaluation documents;
- Strategic Response Plan and other related documents of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); Humanitarian Country Team (HCT); and the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster that is co-led by the ILO and UNDP;
- Technical products (training manuals, technical guidelines, etc) and other publications used or developed by the project (if any)
- Other relevant document such as the Decent Work Agenda of the Philippines; the Central Emergency Response Fund; the National employment Policy and Programme Strategy; National Laws and Regulations on employment; an Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plan 2013-14; the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team's Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response; UNDAF-Philippines 2012-18; and the Philippine Development Plan 2011-16;

The first set of documents above illustrates already likely achievement of key outputs for all three interventions, while at the same time challenges in the complexity of implementation, including team management; timely and transparent delivery of resources; alternate technical perspectives (SALT); mismatch in supply and demand for agriculture products that can affect targeting of activity. The reports indicate that the team has been alert to constraints and flexible in identifying new opportunities, a characteristic certainly necessary in such an operating environment.

While these documents have provided data and insights into the program, they also lead to a request by the Evaluation Team to collate additional data, where it is available either in Manila or on site.

- Site based (San Isidro, Kananga, Villaba, Ormoc) summary of activities. This could be in a simple matrix type of activity (emergency employment; sustainable livelihood recovery; Skills Training/Enterprise Development); actual activity; status; partner agency.
- Map of the sites where activities conducted (sites could be added by hand)
- Record of employment and disbursements, insurance etc. and photos of sites and activity (before/after)
- Technical document for implementing procedures (eg criteria of site selection for emergency employment; market value-chain studies leading to selection of training, etc.); training content

4.9.2 Interviews and Meetings: Interviews with ILO staff (ILO-CO Manila; Project Unit in Ormoc) is crucial part of the evaluation methodology. Many will be done on an ad hoc basis to pursue specific lines of enquiry to strengthen the validity of findings.

List of ILO staff and key stakeholders to be interviewed:

Lawrence Jeff Johnson	ILO Country Director
Simon Hills	Disaster Response and Livelihoods Development Officer
Ruth Georget	Technical Cooperation and Coordination Officer
Jonathan Price	Chief Technical Adviser
Ayako Kaino	Early Recovery and Livelihood Officer
Martha Espano	National Programme Officer
***Representatives from FAO and SC in Manila and on field	
***Community Leaders and Local Partners	

*** to be identified during the actual field mission

4.9.3 Field Visits: The objective of the field visit is twofold: a) to conduct focus group discussions with key stakeholders in pre-identified project sites (Villaba, San Isidro, Kananga and Ormoc City); b) to validate and enrich initial findings and generate new information that will further substantiate conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations. Sex-disaggregated data will be collected and different needs of women and men will be considered throughout the evaluation process.

There is currently difficulty in arranging visit to sites in Kananga, and so it is not included in the itinerary as all activity types can be inspected at the other sites. However, the field reports indicate it was perhaps the first site for activities to be mobilized, and is a dynamic market centre. The team will travel through Kananga and thus it may be possible to still adjust the program or visit opportunistically.

The site visits where ever possible should be arranged at the site of the work or training itself rather than transporting the beneficiaries to a central point. The composition of the focus groups will also be important. Where possible these should be composed of: (a) 1-2 community leaders; (b) 5-6 general beneficiaries; (c) 2-3 other community members whose HHs were not direct beneficiaries.

4.9.4 Stakeholders' Workshop/consultations: for purposes of the evaluation, stakeholders are those organizations, groups or individuals with direct interest in the project. Identification of the stakeholders is already plotted in this report (Table 4), and will further be refined during the evaluation process in order to obtain a range of perspectives and ensure that they have significant participation in the study. It will not be possible to conduct a stakeholder workshop as detailed in the ToR (Annex 1, section 5#) due to the revised itinerary (Tables 5,6). However the team will with each stakeholder meet, express the main points understood back to the stakeholders for confirmation and to allow them to express their own assessment.

At the completion of the field mission, a meeting will be organized by the project with assistance from the ILO-CO for Philippines to share the preliminary findings with local stakeholders in the project sites. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation and the draft evaluation report will be shared with the stakeholders.

