



International Labour Organization

FINAL INTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT - DRAFT

Project Title	Support to the Peace Process in Myanmar through an integrated livelihoods approach
TC Project Code	MMR/15/02/NOR
Starting Date	August 2015
Ending Date	Original: 31 August 2016 Approved no cost extension until 31 March 2017
Type of Evaluation	Internal Final Evaluation
Evaluation Period	1 August 2015- 10 March 2017
Countries covered	Myanmar
ILO Administrative Unit	ILO Yangon
ILO Technical units	DWT Bangkok
Financing Agency	Government of Norway
Donor contribution	USD 480,000

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List of Abbreviations

CBO	Community Based Organization
CC	Community Contractor
CSO	Civil Society Organization
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
JSAP	Joint Strategic Action Plan
KBPPWG	Kroeng Batoi Pilot Project Working Group
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
LRB	Local Resource- Based
MCF	Mon Cetaner Foundation
MNED	Mon National Education Department
MNHD	Mon National Health Department
MNLA	Mon National Liberation Army
MPSI	Myanmar Peace Support Initiative
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
MSDN	Mon Region Social Development Network
MWO	Mon Women's Organization
MYEO	Mon Youth Educators Organization
MYPO	Mon Youth Progressive Organization
NMSP	New Mon State Party
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
P&B	Programming and Budgeting
PIT	Project Implementation Team
RPF	Remonnya Peace Foundation
VDC	Village Development Committee
VIMC	Village Infrastructure Maintenance Committee

1. Executive Summary

The Project's strategy, as outlined in the Project Concept Note remains valid and appropriate vis-à-vis the overall objective and the specific purpose of the Project. The approach of facilitating and supporting the establishment of democratically elected Village Development Committees (VDCs) has been effective and has been very instrumental in the success of the Project. Not only in terms of deciding on the particular Project interventions but also very much in terms of creating inclusive and democratic village decision-making processes that created ownership, empowerment, trust and confidence among the village population.

Considering the very short duration of the Project and the challenging working environment in which the Project operated – in terms of aiming at contributing to the peace process in a fragile cease-fire context, and with regards to the accessibility of the Project sites, the locally available skills and the limited availability of technical assistance¹ – the Project's achievements have been impressive and the NMSP, the Steering Committee, the ILO TA team, the KBPPWG, the Project Implementation Team (PIT), the Village Development Committees (VDCs), the Community Contractors (CCs), and – last but not least the villager of the 9 targeted villages – deserve congratulations for their achievements

The Project has been very relevant in addressing the issues faced by the conflict-affected communities that were targeted by the Project in terms of contributing to the peace process as ceasefire dividend through its all-inclusive participatory approach in selecting, designing and implementing activities. As such, the Project has achieved its overall objective and specific outcome. All involved parties confirmed that the Project has contributed significantly in building trust between the various stakeholders, and in bringing hope and confidence to the targeted beneficiaries for a better and peaceful future

Because of unexpected delays, a no-cost extension of 6 months was requested to the donor. This was approved and the Project actually **ended on 31 March 2017**. The non-cost time extension of the Project was requested for several reasons.

A key reason for the implementation delay was NMSP's initial disagreement to include CBOs/CSOs in the institutional set-up of the Project, including the Mon Women Organization (MWO). NMSP initially insisted to have its own Women's Wing to take part in the Project Steering Committee. In view of the importance of all-inclusiveness in the design of the Project – vis-a-vis its objective of contributing to the peace process – it was decided by the ILO not to start the Project until this issue was resolved.

Discussions were held with the executive committee of NMSP to clarify the importance of the CBOs/CSOs involvement and the need of having women's voice being heard as stakeholders to the Project. NMSP agreed at last – after 6 months of discussions – under the provision that the MWO would work alongside with their NMSP's Women's Wing.

Although it took a long time reach this agreement, the outcome was positive and it made it possible for the NMSP Women's Wing and the MWO to work together. The discussions also resulted in a high degree of trust within the NMSP of ILO's role in the Project and facilitated discussions with NMSP on other Project related issues through the remaining period of the Project. This included the NMSP seeking advice from the ILO in their decision on signing the National Cease-fire Agreement (NCA) and on other issues with regard to their strategic position on peace issues..

Other Project implementation delays related to intense politics around the National Cease-fire Agreement (NCA) by NMSP (September-October 2015), general elections (November 2015), tensions between regional ethnic parties and NMSP Congress (January 2016) and armed clashes between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) in the period November 2016 to February 2017.

¹ The budget only provided for 2 work-months of input of an International Back Stopping Officer and 4 work-months of a national Field Assistant. Through other recourses the ILO managed to extend the inputs of the International Back Stopping Officer with another 4 work-months but this level of TA is considered very low for such a complex and demanding Project.

The villagers also expressed their satisfaction with the infrastructure assets that were constructed in their communities, and the participatory, inclusive and responsive processes that were followed in planning, designing and implementing the works. The Local Resource-based (LRB) approach was generally well appreciated and the villagers felt that the principle of equal access to employment opportunities for all, was well adhered to. The application of the LRB approaches also provided a much valued short-term cash injection in the local economy through wage transfers to the villagers who worked on the infrastructure schemes.

The Project's approach of taking sufficient time to undertake activities that specifically focused on building mutual trust among and between all involved parties, and on creating a sense of hope and confidence among the communities for in a peaceful future, was well justified. Because of the Project's time constraints this unfortunately meant that not much time was left for specific agricultural training and other economic empowerment support activities.

Overall, given the budget limitations vis-à-vis the ambitious targets set by the Project, the resources have been allocated and used efficiently. It should be noted however that without the additional allocation by the ILO of resources to allow for an increase in the ILO TA, the Project would not have been as successful as it was.

With the objective of fostering partnerships and ensuring an inclusive approach in the implementation of the Project, the chosen management structure was sensible. It would however have been beneficial if more funding would have been allocated for capacitating the KBPPWG, the PIT, the Steering Committee, the VDCs and the Community Contractors, in particular for the planning and implementation of the civil works.

More agricultural training would also have been useful, as requested by the communities but the available time-frame was simply too short to provide such training. A budget allocation for the development of training/reference materials and technical guidelines would have been useful as well.

Whereas the Project has started to lay the foundation to create an enabling environment for a peaceful and stable social and economic development for the rural population in the targeted villages, much more needs to be done. This not only relates to further support to the communities in terms of the development of agricultural skills and the provision of inputs, or a continuation of capacity development support to the VDCs and the CCs.

It also requires further efforts at political and institutional level that aim at creating an enabling and conducive environment for local social and economic development. At this moment it is still too early to conclude whether the Project has been able to achieve a lasting positive impact on the livelihoods of the targeted villagers. The duration of the Project was simply too short and resources were too limited to indicate with confidence whether the impact can be sustained.

A key issue is the access to land. Although there is an abundance of fertile land that could be used for agricultural development, many local people don't own land. It was understood that NMSP is allowing local people to have ownership of plots of land but this ownership is conditional to the requirement that the land is being converted within 3 years in productive agricultural land. Without having the resources or skills to develop this land into agricultural land (or forestry land), the local villages effectively will not be able to claim the ownership of such land on a permanent basis.

Poor rural road access is another key issue. Although the first 20 kilometers of the road have been improved (with funding provided by the government and the works carried out by a contractor selected by NMSP), the standard of the road works is such that it is expected that the condition of the road will deteriorate within a few years. Furthermore the condition of the last 10 kilometers of the road is poor and seriously affects the transportation of people and goods (and makes it very costly). A bridge of about 60 meter span is also required at the 20 kilometer point of the road to connect to the last 10 kilometers section.

