ILO EVALUATION

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| Evaluation Title | Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities |
| ILO TC/SYMBOL | : PHI/14/02/JPN |
| Type of Evaluation | : Independent Final |
| Country(ies) | : Philippines |
| Date of Evaluation | : June 2015 |
| Name of consultants | : John G. Connell (international) and Arvy Orígenes (national) |
| ILO Administrative Office | : ILO Country Office for the Philippines |
| ILO Technical Backstopping Office | : Employment Intensive Investment Programme – ROAP |
| Date Project Ends | : May 2015 |
| Donor Country and Budget | : Government of Japan, US$3,0000,000 |
| For joint evaluations, Lead Organization | : ILO |
| Evaluation Manager | : Tite Habiyakare |
| Evaluation Budget | : $28,810.76 |
| Key words | : Natural disaster, livelihood recovery, emergency employment, sustainable agriculture, skills training, social protection |

This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO’s evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Unit.



**International Labour Organization**

**FINAL REPORT**

Final Independent Evaluation of

**Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities**

(PHI/14/02/JPN)

Type of Evaluation: Final Independent

Administrative Unit: ILO Country Office for the Philippines

Technical Unit: DEV/INVEST

Donor Country: The Government of Japan

Project Budget: U$D 3,000,000

Project Duration: March 2014 – May 2015

Evaluation Manager: Tite Habiyakare

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Date of Evaluation: June 2015

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| C-BED | Community-Based Enterprise Development |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DOLE | Department of Labour and Employment |
| DSWD | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| DTI | Department of Trade and Industry |
| ED | Enterprise Development (sub-project type) |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| IMEC | International Maritime Employers Council |
| OC | Operation Compassion |
| OCD | Office of Civil Defence |
| ICEB | Interlocking Compressed Earth Block |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| KII | Key informant interviews |
| LGU | Local Government Units |
| LRB | Local Resource Based (sub-project type) |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PDNA | Post Disaster Needs Assessment |
| PGC | Provincial Government of Cebu |
| PhilHealth | Philippine Health Insurance Corporation |
| PPE | Personal Protection Equipment |
| PRODOC | Project Document |
| SALT | Sloping Agriculture Land Technology |
| STEER | Skills Training and Emergency Employment towards Recovery |
| RAY | Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda |
| SD | Skills Development (sub-project type) |
| SIYB | Start and Improve Your Business |
| SME | Small and Medium Enterprise |
| SPOT | Skills Placement Opportunity Training |
| SRP | Strategic Response Plan |
| SSS | Social Security System |
| STEER | Skills Training for Emergency Employment towards Recovery |
| TCPR | Technical Cooperation Progress Report |
| TESDA | Technical Education and Skills Development Authority |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

**1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The project reached 7468 workers, exceeding its numerical target of 6740 workers by 11%, with some reports still to be received which will add to this. The small locally identified projects constructed by the ILO field teams based in each of the five sites, were considered to be highly effective with substantial and far reaching impacts. These were constructed with multiple implementing partners, which engaged an additional $0.9M, equivalent to about 50% of the deliverable budget of the project. The Skills Development sub-projects similarly delivered significant impacts, not only raising the incomes of beneficiaries, but moving them from the large pool of unskilled labour to become skilled workers with new livelihood opportunities, However the small ILO field teams at each site struggled to achieve rapid mobilisation important within the short disaster recovery timeframe, and so larger institutional sub-project were mobilised in the later stages of the project to fulfil targets. Where a small number of more complex sub-projects were attempted, (i.e. establishment of new enterprises, and construction of Sloping Agriculture Land Technology, or SALT), these faced problems in completion and have doubtful sustainability.

**Background**

Super Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) hit the central part of the Philippines on 8 November 2013, severely damaging devastating 36 provinces across eastern, western, and central Visayas, including the northern part of Palawan. The agriculture sector was severely affected as well as an estimated 5.6 million workers, of which 40% were women, with little or no access to social security. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment was seen as a priority for the vulnerable groups in order to make up for the lost sources of income and livelihood.

In 2014, ILO implemented the PHI/14/02/JPN with funding US$3,000,000 from the Government of Japan, beginning March 2014 and ending, (with a no-cost extension) May 2015. The project targeted five sites; Tacloban, the first landfall of Haiyan, and through Bohol, Ormoc, Cebu, and finally Coron, its last landfall in the Philippines. The project’s development objective was to *“support employment creation, livelihood opportunities and employability of poor and vulnerable workers and families in affected areas”.* It aimed to provide employment support for approximately 6470 poor and vulnerable workers, in addition to 13,000 workers to be reached through other funding sources (DFID, Norway and IMEC). It would achieve this through four interventions; a) **Labour resource based (LRB)** repair, construction and rehabilitation of productive infrastructure and community assets and environmental rehabilitation and protection works, promoting the use of local resources; b) Assessment of alternative livelihood opportunities and technical vocational training and **skills development** (**SD**) to facilitate people to move out of vulnerable employment; and c) re-establishment and strengthening of micro and small/medium sized enterprises, anchored by local government’s plan for economic recovery; **enterprise development** (**ED**). Beneficiaries participating in these activities would be provided a **social protection (SP)** package.

The independent evaluation was conducted to comply with ILO requirements for all projects with budgets of $1M or more. It included three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the Inception Phase; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholders and direct observation; (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings. The evaluation was conducted with a field mission 2 -9 June, 2015.

**Evaluation Findings**

The project operated with open-planning, relying on field teams (4-5 staff) located at each site to identify needs, and then to construct sub-projects to address these. All together 39 sub-projects were implemented across the five sites, the bulk of which (nearly two thirds) were <$40,000 and tailored to local conditions. All included multiple implementing partners to bring a range of support needed to complete the projects. In 10 of the sub-projects the partners contributed funds, a total of about $0.9M or about 50% of the deliverable funds from the project itself of $1,909,980, the combined subcontract and grant budgets.

Strategic Fit

Thus the strategic fit of the project was good at several levels. It directly contributed to the Strategic Response Plan of the IHT: ‘*Strategic Objective 3,*and its immediate objectives addressed three of the four short term outcomes of the government’s main recovery plan; Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY). The social protection component of the project (minimum wage, application of Social Security System (SSS), and PhilHealth and provision of Personal Protection Equipment (PE) contribute to the ILO country program to established decent work conditions.

Validity of Design

The open planning which allowed the ILO field team at each of the five sites to allow the project to respond to the wide and varied needs on the spot, was considered a suitable approach in this disaster context. The LRB and SD sub-projects activities in particular directly addressed the RAY objectives.

This ED component was designed to be applied at two levels; (a) rebuilding of existing enterprises and (b) support for ’new enterprises’. The first was mainly addressed through training inputs using the Community Based Enterprise Development (C-BED) package. Effective establishment of ‘new enterprises’ requires considerable social preparation and follow-up. The 12 month time-frame of the project, and the lack of field staff with at least community organising experience made this impossible to conduct effectively. This type of intervention should not be included in short (12 months) disaster recovery projects.

Project Effectiveness

The project identified and supported 39 sub-projects, which were highly varied and responsive to local needs. In this regard the project was highly successful. Of these all are completed except 4 larger sub-projects (Department of Social Welfare and Development; Sloping Agriculture Land Technology (SALT) II, and 2 ED projects)

The project reached a **total of** **7468 (m-4064/f-3404) workers**, exceeding its overall development target of 6740 by about 11%. This was mainly through exceeding targets for the SD and ED sub-projects, while **LRB** target, the largest target, was **under-achieved by 25%, reaching 3368 (m-1808/f-1560)** workers, compared to its target of 4475. (Note: the DSWD LRB/ED project with 600 approved LRB beneficiaries has not filed a report and so no beneficiaries have been included from it). The achievements for **SD, 2336 (m-1240/f-1096)** trainees, exceeded its targets by 33%. The **ED reached 1764 (m-1016/f-748)** workers and so exceeded its target by more than 3x, achieved through provision of the C-BED training package. Four sub-projects that supported ‘new enterprises’ were supported, these reached only 153 beneficiaries. One of these was physically uncompleted (although ongoing support through ILO Haiyan Norway funds continues) and three of the four have not stabilised their production and market systems, making sustainability doubtful.

Factors that contributed to the effectiveness of delivery.

* The ILO field teams played a key role in identifying the sub-project; constructing the implementation teams and then mentoring the proposals. The thorough vetting of the proposals by the field team and Manila ensured that once approved implementation generally proceeded well.
* Slow identification and development of sub-project was due to only 2 of the ILO field teams being field orientated, with detailed review procedures before approval.
* Selection of the core implementation partner is key, and one of factors limiting more sub-projects not achieved. Partners mainly were local NGOs, and those with previous experience appear to have been better in managing their sub-projects
* Sub-projects have benefited from having multiple implementing partners, but this adds to complexity and different perspectives on implementation emerged. There was a need for ILO field staff to continue to advice and coordinate activities. This could be achieved through incorporating clear validation points, and reviews involving all partners, thus keeping all partners on the same page, as well as providing ILO staff to have ongoing influence in implementation.
* Where the government institutions have been responsible for management , procurements etc., the day-to-day procedures, especially procurement, significantly impeded completion of projects

Efficiency

Project delivery was slow, initially with only 16% of deliverable budget expended within the first 6 months and an alarming 56% by December, just three months before project design closure. Field team composition had only 2 field orientated staff, which was insufficient for a short (12 months) disaster recovery project. Constricting processes for sub-project approval further delayed approving and mobilising sub-projects, highlighting the need for efficient management mechanisms for projects implemented under emergency context.

The 23 micro sub-projects (i.e. < $40,000 ‘total ILO cost’) were considered to be very cost efficient with far reaching impacts (see below). However 5 LRB sub-projects, for Sloping Agriculture Land Technology (SALT), consumed nearly $394,767, or nearly 20% of deliverable project funds. This is a serious commitment to a single specific intervention. SALT is a complex activity which should be applied only in specific contexts, with substantial preparation and follow-up. As applied in the project, it is unlikely to continue as planned, as such will provide only immediate injection of income to its beneficiaries.

SD sub-projects were applied through the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) and TESDA accredited institutions. These were applied in a timely manner and can be considered very cost effective, in particular when the impact on trainees livelihood opportunities is taken into account (see below).

The ED funds expended for C-BED training, just $13,769, was extremely effective in reaching 1511 small businesses which typically have poor business and financial skills. The four ED sub-projects which supported establishing ‘new enterprises’ were either not fully established (3) or physically uncompleted (1). The longer processes for these to mature means their contribution to objective number 4 cannot be ascertained but appear doubtful.

Impact

The LRB sub-projects all had a direct and immediate impact of providing income to the beneficiaries for a limited period. However the main impact from the 23 micro sub-projects which enabled reconstruction of infrastructure; schools, roads, mortuary, etc. is that they enable normal social and economic life of communities to resume. Thus they have an impact far beyond the immediate beneficiaries counted. This then provides a very significant contribution to the major development objective of the project

Similarly for the SD sub-projects. The trainees have gained employment following their training, and more importantly will enable them to shift from the large pool of unskilled labour to continue obtain well paid and responsible positions in the future.

The main ED sub-project provided C-BED training to a large number of existing small businesses does appear to be well received. These projects receive further support from host agencies; working funds and coaching follow-up, there should be significant impact gained with them directly, and through the stimulation they will provide to local economies. Full assessment must wait for the tracer study to be completed later in 2015. As noted above three of the ED sub-projects for ‘new enterprises’ were in the main not fully operational and thus do not yet deliver impact. The fourth project (Tri-cycle drivers repair shop and spare parts store) had moderate impact financially, but more importantly was growing dynamically and providing a voice for this group of dispersed workers within Tacloban City.

The Social Protection provided did not confer any impact at this point, but it has alerted workers to their rights which may result in them progressively seeking or demanding these in future work opportunities. Similarly this experience may have alerted the relevant agencies responsible to ensure decent work conditions in the Philippines (DOLE, DSDW) that there is a receptivity to these, they may apply new programs to promote and ensure compliance in the future.

Sustainability

The bulk of the LRB projects focussed on re-construction of social infrastructure and these will continue to provide benefits to the communities where they are located. Maintenance is required, and in most cases arrangements for this had also been put into place. As noted above, this will not apply to the cluster of 5 SALT sub-projects.

The SD sub-projects have enabled the majority of trainees (2336) to gain NC-II certification in their skills they were trained in. This, along with their accumulating experience will continue to enable them to obtain skilled employment; good wages and confidence to future advance themselves.

The main input for ED was C-BED training and a reasonable number of the small businesses reached can be expected to apply its messages, and thus derive on-going benefits. The training package itself has been accepted well by 22 implementing partners, and continues to several of them including TESDA, and various NGOs including Plan, CARE and Oxfam, generating substantial indirect beneficiaries.

**Lessons Learnt**

1# On-going monitoring and guidance for sub-projects: ILO Considerable effort was put into development of proposals to enable sub-projects to proceed and be implemented by the multi-partners implementing teams. There was a need for continuing role for ILO field teams during sub-project implementation for coordination between partners and to provide ongoing guidance.This could be achieved through inclusion of validation points within the proposals to bring all implementing partners together to assess progress.

2# In-completed or vulnerable establishment of new enterprise: The sub-projects for establishment of ‘new enterprises’ tended to be ‘uncompleted’ in that production and markets not reliably established. These are complex activities and should not be included in short (12 months) disaster recovery projects due to a range of complexities.

3# Un-sustainable SALT interventions:

SALT activities appear to be viewed as a cash4work activity rather than an ‘extension activity’ requiring substantial social preparation and follow-up. While the SALT sites were more or less installed (contour strips not developed due to drought), there were unlikely to continue to be functional for erosion control, or to see continued group cultivation. As such, SALT activities should not be included in short (12 months) disaster recovery projects.

**Emerging Best Practice**

1# Open Planning: The ‘open planning’ approach appears suitable in the disaster recovery context. It allows field teams to identify local issues; possible sub-projects to address these, and then assemble implementing teams from a range of agencies. As such it appeared to be more effective than many of the larger institutional sub-projects.

2# Follow-up support to build on impacts.

Where projects provided forums or focal points for beneficiaries to continue meeting, communication and exchange of experiences was fostered. This encourages mutual support and trust, and can be a pathway for disbursed groups of workers to form associations. These can then give them a voice to change framework conditions.

**Recommendations**

***1# Project design***

**1.1 Strengthened resources for recovery phase projects**

While there is an urgency to achieve rapid and focused delivery in the disaster recovery stage, project design and resources should be adjusted to enable this to be as effective and efficient as possible. Three areas where the design for disaster recovery projects could be adjusted are as follows:

1. Increase project timeframe from the current 12 to 18 months, with this time to allow field teams to focus on the identification and mobilization of locally identified micro-projects. These have proven to be highly effective in assisting the social to regain functionality with the impacts being highly sustainable.
2. Ensure the ILO Field teams continue to have a role in coordinating and guiding sub-projects throughout their implementation, particularly where there are multiple and less experienced implementing partners. This could be structured through development of templates for sub-project proposals to specify validation points at key stages of the project in which all implementing partners together to assess progress, and where timely guidance for ongoing work is provided.
3. ILO field teams should include staff with community background experience to facilitate coordination between multiple implementing partners and in providing guidance in community engagement within sub-projects.

**1.2 Non-inclusion of complex initiatives within short disaster recovery projects**

Complex activities, such as SALT and establishing ‘new enterprises’, should not be included in the range of activities for short (12 months) disaster recovery projects. Such projects require longer timeframes with at least 24 implementation time along with specific support:

* SALT should only be considered once context ([production environment and farming system, market opportunities etc.) has been assessed and found suitable. It needs to be seen as an extension initiative not cash4work, and as a result its introduction should be conducted in a way that encourages farmers to apply it on their own land.
* Where conditions are suitable for supporting establishment of new enterprises, planning needs to consider (a) transition from start-up markets, to local markets; (b) ownership and management structures to be inclusive and accommodate members joining and leaving the enterprise.

**1.3 Provide follow-up activities to consolidate inputs**

Follow-up activities should be structured into proposals to reinforce training inputs through experience sharing across beneficiaries, to (a) stimulate hesitant or weaker trainees; (b) provide a second chance to reinforce lessons and (c) build solidarity, that may provide a pathway towards building associations of independent self-employed workers and enterprises.

***Responsible agencies***

*The above three recommendations could be considered to be part of a set of guidelines for ‘project design’ for the ILO regional office , Bangkok, and other offices involved in project design and negotiation with potential donors. The Bangkok Regional Office, along with the ILO Office Manila, also use these in a concise set of guidelines for ‘implementation of disaster recovery projects’ for use by future field teams.*

***2# Effectiveness***

**2.1 Improved internal management - for short disaster recovery projects**

Streamlined procedures for identification and approval of sub-projects should be identified. This may include locating technical advisors on site (e.g. Tacloban) so that assessment and recommendation for proposal development are more immediate.

Admin and monitoring procedures need to be established at start-up to ensure rapid feed-back and that activities are on track. While each project will have its specific requirements, templates for administration systems should be possible to be developed now from past projects.

Direction setting should be initiated by CO-Manila. Managing field teams’ performance should form part of the monitoring framework to optimize results (move as a team towards a common trajectory) and enforce substantive accountability among them (performance appraisal for teams lagging behind in delivery due to insufficient grasp of their functions).

***Responsible Agencies***

*Guidelines for these management recommendations should be made firstly by the ILO Manila office, in preparation for any future disaster recovery projects, with review by the Bangkok Regional Office for wider application.*

***3# Impact and Sustainability***

**3.1 Apply lesson from disaster recovery in mainstream decent work programs**

Lessons from the disaster recovery projects could be used to develop projects for mainstream ILO decent work activities.

3.1.1 Conduct reviews with partners on protocols which undermine their ongoing mainstream activities. In particular these could include: (a0 slow procurement by LGU’s, and (b) slow response to claims by SSS and PhilHealth,

3.1.2 Design and seek funds for LRB and other labor-based activities as national programs with ILO partners (DOLE, DSWD) as part of national programs to introduce Decent Work components to rural areas.

3.1.3 Design and seek funds for activities that engage and then create ‘focal points’ for dispersed independent workers, as pathways for development and strengthening of associations for dispersed independent workers, to assist them to “express their concerns, to organize and to participate in decisions that affect their lives.

***Responsible Agencies***

*The first of these should be conducted by the Manila ILO country office as part of a general assessment of the Haiyan emergency and recovery projects with its local partners. The second two of these should be considered both by the Manila country Office and the Bangkok regional Office.*

**2. BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

**2.1 Background**

Super Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) hit the central part of the Philippines on 8 November 2013, severely devastating 36 provinces across eastern, western, and central Visayas, including the northern part of Palawan. Categorized as one of the most powerful storms to hit land, it had wind speeds of 235 km/hr. and gusts of 275 km/hr. that resulted to massive storm surges up to six meters high specifically in Tacloban City and other coastal areas in Leyte province and Samar Islands. It was the costliest Philippine Typhoon to date with total estimated damages pegged at US$2.02-Billion (PhP89.6-Billion).

Estimates noted 5.6-million workers were directly affected of which 60 percent were men and 40 percent women. For livelihoods, income earnings are reported to have been cut by 50 percent, which resulted to an increase in the number of people looking for jobs. Compared to pre-Haiyan levels, the number of people seeking work has increased by 10 percent in the urban areas, while for the non-farm based labourers 42 percent are reported in search of work --- thus the need for providing livelihood programs for the most affected populations.

**2.2 The Project**

*Target beneficiaries and type of interventions*

The Integrated livelihood recovery for typhoon Haiyan affected communities (PHI/14/02/JPN) to be referred to as the project, was designed to provide employment support to approximately 6,740 poor and vulnerable workers affected by Typhoon Haiyan. This is in addition to the 13,000 plus workers covered by ILO, supported by other funding sources (DFID, Norway and IMEC). The target beneficiaries formed part of the 260,000 vulnerable workers prioritized under the SRP launched by the HCT in December 2013.The most vulnerable workers are those either self-employed or are unpaid family workers who with inadequate incomes and limited access to social security, are most vulnerable to any disruption in employment and income.

The project builds on ILO’s past experiences responding to disasters in the Philippines (i.e. Washi in 2011 and Bopha in 2012) and in other countries (i.e. Post 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka; Typhoons and Flooding in Mayanmar, Pakistan and India; and earthquakes in Pakistan and Haiti).

While the ILO’s overall intervention applies a two-pronged approach i.e. Phase 1 – Rapid assessments of damages and losses on employment and livelihoods followed by emergency employment through clearance, cleaning and simple community works; and Phase II – Recovery of sustainable livelihoods, this project is mainly focused on the latter through a) Labour resource based (LRB) repair, construction and rehabilitation of productive infrastructure and community assets and environmental rehabilitation and protection works, promoting the use of local resources; b) Assessment of alternative livelihood opportunities and technical vocational training and skills development (SD) to facilitate people to move out of vulnerable employment; and c) re-establishment and strengthening of micro and small/medium sized enterprises, anchored by local government’s plan for economic recovery (ED).

It assists the transition phase of the recovery, moving away from immediate and emergency response to interventions which facilitate long-term and sustainable recovery of livelihoods. The ILO’s integrated approach to livelihood recovery combines labour-based rehabilitation of public infrastructure, creation of alternative livelihoods through vocational skills development and re-establishment of micro and small/medium sized enterprises. The project also reinforces and advocates for existing government standards on minimum wages, occupational safety and health standards and provision of social protection for workers.

***Partners***

At the national level, the ILO works closely with DSWD, DOLE, TESDA, DTI, SSS, and PhilHealth to ensure that the project complements the work of the national government. This also ensures that the project interventions contribute to the country’s adherence to labour standards to include payment of minimum wages, inclusion of social protection benefits, personal protective gear and equipment that meets occupational safety and health standards.

At the local level, the process of sub-project design, implementation, and monitoring will engage LGUs and local NGOs and other community-based groups – representing men, women, and youth – through consultations in the development of sub-projects to respond to specific local contexts and needs.

***Area coverage and Technical Backstopping***

In January 2014, five field offices were established to cover specific targeted areas: 1) Tacloban City; 2) Ormoc City covering Leyte province; 3) Cebu City covering Northern Cebu and Negros Occidental; 4) Coron, Palawan; and 5) Tagbilaran City, Bohol (see map, Annex III). These sites were selected based on the gaps analysis and needs assessment that was conducted in December 2013.

In each field office ILO deployed a ‘field team’ composed of National Programme Coordinators and Engineers, as well as admin and finance personnel. These field teams are backstopped by technical staff from CO-Manila comprised of the Chief Technical Adviser, and a Disaster Response and Livelihood Development Officer. Regional backstopping is also provided from ILO Regional office in Bangkok to include a Technical Specialists on Skills, Employment Intensive Investment, and Enterprise Development.