4.9.5 Sampling Procedure¹⁴ : Given the geographical spread of the project sites, duration of the evaluation mission, and resources available the definitive sites to be visited are determined through purposive sampling. Same procedure applies to the following: a) stakeholder sampling; b) criterion sampling (ILO thematic interest or strategic objectives); c) case sampling (Typical; Paradigmatic (success); Decisive (critical for decision making); Negative or disconfirming (unique); Extreme or Deviant).

4.9.6 Data collection and key questions: The Evaluation team has prepared a data collection plan and this is included as Annex I. While this indicates data to be collected against each of the evaluation questions, in the operation of the evaluation itself, the team will be meeting three levels of stakeholders and during interactions with each must be strategic ensuring all evaluation questions are addressed. The key question to be used with each group of stakeholders has been operationalised and is included as Annex II.

5. Evaluation Team Composition and Management Arrangement

5.1 The team is comprised of two evaluators, one international evaluator in this case team leader, and one national consultant. The evaluation team reports to the evaluation manager based in ILO-ROAP in Bangkok.

¹⁴ IR for Post-Bopha Project Evaluation, 2014

International senior evaluation specialist and team leader: The Team Leader will lead the evaluation to accomplish the Evaluation Terms of Reference and will take overall responsibility for planning and supervising all stages of the evaluation exercise from inception phase to crafting the final evaluation report and carry out specific parts of the work directly. He takes responsibility for ensuring the appropriateness, adherence to deadlines and quality of all the reports produced by the evaluation team in line with the standards of the ILO evaluation policy.

National Consultant: The national consultant reports directly to the Team Leader and will provide support to the latter particularly during the evaluation mission.

5.2 Specific Tasks of the International Consultant

Inception phase:

- Review relevant documentation
- Oversee and contribute to design of methodology.
- Develop the inception tools that take into account the country context, ILO's corporate policy and strategic plans, and goals and objectives of the operation to be evaluated. This includes leading the development of an evaluation matrix based on the terms of reference for the evaluation that sets out the evaluation questions, sources of data and evidence, and data collection means.
- Review existing data from ILO and secondary sources to determine how much data exists, the extent of use to respond to the questions in the evaluation matrix, and to identify how much and what type of data collection is necessary during the main phase of the evaluation.
- Review the geographical distribution of activities in the field and develop selection criteria on the basis of which site visits will be conducted.
- Lead development of the evaluation work plan.
- Draft the evaluation tools according to templates and technical notes provided by the ILO evaluation policy and revise it, if necessary, after it has been quality checked by the evaluation manager.

Field phase:

- Lead the evaluation mission and represent the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders;
- Lead, review and summarize documentary evidence, highlighting issues and questions for follow-up during fieldwork;
- Lead, identify and conduct field work, distribution of tasks and participate in all evaluation activities related to livelihood and resilience building aspects of the evaluation.
- Develop a format for short presentation of main findings at end of the field mission, including an elaborated feedback (PowerPoint)

Reporting phase:

- Develop the Evaluation Report (draft and final) with the contribution of the national evaluator.
- Consolidate all inputs into one coherent and cohesive evaluation report, facilitating agreement amongst the team on the findings, conclusions and recommendations;
- Present main findings and conclusions at required debriefing workshops;
- Produce the final report, amended in response to comments from stakeholders and deliver all the required reports and other outputs on time to the client.

5.3 Specific Tasks of the National Consultant

Inception phase:

- Provide additional inputs or suggestions on the field agenda and methodological sections, including evaluation matrix, sampling, data collection tools, once they have been drafted by the TL
- Provide knowledge and overview on key structured project literature (guided by the evaluation TL): project documents, key progress reports, monitoring information


Field phase:

- Facilitate attainment of the field agenda and co-administer methodological sections, including evaluation matrix, sampling, data collection tools, once they have been drafted by the TL
- Co-facilitate knowledge management and overview on key structured Literature (guided by the evaluation TL): project documents, key progress reports, monitoring information
- Communicate with the TL on contextual/local aspects (culture, customs, norms, language, gender and other relevant issues) to be considered during the field phase
- Participate in field mission (fine tuning of the evaluation tools, data collection, contextual/local aspects taken into consideration, analysis and organisation for the draft report)
- Contribute to the presentation of main findings at end of the field mission (PowerPoint)

Reporting phase:

- Provide a summary of the evaluation mission results that will feed into the draft evaluation report.