Following the findings from the evaluation, the following recommendations are made

1. The piloted model has demonstrated its relevance and effectiveness and to ensure that the initial momentum that has been achieved by the Project will result in a level of economic empowerment at village level that will substantially improve the livelihood situation of the villagers, a follow-up project is strongly recommended – with the main focus on economic empowerment;
2. Advocate for an extension of the Project in the 9 villages where it was implemented following the same implementation model (with improvements to model as recommended by this evaluation), and an expansion to other conflict-affected areas. Also undertake advocacy activities among senior decision-makers at national level to promote the Project's model;
3. Considering the complexity of the Project, the challenging and low-capacity environment in which it operated, follow-up projects should have a longer duration and have more resources allocated for TA, for technical skills development (for economic empowerment), for strengthening the technical and management capacities of the local implementing partners and for the development of appropriate training materials;
4. Follow-up projects would benefit from more comprehensive procedures and systems for financial management, in particular in relation to the financial management and contract management by the NGO(s) contracted by the ILO through an Implementation Agreement (IA). This should include a formal role of the ILO TA in recommending expenditures/payments.
5. Include relevant decent work aspects in the contract conditions of the Service Contracts for the infrastructure works. Contracts should also include conditions promoting the participation of women and people with a disability in the work – this would require the formulation of a gender and social inclusion strategy. Contract liability issues – including the liabilities of personal harm due to unsafe or sub-standard working conditions or construction work – need to be effectively addressed through the Service Contracts.
6. To increase the effectiveness of the LRB approach, more emphasis should be given to the concept of labour productivity as the basis for the payment of the labourers. More training of contractors is also required, including training on the preparation of bids, understanding technical design drawings, quality control, design standards and specifications, and overall contract management. For the training effective visual training material needs to be developed. A less frequent rotation of the labourers is recommended to increase productivity of the labourers. A quantification of the targeted number of labour-days to be created by the Project (for women and men) is useful to allow for an evaluation of a project's achievement in creating short-term employment.
7. To be able to better monitor the intended outcome and the impact, it is recommended that similar future project give more attention to the formulation of SMART outcome-related indicators and to monitoring the outcomes and impacts of the Project. Furthermore, major risks that could prevent the Project from reaching its objectives and outputs should be addressed through the design of the Project and not be left as risks in the logical framework.
8. In a low-capacity environment, like the one in which the Project operated, it is recommended to build in comprehensive and effective financial management- and control procedures that also feature a formal role of the TA in approving/recommending payments for services, goods and works.

2. Background and Information about the Project

The New Mon State Party (NMSP) renewed its ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar Government in April 2012. While there remain among the Mon people lingering doubts about the ceasefire and the new government, Mon civil society organizations nevertheless see the renewed ceasefire as an opportunity to provide much-needed assistance to conflict-affected communities, build these communities' capacity and prepare them so that they too will have the capacity to participate and contribute to peace building.

In addition, and with the help of the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) and the ILO, Mon Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are working with the communities towards building trust among the NMSP, the government and conflict-affected populations.

The **first Kroeng Batoi pilot project** has been implemented in the period **January to June 2013**, constructing water supply infrastructure and undertaking capacity building training activities in 4 IDPs villages in the Kroeng Batoi area of Northern Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region. The project was implemented by a consortium of 9 organizations, the Kroeng Batoi Pilot Project Working Group (KBPPWG). The KBPPWG included local Civil Society Organizations, NMSP and key NMSP line-departments.

This was the first time that many of these organizations agreed to work together to contribute to peace building. It was also the first time that peacebuilding activities on the ground were undertaken through a participatory and inclusive approach. The project focused mainly on capacity building activities for the local population in the project area – including activities related to women empowerment – and the rehabilitation and construction of village water supply systems.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) and Norwegian Peoples' Aid (NPA) provided capacity-building and technical support to the local organizations, with the ILO lending its experience regarding rights-based local infrastructure development. According to ILO's internal review of the first Kroeng Batoi pilot project, the designed activities proved to be most useful and served well the purpose of confidence and trust building between the ethnic CBOs, the local Mon IDPs and the ethnic armed organization (NMSP). The number of the IDPs that participated in the activities gradually increased, as the level of confidence and the immediate sense of security as provided for by the ceasefire increased.

At the end of the first Kroeng Batoi pilot project a joint evaluation was conducted by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and KBPPWG. The evaluation found that the beneficiaries of the project had increased self-esteem and self-confidence as a result of the training and empowerment activities undertaken by the project. Beneficiaries also reported that the project had led to improved internal community communication, e.g. through an exchange of knowledge gained from the training.

Whereas the villagers were overall satisfied with the quality of the provided training, it was also mentioned that they found it difficult to identify practical ways of applying what they had learned. They also commented that visual training aids would have been helpful, also for future reference.

The evaluation also concluded that, whereas a considerable number of the members of the Village Development Committees (VDCs) that were established participated actively in the project, some could not because of financial and time constraints. Some members resigned from the VDC because they did not receive any remuneration for their work, whereas villagers who worked on the project's infrastructure construction schemes did receive payment for their work.

The beneficiaries were satisfied with the job opportunities created by the project for the community members. Some of the men however were not satisfied with the concept of the project paying equal wages for men and women. Another issue that came up was the interference of the project's requirements for local labour for construction

activities, with the peak agricultural season in the villages. Because of this, some villagers could not plant their crops in time. Others reported that this led to a drop in their income from agricultural activities.

The duration of the project was considered too short by the evaluators and this had led to undue pressure on completing the infrastructure works in time – at the expense of the attention given to advocacy activities and community socialization and mobilization activities. The villagers also commented that for possible follow-up projects more attention should be given to the establishment of clear rules, procedures and responsibilities of the VDCs and the villagers during the planning, implementation and operation & maintenance of the constructed infrastructure.

The evaluators recommended that under a possible follow-up project, all the members of the Steering Committee participate in the SC meetings. The SC has the responsibility of decision making and it is therefore considered very important that this is done through an all-inclusive process, to ensure full consensus and to avoid conflicts or misunderstandings at a later stage.

Another suggestion of the evaluators was that the KBPPWG could be more pro-active in approaching other INGOs, NGOs, private organizations, government organizations and donors with the aim of seeking collaboration with them, and with NMSP and other Mon political parties, in undertaking more development activities in the villages.

To assist the communities to move forward beyond the immediate ceasefire phase and continue to improve the living conditions of former conflict affected communities in the Kroeng Batoi Area, and build trust and confidence further in the peace process, the KBPPWG proposed a second phase of the pilot project. This was done in consultation with the original four communities and five additional villages that had constantly been communicating with members of the first four villages during the first phase of the project.

Figure 1: Map of Myanmar-Mon State



This second phase of the project – hereinafter referred as the Project – extended its reach from the original four villages to nine villages. The Project covered the Kroeng Batoi and Thaw Lawi Village areas of Yebyu Township in the Tanintharyi Region. The Project **commenced in August 2015** for an originally agreed duration of 13 months.

The map in figure 1 shows the location of the Mon State in Myanmar. The specific Project area, covering the 9 villages targeted by the Project, is shown in figure 2.

Because of unexpected delays, a no-cost extension of 6 months was requested to the donor. This was approved and the Project **ended on 31 March 2017**. The non-cost time extension of the Project was requested for several reasons.

A key reason for the implementation delay was NMSP's initial disagreement to include CBOs/CSOs in the institutional set-up of the Project, including the Mon Women Organization (MWO).

NMSP initially insisted to have its own Women's Wing to take part in the Steering Committee. In view of the importance of all-inclusiveness in the design of the Project – vis-a-vis its objective of contributing to the peace process – it was decided by the ILO not to start the Project until this issue was resolved.

Discussions were held with the executive committee of NMSP to clarify the importance of the CBOs/CSOs involvement the need of having women's voice being heard as stakeholders to the Project. NMSP agreed at last – after 6


months of discussions – under the provision that the MWO would work alongside with their NMSP's Women's Wing.

Although it took a long time reach this agreement, the outcome was positive and it made it possible for the NMSP Women's Wing and the MWO to work together. The discussions also resulted in a high degree of trust within the NMSP of ILO's role in the Project and facilitated discussions with NMSP on other Project related issues through the remaining period of the Project, including the NMSP seeking advice from the ILO in their decision on signing the National Cease-fire Agreement (NCA) and other issues with regard to their strategic position on peace issues..

Other delays related to intense politics around the National Cease-fire Agreement (NCA) by NMSP (September-October 2015), general elections (November 2015), tensions between regional ethnic parties and NMSP Congress (January 2016) and armed clashes between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) in the period November 2016 to February 2017.

The Project built on the existing and established capacities of local populations of the Kroeng Batoi Area. Local populations were fully included in planning and decision-making processes and actively participated in the proposed activities. The NMSP strongly supported and endorsed the Project.