**TABLE 1: Project Framework**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Title** | Integrated Livelihood recovery for Typhoon Haiyan affected communities |
| **Duration** | 12 months beginning March 2014 (no-cost extension until May 2015) |
| **Budget** | US$3million |
| **Direct recipients** | Poor and vulnerable workers and families in typhoon affected areas |
| **Ultimate beneficiaries** | Community members and LGUs in typhoon affected areas where public infrastructure is restored and where livelihood activities take place |
| **OUTCOMES** | |
| **Outcome 1: Employment Creation** | More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities. |
| **Outcome 2: Skills Development** | Skills Development increases the employability of workers, the competitiveness of enterprises, and the inclusiveness of growth. |
| **Outcome 3: Sustainable Enterprise** | Sustainable enterprises create productive and decent jobs. |

| **Objectives** | **Outputs** | **Indicators** | **Targets** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Development objective:** The project will support employment creation, livelihood opportunities and employability of poor and vulnerable workers and families in affected areas | | # of affected and vulnerable workers who received employment support with social protection and/or other livelihood support | Total of 6,740 workers reached |
| **Immediate Objective 1.** Provision of social protection for workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation and community infrastructure improvement works. | A delivery mechanism to ensure social protection for workers is in place at the local level | | 100% of project location |
| 1.1 Social Protection is provided to workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation works and improvements of community infrastructure, employed under ongoing government agency programmes. | % of workers enrolled in social protection | 100% enrolment |
| Improvements to registration of workers and the delivery of services is provided, including implementation of MOU with PhilHealth and SSS | 2 sets MOU and implementation guidelines |
| 1.2 The importance of social protection is advocated for across key government agencies and humanitarian partners in order to establish a clear message on social protection issues in emergency employment and livelihood recovery. | Common understanding on social protection issues across key government and humanitarian agencies. | Guidelines on social protection agreed by key government agencies and disseminated accordingly |
| Guidelines on social protection disseminated to humanitarian partners in an easy to read format e.g. brochures |
| **Immediate Objective 2.** Community-based approaches optimizing and combining the use of local resources are used for small social and productive infrastructure repairs and reconstruction, environmental rehabilitation and protection works (green works). | Repair, rehabilitation and environmental works are implemented in target communities | | 100% of project locations |
| 2.1 Repair and reconstruction of essential community infrastructure and environmental rehabilitation and improvements works as a means of disaster mitigation (or to improve community’s resilience towards climate change and natural disaster). | # of repairs/works completed | Total of 4.475 workers reached |
| 2.2 Creation of jobs and cash injections into the local economy through the use of local resource-based approaches. | # of jobs created | 4,475 jobs created |
| # of workdays generated (sex-disaggregated) | 67,125 work-days |
| # of total amount paid wages | US$ 402,750 wage payments |
| 2.3 Enhanced capacity of implementation partners to plan, design and implement local resource-based approaches. | # of partners planning, designing and implementing LRB works | 31 |
| 2.4 Local resource-based schemes for further recovery of communities have been identified and designed for additional funding, for after the emergency/early recovery phase. | # of schemes developed | 8 |
| **Immediate Objective 3.** Labour-market responsive technical vocational skills training and development is provided for wage and self-employment. | TESDA is engaged to undertake needs identification and skills training package for project beneficiaries. | | MOU implemented according to agreed roles and responsibilities |
| 3.1 Short-term skills training has been provided to poor and vulnerable workers to enable them to engage in employment opportunities that have been opened up during the recovery phase. | # of affected vulnerable workers completed short term skills training | 1,745 workers in total |
| 3.2 Community-based training and other support have been provided to support the start up or enhancement of alternative income generating activities of the fishing and farming communities. | # of affected vulnerable workers received community-based training and other support for starting or improving income-generating activities |
| 3.3 Young people have received demand-led skills training and TESDA’s skills certification to improve their employability. | # of affected young people completed certified skills training |
| **Immediate Objective 4.** Community-based enterprise development support is provided to micro-small enterprises and local communities. | # of local communities engaged on enterprise development | | 100% of project location |
| 4.1 Individuals, micro-small businesses and the communities enhance entrepreneurial knowledge. | # of people trained on entrepreneurship and business skills (sex disaggregated) | 520 |
| 4.2 Value chain analysis identifies industries with high employment and growth potential. | # of new business/employment opportunities identified | 2-3 sectors per location |
| 4.3 Capacity of local partner institutions strengthened for business development through introduction of new methodologies (SIYB and CBED) to support local SMEs. | # of local institutions, including government and non-government, that adopt ILO tools on entrepreneurship and business skills training | 2 local institutions per location |

**3. RATIONALE, OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION and METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

The ILO’s policy indicates the mandatory conduct of at least one independent evaluation for projects implemented with budget exceeding US$1-million. This evaluation is in compliance with the said requirement.

As set out under the TOR for this exercise, the evaluation objectives are fourfold: a) To examine the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved as per project framework; 2) To assess the sustainability of project benefits and impact of the project particularly on the beneficiaries; 3) To report the lessons learnt and possible good practices; and 4) To make recommendations that will inform the ILO response to future crisis in the Philippines and in other countries as well.

This exercise complies with the ILO evaluation norms, standards, ethical safeguards and uses the following criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as set forth under the ILO Guidelines for results-based evaluation. The latter adheres to the UN system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

* 1. **Scope and Client of the Evaluation**

The evaluation was made in three of the five project sites the project covered, i.e. Tacloban City, North Cebu and Coron. This included 2 sites with the largest number of sub-projects, and Coron, the last landfall of Haiyan, which otherwise received the least attention of other aid agencies. The types of sub-projects visited at each site are indicated below. The specific sub-projects visited are indicated by shading in the monitoring sheet extract in Annex V[[1]](#footnote-1).

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project site** | **Project types visited** | | | |
| **LRB** | **SD** | **ED** | **Total** |
| Tacloban | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Cebu | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| Coron | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| **Total** | 6 | 4 | 4 | 14 |

The evaluation covers the project’s component activities and results in these sites from March 2014 to May 2015.The evaluation (as need be) looks into other ILO projects contributing to the recovery or supporting the same typhoon affected communities, as well as international partners doing similar interventions in the said areas. The clients of the evaluation are: ILO-Manila Office and project team; technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and HQ; tripartite constituents, and the donor (i.e. government of Japan). The evaluation findings shall be primarily addressed to the implementing partners and the ILO units directly involved in backstopping the project.

* 1. **Methodological Framework**

The evaluation framework is guided by a set of criteria which are assessed by asking a number of key questions as provided in Annex 1 - TOR. As previously quoted, the criteria have their origin in the OECD-DAC evaluation Guide for Humanitarian Agencies, consistent with the emerging consensus on evaluations amongst international development institutions.

The evaluation includes three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the inception phase; (b) Field visits (July 2-8)for interview with stakeholders and direct observation (Annex IV – List of Interviewed personal and Itinerary); (c) feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings (July 9).

Given the geographical spread of the project sites, duration of the evaluation mission, and resources available the sites visited were purposively selected by the respective project field coordinators and concurred by the evaluation team upon determination that each sub-project type (i.e. ED, SD, and LRB) are sufficiently sampled. A detailed description of the evaluation methodology is herein provided as Annex II – Inception Report.

Eight sub-projects were co-funded from other Haiyan donors, (Norway, IMEC). Where this was the case the outputs were accredited on a proportional basis to each project. This is indicated in the monitoring sheet extract (Annex V) which includes all sub-projects with PHI/14/02/JPN funding.

* 1. **Limitations of the Evaluation**

The tight time frame for field inspections restricted the data collection to single-visit interviews and thus information gathered was based on memory recall of the respondents. Where possible this was later cross-checked with relevant project documents and follow-up queries with the field staff.

The project was still in the last stages of implementation and so final progress reports / project terminal report were not available during the evaluation hence access to a more systematized data was not sufficed. For a number of sub-projects various data was not yet available, e.g. number of beneficiaries; desegregated data on gender. Such gaps are indicated in the monitoring sheet extract (Annex V).

**4. FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION**

**4.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit of the intervention**

**4.1.1 To what extent has the project contributed to the a) Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014; and b) Typhoon Haiyan Response**.

Between 2012 and 2013, four humanitarian action plans were formulated corresponding to each major calamity that struck the country: a) PHAP for Mindanao - Typhoon Bopha; b) Zamboanga and Basilan Action Plan (armed conflict); c) Great Bohol Quake Action Plan; and d) Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan. The latter surpasses the other plans in both extent of coverage (14-million affected population across Regions 4, 4B, 7 and 8) and funding requirement ($791-million after plan launching in December 2013)[[2]](#footnote-2).

The Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Haiyan was prepared by the International Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to complement the government’s rehabilitation and recovery efforts, filling gaps as identified by both government and inter-agency assessments[[3]](#footnote-3). It consists of five strategic objectives, of which ILO through this Japan-funded project directly contributes to the achievement of ‘***Strategic Objective 3 -*** Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economy, agriculture and fisheries’.

On the government side, having been mandated under Republic Act 10121[[4]](#footnote-4) as lead agency for Rehabilitation and Recovery, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) has prepared two sets of planning documents for Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY): i) Building Back Better which guides the recovery and reconstruction of the economy, lives, and livelihoods of the affected areas; and ii) Implementation for Results which indicates the overall results framework for monitoring of the recovery progress consistent with the Philippine Development Plan (PDP)[[5]](#footnote-5).

The project contributes to three of the four main outcomes articulated by RAY in the short-to medium term: i) livelihoods and economic development; ii) physical infrastructure; and ii) social services. These were addressed through provision of a) labor-based repair, construction and rehabilitation of productive/social infrastructure and community assets and environmental rehabilitation and protection works, promoting the use of local resources; b) provision of alternative livelihood opportunities and technical vocational training and skills development to facilitate people to move out of vulnerable employment; and c) re-establishment and strengthening of micro-and small/medium sized enterprises, anchored on the local government’s plan for economic recovery[[6]](#footnote-6) (Table 2#).

**Table 2**

**Project Contributions to PHAP and RAY**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Strategic Objective in the PHAP addressed by the project** | **Short term outcomes in the RAY addressed**  **by the project** | **Project Contributions** |
| **Strategic Objective 3:** Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries. | **Livelihoods:** incomes are restored or established for households and business enterprises.  **Physical infrastructure:** Public and/or privately owned infrastructure facilities affected by Haiyan are reconstructed or rehabilitated according to improved disaster resilient standards.  **Social services:** Affected communities are able to access (among others) social  protection services | **Immediate Objective 1:** Provision of social protection for workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation and community infrastructure improvement works.  **Immediate Objective 2:** Community-based approaches optimizing + combining use of local resources are used for small social and productive infrastructure repairs, reconstruction + environmental rehabilitation and protection works (green works).  **Immediate Objective 3:** Labor-market responsive technical and vocational skills training and development is provided for wage and self-employment.  **Immediate Objective 4:** Community-based enterprise development support is provided to micro-small enterprises + local communities. |

**4.1.2 Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units**? **Has the project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients?**

The government planning for the recovery and rehabilitation involves two sets of documents that feed into the Comprehensive Master Plan for Yolanda Recovery and Rehabilitation[[7]](#footnote-7), namely i) PDNA and ii) RAY. The former focuses mainly on government’s losses and financing needs mostly in relation to physical reconstruction while the latter is a more comprehensive overall estimate of the total economic damages, losses, and needs covering both private and public sectors. The PDNA formed part of the RAY. Both plans are informed by the synthesis of the damage and loss assessments and financing needs of all the local government units (LGUs) affected by Haiyan.

The extent of the project’s alignment with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units (LGUs) is guided by the SRP’s overarching goal: “*to support communities and local governments to recover from the disaster, build back safer and avoid relapses while building resilience*”, through a set of strategic outputs that significantly contribute to its achievement. As previously quoted, the SRP complements the RAY and thus the project’s components are well fitted within the local government’s recovery and rehabilitation sector plans for short to medium terms on i) livelihoods, ii) social services (social protection services), and iii) (community) infrastructure (Table 1).

**Extent of addressing needs of the beneficiaries and of direct recipients**

The project prioritized the poorest and most vulnerable workers (i.e. self-employed or unpaid family workers with inadequate incomes and limited access to social security) affected by Yolanda, extending reach to include vulnerable groups such as farmers, fisher folk, dis-advantaged, out-of school youth, and indigenous peoples. While recognizing the vast array of recovery and rehabilitation needs, the project’s response is skewed toward contributing to the primary objective of the early recovery and livelihood cluster, which ILO co-chairs, to address the problem of livelihood income and lost opportunities. Among the range of needs listed in the RAY, those addressed by the project for the target groups are - i) income support, ii) enterprise recovery; iii) training programs to equip households with new marketable skills, and iv) transition support to established social protection programs.

**Decent Work Agenda**

Consistent with the state policy under the Philippine Constitution and the Labor law, key approaches employed in the project’s employment generation are aligned with the strategic pillar of decent work agenda – full and productive employment, rights at work, and social protection. As set out in the Prodoc, this project contributes to ILO Country Office Manila’s Decent Country Programme PHL 101 – *Increased employment creation using employment-intensive approaches in community works, infrastructure works, and green works to reduce poverty and prepare for and respond to disasters*. Emphasis for decent work and productive employment is underpinned by the project during employment generation – i) vulnerable workers are provided with not only minimum daily wage, but also social protection benefits (SSS and PhilHealth); ii) Accident insurance (1-year coverage); iii) personal protective equipment; iv) trainings (hand on- on site); v) health monitoring during work hours; vi) regular work condition monitoring to ensure that workers are safe from exploitation and any form of abuses/harassments.

## 4.2 Validity of design

**4.2.1 Was the project design adequate to meet the project objectives? To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the partners**?

The project ‘development objective’ focuses on ‘increased incomes’ and ‘livelihood opportunities and employability,’ to be achieve through 3 outcomes; employment promotion; skills development and sustainable enterprises, for 6,740 households in the five sites. These directly address one of the most critical issues of a disaster ‘recovery’ phase; to enable affected HHs to move from reliance on emergency and relief efforts, to re-establishing their lives in a sustainable way. This was the more challenging as in many cases HHs could not simply resume old occupations due to damage from Haiyan (e.g. farmer workers, etc.). A separate critical issue affecting many areas is the lack of housing. This requires an intense effort in repairs and construction of new temporary and later permanent housing. The project objective and outcomes do not directly address this, but through various sub-projects; (a) training for construction trades; and (b) construction of housing facilities, the issue of housing is in fact addressed also.

Project design employs 4 interventions (outputs) to achieve its objective. These were; (a) provision of social protection (SP) for workers; (b) local resource based construction of social infrastructure (LRB); (c) skills development (SD); and (d) community based enterprise development. Specific funds were allocated to these interventions; $85,000; $396,385; $396,544; and $95,650 respectively, with an additional $936,401 was also available as ‘grants’. **This made the total deliverable budget for the project of $1,909,980.** Specific projects were not defined in the design, but developed by ILO field teams at each site who identified local needs, and constructed sub-projects engaging suitable implementing partners, to address these. This ‘open planning’ approach was considered very suitable to the post-disaster context across 5 separate island sites, each with its specific issues, allowing the field teams to respond to needs on the ground.

The second and third interventions (LRB and SD) both directly contribute to the development objective, and the first two outcomes. LRB contributes to the income for the direct beneficiaries only for the duration of work funded, (generally 15-20 days). The outcome of reconstruction of social infrastructure however enables many activities to restart, and so has a significant number of indirect beneficiaries. Similarly SD should improve beneficiaries’ ability to access new and better work opportunities, and so has the potential to change livelihood opportunities in the longer term.

A The prodoc indicates two levels for (ED); (a) rebuilding and strengthening of selected sub-sectors at a site; and (b) support for ‘new businesses’. The first of these is well able to be addressed through application of various ILO tools. The second has potential to make dramatic and ongoing changes to beneficiaries’ opportunities, and multiplier effects through engaging numerous indirect beneficiaries. Having said this, establishing new enterprises is a complex activity[[8]](#footnote-8), and resources needed for it were not available (see 4.2.2). *As such ED where this referred to establishment of new enterprises should not have appeared in the design for this 12 months recovery project, in its current form. (The notable exception to this was STEER, see 4.3.1)*

The first listed intervention, SP does not make direct contribution to incomes and livelihoods within the duration of the project (it does provide a safety net for anyone injured etc. while engaged in project activities). However it does provide a benchmark for the beneficiaries of the social protection elements to which they are normally entitled. This heightened awareness and practical experience of the SP measures may thus lead then to seek and demand these in seeking subsequent employment as they build back their lives.

**4.2.2 Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?**

The project supported 39[[9]](#footnote-9) sub-projects (with several in multiple sites) across the five sites (with several in multiple sites), with the largest number in Cebu (18) followed by Tacloban (10); Bohol (7) Coron (3) and Ormoc (1), with three Manila derived projects; SSS; PhilHealth and DSWD. While Coron was arguably least affected (comparatively so) is also suffered from least recovery support from other agencies.

The open planning allowed the site teams to respond to needs on the ground, so that project activities were very relevant to the ground situation. The field team participating in ‘cluster meetings’ putting them in contact with LGUs and other aid agencies. This made them aware of issues and at the same time allowed them to inform agencies of the project’s capacity to support initiatives. In all cases sub-projects were implemented through implementing partners, usually NGOs, with government institutions involved in selection of beneficiaries, coordination as well as making fund contributions. As such activities were well integrated into the local context, and with local institutions that had a long term stake in local development.

The delivery and management of activities for the first three interventions is well within the mandate and expected capacity of local partners. Any weaknesses that did exist with partners could be expected to be managed with support from the ILO site teams.

This is not the case for ED. As noted the prodoc had two levels for this; ‘rebuilding and strengthening’ of selected sub-sectors at a site; and support for ‘new businesses’. The first of these was addressed mainly through provision of the interactive C-BED training package, which also engaged local institutions and NGOs as partners to have ongoing support for these businesses. The second level, the establishment of ‘new enterprises’ requires a high level of community development skills at least and preferably value-chain or enterprise development experience. This was not present amongst the core ILO site teams, where most of the non-office-bound field staff had engineering backgrounds for LRB activities. Technical backup for ED was made available from the country office (Livelihood Development Officer). But technical advice alone is not adequate where field team staff don’t have the background (context) to appreciate it. Furthermore the time for the social preparation, and follow-up to stabilize the operation and marketing, would reasonably be in the order of 24 months at a minimum. Such time was clearly not available in this 12 months project where time available is far closer to 6 months, once the time for project identification, proposal development and approvals is taken into account. One strategy to address this used by the project was to have implementing partners who would continue to be available for ongoing support. However these did not appear to have experience necessary for the production and marketing management backup. Thus the project simply did not have adequate resources for new enterprise establishment; the time to initiate and backstop, nor staff at field level with suitable value-chain and/or enterprise development expertise to guide and mentor this.

The project largely did address the needs of women. It aimed for 40% of beneficiaries to be women, in line with the RAY assessment of affected population, and achieved women making up 42% of beneficiaries. The gender breakdown of 60m/40f was not applied across all activities, with LRB sub-projects often favoring men, but not always. This is a crude assessment of gender balance. However it does put cash into women’s hands which does ensure it will be used for family welfare. At the same time insistence of women’s participation in sub-projects to ensure gender targets are met, can mean women are overburdened; working in sub-projects and then returning home to carry out household chores as well, particularly mothers with young children. This is not achieving ‘gender equality in time’ and ways of dealing this need to be considered to ensure projects do comply with ILO’s advocacy of gender equality.

In several ways the project provided a doorway for women to break out of their typical mold. The TESDA training for construction and small engine repairs showed high levels of women participation. These women went on to gain employment at minimum wage or above, and were pleased and proud that they could take on this work. Similarly in the Interlocking Compressed Earth Blocks (ICEB) factory, the shift foreman appointed was a woman. These did not appear to be special cases, but rather suggested a trend that through the project, women had been able to move outside of their traditional occupations and enter a broader workspace.

**4.2.3 Was the capacity of various project’s partners taken into account in the project’s strategy and means of action? Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project**?

Partnership with national government agencies like DSWD, DOLE, TESDA, SSS, and PhilHealth is articulated in the Prodoc and is well emphasized during the actual project implementation (Table 3#). ILO has been very keen about maintaining close ties with these agencies, being its perennial partners since Washi Project implementation in 2012, to ensure complementation of work with the national government, alignment with the national recovery and rehabilitation program for the disaster affected areas, and adherence to labor standards i.e. payment of minimum wage, provision of social protection benefits and work protective gears/equipment fit to meet occupational safety and health (OSH) standards[[10]](#footnote-10). The capacities of these agencies anent to the performance of their roles as project partners are dictated by their respective agency mandates.

At the sub-project level, partnership is instituted with other UN organizations (e.g. FAO in Coron and WHO in Tacloban) for some LRB type interventions where complementation of resources (i.e. ILO for labor resource and partners for material inputs) and sharing of expertise adequately meet expanded post-disaster needs of the target community.

**Table 3# Institutional Partner and Project Contribution**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **National Agency** | **Capacity Contribution to the Project** |
| DSWD | * The National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction database has been very useful in area targeting and selection of project beneficiaries (vulnerable population). |
| DOLE | * Traditional partner of ILO. Has been partner of ILO during the EE activities (emergency phase) that preceded this project. * Actively advocates LGU adherence to decent work and OSH standards in their respective recovery and rehabilitation works. |
| TESDA | * Provides specialized skills trainings. * Screening standards for the trainees under the project were modified to accommodate the disaster affected enrollees who are not high school graduates (minimum requirement under normal training program), but are able to read and write. * Learning from partnership with ILO was integrated in their competency-based curriculum (to include climate proofing concepts for carpentry works). |
| SSS and PhilHealth | * Documentary processing and enrolment to social protection package of the project beneficiaries (MOA with ILO). * Actively engage in the promulgation/information campaign on the important benefits of having social protection coverage. |

For continuity and sustainability of sub-project outputs (LRB and SD types), a number of strategic cooperation/partnership were instituted with established relief and developmental NGOs (E.g. Operation Compassion in Tacloban, Mag-uugmad Foundation in Cebu, PhilSSA in Coron) that have long-term community-based rebuilding plans for areas devastated by Yolanda. Academic institutions (i.e. Eastern Visayas University and Western Philippine University) were also engaged to support partner NGOs.

Inclusion of local community-based groups (e.g. LUFFA, TAFEMDO) and community-based NGO/s (e.g. Damgo sa Kaugmaon, LUPA) as implementing partners requires more detailed screening process and then closer monitoring during implementation. Worth noting however that ILO’s EIIP promotes community-led sub-projects (LRB and ED types) which, in the interest of developing sense of ownership, also builds capacities of the local organizations to manage small sub-projects, and develop working knowledge on contract management, basic accounting (book-keeping and documentary processing for liquidation), procurement processes, among others. In the case of the ED sub-projects aimed at establishing new enterprises, particular skills in community development and value-chain development are needed to provide ongoing support to build capacity in production management and marketing. Such skills were not evident, but admittedly are rare to find.

Partnership with the LGUs across all sub-projects varied depending on the type of intervention. For LRB works (e.g. footbridge construction, SALT-2), LGU contribution is mostly either material inputs or technical inputs through the Municipal Engineer to oversee re/construction works or through the Provincial/Municipal Agriculture officer for technical inputs on SALT site development. Keeping the LGUs in the loop during project implementation ensures full integration of the project investments in their recovery and rehabilitation thrusts and plans.

**4.2.4 Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project**?

**Moderate risk highlighted in the Prodoc is the capacity of implementing partners to deliver activities as agreed under contracts with ILO:** In the case of SALT-2 in Tacloban for example, the design implementation period was 5 January to 31 March 2015 (3 months) but remains ongoing to date. Major outputs have not been completed; the full 33 hectares not yet cultivated using SALT; water impounding and distribution facility not yet set up; etc. the mitigation strategy in this case included engagement of a SALT technical expert to oversee activities strengthen the implementing partner’s capacity on project management.