5.4 Timeline (tentative)



5.5 Evaluation Mission Schedule for the International Consultant

Table 5: Field Itinerary for the International Consultant from 02 to 09 February 2015

Date	Itinerary	Time	Purpose
Arrival in Manila and Courtesy visit at ILO Country office			
01/02/2015; Sunday	Arrival in Manila		Conduct independent evaluation
	Check-in at hotel		
02/02/2015; Monday	Courtesy call to ILO CO Manila Director, Deputy Director; Meeting with ILO colleagues	9:00 p.m. - 10:00 a.m.	Provide overview of evaluation activities; Elicit information about the
	Meeting with AdFin personnel for Administrative matters (i.e. itinerary, DSA, etc.)	10:00 a.m. - 12:00 am	Project Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits
	Courtesy call to FAO, Save the Children	1:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.	Provide overview of evaluation activities; Elicit information about the Project and joint activities
03/02/2015; Tuesday	Fly from Manila to Tacloban	-	
	Arrival in Tacloban; Proceed land trip to Ormoc City with the national consultant; arrival in Ormoc; Hotel billeting	-	
	Meeting with Ormoc Team to be led by Martha Espano	-	Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits
Field Visits (Project Sites)			
04/02/2015; Wednesday	Meeting with partners (Save the Children)- Mykiel Parcho Venue: Save the Children Office - Ormoc City	9:00 -10:30am	KII (information gathering)
	Meeting with implementing partner (DOLE West Leyte) - Ms. Marites Vinas Venue: DOLE Office Ormoc City	10:30-12:00nn	KII (information gathering)
	Lunch	12:00 - 1:00pm	

Date	Itinerary	Time	Purpose
	Meeting with partner (FAO) - Retchel Sasing, Dr. Dario Huelgas Venue: FAO Office Ormoc City	1:00 - 2:30pm	KII (information gathering)
	Meeting with Implementing partners (National Irrigation Administration) - Engr. Haydee Dimpal Venue: NIA Office, Ormoc City	2:40-4:30pm	KII (information gathering)
05/02/2015; Thursday	LGU and site visit in San Isidro Travel to San Isidro	7:30-9:00am	Information gathering; field observation
	Discussion with Mayor Susan and MAO; Discussion with SALT beneficiaries	9:00-12:00pm	Information gathering; field observation
	Travel to Calubian, Leyte	1:00 - 1:30pm	
	Meeting with Skills training beneficiaries (Food processing Ormoc)	1:30 - 2:30pm	Information gathering, field observation
	Meeting with TESDA	2:30 - 3:30pm	
	Travel to Ormoc	3:30 - 5:30pm	
06/02/2014; Friday	Travel to Villaba	8:30 - 9:00am	Field observation; data gathering
	Field Visits	9:00 - 10:30am	
	Meeting with skills training beneficiaries of handicraft production (bamboo-based)	10:30 - 12:00pm	
	Travel to Kananga	1:00 - 1:30pm	
	Meeting with community beneficiaries of debris clearing in Sto. Domingo	1:00 - 2:30pm	
07/02/2015; Saturday	LGU field visits (SALT site and de-silting of irrigation canals) Site 1: Barangay Cabintan (CALCOA and SCAVFA) Site 2: De-silting of irrigation Canals	8:00 - 12:00nn	Field observation; data gathering
	Lunch	12:00 - 1:00pm	

Date	Itinerary	Time	Purpose
	Venue: Ormoc Villa	1:00 - 3:00pm	Debriefing, other matters...
	Travel to Tacloban	3:00 - 5:00pm	Travel to Tacloban City
08/02/2015; Sunday	Fly from Tacloban to Manila; arrival in Manila; Hotel Billeting		
09/02/2015; Monday	Exit meeting with ILO CO Manila Director, Deputy Director, & ILO colleagues	1:00 - 3:00pm	Provide overview of evaluation accomplishments; preliminary findings
10/02/2015	Fly from Manila to home base	-	

