



# ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title:** **Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan**
- **ILO TC/SYMBOL:** **PHI/13/05/NOR**      [Error! No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Type of Evaluation :**      **Final independent evaluation**
- **Country(ies) :**      **Philippines**      [Error! No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Date of the evaluation:** **August 2015**
- **Name of consultant(s):**      **Felicissimo David and  
Christoph David Weinmann**
- **ILO Administrative Office:**      **ILO-CO for the Philippines**      [Error!](#)      [No bookmark name given.](#)
- **ILO Technical Backstopping Office:**      **ROAP (Employment Intensive Investments)**[Error! No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Date project ends:** **31 October 2015**      [Error! No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Donor:** **Norway (USD 5,666,509)**      [Error! No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Evaluation Manager:** **Pamornrat Pringsulaka**      [Error!](#)      [No bookmark name given.](#)
- **Evaluation Budget:** **US\$26,028**
- **Key Words:** **emergency relief, disaster, livelihoods, labour intensive employment, social security beneficiary, minimum wage, community enterprise, community participation, aid coordination, enterprise development, skills development, labour force survey**

**This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Unit.**



## **FINAL REPORT**

### **Independent Final Evaluation**

**Generating Emergency Employment and  
Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods  
in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help  
the central Philippines recover from the  
destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan  
(December 2013 – October 2015)**

**PHI/13/05/NOR**

**December 2015**

**Felicissimo Junior David  
Christoph David Weinmann**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	4
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND CHARTS .....	5
1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	6
2 SUMMARY.....	7
3 PROJECT BACKGROUND.....	11
4 EVALUATION BACKGROUND.....	15
5 METHODOLOGY.....	16
6 EVALUATION FINDINGS .....	17
6.1 Relevance and strategic fit .....	17
6.2 Validity of design .....	19
6.3 Project achievements and effectiveness .....	20
6.4 Efficiency of resource use .....	30
6.5 Effectiveness of management arrangements .....	33
6.6 Impact orientation and sustainability of the project.....	38
6.7 Partnership .....	42
7 CONCLUSIONS.....	43
8 RECOMMENDATIONS.....	45
9 LESSONS LEARNED .....	46
ANNEX .....	48
A.1 Adjusted values for monitoring sheet data and results of calculation of central tendencies .....	48
A.2 Evidence of relevance.....	50
A.3 List of persons met.....	51
A.4 References.....	58
A.5 Itinerary .....	59
A.6 Terms of reference.....	62
A.7 Lessons learned.....	73
A.7.1 Emergencies require surge capacity .....	73
A.7.2 Developed M&E tools are required to reduce the work load for ILO teams.....	74
A.7.3 Special attention to staffing is required for emergency response ..	76

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

C-BED	Community-Based Enterprise Development
CFW	cash for work
CO	Country Office
DOLE	Department of Labour and Employment
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DWT	Decent WorkTeam
ED	enterprise development
EE	emergency employment
EIIP	Employment-Intensive Investment Programme
EOC	Emergency Operations Centres
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMEC	International Maritime Employment Council
JP	Japan
LGU	local government unit
LRB	local resource based (pojects)
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MIRA	Multidisciplinary Inter-cluster Rapid Assessment
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGO	non-government organization
NO	Norway
ODA	official development assistance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSH	occupational safety and health
PESO	Public Employment Services Offices
PHP	Philippine Peso
PO	peoples organization
PPE	personal protective equipment
RAY	Reconstruction After Yolanda
ROAP	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
SD	skills development
SSN	ILO/Japan Fund for Building Social Safety Nets in Asia and the Pacific (SSN Fund)
TESDA	Technical and Skills Development Authority
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDAF	United Nations Delopment Assistance Framework
USD	United States Dollar

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND CHARTS

G.01 Funding sources for staff deployed under Haiyan (Yolanda) response by source.....	12
T.02 Targets specified for Norway contribution.....	14
T.03 Distribution of funds achieved.....	22
T.04 Outputs by component.....	23
G.05 Workdays generated by sub-project type and locations.....	24
G.06 Share of wages in sub-project total budget.....	25
G.07 Range and average duration of sub-project types in days.....	25
G.08 Ranges and averages of workdays per beneficiary by type of sub-project.....	26
G.09 Surge capacity for disaster response.....	27
G.10 Actual beneficiaries reached by ILO's Haiyan (Yolanda) response, independent of funding sources, according to sub-project end date and sex.....	28
G.11 Actual beneficiaries reached by ILO's Haiyan (Yolanda) response, independent of funding sources, according to sub-project start date.....	28
G.12 Proportions of female and male beneficiaries by type of sub-project.....	30
G.13 Proportions of actual female and male beneficiaries by sub-project locations.....	30
G.14 Cost per workday generated by sub-project types, excluding in kind contributions.....	32
G.15 Person-months and shares of total workload by ILO budget categories.....	34
G.16 Time of deployment of international surge capacity of ILO for response to Haiyan (Yolanda).....	35
G.17 Contract duration of staff mobilized by ILO for the response to Haiyan (Yolanda).....	35
G.18 Duration of staff contracts by ILO budget categories.....	36
G.19 Project staff balance of leave in days by August 2015, by ILO budget categories.....	37
G.20 Range of daily wages paid to actual beneficiaries in sub-projects and minimum wage levels.....	40
G.21 Total wages paid per actual beneficiary in sub-projects.....	40

## 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The results of evaluations, understood as joint learning exercises in a process of continuous improvement, essentially depend on the participation of key stakeholders and availability of key informants.

The fact that it was possible to collect a fair amount of relevant information on the Haiyan response during the short time period accorded to this exercise is mainly a result of

- the positive attitude to sharing information and discussing the status of implementation by all interlocutors that were (or made themselves) available for meetings during the evaluation period, notably the different ILO staff, based in different locations, involved with the implementation of the project at different stages, and central and local level partner institutions in the Philippines, implementing partners on the ground, and, last not least, the beneficiaries of Norwegian funded ILO assistance
- the excellent preparation of the field visits by the project team which enabled the evaluators to visit a maximum of sub-projects during the time available despite the need to travel to several islands

The independent consultants deployed under this evaluation exercise reiterate their highest appreciation to all concerned for the valuable support provided to this mission.

All errors and omissions remain at the entire responsibility of the consultants.



## 2 SUMMARY

### Quick Facts

Countries: Philippines

Final Evaluation: August 2015

Mode of Evaluation: Independent

ILO Office Administratively backstopping the Project: CO-Manila

ILO Technical Backstopping Office: ROAP Employment Intensive Investment

Evaluation Manager: Pamornrat Pringsulaka

Evaluation Consultants: Felicissimo Junior David and Christoph David

Weinmann

Project End: October 2015

Project Code: PHI/13/05/NOR

Donor & Project Budget: Norway (USD 5,666,509)

Keywords: emergency relief, disaster, livelihoods, labour intensive employment, social security beneficiary, minimum wage, community enterprise, community participation, aid coordination, enterprise development, skills development, labour force survey

### Background and Context

The project was designed to support the recovery of livelihoods of poor and vulnerable workers and their families in the areas affected by super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda).

Four Immediate Objectives were agreed.

- Generating immediate income through emergency employment (EE, months 1-4).
- Local resource-based (LRB), employment intensive, approaches used for small infrastructure repairs and reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation and protection works.
- Technical vocational training and skills development (SD) provided for affected workers.
- Sustainable employment is generated through local enterprise recovery.

The project structure consisted of a team composed of an international chief technical adviser, international long-term experts for key areas of intervention (disaster response, early recovery, livelihood and enterprise development [ED]) working in conjunction with national project coordinators deployed in selected locations (hubs) and supported by technical field coordinators, administrative staff and short-term consultants. ILO backstopping was limited, mainly administrative through CO-Manila and ROAP. National project coordinators had strong experience in coordinating employment intensive projects and working on disaster response.

In the Philippines, ILO is the designated Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team Counterpart for the government in the Livelihood cluster.

Geographic areas of project intervention were agreed between different contributing agencies and the government in line with a coordinated cluster approach.

The project worked with local implementing partners in order to deliver the assistance needed. Implementing partners were local non-government and government organizations. These were sub-contracted in order to carry out agreed activities benefiting affected communities and/ or affected populations and usually contributed in-kind to the agreed activities.

The evaluation occurred just prior to project closure. At the time of publication of this summary, the project has been closed.

The purposes of this final evaluation were to fulfil the accountability to the donor, to serve as internal organizational learning and for improvement of similar projects in the future. The evaluation was to assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved as per project logical framework, and whether the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation. The evaluation also aimed at identifying lessons learnt and possible good practices, and developing recommendations that can be followed up by key constituents and also ILO. It was also of interest to understand to which extent disaster response is a field of intervention that contributes to achieving strategic objectives of the ILO.

Primary stakeholders of the evaluation were project management, ILO (ILO CO-Manila, ROAP), the Governments of the Philippines and of Norway, the other parties involved in the execution of the project, as well as cluster members and tripartite constituents.

### Methodology of evaluation

The short-notice scheduling of the evaluation generally determined the methodology used. The field visit had to be undertaken prior to the handover of the project documentation. Proper desk review, therefore, could only occur following the field visit. The field visit was well organized, and allowed for independent discussions with a multitude of stakeholders, including national and local government, implementing partners, and beneficiaries of diverse sub-projects, and project staff.

The evaluators worked on the basis of semi-structured interviews (following the standard project evaluation criteria set), triangulation of observations in the field, as well as informed judgment. Project monitoring spreadsheets and monitoring reports were analyzed following the field visits and yielded further insights, however could not be used for deeper follow-up and probing as time for the evaluation expired.

The preliminary results of the evaluation were presented to stakeholders at the CO-Manila at the end of the field visit.

## Main Findings and Conclusions

The project was fully relevant to the different processes supported in the target country as well as to ILO and the donor. It contributed to the decent work agenda by successfully convincing the government and other agencies that minimum wages be paid for emergency, recovery, and reconstruction employment, leading to the revision of previous administrative orders. It also set standards by providing personal protective equipment, social security coverage and health insurance.

The project may serve as basis for ILO to develop further interventions in the field of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance subject to observations made in the following section.

Existing labour force surveys were instrumental for estimating the affected vulnerable populations with considerable accuracy.

The project has been effective in achieving intended outcomes, however enterprise development needs more time and therefore has not been as effective as intended; this has been compensated for by higher effectiveness in emergency employment and LRB.

The project has generally been efficient as a result of a highly dedicated, experienced, and productive team in the field. Optimal cooperation with implementing partners and mobilizing contributions in kind have increased its leverage.

The project, as typical for activities of emergency relief and disaster response did not have sustainability as a principal focus, but managed to contribute to many sustainable processes. Alignment with the government and unison with the cluster approach ensured that emergency activities minimized distortions and strengthened the existing institutional landscape.

The within-project transition from emergency response to the next phases (recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction) needs to be accompanied by appropriate change in management approaches. The project team operated in "emergency mode" for too long. This has led to overburdening and exhaustion of field teams. The project also had difficulties to make available stronger administrative support in the field.

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has been self-developed and was not suitable to timely yield fully reliable M&E information, although it certainly was instrumental for project and sub-project management. Careful attention needs to be paid to setting up an M&E system from the outset for project that deals with large numbers of beneficiaries and respectively sub-projects in a short amount of time.

A significantly higher share of emergency employment was created for male beneficiaries than for female beneficiaries. Part of the explanation is that a

large share of EE consisted of clearing debris. Female beneficiaries benefited more from LRB and ED. It will be important to think of ways of increasing the female share in EE because this is the most immediate assistance available in disaster response. ED, on the other hand, takes more time to lead to results and therefore may not be the first-best solution.

### Recommendations

1. By participating in emergency and disaster response and recovery, ILO is able to promote the decent work agenda because ILO may influence standards of the response. It therefore is recommended that ILO develop a strategy for dealing with emergencies and disasters on the basis of the Haiyan response and other experience accumulated in the Philippines (and possibly selected other responses).
2. If interested in professionalizing interventions in the field of emergency or disaster response, ILO will need to develop a genuine surge capacity. Usually, this would require establishing a pool of experts who accept deployment at short notice and possess of the required qualifications. Ideally, some of these experts continuously work on emergency and disaster response, for example by participating in preparedness, mitigation, and prevention activities.
3. Disaster response requires an administrative backbone on which the field teams can rely. Sufficient and sufficiently experienced or trained administrative staff needs to be secured early on in order to provide support to the technical team at all levels. The project cannot operate with a front office only, a strong back office needs to be in place.
4. A substitution mechanism needs to be in place for field staff to be able to take leave in due course without risking any neglect of duties.
5. Where large numbers of sub-projects are being implemented in a short time, monitoring is not achievable en passant. It requires proper design and proper user training. It should be supported by a software solution that facilitates not only reporting, but also enhances the quality of collected data (e.g. by screening out errors, using plausibility checks, verifying outliers).
6. Both EE and LRB have proven to yield good results. They should be the cornerstone of future emergency and disaster responses by ILO.
7. Particular attention needs to be given to ensure that the share of female beneficiaries of EE is increased. Conditions for this may vary between emergency/ disaster zones.
8. While using emergency and disaster response for standard setting and promoting the decent work agenda is legitimate, it is important that actuarial studies should be commissioned or consulted in order to anticipate any potential effect on the social security system and health insurance prior to enrolling emergency employment beneficiaries in

social security and health insurance. This is because retention of emergency employees in social security and health insurance cannot be guaranteed following the termination of the emergency.

9. The CO-Manila will need to work with Social Security System (SSS) of the Philippines in order to ensure that liabilities related to burial expenses as a result of short-term employment under the Haiyan project cannot impair the financial position of the SSS.

### Lessons Learned

- 1) Emergency and disaster response is not a core activity of the ILO. However, ILO can make good contributions to responses based on its experience with employment intensive and labour based programmes. Up to date labour force surveys may be used for quickly targeting vulnerable populations. Wage and OSH standards may enhance the quality of the response while contributing to the decent work agenda. However, ILO lacks the required surge capacity to participate in emergency and disaster response on a significant scale.
- 2) Where large numbers of sub-projects need to be organized in order to deal with an emergency, it is important to have developed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools at hand that reduce the work load of the ILO team.
- 3) Where emergency or disaster response is linked to livelihood development, it is important to ensure that field teams are able to return to normal working conditions once the (emergency) response phase is over and the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases are reached. Otherwise, the field team members are likely to suffer from burnout or unhealthy lifestyles sooner or later, with all potential consequences. Adequate capacities for substitution and strong administrative backup is also required in order to ensure sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.