Key risk mentioned in the Prodoc is the occurrence of further natural disasters, which cannot be mitigated as such. No major security concerns were identified.

**4.2.5 Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked**?

Implementation monitoring is executed at two levels- i) Field Offices and ii) CO-Manila. In February 2015, a set of tools for Progress Monitoring and Checklist was furnished by CO-Manila to the field teams – 1) for tracking of sub-project progress (to be used by the field team – PC, FC, and M&E ExCol); and 2) for tracking of financial performance or burn rate (to be used by the field ad-fin staff).

The tools afford a uniform format of reporting (physical and financial progress) among field teams and significantly address variations on the type of information collected from the ground and uploaded to the central office. Consistency in the utilization of the tools aides in the consolidation of the reports and ensure that sub-projects progress is systematically tracked and implementation modalities employed are comparable across field teams and across project components.

Each of the field offices is staffed with one Monitoring and Evaluation - External Collaborator (M&E ExCols) tasked to consolidate the sub-projects progress at the field level. Validation is done through ocular inspection of the sub-projects and cross-checking with the records/progress updates from the implementing partners. Such reports are submitted to CO-Manila for consolidation on a weekly basis.

Key indicators provided under the tool for tracking of physical accomplishments per sub-project are:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1. **Administrative Matters** | * Documentary requirements anent to contracts * Payment receipt by implementing partner * Validated records of beneficiaries (attendance) * Any pending reports and payments (IP level) |
| 1. **Physical progress** | * Beneficiaries (gender targets, paid wages, days worked) * Attention to Indigenous People beneficiaries (documentary/legal registration as group) * Status (actual progress vs. Workplan; gaps; alternative plans where applicable) * Procurement status (tools and starter kits) * CBED trainings conducted (modules used) * Visibility and media relations (ILO and donor visibility, opportunity for publicity i.e. turnover, training graduation) |
| 1. **Occupational Safety and health** | * Conduct of orientation on (decent work agenda, Social protection coverage) * Enrolment to accident insurance of the beneficiaries (complete list, 100% of the beneficiaries) * Enrolment to SSS and Philhealth (complete list, 100% of the beneficiaries) * PPEs (utilization during work hours) * On site nurse (1 in every 30 beneficiaries) |

For financial monitoring, the ad-fin per field team is tasked to consolidate expended funds (against budgeted) at the sub-project level to include monitoring of timely submission of liquidation reports (with complete attachments) of the implementing partners. Financial reports submitted by field teams to CO-Manila provide the basis for the release of funds (tranche funding under contract) to the implementing partner.

**Key points:**

* The standardization of the monitoring practice project-wide was only instituted 10 months after project launch in March 2014. Prior to that, the field teams employed varied monitoring approaches though still producing required information to track financial and physical progress, but prevented consolidated progress reporting at the CO-Manila. This effects of this delay were seen in (a) under achievement of gender targets 40(f)-60(m) were noted late, and so 2015 targets for new sub-projects were set to 70(f)-30(M), and extreme demand; (b) slow sub-project identification was not noted; (burn rate for funds only at an alarming 56% for the first ten months of implementation); and implementing partners’ inability to deliver not noted, especially on sub-projects with substantial budget allocation (e.g. SALT 1&2). As a result there appeared to be a rush to resolve this with larger institutional sub-projects later.
* The consolidated monitoring spread sheet does not facilitate for easy tracking of fund charging specifically for subprojects being jointly funded by different donors (Japan, Norway, and IMEC). Neither does it systematically show to which donor the number of beneficiaries reached by the intervention should be credited for.

* Outcomes monitoring[[11]](#footnote-11) is not emphasized in the monitoring mechanism employed across all field teams. Monitoring is generally focused on quantitative accomplishments (financial delivery and physical progress) and does not articulate how results at various levels of the sub-project design hierarchy interact with each other – from inputs and activities to overall goal of the project.

Overall monitoring was inadequate and at times confused even at the basic level of outputs achieved and attribution to specific donors. The need for an effective monitoring tool cannot be overemphasized as this affects management decisions to optimizing results, as indicated above. While having the advantage of multiple donors and flexible planning, there are clearly dangers in all this as it adds to complexity of monitoring. However the main problem appears to be due to the delay in instituting a consistent monitoring process from the beginning of the project. It is understandable that the early emphasis is on achieving outputs in a confused disaster context, but short cuts here can lead to issues which cannot easily be resolved, especially in projects with such a short timeframe of 12 months.

* 1. **Project Effectiveness**

**4.3.1 To what extent the project has achieved its objectives? What major factors influenced the project achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?**

The project’s open design was a means to identify needs on the ground and for sub-projects to then address these. The project identified and supported implementation of a total of 39 sub-projects, of which three were not physically completed at the time of the evaluation; SALT 2 and DSWD both LRB, and Fair Trade moringa processing (ED). The majority of subprojects (two thirds) are micro-projects, were < $40,000 for ‘ILO total funds’ per project, with just 3 sub-projects with expenditure $100,000. This is one indicator of the projects responsiveness to local needs. This is further indicated by the range of activity types within the three main outputs. For instance within LRB - sub-projects include; repairs to public building such as schools, mortuary etc.; construction of roads, and a footbridge linking islands; and systems for agriculture on slopping land (SALT).

To reinforce results, the ILO teams in several cases integrated sub-projects i.e. SD training provided skills which these workers continued to be involved in subsequent LRB or ED sub-projects. The project’s efforts to set-up this sort of reinforcement between components was pragmatic and very worthwhile. All projects had multiple implementing partners, each bringing specific support. One relatively simple example can illustrate this: for the LRB sub-project: mortuary reconstruction, Tacloban city; WHO provided equipment ($34,052), EVRMC - building materials ($1,559) and ILO – the labour costs (39 workers) with SP ($12,548). Partner cash contributions were significant adding just over $0.9M, equivalent to nearly 50% of the JPN deliverable budget. Thus ‘*the project’s sum is greater than its part*’, and indeed, without the integrating role of the project, many of these sub-projects would not have come to be.

The achievement of the project targets is summarised in the Table 4. Not all sub-projects have submitted final reports, in particular that of DSWD and one STEER sub-project. Where these figures are not available it is indicated. As it is the project will have reached at least **7468 workers (m-4064/f-3404)** and so exceeded its **development objective** of ‘6740 workers’ by 11%. It should also be noted that with some sub-projects supporting others (SD supporting LRB) some beneficiaries will have been counted twice, but this would not be as much as 11%.

The **Local** **resource based projects (LRB)** reached, **3368 workers (m-1808 / f-1560)** 75% short of the 4475 target. Yet the days worked and the wages paid here are in excess of the numerical targets. Actual beneficiaries from the DSWD project have not been reported, potentially adding a further ~600 LRB workers to the total. This may explain to some extent the higher figures here.

Within the 25 LRB sub-projects, the project engaged with 21 separate agencies as the main sub-project managers, and then numerous additional agencies within the implementation groups formed. These come with a range of competencies and it is difficult to assess to what degree their capacities have been enhanced through the project. Certainly the concept of utilising local-resources, especially those regarded as discarded or waste is one that will have been highlighted through the LRB projects and which they could continue apply. The target that communities and agencies would continue to develop further LRB plans to seek funding is an excellent one. The evaluation team did not assess this directly, but was not aware of any such ongoing planning.

The **skills development (SD)** component reached **2336 (m-1240 / f-1096)** beneficiaries and thus achieved well over its target of 1745 workers. The bulk of the training was through TESDA or TESDA affiliates and is high quality output. Even though many of the courses were shortened, trainees were still able to sit and pass NC-II certification. Trainings varied in response to local needs, with high concentration for construction and small engine repairs in urban Tacloban, but shifting more towards tourist based occupations in other sites, e.g. beauty care and food processing in Cebu. Unemployed youth was in the prodoc to be a focus in selection of trainees, but this did not appear to be the case. Trainees were those in unskilled labour occupations and with families and so generally suitable.

**Enterprise development ED** also dramatically over-achieved its goal of ‘enhancing entrepreneurial knowledge’ reaching 1764 (m-1016/f-748) beneficiaries, far exceeding its target of 520. The main **ED** intervention was aimed at ‘rebuilding and strengthening’ existing businesses. This was achieved through providing the interactive C-BED training package to an impressive 1511 small business operators, along with the various agencies providing them ongoing support (e.g. TESDA, NGOs, Women’s Associations etc.). The training events were small and focussed, (typical session’s 10-30 trainees). Trainees were selected by these agencies which also provided working capital (conditional cash transfers) and on-going coaching support. This was a highly effective way to reach a large number of such small businesses to provide them with the business and financial management skills that are a recognised gap for this group of operators.

**Table 4: Summary of achievement against target**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Target** | **Achieved**  **(male/female)** | **Percent completed** |
| **Development objective**  Support employment creation and livelihood opportunities and employability of poor and vulnerable workers and families in affected areas | 6740 workers reached | **7468**  **(4064/3404)** | **111%** |
| **Immediate Objectives 1** Provision of and advocacy for social protection for workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation and community infrastructure improvement works. | | | |
| **Output 1.1** Social protection is provided to workers | 100% | 100% | **100%** |
| **Output 1.2** Social protection advocated with key government agencies | Guidelines | Not assessed | **-** |
| **Immediate Objective 2:** Community-based approaches optimizing and combining the use of local resources, used for small social + productive infrastructure repairs and reconstruction, environmental rehabilitation and protection works (green works) | | | |
| **Output 2.1** Repair +reconstruction of  Community infrastructure + environmental works | 4,475 workers reached | **3368**  **(1808/1560)** | **75%** |
| **Output 2.2** Jobs + cash injections through local resource-based works | 4,475 job created  67,125 workday  $US 402,750 wages | **3368**  **152,221 days**  **$613,014** | **75%**  **227%**  **152%** |
| **Output 2.3** Enhanced capacity of partners to plan, design and implement LRB works; | 31 agencies | **21** (as sub-project proposers | **61%** |
| **Output 2.4** Further LRB projects designed for communities to gain additional funding | 8 plans developed | *None noted* | **-** |
| **Immediate Objective 3:** Vocational skills training and development provided for wage and self-employment. | | | |
| **Output 3.1** Short-term skills training has been provided | 1745 workers trained | **2336**  **(1240/1096)** | **133%** |
| **Output 3.2** Community-based Training + support  for start-up or enhancement of income activities | *Covered under C-BED below* | **-** |
| **Output 3.3** Young people received skills training + certification to improve employability | *Not dis-segregated in data* | **-** |
| **Immediate Objective 4:** Community-based enterprise development support for micro-small enterprises | | | |
| **Output 4.1** Individuals, micro-small businesses + communities enhance entrepreneurial knowledge | 520 workers reached | **1764**  **(1016/748)**  By sub-project type:  **C-BED -1511**  **STEER – 100**  **‘new enterprises’ - 153** | 339% |
| **Output 4.2** Value chain analysis identifies industries with potential | 2-3 sectors identified/site | General prioritization as provincial priorities only | **-** |
| **Output 4.3** Capacity of local partners strengthened for business development | 2 local institutions /site | Uptake of C-BED by 22 agencies in three sites: Tacloban, Cebu, Manila | + 100% |

Notes:

The numerical figures are derived primarily from the summary table in Annex V.

In addition to this it should be noted that (a) beneficiary data (actual) is not yet available for DSWD (sub-project 1# in Annex V); (b) actual beneficiary data for SALT I and II are unusual (items LRB in sub-projects; (c) C-Bed training is not listed in the MON matrix supplied, but included in the summary sheet.

The intervention also exposed 22 agencies to the C-BED package as a way of supporting small businesses. Several agencies incl., TESDA, Plan, CARE Oxfam to C-BED, have in turn trained a further 16,180 small business operators (indirect beneficiaries). The ongoing application of C-BED by the partner agencies speaks to the quality of the package and its appreciation.

The STEER interventions were also a training based intervention, combined with follow-up coaching. This focussed on selected SD beneficiaries already trained in construction skills, to enable them to become entrepreneurs in this area. As such they might also be considered to be establishing ‘new enterprises’ on a modest scale.

Four other ED sub-projects attempted to set up completely new enterprises, which in one case also required establishing a market the new product, the most challenging level of enterprise development. The effectiveness of these was variable. The Tri-cycle Foundation sub-project supported an existing foundation to provide additional services to its members (repairs and stocks of spare parts), in effect a new business model for them. This was completed on time and is dynamically expanding (see 4.5.1). For the remaining three ED sub-projects,[[12]](#footnote-12) while the ILO labour component for workplace construction was completed other aspects remained incomplete; equipment was not installed (moringa processing) and in all three cases production and marketing systems were not yet stabilised, and so sustainability is not ensured once support is withdrawn. These three sub-projects have local agencies for continued support but as noted earlier these agencies lack the specific expertise to provide this support. The number of direct beneficiaries for these four sub-projects is relatively small with 153 actively involved. Of course if the enterprises are successful the benefits and indirect beneficiaries involved will be considerably greater than a one-off LRB activity. These projects are discussed further in 4.3 and 4.4.

The **social protection package (SP)** is discussed here last as it depends on the application of the three components above, and was applied to all beneficiaries. This was assessed in the field with beneficiaries met who had all received the SP package. The expansion of the number of beneficiaries in the above components by 11%, would have budget implications for payment for SSS and PhilHealth and PP gear. This was not examined under the evaluation conditions.

***Final comments***

The key element in the project identifying and setting up the sub-project implementation groups was the field teams. In this they did an excellent job, and the bulk of the project were appropriate and effective in addressing local needs. The key here was in identifying an effective implementing partner who would manage delivery effectively. Considerable effort was put into the proposal development, both by the field teams and then by technical backstopping in Manila (project proposals carried many queries from Manila backstopping team). As a result the bulk of the sub-projects ran well.

Partner selection and establishment of the implementation teams was crucial. As indicated above the field teams did this generally well. However capacity of the partners was not always up to expectation. Where GoP agencies were responsible for inputs and procurement was required, these frequently were delayed when ‘business as usual’ protocols were applied. Partners who had existed prior to Haiyan appeared to be more competent. This is to be expected, but should not be a reason to completely avoid ‘newly formed’ agencies. Certainly in the area of ED, none of the agencies appeared to have adequate experience in this area, including such groups as PhilSSA and Fair Trade group. Their forte may well be in other areas, but this does not necessarily carry over into ED and VCD.

The project began in March 2014, five months after Haiyan and when the emergency phase was completed. It took 3 months before it initiated any sub-project, and then within the next 6 months. (July-Dec) the majority of the project were begun and completed. However one of the largest single sub-projects, with an institutional partner DSWD, for $480,000 (co-funded with Norway) was begun only in Dec 2014, and still ongoing at the time of the evaluation. Beginning such a large project in the final months is concerning, especially appreciating the institutional constraints an agency such as DSWD will have. Thus it does appear that the field teams were somewhat slow in identifying sub-projects, and in the end the project resorted to this large institutional project from Manila

The ED component reached an impressive number of beneficiaries through the C-BED and STEER interventions. However weaknesses occurred with the sub-projects that attempted to establish new enterprises. The difficulties here were inherent in the short time available which automatically limited the support the project could provide to coach or mentor the enterprises in production and market management. This was expected to be conducted by the implementing partners who will have ongoing involvement, but their awareness and capacity of these areas was also judged as weak. Other complexities remain for these type of projects, particularly in asset management, and these are discussed under Impact, section 4.5.1. It should be noted also that such complexities can soak up large amounts of staff time and distract from other work. As a result these sub-projects appear to have been an over-reach for the project given its resources.

The integration of project and forming of implementation teams is recognised as an achievement of the field teams. But this adds to the complexity of the implementation. While the field teams continued with follow-up, it appeared that once the sub-project has been granted, given so much effort had been put into proposal development, ongoing involvement of the ILO field teams was minimal. Where follow-up did take place it was ad hoc, and with the implementing partners separately. This allowed different messages, views and approaches to develop. As such it would be worthwhile for proposals to set a series of validation points where progress could be checked, and for group meetings with all partners attending. Recognising the disaster context, this is not easy, but to short cut these types of procedures then results in issues arising which are far more difficult to address after the fact.

**4.3.2 Examine the effectiveness of project institutional framework, its management arrangement and coordination mechanism** **with other relevant ILO projects, and with other implementing partners.**

The project used the ‘cluster meetings’ as the starting point at the local level to assess needs and identify partners for sub-projects. The cluster meetings are a recognised mechanism within local Philippines government and ensured that sub-project were aligned with, and engaged the LGUs. In this manner the project reinforced this mechanism, as well as demonstrating to the LGUs the formation of integrated projects and streamlined planning.

The project operated in the five sites separately. There was little direct interaction between sites for sharing of lessons, other than by cross fertilization by the Manila based technical advisors. Given the short time frame this is perhaps understandable.

The ILO had three other funding sources outside of Japan, including DFID, Norway and IMEC. While the DFID funds were committed to specified activities, open planning was allowed with the other two. This provided the opportunity for ILO to use multiple donors to fund activities. In many cases this did not appear related to any specific input by the respective donors, but simply a sharing of the inputs. While such flexibility can be relished for planners, at times it did not seem to add to the activity.

**4.3.3 Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to changing situation on the ground or challenges faced**

With an open planning structure for the project, this aspect of project management was not so prominent. Several small adjustments were made, such as the employment of an excol expert to do remedial work on the SALT 2# sub-project. The interesting adjustment was by the Cebu field team, who were not satisfied with the ‘cluster meetings’ as the doorway to sub-projects, and so conducted its own ‘project identification workshop’ (Dec. 2014), which generate a second group of sub-projects.

* 1. **Efficiency**

**4.4.1 Has the project been implemented in the most efficient way vis-à-vis it’s financial and human resources?**

**Have activities been implemented in a cost efficient manner and have project objectives been achieved on time and with planned budget?**

The project budget (version 10#) indicates two types of allocations to achieve project deliverables (a) sub-contract: $973,579 and (b) grants - $936,401, together making the deliverable budget a total of $1,909,980, or 64% of the total budget of $3,000,000. Final expenditures in the MON sheets supplied lists expenditures in two forms (a) ‘downloads to partner’ and (b) “ILO total costs’, which together total 2,595,986 (see summary table Annex V). This is far in excess of the deliverables budget. As the items acquitted against ‘ILO costs’ is not specified it is not clear exactly what the expenditure against the ‘deliverable’ budget was.

Financial delivery as of June 2015 is at [[13]](#footnote-13)97% (approx. US$2.9M of US$3M) with beneficiary reach of 109% (total of 7350 vs. target 6740). Under grants, ten agreements were executed (each amounts to >US$30-thousand) and 31 sub-projects under purchase orders with LRB having the biggest allocation comprising almost 49% of total ILO costs followed by SD-40%, SP-7% and ED-4%.

The project is executed in five field offices each with a team comprised of one project coordinator, one technical officer (engineer), one M&E-excol, one adfin staff and a driver. The teams are backstopped by technical specialists and a chief technical advisor at CO-Manila.

**Key points:**

**Small teams vs. mobilisation**

* Field level - Field team composition did not favour rapid achievement of targets. Sub-project identification, proposal preparation took up to 3 months. Once approved, execution requires further 1-2 months for social preparation activities. Despite there being implementing partners, they cannot always be relied upon to do this effectively and ILO staff need to be involved in this critical stage. With only two technical staff at each site, and one of these responsible for overall management, it is not possible to achieve rapid mobilisation. As a result funds expended for the first six months of project operations is only 16% of the total budget, --- arguably a manifestation of alarmingly slow project movement, and also a delay in reaching project beneficiaries.
* Admin level - Sub-project development takes three layers of review process at CO-Manila. Once a particular proposal is submitted for appraisal, the technical document is forwarded to the designated specialist for sub-project type (one reviewer each for LRB, SD, ED), with financial aspects reviewed by designated finance staff. Where revisions are required it is returned to the field office for improvement, necessarily requiring consultation with the various implementing partners. Once technically approved, it is forwarded for review by the project CTA, for final approval and then signature of the Country Director. Only then shall the proposal be issued with fund request and appropriated with budget by the finance unit. The process takes 1-3 months, given the limited number of staff appraising the numerous proposals emanating from the 5 field offices. While criticism is often levelled at government agencies for continuing to use standard operating procedures under disaster conditions, there is also a need for the ILO to examine this procedure to find more efficient mechanisms to mobilise projects implemented under emergency conditions.

**Results achieved vs. Budget**

On LRB

* LRB projects make up the bulk of ILO costs (49%). The bulk of LRB sub-projects were ‘micro’ or low budget (<US$40,000). These had notably far reaching impacts, among those visited by the evaluation team were i) footbridge construction in Brgy. Sulangan, Bantayan which connects two islets (sitios) providing safe passage of children to and from school and fish traders for marketing of their fresh-catch; ii) Mangrove reforestation in Busuanga that will sufficiently provide protection to the residents against big waves come typhoon season and affords spawning ground for different fish species; and iii) Mortuary Renovation in Tacloban which paves way for the upgrading of critical hospital facility that was totally damaged by Haiyan.
* The **SALT** application was the highest funded type of interventions (5 sub-project) at a total of US$394,767. Based on the monitoring data sheet SALT-1 covers 23 hectares involving 700 workers and generated 60,900 workdays while SALT-2 covers 33 hectares involving 244 workers and generated 48,100 workdays (notably SALT-1 has more workers but lesser work days). The disparity in the unit of output per person per day is also glaring --- SALT-1 at 3.8 sq.m./worker/day vs. SALT-2 at 6.9sq.m./worker/day. Compared to SALT application in other ILO projects (DFID-Haiyan and Bopha Proj), the average output per worker is set at minimum 11 sq.m./worker/day. Efficiency was further compromised in SALT-2 by poor planning, misguided technology application (slash and burn in Brgy. Caraycaray), poor social preparation and technical inputs, due to poor monitoring by both implementing partners and project team. To recover this a SALT technical expert was hired, but near the tail-end of project which may no longer suffice to produce outputs, and much less contribute to the achievement of project objective number 2 (i.e. greenworks).

On SD

* Skills development activities came second to LRB in terms of budget allocation at 40% of total ILO cost, reaching 2,336 beneficiaries that have availed of NC-II certification from TESDA. The range of the skills training varied from highly labour intensive i.e. carpentry, masonry, welding, small engine repair; to mildly labour intensive i.e. beauty care, cookery, tour-guiding, handicraft weaving. Identification of marketable skills is well coordinated with relevant agencies: i) DSWD, Habitat for Humanity and Red Cross (for hiring of training graduates to their respective shelter projects); ii) LGUs (under their tourism unit for hiring of tour guiding graduates and tapping of beauty care graduates for contracting and home service). ILO advocacy on social protection and decent work is well integrated in the skills development component to significantly contribute in the achievement of project objective number 3.

On ED

* Enterprise development takes a small sliver of the budget of ILO costs. Through the C-BED and STEER interventions a total of 1611 (with expected further 100 from STEER2-DOLE) were reached. This was thus extremely effective both in terms of fund use and expected impact.