5.6 Evaluation Mission Schedule for the National Consultant

Table 6: Field Itinerary for the National Consultant from 02 to 07 February 2015

Date	Itinerary	Time	Purpose
02/02/2015 Monday	Fly from Davao to Cebu	9:05 - 10am	en route to Tacloban City
	Fly from Cebu to Tacloban	1:35-2:25pm	
	Arrival in Tacloban; Hotel billeting		
03/02/2015 Tuesday	Land trip to Ormoc with the International Consultant; arrival in Ormoc; Hotel billeting	-	en route to Ormoc City for the series of field visits, etc.
	Meeting with Ormoc Team to be led by Martha Espano	-	Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits
Field Visits (Project Sites)			
04/02/2015; Wednesday	Meeting with partners (Save the Children)- Mykiel Parcho Venue: Save the Children Office - Ormoc City	9:00 -10:30am	KII (information gathering)
	Meeting with implementing partner (DOLE West Leyte) - Ms. Marites Vinas Venue: DOLE Office Ormoc City	10:30-12:00nn	KII (information gathering)
	Lunch	12:00 - 1:00pm	
	Meeting with partner (FAO) - Retchel Sasing, Dr. Dario Huelgas Venue: FAO Office Ormoc City	1:00 - 2:30pm	KII (information gathering)
	Meeting with Implementing partners (National Irrigation Administration) - Engr. Haydee Dimpal Venue: NIA Office, Ormoc City	2:40-4:30pm	KII (information gathering)

Date	Itinerary	Time	Purpose
05/02/2015; Thursday	LGU and site visit in San Isidro Travel to San Isidro	7:30-9:00am	Information gathering; field observation
	Discussion with Mayor Susan and MAO; Discussion with SALT beneficiaries	9:00-12:00pm	Information gathering; field observation
	Travel to Calubian, Leyte	1:00 - 1:30pm	
	Meeting with Skills training beneficiaries (Food processing Ormoc)	1:30 - 2:30pm	Information gathering, field observation
	Meeting with TESDA	2:30 - 3:30pm	
	Travel to Ormoc	3:30 - 5:30pm	
06/02/2014; Friday	Travel to Villaba	8:30 - 9:00am	Field observation; data gathering
	Field Visits	9:00 - 10:30am	
	Meeting with skills training beneficiaries of handicraft production (bamboo-based)	10:30 - 12:00pm	
	Travel to Kananga	1:00 - 1:30pm	
	Meeting with community beneficiaries of debris clearing in Sto. Domingo	1:00 - 2:30pm	
07/02/2015; Saturday	LGU field visits (SALT site and de-silting of irrigation canals) Site 1: Barangay Cabintan (CALCOA and SCAVFA) Site 2: De-silting of irrigation Canals	8:00 - 12:00nn	Field observation; data gathering
	Lunch	12:00 - 1:00pm	
	Venue: Ormoc Villa	1:00 - 3:00pm	Debriefing, other matters...
	Travel to Tacloban	3:00 - 5:00pm	Travel to Tacloban City
08/02/2015; Sunday	Tacloban - Cebu	6:20am	Enroute to home base
	Cebu - Davao	11:30am	

6. Deliverables of the Evaluation Team

6.1 As provided under Section 6 of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation team is tasked to deliver the following:

6.1.1 A short inception report, including the work plan and details on methods, data sources, interviews, participatory methodologies, draft mission schedule and draft report format. This report should also provide a review of the available documents. It should set out the evaluation instruments (which include the key questions, participatory workshop and data gathering/and analysis methods) and any changes proposed to the methodology or any other issues of importance.

6.1.2 A power-point presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation mission at a stakeholders' meeting to be held at the end of the evaluation mission, for the purpose of providing the project's stakeholders a chance to jointly assess the adequacy of the findings and emerging recommendations as well as recommend areas for further considerations by the evaluators.

6.1.3 A draft evaluation report of no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ILO's 'Quality Checklists 4 and 5' for Evaluation Reports which will be provided to the evaluator.

6.1.4 A final evaluation report, which integrates comments from ILO and project stakeholders. The evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluator together with the finalised evaluation report.

The evaluation report shall include the following:

- Title page (**standard ILO template**)
- Table of contents
- Executive summary (**standard ILO template**)
- Acronyms
- Background and project description
- Purpose of evaluation
- Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
- Project status and findings by outcome and overall
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Lessons learnt and potential good practices (**please provide also template annex as per ILO guidelines on Evaluation lessons learnt and good practices**) and models of intervention
- Annexes (list of interviews, overview of meetings, proceedings stakeholder meetings, other relevant information)

7. Limitations, etc

7.1 The resource envelope for this evaluation and tight timescale infer that data collection will be restricted to single-visit interviews. This implies that most of the information to be collected will be based on memory recall of the respondents and shall be triangulated (cross-validated) with the facts and evidences gathered through desk review and field visits.