## 3 PROJECT BACKGROUND

The project "Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods" is funded by Norway and implemented by ILO in Central Philippines, an area devastated by Typhoon Haiyan on 08 November 2013. The typhoon had a direct impact on about 5.6 million workers spread over 36 provinces. Of these, 2.6 million were already in vulnerable employment and living at or near the poverty line even before the super typhoon and with limited income and social security prior to the disaster.

Within a few days after the typhoon, the UN agencies and other partners quickly developed the initial UN Flash Appeal based on the Action Plan which contains an analysis of the context, outlines roles and responsibilities, specific sectoral response plans and activities that require funding. The Philippines Typhoon Haiyan initial Flash Appeal was launched on 12 November 2013 with a total funding requirement of USD 301 million over six months, and USD6.5 million were needed for emergency employment.

The Humanitarian Country Team launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) in December 2013 and the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster<sup>1</sup> targeted a total of 260,000 vulnerable workers. In support of the SRP, the ILO prepared its integrated approach to livelihoods under the UN Flash Appeal "Philippines Super Typhoon Haiyan: Rebuilding Sustainable Livelihoods". The ILO's response plan directly supports the strategic objective of the six months action plan i.e. "within four months, starting with immediate short-term employment, people with lost or reduced livelihoods targeted by this plan start to re-establish their livelihoods and regain self-reliance".

ILO raised funds amounting to USD 11.5 million from the Government of Norway (MOFA), Government of Japan-Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, SSN), International Maritime Employment Council (IMEC), United Kingdom (DFID) and ILO (regular funds). The Norwegian contribution is in line with ILO SRP objective that targets women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture, and fisheries. The Norwegian allocation also support the national Government's efforts in providing emergency employment and livelihood recovery in central Philippines covering the provinces of Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte (including Tacloban City), Cebu, Bohol, Negros Occidental and Palawan.



G.01 Funding sources for staff deployed under Haiyan (Yolanda) response by source.  
Source: List of Haiyan Staff.xlsx, own calculations.

## Funding Arrangements

The Norwegian support to the project "Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods", amounts to USD 5.6 million under the

<sup>1</sup> The cluster is led by DSWD with ILO as co-lead. Cf. NDCC 2007. Members include DOLE, TESDA, SSS, UNFPA, IOM, WFP, UNDP, ACF International, and AusAID.

Technical Cooperation agreement -- PHI/13/05/NOR. The project approach involves partnership with national government agencies, local government units, NGOs, business organizations, labour groups/ unions and people's organization. The specific project agreement specifies cost sharing/ counterpart fund arrangement, as applicable, according to the types of projects implemented. At the community level, local materials were provided as counterpart to the project. For other projects, only the labor component is covered by the sub project cost.

### **Strategic Objectives, Immediate Outcomes and Outputs**

The overall goal of the Norwegian contribution is to support the recovery of livelihoods of poor and vulnerable workers and their families in the typhoon affected areas. The specific project outputs grouped by Immediate Objectives (IO) are as follows:

- A. IO 1: Generating immediate income through emergency employment (months 1-4)
  - a. Output 1.1 - Communities cleaned and material/debris collected and recycled
  - b. Output 1.2 - On the job-training for workers on emergency employment schemes provided
  - c. Output 1.3 - Social protection provided to the workers
- B. IO 2: Local resource-based, employment intensive, approaches used for small infrastructure repairs and reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation and protection works.
  - a. Output 2.1 - Direct employment created through community infrastructure repairs and development and environmental works
  - b. Output 2.2 - Communities have improved social and economic infrastructure and natural environment;
  - c. Output 2.3 - Capacity of implementation partners has been strengthened;
  - d. Output 2.4 - New labour-based schemes for recovery of communities have been identified and designed for additional funding after the emergency/early recovery phase
- C. IO 3: Technical vocational training and skills development provided for affected workers
  - a. Output 3.1 – Skills needs assessments have been carried out in the different geographical clusters and skills training needs have been identified;
  - b. Output 3.2 – Training has been provided to poor and vulnerable workers and their skills have been upgraded or are newly acquired;
  - c. Output 3.3 – Poor and vulnerable workers have received skills certification;
  - d. Output 3.4 – Close collaboration has been established with TESDA in delivering the skills courses
- D. IO 4: Sustainable employment is generated through local enterprise recovery.

- a. Output 4.1 – economic, entrepreneurship and employment opportunities are identified and main value chains are identified for the selected cluster areas;
- b. Output 4.2 – A community-based entrepreneurship program for micro and small start up enterprises is developed and rolled out;
- c. Output 4.3 – New and existing entrepreneurs have benefited from business developments services

The corresponding targets set for the Norway contribution is detailed in the table below:

Immediate Objective	Indicator	Targets original	Targets revised*)	Remarks
Emergency employment (EE)	Workers Work-days	5,000 100,000	3,900 78,000	50% female; average work duration is 20 days
Local resource based (LRB) and labour based community works	Workers	1,000	1,550	50% female
Long term skills training (SD)	Workers Certifications achieved	1,000 60	1,550 930	50% female and 50% male
Enterprise Development (ED)	Workers	250	250	50% female
Overall Norway contribution **)	Individual workers (including family members)	5,000 25,000	5,000 *) 25,000	50% male and 50% female
<i>Observations: *) Following review of mid-term report. **) Overall figures do not add up because overlaps between beneficiaries, e.g. EE and LRB, were admissible.</i>				

T.02 Targets specified for Norway contribution.

Source: Project Management.

## Institutional Framework and Management Arrangements

The overall management of the ILO SRP is undertaken by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) based in Manila and assisted by an Enterprise Development specialist plus an EIIP specialist. The scope of work includes all of the projects supported by Norway-MOFA, Japan-MOFA, DFID, IMEC, SSN funds and internal funding.

At the field level, teams of three to four local staff were based in three hubs (Bogo/ North Cebu, Coron/ Palawan, Tacloban and Ormoc/ Leyte). There were also teams operating in Bohol, Negros Occidental and Samar. The field team makeup was Project Coordinator, reporting directly to the CTA, Field Coordinator (usually technical staff member/ engineer or architect), administrative/ finance staff, and driver. An Enterprise Specialist worked in Tacloban for a while, providing support to all teams.

The Manila team is based in the ILO Manila Office while the local team in Tacloban City rented offices jointly with UNFAO, and the Northern Cebu and Coron teams rented offices. The project technical backstopping support is provided by a Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work



Support Team, Bangkok. ILO Manila provides administrative backstopping to the project.

The implementation scheme involves the preparation of specific sub-projects with partner government agencies, local government units, employers/labour groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), peoples organization (POs) and church based groups. The ILO project team plays an important role in the detailing of the projects following ILO prescribed documentation. Grant agreements or purchase orders were used to organize the implementation of the sub-projects and activities with the project partners.

Emergency employment activities were implemented in partnership with DOLE through grant agreements both at regional level and provincial level. At the municipal level, the Public Employment Services Offices (PESO) of the LGUs provided support in the selection of labourers for emergency employment. The responsibility of DOLE under the grant agreements includes targeting or selection of vulnerable individuals to be employed, administration and payment of wages. ILO provided technical advisory services, particularly in areas such as project identification, monitoring of works and ensuring quality control, social and environmental and OSH safeguards.

Labour-based community infrastructure works were implemented with different partners including DOLE, LGUs, NGOs, CBOs, community contractors etc. Contract agreements for sub-projects were signed with these partners. Identification of works and workers was done in close collaboration with the community groups and LGUs. ILO provided technical advisory services, particularly in areas such as project identification, monitoring of works and ensuring quality control and social and environmental safeguards. Skills development was carried out in close collaboration with TESDA.

#### 4 EVALUATION BACKGROUND

The evaluation was to provide the project stakeholders, the donor (Norway) and the ILO with an independent assessment of the progress made and with lessons learned for further projects of similar structure, and/ or projects of similar content in the Philippines or other countries. In particular, it was considered important to reflect on whether disaster response is a field the ILO should more actively engage in.

Specific questions to be addressed are referenced in the terms of reference for the evaluation (cf. Annex A.6).

In practice, the evaluation's potential was curtailed by the short time made available for reviewing documents and monitoring data prior to the field mission. The evaluation mission ultimately occurred according to the following sequence (travel time excluded):

12-27 August (cf. itinerary in Annex A.5)

Clients of the evaluation are the stakeholders of the project "Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan", notably the government of Norway, the concerned ILO units (CO-Manila, ROAP), and partners of the ILO in the recovery work in the Philippines.

## 5 METHODOLOGY

The methodology<sup>2</sup> of the evaluation has largely been determined by the short notice prior to the evaluation, resulting from an administrative constraint, and the time it took to the project to make available the vast documentation that is required for a project operating with multiple approaches in multiple locations on the basis of negotiated sub-projects.<sup>3</sup> It implied that the inception report could only be produced while the field mission was already being conducted, and that time was required following, instead of prior to, the field visit in order to review the documentation.

The main methodological elements of this evaluation consisted of a desk review of programme documents, meetings with available stakeholders at national level and field visits in Leyte, Cebu, Palawan to locations and sub-projects selected by project.

Meetings in the field consisted of discussions with final beneficiaries, staff, stakeholders, other related organizations, using semi-structured, open-ended questions, exchange of opinions, selective probing, as well as informed judgment as a basis for developing evaluation findings.

- Interviews with beneficiaries were conducted mainly in English, supplemented by Filipino, with the responsible ILO staff not present during most of the discussions with the evaluators. Interviewees were all willing to speak freely and there was no indication of uneasiness in the meetings.
- One of the discussions in Leyte was organized in a more formal way by the local community worker and therefore was a little more difficult to unwind so as to create an atmosphere conducive to open discussion. However, the information gained was deemed sufficient for a proper appreciation of the issues the sub-project is dealing with.

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<sup>2</sup> See also the TOR in Annex A.6 which detail the conceived methodological approach.

<sup>3</sup> Incomplete documentation was first offered 2 days before the mission via an external server file sharing account. Downloading the complete documentation as made available by the same mechanism during the field visit was not feasible due to slow internet connections in the field. The documentation ultimately was handed over on a flashdisk at the end of the field mission. The pitfalls of transferring the large set of files via internet during the field mission should have been anticipated.

Updating monitoring information with key information relevant for ILO evaluations such as workdays generated took until mid-September. The monitoring data also was not cleaned, as it turned out when processing it for analysis, including numerous obvious errors (among which disaggregated data not adding up to the total, outliers, incorrect exchange rates for converting USD to PHP).

Monitoring reports for sub-projects were made available by end of September instead of at the outset.

- One of the discussions in Cebu was held at a very basic English level because of lack of interpreter for the local language, but was sufficient to gain a basic understanding of what kind of benefits beneficiaries felt they had obtained and to which extent they made use of acquired skills.

As a result of discussions with ILO staff in the field, the evaluators also scheduled a session with project administrative staff in Manila in order to be able to better understand the administrative environment the project operated under.

Technically speaking, the joint administration of funds from different sources leads to a pool of resources which becomes fungible for resource allocations under a general headline, in this case the response to Haiyan. From this perspective, it is not meaningful to distinguish sub-projects financed by specific donors that have been as generous as to finance this response. At the same time, donors, to different degrees, usually would like to track their funds to specific sub-projects and beneficiaries so as to be able to show how they made a difference and/ or to respond to fiduciary expectations.

With regard to the methodology, the evaluation of the Norway-financed part of the response cannot be separated from the evaluation of those parts financed by other donors (Japan, UK, ILO). This is also reflected in the fact that there is a single implementation structure created for this response, which draws on the resources made available by all donors.

The evaluators, nevertheless, decided to abstain from reviewing the evaluations for the parts financed by Japan and the UK. This way the sub-projects administered under Norwegian "flag" are not at risk of being "brushed over" by association with results of visits to other sub-projects implemented during the Haiyan response, but are being afforded equal attention as the other sub-projects.

This principle of separate evaluation is only broken in two contexts:

- when discussing the capacity of ILO to mobilize for emergency or disaster response (surge capacity) because this would be inadequately reflected given the attribution of sub-projects to a funding source is somewhat arbitrary and therefore may lead to measurement errors (cf. section 6.3)
- when looking at project management because staff have not been recruited according to funding sources but in line with overall project requirements

## 6 EVALUATION FINDINGS

### **6.1 Relevance and strategic fit**

The Philippines' National Disaster Risk Reduction & Management Council (NDRRMC) that oversees the operation of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System utilizes the United Nations (UN) cluster approach in disaster management. The cluster system is activated whenever a disaster occurs to form the organizational framework for assessment, planning and response. The clusters are convened as working groups chaired by heads of government line agencies with access to resources at the national level. During Haiyan disaster response planning, the International Development Partners (including ILO) participated in the cluster activities with inter-cluster coordination undertaken via the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator.

The project interventions falls within the scope of the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster and involves emergency employment, which includes both cash for work (CFW), social insurance and occupational safety and health related equipment that required integrated approach across other clusters. The Government of the Philippines policies for emergency employment in disaster settings, which have recently been updated to ensure that also in such circumstances minimum labour and decent work standards are met by providing accident and social insurance coverage, occupational safety and health measure and compliance with minimum wages.<sup>4</sup>

The project was developed and implemented as part of ILO's Integrated Approach to Livelihoods under the UN Flash Appeal and a component of the Strategic Response Plan developed by the humanitarian partners. It is also consistent with the core principles in planning for recovery and reconstruction in the document: Reconstruction After Yolanda (RAY)-Build Back Better (December 2013). These principles include: 1) focus on ensuring that recovery and reconstruction proactively addresses inclusiveness and sustainable livelihoods and 2) incorporate gender into the design and implementation of post-disaster interventions.

The project contributes into the ILO Philippines Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) outcomes: Decent Jobs for a Competitive Philippines and the corresponding outcome indicators identified corresponds to Norway supported outputs and outcomes. The mandatory decent work standards prescribed by ILO under the project even in emergency employment were recognized as important by most implementing partners. The workers employed belong to vulnerable households affected by Typhoon Yolanda.

The project is relevant to the four outcomes of the UNDAF (2012-2018) with the project approach directly supporting two Specific Objectives (SO) i.e. social protection, and decent work mechanism. On social protection, the project approach fits into the policies and programmes that seek to reduce poverty and vulnerability and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised by promoting and protecting livelihood and employment, protecting against hazards and sudden loss of income, and improving people's capacity to manage risks. The social protection programmes includes

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Livelihood Cluster (2013). See also Annex 2 for the revision of previous policy.

support vulnerable workers (under SO2.2), and to strengthen social insurance (under SO1.2 and SO4.1).