The four sub-projects which attempted to establish new enterprises[[14]](#footnote-14) used $115,644 or about 6%[[15]](#footnote-15) of the deliverable budget. These funds included immediate income during construction and start-up, similar to LRB sub-projects. For three of these; ICEB and moringa processing sub-projects in North Cebu; and Sawali Livelihood Project in Coron the number of ongoing beneficiaries was limited, a total of 153 beneficiaries: ICEB: 62 were provided C-BED training, but 30 HHs continue working). Fair Trade moringa processing: 55 persons trained in C-BED, with 20 HHs to operate when facility becomes operational; and Sawali weaving: from 42 to 9 HHs, due to drop in market demand once institutional or start-up markets were satisfied, but also rationalization of the original group as many were from same HH. This represents high project investment cost for few direct beneficiaries left to manage the livelihood activity. It is appreciated that beneficiaries can increase once enterprises prosper, but at this point they still face many challenges. In comparison for the Tri-cycle Repair shop, while there are only 27 direct beneficiaries, has afforded access of the facility/shop by 545 members across 17 Tri-cycle Operators and Drivers Associations in Tacloban City.

The extent of the ED sub-projects’ contribution to the achievement of immediate objective number 4 cannot be sufficiently ascertained yet within the project life.

On SP

* This is applied for all beneficiaries of the above three interventions. The total expenditures for SSS and PhilHealth are $$131,086 and $102,853 totalling $233,939. This figure is about 12% of the deliverable budget and can be considered justified for the longer term contribution it makes to SP awareness.
  1. **Impact**

**4.5.1 What has happened as a result of the project? To what extent the project has made its contribution to broader and longer team crisis response and decent work goal in the Philippine**

**Local resource based sub-projects**

To a large degree the LRB sub-projects represented a job-done. Beneficiaries obtained income for a limited time (15-20 days) and then had to obtain other sources of income for their livelihoods. These direct beneficiaries also gained some personal satisfaction in being employed in useful work, an important aspect in re-invigorating HHs following a disaster. Taken in this light it is a simple activity.

Perhaps the more important impact from LRB sub-projects is gained from the social benefits they confer with indirect beneficiaries. Generally the LRB sub-projects constructed social infrastructure which enabled normal social and economic activities to proceed, such as though clearing of land for housing, construction of causeways, repairs to schools, construction of a city mortuary (Tacloban) etc.

In some case the LRB activities were far more transformative. Mangroves have in the past protected coastal communities from wave damage during storms. In several coastal sites ‘mangrove re-forestation’ was conducted to provide the communities with barriers against future storms. In one notable project a new 300m footbridge was constructed between two low lying islands. Previously communities on one island had had to wait for low tide to cross between islands. This had prevented children attending the school on the larger island (25% absenteeism rates) or attending school and then being stranded overnight. Women had been discouraged from carrying their produce to markets on the larger island, etc. The bridge itself was constructed with local bamboo (provided by the LGU), and fallen electric poles (provided by the municipal electricity commission) as the main posts, thus making use of local and discarded material from Haiyan. Communication between the islands has change profoundly, with school absenteeism reduced to almost nil. This would apply to all the micro-LRB projects but such indirect beneficiaries are not generally able to be assessed or reported on without specific examination.

One set of sub-projects were aimed at agricultural communities and workers, the construction of Sloping Agricultural Land Technology (SALT). This uses vegetative contour barriers to stop water flow downhill and sloping land and thus reduces erosion and crop washouts in heavy rainstorms. As applied it also enables farmer associations to access upland areas at low tenancy rates (10-15%) for joint cultivation and shared incomes from the harvests. While there are examples of where this has been applied successfully, these tend to be special cases. The system itself takes several years to establish and fully functional, and the concept of joint cropping and profit sharing is fraught with difficulties and generally unlikely to persist. Thus while the site visited is impressive in its landscaping, contour barriers were not well established (drought in recent months would play a role here), but nevertheless without a functional system in place it is unlikely the beneficiaries would witness its effectiveness or advantages. The participants themselves did not indicate they were well prepared to continue operation or that income sharing arrangements were in place. Under such circumstances SALT is unlikely to persist. With low cost leases in place, some famers might continue to use the land for cropping and so gain benefit in this manner.

The SALT activity is worth commenting on further, as it used $393,767 or 20% of the deliverable budget, over 5 sites. It is a technology with a high profile amongst agricultural projects in the Philippines, but with success only in particular cases. It does have application in its ability to reduce washouts and crop damage from severe rain storms. However sites need to be selected carefully, the system itself installed in a cost-effective manner (i.e. without embellishments of paths and meeting huts etc.) so farmers can be interested to apply on their own land. It should be further supported by value-chain development work to ensure that crops produced can be sold profitably. This requires at least 2 seasons (24 months) to allow the social preparation and follow-up. Thus it is not suitable for short timeframe disaster recovery projects, and in any case should be applied only after careful assessment.

**Skills development sub-projects**

This was contract through TESDA or TESDA accredited schools. The courses mainly focus on construction were generally adapted from their standard course curriculum, mainly through shortening of the time. Nonetheless the beneficiaries still sat the certification exams and most were still able to gain their NC-II certificates of competency.

The SD training had high impact on the immediate incomes of the beneficiaries and their future livelihood opportunities.

The previous employment of most trainees was as unskilled labour, including; on-farm; office and factory. As such their incomes were generally well below the minimum wage, as low as 100P/day. Following training, trainees in construction skills almost all gained employment with day rates at minimum wage (~300 P/day according to the area) or well above (up to 600P/day). This was so for both men and women trainees. The employment demand was strongest in Tacloban, and appeared less strong in the more isolated areas (Nthn Cebu and Coron) where trainees needed to travel to find work. The other courses, beauty care, food processing and hospitality (Nth Cebu and Coron) were selected in response to identification of tourism as a main industry for those areas. These were still in progress and so uptake in employment could not be assessed. The beauty care trainer noted that some of her trainees had already gained spot income, from providing services in their own communities, indicating a local demand in addition to tourism.

The employment uptake for the trainees is an economic indicator. But beyond this is the change in livelihood opportunities. As noted above most trainees were previously engaged in unskilled labour and as such, feed into a large labour pool, with few opportunities to advance themselves or their families’ livelihoods. Completing the courses provided through the project has dramatically changed that, as they now have skills that are in demand and opportunities to further advance themselves. Several construction trainees met (men and women) had gained positions as foremen, or were now able to take on ‘ticket’ jobs. With this has come the confidence that they can change themselves also. This was very evident in the trainees met. Overall this activity was considered to have a very high impact on the beneficiaries’ lives.

**Enterprise development sub projects**

As noted earlier, the main ED effort focussed on rebuilding and strengthening existing enterprises through the provision of C-BED training package. This was directly applied to 1511 small business and then through partner agencies independently to a further 16,180 businesses. The degree to which these will have applied the business and financial skills provided and so gain economic gains, cannot be stated at this point. However C-BED was well accepted and a fair uptake can be expected. The STEER sub-projects provided similar training to two sets of 100 construction trainees of SD sub-projects to encourage them to operate as entrepreneurs. These trainees had not previously operated business and thus the degree to which they will respond is less predictable. However several of the trainees met in Cebu and Coron had begun to take on contract or ‘ticket’ jobs.

While the new enterprises comprise a relatively small portion of the overall project effort, they nonetheless attract attention due to their potential.

The most notable ED sub-project inspected was the tri-cycle repair and spare parts project. This initially involved only a small number of beneficiaries; 27 (10 women) who received training in ‘small motor repair’ on behalf of the Tacloban Federation of Motor-cab for Hire Drivers and Operators (TAFEMDO). The federation itself was granted a reserve of spare parts ($33,242 from DOLE), and they themselves established their store and repair centre. The benefits from this are modest – minimal down time for repair, spare parts on credit, small income from repairs to other members or friends’ motorcycles which might amount to +1000 P per month. More importantly the federation has increased its membership from the original 220 to about 550, spurred by the repair centre. It is notable that where so many groups who receive material inputs, this group did not, but welcomed additional members. The expanded membership has given them a voice, in May this year they conducted a motorcade to oppose a new city ordinance to grant a franchise for tri-cycle services to a single company. As a result of this action the ordinance lapsed. It should be noted that for this subproject the inputs provided were relatively small; training for members, and a grant to establish a repair shop, and spares stock. This provided a venue and practical focus for the try-cycle members who normally working in a disbursed manner. From this has grown a dynamic association of self-employed workers, with a voice to influence their own working conditions. This was certainly not expected from the outset, but is a very significant impact gained beyond the simple enterprise itself.

A second project that illustrates both the opportunities and issues with new enterprise establishment is the Interlocking Compressed Earth Brick (ICED) production, Bantayan Island, Nth Cebu. A post-Haiyan NGO, DAMGO formed from existing group of 18 farmer associations, sought an enterprise to provide income and the ICEB was suggested. Training and equipment was provided, and the small factory has been operational some months already. It uses crushed lime-earth prevalent on the island, mixed with 10% cement, and then compressed into bricks in a hand-press. The bricks have an excellent appearance, and their protuberances allow them to construct small buildings by ‘stacking’ without need for columns, thus saving in cost, and construction time (30%). At the same time they provide a stronger building, an important attribute in typhoon prone areas. Their pricing at 19-20 P / brick is higher than local cheap cement blocks @ 11P/brick made from sea-sand (which due to salt content gradually collapse), but cheaper than ‘quality’ cement blocks, made with standard river-sand, @ 24 P/brick. The factory has an institutional buyer but this is limited. However given the quality of the product, it should be able to compete with existing product and find its own market niche.

Issues with the project are managerial and ownership. Following training, only 2 shifts of 11 workers and their supervisors are retained to operate the factory, employed on a wage basis by DAMGO. DAMGO currently still manages the factory but does not seem to have a strong business sense; both earth crushers were in needed of repairs and out of order, so there was no supply of lime earth thus halting production – such maintenance should have been dealt with promptly for a business to survive. Its young staff while enthusiastic, have no sense of marketing the product once the institutional market is satisfied. Finally there did not appear to be a clear procedure for distribution of profits to the 18 member associations, or any program to hand-over the enterprise to them. The workers met indicated no expectation of this. Such hand-over was not explicit in the proposal. It would in fact be difficult to hand the enterprise over as the member associations are not ‘compact’ but dispersed across 18 different communities. To set-up an ownership structure with such dispersed communities would be difficult. At this point the beneficiaries are 22 shift workers (receiving the minimum wage which they appreciate), for an enterprise that appears to be owned by DAMGO, who themselves are weak in production and market management skills for sustainable operation. The ICEB does appear to be an excellent product, and one very appropriate to the island conditions, where raw materials for construction are limited. Its introduction through the project could be a major opportunity to have this building material mainstreamed. The issues indicated above are not impossible to deal with, but it would take time, and expertise, to work through the various issues of ownership, operation and marketing, with DAMGO and the 18 farmer associations.

These issues were found in various forms with the other two ‘new enterprise’ ED projects; Sawali bamboo weaving and *moringa* processing. These issues are less to do with the business model than to how the business will fit with the beneficiaries and their community. These are summarized below:

* Projects are initiated relying on an ‘institutional markets’ arranged by the project. This ensures production output has an immediate market and enables set-up of the enterprise. However these institutional markets generally will have some limitation or challenge, which without project backing, the communities will have difficulty to renegotiate. Thus while these markets do operate, projects need to facilitate communities to explore links with more accessible local markets. This would apply to the ICEB enterprise above (and to another non-JPN enterprise visited; green-charcoal production).
* Projects frequently have high fund inputs for relatively few beneficiaries. If the enterprises flourish then benefits will be sustained and other ‘indirect beneficiaries’ will gain through engagement in the value chain. While the indirect beneficiaries can off-set the high fund/beneficiary ratio, there should be ways to extend the benefits to the wider community, (e.g. % profit for use of land, water, etc.).

Where project provide material inputs, building, machinery, etc., then the ownership of these assets should be structured within the communities to ensure they are not captured by a few, and there are arrangements so that participants of the enterprise can join or leave as required. Where local resources are used, such as the Sawali weavers, collection of bamboo a local resource once used freely for occasional household needs, can be depleted or infringe on rights of other users as large volumes are collected for the enterprise. In such cases ‘natural resource management’ plans will need to be developed, and sometime compensation to other users.

The communities met did not appear to have thought about these issues, understandably as they were still focussed on getting the enterprise going. Similarly these issues did not appear to have been considered by the implementing partners, or the ILO staff. At the same time given the short timeframe of the project they would be difficult to begin to address.

The provision of **SP** to the project beneficiaries made them aware of the services they were entitled to and the mechanisms to obtain them. This is part of a long term strategy then for these communities to continue to access these services, and for the agencies concerned to recognise that they could take constructive action to deliver these services in areas where previously there had been little uptake.

The beneficiaries at each site were questioned whether they appreciated the SP provision, and if so whether they would continue to maintain it themselves. This was strongly affirmative and already practiced to some degree in Tacloban city, and then to gradually lesser degree moving away from city centres, but still positive. In fact in Coron the most distant site, the village of Buluang, Coron (site of mangrove reforestation), the community were actively maintaining their payments. This was clearly a special case and would be worth assessing the factors that had contributed to this strong uptake in this community. Of course the SSS and PhilHealth could provide protection to project beneficiaries during the course of the project. There were two instances noted when this was applicable, one death of one worker (after project work completed) and one seeking recompense of medical funds. In both cases the normal day-to-day procedures results in the claimants not receiving their entitlements up to 6 months after the events. If this is the case then such SP exists in theory only.

**4.5.2 What real difference that the project has made to the ultimate beneficiaries, capacity of local authorities, and to gender equality?**

Areas where the project has made a real difference to beneficiaries have been largely described above. The key areas and areas which are impressive, are in;

1. The reconstruction and construction of social infrastructure under the LRB, where these will have enabled normal social and economic functions disrupted by Haiyan to resume. This would be so in almost all sub-projects other than the SALT sub-projects which are not expected to persist, and will have provided temporary income only.
2. The skills development which has directly enabled most trainees to obtain ‘permanent work’ at minimum wage or above, a big step up from wages they received as unskilled labour. The more significant impact is in the opportunities this has opened for these beneficiaries to shift from being part of a large pool of unskilled labour to being able to enter skilled workforce.

The ED initiatives directed at strengthening existing enterprises, typically with poor businesses and financial practices, would have the potential to stimulate important changes that would significantly improve their profitability and sustainability. The three ‘new enterprises’ supported have the potential to provide the beneficiaries with quite new livelihoods. Achieving this depends on effective ongoing mentoring to stabilise these by the implementing partners who will continue to operate in the areas independently.

The SP has not made direct impact at this point. The contribution of this initiative has been to alert the beneficiaries to their entitlements and the mechanisms they need to access them. For a limited group, membership for these will be maintained and benefits thus accrue. Perhaps the main benefits is that various agencies including the GoP partner agencies with ILO that have vested interest in SP, have been mobilised in extending these services and begin to see that they should become the norm even in isolated rural communities

The inclusion of women in many of the trainings normally the preserve of men, in construction skills, has altered the lives and opportunities of the women concerned. The attitudes of the agencies providing the training, such as TESDA, has also been affected by this non-traditional inclusion of women in these male dominated occupations. This may lead them to continue to encourage women in these areas in the future.

## 4.6 Sustainability

**4.6.1 and 2 To what extent the project’s benefit continue after the project ended, and, what factors which will have, or will, influence the continuity of the project’s benefit?**

The project began post- emergency. As such it did not include activities addressing immediate needs which necessarily are transient, but with recovery and rebuilding. As such all four outputs (interventions) should continue to confer benefits after its completion.

A larger proportion of the LRB sub-projects were directed at the rebuilding social infrastructure damaged during Haiyan (13 of the 25). These included rebuilding of schools, roads, a mortuary, roads, and so on. The benefits and social functions will certainly continue. This will also be so for two mangrove reforestation initiatives, which once they do grow will act as buffer against wave damage in future storms to protect these coastal communities. All the LRB project will need maintenance, either by Baranguy councils or the communities themselves. To a larger degree arrangements for both these types of support were put in place.

In contrast to this the five SALT sub-projects are unlikely to make an impact or to continue as they were designed. It is unlikely that the communities will continue with group labour for either cultivation, or that the contour strips that confer erosion protection will continue to be maintained. The project obtained tenancy agreements at low rates (10-15%) and so some of the members of the farmer associations may well take advantage of this and continue to crop these areas. Here access of individual members to what is in effect community leases (farmer associations) may see minor conflicts arise.

The SD sub-projects, with the bulk of the trainees now with NC-II certification, and with their growing work experience, should see these beneficiaries continue to access skilled employment for the future. This will have in effect have had a profound effect on their livelihood horizons and is most commendable.

The C-BED training was well applied and now continues to be applied by several responsible agencies (TESDA, Plan, CARE etc.). This is both an indicator of its effectiveness and that it is now seen as an effect business development tool that will continue to be applied. However single training inputs can only have limited impact. Where the recipients of the training also receive ongoing support from the 22 partner agencies, there is greater likelihood that the C-BED messages will be applied and have effect. It would in fact be better that such ongoing support was ensured and built into the project. This type of approach have already begun to be used through the STEER type sub-projects. Such an approach could be applied more widely. For the 4 sub-projects that supported ‘new enterprises’, these require considerable mentoring to be fully operational and with secure markets. The implementing partners will continue to operate in these sites for at least another year, which should be sufficient time. However their understanding of enterprise development is somewhat weak and they could struggle to provide effective support. It would be worthwhile to find some means to provide intermittent guidance to them over the next 12 months.

Institutionally the project will have contributed to changed mindset and tools, which these institutions will continue to call on:

TESDA - has seen women embrace training in construction related trades; gain NCII certification; and gain employment. They are likely to be more ready to promote and accept women in these classes in the future. More generally they have worked through a process of course revision and accepted trainees with lower education standards than before. This can be expected to lead to more innovative and flexible courses in the future.

NGOs, TESDA and other agencies - have used and continue to use the C-BED training package. Given the current momentum seen already they should continue to do so and include this in their training/development strategies. (However we still await the travel study to assess the impact has with the end-users.)

DOLE, DSWD and NGOs – these have seen that there are mechanisms to make poor households aware of their basic rights and the mechanism by which they can access SP. Strategies employed to do this (piggy-backing the SP on various public works) could be applied more generally outside of disaster relief. At least two NGOs have recognised the validity of this and independently employed them in their own recovery programs.

**5. CONCLUSIONS**

## Strategic Fit

The Japan funded “Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities (PHI/14/02/JPN) with its development objective “ *Increased employment creation using employment-intensive approaches in community works, infrastructure works, and green works to reduce poverty and prepare for and respond to disasters”* had good strategic fit on several levels.

Within the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) of the International Humanitarian Country team (IHCT) the project directly contributes to achieving: ‘*Strategic Objective 3* ***-*** Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economy, agriculture and fisheries’. The project immediate objectives then addressed three of the four short term outcomes of the government’s main recovery plan, Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) i.e. ; Livelihoods – incomes restored ; Physical infrastructure- reconstructed according to disaster resilient standards; and Social services – communities able to access social protection services.

Furthermore, the project activities comply with Philippine Labor Law and the ILO’s country office Program PHL 101 - *Increased employment creation using employment-intensive approaches in community works, infrastructure works, and green works to reduce poverty and prepare for and respond to disasters*, through the social protection component of the project.

## Validity of Design

The project sub-projects generally were very appropriate to achieve the stated objectives. This was particularly so for the LRB and SD activities which directly address the RAY objectives as well.

The open planning which allowed the ILO field team at each of the five sites to allow the project to respond to the wide and varied needs on the spot, was considered a suitable approach in this disaster context.

Project time-frame of 12 months appears to be somewhat short. Project start-up, identification and mobilisation of sub-projects leaves only 6 months of effective working time. While locally based implementing partners can provide on-going support once the project ends, they often need ongoing coordination and support. A time frame of 18 months would enable a greater number of locally identified micro-sub-projects to be identified, mobilised, and on-going support to be provided by ILO field teams (ILO teams might change in size and composition throughout this time as required).

The ED component was mixed. The types of activities that rebuilt and strengthened existing enterprises (C-BED), and that encouraged skilled trades to move from accepting day-wage to operating as entrepreneurs (STEER) were excellent.

The establishment of ‘new enterprises’ requires considerable social preparation and follow up to ensure that assets, operations and marketing are well managed and stabilised. The 12 months’ time-frame of the project, and lack of staff with at least community organising experience at the field level were not available and did not allow for this. Given these limitations of this project, attempting this type of ED initiative was unrealistic.

Where project inputs are training based, some additional structured follow-up and experience sharing should be employed to stimulate change and top-up skills. This could also open opportunities for formation of associations for self-employed workers. This was done with STEER and could be applied more broadly.

## Project Effectiveness

The project identified and supported 39 sub-projects across the three outputs, (all with over-arching SP cover the fourth output). The sub-projects were highly varied and responsive to local needs. In this regard the project was highly successful.

The project reached 7382 workers, exceeding its overall development target of 6740 by 15%. This was mainly through exceeding targets for the SD and ED sub-projects. The LRB target, the largest of the three, was slightly under-achieved, with 3291 workers reached compared to the target of 4475, or just 73% of one of its major targets. Overall, given the challenge to match targets across interventions, and the excellent results from SD this is acceptable.

The high ED output was achieve through the implementation of C-BED training which focussed on existing enterprises. The four sub-projects to support development of new enterprises had relatively small number of beneficiaries and three of these were considered incomplete in that production is not operational and/or markets not stabilised. While these will have local NGOs continuing to support these, not all these have strong enterprise development backgrounds and as such these projects may still flounder.

Several points can be noted that affect the effectiveness of delivery.

* The ILO field teams played a key role in identifying the sub-project; constructing the implementation teams and then mentoring the proposals. The thorough vetting of the proposals by the field team and Manila ensured that once approved implementation generally proceeded well.
* Selection of the core implementation partner is key.> Partners mainly were local NGOs, and those with previous experience appear to have been better in managing their sub-projects
* Sub-projects have benefited with a number of partners, but this adds to complexity and different perspectives on implementation. The ILO teams had limited influence once sub-project launched. There was a need for them to continue to advise and coordinate. This could be achieved through incorporating clear validation points involving all partners, and so keep all partners on the same page, as well as allow ILO to have further influence.
* Where the government institutions have been responsible for management , procurements etc., the day-to-day procedures, especially procurement, significantly impeded completion of projects

## Efficiency

Field team composition did not have adequate active field staff (cf. administrative staff) to identify and mobilise sub-projects quickly as required within a short (12 months) disaster recovery project. Constricting processes for sub-project approval further delayed deliverables, highlighting the need to put in place suitable management efficiency mechanisms for projects implemented under emergency context.

SALT application is not worthwhile to pursue under short-term projects. Its role should by to provide resiliency for upland agriculture and as such this requires at least two seasons (24 months) to establish and then demonstrate this function. Apart from this the way it was established in this project it will likely not continue, and hence was a waste of financial resources. Other LRB type interventions, mostly rebuilding of community assets are more viable to pursue; require low financial inputs; and yet are very sustainable.

SD and ED for strengthening existing enterprises both significantly contribute to achievement of the project’s immediate objective number 3. Those ED sub-projects supporting new enterprises were beyond the reach of the project given the longer processes they entail to mature. Their contribution to the achievement of immediate objective number 4 looks doubtful but cannot be ascertained yet.

**Impact**

The LRB sub-projects had a direct and immediate impact of providing income to the beneficiaries for a limited period. However the main impact from these sub-projects derives from the reconstruction of infrastructure which has played an important role in allowing local communities to resume normal functioning. This was certainly achieved with the bulk of the LRB project (13/25), which repaired schools, roads, mortuary, etc. The cluster of 5 sub-projects which introduced Sloping Agriculture Land Technology (SALT) however, are not expected to be maintained either for effective in erosion control or group cultivation.