7.2 The project ends at the end of December, to date the final progress report has not yet been prepared hence less access to systematized information, a significant limitation given the tight timescale of the evaluation mission (20 days for the international consultant; 14 days for the national consultant).

7.3 The evaluability will depend on the accuracy of the monitoring information. This increases the need for triangulation across relevant/available sources and references.

ANNEXES

II. Data Collection Plan Worksheet

Evaluation Questions	Indicator	Sources of Data?	Method?	Who Will Collect?	How Often?	Cost?	Who will analyze?
1 To what extent has the Project contributed to a) Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014 (PHAP); b) Typhoon Haiyan Response; c) DFID overall response to typhoon Haiyan	Level of alignment with PHAP, THR, and DFID response plan	PHAP, THR Plan, DFID response plan	Desk review KII	Eval Team	ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	Eval Team
2 Has the project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients?	Level of alignment with the key social protection areas	Social protection indicators	Desk review KII; Field visit; FGD	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team
3 Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units?	Level of alignment with the Local Development Plans; NDRRMC Strategies	LDPs, DRRM Plan (if available)	Desk review KII	Eval Team	ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	Eval Team

Evaluation Questions	Indicator	Sources of Data?	Method?	Who Will Collect?	How Often?	Cost?	Who will analyze?
4 The extent to which it has supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes? a) the needs and priorities of the ILO's social partners in Philippines? b) the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes?	Level of alignment with the Phil Decent Work Programme; level of alignment with the UNPDF	Phil Decent Work Programme Document; UNPDF document	Desk review KII		ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	
5 Was the project design adequate to meet the project objectives?	Project internal coherence	Prodoc, LFA	Desk review; KII	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team
6 To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners?	Existing PPs capacity needs assessment; baseline as basis of project design	Prodoc Baseline study Capacity Needs assessment results	Desk Review	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team

Evaluation Questions	Indicator	Sources of Data?	Method?	Who Will Collect?	How Often?	Cost?	Who will analyze?
7 Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? a) Did it address gender needs and interests?	Project relevance; existing gender needs assessment and approach; existing situational analysis	Prodoc; project progress reports;	Desk review; KII; FGD	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team
8 Was the capacity of various project's partners (PP) taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action (PSMA)?	Existing PPs capacity needs assessment; level of use/integration in the PSMA	Prodoc	KII; FGD	Eval Team	ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	Eval Team
9 Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project?	Contribution analysis; support required and support received	Prodoc; Minutes of meetings; progress reports	KII; FGD	Eval team	ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	Eval team

Evaluation Questions	Indicator	Sources of Data?	Method?	Who Will Collect?	How Often?	Cost?	Who will analyze?
10 Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? a) To what extent have they affected the project?	Risk assessment and approach; initial assumptions; cases of risk management	Prodoc and progress reports;	Desk review; KII	Eval team	ILO and local implementing partners	n/a	Eval team
11 Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?	Existing M&E design, plan & implementation ; cases of use of the M&E system	ILO monitoring system document (if available); monitoring mission reports	Desk review; KII	Eval Team	1 site	n/a	Eval Team
12 To what extent the project has achieved its objectives?	Targets vs. outputs (comparison per targets in the prodoc vs. actual accomp)	Progress report; terminal report; monitoring report	Desk Review, KII	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team
13 What have been the major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement of its objectives?	Existing Situational analysis; support needed vs. support received		KII; FGD	Eval Team	All sites	n/a	Eval Team

III. Data Collection Tool

1. Evaluation questions for interviews

STAKEHODLER GROUP 1# ILO and Partners (FAO and SC)

- Fit of DFID within other PHAP along with other donors and partners
- Fit within ILO country strategy, and expectations
- -----
- linkage with partners (FAO/SC and local)
- Implementation process (consultation, preparation, implementation, M+E)
- Activities completed / results / challenges
- What would you do differently?
- *[DOCs : request to view monthly plans and reports (some supplied already), technical tools or justifications, records of beneficiaries and their status.*