Project beneficiaries employed as workers under emergency employment and local resource based approach for small infrastructure community projects were paid minimum wages. It exposed them to use of protective workgear, insurance and social benefits. The benefits received allowed them to meet immediate emergency needs. The skills trainings also developed life long skills for other work opportunities in the community while the enterprise development training allowed them to start community livelihood activities. Longer term interventions on Enterprise Development appears to be an emerging need as the beneficiaries/communities engage in livelihood activities to improve their economic conditions. It maybe recalled that about 44 percent of the population in the affected areas was vulnerably employed with limited income and social security prior to the disaster.

The project is very well aligned with ILO's mandate on promoting and supporting decent employment, social inclusion, and social protection measures. The project draws from ILO and constituents' experience gained during the implementation of the Philippines DWCP and is specifically linked to the ILO's work on sustainable employment-centred recovery programmes to address job losses caused by disaster. The project also supports the DWCP Country Objective PHL101.

Moreover, the project provided an excellent entry point for promoting occupational safety and health (OSH), boosting membership in the social security system and health insurance, and ensuring adequate wage levels. The, to a certain extent, centralized nature of disaster response provided a communication mechanism for important messages the ILO had to send.

The project supports the LGUs strategic thrusts on generating employment and livelihood opportunities and involvement of women in community development activities. As an emergency response, it is in line with the Disaster Risk Reduction and Mitigation Strategy of the LGUs.

## 6.2 Validity of design

The design of the project was fully valid for the context of emergency or disaster response.

- The ILO has mobilized its existing knowhow related to creating employment opportunities and working on livelihoods to the full, and transferred it to the context of disaster response by developing a diverse number of sub-projects that cater to the specific contexts of the beneficiaries on a tailor-made basis. At the same time, ILO has actively coordinated at national level with other stakeholders in order to harmonize

and shape approaches to response (e.g. within the framework of the Livelihood Cluster organized under OCHA's cluster approach).<sup>5</sup>

- In order to implement the sub-projects, a relatively lean structure was set up at the ILO CO-Manila supplemented by a similarly lean structure in the field. While beginning with a relatively lean structure as long as funding is still being mobilized is wise, a switch to a more powerful structure in the field did not occur during the course of implementation. Whether this is an issue of project design or project management is debatable.<sup>6</sup>
- ILO has not opted for any one-size-fits-all approaches, also found in the field,<sup>7</sup> but listened to beneficiaries and local communities before implementing sub-projects. At the same time, ILO has cautiously avoided substitute performance by relying on implementing partners on the ground to identify beneficiaries, develop sub-project proposals, and organize sub-project implementation, while at the same time not neglecting proper negotiation, supervision, and follow-up.
- Where infrastructure or construction works were concerned, ILO relied on local standards and designs approved by the relevant national authorities and therefore could be implemented with relative ease, as appropriate to response, rehabilitation, and recovery work. This also is conducive to proper future maintenance of the works delivered because maintenance may rely on existing knowhow and standards.

### 6.3 Project achievements and effectiveness

Measuring project achievements and effectiveness for the project "Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan" is not as straightforward as it may be for other ILO projects because the project is geared toward multiple time lines and operates with different types of approaches.

- While the generation of emergency employment essentially refers to a short-term humanitarian objective, recovery and sustainable livelihoods refer to medium to long-term perspectives. While the former places a very clear emphasis on reaching as many beneficiaries as possible in a very short time and call for a maximum of effectiveness, if need be at the expense of efficiency, the latter cannot ignore efficiency criteria because efficiency is a key ingredient for achieving sustainable solutions. In other

<sup>5</sup> The most noteworthy shaping to occur was related to the agreement that minimum wages be paid and personal protective equipment be provided during emergency employment and other work related to response, rehabilitation, and recovery. This approach, at the time, was not in line with existing provisions for emergency response in the Philippines (which foresaw payments amounting to only 75% of stipulated minimum wages; cf. DSWD [2008]) and also put other agencies that apparently were not considering labor related implications of their activities on the spot.

<sup>6</sup> See also section 6.5 below.

<sup>7</sup> Some beneficiaries have made it a point to let us know (without being asked) that ILO was the only organization they met to ask what they actually needed instead of administering standard responses (providing piglets which they did not need, providing latrines which they did not need, etc.).

words, activities focusing on emergency employment (EE) cannot be measured against the same criteria as activities concerned with enterprise development (ED), skills development (SD), and those which are based on local resources (LRB).

- The targets that were agreed with the donor, moreover, strongly reflect aims of humanitarian assistance, and less directly objectives of the ILO. For example, the number of beneficiaries reached appears to be of much higher importance than the number of workdays created, let alone the long-term sustainability of any activities. As a consequence, data collection regarding the number of workdays achieved is incomplete.

The USD 5.6 million fund for the Government of Norway was in response to the ILO's Integrated Approach to Livelihoods under the UN Flash Appeal. It supported the Philippine Government's efforts in the areas directly affected by typhoon Haiyan.

Specific inputs consisted of sub-projects for emergency employment and livelihood recovery, local resource based community works, skills training and enterprise development in Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Negros Occidental and Palawan.

The allocation of funds across the geographic areas considered the extent of typhoon damage, as assessed by the ILO team, and validated by the first UN Multidisciplinary Inter-cluster Rapid Assessment (MIRA) report published by UN OCHA. The priorities of the LGUs and national government agencies and other humanitarian partners also influenced the allocation of project resources.

The Norway funds covered 58 projects amounting to USD 6,927,678. The partner's contribution amounted to USD 1,630,034 or 24 percent. The partner's contribution consisted of regular staff time, materials, use of equipment and use of venues for training.

Total funds downloaded to the partners amounted to USD 2,549,820 (37.5%) while USD 2,613,005 (38.5%) was directly paid or procured by ILO. The social protection coverage under the Social Security System and PhilHealth amounted to USD 211,743 or 3.1% of the total sub project costs. Total wages paid amounted to USD 1,468,946 or about 21.2% of the total sub-project costs.

The sub project agreements specified activities/ inputs directly procured/ paid by ILO and funds that were downloaded/ released to the project partners. The grant agreement also specified social protection to be directly procured by ILO while the personal protective equipment were either directly procured by ILO or included as part of the downloaded funds to the partners.

ITEM	Cost (USD)	Percent Share
Number of Projects	58	
Total sub-project costs	6,792,859	
Contribution of Partners	1,630,034	24.0
ILO Direct Payment	2,613,005	38.5
Downlad to Partners	2,549,820	37.5
<i>PhilHealth and Social Security System*</i>	<i>211,743</i>	<i>3.1</i>
<i>Total wages paid**</i>	<i>1,468,946</i>	<i>21.2</i>

T.03 Distribution of funds achieved.

Source: Project Management.

Observations: \*) part of ILO direct payment; \*\*) part of download to partners.

In terms of employment generated by the sub-projects, 11,549 persons (47% women and 53% men) benefited from implementation. Total workdays generated is 241,467 and the average duration of employment was 20.5 days.

Overall accomplishment in terms of number of workers involved in the sub-projects exceeded the targets and the women participation was 47 percent. The sub-projects on Emergency Employment reached 4,997 workers, slightly below target but the Local Resource Based sub-projects, exceeded planned target by more than 300 percent. Skills development also reported high accomplishment but the certifications target were not achieved. Enterprise Development involved more women beneficiaries than other components.



The table below shows outputs by component.

Immediate Objective/Output	Indicator	Remarks	Target	Actual				Average duration
				Male	Female	Total	Work-days	
<b>Emergency Employment</b>	Workers	50% female	5,000	2,599	2,398	4,997	75,105	15
<b>Local Resource Based and labour based community works</b>	Workers	50% female	1,000	1,554	1,955	3,509	111,935	31
<b>Long term Skills Training (SD)</b>	Workers	50% female & 50% male	1,000	1,592	563	2,155	54,427	25
<b>Certification achieved</b>	Workers		600					
<b>Enterprise Development (Non-CBED)</b>	Workers	50% female	250	371	517	888	5,446	6
<b>Overall Norway Contribution</b>	Individual workers	50% male & 50% female	5,000	6,116	5,433	11,549		20
	Incl. family members		25,000			57,745		
	% Share M/F			53	47			
	Total Work-days						246,913	

T.04 Outputs by component.  
Source: Project monitoring reports.


The data shows achievement above targets on almost all components except Emergency Employment (EE). The M&E system, however, was not able to track any workers that were involved on more than one component. This scenario was anticipated in the project design and in the detailing of the target beneficiaries.

### Effectiveness compared between different types of sub-projects

Given that it is the objective of most response activities to maximize outreach and speed, it is useful to compare how the different types of projects compare to each other. The results of this comparison may be important for planning future interventions in the field of disaster response.

Both emergency employment and LRB have been relatively successful in creating workdays (cf. graph below). This contrasts markedly with the work days that have been created by ways of skills and enterprise development,

although some very significant successes have been recorded for skills development in Cebu and even Coron.




G.05 Workdays generated by sub-project type and locations.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, own calculations [N=58].

It is obvious that both EE and LRB are very straightforward methods of creating short-term employment whereas both skills and enterprise development usually cannot immediately lead to employment (including self-employment), but require longer lead times and depend on external factors (markets, competition, etc.). In contrast, EE and LRB are relatively easy to manage because there are fewer external factors and the lead times are determined more by technicalities.

Exploring more deeply how it was possible for skills development to lead to significant workdays being created in Cebu and Coron may therefore be of interest for future emergency responses by ILO because it could create a link between emergency response and a more sustainable recovery of livelihoods.<sup>8</sup>


<sup>8</sup> If the explanation for the success is that trainees were paid wages while participating in training, such a link is unlikely to exist. If the explanation is related to trained persons having obtained employment as a result of the training, even in other locations, then it may be worthwhile to pursue. Given the monitoring data could only be analyzed after the mission to the field, the evaluators have no answer to offer regarding this question.



G.06 Share of wages in sub-project total budget.

Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, cleaned; own calculations [N=38].

The share of wages in the total sub-project budgets covers a wide range, and it is unclear what are the reasons for this. The highest average share (51%), based on a calculation of the arithmetic mean, occurred in emergency employment. While that is encouraging in the sense that the first response also was able to transfer significant amounts of cash to beneficiaries in need (effective response), there also were cases where the share was as low as 19% or 25%. Both LRB and skills development projects achieved an average of ca. 35% each, while the data for enterprise development were insufficient for conducting any meaningful analysis.



G.07 Range and average duration of sub-project types in days.


Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx; own calculations [N=58].

When it comes to the speed of implementation which is of paramount importance for effectiveness of any response, it is interesting to note that the shortest average durations were actually achieved by LRB projects (54 days, based on median values). This is significantly faster than for emergency

employment (88 days) and skills development (87 days), as well as for enterprise development (106 days).

Assuming that distinguishing between EE and LRB sub-projects is meaningful (i.e. that it is not just a matter of labeling), it may be a consequence of accumulated ILO experience in implementing LRB. There may be other reasons, of course. For example, it may be generally more difficult to implement emergency employment because it needs to occur while most systems are "down", and when coordination between stakeholders on the ground is only being re-established. Given the monitoring data only could be reviewed after the field visit, there was no possibility to discuss the reasons for this difference and what implications, if any, it may have for further emergency response interventions.

Finally, the mean duration of employment of laborers was 20.45 person-days, which is at the level of the target duration in the Project Document. The figure below shows average person-days by component. Actual duration of emergency employment ranged between 15 to 25 person-days while skills development ranged from 15 to 30 person-days. Local resource based employment involved longer work duration up to 70 person-days, depending on the type of community infrastructure.




G.08 Ranges and averages of workdays per beneficiary by type of sub-project.

Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, cleaned; own calculations [N=44].

From this perspective, emergency employment and skills development would seem to be more effective approaches for reaching many beneficiaries in a short period of time.

## ILO and emergency and disaster response

Emergency and disaster response usually exerts strong requirements on effectiveness. In order to be effective in responding to disasters, resources, both human and material, need to be mobilized very quickly. In humanitarian assistance, the capability to rise to the sudden demand exerted by an emergency or disaster is called surge capacity. While there may be a need for maintaining a basic capability on a continuous basis, as displayed in the figure below, the real challenge for humanitarian assistance still is to be able to quickly rise on the occasion of the emergency or disaster. If there is no surge capacity, then response must be too slow.




G.09 Surge capacity for disaster response.  
Source: Emmons and Houghton (2008): 30, Fig.1.

Given that ILO traditionally is not an organization specialized in humanitarian assistance and emergency and disaster relief, assessing effectiveness requires probing to which extent the ILO was able to rise to the disaster resulting from super-typhoon Haiyan's landfall in the Philippines.

In order to assess this capacity, we have analyzed the start and end dates of sub-projects implemented under the ILO's response to Haiyan, independent of the sources of funding. The independence of the sources of funding is important because of the fungibility of the resources provided by the different donors to ILO. Otherwise, the overall surge capacity could depend on the ability of a specific donor to disburse funds.


The picture that emerges is encouraging because ILO has, indeed, managed to deliver emergency employment directly following the landfall and thereby demonstrated surge capacity in the Philippines. As displayed in the first of the graphs below, ILO was able to complete sub-project contracts already by the end of 2013 that have led to emergency employment for 4,365 beneficiaries.

This is a result of contracts signed and starting as of 20 November 2013 as displayed in the second graph below.



G.10 Actual beneficiaries reached by ILO's Haiyan (Yolanda) response, independent of funding sources, according to sub-project end date and sex.

Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx; own calculations [N=146].



G.11 Actual beneficiaries reached by ILO's Haiyan (Yolanda) response, independent of funding sources, according to sub-project start date.

Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx; own calculations [N=146].

While possibly not unexpected given the share that debris clearing takes during the disaster response phase, it is nevertheless noteworthy that 78.5% of the beneficiaries were male while only 21.5% were female. This bias in favor of creating employment for males in the direct aftermath of disaster was corrected during the subsequent implementation of enterprise development, skills development, and local resource based projects.

While, *prima facie*, surge capacity has been successfully demonstrated in the response to Haiyan by ILO, the reason for this powerful capacity is rooted in a number of fortuitous coincidences.

- ILO expertise with recovery following disaster in the Philippines has been built over previous projects that already addressed the aftermath of previous typhoons. As Haiyan made landfall, this human capital was

already deployed, and it only needed to be shifted from other locations in the Philippines.