The SD sub-projects which tailored courses for local labour demand (construction in Tacloban, tourism in Cebu, etc.) and the educational status of Haiyan affected persons did firstly enable the trainees to obtain NCII certification in most cases. This will enable these beneficiaries who came mainly from the large pool of unskilled labour to obtain well paid and responsible positions.

The main ED sub-project which provided C-BED training to a large number of existing small businesses through other partners does appear to be well received, but real impact in terms of how the messages have been applied and their impact on the businesses could not be assessed, and must wait for the tracer study to be completed in July). STEER focussed supporting skilled worked to shift from day-wage work to become entrepreneurs in their own right. In addition this created a forum or focus point which allows such self-employed workers to exchange experiences and could be a pathway toward formation of associations for such self-employed workers. Such was also noted with the tri-cycle drivers’ foundation in Tacloban whose membership is increasing dynamically and has been able to affect their working conditions (more equitable city ordinances).

As noted above the sub-projects which supported establishment of new enterprises were in the main not fully operational and thus do not yet deliver impact.

The Social Protection provided did not confer any impact at this point, but where it has alerted workers to their rights which may result in them progressively seeking or demanding these in future work opportunities. Similarly this experience may have alerted the relevant agencies responsible to ensure decent work conditions in the Philippines (DOLE, DSDW) that there is a receptivity to these, and that they might apply similar programs to promote and ensure compliance in the future.

## Sustainability

The bulk of the LRB projects focussed on re-construction of social infrastructure and these will continue to provide benefits to the communities where they are located. While maintenance is required, either by LGU’s or the communities themselves, in most cases arrangements for this had also been put into place. As noted above, this assessment will not apply to the cluster of SALT sub-projects.

The SD sub-projects have enabled the majority of trainees (2336) to gain NCII certification in their skill they were trained in. This, along with their accumulating experience will continue to enable them to obtain skilled employment; good wages and confidence to future advance themselves.

The main input for ED was C-Bed training for existing small business operators. The application of the lessons has not been assessed at this point. However a reasonable number could be expected to apply these in some measure, and where so they will continue to derive on-going benefits. The sub-projects for establishment of new enterprise are generally still not operational. While ongoing support from the implementing partners (local NGOs) will continue, it is not clear that these will adequately guide them in operational and markets challenges. It would be brave to predict their sustainability at this point.

**6. LESSONS LEARNT AND EMERGING BEST PRACTICES**

**6.1 Lessons Learnt**

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| ILO Lesson Learned Template  Project Title: Integrated livelihood recovery for typhoon affected communities.  Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/02/JPN  Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: June.2015  The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report. | | |
| LL Element Text | | |
| Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task) | The assembling of multi-partner implementing teams was an achievement and the vetting process of the proposals, (between field team and Manila) generally ensured the final proposal was solid and implementation could proceed.  There were a number of sub-projects where this was not adequate and; (a) coordination between members of the implementing teams (NGOs, LGUs etc.) was not maintained, and (b) where the responsible implementing partner did not have sufficient background to manage effectively (particularly ED sub-projects). Thus ILO field staff should continue to have an active role in mentoring and coordination amongst implementing partners **throughout the sub-projects.**  This could be achieved through inclusion of validation points within the proposals to bring all implementing partners together to assess progress. This will: (a) ensure that all partners maintain the same perspective on management of the sub-projects, and  (b) Provide structured opportunities for the ILO field team to continue to support and have influence on activities. |
| Context and any related preconditions | Sub-projects are an effective mechanism to address the wide range of local issues arising from a disaster to be identified by site based team and addressed. They typically are composed of a number of implementing partners providing a range of inputs and support throughout the project. This enhances projects, but adds to the complexity of management |
| Targeted users /  Beneficiaries | New procedures for development of proposals and management of sub-projects would benefit the implementing partners, and other stakeholders. |
| Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors | Staff had made great efforts to identify sub-projects and assemble the implementing teams. Once this was accomplished they assumed sub-projects should run themselves, and they focused on new sub-projects. Many did but some ran into difficulties. |
| Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors | **-** |
| ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation) | It should be possible for ILO to develop new protocols and planning formats to enable them to monitor progress at agreed points |

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| ILO Lesson Learned Template  Project Title: Integrated livelihood recovery for typhoon affected communities.  Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/02/JPN  Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: June.2015  The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report. | | |
| LL Element Text | | |
| Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task) | The sub-projects for establishment of ‘new enterprises’ tended to be ‘uncompleted’ with production and markets not reliably established. These should not be included in short (12 months) disaster recovery projects due to a range of complexities;   1. ED type sub-projects typically have a high cost ratio to ‘direct beneficiaries’, compared to other interventions 2. They require considerable effort and field skills for implementing partners to provide; social preparation; enabling beneficiaries to perform new functions (e.g. farmers must learn to operate a production line reliably, source and engage with markets, etc.). 3. Where material resources are provided, the ownership right must be worked out before provision, to allow the group to change and encourage growth. |
| Context and any related preconditions | ‘New enterprise’ initiatives require a minimum of 2 yr. project timeframe, and staff with skills in community organization at least (at field level) and enterprise development within humanitarian contexts (at advisory level). These should be explicit in the project design or such activities not attempted.  It may be considered that local NGOs are ‘committed’ and so will provide the longer term support needed for ED, thus allowing ED initiatives to be included as sub-projects. However these local NGOs rarely have the specific expertise in enterprise development. |
| Targeted users /  Beneficiaries | ILO Field teams in the development of sub-projects and technical staff in Manila. |
| Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors | New enterprise initiatives can offer ongoing benefits, and by adding a new enterprises to an area, stimulate local economies. As such they are attractive to support. However these potential benefits should be assessed against the real challenges in their establishment, and the resources available to implement effectively. |
| Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors |  |
| ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation) | Guidelines for work on enterprise support, which distinguishes between enabling existing and establishing new ones should be developed. |

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| ILO Lesson Learned Template  Project Title: Integrated livelihood recovery for typhoon affected communities.  Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/02/JPN  Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: June.2015  The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report. | | |
| LL Element Text | | |
| Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task) | While SALT sites were more or less physically established but are unlikely to be functional for erosion control, or to see ongoing group cultivation. As such, SALT activities should not be included in short (12 months) disaster recovery projects. |
| Context and any related preconditions | SALT activities are extremely complex and must be regarded as an agriculture extension activity, with traditional ILO inputs such as cash4 work as a small part of the initiative. Where such activities are considered they would need to take into account (a) soil type and susceptibility to erosion; (b) local farming system and land use; (c) farmers’ access to land. Inputs that would need to be in place would include experienced extension worker in sustainable agriculture (not just construction of the SALT); (c) at least 24 months for introduction and follow-up (c) Value-chain development specialist o to ensure farmers will receive good returns for their produce to provide an incentive to continue to maintain the contour strip the key part of the SALT. |
| Targeted users /  Beneficiaries | ILO Field teams, both at field and technical supervision level (Manila) who should be aware of these issues and not accept them in 12 months recovery type projects, and be cautious in their consideration in even longer projects. |
| Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors | These have been widely promoted in Philippines, are impressive to visit and do have application in specific contexts. What is not recognized, is that the challenges are not technical (how to build a SALT site), but in identifying the suitable context and then the social preparation and support still needed. |
| Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors |  |
| ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation) | ILO staff (field and technical support staff in Manila) should be made aware of the context needed for SALT application and the inputs needed for success. This should aim to avoid miss-application in the future and ensuring necessary resources are available in the rare cases when it might be considered in a recovery project |

## 6.2 Emerging Best Practices

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| ILO Emerging Good Practice Template  Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan  Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM  Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: Feb.2015  The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report. | |
| GP Element Text | |
| Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.) | **The ‘open planning’ approach appears to be very suitable in the disaster recovery context. It allows field teams to identify local issues; possible sub-projects to address these, and then assemble implementing teams from a range of agencies.** |
| Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability | **This is especially suitable when affected areas are widely scattered and or have variable issues, and where a single initiative is not generally applicable.** |
| Establish a clear cause-effect relationship | **The wide range of sub-projects identified and applied over the five sites did address very specific local issues.** |
| Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries | **The 43 sub-projects identified and implemented through the project reached a total of 7,350 beneficiaries.** |
| Potential for replication and by whom | **This planning concept should be applicable in any future disaster recovery context; especially when areas affected are widely scattered and many issues need to be addressed.** |
| Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO’s Strategic Programme Framework) | **The sub-projects can be vehicles for the introduction of decent work conditions by piggy-backing these onto the main interventions,** |
| Other documents or relevant comments | **Various labor-based activities could be proactively (without any disaster trigger) supported through relevant agencies (DOLE, DSWD) to provide a vehicle for the introduction of decent work conditions to rural areas as part of a national program.** |

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| ILO Emerging Good Practice Template  Project Title: Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency and to build the resilience of small scale rice-and corn-based farming communities in Leyte province of Region VIII severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan  Project TC/SYMBOL: PHI/14/01/UKM  Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: Feb.2015  The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report. | |
| GP Element Text | |
| Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.) | **Where sub-project activities provided forums or focal points that allowed workers to meet, through follow-up training, or in the case of the tri-cycle drivers’ foundation in Tacloban, a repair and spare parts center, this fosters communication. This in term can be a pathway to associations for self-employed workers.** |
| Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability | **This opportunity will often occur with training based activities for skilled workers, but may also be enabled with small businesses in other way (e.g. tri-cycle drivers as above)** |
| Establish a clear cause-effect relationship | **The focal points, provided by follow-up training or other means that creates repeated meetings, enables communication and the opportunity for more formal structures to be explored** |
| Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries | **Applicable to trainees in skills development activities and micro, small and medium enterprises** |
| Potential for replication and by whom | **Could be applied as structured follow-up for all SD proposals and selected ED proposals** |
| Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO’s Strategic Programme Framework) | **Linked to ILO decent work objectives for workers to have a voice and being enabled to affect conditions that affect their livelihoods** |
| Other documents or relevant comments |  |

**7. RECOMMENDATIONS**

***1# Project design***

**1.1 Strengthened resources for recovery phase projects**

While there is an urgency to achieve rapid and focused delivery in the disaster recovery stage, project design and resources should be adjusted to enable this to be as effective and efficient as possible. Three areas where the design for disaster recovery projects could be adjusted are as follows:

1. Increase project timeframe from the current 12 to 18 months, with this time to allow field teams to focus on the identification and mobilization of locally identified micro-projects. These have proven to be highly effective in assisting the social to regain functionality with the impacts being highly sustainable.
2. Ensure the ILO Field teams continue to have a role in coordinating and guiding sub-projects throughout their implementation, particularly where there are multiple and less experienced implementing partners. This could be structured through development of templates for sub-project proposals to specify validation points at key stages of the project in which all implementing partners together to assess progress, and where timely guidance for ongoing work is provided.
3. ILO field teams should include staff with community background experience to facilitate coordination between multiple implementing partners and in providing guidance in community engagement within sub-projects.

**1.2 Non-inclusion of complex initiatives within short disaster recovery projects**

Complex activities, such as SALT and establishing ‘new enterprises’, should not be included in the range of activities for short (12 months) disaster recovery projects. Such projects require longer timeframes with at least 24 implementation time along with specific support:

* SALT should only be considered once context ([production environment and farming system, market opportunities etc.) has been assessed and found suitable. It needs to be seen as an extension initiative not cash4work, and as a result its introduction should be conducted in a way that encourages farmers to apply it on their own land.
* Where conditions are suitable for supporting establishment of new enterprises, planning needs to consider (a) transition from start-up markets, to local markets; (b) ownership and management structures to be inclusive and accommodate members joining and leaving the enterprise.

**1.3 Provide follow-up activities to consolidate inputs**

Follow-up activities should be structured into proposals to reinforce training inputs through experience sharing across beneficiaries, to (a) stimulate hesitant or weaker trainees; (b) provide a second chance to reinforce lessons and (c) build solidarity, that may provide a pathway towards building associations of independent self-employed workers and enterprises.

***Responsible agencies***

*The above three recommendations could be considered to be part of a set of guidelines for ‘project design’ for the ILO regional office , Bangkok, and other offices involved in project design and negotiation with potential donors. The Bangkok Regional Office, along with the ILO Office Manila, also use these in a concise set of guidelines for ‘implementation of disaster recovery projects’ for use by future field teams.*

***2# Project effectiveness***

**2.1 Improved internal management - for short disaster recovery projects**

Streamlined procedures for identification and approval of sub-projects should be identified. This may include locating technical advisors on site (e.g. Tacloban) so that assessment and recommendation for proposal development are more immediate.

Admin and monitoring procedures need to be established at start-up to ensure rapid feed-back and that activities are on track. While each project will have its specific requirements, templates for administration systems should be possible to be developed now from past projects.

Direction setting should be initiated by CO-Manila. Managing field teams’ performance should form part of the monitoring framework to optimize results (move as a team towards a common trajectory) and enforce substantive accountability among them (performance appraisal for teams lagging behind in delivery due to insufficient grasp of their functions).

***Responsible Agencies***

*Guidelines for these management recommendations should be made firstly by the ILO Manila office, in preparation for any future disaster recovery projects, with review by the Bangkok Regional Office for wider application.*

***3# Impact and Sustainability***

**3.1 Apply lesson from disaster recovery in mainstream decent work programs**

Lessons from the disaster recovery projects could be used to develop projects for mainstream ILO decent work activities.

3.1.1 Conduct reviews with partners on protocols which undermine their ongoing mainstream activities. In particular these could include: (a) slow procurement by LGU’s, and (b) slow response to claims by SSS and PhilHealth,

3.1.2 Design and seek funds for LRB and other labor-based activities as national programs with ILO partners (DOLE, DSWD) as part of national programs to introduce Decent Work components to rural areas.

3.1.3 Design and seek funds for activities that engage and then create ‘focal points’ for dispersed independent workers, as pathways for development and strengthening of associations for dispersed independent workers, to assist them to “express their concerns, to organize and to participate in decisions that affect their lives.

***Responsible Agencies***

*The first of these should be conducted by the Manila ILO country office as part of a general assessment of the Haiyan emergency and recovery projects with its local partners. The second two of these should be considered both by the Manila country Office and the Bangkok regional Office.*

# ANNEXES

## ANNEX I. Terms of Reference

“Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan affected communities”

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| --- | --- |
| Donor | The Government of Japan |
| TC code | PHI/14/02/JPN |
| Administrative unit | ILO Country Office for the Philippines |
| Technical Unit | DEV/INVEST |
| Project budget | USD3,000,000 |
| Type of evaluation | Independent final evaluation |
| Evaluation Manager | Tite Habiyakare |
| Date of evaluation | May 2015 |

## **1. Introduction and Rational for the final independent evaluation**

This Terms of Reference cover the final evaluation of the project. The project is implemented by ILO and funded by the Government of Japan. It is a one year project that started officially in March 2014. The project will end at the end of March 2015 [though a two month no-cost extension is currently under process meaning the project would end at the end of May 2015].

The final evaluation is a mandatory exercise for all ILO projects and as per ILO Evaluation policy, all ILO projects with budget of more than USD 1 million at least one independent evaluation is required. The independent final evaluation is thus required. The evaluation will be conducted by an independent evaluation team (one international and one national consultant). The evaluation process will be participatory and will involve ILO tripartite constituents, stakeholders, and beneficiaries throughout the process.

The evaluation aims at examining the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and at assessing what has been the impact of the project particularly on the beneficiaries. The evaluation will also report on the lessons learnt and possible good practices. The evaluation findings, recommendations and lessons learnt will provide valuable information regarding ILO response to Typhoon like type of crisis in the Philippines and also in other countries.

## 2. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

On the morning of 8 November 2013, the category 5 Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made a direct hit on the Philippines, devastating areas in 36 provinces. Typhoon Haiyan is possibly the most powerful storm ever recorded to hit land. The typhoon first made landfall in the municipality of Guiuan, Eastern Samar province, with wind speeds of 235 km/h and gusts of 275 km/h. Rain fell at rates of up to 30 mm per hour and massive storm surges up to six meters high hit Leyte and Samar islands. Many cities, towns and communities experienced widespread destruction, with as much as 90 per cent of housing destroyed in some areas. Roads were blocked, and airports and seaports impaired; heavy ships have been thrown inland. Water supply and power were cut, with much of the food stocks and other goods destroyed. In additional to the immediate humanitarian crisis, the disaster has had an immense impact on the livelihoods of the local communities.

It is estimated that the direct impact of Typhoon Haiyan in Regions IV – B (MIMAROPA), VI (Western Visayas), VII (Central Visayas), and VIII Eastern Visayas), was 5.6 million workers. Of these 60% were men and 40% women. An estimated 49% worked in the service sector, which includes retail, trade, transportation, accommodation and food service activities among others. The industry sector including mining, manufacturing, electricity, water supply and construction accounted for 13% of the employed while the agriculture, forestry and fishing comprised 38% of those previously employed. Provision of opportunities for more productive and decent employment must be seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups in order to reduce their vulnerability for future disasters and improve local communities and the local economy in an inclusive manner, allowing them to ‘build back better’.

For most livelihoods, income earnings have been cut in half. This has resulted in an increase in the amount of people looking for work. In urban areas the number of people seeking work is up by 10 percent (compared to pre-Haiyan levels). Daily labor (unskilled, non-agricultural) is most impacted, with currently 42 percent in search of work – hence highlighting the opportunity for livelihood programs for the most affected populations.

Destruction of and damage to millions of coconut trees have and will continue to have a heavy and long lasting impact on livelihoods. It is estimated that there were 15 million fallen coconut trees that will no longer be productive while it takes 6-8 years for a coconut tree to reach productive maturity. Families who rely on micro-small enterprises that are linked to the coconut industry’s value chain such as buyers, traders, transporters and exporters of coco products will be severely affected for some time to come.

Men and women engage differently across main sources of livelihoods. Wholesale and retail trading was predominantly reported as a female activity, whereas farming, fishing, salaried and skilled employment and non-agriculture daily labor were reported as typical activities carried out by men.

Even before Typhoon Yolanda hit, the poverty incidence in the provinces severely affected by Yolanda was relatively high as reported in the Family Income Expenditure Survey (FIES) in 2012. Across provinces, the poverty incidence ranges from 22.7 in Cebu to 63.7 in Eastern Samar. A total of 8.9 million workers were employed in agricultural production, industry, services, and a multitude of home-based enterprises in Regions IV-B, VI, VII, and VIII according to the October 2012 Labor Force Survey. Wage workers in the private sector number 2.8 million across all industries. An estimated 2.6 million workers are either self-employed or are unpaid family workers. Often with inadequate incomes and no or limited access to social security prior to the disaster, the latter group is most vulnerable to any disruption in employment and income flows. This project aimed to provide employment support to approximately 6,740 poor and vulnerable workers affected by Typhoon Haiyan. It complemented the ongoing activities of the ILO, which together with this project will be able to reach out to just over 20,000 workers. The project assists the transition phase of the recovery, moving away from immediate and emergency response to interventions which facilitate long-term and sustainable recovery of livelihoods. The ILOs integrated approach to livelihood recovery combines labour-based rehabilitation of public infrastructure, creation of alternative livelihoods through vocational skills development and re-establishment of micro and small/medium sized enterprises. The project also reinforces and advocates for existing government standards on minimum wages, occupational safety and health standards and provision of social protection for workers.

The project development objective is to ensure that 6,740 poor and vulnerable workers and their families will have increased their incomes, their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills), contributing to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods. The project will bring up the total number of poor and vulnerable workers affected by the Typhoon receiving employment support by the ILO programme to just over 20,000. It has 4 immediate objectives as follows:

*Immediate Objective 1*: Provision of social protection for workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation and community infrastructure improvement works.

*Immediate Objective 2*: Community-based approaches optimizing and combining the use of local resources are used for small social and productive infrastructure repairs and reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation and protection works (green works).

*Immediate Objective 3*: Labour-market responsive technical vocational skills training and development is provided for wage and self-employment.

*Immediate Objective 4*: Community-based enterprise development support is provided to micro-small enterprises and local communities

The ILO project performance framework is reflected in the project proposal and attached as **Annex 2** which provides detailed information about project objectives, outputs, performance indicators, and targets.

**The project management** – ILO Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) based in Manila has the overall responsibility for all ILO projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, assisted in the country office by an Early Recovery and Livelihood Specialist, an Enterprise and Livelihoods Officer, a Local Resource Based Officer and an Admin Finance team. For the Government of Japan funded project, the ILO Field Offices based in Bogo City, North Cebu; Coron, Busuanga; Tacloban, Leyte and Tagbilaran, Boholare directly managed by a national Project Officer with the support of a technical Field Coordinator, an Admin/Finance Clerk and driver. The project technical support is also provided by Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work Support Team, Bangkok. ILO Manila provides administrative backstopping to the project.

**Progress to date**

With the contribution from the Government of Japan, the ILO has been able to implement 23 Local Resource Based sub-projects with 22 partners in Region IVB, VII and VIII covering 32 municipalities. As of 28-February-2015, a total of 146,999 workdays were created for 3,471 people (1,932 male/1,539 female) with a basic benefit package of minimum wages, accident and health insurance, enrolment in social security and provision of appropriate personal protective equipment.

Through two Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with PhilHealth and Social Security System, the ILO was able to ensure the project beneficiaries with 100% enrolment application in health insurance and Social Security for at least three months. Japan funded sub-projects benefited not only workers and their families to meet their basic human needs, but also a total of USD 553,129 in the form of wages, in addition to USD 232,301 for social protection package and personal protection equipment to the workers was injected into the local economy.

The ILO and TESDA also signed a MoU for technical cooperation of skills training on 6-March-2014. In this basis,1,418 individuals (823 male/595 female)completed or are currently participating TESDA and community based skills training and another 396individuals are to completed skills training. According to TESDA, an average of over 90% of the participants completed the training and over 60% of successful graduates are engaged in a form of employment. The ILO has been also promoting Community-based Enterprise Development (CBED) tool among small entrepreneurs, governmental and non-governmental partners. A total of 959 small entrepreneurs completed CBED orientation in Region 6, 7, and 8. In addition, 2 governmental partners, 4 International NGOs, and 1 national NGO have already agreed to institutionalize CBED in their training curriculum.

The ILO believes that the partners’ active participation is a key part of achieving sustainability. Thus, a great deal of effort has been put into social preparation during the latter part of the first half of the project. The ILO teams on the ground have made multiple community consultations and sensitization to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the ILO supported proposals and the longer-term impact of the work. Moreover, numerous site visits with the implementing partners were conducted to ensure the government and community ownership of further project implementation. As of the end of February 2015, the ILO’s governmental and nongovernmental partners have contributed a total of USD 771,363 of their own funds to the total sub-projects cost. Both governmental and non-governmental partners agreed to reach a further 667 employment opportunities for local resource-based schemes by the end of May 2015.

Alongside the project implementation, the ILO provided intensive technical support to the shift towards early recovery. In August 2014, a decision was made by the Humanitarian Country Team to end the SRP and transition to Government organized structures to address recovery and rehabilitation efforts. Throughout this process, the ILO is also assisting the Philippine government by supporting its Livelihood Cluster led by the DTI. The ILO continues to provide significant support to the DTI in strengthening its coordination and communication among the cluster members as well as to identify community needs.