Figure 2: Map with Location of the Project Target Villages



The Project's strategy is aligned with the ILO – Government of Myanmar's Joint Strategic Action Plan (JSAP) to eliminate forced labour. The JSAP has acknowledged the widespread use of forced labour across the country, particularly in ethnic areas, with its cause being a disrespect of human dignity.

The JSAP requires the ILO to work towards overturning the Myanmar authorities' attitude of disrespect for human dignity. To eliminate the use of forced labour, the ILO works with government authorities at all levels to encourage positive change from within the structure of power, to respect the principle of human rights and human dignity. This work is supported by the EU stability fund.

The JSAP also requires ILO to work with the local population to clarify their rights and responsibilities with regards to forced labour. Building an environment of the rule of law requires confidence from the part of the local communities in demanding a respect of law, and from the part of the authorities an understanding of accountability and legal responsibility is required.

The Project aimed at bringing about changes and confidence towards some 2,742 people of 496 households from 9 villages, who had been internally displaced in the past due to the conflict between the NMSP, the Myanmar Government and the Tatmadaw².

Forced labour practices were part of the severe plight that the people in the Project areas suffered from and from which this fled in the past and became IDPs. These IDPs are currently residing in the NMSP Kroeng Batoi ceasefire area. A needs assessment in 2013 revealed that the majority (over 90%) of the villagers are planning to stay in their current place of settlement. All of the 9villagers in the Project area would directly benefit from the project activities.

The Project was developed through a series of consultative workshops with representatives of the target communities, including women, the KBPPWG, the NMSP, The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) and the ILO. A needs assessment in the target area was conducted by KBPPWG in August/September 2013 and was followed by a technical infrastructure survey conducted by ILO. Lessons-learned from phase I also informed the design of the Project.

During the first phase of the project, concerns regarding good governance and transparency of the implementation were raised. These related to the NMSP's top-down approach which hampered RPF's liaison function and delayed project implementation. Another constraint was the observed lack of financial and technical capacity of NMSP Departments to spearhead project implementation.

Furthermore it was also proposed for the set-up of the phase II project to minimize the risk of collusion by awarding contracts for community infrastructure works to Community Contractors and not to the NMSP's Departments (which were also represented in the Steering Committee).

Based on the lessons learned from the first phase, the Project's institutional and management set-up was modified. The Kroeng Batoi Pilot Project Working Group (KBPPWG) was given the responsible for the implementation of the Project. It consisted of the following 11 Mon CBOs and NMSP Departments:

1. Remonnya Peace Foundation (RPF) – The lead agency
2. Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC);
3. Mon National Health Department (MNHD);
4. Mon National Education Department (MNED);
5. Mon Women's Organization (MWO);
6. Mon Region Social Development Network (MSDN);
7. Mon Cetaner Foundation (MCF);
8. Mon Youth Progressive Organization (MYPO)
9. Mon Youth Educators Organization (MYEO);
10. NMSP Development Office;
11. NMSP District Office.

² The Myanmar Armed Forces

To support the Project implementation, a Project Implementation Team (PIT) was established under the KBPPWG. It was composed of:

- 1 Project Coordinator – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 Training Officer – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 Finance Officer – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 Account Officer – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 Cashier – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 M&E Officer – based in Mawlamyine
- 1 Social Mobiliser – based in the Project areas
- 1 Engineer – based in the Project areas
- 1 Training Officer Assistant – based in the Project areas
- 2 Assistant Mobilisers – based in the Project areas
- 9 Community Supervisors – based in the Project areas
- 2 Office support staff

A Project Steering Committee (SC) was established to provide overall guidance and supervision, and to approve work plans, contracts and payments. The SC consisted of representatives of the following organizations that constituted the KBPPWG:

- 1 RPF Representative (Chair)
- 1 NMSP Representative (representing the Departments of Education, Health, Development, Relief)
- 1 NMSP's Women Wing Representative
- 4 Representatives of CSOs/CBOs, including the Mon Women's Organization

At village level, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were established in all the 9 villages. The VDCs were involved in all the stages of the project, including planning, the identification of training requirements, the selection and implementation of the infrastructure works, the selection of the community contractors and also through a public audit.

The ILO provided technical assistance and implementation support, covering all aspects of the Project. This included TA and implementation supporting in engineering, programming, budgeting, planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, financial control and administration.

Advisory services and implementation support were provided to the KBPPWG, the SC, the VDCs, the Community Contractors and the PIT. For the provision of technical assistance services, 2 person-months of an international EIIP Specialist and 4 person-months of a national Field Assistant were included in the budget.


A schematic overview of the institutional arrangements is presented in figure 3. The figure also shows the contracting and financial arrangements between the various parties.

An Implementation Agreement (IA) was signed with the Lead Agency of the KBPPWG (RPF) and contracts for infrastructure works were signed between RPF and the selected contractors, using the ILO Service Contract template.

An overview of the Project's development objective, purpose, outputs and verifiable indicators is presented in table 1. The project is linked to the following ILO Country Programme Outcomes (CPO) and P&B Outcomes:

- CPO MMR 101: Implementation of the joint action plan to eliminate all forms of forced labour by 2015;
- CPO MMR 127: Entrepreneurship development
- P&B outcome 1: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities;
- P&B outcome 15: Elimination of Forced labour

Figure 3: Institutional Set-up and Financial/Contractual Arrangements



Note: Budget for Health Workers is for stipends for 12 health workers for 24 months

Table 1: Project Development Objective, Intended Outcomes and Indicators

Development objective: To contribute to Rehabilitation of social & rural infrastructure, through a community based approach and the empowerment of conflict affected communities through skills and knowledge transfers in the Kroeng Batoi Area of Northern Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region	
Purpose	Indicators
Empowerment of conflict affected communities through skills and knowledge transfers and rehabilitation of social and rural infrastructure, through a community based approach in the Kroeng Batoi Area of Northern Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of conflict-affected communities (project villages) adopting participatory decision-making processes (incremental milestones over project life cycle) • Number of households provided with opportunities for livelihood (where targeted or % of households)
Outputs	Indicators
1: Target communities have an increased knowledge of the peace process and are equipped to address related consequences/issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of survey respondents who feel that workshops materials and activities are of sufficient quality and relevance to support them to fulfil their role in the peace process • % of stakeholders who express more confidence in expressing their views on peace and conflict
2: Better access to Education provided in 9 Villages through the community-based approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 school building constructed • 4 school buildings renovated • 2000 ft. of access tracks. • 1 rural bridge constructed • # of furniture distributed • # of Educational kits distributed. • # of working days
3: Health & Hygiene situation has been improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 rural health clinic constructed • 1 rural health clinic renovated • 2000 ft. of access tracks. • 1 rural bridge constructed • 5 of water systems established • 50 of HH latrines constructed • 6 Nos Hygiene trainings conducted • # of working days
4: Skills Development and Capacity Building of target communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # of contractors trained • 9 of VDC trained • 20 Skilled-workers have benefited • 100 farms trained • 1 training centre constructed

3. Purpose, Scope and Clients of Evaluation

The evaluation concerns the final internal evaluation of the project “*Support to the Peace Process in Myanmar through an integrated livelihoods approach*”. The project had undertaken a mid-term evaluation from January-February 2016.

The information presented in this report on the background of the project, its purpose, scope and clients, the used evaluation methodology, and the evaluation questions, has been provided in the TOR for the evaluation. To avoid unnecessary repetition, only the information in the TOR that is not captured in the main text of this report, is presented in Annex 1 (i.e. information on reporting and management requirements, the work plan and the time frame).

This internal final evaluation has been carried out for accountability and organisational learning. The evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and to identify lessons learned and best practices. As per ILO evaluation guidelines, the evaluation assessed the project against the evaluation criteria of relevance, the validity of design, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

The internal final evaluation has been conducted by the Senior ILO EIIP Specialist of DWT-ROAP and has been managed by the Deputy Liaison Officer of the ILO Liaison Office for Myanmar. Quality assurance has been provided by the Regional Evaluation Officer of the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.

This evaluation has been carried out in line with the requirements of the ILO Evaluation Policy³. ILO project evaluations are conducted to provide an opportunity for the Office and its funding partners to assess the appropriateness of design as it relates to the ILO's strategic and national policy framework, and considerations related to the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of project outcomes. The evaluation has also tested the underlying assumptions about the Project's contribution to the peace process.