STAKEHODLER GROUP 2# Implementing Partner on site

DESIGN + PLANNING

- How was assessment of needs made (MIRA I,II) and how well did they fit reality
- to what degree were the local IP consulted in plans for interventions and delivery process
- what other programs have been operating (GoP and donor) and their complementarity
- How do these fit with various (still valid ?) local development initiatives
- how do you rate your capacity to deliver, was training needed
- *[DOCs : request view planning docs]*

DELIVERY

- what interventions have been delivered
- Process of delivery (eg targeting and selection of beneficiaries)
- describe implementation delivery, and results, both immediate, livelihood rehab. and longer term
- was implementation such that various added values gained (e.g. timber stacked + available for reconstruction; skills linked to local value chains, local organisations engaged and strengthened for resilience + sustainability etc.)
- What remains to be done (as indicator of effectiveness) and what comparison can be made with other interventions.
- What would you do differently (as indicator of both design ; strengthening and lessons)
- *[DOCs ; request records of activity, esp. where payments have been made which can be cross checked with beneficiaries. These should be a key source of quantitative data]*

STAKEHODLER GROUP 3# Beneficiaries

Background

Through *ad hoc* observations and informants (incl visits to local markets)

- Identify original livelihood occupation, esp. seasonal cropping patterns etc.
- Identify local nutritional and or market demands and how these may be supported by interventions (eg. vegetable cropping)

Focus Groups

Establish FG position within their communities (ethnicity, poverty, etc.) and to what degree other Hhs have received support through ILO /DFID or other agencies.

DELIVERY

- what interventions have been delivered
- Process of delivery (eg targeting and selection of beneficiaries)

- describe implementation delivery, and results, both immediate, livelihood rehab. and longer term
- was implementation such that various added values gained (e.g. timber stacked + available for reconstruction; skills linked to local value chains, ***esp . local organisations engaged and strengthened for resilience + sustainability etc.)
- What remains to be done (as indicator of effectiveness), including other HHs who were not directly involved in activity.
- What comparison can be made with other interventions you know of
- What would you like to see done differently

IV. Checklist for Preparing and Rating the Evaluation Report

Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm

Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm

ANNEX III List of Persons Interviewed.

**List of Interviewed Persons
3 – 7 February 2015**

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
3 February: Tuesday			
Meeting with Ormoc Team	Martha Mildred Espano	Project Manager/ National Programme Officer	ILO
Meeting with DOLE	Marites Z. Vinas	Chief, Labor Employment Officer (LEO)	DOLE - 8
	Ronnie Guzman	Assistant Regional Director (ARD)	
	Elias Cayanong	Regional Director (RD)	
	CliniaEstanilla	Supervising LEO	
	MiraflorCatarman	LEO III	
4 February: Wednesday			
Meeting with partner	Retchel Sasing	OIC, Program Manager	FAO
	MykielPatcho	Area Manager	StC
Meeting with NIA staff	Rosalia C. Borneo	Institutional Development Officer (IDO)-A	NIA
	Hazel Corpin	IDO-RAB	
	Ma. Fe Cerilles	Engineering Assistant (EA)	
	Aniceta Paloma	Principal Engineer, OIC	
Meeting with SSS and Philhealth representatives	AnecitaVerano	Officer in-charge (OIC)	SSS-Ormoc
	JaymarJamadron	CEO II/AMS	
	Misael Paigan	CSIO	PhilHealth
5 February: Thursday			
Meeting with beneficiaries – desilting of irrigation canal	NarcisaToloso	Chairperson	KASAMMAVA (Irrigator Association)
	ConradoQuiapo	Member	LASASCA (Irrigator Association)
	Antonio Lomasak	OIC, Chairperson	OSDI (Irrigator Association)