## 3. Purpose, objective and scope of the evaluation

**Purpose:** The evaluation seeks to assess the key achievements of the project as per project framework, the extent of sustainability of the project’s benefit. It is aimed to highlight recommendations for sustainability, lessons learnt and good practices.

While this evaluation will seek to address a set of relevant evaluation questions, the findings of the evaluation will be used for promoting accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO.

**Scope:** The scope will cover ILO component’s project activities and results from March2014 to the end of the project (May 2015). Geographical coverage will be all project sites that ILO has worked in. The evaluation may need to involve other ILO projects contributing to supporting the same communities, as well as international partners supporting recovery of the Typhoon affected areas.

**Client:** the clients of the evaluation are ILO Manila Office and project team, technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and HQ, tripartite constituents, and the donor (Japan).

The evaluation findings and recommendations will be primarily addressed to the implementing partners and the ILO units directly involved in backstopping the project.

## 4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY QUESTIONS

This final evaluation will assess the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful. The evaluation should address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2012

(<http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_176814/lang--en/index.htm>).

The following OECD/DAC evaluation criteria will be applied.

* Relevance and strategic fit of the project;
* Validity of the project design;
* Project effectiveness;
* Efficiency of resource use;
* Sustainability of project achievements/results;
* Impact orientation;

The suggested analytical framework for the final evaluation of the project is set out in Annex 1.

A more detailed analytical framework of the questions and questions/sub-questions may be modified by the evaluation team in consultation with the evaluation manager.

In addition the evaluation is expected to be based on the following principles:

* Application of result-based management;
* Gender equality;
* Adoption of human rights-based approach;
* Capacity development;
* Environmental sustainability;

Gender equality issues shall be explicitly addressed throughout the evaluation activities by the consultants and all outputs including reports need to mainstream gender equality.

To achieve the above mentioned purposes, this final evaluation will focus and address the following:

* The ILO’s overall approach to the Haiyan response programme formulation, preparation of individual projects, budgeting, project management, backstopping and monitoring including coordination mechanisms among various stakeholders (including international partners and other ILO projects) in the project areas and how effective this has been.
* The extent to which the Haiyan programme has achieved the results and the immediate objectives and targets;
* An assessment of the level of collaboration and cooperation with relevant technical and local government agencies and other local partners to ensure quality control and sustainability and the relevance of such collaboration;
* Programme experiences that can be learned with regard to promoting social protection, gender equality and environmental sustainability;
* The effectiveness of social protection; how the beneficiaries, communities, and social protection partners have benefited from the project, what seems to work and what not, overall perception and a first assessment of sustainability;
* An initial assessment of the programme’s indirect impacts including but not limited to the impact of social preparation, training and capacity building, the forming of associations and groups etc.;
* An analysis of the transition from emergency employment to local resource-based works, skills development and small enterprise recovery and an assessment of the linkages between the 3 medium term components also reviewing the sustainability of the work –what can be done to link recovery to medium term development and how did the ILO do this even at the earliest humanitarian/emergency phases? How effective has this been?

## 5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will comply with evaluation norms and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in ILO’s evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

In order to enhance usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation will be adopted. A combination of tools and methods will be used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time will be allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information. The methodology for collection of evidences will include:

* + Review of documents related to the project, including the initial project document, progress reports, technical assessments and reports, project monitoring and evaluation documents.
  + Review the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) and other related documents of the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster that was co-led by the ILO and UNDP.
  + Review of technical products (training manuals, technical guidelines, etc.) and other publications used or developed by the project, if any.
  + Review of other relevant documents such as the Decent Work Agenda of Philippines, the Central Emergency Response Fund, the national employment policy and programme strategy, national laws and regulations on employment, an Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014, the Philippine Humanitarian Country Team’s Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response, UNDAF (Philippines) 2012-2018 and the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016.
  + Conduct field missions, interview and focus group discussion in project sites located in and around Bogo City, North Cebu; Tacloban City, Leyte and Coron, Busuanga with key stakeholders [a list of project sites can be provided and project visits agreed].
  + Conduct stakeholders’ workshop to validate information and data collected through various methods.
  + Pro-active and informed consultation with and participation of the key stakeholders in the evaluation process and the finalization of the report will be ensured.

Sex-disaggregated data will be collected and different needs of women and men will be considered through-out the evaluation process. At the completion of the field mission, a meeting will be organized by the Project with assistance from the ILO Country Office for Philippines to share the preliminary findings with local stakeholders in the project municipalities. The draft terms of reference for the evaluation and a draft evaluation report will be shared with relevant stakeholders

## 6. Deliverables

The evaluation team will provide:

1. A short inception report, including the work plan and details on methods, data sources, interviews, participatory methodologies, draft mission schedule and draft report format. This report should also provide a review of the available documents. It should set out the evaluation instruments (which include the key questions, participatory workshop and data gathering/and analysis methods) and any changes proposed to the methodology or any other issues of importance.
2. A power-point presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation mission at a stakeholders’ meeting to be held at the end of the evaluation mission, for the purpose of providing the project’s stakeholders a chance to jointly assess the adequacy of the findings and emerging recommendations as well as recommend areas for further considerations by the evaluators.
3. A draft evaluation report of no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ILO's ‘Quality Checklists 4 and 5' for Evaluation Reports which will be provided to the evaluator.
4. A final evaluation report, which integrates comments from ILO and project stakeholders. The evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluator together with the finalised evaluation report.

The evaluation report should include

* Title page (**standard ILO template)**
* Table of contents
* Executive summary (**standard ILO template**)
* Acronyms
* Background and project description
* Purpose of evaluation
* Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
* Project status and findings by outcome and overall
* Conclusions and recommendations
* Lessons learnt and potential good practices (**please provide also template annex as per ILO guidelines on Evaluation lessons learnt and good practices**) and models of intervention
* Annexes (list of interviews, overview of meetings, proceedings stakeholder meetings, other relevant information)

The deliverables will be circulated to stakeholders by the evaluation manager and technical clearance for the deliverables will come from the evaluation manager. The evaluation report will be in English.

All draft and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided in electronic version compatible with WORD for Windows. Ownership of the data from the evaluation rests with the ILO. The copyright of the evaluation report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentation can only be made with notification and agreement by the ILO. Key stakeholders can make appropriate use of the evaluation report in line with the original purpose with appropriate acknowledgement

***7. Management arrangement and work plan***

The evaluation will be funded from the project budget. The evaluation is being managed by Mr. Tite Habiyakare, based at the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. He will be in charge of developing the evaluation ToR, the selection of the consultants in consultation with Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officer and in consultation with the ILO’s Office in Manila.

ILO Manila Office and the project handles all contractual arrangements with the evaluation team and provide any logistical and other assistance as may be required.

The evaluation team reports to the evaluation manager. The team leader (or evaluator) is an international consultant selected through a competitive process from a list of available and qualified consultants. If required, a national consultant can be hired who will be chosen from a list of qualified consultants to assist the team leader.

The international consultant will lead the evaluation and will be responsible for delivering the above evaluation outputs using a combination of methods as mentioned above. The national consultant provides support to the team leader particularly during the evaluation mission as requested by the team leader. The national consultant reports to the evaluation team leader.

Specific tasks of the national consultant are as follows:

* To review relevant project documents;
* To provide support to the International consultant throughout the evaluation process particularly during the evaluation mission. This includes assisting in local language translation where necessary.
* To jointly facilitate the stakeholders workshop with the team leader; local beneficiaries and staff
* To contribute to the draft and finalization of the evaluation report to be written by the International consultant.

***Evaluation team***

* One independent international evaluation specialist with a relevant degree. He/she should have a proven track record in the evaluation of complex projects, experience with country situations similar to that of Philippines and with arrangements as used in the set-up of the current project. Experience in a community-based employment intensive programme or project in a post crisis condition will be an advantage.
* One national consultant with expertise in environmental engineering or environmentally sustainable development models. Knowledge of the post conflict/ natural disaster mitigation programme and associated local institutions and government structures is required. Familiarity with employment creation and poverty reduction schemes in rural areas will be a distinct advantage.

Depending on the evaluation team, translators may be recruited to assist in interviewing community members.

***Stakeholders’ role:*** All stakeholders in Philippine particularly the project teams, ILO CO-Manila, DWT/CO-Bangkok, ILO technical unit at HQ, and donor will be consulted and will have opportunities to provide inputs to the TOR and draft final evaluation report.

***The tasks of the Project:*** The project management will provide logistic support to the evaluation team and will assist in organising a detailed evaluation mission agenda. Also the project needs to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluation team.

***Time frame and responsibilities (Tentative)***

| **Task** | **Responsible person** | **Time frame (by end)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Preparation of the TOR –draft | Evaluation Manager | February 2015 |
| Preparation of list of stakeholders with E-mail addresses | Project Manager | March 6, 2015 |
| Sharing the TOR with all concerned for comments/inputs | Project Manager  Evaluation Manager | First week of March 2015 |
| Finalization of the TOR | Evaluation Manager | 6 March 2015 |
| Approval of the TOR | Evaluation Office | April 2015 |
| Selection of consultant and finalisation | Evaluation Manager/ Evaluation Office | 30 April 2015 |
| Draft mission itinerary for the evaluator and the list of key stakeholders to be interviewed | Project Manager | 30April 2015 |
| Ex-col contract based on the TOR prepared/signed | Project Manager /ILO Director, CO-Manila | 18 May 2015 |
| Brief evaluators on ILO evaluation policy | Evaluation Manager | 20 May 2015 |
| Inception report submitted to Evaluation Manager | Evaluators | 22May2015 |
| **Evaluation Mission** | **Evaluators** | **1 – 10 June2015** |
| Draft report submitted to Evaluation Manager | Evaluators | 22 June 2015 |
| Sharing the draft report to all concerned for comments | Evaluation Manager | 22 June 2015 |
| Consolidated comments on the draft report, send to the evaluator | Evaluation Manager | 6 July2015 |
| Finalisation of the report and submission to Evaluation Manager | Evaluator | 13July 2015 |
| Review of the final report | Evaluation Manager | 20July 2015 |
| Submission of the final report to EVAL | Evaluation Manager | 24July 2015 |
| Approval of the final evaluation report | Evaluation Office | 31st July 2015 |

The evaluation is estimated at the total of 30 workdays for the evaluation team leader, and at 20 days for the national evaluator as indicated below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Time frame** | **Tasks** |
| Third week of May 2015 | Desk review of documents and preparation of the inception report. |
| Last week of May 2015 | * Meeting with ILO staff at ILO Manila Office * Field work in Ormoc with ILO and the project staff would prepare a programme of meetings that the consultants could amend to suit their needs. Visits to the affected municipalities would be arranged and facilitated by the project staff. Meetings with the stakeholders will be arranged so that the consultants could have a better understanding of the perspectives of the key stakeholders. * The evaluation team will review its findings and prepare a presentation on the preliminary findings, including verification of the findings with the project team. * End-of-evaluation mission stakeholder meeting and debriefing, including the presentation of the preliminary findings and associated discussion. |
| June 201 | Produce a draft report for submission to the evaluation manager. Receive comments from evaluation manager and finalise the report. Submit evaluation summary. |
| 13July2015 | Finalization of report |

## ANNEX II Inception Report



**International Labour Organization**

**INCEPTION REPORT**

Final Independent Evaluation of

**Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities**

(PHI/14/02/JPN)

Type of Evaluation: Final Independent

Administrative Unit: ILO Country Office for the Philippines

Technical Unit: DEV/INVEST

Donor Country: The Government of Japan

Project Budget: U$D 3,000,000

Project Duration: March 2014 – May 2015

Evaluation Manager: Tite Habiyakare

Name of International Consultant: John G. Connell

Name of National Consultant: Arvy G. Origenes

Date of Evaluation: June 2015

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| CBED | Community-Based Enterprise Development |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DOLE | Department of Labor and Employment |
| DSWD | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| DTI | Department of Trade and Industry |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| KII | Key informant interviews |
| LGU | Local Government Units |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PhilHealth | Philippine Health Insurance Corporation |
| ProDoc | Project Document |
| RAY | Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda |
| SIYB | Start and Improve Your Business |
| SME | Small and Medium Enterprise |
| SRP | Strategic Response Plan |
| SSS | Social Security System |
| TBC | To be confirmed |
| TCPR | Technical Cooperation Progress Report |
| TESDA | Technical Education and Skills Development Authority |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

**1. Rationale and Objectives of the Evaluation**

* 1. The ILO’s policy indicates the mandatory conduct of at least one independent evaluation for projects implemented with budget exceeding US$1-million. This evaluation is in compliance with the said requirement.
  2. As set out under the TOR for this exercise, the evaluation objectives are fourfold: a) To examine the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved as per project framework; 2) To assess the sustainability of project benefits and impact of the project particularly on the beneficiaries; 3) To report the lessons learnt and possible good practices; and 4) To make recommendations that will inform the ILO response to future crisis in the Philippines and in other countries as well.
  3. The findings of the evaluation shall inform ILO’s efforts for promoting accountability and organizational learning.

Scope and Client of the Evaluation

* 1. The evaluation shall coverall the project’s component activities and results from March 2014 to May 2015. Physical coverage encompasses all project sites that ILO has worked in. The evaluation may need to look into other ILO projects contributing to the recovery or supporting the same typhoon affected communities, as well as international partners doing similar interventions in the said areas.
  2. The clients of the evaluation are the following: ILO-Manila Office and project team; technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and HQ; tripartite constituents, and the donor (i.e. government of Japan). The evaluation findings shall be primarily addressed to the implementing partners and the ILO units directly involved in backstopping the project.

**2. Project Background and Description[[16]](#footnote-16)**

Background

2.1 Super Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) hit the central part of the Philippines on 8 November 2013, severely devastating 36 provinces across eastern, western, and central Visayas, including the northern part of Palawan. Categorized as one of the most powerful storms to hit land, it had wind speeds of 235 km/hr and gusts of 275 km/hr that resulted to massive storm surges up to six meters high specifically in Tacloban City and other coastal areas in Leyte province and Samar Islands. It was the costliest Philippine Typhoon to date with total estimated damages pegged at US$2.02-Billion (PhP89.6-Billion).

2.2 Estimates noted 5.6-million workers were directly affected of which 60 percent were men and 40 percent women. For livelihoods, income earnings are reported to have been cut by 50 percent, which resulted to an increase in the number of people looking for jobs. Compared to pre-Haiyan levels, the number of people seeking work has increased by 10 percent in the urban areas, while for the non-farm based labourers 42 percent are reported in search of work --- thus the need for providing livelihood programs for the most affected populations.

The Project

***Target beneficiaries and type of interventions***

2.3 The project under review was designed to provide employment support to approximately 6,740 poor and vulnerable workers affected by Typhoon Haiyan. This is in addition to the 13,000 plus workers covered by ILO, supported by other fund sources. The target beneficiaries formed part of the 260,000 vulnerable workers prioritized under the SRP launched by the HCT in December 2013.The most vulnerable workers are those either self-employed or are unpaid family workers who with inadequate incomes and limited access to social security, are most vulnerable to any disruption in employment and income.

2.4 The project builds on ILO’s past experiences responding to disasters in the Philippines (i.e. Washi in 2011 and Bopha in 2012) and in other countries (i.e. Post 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka; Typhoons and Flooding in Mayanmar, Pakistan and India; and earthquakes in Pakistan and Haiti).

2.5 While the ILO’s overall intervention applies a two-pronged approach i.e. Phase 1 – Rapid assessments of damages and losses on employment and livelihoods followed by emergency employment through clearance, cleaning and simple community works; and Phase II – Recovery of sustainable livelihoods, this project is mainly focused on the latter through a) Labour-based repair (LBR), construction and rehabilitation of productive infrastructure and community assets and environmental rehabilitation and protection works, promoting the use of local resources; b) Assessment of alternative livelihood opportunities and technical vocational training and skills development (SD) to facilitate people to move out of vulnerable employment; and c) re-establishment and strengthening of micro and small/medium sized enterprises, anchored by local government’s plan for economic recovery (ED).

2.6 It assists the transition phase of the recovery, moving away from immediate and emergency response to interventions which facilitate long-term and sustainable recovery of livelihoods. The ILO’s integrated approach to livelihood recovery combines labour-based rehabilitation of public infrastructure, creation of alternative livelihoods through vocational skills development and re-establishment of micro and small/medium sized enterprises. The project also reinforces and advocates for existing government standards on minimum wages, occupational safety and health standards and provision of social protection for workers.

***Partners***

2.7 At the national level, the ILO works closely with DSWD, DOLE, TESDA, DTI, SSS, and Philhealth to ensure that the project complements the work of the national government. This also ensures that the project interventions contribute to the country’s adherence to labour standards to include payment of minimum wages, inclusion of social protection benefits, personal protective gear and equipment that meets occupational safety and health standards.

2.8 At the local level, the process of sub-project design, implementation, and monitoring will engage LGUs and local community-based groups – representing men, women, and youth – through consultations in the development of sub-projects to respond to specific local contexts and needs.

***Area coverage and Technical Backstopping***

2.9 In January 2014, five field offices were established to cover specific targeted areas: 1) Tacloban City; 2) Ormoc City covering Leyte province; 3) Cebu City covering Northern Cebu and Negros Occidental; 4) Coron, Palawan; and 5) Tagbilaran City, Bohol. These sites were selected based on the gaps analysis and needs assessment that was conducted in December 2013.

2.10 ILO staff has been deployed in each field office composed of National Programme Officers and Engineers, as well as admin and finance personnel. These teams are backstopped by technical staff from CO-Manila comprised of the Chief Technical Adviser, and a Disaster Response and Livelihood Development Officer. Regional backstopping is also provided from ILO Regional office in Bangkok to include a Technical Specialists on Skills, Employment Intensive Investment, and Enterprise Development.

**TABLE 1: Project Framework**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Title** | Integrated Livelihood recovery for Typhoon Haiyan affected communities |
| **Duration** | 12 months beginning March 2014 (no-cost extension until May 2015) |
| **Budget** | US$3million |
| **Direct recipients** | Poor and vulnerable workers and families in typhoon affected areas |
| **Ultimate beneficiaries** | Community members and LGUs in typhoon affected areas where public infrastructure is restored and where livelihood activities take place |
| **OUTCOMES** | |
| **Outcome 1: Employment Creation** | More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities. |
| **Outcome 2: Skills Development** | Skills Development increases the employability of workers, the competitiveness of enterprises, and the inclusiveness of growth. |
| **Outcome 3: Sustainable Enterprise** | Sustainable enterprises create productive and decent jobs. |

\*\*

| **Objectives** | **Outputs** | **Indicators** | **Targets** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Development objective:** The project will support employment creation, livelihood opportunities and employability of poor and vulnerable workers and families in affected areas | | # of affected and vulnerable workers who received employment support with social protection and/or other livelihood support | Total of 6,740 workers reached |
| **Immediate Objective 1.** Provision of social protection for workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation and community infrastructure improvement works. | A delivery mechanism to ensure social protection for workers is in place at the local level | | 100% of project location |
| 1.1 Social Protection is provided to workers undertaking disaster risk mitigation works and improvements of community infrastructure, employed under ongoing government agency programmes. | % of workers enrolled in social protection | 100% enrolment |
| Improvements to registration of workers and the delivery of services is provided, including implementation of MOU with PhilHealth and SSS | 2 sets MOU and implementation guidelines |
| 1.2 The importance of social protection is advocated for across key government agencies and humanitarian partners in order to establish a clear message on social protection issues in emergency employment and livelihood recovery. | Common understanding on social protection issues across key government and humanitarian agencies. | Guidelines on social protection agreed by key government agencies and disseminated accordingly |
| Guidelines on social protection disseminated to humanitarian partners in an easy to read format e.g brochures |
| **Immediate Objective 2.** Community-based approaches optimizing and combining the use of local resources are used for small social and productive infrastructure repairs and reconstruction, environmental rehabilitation and protection works (green works). | Repair, rehabilitation and environmental works are implemented in target communities | | 100% of project locations |
| 2.1 Repair and reconstruction of essential community infrastructure and environmental rehabilitation and improvements works as a means of disaster mitigation (or to improve community’s resilience towards climate change and natural disaster). | # of repairs/works completed | Total of 4.475 workers reached |
| 2.2 Creation of jobs and cash injections into the local economy through the use of local resource-based approaches. | # of jobs created | 4,475 jobs created |
| # of workdays generated (sex-disaggregated) | 67,125 work-days |
| # of total amount paid wages | US$ 402,750 wage payments |
| 2.3 Enhanced capacity of implementation partners to plan, design and implement local resource-based approaches. | # of partners planning, designing and implementing LRB works | 31 |
| 2.4 Local resource-based schemes for further recovery of communities have been identified and designed for additional funding, for after the emergency/early recovery phase. | # of schemes developed | 8 |
| **Immediate Objective 3.** Labour-market responsive technical vocational skills training and development is provided for wage and self-employment. | TESDA is engaged to undertake needs identification and skills training package for project beneficiaries. | | MOU implemented according to agreed roles and responsibilities |
| 3.1 Short-term skills training has been provided to poor and vulnerable workers to enable them to engage in employment opportunities that have been opened up during the recovery phase. | # of affected vulnerable workers completed short term skills training | 1,745 workers in total |
| 3.2 Community-based training and other support have been provided to support the start up or enhancement of alternative income generating activities of the fishing and farming communities. | # of affected vulnerable workers received community-based training and other support for starting or improving income-generating activities |
| 3.3 Young people have received demand-led skills training and TESDA’s skills certification to improve their employability. | # of affected young people completed certified skills training |
| **Immediate Objective 4.** Community-based enterprise development support is provided to micro-small enterprises and local communities. | # of local communities engaged on enterprise development | | 100% of project location |
| 4.1 Individuals, micro-small businesses and the communities enhance entrepreneurial knowledge. | # of people trained on entrepreneurship and business skills (sex disaggregated) | 520 |
| 4.2 Value chain analysis identifies industries with high employment and growth potential. | # of new business/employment opportunities identified | 2-3 sectors per location |
| 4.3 Capacity of local partner institutions strengthened for business development through introduction of new methodologies (SIYB and CBED) to support local SMEs. | # of local institutions, including government and non-government, that adopt ILO tools on entrepreneurship and business skills training | 2 local institutions per location |

**3. Evaluation Principles, Criteria and Methodological Framework[[17]](#footnote-17)**

## Evaluation Principles

3.1 Section 5 of the TOR provides for the compliance of this evaluation exercise with the evaluation norms, standards and ethical safeguards specified in ILO’s evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

3.2 In order to enhance the usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation will be adopted. A combination of tools and methods will be used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time will be allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information.

## Evaluation Criteria

3.3 The evaluation will address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as set forth under the ILO Guidelines for results-based evaluation. The criteria have their origin in the OECD/DAC Evaluation Guide for Humanitarian Agencies and are consistent with the emerging consensus on evaluation criteria amongst international development institutions.

3.4 The use of the same criteria, for this particular exercise, and across all other evaluations of ILO projects, intends to help reduce variations in approaches and reporting format among evaluators and evaluations. It is reckoned that consistence in the application of these criteria ensure that project results are systematically assessed, performance and implementation modality are comparable across projects and project components/categories, generic lessons are more easily identified and a consolidation of the performance and results of a group of similar projects implemented by ILO evaluated periodically is more feasibly provided.