The purpose of this evaluation was to:

1. Assess the relevance of the intervention objectives and approach;
2. Assess to what extent the intervention has achieved its planned outputs, outcomes and objectives;
3. Assess the extent to which the Project strategy has proven to be efficient and effective;
4. Assess whether the Project has been likely to have a sustainable impact.
5. Take stock of achievements, performance, impacts, good practices and lessons learned from the implementation of the Project towards a community-based approach and the empowerment of conflict affected communities.

Knowledge and information obtained from the evaluation will be used to inform the design of future similar projects which support the peace process of Myanmar.

The evaluation covered the various activities undertaken by the project during the 1 August 2015– 10 March 2017 and included field visits to selected infrastructure works constructed by the Project. The evaluation also included interviews with the different groups of beneficiaries. The evaluation covered the different stages of the Project and also assessed the actually followed implementation mechanisms vis-à-vis the initially planned implementation mechanisms (including the institutional set-up, planning and implementation plans/arrangements, and budget expenditures).

The evaluation also evaluated how gender equality concerns were integrated throughout all stages of the project.

³ <http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/lang--en/index.htm>

4. Methodology and Evaluation Questions

The evaluation used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, which have been discussed and agreed upon with the Project management. These included the following:

- Desk review of relevant documents related to the project and the context of the peace process in Myanmar, available reports related to the performance and progress to the project, the initial project document, contract documentation, designs and cost-estimates and implementation agreements. A list with the documents that were provided and that were reviewed by the Evaluator is presented in Annex 2.
- Interviews with the concerned staff in the ILO offices such as management, programme and finance units, project implementation team. Interviews with the local communities, members of committee, contractors, project implementing partners, CSOs, NMSP, and other stakeholders e.g. health workers, school teachers. Focus group discussions were also arranged with selected contractors and beneficiaries. A list of stakeholders met and the mission's itinerary are presented in Annex 3.
- Field trip(s) to project implementation locations for a more in-depth review of the Project's output and outcomes that have resulted from the Project interventions. Information regarding the itinerary of the field trips is provided in Annex 3.

The evaluation addressed the following evaluation questions:

- **Relevance and strategic fit:** To evaluate the outcomes of the project and assess whether the project has achieved its immediate objectives as well as contributed to the broader framework, specifically the project's development objectives:
 1. To what extent the project continued its relevance and responsiveness to address issues faced by conflict-affected communities' requirement on social and rural infrastructure and employment generation?
 2. Were the project strategies and interventions appropriate for promoting the local resource-based approach in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar?
 3. To what extent have project approaches been flexible, to ensure appropriateness to address peace process and political/conflict issues and respond to the changing situations? To what extent have political/conflict issues positively or negatively affected the relevance of the project?
 4. Do the planned target beneficiaries correspond to the ones that are actually benefiting? Were the project training and workshops appropriate for promoting the skills and knowledge for peace process? Is the intervention logic clear to CBOs partner/implementation team? Has the logical framework been used for monitoring purposes by the implementation team?
 5. Has the gender parity approach been taken into consideration in the project?
- **Validity of intervention design:** Assess the appropriateness of the results framework and appropriateness of its indicators, targets and the overall M&E strategy and practices:
 1. Were the designs of the infrastructure works schemes developed in consultation with the communities? Have there been adjustments in the design throughout the project implementation?
 2. Did the design appropriately identify risks and key assumptions? Did the project have a mitigation strategy taking into account the situation?
 3. How was the process of consultation and identification of problem and strategies done during the project design stage? How did the consultation results affect the project design?
 4. Did the project design adequately consider the gender dimensions of the problem, challenges, and interests of the women target groups and the planned interventions?
- **Project progress and effectiveness:** Assess the progress of the project against its immediate objectives, expected outputs and outcome targets, as well as the delivery of quality outputs:

1. To what extent has the project contributed to improving knowledge of and actual working conditions of women and men in the target areas?
 2. To what extent has the project attained its objectives? Have all planned activities, outputs and outcomes been achieved? Was the quality of the provided services/activities, outputs and outcomes satisfactory?
 3. What were the challenges faced by the project in achieving the results and how were they addressed?
 4. How effective was the communication with the beneficiaries and stakeholders?
 5. Have Village Development Committees (VDCs) been set up and were they meeting regularly? Is there evidence of the meetings having taken place, e.g. through minutes of meetings? Who participated in those meetings?
 6. Have community contractors been selected by the communities? Have contractors and VDCs had regular meeting? Are project approaches clearly understood by contractors and VDCs?
 7. Are there any unplanned positive/negative effects of the projects interventions on the target beneficiaries?
 8. To what extent was the project successful in addressing gender equality and employment creation for women?
- ***Efficiency of resource use:*** Measure how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results:
 1. Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated and delivered strategically to achieve the project objectives?
 2. Given the size of the project, its complexity and challenges, were the existing project management structure and technical capacity sufficient and adequate?
 3. How well did the project manage finances (including work and financial planning, budget forecasts, spending and reporting)?
 - ***Impact orientation and sustainability of the intervention:*** Provide the overview of sustained impact of the project against the following outcomes:
 1. Any evidence of longer-term development impact promoted through the project in the targeted local areas?
 2. Are there any good practices and process of promoting inclusive participatory approaches that came about from this project?
 3. Has there been evidence of better understanding of the need of democratic institutions such as the village development committees? Provide elaboration of the evidence and how this understanding has led to improved institutional practices.
 4. What is the current level of ownership over the infrastructure by the communities? What is the likelihood that communities will continue to take ownership and maintain the assets?
 5. Are there any follow-up actions required to continue the momentum of the project?
 - ***Capacity building and institutionalisation:*** The implementation arrangements put in place by the project to ensure the appropriate capacity building of its institutional counterparts:
 1. How did the project engage with conflict-affected communities, especially with women, during project implementation and to institutionalize project interventions?
 2. Which types of capacity building activities have been more and less effective and what lessons can be derived from these experiences?
 3. How likely are the project outcomes going to be sustainable? What are needed to increase the likelihood of sustainability?
 4. What are potential good practices or outcomes, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further, shared and replicated as well as up-scaled?

5. Main Findings

Considering the very short duration of the Project and the challenging working environment in which the Project operated – in terms of aiming at contributing to the peace process in a fragile cease-fire context, and with regards to the accessibility of the Project sites, the locally available skills and the limited availability of technical assistance⁴ – the Project's achievements have been impressive and the ILO TA team, the KBPPWG and the Project Implementation Team (PIT) deserve congratulations for their achievements.

5.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit

The Project has been very relevant in addressing the issues faced by the conflict-affected communities that were targeted by the Project in terms of contributing to the peace process through its all-inclusive participatory approach in selecting, designing and implementing activities. As such, the Project has achieved its overall objective. All involved parties confirmed that the Project has contributed significantly in building trust between the various stakeholders, and in bringing hope and confidence to the targeted beneficiaries for a better and peaceful future.

The beneficiary villagers commented that the Project has also helped a lot in empowering the communities and in providing the communities with a sense of belonging. Overall, the villagers also expressed their satisfaction with the infrastructure assets that were constructed in their communities, and the participatory, inclusive and responsive processes that were followed in planning, designing and implementing the works. During the village meeting that was held, a very positive attitude and spirit was observed among and between the villagers.

The Local Resource-based (LRB) approach was generally well appreciated and the villagers felt that the principle of equal access to employment opportunities for all, was well adhered to. The application of the LRB approaches also provided a short-term cash injection in the local economy through wage transfers and this was seen as very useful by the communities. When the supply of labour exceeded the demand – which happened regularly – a rotation systems was applied. This led however in a number of instances to high rotation frequencies, with labourers being rotated as frequent as every 1-2 days.



Water Storage Reservoir for Drinking Water Scheme

The principle of output-based wage payments for the Project's labourers was not always completely understood and sometimes labourers were paid on a daily basis instead of on the basis of labour productivity. Overall, the LRB approach demonstrated its usefulness in optimizing the utilization of local resources, in creating short-term employment, and in facilitating a very participatory process of planning and implementing the works that clearly contributed to the overall objective and specific purpose of the Project.