- The labour force surveys available to ILO allowed for fairly accurate estimates of the affected population and thereby assisted the targeting of the response and the respective resources. ILO thus was able to offer "premium" information to all stakeholders involved in the response.
- The coinciding endings of both the biennium and the current year with the landfall of Haiyan allowed ILO to mobilize some of its own resources in order to support this process. Had the super-typhoon found its way to the Philippines a few months earlier or later, it would have been much more unlikely that ILO would have been able to draw on additional sources such as the regional budget.

Naturally, besides the coincidences, ILO's long experience with implementing local resource based labor intensive employment is a core competency of the ILO that can be directly applied in the field of disaster response and recovery operations. This experience is an asset that can be tapped into for increasing the effectiveness of many emergency and disaster responses.


That being said, it is difficult to imagine that the circumstances surrounding the Haiyan response are replicable by the ILO in other countries, although continuing climate change may augur for an increasing number of opportunities for responding to natural disasters.

### **Participation of women**


Besides the marked bias in favor of male beneficiaries during the phase immediately following landfall mentioned above, the participation of both sexes in the diverse sub-projects has been actively encouraged.

Generally speaking, the different projects under the four components provided equal opportunities for both genders to participate. The figure below shows EE and SD component employed more male while ED, LRB employed more female but overall share gives the male a slight edge in participation. In terms of geographic distribution, the projects in Negros, Samar and Tacloban City employed more female than the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Coron and Ormoc.

The relatively equal participation of females in overall emergency employment in the graph below is explained by the fact that emergency employment is continuing to be used as a tool, i.e. that its usage was not limited to the response phase for Haiyan/ Yolanda. At the time of the evaluation, for example, there were still ongoing projects in Samar that seek to employ 1,620 beneficiaries in response to Typhoon Ruby (with consent of the involved donors). The very high male share in Ormoc is likely to be an outlier that does not represent the whole picture because it is based on a single emergency employment sub-project which took place in Ormoc.



G.12 Proportions of female and male beneficiaries by type of sub-project.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, own calculations [N=58].



G.13 Proportions of actual female and male beneficiaries by sub-project locations.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, own calculations [N=58].  
Observation: Ormoc should be considered an outlier.

## 6.4 Efficiency of resource use

Efficiency, as opposed to effectiveness, is concerned with input-output ratios. It is a criterion which seeks to assess to which extent resources have been put to good use, i.e. achieving a maximum value for money.

The evaluators have not been able to visit any emergency employment project, however had the opportunity to visit enterprise development, LRB, and skills development sub-projects. The general impression from these visits is that



sub-projects have been implemented efficiently. Beneficiaries, implementing partners, and local government at all locations were happy with their swift implementation. Wages were paid punctually by ILO. Delays were mainly attributable to implementing partners responsible for procuring materials.

The implementation approach was both effective and efficient as reported on Emergency Employment that involved debris clearing. Feedback from the project team and the beneficiaries showed the implementation occurred more swiftly than with other agencies and the ILO project hired workers were able to haul the debris and put it to use. The debris from coconut trees that were quickly cleared prevented the deterioration of the tree trunks for processing to coco lumber. The material produced was used in the construction of temporary relocation facilities and other community structures.

The project was successful in mobilizing resources from various partners e.g. DOLE, DSWD, TESDA and other national government agencies, LGUs, NGOs, and community beneficiaries. Moreover, the project aligned itself strongly with systems existing in the Philippines, thereby ensuring that any inefficiencies relating to incompatibilities of imported standards or approaches were minimized. For example, skills development sub-projects usually was plugged into TESDA's qualification network and made flexible use of existing providers.

If taken as percentage of the total value of USD 6.792 million implemented, the USD1.63 million leveraged with other partners represent about 24 percent of the total project cost. The LRB sub projects funded by the project also show that in kind contributions of partners e.g. construction materials were not included in the total sub project costs inasmuch as the project funds covers only the labor component. If quantified and included in the cost, a higher counterpart level will be reflected. The evaluation of the 58 projects showed the average contribution of the project partners was USD 34,888 and ILO average cost per project was USD 75,515.


The consultative approach that involved consultations with the LGUs during sub project preparation considered the local institutional capacity. Some LGUs were tapped as implementation partners or directly involved as implementers of sub-projects while in other LGUs, the regular staffs assisted in providing assistance during implementation.

Feedback from the beneficiaries contacted during the field visits showed the payment of workers salary was on schedule and prevailing minimum wage was followed for employed laborers in the project sites. One incidence of delayed payment of workers wages was reported, although the funds were already downloaded to the partner. The issue was brought to the attention of the CTA by the Project Team Leader in Tacloban to facilitate the payment of the wages.

The project monitoring reports also showed some savings in the implementation of planned activities and most of implementing partners were allowed use of the remaining fund in expanding coverage and activities for

consolidating project results.

At the risk of comparing apples with pears, one possibility of comparing the efficiency of different components could be to review the cost they entail for creating the desired number of jobs. The graph below presents such a comparison on the basis of the monitoring data provided by the project. It should be noted, however, that this comparison does not include in-kind contributions made by the community or stakeholders and therefore does not reflect the full cost.



G.14 Cost per workday generated by sub-project types, excluding in kind contributions.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, cleaned; own calculations [N=50].

From this perspective, it would seem that EE activities were more than two times less costly to implement than LRB sub-projects, and three times less costly than skills development sub-projects. While this would seem to make sense for LRB sub-projects, it may be more challenging to explain why skills development should absorb significantly more resources than the other two approaches. The evaluation team was not able to probe into this matter.

Likewise, proper analysis of efficiency would require to add benefits that are not directly accruing to the beneficiary to the calculation. These, for example, include savings generated from the collective usage of any rehabilitated infrastructure by all users of that infrastructure. There were no resources available to conduct such an in-depth analysis.

Information available from monitoring data was too scarce to allow for any comparison of efficiency of those sub-projects that were concerned with enterprise development. This is unfortunate inasmuch enterprise development usually is an area where female beneficiaries face fewer barriers of entry. If

the share of females among the beneficiaries deserves to be boosted, enterprise development would be a first option.

The impression from the field visits to enterprise development projects is that full-cost accounting would most probably reveal negative return on investment. A late start in deploying an international expert on this component in combination with the longer lead times usually required, may have led to an inefficient component. That being said, the project team has identified an used a good method for working with vulnerable populations (CBED), and thereby lain a foundation for further work with vulnerable groups in the Philippines. In Tacloban, one INGO has already integrated the CBED approach into their own methods and is currently using the method to work with youth.

The approach to social security membership the project has taken has had impact on efficiency by increasing the overall administrative burden/ cost of implementation. Registration for SSS and PhilHealth proved to be more cumbersome than anticipated by the project. While solutions were found,<sup>9</sup> administrative cost remains high until these solutions are fully implemented. In this context, SSS registration is more difficult to deal with than PhilHealth registration. PhilHealth already has substantial experience in dealing with informal clients and therefore does not find it challenging to deal with them.

Persons contracted under the Haiyan response were usually insured for significantly longer, three months minimum enrollment periods than actual time employed (three weeks). It could therefore be argued that ILO "overpaid" the insurers and thereby has reduced the efficiency of the project. However, reducing the coverage to the mere time span the beneficiaries are working (workdays) would reduce the potential exposure to the benefits of social security that could motivate a continued participation in the system. This inefficiency therefore is a result of a conscious trade off between different objectives and justifiable. The ultimate success rate of shifting beneficiaries to the social security system, at this point, is difficult to discern.<sup>10</sup>

## 6.5 Effectiveness of management arrangements


The project has encountered a significant number of management challenges which need to be overcome in any future projects that seek to contribute to disaster response. Possibly, these problems qualify as teething problems given that ILO's experience in emergency and disaster response is of an emergent nature and does not yet constitute a fully developed business area. Arguably, the Philippines are providing the ILO with an excellent learning opportunity for refining the required implementation skills.

ILO has deployed a total of 41.9 person-years (or over 15,000 ILO workdays) for implementing the response to Haiyan, as financed from different sources. 39% of these were based in Manila (involving travel to the sub-project locations) and 61% were based in the field. Technical experts accounted for

<sup>9</sup> The project commissioned a special study in order to be able to improve the registration procedures.

<sup>10</sup> For a more significant issue concerning social security, please refer to section 6.6 below.


55% (35% in the field, 20% in Manila) while administrative staff had a total share of 26%, roughly equally split between the field and Manila. (Cf. the figure below.) Attributing specific parts of these shares to Norway is not meaningful in practice given the funding sources entered entered a pool of resources that is jointly being managed.<sup>11</sup>




G.15 Person-months and shares of total workload by ILO budget categories.  
Source: List of Haiyan Staff.xlsx, own calculations.

The next graph displays the duration of the contracts of the international experts mobilized by ILO for the Haiyan response, with the time line progressing from the inside to the outside of the graph. It shows that with the exception of the CTA and an Early Recovery and Livelihood Coordinator, all other experts only arrived more than half a year after the super typhoon made landfall. This clearly does not reflect any international surge capacity on behalf of ILO. Most international experts came in after the surge was (and would be) completely over. This is not to imply that their work was not meaningful. It merely implies that it cannot actually be considered to be part of any emergency or disaster response, but rather qualifies as rehabilitation, recovery, or possibly reconstruction activity.

<sup>11</sup> Asking staff to maintain time sheets regarding the sub-projects would theoretically be a solution for properly allocating the shares. However, this would only increase the administrative burden of implementing the project without adding any value (e.g. increased benefits, higher quality).




G.16 Time of deployment of international surge capacity of ILO for response to Haiyan (Yolanda).  
Source: List of Haiyan Staff.xlsx, own calculations.



G.17 Contract duration of staff mobilized by ILO for the response to Haiyan (Yolanda).  
Source: List of Haiyan Staff.xlsx, own calculations.

ILO's capacity to respond to Haiyan effectively relied on the availability of national staff that had already been working on similar typhoon-related projects and that could be shifted to working on the Haiyan response. The graph above displays all contract start and end dates for ILO staff involved in the response. There has been a handful of national staff that were transferred to working on the Haiyan response quickly after its occurrence, and who have until this date not left the project. They have formed an effective and dedicated core team that was able to perform on the ground with very good knowledge of institutions and procedures and the experience of implementing projects on the ground in the aftermath of other emergencies and disasters.



G.18 Duration of staff contracts by ILO budget categories.

Source: List of Haiyan Staff.xlsx, own calculations.


Administrative staff: blue (Manila) and light blue (field). Experts based in Manila: dark green (foreign) and light green (national). National experts in the field: red and orange.

The core technical team in the field, however, has not had any sufficient administrative support in parallel as the chart above reveals. In particular, ILO apparently had difficulties in placing administrative staff into the field so as to reduce the work load of the field team to acceptable levels. Even by the time of the final evaluation, administrative staff assisting in the field seems to not be fully functioning at the levels required for smooth implementation, partially attributable to lack of intensive training prior to deployment in the field. This has led to repercussions at the level of administration in Manila which regularly needs to correct processing errors committed in the field. The difficulty of scheduling regular project team meetings (including over VoIP) may have exacerbated this situation.

Based on evaluator observations and discussions in the field, staff in the field appear to be significantly overworked. The technical team appears to use most weekends of the year to write up reports and draft contracts because activity levels during the weekdays to negotiate and follow-up on sub-projects do not allow for sufficient time for writing. Compensatory time off is not taken for these weekend-based activities because they are assumed to be part of the job description. Indicators of the validity of this status include private

conversations on gaining of weight during the course of the implementation of the project (a symptom of insufficient time available for exercise and an unhealthy lifestyle). Mention has been made of the fact that annual leave was to be forfeited without compensation (in line with ILO procedures) while project activity levels did not allow for absences. No substitutes were available to take over tasks during periods of absence.

The graphic below reflects project staff balance of leave in days at the time of the evaluation according to different ILO staff categories, two months before the final end of the project respectively zero months before the originally agreed end. Clearly, most national staff should leave the project by the end of September to be able to take annual leave before continuing on their next assignments.



G.19 Project staff balance of leave in days by August 2015, by ILO budget categories.  
Source: LEV.haiyan annual leave summary.pdf; own arrangement of data.

From this perspective, it would seem that the high activity level which is required during the response phase has not been turned off during the recovery period. This is difficult to reconcile with good management practices.

In this context, it should also be noted that working conditions for national staff in the field do not take into consideration the additional cost of living incurred from relocation to the provinces. Other than with international experts who are being provided with packages that compensate for additional cost entailed when moving to posts in other countries, it appears that national staff can be freely assigned to other posts within the Philippines even if this implies that additional housing needs to be rented or prices for goods and services are higher than at their respective home bases. In other words, active and dedicated participation in the response to Haiyan, including on hardship posts, is being punished rather than rewarded. If ILO wishes to consider implementing further emergency and disaster response projects, the treatment and motivation of national staff needs to receive the proper attention.

A particular, external management issue affecting implementation is the limited radius of operation for field staff as administered by UNDSS. Here, too it appears that the switch from response to recovery modes has not fully occurred. While there is no compromise when it comes to security issues, it may be worthwhile to review to which extent travel radius really needs to be restricted during periods of peace and without significant weather risk in order to increase the flexibility of staff to work in sub-projects that are located in regions of their responsibility. Possibly, threat levels are set slightly too high. This, of course, can only be solved at the level of the UNCT in appropriate consultation with UNDSS.

UNDSS travel authorization lead times have also been mentioned as a frequent issue in responding to requirements of operations in the field. While practical solutions seem to have been found most times, here too, the threat level may have been set at a higher level than effectively required.

Last not least, the M&E system of the project clearly is not at levels required for monitoring a larger number of sub-projects and report on the status of their implementation. A common spreadsheet serves as the main tool for monitoring the status of implementation. Data is entered by hand on the basis of reports submitted from the field. This data apparently is neither checked for plausibility nor for consistency and therefore cannot be considered a reliable source of information.<sup>12</sup>

The reports from the field consist of questionnaires which obviously neither were designed to minimize data entry errors nor to minimize data entry efforts. A significant number of monitoring reports viewed also were not properly completed.

While the volume of information that needs to be processed and managed would justify the recruitment of a special M&E expert, this function seems to have only been assumed half-heartedly by a person with an unsuitable profile for a limited amount of time.

If ILO would like to continue implementing projects of a similar format as in the Haiyan response, then ILO should develop a software that can be used for M&E or buy an off-the-shelf software that can fulfill the same purpose, train the respective users, and enforce its application in all projects that work with larger volumes of monitoring information.