3.7 The set of questions under each criterion to be addressed by the evaluation is noted:

**3.7.1 Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention**

* + To what extent have the Project contributed to a) the Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014? b) Typhoon Haiyan Response?; c) DFID overall response to Typhoon Haiyan
  + Has the Project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients? Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units?
  + The extent to which it has supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes, the needs and priorities of the ILO’s social partners in Philippine and the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes?

**3.7.2 Validity of design**

* + Was the project design realistic and adequate to meet the project objectives? To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners?
  + Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?
  + Was the capacity of various project’s partners taken into account in the project’s strategy and means of action? Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project?
  + Which risks/assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project?
  + Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?

**3.7.3 Project Effectiveness**

* + To what extent the project has achieved its objectives?
  + What major factors influenced the project achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
  + Examine the effectiveness of project institutional framework, its management arrangement ad coordination mechanism with other relevant ILO projects, and with other implementing partners
  + Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to changing situation on the ground or challenges faced

**3.7.4 Efficiency**

* + Has the project been implemented in the most efficient way vis-à-vis its financial and human resources?
  + Have activities been implemented in a cost efficient manner and have project objectives been achieved on-time and with planned budget?

**3.7.5 Impact**

* + What has happened as a result of the project? To what extent the project has made its contribution to broader and longer team crisis response and decent work goal in the Philippine
  + What real difference that the project has made to the ultimate beneficiaries, capacity of local authorities, and to gender equality?

**3.7.6 Sustainability**

* + To what extent the project’s benefit continue after the project ended?
  + What are the major factors which will have or will influence the continuity of the project’s benefit?

3.8 In addition, the evaluation will examine extent the project has addressed following cross-cutting themes:

* Application of results-based management,
* Gender Equality,
* Adoption of human rights-based approach,
* Capacity development, and
* Environmental sustainability.

## Evaluation Methodology

3.9The evaluation will include three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the inception phase; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholders and direct observation; (c) fed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings.

**3.9.1 Desk study:** The desk study aims will be used by the evaluation team to familiarize themselves with the progress of the work to date and to identify field sites where data can be collected that will answer the evaluation listed above. The documents include, viz:

* Project document, progress reports, technical assessments (in particular selection criteria and value-chain reports) and reports, project monitoring and evaluation documents;
* SRP and other related IASC documents, HCT and the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster that was co-led by the ILO and UNDP.
* Technical products (training manuals, technical guidelines, etc.) and other publications used or developed by the project, if any.
* Relevant documents such as the Decent Work Agenda of Philippines, the CERF and the national employment policy and programme strategy, national laws and regulations on employment, an Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plan 2013-2014, the Philippine Country Team’s Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response, UNDAF Philippines 2012-2018, and the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016.

3.9.2 Interviews and Meetings: Interviews with ILO staff (ILO-CO Manila; Project Units) is crucial part of the evaluation methodology. Many will be done in an ad hoc basis to pursue specific lines of enquiry to strengthen the validity of findings.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lawrence Jeff Johnson | ILO Country Director |
| Simon Hills | Disaster Response and Livelihoods Development Officer |
| Ruth Georget | Technical Cooperation and Coordination Officer |
| Jonathan Price | Chief Technical Adviser |
| Chris Donnges | Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Employment (via Skype) |
| Ayako Kaino | Early Recovery and Livelihood Officer |
| Jordi Prat Tuca | Enterprise and Livelihoods Officer |
| National Programme Officers and Field Coordinators in each field office | |
| Community Leaders and Local partners (including local and provincial government, NGOs, Pos, INGOs) | |
| National Government Partners and agencies (DOLE, DSWD, TESDA, DTI and SSS/Philhealth) | |

**3.9.3 Field Visits:**The objective of the field visit is twofold: a) to conduct focus group discussions with key stakeholders in pre-identified project sites; b) to validate and enrich initial findings and generate new information that will further substantiate conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations. Sex-disaggregated data will be collected and different needs of women and men will be considered throughout the evaluation process.

Due to time limitations the field visits will be limited to 3 of the 5 sites, Tacloban, Cebu and Coron. Within these sites, all project interventions: labour-based repairs (LBR) using local resources; skills development (SD) and enterprise development (ED) will be examined.

**3.9.4 Stakeholders’ Workshop/consultations:** Stakeholders are identified below and will further be refined during the evaluation process in order to obtain a range of perspectives and ensure that they have significant participation in the study. It will not be possible to conduct a stakeholder workshop as detailed in the ToR (Annex 1, section 5#) due to the tight field visits schedules (Table 3, Itinerary). However the team will with each stakeholder meet, express the main points understood back to the stakeholders for confirmation and to allow them to express their own assessment.

**Table 2: List of Stakeholders**

| **Stakeholder** | **Interest in the Project** | **Involvement in the Evaluation** | **Who** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ILO INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS** | | | |
| ILO Country Office | Responsible for the planning at the country level and implementation of the project, is an important stakeholder of this evaluation. Has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. | **Main Stakeholder**   * Key informant * Main user of the evaluation results | * Country Director * Dep. Country Director * M&E * Project Unit * Adfin/Logistics |
| Project Manager / Project Management Office | Responsible for the planning at the project level as well as for the execution of project activities. Accountable to ILO as well as to the beneficiaries and partners for the performance and project results. | **Main Stakeholder**   * Key Informant * Main user of the evaluation results | * Project Manager |
| ROAP - Bangkok | Responsible for providing technical backstopping to the project. Has an interest in learning from the project experiences as basis for the furtherance of the strategies to be employed in similar projects across other country offices. | * Main user of the evaluation results | * Regional M&E Officer * Regional technical advisor |
| **EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS** | | | |
| Local government units; regional and local government agencies | The PLGUs and LGUs covered by the project, regional and local counterparts of DOLE, DTI and DSWD have a direct interest in the alignment of the ILO activities with their local plans and priorities. Harmonization of project deliverables with the reconstruction and rehabilitation actions of these agencies is central to the integrated approach toward full recovery. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest.  Regional agencies provide support in scaling up intervention process between various development actors. | **Main stakeholder**   * Provide information to the evaluation team in regard to extent of their partnership with ILO and sustainability of relevant assets created through the project. | * Local officials (P/M/CLGUs; Head and/or technical staff of DSWD, DTI, DOLE, TESDA) |
| Beneficiaries | Have stake in the appropriateness and effectiveness of the ILO project as ultimate recipients of the support/assistance provided. Maximum level of their participation (women and men across different groups, tribe, age, gender) in the evaluation is determined in that their respective perspectives will be sought. | **Main Stakeholder**   * Receivers of assistance through the project. * Provide information as key sources of insights on relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the project. | * Community members; * community or neighborhood associations/organizations contracted by the project |
| International and national NGO partner/s | INGO/s and NGOs are ILO’s partners in the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own respective interventions.  The results of the evaluation shall inform future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships. | **Main Stakeholder**   * Provide information to the evaluation team * Value added of the partnership shall be of particular interest | * Country director and/or Technical staff of ILO partner/s |
| UN Country team | The Cluster Approach provides for a coherent and complementary action among humanitarian actors working in the disaster-affected area. ILO operation is thus expected to harmonize with and contribute to these concerted efforts. | * Provide information to the evaluation team * Value added of the partnership will be of particular interest |  |
| Donors | ILO operations are funded by a number of donors. The latter have interest in knowing whether their funds were efficiently spent and whether ILO’s implementation has been effective and has contributed to their own strategies and programmes.  Value for money shall be of particular interest. | * Provide information to the evaluation team * Users of the evaluation results | * Government of Japan |
| Other Donors | Not funding the project but working in the same area where ILO operates | * Provide information to the evaluation team |  |

**3.9.5 Sampling Procedure[[18]](#footnote-18) :** Given the geographical spread of the project sites, duration of the evaluation mission, and resources available the definitive sites to be visited are determined through purposive sampling. Same procedure applies to the following: a) stakeholder sampling; b) criterion sampling (ILO thematic interest or strategic objectives); c) case sampling (Typical; Paradigmatic (success); Decisive (critical for decision making); Negative or disconfirming (unique); Extreme or Deviant).

**4.9.6 Data collection and key questions:** The Evaluation team has prepared a data collection plan and this is included as Annex I. While this indicates data to be collected against each of the evaluation questions, in the operation of the evaluation itself, the team will be meeting three levels of stakeholders and during interactions with each must be strategic ensuring all evaluation questions are addressed. The key question to be used with each group of stakeholders has been operationalized and is included as Annex II.

# 4. Evaluation Team Composition, Timeline and Mission Schedule

4.1 The evaluation team is comprised of two evaluators – International consultant in this case team leader, and national consultant. The team reports to the evaluation manager based in ILO-ROAP in Bangkok.

**Table 3: Mission Itinerary**

| **Date** | **Itinerary** | **Time** | **Purpose** | **Remarks** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Arrival in Manila and Courtesy visit at ILO Country office** | | | | |
| Sun, 31 May 2015 | Arrival in Manila | all day | Conduct independent evaluation | **International flight Team leader c/o ILO-ROAP Bangkok; Hotel booking c/o ILO-Manila; National consultant flies directly Tacloban City, June 1.** |
| Check-in at hotel |
| Mon, 1 Jun 2015 | Courtesy call to ILO CO Manila Director, Deputy Director; Meeting with ILO colleagues | 09:00 - 10:00 | Provide overview of evaluation activities; Elicit information about the Project | **TBC** |
| Meeting with AdFin personnel for Administrative matters (i.e. itinerary, DSA, etc.) | 10:00 - 12:00 | Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits | **TBC** |
| Fly from Manila to Tacloban | pm |  | **Domestic flight c/o ILO Manila; Tacloban team arrange transportation , hotel booking** |
| **Field Visits (Tacloban Sites)** | | | | |
| Tue, 2 Jun 2015 | Arrival in Tacloban, hotel billeting | am |  |  |
| Meeting with Tacloban team - led by Martha Espano and Godofredo Rodriguez | Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits | **TBC** |
| 1. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners | pm | KII (information gathering) | **TBC** |
| Wed, 3 Jun 2015 | 2. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners | am | KII (information gathering) | **TBC** |
| 3. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners | pm | KII (information gathering) | **TBC** |
| Fly from Tacloban to Cebu, overnight in Cebu City | evening |  | **Domestic flight c/o ILO Manila; Cebu team arrange transportation, hotel** |
| **Field Visits (North Cebu Sites)** | | | | |
| Thu, 4 Jun 2015 | Road travel from Cebu City to Bogo City, hotel billeting | am |  | **Cebu team to arrange transportation** |
| Meeting with Cebu team - led by Ivan Ledesma | Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits | **TBC** |
| 1. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners | pm | KII; Information gathering | **TBC** |
| Fri, 5 Jun 2015 | 2. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners | am | KII; Information gathering | **TBC** |
| 3. Visits sub-projects sites and meetings implementing partners | pm | KII; Information gathering | **TBC** |
| Sat, 6 Jun 2015 | Road travel from Bogo City to Cebu City | am |  | **Cebu team to arrange transportation** |
| Fly from Cebu to Coron, overnight in Coron | pm |  | **Domestic flight c/o ILO Manila; Coron team arrange transportation and hotel** |
| **Field Visits (Coron Sites)** | | | | |
| Sun, 7 Jun 2015 | Meeting with Cebu team - led by Jen Hiloma | am | Discuss preparations for the meetings and field visits |  |
| 1. Visits sub-projects sites and meetings implementing partners | pm | KII; Information gathering | **TBC** |
| Mon, 8 Jun 2015 | 2. Visit sub-projects sites, and meet implementing partners | am | KII; Information gathering | **TBC** |
| Fly Coron to Manila (intl cnslt) | pm | KII; Information gathering | **Domestic flight to Manila** |
| **Exit meeting ILO country and departure** | | | | |
| Tue, 9 Jun 2015 | Exit meeting with ILO CO Manila Director, Dpty Director & ILO colleagues | am |  | **;** |
|  | Fly from Manila to home base | pm |  | **1305 TG flight Manila/Bkk** |

**Figure 1: Mission Timeline**

26 May 2015 01 June 02-08 June 09 June 22 June 13 July

Manila itinerary (Courtesy visit at ILO-CO; KII)

Inception report -Action Plan submitted

Final debriefing in Manila

Submission of Draft report

Field Itinerary

Submission of Final Report

# 5. Deliverables of the Evaluation Team

5.1 As provided under Section 6 of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation team is tasked to deliver the following:

5.1.1 A short inception report, including the work plan and details on methods, data sources, interviews, participatory methodologies, draft mission schedule and draft report format. This report should also provide a review of the available documents. It should set out the evaluation instruments (which include the key questions, participatory workshop and data gathering/and analysis methods) and any changes proposed to the methodology or any other issues of importance.

5.1.2 A power-point presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation mission at a stakeholders’ meeting to be held at the end of the evaluation mission, for the purpose of providing the project’s stakeholders a chance to jointly assess the adequacy of the findings and emerging recommendations as well as recommend areas for further considerations by the evaluators.

5.1.3 A draft evaluation report of no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ILO's ‘Quality Checklists 4 and 5' for Evaluation Reports which will be provided to the evaluator.

5.1.4 A final evaluation report, which integrates comments from ILO and project stakeholders. The evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluator together with the finalised evaluation report.

The evaluation report shall include the following:

* Title page (**standard ILO template)**
* Table of contents
* Executive summary (**standard ILO template**)
* Acronyms
* Background and project description
* Purpose of evaluation
* Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
* Project status and findings by outcome and overall
* Conclusions and recommendations
* Lessons learnt and potential good practices (**please provide also template annex as per ILO guidelines on Evaluation lessons learnt and good practices**) and models of intervention
* Annexes (list of interviews, overview of meetings, proceedings stakeholder meetings, other relevant information)

**6. Limitations, etc.**

6.1 The resource envelope for this evaluation and tight timescale infer that data collection will be restricted to single-visit interviews. This implies that most of the information to be collected will be based on memory recall of the respondents and shall be triangulated (cross-validated) with the facts and evidences gathered through desk review and field visits.

6.2 The project terminates at the end of May, to date the final progress report has not yet been prepared hence less access to systematized information, a significant limitation given the tight timescale of the evaluation mission (25 days for the international consultant; 20 days for the national consultant).

6.3 The evaluability will depend on the accuracy of the monitoring information. This increases the need for triangulation across relevant/available sources and references.

# ANNEXES

**I. Terms of Reference**

As per Annex 1# of the Final Evaluation Report.

**II. Data Collection Plan Worksheet**

| Evaluation  Questions | Indicator | Sources of Data? | Method? | Who Will Collect? | How Often? | Cost? | Who will analyze? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 To what extent has the Project contributed to a) Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014 (PHAP); b) Typhoon Haiyan Response; | Level of alignment with PHAP, THR | PHAP, THR Plan, | Desk review  KII | Eval Team | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a | Eval Team |
| 2 Has the project addressed the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries and of direct recipients? | Level of alignment with the key social protection areas | Social protection indicators | Desk review  KII; Field visit; FGD | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |
| 3 Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units? | Level of alignment with the Local Development Plans; NDRRMC Strategies | LDPs, DRRM  Plan (if available) | Desk review  KII | Eval Team | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a | Eval Team |
| 4 The extent to which it has supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes? a) the needs and priorities of the ILO’s social partners in PhilippineS? b) the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes? | Level of alignment with the Phil Decent Work Programme; level of alignment with the UNPDF | Phil Decent Work Programme Document; UNPDF document | Desk review  KII |  | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a |  |
| 5 Was the project design adequate to meet the project objectives? | Project internal coherence | Prodoc, LFA | Desk review;  KII | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |
| 6 To what extent was the project design adequate and effective in addressing the needs of ultimate beneficiaries and the capacities of the project partners? | Existing PPs capacity needs assessment; baseline as basis of project design | Prodoc  Baseline study  Capacity Needs assessment results | Desk Review | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |
| 7 Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? a) Did it address gender needs and interests? | Project relevance; existing gender needs assessment and approach; existing situational analysis | Prodoc;  project progress reports; | Desk review; KII; FGD | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |
| 8 Was the capacity of various project’s partners (PP) taken into account in the project’s strategy and means of action (PSMA)? | Existing PPs capacity needs assessment; level of use/integration in the PSMA | Prodoc | KII; FGD | Eval Team | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a | Eval Team |
| 9 Did the project design adequately plan for an effective participation of local governments in the management of the project? | Contribution analysis; support required and support received | Prodoc; Minutes of meetings; progress reports | KII; FGD | Eval team | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a | Eval team |
| 10 Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? a) To what extent have they affected the project? | Risk assessment and approach; initial assumptions; cases of risk management | Prodoc and progress reports; | Desk review; KII | Eval team | ILO and local implementing partners | n/a | Eval team |
| 11 Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate? Were the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? | Existing M&E design, plan & implementation ; cases of use of the M&E system | ILO monitoring system document (if available); monitoring mission reports | Desk review; KII | Eval Team | 1 site | n/a | Eval Team |
| 12 To what extent the project has achieved its objectives? | Targets vs. outputs (comparison per targets in the prodoc vs. actual accomp) | Progress report; terminal report; monitoring report | Desk Review, KII | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |
| 13 What have been the major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement of its objectives? | Existing Situational analysis; support needed vs. support received |  | KII; FGD | Eval Team | All sites | n/a | Eval Team |

**III. Data Collection Tool**

1. **Evaluation questions for interviews**

**STAKEHODLER GROUP 1# ILO and Partners**

* Fit of project within other PHAP along with other donors and partners
* Fit within ILO country strategy, and expectations
* ------------------------------------
* linkage with partners
* Implementation process (consultation, preparation, implementation, M+E)
* Activities completed / results / challenges
* What would you do differently?
* *[DOCs : request to view monthly plans and reports (some supplied already), technical tools or justifications, records of beneficiaries and their status.*

**STAKEHODLER GROUP 2# Implementing Partner on site**

DESIGN +PLANNING

* How were assessment of needs made (MIRA I,II) and how well did they fit reality
* to what degree were the local IP consulted in plans for interventions and delivery process
* what other programs have been operating (GoP and donor) and their complementarity
* How do these fit with various (still valid ?) local development initiatives
* how do you rate your capacity to deliver, was training needed
* *[DOCs : request view planning docs]*

DELIVERY

* what interventions have been delivered
* Process of delivery (e.g. targeting and selection of beneficiaries)
* describe implementation delivery, and results, both immediate, livelihood rehab. and longer term
* was implementation such that various added values gained (e.g. timber stacked + available for reconstruction; skills linked to local value chains, local organisations engaged and strengthened for resiliance + sustainability etc.)
* What remains to be done (as indicator of effectiveness) and what comparison can be made with other interventions.
* What would you do differently (as indicator of both design ; strengthening and lessons)
* *[DOCs ; request records of activity, esp. where payments have been made which can be cross checked with beneficiaries. These should be a key source of quantitative data]*

**STAKEHODLER GROUP 3# Beneficiaries**

**Background**

Through *ad hoc* observations and informants (incl visits to lcoal markets)

* Identify original livelihood occupation, esp. seasonal cropping patterns etc.
* Identify local nutritional and or market demands and how these may be supported by interventions (e.g.. vegetable cropping)

**Focus Groups**

Establish FG position with in their communities (ethnicity, poverty, etc.) and to what degree other Hhs have received support through ILO /DFID or other agencies.

DELIVERY

* what interventions have been delivered
* Process of delivery (e.g. targeting and selection of beneficiaries)
* describe implementation delivery, and results, both immediate, livelihood rehab. and longer term
* was implementation such that various added values gained (e.g. timber stacked + available for reconstruction; skills linked to local value chains, \*\*\*esp . local organisations engaged and strengthened for resilience + sustainability etc.)
* What remains to be done (as indicator of effectiveness), including other HHs who were not directly involved in activity.
* What comparison can be made with other interventions you know of
* What would you like to see done differently

**IV. Checklist for Preparing and Rating the Evaluation Report**

Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report

<http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm>

Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report

<http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm>

## ANNEX III Map of project areas



**Tacloban**

**Ormoc**

**Nth Cebu** CebuCebu/Negros

**Bohol**

**Coron**

**Project sites - PHI/14/02/JPN**

## Annex III. List of Interviewed Persons

| **Itinerary** | **Interviewed Persons** | | **Position** | | **Organization** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2 June 2015, Tue** | | | | | |
| Meeting with Tacloban team | Godofredo Rodriguez | National Programme Coordinator | | ILO | |
| Minerva Rosel | Project Technical Officer | | ILO | |
| Ayako Kaino | Early Recovery and Livelihood Officer | | ILO-CO | |
| * Field visit TAFEMDO repair shop and spare parts store * KII with TAFEMDO Officers and members | Judy Torres | President | | TAFEMDO | |
| Gabriel Juvan Sales | PIO | | TAFEMDO | |
| Antonio Dela Pena, Jr. | Auditor | | TAFEMDO | |
| Randy Esperas | Member | | TAFEMDO | |
| Teodorico Bantilon | Member | | TAFEMDO | |
| * Field visit at OC sites * KII with Implementing partner and workers | Julius Ferrer | Project Manager | | OC | |
| Meeting with TESDA and KII with trainees | Cleta M. Omega | Regional Director | | TESDA | |
| Laurita Banario | Provincial Director – Leyte | | TESDA | |
| Fortunato Dilao | OIC Administrator of Trng. Center | | TESDA | |
| Meeting with DOLE | Ronnie Guzman | Assistant Regional Director | | DOLE | |
| Ocular inspection of the Mortuary building at EVRMC | |  | |  | |
| **3 June 2015, Wed** | | | | | |
| * Field visit at briquetting production site in Tolosa * KII with Implementing Partner and beneficiaries | Nestor Abalos | President | | MBA | |
| Ma. Milagrosa Noveda | ARPO I | | DAR | |
| * SALT-2 site visit in San Miguel * KII with implementing Partner and beneficiaries | Crispin Alvarado | President | | LUPA | |
| Wilma Lesegues | President | | Karaykaray Farmers Association | |
| **4 June 2015, Thurs** | | | | | |
| * Field visit – on-going SPOT in Sogod * KII with the implementing partner and STEER graduates | Annie Adarna | Training Instructor | | St. Jude Foundation | |
| Ma. Victoria Calderin | Livelihood Consultant | | PLGU - Cebu | |
| * Field visit – ICEB production facility in Bantayan * KII with implementing partner | Luckie Baulita | Operations Manager | | Damgo sa Kaugmaon | |
| **5 June 2015, Fri** | | | | | |
| * Field visit – footbridge in Brgy. Sulangan, Bantayan * KII with implementing partner and beneficiaries | Engr. Mario Mahilum | Project Officer | | Mag-uugmad Foundation, Inc. | |
| * Field visit – reconstructed training centre in Bogo * KII with implementing partner and training graduates | Elenita Ursal | Administrator | | Bogolites Training Center | |
| Engr. Sam Louise Lepiten | Trainer | | Bogolites Training Center | |
| * Field visit – Moringa and Turmeric Processing Center in Brgy. Luyang, San Remegio * KII with implementing partner and beneficiaries | Emma Pable  Myrna Ando  Aldegunda Marianito | Officer  Member  Member | | LUFFA  LUFFA  LUFFA | |
| * Debriefing with Cebu Team | Ivan Ledesma | National Programme Coordinator | | ILO | |
| Martha Mildred Espano | National Programme Coordinator | | ILO | |
| Jonathan Price | Chief Technical Advisor | | ILO-CO | |
| **6 June 2015, Sat** | | | | | |
| Travel to Coron via Manila | |  | |  | |
| **7 June 2015, Sun** | | | | | |
| * KII with Implementing partners and Carpentry and Masonry Graduates in Bogtong, Busuanga | Drew Sandoval | Project Coordinator | | Red Cross Philippines | |
| Renato Francisco  Ronilo Cabangon  Paolo Pagtanac | NC-II holders / training graduates | |  | |
| * Field visit and KII with fish drying racks beneficiaries in brgy. Panlaitan, Busuanga * KII with Implementing partner | Ephraim Pedrito  Eva Macuitid  Marilou Lebara | Beneficiaries | |  | |
| Jommel Bao-bao | Project Officer | | FAO | |
| * Field visit – mangrove reforestation project in Brgy. Buluang, Busuanga | Corazon Factuar | Barangay Chairperson | | BLGU – Buluang | |
| **8 June 2014** | | | | | |
| * Field visit – Sawali showroom and production facility in Brgy. Guadalupe, Coron * KII with GUSAWA officer and implementing partner | Merlita delos Angeles | Secretary | | GUSAWA | |
| Theodorico Dequia | Project Field Coordinator | | PhilSSA | |
| * Meeting with TESDA | Baron Jose Lagran | Regional Director | | TESDA – RO IVB | |
| * Debriefing with Coron Team | Jen Hiloma | National Programme Coordinator | | ILO | |
| Cyrus Juntilla | Project Technical Officer | | ILO | |
| Gerald Villasis | Field Monitor | | ILO | |
| Margie delos Santos | Adfin | | ILO | |
|  | Simon Hills | Disaster Response and Livelihood Development Officer | | ILO-CO | |

## ANNEX IV Extract of monitoring sheet for all sub-project funded by government of Japan.

Notes on table: Sub-projects are shown in two tables for ‘grant’ and ‘purchase order’ allocations. They are number sequentially across both tables.