Concrete Footpath

The constructed infrastructure – drinking water supply systems, concrete footpaths, school buildings, latrines, health clinics and an agricultural training center – was well appreciated by the communities, who decided on the prioritization and selection of the works through a democratic and participatory process which involved the VDCs and the communities at large.

⁴ The budget only provided for 2 work-months of input of an International Back Stopping Officer and 4 work-months of a national Field Assistant. Through other recourses the ILO managed to extend the inputs of the International Back Stopping Officer with another 4 work-months but this level of TA is considered very low for such a complex and demanding Project.

Whereas the short-term employment generated by the Project, through the application of LRB approaches, was much appreciated by the villagers, one of their key needs is to develop agriculture – the main source of livelihood for the population of the villages.

Another key constraint that was frequently mentioned, was the quality of the rural road that connects the villages with the national roads, in particular the last section. Whereas the first 20 kilometers have been somewhat improved recently, the condition of the last 10 kilometers of the road is still very poor. Also, a bridge or large vented level crossing with a span of approximately 60 meters is required to cross a river after the first 20 kilometers of the road. Such road improvement activities were much beyond the time, resources and local skills-sets available to the Project, to address.

Overall, the Project has achieved its immediate objective of empowering the conflict affected communities in the Project areas through dialogue, information sharing, awareness raising, and the transfer of soft skills and construction skills. Because of budget constraints and the very short time available to the Project, not sufficient time could be given however to agricultural training activities – as also mentioned by the villagers.

The Project's approach of taking sufficient time to undertake activities that specifically focused on building mutual trust among and between all involved parties, and on creating a sense of hope and confidence among the communities for in a peaceful future, was well justified. Because of the Project's time constraints this unfortunately meant that not much time was left for specific agricultural training and support activities.

Because of delays in starting the construction works – contracts for works could only be signed from November 2016 onwards. These delays were beyond the control of the Project. They were related to regional and local clashes and tensions between the NMSP and other ethnic parties, the general elections and the initial reluctance of NMSP to include CBOs/CSOs in the set-up of the Project.



Health Centre and Concrete Footpath

Because of the late start of the construction works, the majority of the works still had to be completed at the time of the evaluation. It is estimated that, overall, 90% of the works had been completed at the time of the evaluation and the ILO TA assured that all the works would be completed in time, i.e. before 31st March 2017.

This seems to be however a bit over-optimistic, in particular for the infrastructure works in the villages at the end of the road where the Community Contractors face transport problems that are related to the poor condition of the road.

The Project has been able to adapt fairly well to these external challenges that caused delays in the implementation of activities. If sufficient resources would have been available, a further extension of the Project with 2-3 months would have been preferable, to avoid the 'rush' in completing the infrastructure works.

Meetings with all the Project's stakeholders confirmed that the Project's intervention logic was well understood and appreciated. Women in the communities were actively involved in all stages of the Project and this was not only noted from attendance sheets of training courses and workshops, but was also observed during meetings with the community members and the inspection of the on-going works. Some of the VDCs also decided to select female Community Contractors to carry out the infrastructure works.

In terms of monitoring and evaluating activities in accordance with the Project's logical framework, the Project Implementation Team (PIT) is keeping track of the progress of the Project's activities. A Project end-line survey and a public audit however were not conducted yet at the time of the evaluation to assess the outcome and outputs (including quality aspects) of the Project against the defined verifiable indicators. Although the findings of the evaluation suggest that, overall, the objective, purpose and outputs of the Project have been achieved, an earlier start of the end-line study would have been preferred to inform the evaluation.

5.2 Validity of Intervention Design

The Project's strategy, as outlined in the Project Concept Note remains valid and appropriate vis-à-vis the overall objective and the specific purpose of the Project. The approach of facilitating and supporting the establishment of democratically elected Village Development Committees (VDCs) has been effective and has been very instrumental in the success of the Project. Not only in terms of deciding on the particular Project interventions but also very much in terms of creating inclusive and democratic village decision-making processes that created ownership, empowerment, trust and confidence among the village population.

Illustrative of the Project's effectiveness in terms of a gender parity approach, was the presence and active participation many women during a village meeting that was held during the evaluation, the participation of the women in the workforce at the construction sites, and the active participation of women during meetings with the contractors and VDCs. Because of capacity constraints a formal gender strategy could unfortunately not be prepared.

Whereas the Project's strategy as formulated in the Project Concept Note is sound, the logical framework could have benefited from a more specific and precisely articulated formulation of the verifiable indicators (i.e. SMART indicators) and the assumptions, risks and mitigation measures. This would have enabled the Project to better assess its achievements in terms of outputs, results and impacts, and would have better facilitated the identification of mitigation measures in case of observed risks.

Below some illustrative examples are given on how the logical framework for a possible follow-up project could be improved:

- Verifiable indicators for physical works outputs refer in the logical framework to the numbers of units to be constructed or renovated. Instead of only referring to the numbers of infrastructure, it would be useful to include reference to the quality, the cost, the time of completion and the functionality. For example: *5 water systems established and functional, as per design standard, in time and within the approved budget;*
- Sex-disaggregated indicators are missing in the logical framework. Whereas the Project actually implemented an effective gender parity approach, this is not reflected in the logical framework. The number of work-days of work created through the infrastructure works could for example have been disaggregated in the logical framework. In practice this information was monitored and reported on by the Project.
- At outcome level, one of the formulated indicators of the Project's purpose of *empowerment of conflict affected communities'* states: *Number of households provided with opportunities for livelihood (where targeted or % of households)*. This definition is very generic/abstract and does not relate to the specific interventions of the Project. Possibly a more relevant indicator of empowerment⁵ in the context of the Project could have been defined as: *% of households that feel that the Project has helped them in gaining more control over important decisions in their village that affect their livelihood.*
- Indicators of output 4 on skills development and capacity building relate to the numbers of the community contractors, VDCs and farmers that have been trained. Instead of limiting the indicators to the numbers of trainees that were trained, it would have been useful to consider for each of the specific groups of trainees more specific indicators, e.g. for the contractors: *# contractors understand technical designs and design drawings for the construction of a standard technical school and have the technical skills to construct primary schools accordingly, without outside technical support or supervision.*
- At purpose level, formulated assumptions relate to: i) the opportunity and the communities' willingness to participate in the development activities through a bottom-up approach, and; ii) a minimum level of resources and access that is available for livelihood development activities. These assumptions would normally already been checked during the design of the Project and would therefore not have to feature as assumptions. The risk that was

⁵ Empowerment as a multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power in people for use in their own lives, their communities and in their society, by acting on issues they define as important.

mentioned at purpose level relates to a lack of security and the proposed mitigation measure is *protection presence and incremental building of trust*. Possibly it would have been more logical and clear to formulate a risk mitigation measure as follows: *Continuously involving all concerned parties in the planning and implementation of the Project to minimize the risk of local conflicts. In case of conflicts, the Project would facilitate the dialogue between the conflicting parties and might have to keep Project field activities on-hold until the conflict has been resolved*. Such a risk mitigation strategy was de facto also followed when the Project's field activities had to be kept on-hold when the local security situation did not permit the Project staff to undertake field activities.

- Under activity 4.1 (training of local supervisory staff and community contractors) the risk that is mentioned in the logical framework states: *Inadequate number of credible or skilled local counterparts (CBOs/CSOs) or resource persons to VDCs to make the implementation of projects effective*. No mitigation measure appears in the logical framework to address the risk. Such a risk should normally not appear in the logical framework as greatly increase the risk of the Project failing. This risk should have been addressed in the design of the Project.

Despite above observations regarding the logical framework, actual implementation practices did address the risks that emerged in a logical way (e.g. by postponing project activities in situations of insecurity and by taken measures to ensure that sufficient technical support was available to ensure effective implementation of the works in terms of quality, budget and time). As mentioned, these could have been better reflected in the logical framework.



School + Dormitory

The designs of the infrastructure works schemes and the selection of the Community Contractors have been undertaken in close consultation with the communities who expressed their satisfaction with the participatory process that was followed in designing of the works and selecting the contractors.

These consultations were held through the VDCs and dealt with issues related to location, specifications and standards of the infrastructure, and the requirements that Community Contractors needed to comply with to be considered as candidate contractors.