## **6.6 Impact orientation and sustainability of the project**

Impact is usually measured as an effect that occurs outside the scope of direct control of the project, i.e. one level higher than outcome, while

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<sup>12</sup> Annex A.1 displays the number of entries in the monitoring sheet that were accepted for calculating central tendencies in this report. It is fair to say that only the most obvious of mistakes were rejected and the most obvious outliers were removed.




sustainability refers to the capability of project outcomes or selected outputs to survive in the absence of project support. Impact and sustainability are related to the extent that achieving impact depends on the creation of institutions or an enabling environment that deliver benefits over a long period of time. Sustainability essentially is concerned with establishing patterns that are able to ensure a lasting success of a given measure or the continuous presence or activity of institutions or organizations created to address specific issues on a continuous basis.

For emergency and disaster response, sustainability usually is not the the foremost concern. By definition it does not apply to "emergency employment" impact. However, as early as recovery sets in, there is a gradual shift toward the medium and long-term perspective which needs to emphasize sustainability.


The project output mainly provided employment to vulnerable individuals, developed capabilities through skills trainings for future employment or as a beneficiary group trained on operating a community enterprise. The outcomes from the discussions conducted with the beneficiaries showed the wages provided additional resources for basic needs of households and repair of dwellings. A total of USD1.5 million or 21% of the project cost was paid in wages and topped with social protection benefits and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

The planned project impact is "support the recovery of livelihoods of poor and vulnerable workers and their families". To date, achievement of the outcomes in all the components eased the process of recovering livelihoods (farming and fishing) which were destroyed by the typhoon by providing beneficiaries interim and short term source of family income for their basic needs. The community infrastructure rehabilitated also contributed to the recovery of the community and the resumption of economic activities and generation of employment. Contribution of the skills training to the beneficiaries if assessed against actual employment to date will show limited contribution to the project impact. Some of the skills trainings are still ongoing and feedback from the discussions with beneficiaries in the field shows a small number actually are employed applying the skill gained from the training.

Impacts of project on beneficiaries' awareness of occupational safety and health (OSH), social security, and minimum wages were validated from the meetings with beneficiary groups. Information drawn from the monitoring sheet of the project (cf. figures below) would also appear to corroborate that minimum wages were generally paid. The project exposed the workers employed to social protection, i.e. enrollment in PhilHealth and Social Security System coverage. The orientation/briefings on the nature of the PhilHealth and SSS coverage prior to enrollment heightened their awareness of the benefits that are prescribed by law and should be available if engaged in employment. Incidents of actual claims of benefits from the social protection coverage (PhilHealth and SSS) were shared by the beneficiaries during the meetings.



G.20 Range of daily wages paid to actual beneficiaries in sub-projects and minimum wage levels.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, cleaned; own calculations [N=50].



G.21 Total wages paid per actual beneficiary in sub-projects.  
Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx, cleaned; own calculations [N=46].

Expectations should not be too high for large retention rates in either PhilHealth or SSS because vulnerable groups will usually carefully calculate whether they want to afford the expenses related to social security. However, their exposure to these systems is going to increase the likelihood that they will seek to secure continuation of participation when they are employed as labor.

There is one potential sustainability issue that has been overlooked by the project when it comes to registration of beneficiaries with the SSS. As soon as anyone registers with the SSS, the SSS becomes liable, by law, to pay for burial expenses. Given that the burial expenses are a multiple of the amount that are required to register with the SSS, this is financially not sustainable. Should the word spread that burial expenses can be financed out of the SSS, the SSS may incur a substantial risk unless respective legislation is changed (which is unlikely). ILO thus needs to seek to ensure that the registration of the project's beneficiaries does not have any knock-on effects on the SSS.

The impact on the trained individuals from the skills training sub projects is not observed at project closure stage. There was feedback during the field visits on graduates that were employed following their completion of the trainings but insufficient to indicate positive impact on the whole skills training sub projects implemented. The impact of the training may be observed after the project from the planned tracking of graduates by the lead partner, TESDA.

The project has contributed to the government's policy on the provision of emergency employment. ILO's involvement at the cluster level influenced the other agencies (DOLE and DSWD) and some NGOs on its decent work program strategy that prescribes the payment minimum wage to workers, social protection benefits, insurance and use of personal protective equipment. At the local level, potential policy impact in the municipality of Busuanga is expected where the local government is set to enact a Local Ordinance that prescribes use of local resource based approach in all of its future public works.

On sustainability of project benefits, the Local Resource Based labor intensive employment approach and skills training is likely to continue after the end of the project. The implementing partners and beneficiaries of the sub-projects are more informed on benefits that have to be provided to workers and there are indications that the project approach to local employment will be mainstreamed by some LGUs in their policies.

The municipality of Busuanga adopted LRB in the implementation of LGU funded infrastructure projects. It also integrated the newly established structures (boat landing, national high schools and municipal road) constructed/ rehabilitated by the project into its inventory of assets and will be provided by regular LGU budget for maintenance.

The rehabilitated Communal Irrigation System that restored the system's irrigable area has improved the revenue collection of the Irrigators Service Association from irrigation service fees. The increased revenues will be available for maintaining the operation of the system. The beneficiary organization has also attracted other donors to provide assistance in the form of post harvest facilities to add value to the crops produced by the farmers.

The operation of the Level 3 water system rehabilitated in Barangay Buluang, Busuanga is likely to be sustained with the improved availability of water to households, willingness to pay as indicated by increased collection and availability of skilled plumbers trained by the project. Some operational issues observed however are likely to affect the sustainability of the system e.g. need for capacity building of the officers and members on enterprise development and ensuring water quality or protection of the water system source from contamination.

The sustainability of benefits from the skills training indicates mixed results. The application of the skills gained by the beneficiaries from the training through employment or livelihood activities applying the skills learned was not observed from feedback of most of the beneficiaries met during the

evaluation. There was however positive feedback from the trained skilled workers, mostly carpenters and masons, who were employed by other agencies or NGOs implementing permanent shelters and businesses that are now operating in the urban areas. The proportion to the total number of beneficiaries from the skills training however is not available from reports generated by the ILO project team.

For the skills training in Coron Palawan that is linked with the local tourism sector, there is likelihood of new employment that will be available to the trained beneficiaries.

For the Enterprise Development sub projects implemented, the project duration is not adequate to build capacity and elements of sustainability into the project. It usually takes longer lead times for sustainability to be achieved. The briquette production in Leyte, and the Bio Farm production and Water Supply System in Busuanga still needs Enterprise Development inputs to address sustainability issues.

The evaluation observed strong ownership from beneficiaries contacted of the local community infrastructures as a result of their involvement during planning and implementation.

## **6.7 Partnership**

There were several layers of partnership at work within the framework of this project. Coordination within the Livelihood cluster at national level (DOLE, TESDA, etc.) and with OCHA, between the ILO and the beneficiaries as well as the implementing partner organizations in the field, as well as local government unit partners; and coordination with external donors (JP, NO, UK).

Other than in most ILO projects, tripartite constituents did not play the same role as they usually do. This is mainly due to the fact that their role in implementing emergency or disaster response remains limited because they do not have structures throughout the country at the local government unit level. Tripartite constituents were informed of the ILO's activities. In Cebu, workers organizations were involved in the implementation of a sub-project (not part of the sub-projects associated with the Norway contribution).

Generally, ILO has well navigated the multiple partnerships. We have not observed any discontent by partners relating to the partnership with the ILO in the Haiyan response.

## 7 CONCLUSIONS

Major conclusions from this evaluation of the project "Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan" are the following:

1. Although emergency and disaster response does not represent ILO core business, the project was fully relevant to and in line with the policies of the Philippines, ILO strategic outcomes, and with regard to the specific needs of the beneficiaries of the Haiyan response. ILO has been able to take a lead in the livelihood cluster and played an important role in shaping the disaster response. Moreover, the ILO has managed to use the disaster response as a valid entry point in order to successfully promote the decent work agenda.
2. Existing labour force surveys were instrumental for estimating the affected vulnerable populations with considerable accuracy.
3. The design of the project served the purpose. It organized specific types of activities under separate headings (emergency employment, enterprise development, skills development, and local resource based projects) and worked with multiple sub-projects in order to achieve its aims.
4. The project has been effective in achieving its targets. This is fundamentally due to the dedicated and professional attitude of the project staff that has consistently sought to negotiate feasible projects with local implementing partners. Enterprise development and local resource based sub-projects were the most effective sub-project categories. Results for skills development were mixed, and significant results for enterprise development did not yet materialize despite the choice of a modern approach.
5. Emergency employment seems to benefit significantly more male beneficiaries than female beneficiaries. Ways need to be found to increase the share of female beneficiaries in these sub-projects.
6. The project has generally been efficient as a result of a highly dedicated, experienced, and productive team in the field. It has made optimal usage of cooperation with implementing partners in order to economize resources and managed to mobilize contributions in kind that have increased its leverage.
7. Management arrangements left to be desired. The project was managed with a lean structure that was fueled by a dedicated team. However, it has not managed to properly exit the disaster response mode to the extent that it continues to overwork its field staff and continues to have difficulties

in providing the field with properly trained and functioning administrative staff.

8. UNDSS threat levels are still affecting the implementation of the project. It is unclear why the radius of operation continues to be very limited.
9. The M&E system was not appropriate for a project of this volume and with the high number of sub-projects that needed to be monitored. Questionnaires used were inadequately designed to fulfill their purposes. The key monitoring file contained numerous errors and outliers and therefore did not yield information at desired levels of accuracy.
10. The project did not conduct an actuarial review before deciding to enroll beneficiaries of the Haiyan response in PhilHealth and the SSS. As a consequence, all parties overlooked that SSS may incur liabilities that are cannot be financed from short-term memberships. Similarly, the burden of registering beneficiaries with PhilHealth and SSS has been significantly underestimated.
11. It is unlikely that the enterprise development component will yield any significant sustainable results. Enterprise development usually needs longer lead times than EE, LRB, and SD and may not be the right approach for projects launched to respond to an emergency or disaster, and that only have a very limited time frame for recovery work.
12. The ILO currently does not have the surge capacity that is required to be effective in projects of emergency and disaster response. The reason why the project has nevertheless been effective is that national staff experienced with recovery work was already in the field (as a result of other projects dealing with the aftermath of previous typhoons) and that regional budget resources could be mobilized more easily during the time period Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines.

## 8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Major recommendations emerging from this evaluation are as follows. All to be addressed by the ILO.

- ①. ILO can learn from the Haiyan response that it is able to perform at par with or better than other agencies during emergency or disaster response. Major strengths of ILO are long-standing experience with LRB, cash for work, and other useful instruments in order to generate employment. By participating in emergency and disaster response and recovery, ILO is able to promote the decent work agenda because it may influence standards of the response. It therefore is recommended **that ILO HQ develop a strategy for dealing with emergencies and disasters on the basis of the Haiyan response and other experience accumulated in the Philippines (and possibly selected other responses)**. This strategy should also determine the priority ILO accords to this field of activities and assess the costs and benefits for ILO associated with these interventions.
- ②. The design of the Haiyan project may generally serve as a model for future ILO projects of emergency or disaster response. However, **future project design needs to ensure the following**
  - a) **The transition from emergency response to the next phases (recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction) needs to be accompanied by appropriate change in management approaches.** Once the phase of response is over, working time for ILO staff needs to be reduced to sustainable levels. The workload of the response phase cannot become the standard for continuous workload. A substitution mechanism needs to be in place for field staff to be able to take leave in due course without risking any neglect of duties. While prima facie this may require additional resources, it is likely that the overall effectiveness and efficiency of implementation will be higher.
  - b) **Careful attention needs to be paid to setting up an M&E system from the outset.** Where large numbers of sub-projects are being implemented, monitoring is not achievable *en passant*. It requires proper design and proper user training. It should be supported by a software solution that facilitates not only reporting, but also enhances the quality of collected data (e.g. by screening out errors, using plausibility checks, verifying outliers). The total cost of M&E will be dramatically reduced and quality substantially enhanced when a proper M&E system is put to use.
  - c) **For projects with relatively high throughput of sub-projects, administrative requirements should not be underestimated.** Sufficient and sufficiently experienced or trained administrative staff needs to be secured early on in order to provide support to the technical team. The project cannot operate with a front office only, a strong back office needs to be in place. Leaving administrative work to the technical team is usually inefficient, and a proper administrative structure in the field would reduce cost of administrative supervision.

- d) **Both EE and LRB have proven to yield good results. They should be the cornerstone of future emergency and disaster responses by ILO.**
  - e) **Particular attention needs to be given to ensure that the share of female beneficiaries of EE is increased.** Conditions for this may vary between emergency/ disaster zones.
  - f) **If ED sub-projects are to be integrated in the project, project duration needs to be extended so as to allow for sufficient time for attaining results. Usually, ED sub-projects should be more accessible to females.**
  - g) **Prior to venturing into the field of social security and health insurance, actuarial studies should be commissioned or consulted in order to anticipate any potential effect on the social security system and health insurance.** This is because retention of emergency employees in social security and health insurance cannot be guaranteed following the termination of the emergency.
- ③. If interested in professionalizing interventions in the field of emergency or disaster response, **ILO will need to develop a genuine surge capacity. Usually, this would require establishing a pool of experts who accept deployment at short notice and possess of the required qualifications.** Ideally, some of these experts continuously work on emergency and disaster response, for example by participating in preparedness, mitigation, and prevention activities. This would also ensure that such human resources do not remain idle between emergencies. They could also work on operationalizing any future ILO strategy for emergency response. **The CO-Manila could serve as a laboratory for developing this approach given the frequency of typhoons in the area and the experience gained with the Haiyan response.**
- ④. **The CO-Manila will need to work with SSS in order to ensure that liabilities related to burial expenses as a result of short-term employment under the Haiyan project cannot impair the financial position of the SSS.** In particular, ILO should refrain from highlighting in public that one-time enrollment in the SSS automatically entitles beneficiaries to coverage of burial expenses as long as the legal obligation exists.

## 9 LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned are summarized as follows. For context and detail, see the standard lessons learned templates as included in Annex 7.

- 1) Emergency and disaster response is not a core activity of the ILO. However, ILO can make good contributions to responses based on its experience with employment intensive and labour based programmes. Up to date labour force surveys may be used for quickly targeting vulnerable populations. Wage and OSH standards may enhance the quality of the response while contributing to the decent work agenda. However, ILO lacks the required surge capacity to



participate in emergency and disaster response on a significant scale. ILO's ability to swiftly participate in the response to super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was a result of already having had capacities in place and being able to draw on funds available at the end of the biennium and the year.