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
	Joselito Alison	Chairperson	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
	Joel Juntong	Chairperson	MARLIS (Irrigator Association)
	Antonio Codilla	Chairperson	OSDI (Irrigator Association)
	ToribioDiabo	Board of Director (BOD)	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
	Arlene Abapo	Treasurer	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
	Juan Maniquit	Board of Director (BOD)	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
	Jaime Dalaguit	Chairperson	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
	Vencio Merahuerta	Board of Director (BOD)	KASANAG (Irrigator Association)
Meeting with beneficiaries – SALT site in Lake Danao	DoroteoRedilla	President	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Joel Capuyan	President	Gaas Farmers Association (GAFA), Ormoc City
	Allan Dula	President	SitioCatmonay Vegetables Farmers Association (SICAVFA), Ormoc City
	Jessie Lauron	Agriculture Technician	City Agriculture Office (CAO), Ormoc City
	RecelleGamusa	Secretary	Lake Danao Community Association (LADCOA), Ormoc City
	Judith Paredes	Agriculture Technician	City Agriculture Office (CAO), Ormoc City
	Regina Arellano	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
	RizaHenido	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Emily Metran	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Sabina Cabantoy	Member	SitioCatmonay Vegetables Farmers Association (SICAVFA), Ormoc City
	Erwin Montesclaros	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	BemboyMontesclaros	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Gaudioso Palacio	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Jerela Beltran	Member	Lake Danao Community Association (LADCOA), Ormoc City
	BaltazarAblen	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Dionilo Lautente	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Danilo Sepe	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Nicandro Laurente	Member	Lake Danao Farmers Association (LADFA), Ormoc City
	Rodelito Cantay	Member	Sitio Catmonay Vegetables Farmers Association

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
Meeting with beneficiaries – SALT site in Sto. Domingo, Kananga			(SICAVFA), Ormoc City
	Genaro Custodio	President	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Jaime Baclohan	Vice-President	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	JessaDecio	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Rome Dela Pina	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Emelyn Magallanes	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Ronelo Magallanes	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Rodolfo Entrampas	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Catalina Custodio	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Flordeliza Magallanes	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Cristobal Rondina	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	JennelynMondejar	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Manilyn Samson	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	Rosie Custodio	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
	RusticoMondejar	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga
Pio Magallanes	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers Association (SDFA), Kananga	
Alejandro Magallanes	Member	Sto Domingo Farmers	

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
			Association (SDFA), Kananga
Meeting with ILO management	Chris Donnges	EIIP Technical Specialist	ILO – ROAP
	Ayako Kaino	Early Recovery and Livelihood Officer	ILO - CO
	Martha Mildred Espano	National Programme Officer	ILO – Ormoc
6 February: Friday			
Courtesy call to the mayor – LGU Villaba	Jorge Veloso	Municipal Mayor	LGU-Villaba
	Orlando Romero	Municipal Engineer	LGU-Villaba
Meeting with beneficiaries – FMR and SALT activities	Felipe Lazo	EEP Worker	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Marcelino Olila	EEP Worker	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Roger Prias	Barangay Captain	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Alpaso Ariz	Farmer	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Myrna Ondos	Farmer	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Cresencia Menacho	Farmer	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
	Concordia Montemar	Farmer	Barangay Tabunok, Villaba
Meeting with ST beneficiaries – handicraft production	Febelinda Gilbuena	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Villaba, Leyte
	Wilfredo Garbo	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Villaba, Leyte
	Catalino Garbo	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Villaba, Leyte
	Ofelia Anasco	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Ormoc City
	Maricris Reubal	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Ormoc City
	May Flair Mahinay	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	Ormoc City
	Vibelyn Orongan	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	San Isidro
	Jinky Montana	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	San Isidro
	Maricel Alvesco	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	San Isidro
	Elizabeth Loriba	SD Graduate (Handicraft)	San Isidro
7 February : Saturday			
Meeting with San Isidro Mayor; SALT beneficiaries	Susan Yap-Ang	Municipal Mayor	San Isidro, Leyte
	Teodulo Torregoza	Municipal Agriculture	San Isidro, Leyte

Itinerary	Interviewed Person/s	Position	Organization
		Officer	
	Hospicio Apacible	Municipal Engineer	San Isidro, Leyte
	Fidelino Montesino	Vice-President	Basud Farmers Association (BFA), San Isidro
	Lolita Ochea	President	Banat-I Farmers Association, San Isidro
	Alicia Canete	President	San Jose Farmers Association (SJFA), San Isidro
	Elena Dumahil	President	DajaDaku Farmers Association, San Isidro
	Christopher Asong	President	Biasong Farmers and Fishermen Association, San Isidro

ANNEX IV Photographs from field visit



Fig 2. SALT site Sto Dominigo.

Showing (a) overdevelopment (elaborate pathways and stairways, decorative flowers) unfunctional bunds or hedgerows, (would not prevent runoff and erosion even on gentle slopes).



Fig 3. SALT site, San Isidro:

Effective bunds, but not aligned to site contours and site on highly degraded soils (white areas have no top soil), which would limit productivity.