Compared to the originally designs, no significant adjustments in the design of the infrastructure schemes had been necessary during the actual construction, with the exception of expansions of the drinking water systems that were requested by the communities, after the works had started. According to the ILO TA, only the scheduled construction of one bridge could not take place because of resource constraints. Instead, a school dormitory was constructed. Once all the infrastructure works are completed, the PIT should prepare a list showing the actual versus the planned outputs from the Project's infrastructure works.



Completed Drinking Water Tap Stand

5.3 Project Progress and Effectiveness

Considering its very short duration, the Project has made remarkable progress in achieving its intended objective, outcome and outputs. No unplanned positive or negative effect of the Project's interventions on the targeted beneficiaries occurred. Because of the very short duration and the very limited technical assistance that was available, not all capacity development activities could achieve the desired level.

In terms of achievements, the Project's contribution to the peace process in the Project working area is to be highly commended. The Project's management structure and participatory approach, combined with the provision of a variety of awareness raising activities, training and the construction of key village infrastructure have greatly benefited

the local population, in terms of giving the local people more trust and confidence in being able to influence their future, as well as through the provision of key infrastructure assets that will facility local development.

Table 2 summarizes the Project's achievements in infrastructure works at the time of the evaluation, against the set targets. The number of planned and actually generated labour-days of work are also shown in the table.

Table 2: Achieved Progress Infrastructure Works and Labour-days of Work Generated

Infrastructure	Number planned	Number completed	Work-days	
			planned	achieved
School building - new construction of dormitory	1	1	942	940
School building - renovation	4	4	1960	2097
Access tracks (concrete pavement) – length in feet	4,000	5,000	1040	1143
Bridge	2	0	0	0
Rural health clinic – new construction	1	1	700	672
Rural health clinic - renovation	1	1	640	645
Household latrines	50	175	1400	1365
Water systems – new construction	5	5	2537	2432
Agricultural training centre – new construction	1	1	669	713
TOTAL			10,008	10,032

Table 2 shows that, with the exception of the 2 bridges, all infrastructure works have been completed as planned. In the case of access tracks and latrines the Project has even exceed the target. The number of labour-days of short-term employment that were generated through the construction activities (10,032) is very similar to the number of work-days planned (10,008). 36 % of the work-days were carried out by women from the communities, which is a very good achievements in the traditionally typically male construction sector.

Communication between the different stakeholders functioned well. The establishment and empowerment of the VDCs has been an effective means of ensuring an effective participatory partnership with the communities. The PIT actively engaged with the VDCs and the presence of PIT staff on the ground greatly facilitated the interaction and communication with the communities and the Community Contractors. VDC meetings were organized regularly and were well attended by the members. Minutes of these meetings were prepared and show the outcomes and decisions taken by the VDCs.



Meeting with female and male Community Contractors

Community Contractors (CCs) were selected in close consultation between the VDCs, the PIT and the ILO TA. Criteria that were used in selecting the CCs related to their technical competence, their demonstrated trustworthiness in the community, their communication skills, mobility and their commitment.

Regular meeting between the VDCs and the CCs – facilitated by the PIT and/or the ILO TA – took place to discuss progress and resolve possible issues related to the implementation of the works. Technical inputs provided by the PIT staff and the member of the KBPPWG were much appreciated by the communities.

ILO Service Contracts were used for contracting the CCs to implement the infrastructure works. Whereas there have been no defaulting CCs and the overall quality of the work appears to be satisfactory, the Service Contracts could have been more specific with regards to:

- Details of the work implementation;
- Liquidated damages (this standard ILO heading of the Service Contract was deleted in the template that was used);
- Payment conditions;

- Contractors' liability (including defects liability);
- Decent work standards (e.g. working hours, minimum wage and age, workers insurance, OSH provisions);
- Promotion of women's participation in the work-force;
- Provision of work opportunities for people with a disability;
- Roles and responsibilities of the CC, VDC, the ILO TA and the PIT;
- Standard contract conditions (similar to the ILO conditions for Service Contracts – these were not included).

It is understood and appreciated that – in line with the Project's objective to build trust between concerned parties – contracting arrangements for infrastructure works were done in a non-standard way, i.e. through a Service Contract between an NGO (RPF) that represented the KBPPWG⁶ and the CC. In this case, RPF acted as the Employer.

However, because of a lack of the required expertise within RPF/KBPPWG/PIT on civil works and the absence of an appropriate formal quality assurance procedure (with regards to quality of the works, budget control, authorization of payments to contractors), there could have been a risk of not achieving value-for-money.

Whereas there have been no indications whatsoever that achieving value-for-money was compromised, this was more related to the integrity of the involved stakeholders and the pro-active high quality advisory support rendered by the ILO TA, then to well-established and formalized contracting/procurement practices.

There were no overhead charges or profit margins included in the Implementation Agreement between the ILO and RPF and the contractor's profit margins included in the Service Contracts between RPS and the CCs were in line with common practices. Realistic BoQs and cost-estimates were prepared by the ILO TA and these 'Engineer's Estimates' were used for the contracts.

The used Service Contracts do not make explicit reference to a role of the ILO TA in recommending payments to the CCs, whereas this TA was the only party in the Project with sufficient technical expertise to provide expert advice on the quality and quantity of the progress made – and hence also regarding the authorization of payments.

Whereas the ILO TA did effectively have this advisory and supervisory role in terms of monitoring the quality of the work and advising on payments, this arrangement could have been formalized in the procedures (e.g. by having the ILO signing-off on an invoice submitted by the CC).

Overall, it can be concluded that value-for-money was achieved, mainly because of the role of the ILO TA. Whereas the contracting arrangements that were used can be justified in the context of the objective and purpose of the Project, such arrangements would not be advisable if the Project would have been implemented in a developmental context.

In the case of the Project RPF acted as the Employer for the contracts. Normally an Employer for civil works contracts is a well-established competent body of a permanent nature that has the expertise to oversee and manage the implementation of the work of contractors.

Such Employers also have the responsibility to ensure that contractual obligations are being fulfilled, including the rectification of defects by the contractors during the defects liability period. An Employer may also be held responsible for defects, or harm caused by defects, in structures after the Employer has accepted the completed works from the contractor at the end of the defects liability period. This would require the Employer to take out appropriate insurance to cover such risks. RPF would not be in a position to fulfil the typical requirements of Employers in the construction sector.

⁶ An inspected Service Contract mentions in the heading as the parties in the contract the KBPPWG represented by the PIT, and a named Community Contractor. On the signature page however, the Director (?) of the RPF (the lead of the KBPPWG) has signed the contract, together with the Community Contractor. This inconsistency could have been avoided by mentioning in the heading RPF, representing the KBPPWG. Furthermore, the RPF representative has signed on the signature page with his name only. No mention is made of his association with RPF and his function at RPF.

Interviews with the labourers indicated that the CCs paid the required minimum wages to unskilled labourers of Kyat 6,000 per day. Skilled labourers were paid daily wages between Kyat 10,000 to 12,000. OSH provisions like the adequate supply of drinking water to the labourers, respecting decent working hours, adherence to the minimum age requirements and the supply of good quality hand tools and protective gear (where necessary) were in place. No provisions for accident insurance were incorporated in the Bill of Quantities (BoQ) of the works.

Whereas the Project has made optimum use of its limited resources within the very short available time frame in supporting the communities in terms of improving their local knowledge base, more time would be required to meet the requirements. Key areas where more training is needed, are:

- Training of Community Contractors (CCs): Whereas only some of the CCS has some previous experience as a skilled labourer (e.g. as a mason or carpenter) in construction works, none of them had worked as a contractor before. Considerably more training is required for the CCs on the preparation of realistic bids, understanding design drawings, contract management (including the management of labourers, equipment and budgets, and the planning of the works), typical features of the LRB approach (including the understanding of best practices for site management, the use of labour productivity norms as the basis of payments) and quality control. Furthermore, the development of appropriate (and very visual) guidelines would be very useful for the CCS.
- Agricultural training: Agriculture is the main source of livelihoods for the people in the villages and in meetings with the villagers and the VDCs the need for more agricultural training and support was expressed. Such training should also be supported with clearly understandable and visual technical agricultural best practices guidelines.
- Training of the VDCs and the Village Infrastructure Maintenance Committees (FIMCs): More training is required to capacitate the VDCs and FIMCs for their oversight role of CCs and for the management of the maintenance of the constructed infrastructure. Whereas the Project made a very good start with this, more remains to be done.