- 2) Where large numbers of sub-projects need to be organized in order to deal with an emergency, it is important to have developed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools at hand that reduce the work load of the ILO team. Leaving the development of these tools to the team not only diverts valuable time from emergency response, but also leaves the quality of the M&E tools to chance (unless an experienced M&E specialist is a full-time member of the team) and significantly reduces the quality of reporting. Ideally, ILO should have an M&E tool available for such interventions.
- 3) Where emergency or disaster response is linked to livelihood development, it is important to ensure that field teams are able to return to normal working conditions once the (emergency) response phase is over and the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases are reached. Otherwise, the field team members are likely to suffer from burnout or unhealthy lifestyles sooner or later, with all potential consequences. Adequate capacities for substitution and strong administrative backup is also required in order to ensure sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

**ANNEX****A.1 Adjusted values for monitoring sheet data and results of calculation of central tendencies**

Source: CMS.contract monitoring sheets 150915-for cdw.xlsx; own calculations.

Table T.A1a	actual bene- ficiaries M	actual bene- ficiaries F	actual bene- ficiaries total	workdays M	workdays F	workdays total	total wages USD
Low	0	1	31	0	20	682	3,691
High	712	630	1,342	10,680	9,450	25,900	111,925
Mean	123.64	114.34	237.98	2,687.85	2,307.97	5,131.38	31,254.17
Median	78.00	72.00	164.00	1,920.00	1,155.00	3,230.00	20,923.00
Number of entries	53	53	53	38	38	50	48
Number of obvious errors and outliers	0	0	0	5	5	5	1
Number of accepted entries	53	53	53	33	33	45	47
Number of sub-projects	58	58	58	58	58	58	58

Table T.A1b

	total partner contribution USD	total download to partner PHP	total download to partner USD	total cost ILO USD
Low	423	174,880	3,895	6,873
High	307,278	6,654,274	148,566	137,590
Mean	34,888.26	2,088,077.76	47,138.35	75,515.00
Median	6,205.00	2,023,398.50	45,782.00	63,620.00
Number of entries	50	53	53	38
Number of obvious errors and outliers	0	5	5	3
Number of accepted entries	50	48	48	35
Number of sub-projects	58	58	58	58

Table T.A1c

	average wage per day USD	wage share in total (partner and ILO)	workdays per worker M	workdays per worker F	workdays per worker	wages per beneficiary USD	sub- project duration	cost per workday created USD
Low	1.71	9.10	13.20	13.30	13.90	72.36	21.00	
High	20.96	64.11	60.00	60.00	70.00	523.08	209.00	
Mean	6.15	31.94	18.24	17.64	20.45	126.32	86.79	18.33
Median	6.63	35.99	19.10	18.20	19.25	136.36	80.50	
Number of entries	50	48	37	37	50	46	61	50
Number of obvious errors and outliers	4	10	1	1	2	0	3	12
Number of accepted entries	46	38	36	36	48	46	58	38
Number of sub-projects	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58

## A.2 Evidence of relevance



31 October 2013

**LUIZA CARVALHO**  
UN Resident Coordinator and  
Humanitarian Coordinator

Dear Ms. Carvalho:


On behalf of the Philippine Government, we would like to extend our gratitude to the United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) for its immediate and active support in the relief and rehabilitation initiatives in Zamboanga City and Bohol. The support extended by the various clusters on issues as wide as WASH, Protection, Health and Camp Coordination and Management have been much appreciated and we value the strong linkages between the HCT and Government of the Philippines in regards to humanitarian activities.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as chair of the Livelihood Cluster has reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on approaches to emergency employment, livelihood recovery and development, along with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The MOU is very much acceptable and necessary to both Departments as it sets the standards and policies that will enable disaster-affected families to rebuild their livelihoods with better access to social protection and sustainable income sources. From this point on, we are asking to ensure this document is used as the basis for all emergency employment and livelihood activities, including any and all Cash-for-Work activities, along with the following enhancements:

1. Emergency employment and livelihoods should be placed at the forefront of disaster response considering the Government's objective of ensuring that the people's lives return to normalcy at the soonest possible time.
2. The full minimum wage, as defined by DOLE regionally, shall be paid to Cash-for-Work participants for a minimum of fifteen (15) days. Relative to this, DSWD shall review and revise its Administrative Order 15 Series of 2008 on the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Cash-for-Work Project.

The abovementioned enhancements aim to address the vulnerabilities faced by disaster-affected families by providing them with immediate access to decent work and sustainable livelihoods, enabling them to 'build back better'. We are confident that you are one with the Philippine Government in its vision to rebuild communities through the rehabilitation of resilient and viable economic activities.

  
**CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN**  
Secretary  
Department of Social Welfare and Development

  
**ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ**  
Secretary  
Department of Labor and Employment

### A.3 List of persons met

(by order of organizational affiliation and function)

Name	Organization	Function
<b>MANILA</b>		
<b>Manila: ILO</b>		
Lawrence Jeff Johnson	ILO CO-Manila	Director
Jonathan James Price	ILO CO-Manila	Chief Technical Adviser
Simon Hills	ILO CO-Manila	Disaster Response and Livelihood Devt. Officer
Jordi Prat Tuca (☎)	ILO CO-Manila	Enterprise and Livelihood Devt. Officer
Daniel Bagsic	ILO CO-Manila	Programme Assistant
Jedel Tabamo	ILO CO-Manila	Programme Officer
Virginia B. Creer	ILO CO-Manila	Administrative and Finance Officer
Ruth Honculada-Georget	ILO CO-Manila	TC Coordination and Resource Mobilization Officer
Ma. Lourdes Macapanpan	ILO CO-Manila	
Chona Sabugo	ILO CO-Manila	Administrative Clerk
Ma. Teresa Cruz	ILO CO-Manila	Finance Clerk
<b>Manila: other organizations</b>		
Maria Agnes Palacio	UN OCHA	National Disaster Response Advisor
Baicon Macaraya	World Food Programme (WFP)	
Margarita R. Songco	Office of the Deputy Director General NEDA	
Narisa Sugay	PhilHealth	MD Non-Formal Sector
Judy Frances A. See	Social Security System, Account Management Group and International Operations Division	Senior Vice President
Socorro Y. Pusta	Department of Trade and Industry	Head Yolanda Project Office
Mauro C. Magpili Jr.	Department of Trade and Industry	Yolanda Project Office

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
Aristeo A. Portugal	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Assistant FAO Representative (Programme)
<b>LEYTE</b>		
<b>Leyte: ILO</b>		
Godofredo Rodriguez Jr	ILO	Project Coordinator-Tacloban
Minerva Rosel	ILO	Field Coordinator
Alfie Bagares	ILO	AdFin Officer
Elmer Manginsay	ILO	Driver
Ian De Paz	ILO	Driver
Aldin Betaa	ILO	Project Coordinator- Samar
John Granda	ILO	Monitoring and Evaluation, EX-Col
<b>Leyte: government and employers</b>		
Oliver Cam	Leyte Chamber of Commerce	Leyte Chamber Officer
Rey Cruz	LGU	Livelihood Program Officer
Armand Cabaltera	LGU	Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
Cecile Mae Ocado	LGU	Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
Carolina Malate	LGU	Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
<b>Leyte: implementing partners and beneficiaries</b>		
Helena Claire Canayong	Volunteer for the Visayans	Dir. Volunteer for the Visayans
Benito Lumanog Sr.	Phils. Communitere Inc.	Community Leader
Regin Olimberio	Communitere	Outreach Director
Victor Julius A. Ferrer	Operation Compassion Philippines	Field Operations Officer
Teshome Assefa	Plan International	International Program Manager
Lourdes Troyo	DSWD	DSWD Focal Person
Eden Reswa	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
Carina Agayones	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher
Jocelyn Udtohan	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher
Alma Balais	Uswag Kita Inc.	Barangay Official
Fe Lazarte	Uswag Kita Inc.	Worker / Beneficiary
Marita Balmes	Uswag Kita Inc.	Worker / Beneficiary
Arnel Sudario	Uswag Kita Inc.	Worker / Beneficiary
Tedoro Cinco	Sta. Elena Irrigators Services Asso.	Pres. SEISA
Alvin Juntilla	Sta. Elena Irrigators Services Asso.	Vice Pres. SEISA
Anastacio Arcena	Sta. Elena Irrigators Services Asso.	Worker / Beneficiary
Manolo Taña	Sta. Elena Irrigators Services Asso.	Worker / Beneficiary
Maxima Sultan	Sta. Elena Irrigators Services Asso.	Worker / Beneficiary
Rosalinda Tupaz	Magbinuligon Bayanihan Asso.	President, MBA
Nestor Abalos	Magbinuligon Bayanihan Asso.	LGU Tolosa, Community Outreach Program
Maricel Martinez	Magbinuligon Bayanihan Asso.	Pres. Women's Development Asso.
Ma. Milagrosa Noveda	Magbinuligon Bayanihan Asso.	Agrarian Reform Program Officer, DAR
Helena Claire Canayong	Volunteer for the Visayans	Dir. Volunteer for the Visayans
Benito Lumanog Sr.	Phils. Communitere Inc.	Community Leader
Lourdes Troyo	DSWD	DSWD Focal Person
Eden Reswa	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher
Carina Agayones	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher
Jocelyn Udtohan	Uswag Kita Inc.	School Teacher
<b>CEBU</b>		
<b>Cebu: ILO, government, and workers</b>		
Martha Mildred España	ILO Cebu	Project Coordinator - Ormoc/ Cebu
	ILO	Field Coordinator
Arturo Barrit	Associated Labour	

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
	Union	
Ian Christopher Gonzaga Escario	LGU Bantayan	Mayor
Mariano R. Martinez	LGU San Remigio	Mayor
Rey Perez	PBSP-VRC	Team Leader Project New Dawn
Juan Pablo Yao	PBSP-VRC	Project Officer
	Installation of shared fish drying facilities - sup-project (ED)	beneficiaries
Edgar Allan C. Monreal	Damgo sa Kaugmaon, Inc.	President
Luckie A. Baulita	ICEB sub-project - Damgo sa Kaugmaon	community beneficiary (worker)
Mylene Mariblanca	ICEB sub-project - Damgo sa Kaugmaon	community beneficiary (worker)
Ronald Mata	ICEB sub-project - Damgo sa Kaugmaon	community beneficiary (worker)
	Enhancing Self and Wage Employment Opportunities sub-project (SD)	beneficiaries
	Bidlisiw Foundation, Inc	implementing partners
	Shelter Construction in San Remegio LRB sub-project	community beneficiaries
<b>CORON</b>		
<b>Coron: ILO and government</b>		
Mary Janelyn Hiloma	ILO Coron	Project Coordinator - Coron
Baron Jose Lagran	TESDA - Regional Office 4B (MIMAROPA)	Regional Director
Elizabeth Cervantes	Busuanga	Vice Mayor
Segundo Aguilar	Busuanga	MDRRM Officer
Corazon Factuar	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Chairman
Mercurio Orecama	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor



<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
Amor Libaan	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Secretary
Zaparte Silverio Jr	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Melojane Betita	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Arlan Ondiano	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Nemia Loquib	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Norma Daco	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Josephine Padilla	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
Angie Daco	Barangay Buluang, Busuanga	Barangay Councilor
<b>Coron: implementing partners and beneficiaries</b>		
Shiela Austria	VKGV Spa	Masseuse
Aiza Labuca	Rudy's Place	Housekeeper and Part-Time Masseuse
Carmela Casibang	Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources	Field Technician (and Part-Time Masseuse)
Ramil Agnes	Balik Calautit Movement (BCM)	Vice-Chairman
Fredel Mued	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Delailah Loquib	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Lerma Eco	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Nestor Lacaba	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Onofre Mued	PAYAPACA Bio-Farm of Balik Calautit Movement	President
Emerlita Pabia	PAYAPACA Bio-Farm of Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Gabriel Mued	PAYAPACA Bio-Farm of Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Conie Sernada	PAYAPACA Bio-Farm of Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Carmen Alcantara	PAYAPACA Bio-Farm of Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Victoria Mued	Balik Calautit Movement	Secretary

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
Jose Gonzaga	Balik Calautit Movement	Trustee
Arman Vergara	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Roger Eguia	SAMACA Fisherfolk of Balik Calautit Movement	President
Letecia Mondragon	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Hydee Agnes	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Saniel Sabroso	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Kimberly Arceo	Balik Calautit Movement	Member
Edizon Garcia	Buluang Water and Sanitation Association (BUWASA)	Plumber
John Paul Caba	Buluang BUWASA	Plumber
Noliboy Bunotan	Buluang BUWASA	Plumber
Normita Tradio	Buluang BUWASA	Member
Lilia Sabroso	Buluang BUWASA	Secretary
Evelyn Silverio	Buluang BUWASA	Auditor
Delma Garcia	Buluang BUWASA	Treasurer
Gloria Plames	Kalipunan ng Liping Pilipina (KALIPI) Women's Federation (WF), Busuanga	Member
Aurora Taghap	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Amelia Bulabos	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Eunice Abaring	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Wilfreda Bacong	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Precious Mae Albag	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Miriam Reyes	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Annaliza Gajardo	KALIPI WF Busuanga	Member
Rosalie Rebuyaco	KALIPI	Member

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<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Function</b>
	WF Busuanga	
Donnabelle Maambong	KALUPI WF Busuanga	Member

## A.4 References

DSWD 2008. Guidelines for the Implementation of the Cash-For-Work Project. Administrative Order 15, Series of 2008.

Emmons, Ben, and Rachel Houghton 2008. Understanding surge capacity within international agencies. Humanitarian Exchange 39, November: 29-33.

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Inter-cluster Coordination Group for the Humanitarian Country Team 2014. Final Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR).

Livelihood Cluster 2013. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Members of the Livelihood Cluster in the Philippines on its Approach to Livelihood Recovery and Development. As agreed in the meeting of 21 October 2013.

NDCC 2007. Institutionalization of the Cluster Approach in the Philippine Disaster Management System, Designation of Cluster Leads and their Terms of Reference at the National, Regional and Provincial Level. NDCC Circular No.05, s-2007.

NDRRMC 2014. Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) in TY Yolanda Affected Areas. April 2014.

NEDA 2013. Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better. 16 December 2013. ISSN: 2243-7576.

NEDA 2014. Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Implementation for Results. ISSN: 2243-7576.

Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2013. Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan. 10 December 2013.