Sub-projects projects using funds from multiple donors: are indicated and the data shown is a proportional allocation for the JPN share, in red font.

Sub-projects have multiple components (e.g. SD and ED) are regarded as a single sub-project and so have a single ‘number. The outputs are listed under both types, showing the beneficiaries according to the type, but with the second entry not numbered and shown in italics.

Where data has not been received this is indicated as a dash and shaded

Sub-project visited during the field mission are shaded.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| x**GRANT allocations** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **No** | **Field** | **Contractor/Implementing partners / organization** | **General description** | **Project type** | **Donor** | **Outputs** | | | | | **Funds (USD)** | | |
| **male** | **female** | **total** | **Work-days** | **Wages (USD)** | **Partner contribution** | **ILO funds**  **download to partner** | **ILO funds**  **total cost** |
| **LRB** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Manila | **Department of Social Welfare and Development** | CBLA & CDED, 1,200 workers gain skills in construction work with Decent Work condition, and start /strengthen new or existing small enterprises with starter kits/tools. | LRB/ ED | Japan(50%)/Norway | - | - | - | - | $61,238.00 | $0.00 | $240,000.00 | $271,135.00 |
| 2 | Coron | **Western Philippines University** | Post-Yolanda Sustainable Livelihoods Project; Coron, Busuanga, Linapacan | LRB/ SD | Japan | 66 | 107 | 173 | - | $21,246.31 | $2,495.53- FAO | $31,993.07 | $39,637.30 |
| 3 | Cebu | **Mag-uugmad Foundation Incorporation 2** | **ECO Tourism** + Sanctuary Rehab +Development for Bantayan | LRB | Japan | 105 | 265 | 370 | 25,900 | $44,402.22 | $4,609.00 MFI | $49,067.00 | $71,017.00 |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | **171** | **372** | **543** | **25,900** | **$126,886.53** | **$7,104.53** | **$321,060.07** | **$381,789.30** |
| **SD** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Negros | **TESDA R6** | Skills training for training courses and related expenditures for 300 trainees from Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante City, E.B. Magalon, Talisay City, Sagay City, and Manapla Province | SD | Japan | 101 | 36 | 137 | 2,508 | $0.00 | $668.15 | $93,339.00 | $103,963.02 |
| 5 | Cebu | **Prov. Gov. of Cebu (STEER 1-Mainland)** | Support LRB and skills training programmes in the province of Cebu. | SD | Japan | 279 | 32 | 311 | 7,980 | $58,475.50 | $20,417-LGU $51,044-TESDA | $61,079.00 | $91,493.00 |
| 6 | Cebu | **Prov. Gov. of Cebu (SPOT CEBU) - PGC** | Support skills training programmes in the province of Cebu. | SD | Japan(68%) /IMEC | 39 | 145 | 184 | 2,837 | $20,848.00 | $20,446-St. Jude  $20,214-MLGU | $21,964.00 | $34,538.00 |
| 7 | Tacloban | **Operation Compassion 3** | Improving resiliency of transitional shelters in barangays New Kawayan and Sto Nino, Tacloban city | SD | Japan | 107 | 248 | 355 | 7,100 | $43,822.28 | $1,116.32 | $67,313.91 | $79,916.05 |
| *-* | *Coron* | ***Western Philippines University*** | *Post-Yolanda Sustainable Livelihoods Project for Coron, Busuanga and Linapacan* | *LRB SD* | *Japan* | *47* | *3* | *50* | *0* | *0* | *0* | *0* | *0* |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | **573** | **464** | **1037** | **20,425** | **$123,145.78** | **113,905.4** | **$243,695.91** | **$309,910.07** |
| **ED** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Cebu | **DOLE Region 7** | Skills Training and Emergency Employment Towards Recovery in Northern Cebu (STEER2-DOLE) | ED | Japan (50%)/Norway | - | - | - | - | $0.00 | $1,677-LGU $56,910-DOLE | $28,759.00 | $28,790.50 |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | |  |  |  |  |  | **$58,587** | **$28,759.00** | **$28,790.50** |
| **SP** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | Manila | **PHILHEALTH Phase 2** | Providing social health protection to the beneficiaries of the emergency employment and early recovery and livelihood programs |  | Japan(50%)/Norway | - | - | 14,900 | - | - | - | $102,853.00 | $102,853.00 |
| - | Manila | **Republic of the Philippines, Social Security System (SSS) 2** | SSS coverage of 17,000 workers under the emergency employment activity scheme of the ILO. |  | Japan(33%)/ Norway/ IMEC | - | - | - | - | - | - | 131,086 | $131,086.00 |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | |  |  | **14,900** |  |  | **-** | **$233,939.00** | **$233,939.00** |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PURCHASE ORDER allocations** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **No** | **Field** | **Contractor/Implementing partners / organization** | **General description** | **Project type** | **Donor** | **Outputs** | | | | | **Funds (USD)** | | |
| **male** | **female** | **total** | **Work-days** | **Wages (USD)** | **Partner contribution** | **ILO Funds**  **download to partner** | **ILO funds**  **total cost** |
| **LRB** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Coron | **Partnership for Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc. (PHILSSA 1)** | Guadalupe Community **Sawali** Livelihood Project in Coron, Palawan | LRB/ED | Japan | 43 | 39 | 82 | 820 | $10,248.37 | $3,180.49 | $26,886.58 | $29,781.38 |
| 11 | Coron | **Partnership for Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc. (PHILSSA 2)** | Buluang Community Mangrove Rehabilitation Project, Municipality of Busuanga, Palawan | LRB | Japan | 60 | 94 | 154 | 2,310 | $13,690.45 | $0.00 | $27,113.00 | $35,920.00 |
| 12 | Tacloban | **Provincial Government of Leyte/LUPA** | SALT 1 - 23 hectares in 5 sites in Palo, Sta Fe, Burauen, Leyte municiparities | LRB | Japan | 378 | 322 | 700 | 60,900 | $104,233.41 | $6,553.00 $11,397.00 | $129,097.50 | $150,160.00 |
| **13** | Tacloban | **LEYTE UNION OF PRODUCERS OF AGRI-PRODUCTS (LUPA)** | **SALT-II** 5 sites in Tolosa, Dulag, San Miguel, Babatngon & Dagami Municipalities of Leyte | LRB | Japan (50%)/Norway | 122 | 0 | 122 | 24,050 | $56,459.00 | $11,135.86 | $74,063.00 | $90,638.00 |
| **14** | Tacloban | **Latter-Day Saints Charities (LDSC)/WHO** | EVR Health Centre **Mortuary** renovation at EVRMC | LRB | Japan | 30 | 9 | 39 | 780 | $8,240.53 | $34,052.72 $1,559.02 | $8,858.92 | $12,548.56 |
| **15** | Ormoc | **Brgy.Malazarte Matag-ob FA(BMMKFAI)** | Land Preparation for **SALT** in the Municipality of Matag-ob, Leyte | LRB | Japan | 43 | 43 | 86 | 2,580 | $15,236.19 | $0.00 | $17,315.15 | $22,800.09 |
| **16** | Cebu | **Technical Assistance Movement for People+Environment, Inc. (TAMPEI)** | Repair of **damaged houses** in San Vicente, Daanbantayan, Cebu | LRB | Japan | 56 | 5 | 61 | 915 | $6,258.26 | $0.00 | $7,074.62 | $7,074.62 |
| **16** | Cebu | **Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI)** | Construction and Repair of **Damaged Schools** in Sta. Fe, Bantayan Islands, Cebu | LRB | Japan | 70 | 4 | 74 | 178 | $15,669.59 | $21,549 $70,643.00 | $16,139.68 | $21,786.56 |
| **17** | Cebu | **MLGU, Municipality of Tudela, Cebu** | Eco-Tourism Rehabilitation and Development for the Municipality of Tudela | LRB | Japan | 101 | 66 | 167 | 3,600 | $24,083.61 | $9,249.38 | $25,596.00 | $39,098.00 |
| **18** | Cebu | **MLGU, Municipality of San Remegio, Cebu** | Caus**eway Reconstruction** for the Farming Communities of San Remegio. | LRB | Japan | 96 | 129 | 225 | 3,450 | $24,244.46 | $3,904.36 | $25,554.00 | $39,295.00 |
| **19** | Cebu | **MLGU, Municipality of Pilar, Cebu** | **Eco-Tourism** Rehabilitation and Development for the Municipality of Pilar | LRB | Japan | 97 | 105 | 202 | 4,040 | $26,635.08 | $11,844.16 | $28,002.86 | $44,995.57 |
| **20** | Cebu | **International Mission Board (IMB)** | **Construction and Repair** of **Damaged Schools** in Camotes Islands with IMB and Baptist Global Response Disaster Development | LRB | Japan | 121 | 37 | 158 | 4,265 | $28,427.76 | $34,410.39 | $29,713.37 | $39,775.00 |
| **21** | Cebu | **Mag-uugmad Foundation 1** | Waste management and Eco-tourism, **Footbriedge** construction/CBED workshop | LRB | Japan | 81 | 56 | 137 | 4,065 | $27,061.33 | $1,956.52 $8,547.57 | $28,449.45 | $37,070.28 |
| **22** | Cebu | **Southern Partners & Fairtrade Center, Inc. (Fairtrade)** | **Fairtrade Processors (moringa)** for Brgy. Luyang, San Remegio, etc.\* | LRB | Japan/ | 11 | 11 | 22 | 3,927 | $7,800.00 | $31,318 $6,846 | $10,544.00 | $11,921.00 |
| **23** | Bohol | **Poblacion Farmer's Assoc** | **Repair/Reconstruction** of road and hall-San Isidro | LRB | Japan | 74 | 73 | 147 | 2,050 | $14,321.58 | $1,151.81 | $15,620.48 | $31,897.58 |
| **24** | Bohol | **The Holy Rosary Chapel and Tupas LGU** | **Demolition, reconstruction** and maintenance of public facilities | LRB | Japan | 65 | 64 | 129 | 2,375 | $16,402.42 | $11,088.93 | $17,545.00 | $27,189.89 |
| **25** | Bohol | **St. Rosario Farmer's Assoc** | Communal **gardening, road maintenance**, multi-purpose hall repair | LRB | Japan | 36 | 43 | 79 | 1,577 | $10,950.89 | $572.08 | $11,793.25 | $23,257.99 |
| **26** | Bohol | **Danao Farmer's Assoc** | Communal **gardening, road maintenance, hall repair** | LRB | Japan | 30 | 24 | 54 | 1,070 | $7,474.83 | $572.08 | $8,029.00 | $22,117.68 |
| **27** | Bohol | **Agsoso-PTA** | Demolition of **school buildings** and improvement of road-Loon | LRB | Japan | 35 | 41 | 76 | 1,155 | $8,176.20 | $4,576.66 | $8,872.14 | $19,166.33 |
| **28** | Bohol | **Calape United Workers Organization (CUWO)** | **Repair and Construction** of damaged permanent shelters at the Angcop Cameron Canada Aslem | LRB | Japan | 52 | 5 | 57 | 1,026 | 0 | $11,587.04 | $7,465.00 | $11,577.06 |
| **29** | Tacloban | **Pastrana Integrated Farmers Association (PIFA)** | Provision of Alternative Livelihood Opportunities for Coco-workers Through Contour Farming, **(SALT)** | LRB | Japan | - | - | - | - | $29,308.98 | $0.00 | $29,979.69 | $101,274.65 |
| **30** | Tacloban | **Babatngon United Farmers Fisherfolks Labor Organization (BUFFALO)** | Provision of Alternative Livelihood Opportunities for Coco-workers Through Contour Farming, **(SALT)** | LRB | Japan | - | - | - | - | $29,367.97 | $0.00 | $29,955.33 | $29,895.16 |
|  | *Cebu* | ***Damgo sa Kaugmaon Inc. Bantayan, Bantayan Island Cebu*** | ***ICEB production*** *as community enterprise for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Areas in N Cebu\** | *LRB* | *Japan* | *36* | *18* | *54* | *1188* | *1882* | - | - | - |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | **1637** | **1188** | **2825** | **126,321** | **$486172.91** | **$297,695.05** | **$583,668.02** | **$849,240.40** |
| **SD** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 31 | Tacloban | **Operation Compassion/Eastern Visaya State Univ 1** | Transitional **Shelter Assistance** in Tacloban (brgy Sto Nino, New Kawayan) | SD | Japan | 28 | 22 | 50 | 8,580 | $19,148.71 | $83,489.08 | $42,286.91 | $290,485.98 |
| 32 | Tacloban | **TESDA** | **SD** for out of school youth on carpentry/shelter repair-Tacloban, Palo, Sta.Fe, Tolosa, Dagami, Jaro, Mayorga, Pastrana | SD | Japan (86%)/IMEC | 258 | 258 | 516 | 45,408 | $53,842.00 | 0 | $185,493.00 | $234,415.00 |
| 33 | Cebu | **City of Bogo** | **Repair of Vocational Training** Center in Bogo City | SD | Japan | 60 | 1 | 61 | 1,240 | $8,418.52 | $21,420.54 | $8,671.08 | $12,844.00 |
| 34 | Cebu | **Young Pioneer Disaster Response (YPDR) Sta. Fe, Cebu** | **School Repair and Shelter Construction** in Sta Fe and Bantayan Municipalities | SD | Japan | 100 | 30 | 130 | 3,960 | $28,742.75 | $91,166.8 -PAH&YPDR $842.8LGU | $29,905.00 | $29,905.00 |
| 35 | Cebu | **St Jude Foundation Inc (SPOT CEBU)** | **Support skills trainin**g programmes in the province of Cebu. | SD | IMEC/Japan (68%) | 48 | 190 | 238 | 3,859 | $28,341.00 | $40,863St. Jude $20,214 MLGU | $13,682.00 | $59,910.00 |
| 36 | Bohol | **Seaweed growers association** | Training on **seaweed culture and processing** in CPGarcia, Ubay, Mabini, Candijay, Tubigon, Calape, Clarin, Panglao, Tagbilaran, Talibon, Getafe, Buenavista | SD | Japan (33%)/Norway | 123 | 81 | 204 | 5,818 | $33,693.00 | $16,035.63 | $9,839.00 | $33,420.00 |
| 37 | Tacloban | **Operation Compassion Philippines Inc.** | **Skills Training and Shelter Construction** - OC 2 | SD | Japan | 50 | 50 | 100 | 4,000 | $23,814.92 | $67,084.08 | $29,941.86 | $40,943.00 |
| **Sub-totsl** | | | | | | **667** | **632** | **1299** | **72,865** | **$196,000.90** | **$341,115.90** | **$319,818.85** | **$701,922.98** |
| **ED** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 38 | Tacloban | **Tacloban Federation of Motors and drivers (TAFEMDO)** | **Tri-cycle repai**r and spare parts enterprise | ED | Japan | 17 | 10 | 27 | 1,917 | $2,344.39 | $4,363.05-TAF $33,693.96-DOLE $939.88-LGU | 7,604.47 | 9,647.60 |
| 39 | Cebu | **Damgo sa Kaugmaon Inc. Bantayan, Bantayan Island Cebu** | **ICEB production** as community enterprise for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Areas in N Cebu\* | ED | Japan | 39 | 23 | 62 | 7630 | $13,883.18 | $7,245.34 | 15,854.00 | 33,320.94 |
| 40 | Cebu | **STEER 2-UNDP** | Support **STEER** (by UNDP) graduates for enterprise | ED | Japan | 87 | 13 | 100 | 5,600 | $14,005.32 | $4,990.00-LGU $78,731.00-TESDA | 14,271.00 | 33,676.00 |
| 41 | Tacloba/ Cebu/ Manila | **Multiple partners (TESDA,CARE, Oxfam etc.)** | Provision of **Community-Based Enterprise Development (C-BED)** training package to MSMEs) | ED | Japan | 845 | 666 | 1511 | - | - | - | - | 13,750 |
|  | *Coron* | ***Partnership for Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc. (PHILSSA 1)*** | *Guadalupe Community* ***Sawali*** *Livelihood Project in Coron, Palawan* | *LRB/ED* | *Japan* | *0* | *9* | *9* | *820* | - | - | - | - |
|  | *Cebu* | ***Southern Partners & Fairtrade Center, Inc. (Fairtrade)*** | ***Fairtrade Processors (moringa)*** *for Brgy. Luyang, San Remegio, etc.* | *LRB/ ED* | *Japan* | *28* | *27* | *55* | *0* | - | - | - | - |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | **1016** | **748** | **1764** | **15,967** | **$30,232.89** | **$129,963.23** | **$37,729.47** | **$90,394.54** |

**SUMMARY**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **GRANT ALLOCATIONS** | | | | | | | |
| **Sub-project type** | male | female | total | workdays | wages | Download to partners | ILO total |
| Local resource based (LRB) | 171 | 372 | 543 | 25,900 | $126,886.54 | $321,060.07 | $381,789.30 |
| Skills development (SD) | 573 | 464 | 1037 | 20,425 | $123,145.78 | $243,695.91 | $309,910.07 |
| Enterprise development (ED) | - | - | - | - | 0 | $28,759.00 | $28,790.50 |
| Social Protection | - | - | - | - | - | $233,939.00 | $233,939.00 |
| **subtotal** | **744** | **836** | **1580** | **46,325** | **$250,032.32** | **$827,453.98** | **$954,428.87** |
| **PURCHASE ORDER ALLOCATIONS** | | | | | | | |
| Local resource based (LRB) | 1637 | 1188 | 2825 | 126,321 | $486,127.91 | $583,668.02 | $849,240.0 |
| Skills development (SD) | 667 | 632 | 1299 | 72,865 | $196,000.91 | $319,818.85 | $701,922.98 |
| Enterprise development (ED) – (incl. C-BED) | 1016 | 748 | 1764 | 15,967 | $30,232.89 | $37,729.47 | $90,394.54 |
| **subtotal** | **3320** | **2568** | **5888** | **215,153** | **$712,361.71** | **$941,216.34** | **$1,641,557.52** |
| **TOTAL** | **4064** | **3404** | **7468** | **261,478** | **$962,394.03** | **$1,768,670.32** | **$2,595,986.39** |

1. Note: In the case of Operation Compassion, three LRB sub-projects had been applied at the one site. These are indicated in Annex V but counted here as a single site. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Overview of Philippine Humanitarian Action Plans 2013-2014,18 December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Typhoon Yolanda Strategic Response Plan, 10 December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Recovery Assistance for Yolanda (BBB and Implementation for Results), 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Prodoc: Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The Comprehensive Master Plan for Yolanda Recovery and Rehabilitation is a detailed short-and medium term response generated based on the findings and recommendations of NEDA’s RAY report and OCD’s PDNA, incorporating the detailed sector- and area-based plans prepared by the national government agencies and local government units. The Master Plan is managed and coordinated by the Office of Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) and monitored by NEDA to ensure consistency with the Philippine Development Plan. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Establishment of new enterprises faces a range of challenges if they are to be sustainable and not distort local economies.

   **Asset management.** Frequently projects provide significant assets (buildings, equipment, raw materials) to a few direct beneficiaries. Thus ownership and management structures should be put in place such that (a) there are opportunities for inclusion of additional beneficiaries as the enterprise matures and/or benefits are shared with the broader community; and (b) flexibility that allows ‘owners’ to come and go and dispose of their ‘shares’.

   **Production management.** The local operators must quickly develop capacity to ensure supply of materials is timely, equipment is maintained and operational (preferably before breakdowns), and the need for operating capitol.

   **Market /customer management:** At a basic level local operators must appreciate timely delivery consistent quality as essential for marketing. At another level they need to learn to become proactive in engaging with new customers/markets so they can have a balanced demand, and alternative outlets when they negotiate new contracts.

   Establishing such enterprises thus requires far more than physical establishment. Substantial investment must be made in social preparation where beneficiaries, and the wider communities of which they are a part, are made aware of the above challenges, and criteria established (particularly for asset management). The first period of operation needs to be managed by a project while skills are learnt and products (either physical or services) are established. Having an institutional market (i.e. one put in place by the project) provides an immediate outlet and allows this step to be implemented. But ‘production’ and ‘market management’ capacities so necessary for a sustainable and dynamic enterprise, can only be learnt through working through several cycles. Continued but reducing backup is required in these cycles until autonomy can be achieved. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The SP components for SSS and PhilHealth are listed in the monitoring sheet extract to display the fund inputs, but are not listed as a sub-project, not are beneficiaries listed against them, as these are already counted against the specific sub-projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See footnote 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Managing Performance Framework for M&E, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Southern Partners and Fair Trade center Inc. – moringa processing

    DAMGO sa Kaugmain inc. - Interlocking Compressed Earth Block production (ICEB)

    PHILSSA – Sawali bamboo weaving [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Monitoring Spread sheet as of June 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Southern Partners and Fair Trade center Inc. – moringa processing

    DAMGO sa Kaugmain inc. - Interlocking Compressed Earth Block production (ICEB)

    PHILSSA – Sawali bamboo weaving

    Taclobanfederation of Motor-Cab for Hire Drivers and Operators (TAFEMDO) Inc. – repair and spare parts shop [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Based on the ILO contribution to the sub-project funds as indicated in proposals. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. ILO ProDoc, 2014; 1st TCPR; RAY 2013; NDRRMC 2013 report [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Evaluation TOR; DFID funded ILO Post-Haiyan Independent Evaluation Inception Report [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. IR for Post-Bopha Project Evaluation, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)