Whereas the beneficiaries and the CCs indicated that they considered the providing training useful, they also commented that they needed more technical training, in particular on agriculture and civil works.

Training and awareness raising/empowering activities were conducted to a large extent by the CSOs of the PBPPWG, with support from the PIT. Because of resource and time constraints, no comprehensive visual training materials could be produced and it was left to a large extent to the CSOs to decide on the specific contents of the training subjects.

Given the limited ILO TA that was available during the Project, the achievements in terms of knowledge transfer has been impressive. The Project would however have benefited from the inclusion of capacity building activities for the KBPPWG, the PIT and the Steering Committee. For these bodies, training related to their specific functions would have equipped them with more knowledge to implement their tasks more effectively. No separate provision was however made in the budget or in the work plan for capacitating the KBPPWG, the PIT and Steering Committee.

Table 3 gives an overview of the numbers of the different types of training courses and awareness raising and knowledge sharing activities were undertaken and the number of men and women from the communities that participated in these courses and activities. As shown in table 3, the Project has achieved the set targets in terms of the specific training activities that were planned.

Table 3 also shows that the Project has been successful in terms of gender parity for the training and capacity building activities with 50% of the trainees/participants being women.

To ensure sufficient expertise at all levels of Project implementation and management, the ILO TA had to play a critical and pivotal role, as is also shown in figure 2 of chapter 2. Because of the very strong commitment and competence by the ILO TA, combined with ILO's willingness to top-up the number of work-months for the international ILO Expert from 2 to 6, the Project was able to deliver quite well in terms of achieving the objective, outcome and outputs.

In terms of sustainability (as far as it is possible to talk about sustainability in a cease-fire context), the Project would have benefited from a considerably longer duration and substantially more TA to allow for more capacity building for the villagers and among the Project's implementation and management partners.

Table 3: Overview of Conducted Training Courses and Awareness Raising & Knowledge Sharing Activities

Activity	Number planned	Number conducted	Number of participants		
			Women	Men	Total
Peace information dissemination to target villages	2	2	49	84	133
Workshops related to peace education and human rights	2	2	27	33	60
Workshops on women empowerment and leadership	2	2	58	21	79
Peace building awareness workshops for youth	2	2	53	18	71
Community empowerment training for youth	2	2	25	32	57
Democracy awareness training for youth	2	2	34	34	68
Training on health and hygiene	2	2	35	42	77
Capacity training workshops for VDCs	9	9	31	38	69
Vocational skills training for contractors and supervisors	1	1	4	16	20
Agricultural training on home gardening, animal husbandry, etc.	3	3	48	51	99
TOTAL	27	27	364	369	733

5.4 Efficiency of Resource Use

Overall, given the budget limitations vis-à-vis the ambitious targets set by the Project, the resources have been allocated and used efficiently. It should be noted however that without the additional allocation by the ILO of resources to allow for an increase in the ILO TA, the Project would not have been as successful as it was.

With the objective of fostering partnerships and ensuring an inclusive approach in the implementation of the Project, the chosen management structure was sensible. It would have been beneficial if more funding would have been allocated for capacitating the KBPPWG, the PIT, the Steering Committee, the VDCs and the Community Contractors, in particular for the planning and implementation of the civil works.

More agricultural training would also have been useful, as requested by the communities but the available time-frame was simply too short to provide such training. A budget allocation for the development of training/reference materials and technical guidelines would have been useful as well.

As already mentioned earlier, the available budget in the Project for ILO technical assistance was not sufficient and without the additional external budget resources provided by the ILO for TA, the Project would not have been able to achieve its intended objective, outcome and outputs. The international ILO TA played a crucial role in the success of the Project. The number of person-months allocated for this international ILO TA (2 work-months from the Project and 4 work-months from other ILO resources) was actually still insufficient to provide all the necessary TA.

Considering the complexity of the Project and the challenging working environment, the support of a full-time international ILO expert would have been warranted. This would also have enabled the Project to develop more comprehensive operational procedures, including those related to contract management and the payment of contractors. It would also have allowed for more training for community contractors and work supervisors, and for the development of technical manuals and training materials for the civil works.

The overall financial management by the ILO of the Project has been done in accordance with its established procedures and was carried out efficiently. Sufficient information was available to enable a proper overall financial planning. As and when required budget revisions were made.

The financial management of the budget of USD 343,599 that was managed by RPF through an Implementation Agreement with the ILO appears to have been undertaken quite effectively, resulting in value-for-money. However, from a transparency point of view it would have been better if the actually followed financial management practices would have been reflected more in detail in operational procedures. A formal certifying role of the ILO in the financial management by RPF would have been preferred. This also applies to the management of the service contracts let by RPF to the CCs, as has been explained in paragraph 5.3.

5.5 Impact Orientation and Sustainability of the Intervention

A major impact of the Project has been its contribution to the peace process at local level and the increased sense of confidence among the villagers about the likelihood to be safe and the possibility to build a sustainable livelihood in their villages.

The democratically elected VDCs appear to function well and the villagers indicated that the VDC structure will be maintained after the closure of the Project. All decisions made regarding the selection of activities under the Project have been made in a democratic and participatory way, following the principles of inclusiveness and consensus. The question is whether the VDCs will be able to operate effectively, considering the fact that only a very short time-span has been available to establish, capacitate and empower these VDCs.

The establishment of the VDCs and the Village Infrastructure Maintenance Committees (VIMCs) are likely to ensure that the constructed infrastructure will be maintained. An indication of this is that the Maintenance Committees that were established under the first phase of the project are still functioning and that the water supply schemes that were constructed at that time were still operational. It is however too early to provide a firm conclusion regarding the sustainability of the maintenance of the constructed and renovated infrastructure.

The quality of the work undertaken by the Community Contractors shows the potentials of using contractors from the community for the types of infrastructure works that were undertaken. However, considerably more training will be required for these contractors. Without the extensive support of the ILO TA, the contractors would not have been able to achieve the quality of the work as it was.

No unintended negative effects or impacts of the Project's interventions were observed. A positive, unintended effect of the Project has been the start of kitchen gardening activities by some households. This has become possible because of the increased availability of water.

Whereas the Project has started to lay the foundation to create an enabling environment for a peaceful and stable social and economic development for the rural population in the targeted villages, much more needs to be done. This not only relates to further support to the communities in terms of the development of agricultural skills and the provision of inputs, or a continuation of capacity development support to the VDCs and the CCs.

It also requires further efforts at political and institutional level that aim at creating an enabling and conducive environment for local social and economic development. At this moment it is still too early to conclude whether the Project has been able to achieve a lasting positive impact on the livelihoods of the targeted villagers. The duration of the Project was simply too short and resources were too limited to indicate with confidence whether the impact can be sustained.

A key issue is the access to land. Although there is an abundance of fertile land that could be used for agricultural development, many local people don't own land. It was understood that NMSP is allowing local people to have ownership of plots of land but this ownership is conditional to the requirement that the land is being converted within 3 years in productive agricultural land. Without having the resources or skills to develop this land into agricultural

land (or forestry land), the local villages effectively will not be able to claim the ownership of such land on a permanent basis.

Poor rural road access is another key issue. Although the first 20 kilometers of the road have been improved (with funding provided by the government and the works carried out by a contractor selected by NMSP), the standard of the road works is such that it is expected that the condition of the road will deteriorate within a few years. Furthermore the condition of the last 10 kilometers of the road is poor and seriously affects the transportation of people and goods (and makes it very costly). A bridge of about 60 meter span is also required at the 20 kilometer point of the road to connect to the last 10 kilometers section.

A continuation and expansion of activities at village level will be required to ensure that the benefits of the initial momentum that has been established can be fully secured. Furthermore it is very important that activities are initiated at higher-level to ensure that a conducive and enabling is created that will allow for agricultural development. This will require a dialogue with NMSP (e.g. on the issue of granting villagers access to land and supporting them in developing agricultural potentials) and other specialized institutions (for the provision of expertise support).

Building on the momentum that already has been achieved, it would be timely to disseminate the success of the model to high-level policy makers and promote an expansion of the approach to other areas as well.