## A.5 Itinerary

Date	Itinerary	Time
<b>Arrival in Manila and Courtesy visit at ILO Country office</b>		
Wed, 12 Aug 2015	Arrival in Manila	all day
	Check-in at hotel [Best Western Plus Antel Hotel]	
Thu, 13 Aug 2015	Meeting with ILO Haiyan Team (Manila)	09:00 - 11:00 Meeting with CTA 13:30 Meeting with Diane Respall and Ruth Georget 14:00-15:00 Meeting with Director 15:00 Meeting with Simon Hills
Fri, 14 Aug 2015	Meeting with ILO Haiyan Team (Manila)	half day - further meetings including with Admin staff
Sat, 15 Aug 2015	Fly from Manila to Tacloban	Flight 5J653 Departure 14:35 Arrival 15:50
<b>Field Visits (Tacloban Sites)</b>		
Sat, 15 Aug 2015	Arrival in Tacloban, hotel billeting	Arrival 15:50
Sun, 16 Aug 2015	Meeting with Tacloban team - led by Godofredo Rodriguez	am
	1. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	1200- 1230 travel to ALS 1230 - 1330 ALS (FGD) 1330 - 1430 Communitere (FGD) 1430 -1500 Travel to EVSU Campus 1500 - 1630 DSWD Proj. (FGD)
Mon, 17 Aug 2015	2. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	0700 - 0800 Tac to Tanauan (travel) 0800 - 1200 San Victor and Sta. Elena Projects. (FGD) 1200 - 1400 Tanauan to Tolosa (travel and lunch) 1400 - 1600 Briquette project (FGD) 1600 - 1630 Travel to Tacloban
Tue, 18 Aug 2015	3. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	0900 - 1100 (ILO Office)
	Additional meetings with local government unit officials to discuss coordination and sustainability issues, e.g. the disaster risk mitigation and/ or planning and development authorities	11:00 - 12:00 and 13:00 - 14:00
	Meeting with Plan International	15:00 - 16:00

Date	Itinerary	Time
Tue, 18 Aug 2015	Fly from Tacloban to Cebu, overnight in Cebu City	Flight 5J423 Departure 17:40
<b>Field Visits (North Cebu Sites)</b>		
Tue, 18 Aug 2015	Arrival in Cebu City, hotel billeting	Arrival 18:30
Wed, 19 Aug 2015	Road travel from Cebu City to Bogu City	0600-1000AM
	Meeting with Cebu team - led by Martha Espano	1000-1100
	1. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	1130AM onwards
Thu, 20 Aug 2015	2. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	8:00 AM - 1730
Fri, 21 Aug 2015	3. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	0800 - 1300
Fri, 21 Aug 2015	Road travel from Bogu City to Cebu City	1330-1800
Fri, 21 Aug 2015	Fly from Cebu to Manila (layover), overnight in Manila	Flight 5J584 Departure 19:00 Arrival 20:20
<b>Field Visits (Coron Sites)</b>		
Sat, 22 Aug 2015	Arrival in Coron, Hotel Billeting	Flight PR2031 Departure 08:40 Arrival 09:35
Sat, 22 Aug 2015	1. Travel to sub-projects site	1300-1700
Sun, 23 Aug 2015	2. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	0600-1800
Mon, 24 Aug 2015	3. Visits to sub-projects sites and meetings with implementing partners	0600-1800
Tue, 25 Aug 2015	Fly from Coron to Manila	Flight PR 2032 Departure 09:55 Arrival 10:50
<b>Departure from Manila and exit meeting at ILO Country office</b>		
Tue, 25 Aug 2015	Arrival in Manila Hotel Billeting	Arrival 12:05
Tue, 25 Aug 2015	ILO meeting	13:00 Meeting with Gie and Chona re DSS and travel

Date	Itinerary	Time
	Meeting with implementing partners	14:00 Meeting with PHILSSA, Mr. Benedict Balderrama - National Coordinator
	ILO meeting	16:00 Skype meeting with Enterprise Development Specialist
Wed, 26 Aug 2015	Government Stakeholder Meetings	9:00 Meeting with SSS, Lilian Borgona and SVP See [at 9:30]
		11:30 Meeting with DTI, Director Lydia R. Guevarra - Regional Operations Group and Socorro Pusta - Head of the DTI Yolanda Project Office
		13:30 Meeting with PhilHealth, Dr. Narisa Sugay - MD Non-Formal Sector
		15:00 Meeting with NEDA, Margarita R. Songco Office of the Deputy Director General NEDA
		17:30 Meeting with WFP in ILO office, Ms Baicon Macaraya
Thu, 27 Aug 2015	ILO meeting	8:00 Meeting with Simon and la re labour force survey
	Preliminary Findings Presentation / Stakeholder debriefing meeting	9:00 to 12:00
	Stakeholder meeting	13:00 Meeting with UN OCHA, Maria Agnes Palacio National Disaster Response Advisor
Thu, 27 Aug 2015	Fly from Manila to home base	pm

## A.6 Terms of reference

### Terms of Reference Final Independent Evaluation

#### Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods – Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan

PHI/13/05/NOR

**Project budget:** USD 5,666,509

**Project duration:** December 2013 to 31 October 2015 (4 month NCE granted)

**Administrative unit:** ILO Country Office for the Philippines

**Technical Unit:** DWT-Bangkok - DEV/INVEST and ENTERPRISES

**Donor:** Government of Norway

**Evaluation Date and file work date:** August-September 2015 (with proposed field work on Aug 12 to 27)

**Evaluation Manager:** Pamornrat Pringsulaka

#### 1. Introduction and Rationale for the final evaluation

In Nov. 2013, Typhoon Haiyan made a direct hit on the Philippines, devastating areas spread in 36 provinces. It had a direct impact on about 5.6 million workers. Of these 2.6 million were already in vulnerable employment and living at or near the poverty line even before the super typhoon with limited income and social security prior to the disaster.

The Humanitarian Country Team in December 2013 launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) and that a total of 260000 vulnerable workers were targeted by the Early Recovery and Livelihood. ILO raised funds to about USD 11.5 million of which about USD 5.6 million received from the Government of Norway.

The Norwegian allocation has been used to allow ILO to support the national Government's efforts to provide for emergency employment and livelihood recovery in Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte (including Tacloban), Cebu, Bohol, Negros Occidental and Palawan.

The project is coming to an end at the end of August 2015, thus the final independent evaluation is required as per ILO evaluation policy. The purposes of the final evaluation are both for accountability to the donor and for organizational learning within the ILO. The final evaluation aims to assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved, and to identify possible lessons learnt and good practices. The evaluation will apply key evaluation criteria of relevance, validity of design, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, and gender equality.

The independent final evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent evaluators and will be managed by Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) officer based at ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RO-Bangkok).

The evaluation manager will prepare TORs and will subsequently finalize it in a consultative process involving key stakeholders of the programme including the donors. The evaluation will comply with UNEG Norms and Standards and the ethical safeguards will be followed.



## 2) Project background

The ILO's programme components set out an immediate and longer term integrated response to address the livelihood needs of those affected by Typhoon Haiyan. The components consist of various complementary activities which combined together offer a pathway to re-establish livelihoods and regain self-reliance. The ILO's intervention applies a three pronged approach:

1. Rapid assessments of damages and losses on employment and livelihoods;
2. Immediate emergency employment through clearance, cleaning and simple community works (Phase I); and
3. Labour-based rehabilitation of community assets, infrastructure and the environment promoting the use of local resources and mid-term livelihood recovery activities through skills training and enterprise development (Phase II).

The main strategic objectives of this Norwegian's contribution are to enable the ILO to strengthen its overall response framework in support of Government partners, to provide short term employment opportunities to poor and vulnerable households whose source of employment and livelihoods were destroyed, provide workers with training and skills development, tools and materials and support communities and small community enterprises in their recovery to place the affected communities again on a path of resilient and inclusive local economic growth. There are 4 immediate objectives as follows:

- Immediate Objective 1: Generating immediate income through emergency employment
- Immediate Objective 2: Local resource-based, employment intensive, approaches used for small infrastructure repairs and reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation and protection works.
- Immediate Objective 3: Technical vocational training and skills development provided for affected workers.
- Immediate Objective 4: Sustainable employment is generated through local enterprise recovery.

### Project management set up

ILO Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) based in Manila has the overall responsibilities for all ILO projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, assisted in the country office by an Early Recovery and Livelihood Specialist.

Please see Annex 1 for an organigram of the Haiyan Project Management and Implementation set-up.

The project technical support is also provided by Senior Employment Specialist based at ILO Decent Work Support Team, Bangkok. ILO Manila provides administrative backstopping to the project.

### Progress to date

- As of July 2015, about 96% of the target male and female workers have received emergency employment, local resourced based works, skills development and enterprise development.
- Twenty emergency employment projects have been completed, five others are still on-going- pending final reports.
- Forty Nine local resourced based projects have been completed, sixteen others are on-going.
- Fifteen skills development sub-projects have been completed, six others are on-going

- Five enterprise development sub-projects have been completed and seven others are on-going
- ILO continue to advocate for emergency workers' rights, decent work and labour standards including minimum wage, accident insurance, OSH and social protection enrolment among all partners at all levels (National, Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay). MoUs between the ILO and the responsible government agencies (PhilHealth and SSS) have been extended and expanded to encompass increased target numbers, for the enrolment of all beneficiary workers in social security and health insurance, following the respective agencies implementation guidelines.

### 3. Purpose, objective and scope of the evaluation

This final evaluation assesses the key achievements of the project as per project framework, the extent of sustainability of the project results. It will also assess the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful. The following evaluation criteria will be applied.

- Relevance and strategic fit of the project;
- Validity of the project design;
- Project effectiveness;
- Efficiency of resource use and Cost efficiency (value for money)
- Sustainability of project achievements/results;
- Impact orientation;
- Gender mainstreaming

While this evaluation will seek to address a set of relevant evaluation questions, the findings of the evaluation will be used for promoting accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO.

#### Scope

The scope of the evaluation includes the whole duration of the project and all geographical sites i.e. Samar, Leyte (include Tacloban), Northern Cebu, Bohol, Negros Occidental, Coron, and Palawan. The evaluation will need to take into account, when assessing the results of the project, the involvement and contribution made by other relevant ILO projects which operates in the same areas/communities as well as the work of other partners that support the recovery of the Typhoon affected areas.

The evaluation should focus on the following specific aspects:

- To what extent has the overall model been effective as a post crisis strategy to restore livelihoods in the long run?
- Does ILO have a comparative advantage in this type of programming in the Philippines?
- What project experiences can be learned with regard to promoting decent work particularly on social protection, gender equality, rural access and environmental sustainability, promoting local knowledge and skills;
- The Project has worked with partners as it did not have the capacity to implement all sub-projects directly. What have been the experiences and how effective has this approach been?
- To what extent has the project applied result-based management principles/approaches to achieve the project objectives in different stages of the project cycle?
- Has the project management and coordination mechanisms among various stakeholders in the project areas included the leverage of resources with other related ILO projects?

- What were the most significant achievements/information that the project can communicate?
- Were risk management processes adequate?

### **Clients**

The evaluation will primarily serve the ILO including the project management team, the donor, and project partners. ILO is a primary client of the evaluation.

The evaluation findings and recommendations will be primarily addressed to the implementing partners and the ILO Manila and units directly involved in backstopping the project.

### **4. Methodology**

The evaluation will comply with evaluation norms and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

In order to enhance usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation will be adopted. A combination of tools and methods will be used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time will be allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information. The methodology for collection of evidences will include:

- Review of documents related to the project, including the initial project document, progress reports, technical assessments and reports, project monitoring and evaluation documents.
- Review project evaluation reports of related projects (DFID and Japanese funded projects in responding to Typhoon Haiyan)
- Review of technical products (training manuals, technical guidelines, etc.) and other publications used or developed by the project, if relevant.
- Review of other relevant Strategic documents such as the Decent Work Agenda of Philippines, the Central Emergency Response Fund, the national employment policy and programme strategy, national laws and regulations on employment, an Overview of Philippines Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014, Typhoon Haiyan Response, the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016.

(list of all documents to be reviewed are provided in the annex)

- Conduct field missions, interview and focus group discussions with key stakeholders in Leyte (Tacloban), Northern Cebu and Coron (Palawan) where the project has its offices and ILO field operation teams.
- Conduct stakeholders' workshop to validate information and data collected through various methods.
- Pro-active and informed consultation with and participation of the key stakeholders in the evaluation process and the finalization of the report will be ensured.

Sex-disaggregated data will be collected and different needs of women and men will be considered through-out the evaluation process. At the completion of the field mission, a meeting will be organized by the Project with assistance from the ILO Country Office for Philippines to share the preliminary findings with local stakeholders in the project municipalities. The draft terms of reference for the evaluation and a draft evaluation report will be shared with relevant stakeholders/

The suggested analytical framework for the final evaluation of the project is set out below and shall guide the assessment of each strategic component of the project. The evaluation should address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2012 ([http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_176814/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_176814/lang--en/index.htm)).

### *Analytical framework*

#### *1) Relevance and strategic fit*

- To what extent have the Project contributed to a) Philippines National Disaster Management System, b) the Philippine Humanitarian Action Plan, 2013-2014? b) Typhoon Haiyan's Response: An Action Plan for Recovery?
- Has the Project supported the realization of the Philippine Decent Work Country Programme outcomes, the needs and priorities of the ILO's social partners in Philippine and the relevant UNPDF, 2012-2018 outcomes?
- Have the Project's beneficiaries been delivered what they needed most today? Or have new, more relevant needs emerged like promotion of social protection?
- How did the project align with and support other relevant areas of the ILO's mandate like decent employment, social inclusion, and social protection measures?
- Was the project aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units?

#### *2. Validity of design*

- Was the project design adequate to meet the project objectives?
- How was the baseline condition established? Was a gender analysis carried out?
- To what extent was the project design adequate and effective for strengthening capacities of the local government and the project partners? Have the local authorities benefited from the overall project in terms of their capacities to respond similar future disasters?
- Were the planned project objectives, means of action and outcomes, relevant, coherent and realistic to the situation on the ground? Did it address gender needs and interests?
- Was the capacity of various project's partners taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action?
- Did the project design take into consideration local knowledge and technologies?
- Which risks and assumptions were identified and managed? To what extent have they affected the project?
- Were the planned monitoring and evaluation arrangements adequate?
- Assess the project design in terms of its replication in other regions /areas.
- What were the good practices and lessons learned noteworthy of documentation?

#### *3. Project progress and effectiveness*

- To what extent the project has achieved its objectives? Have the quantity and quality of the outputs produced been satisfactory? Did the benefits accrue equally to men and women?
- What have been major factors influencing the project achievement or non-achievement?
- Are the project partners using the outputs? Have they transformed outputs into outcomes?
- Has the project identified/strengthened skills in terms of promoting gender equality?
- Examine the extent that the project has adjusted/modified its strategy to respond to

changing situation, if any on the ground or challenges faced? What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the project's objectives?

#### 4. *Efficiency of resource use*

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outputs and outcomes? Have they been used efficiently?
- The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with others' related projects resources to maximize the impact?
- Has the project been sensitive to different levels of investment required by local governments' existing programmes and newly introduced programmes?
- Have Project funds and activities been delivered by ILO in a timely manner? What were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of project funds and the counter-measures that were put in place in lights of delayed delivery of project funds?

#### 5. *Management arrangements including monitoring and evaluation*

- Were management capacities and arrangement adequate and did they facilitate good results and efficient delivery? Was there a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities by all parties involved?
- Have the project implementation arrangements contributed to the enhanced capacity of the project's implementation partners?
- Did the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its national partners, especially local governments at the project areas?
- Did the project stakeholders have a good grasp of the project strategy? How did the project stakeholders contribute to the success of the project?
- Was cooperation with project stakeholders efficient?
- How effectively did the project management and ILO monitor project performance and results?
  - o Was a monitoring and evaluation system in place and how effective has it been?
  - o Were appropriate means of verification for tracking progress, performance and achievement of indicator values defined?
  - o Were relevant information and data systematically collected? Was reporting satisfactory? Was data disaggregated by sex (and by other characteristics, if relevant)?
  - o Was information regularly analysed to feed into management decisions?
- Was relevant gender expertise sought? Was available gender mainstreaming tools adapted and utilized?
- Did the Project make strategic use of coordination and collaboration with other ILO projects and with other donor's projects in the project areas?

#### 6. *Impact*

- What have been the impacts of the project? What are the future likely impacts that can be causally linked to the project interventions? Has the Project successfully built or contributed or strengthened an enabling environment (laws, policies, technical capacities, local knowledge, people's attitudes, etc.)?
- What were the arrangements to measure the project's impact during and at the end of the project? Were these arrangements adequate?
- In how far has the project made a contribution to the broader, longer-term goals of Typhoon Haiyan Response: An Action Plan for Recovery?

#### 7. *Sustainability*

- To what extent will the project's benefits continue after the project ended? What are the major factors which will have or will influence the continuity of the project's benefits?

- How effectively has the project built a sense of ownership among its partners and among local communities?

## 5. Deliverables

The evaluator will provide:

1. A short inception report, including the work plan and details on methods, data sources, interviews, participatory methodologies, draft mission schedule and draft report format. This report should also provide a review of the available documents. It should set out the evaluation instruments (which include the key questions, participatory workshop and data gathering/and analysis methods) and any changes proposed to the methodology or any other issues of importance.
2. A power-point presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation mission at a stakeholders' meeting to be held at the end of the evaluation mission, for the purpose of providing the project's stakeholders a chance to jointly assess the adequacy of the findings and emerging recommendations as well as recommend areas for further considerations by the evaluators.
3. A draft evaluation report of no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes. It will contain an executive summary, a section with project achievements to date, findings and recommendations for short and medium term action. The report should be set-up in line with the ILO's 'Quality Checklists 4 and 5' for Evaluation Reports which will be provided to the evaluator.
4. A final evaluation report, which integrates comments from ILO and project stakeholders. The evaluation summary according to ILO template will also be drafted by the evaluator together with the finalised evaluation report.

The evaluation report should include

- Title page (standard ILO template)
- Table of contents
- Executive summary (standard ILO template)
- Acronyms
- Background and project description
- Purpose of evaluation
- Evaluation methodology and evaluation questions
- Project status and findings by outcome and overall
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Lessons learnt and potential good practices (**please provide also template annex as per ILO guidelines on Evaluation lessons learnt and good practices**) and models of intervention
- Annexes (list of interviews, overview of meetings, proceedings stakeholder meetings, other relevant information)

The deliverables will be circulated to stakeholders by the evaluation manager and technical clearance for the deliverables will come from the evaluation manager. The evaluation report will be in English.

## 6. Management arrangements and time frame

The evaluation will be funded from the project budget. The evaluation will be managed by Ms. Pamornrat Pringsulaka, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. She will be in charge of the selection of the consultants in consultation with ILO Office in Manila, which is in-charge of ILO programmes in Philippines. The ILO Manila office will handle all contractual arrangements with the evaluation team and provide any logistical and other assistance as may be required.

The evaluation team reports to the evaluation manager. The team leader (or evaluator) is an international consultant selected through a competitive process from a list of available and qualified consultants. If required, a national consultant can be hired who will be chosen from a list of qualified consultants to assist the team leader.

The international consultant will lead the evaluation and will be responsible for delivering the above evaluation outputs using a combination of methods as mentioned above. The national consultant provides support to the team leader particularly during the evaluation mission as requested by the team leader.

Specific tasks of the national consultant are as follows:

- To review relevant project documents;
- To provide support to the International consultant throughout the evaluation process particularly during the evaluation mission. This includes assisting in local language translation where necessary.
- To jointly facilitate the stakeholders workshop with the team leader; local beneficiaries and staff
- To contribute to the draft and finalization of the evaluation report to be written by the International consultant.

Qualification of evaluation team

- One independent international evaluation specialist with a relevant degree. He/she should have a proven track record in the evaluation of complex projects, experience with country situations similar to that of Philippines and with arrangements as used in the set-up of the current project. Experience in a community-based employment intensive programme or project in a post crisis condition will be an advantage.

- One national consultant with expertise in environmental engineering or environmentally sustainable development models. Knowledge of the post conflict/ natural disaster mitigation programme and associated local institutions and government structures is required. Familiarity with employment creation and poverty reduction schemes in rural areas will be a distinct advantage.

Depending on the evaluation team, translators may be recruited to assist in interviewing community members.

**Stakeholders' role:** All major stakeholders in the Philippines particularly the project teams, ILO CO-Manila, DWT/CO-Bangkok, ILO technical unit at HQ, and donor will be consulted and will have opportunities to provide inputs to the TOR and draft final evaluation report.

**The tasks of the Project:** The project management will provide logistic support to the evaluation team and will assist in organising a detailed evaluation mission agenda. Also the project needs to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluation team. 9/12

Time frame and responsibilities (Tentative) Task	Responsible person	Time frame
Preparation of the TOR –draft	Evaluation Manager	6 July 2015
Preparation of list of stakeholders with E-mail addresses	Project Manager	10 July 2015
Sharing the TOR with all concerned for	Project Manager Evaluation Manager	13-24 July 2015

comments/inputs		
Finalization of the TOR	Evaluation Manager	27 July 2015
Approval of the TOR	EVAL	30 July 2015
Selection of consultant and finalisation	Evaluation Manager/EVAL	22 July 2015
Draft mission itinerary for the evaluator and the list of key stakeholders to be interviewed	Project Manager	31 July 2015
Ex-col contract based on the TOR prepared/signed	Project Manager /ILO Director, CO-Manila	1 August 2015
Brief evaluators on ILO evaluation policy	Evaluation Manager	3 August 2015
Inception report submitted to Evaluation Manager	Evaluators	9 August 2015
Evaluation Mission	Evaluators	12-27 August 2015
PPT Presentation of Evaluation and stakeholders workshop	Evaluators	27 August
Draft report submitted to Evaluation Manager	Evaluators	10 August 2015
Sharing the draft report to all concerned for comments	Evaluation Manager	8-21 September 2015
Consolidated comments on the draft report, send to the evaluator	Evaluation Manager	22 September 2015
Finalisation of the report and submission to Evaluation Manager	Evaluator	25 September 2015
Review of the final report	Evaluation Manager/EVAL	28 September 2015
Submission of the final report to EVAL	Evaluation Manager	1 October 2015
Approval of the final evaluation report	EVAL	9 October 2015
Follow up to recommendations	ILO Manila	October/November 2015

The evaluation will be completed within 2.5 months from the date of signing of a contract with the evaluator. The evaluator will undertake a field mission in August 2015, and the final report will be available at the end September 2015.

The evaluation is estimated at the total of 25 workdays for the evaluation team leader, and at 18 days for the national evaluator as indicated below:

#### Time frame

July 2015  
 ( 3 days for team leader)  
 ( 2 days for team member)  
 August 2015  
 (14 days for team leader)  
 (13 days for team member)

#### Tasks

Desk review of documents and preparation of the inception report.

Evaluation field missions  
 The evaluation team will review its findings and prepare a presentation on the preliminary



findings, including verification

## **8. ANNEX**

### **Annex 1: ILO Haiyan Organigram**

### **Annex 2: Project performance plan (to be provided)**

### **Annex 3a: Tentative mission schedule (see attached excel file)**

### **3b: List of ILO staff and key stakeholders to be interviewed (to be provided)**

### **3c: List of Norwegian Funded Projects by region**

### **Annex 4: List of documents to be review**

- Government's Recovery Assistance to Yolanda (RAY) Plan
- Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan
- ILO Conceptual Framework on Typhoon Haiyan Integrated Livelihood Approach
- Project Documents
- Progress Reports
- Mission Reports
- List and Profiles of Sub-Project Reports implemented under the project
- Sub-Project Accomplishment Reports per Implementing Partner
- Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) Report
- ILO evaluation reports of two other projects that responding to the Typhoon Haiyan

### **Annex 5: All relevant ILO evaluation guidelines and standard templates**

Code of conduct form (To be signed by the evaluators)

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206205/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206205/lang--en/index.htm)

Checklist No. 3 Writing the inception report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165972/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165972/lang--en/index.htm)

Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165967/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm)

Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165968/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm)

Template for lessons learnt and Emerging Good Practices

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206158/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206158/lang--en/index.htm)

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206159/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206159/lang--en/index.htm)

Guidance note 7 Stakeholders participation in the ILO evaluation

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165986/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm) 12/12

Guidance note 4 Integrating gender equality in M&E of projects

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165986/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm)

Template for evaluation title page

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_166357/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_166357/lang--en/index.htm)

Template for evaluation summary:

<http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-summary-en.doc>

**A.7 Lessons learned****A.7.1 Emergencies require surge capacity****ILO Lesson Learned Template****Project Title:** Error! No bookmark name given.**Project TC/SYMBOL:** Error! No bookmark name given.**Name of Evaluator:** Felicissimo Junior David and  
Christoph David Weinmann**Date:** August 2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

<b>LL Element</b>	<b>Text</b>
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	Emergency and disaster response is not a core activity of the ILO. However, ILO can make good contributions to responses based on its experience with employment intensive and labour based programmes. Up to date labour force surveys may be used for quickly targeting vulnerable populations. Wage and OSH standards may enhance the quality of the response while contributing to the decent work agenda. However, ILO lacks the required surge capacity to participate in emergency and disaster response on a significant scale. ILO's ability to swiftly participate in the response to super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was a result of already having had capacities in place and being able to draw on funds available at the end of the biennium and the year.
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	All emergencies require surge capacity because competent staff needs to be mobilized instantaneously in order to ensure the timeliness of response. Without any surge capacity, the response is delayed and will not reach the affected population in time.
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	n.a.
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	n.a.

<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	ILO's ability to swiftly participate in the response to super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was a result of already having had capacities in place.
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	ILO could maintain a core pool of experts who are ready to deploy at short notice in the event of emergencies. These experts could form part of the permanent staff of ILO if their tasks are combined with disaster preparedness and/ or if they are integrated with other livelihood related activities of the ILO.

#### A.7.2 Developed M&E tools are required to reduce the work load for ILO teams

### ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Error! No bookmark name given.

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** Error! No bookmark name given.

**Name of Evaluator:** Felicissimo Junior David and Christoph David Weinmann

**Date:** August 2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

**LL Element**

**Text**

<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	Where large numbers of sub-projects need to be organized in order to deal with an emergency, it is important to have developed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools at hand that reduce the work load of the ILO team. Leaving the development of these tools to the team not only diverts valuable time from emergency response, but also leaves the quality of the M&E tools to chance (unless an experienced M&E specialist is a full-time member of the team) and significantly reduces the quality of reporting. Ideally, ILO should have an M&E tool available for such interventions.
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	All kinds of activities that are based on large numbers of beneficiaries or implementing partners would benefit from a standard ILO software that facilitates M&E of sub-projects and processing of monitoring information.
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	Field teams and project managers.
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	During the response to super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), ca. 150 sub-projects have been monitored using a common spreadsheet file based on manual entry of information in almost 50 fields for each sub-project. There were many potential sources of error, including typos, mistakes when copying from text documents (monitoring reports), mistakes when drafting monitoring reports, etc. that could have been avoided and thereby increased reliability and timeliness of M&E information., including generation of reports.
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	n.a.
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	ILO could develop or acquire a project monitoring software for the purpose of M&E of projects that work with large numbers of sub-projects. An M&E desk at HQ or in regional offices could train field teams in using the software, and provide technical backstopping.

**A.7.3 Special attention to staffing is required for emergency response****ILO Lesson Learned Template**

**Project Title:** Generating Emergency Employment and Recovery Sustainable Livelihoods in the Philippines -- Norwegian support to help the central Philippines recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** PHI/13/05/NOR

**Name of Evaluator:** Felicissimo Junior David and Christoph David Weinmann

**Date:** August 2015

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

<b>LL Element</b>	<b>Text</b>
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	Where emergency or disaster response is linked to livelihood development, it is important to ensure that field teams are able to return to normal working conditions once the (emergency) response phase is over and the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases are reached. Otherwise, the field team members are likely to suffer from burnout or unhealthy lifestyles sooner or later, with all potential consequences. Adequate capacities for substitution and strong administrative backup is also required in order to ensure sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	All projects or programmes where teams are in the field for a longer period than the response phase or longer than six months should the response phase not have been formally declared as ended.
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	ILO field teams.
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	During the response to super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), field team members, some of whom moved in directly from other response and recovery projects, did not have sufficient administrative backup and stayed on locations for more than 18 months without adequate normalization of workloads.
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	n.a.
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	ILO needs to ensure that sufficient staff is available in the field to deliver during response and recovery. Response phases should not be managed in a "lean" fashion, but need to be adequately resourced. The high workload level of the response phase should not be maintained during the recovery and other subsequent phases.