5.6 Capacity Building and Institutionalization

The question regarding the institutional sustainability of the organizational management model that has been used by the Project, including local CBOs, CSOs, PIT, Steering Committee and the VDCs, needs to be seen in the context of the cease-fire context in which the Project operated. In a stable developmental context such a model would not be preferred and would not be sustainable, in particular because the KBPPWG/RPF does not have the institutional mandate, nor capacity, nor permanency to effectively implement activities on the long-term like those implemented by the Project – especially those relate to the infrastructure works.

In a stable developmental context the logical choice would be to implement the infrastructure works with the involvement of a specialized line agency like a Ministry of Public Works. As and when required such a line agency might also require capacity strengthening support to enable it to plan, program, design, procure and supervise LRB infrastructure works. Such capacity building interventions would be much more effective than those directed to a temporary body (like the KBPPWG) that does not have the expertise, resources nor mandate to undertake and manage civil works.

However, considering the special context in which the Project operated, and its specific objectives, the chosen organizational and management arrangements can be justified as they have demonstrated to be effective in the cease-fire environment in which the Project operated – which is seen as a temporary and transitional phase towards the peace process.

All capacity development activities that have been undertaken by the Project are considered useful, as was also confirmed by the different groups of stakeholders. However, the key issue is that the duration of the Project was too short and the available funding too limited to achieve a high level of social and economic empowerment. The Project was on the right approach and if the Project would have lasted 2 or 3 years longer it is very likely that the Project's interventions could have resulted in significant positive impacts on the economic livelihood situation of the targeted population.

Although the Project has not formalized a specific Gender strategy, the actual approach on the ground showed the Project's commitment towards gender parity. Through training, through discussions, awareness raising activities and knowledge sharing – involving both women and men of the communities – the Project succeeded in engaging women in the decision making processes and the implementation of works. During interviews and meetings held with mixed groups of women and men from among the villages, the VDCs and the Community Contractors, women were found to participate actively, appeared to be well informed about the Project and radiated a lot of confidence.

6. Conclusions, Lessons Learned, Good Practices

The Project has been very relevant and successful in contributing to the Peace Process in the targeted villages. Overall, it has reached the objective of contributing to the recovery from the conflict in the Project's working areas and the empowerment of the conflict affected communities.

With the exception of the construction of a bridge (in which place a school dormitory was constructed), the Project has achieved its intended infrastructure outputs as formulated in the logical framework. The constructed and renovated infrastructure is of a good standard and is functional. The maintenance system that has been established through Village Infrastructure Maintenance Committees appears to be working well. It is too early however to make firm conclusions regarding the long-term sustainability of these village-based maintenance systems.

Considering the very short duration of the Project, its budgetary constraints and the limited TA available, the overall progress of the Project has been impressive. Available resources have been used very efficiently. Because of the resource and time limitations the Project has only been able to make a start with the social and economic empowerment of the targeted communities.

As the Project had not yet conducted an end-line (impact) assessment of its interventions at the time of the evaluation, no data were available to assess the impact. From the evaluation's observations, inspections and meetings, it appears that relatively much progress has been made in terms of social empowerment at village level and the establishment of sound democratic decision-making structures in the Project's targeted villages. The construction of water supply systems, schools, health clinics, footpaths and latrines has also been an important achievement.

In terms of economic empowerment, the Project has started with technical skills training and the transfer of knowledge but much more needs to be done to achieve a level that will allow the villagers to improve their economic livelihoods situation in a substantial way. Again, time and budgetary constraints limited the scope of what could be achieved by the Project and a substantially longer duration of the Project with increase resource allocation would have been preferred.

The Project's approach of focusing initially on social empowerment and on building trust, mutual understanding and confidence among and between the stakeholders was a sensible choice. With the (too) short duration of the Project, this meant however that only a start could be made with capacity building activities directed at economic empowerment, like agricultural training and related support activities. The available time and resources were also too limited to address issues related to the creation of an enabling environment for agriculture development (in particular issues related to access to land) and the improvement of rural road access.

The logical framework that was prepared by the Project includes indicators of success regarding capacity building. These indicators only relate to the number of trainees to be trained among the different groups of stakeholders (in particular the contractors, the VDCs and the villagers). It would have been more useful if performance indicators would have been formulated (and assessed) in relation to the particular targeted skill levels and competencies that the Project aimed for through the provision of capacity building interventions. This would have been more meaningful than using the number of trainees trained as indicators of success.

It would have been useful if the Project had specified in the logical framework the number of working days of work that the Project aimed to create for the local population through the construction activities, including sex-disaggregated targets. As this was not done, it was not possible to assess the Project's achievements in this area.

In the context of the cease-fire situation that exists, the chosen organizational set-up of the Project was justified and valid. By having included all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and management, mutual trust and understanding was built and this is seen as one of the key achievements of the Project. It would however have been useful if more support could have been provided to the KBPPWG/PRF and the PIT in further strengthening their Project management and contract management capacities.

Likewise more training of the Community Contractors on various tendering and contract implementation aspects would have been useful. If resources would have been available for the preparation of appropriate training materials on the various subjects that were covered by the Project's capacity building activities, reference materials for future use would have been available.

For reasons of transparency it is recommended that in similar future follow-up projects more attention is given to the development and formalization of comprehensive systems and procedures for RPF regarding the financial and contract management of the funds under the Implementation Agreement and the Service Contracts – including procedures related to financial liability and liquidated damages.

Various decent work aspects could also have been included in the Service Contracts to provide a more structured and formalized framework for the implementation of decent work standards and the implementation of the gender strategy. Considering the limited knowledge available among the local implementing partners and stakeholders, a strengthened formal role of the ILO TA in terms of quality control and approvals for payments would have been preferred. On the ground, good financial management and quality control practices were observed and these have resulted for value-for-money. These were however not sufficiently formalized through comprehensive procedures.

Concluding, the evaluation found that the Project has – within its resource and time limitations – been very successful at village level in building trust between NMSP and the targeted village communities and in contributing to the peace process at local level. Much remains to be done however to reach a momentum at village level that can be self-sustained.

Important interventions at village level that need to be addressed relate to technical skills training and support, in particular in relation to agricultural development, and the training of local contractors and construction labourers. Another important development constraint that needs to be addressed is the improvement of rural road access. This would also have to include the establishment of a sustainable and effective system for the maintenance of the road.

In terms of agricultural development, it is of essence that a dialogue with the NMSP and other stakeholders is initiated in relation to the conditions of access/ownership to land by the villagers. Apart from agricultural training, financial support will also be required to help the farmers to start-up agricultural activities.

If above activities are not pursued, it will be very difficult for the villagers to reach a level of empowerment that can be sustained by them.

7. Recommendations

Following the findings from the evaluation, the following recommendations are made:

1. To ensure that the initial momentum that has been achieved by the Project will result in a level of economic empowerment at village level that will substantially improve the livelihood situation of the villagers and can be sustained by the villagers, a follow-up project is strongly recommended. A main focus of a follow-up project needs to be on economic empowerment – in particular on agricultural skills and development, on resolving issues related to access to land, and on improving rural road access;
2. The followed approach and structure of the Project has been effective and successful, and it is recommended to advocate for an extension of the Project in the 9 villages where it was implemented following the same implementation model, and an expansion to other conflict-affected areas. Follow-up activities in the 9 villages should have a strong focus on economic empowerment (including issues related to road access, access to land and agricultural training and support). Advocacy activities among senior decision-makers at national level are also recommended to promote the Project's model;
3. Considering the complexity of the Project, the challenging and low-capacity environment in which it operated, and taking into account the ambitious objectives that were formulated, it is recommended that follow-up projects have a longer duration and have more resources allocated for TA, for technical skills development, for strengthening the technical and management capacities of the local implementing partners (KBPPWG, PIT, VDCs, Steering Committee, Village Infrastructure Maintenance Committee and CCs), and for the development of appropriate training materials;
4. For reasons of transparency, follow-up projects would benefit from the development of more comprehensive procedures and systems for financial management, in particular in relation to the financial management and contract management by the NGO(s) contracted by the ILO through an Implementation Agreement (IA) for the implementation of the project(s). A formal role of the ILO TA in recommending expenditures/payments by the NGO(s) under the IA is recommended – in particular with regards to the Service Contracts for infrastructure works awarded by the NGO to the Community Contractors;
5. It is recommended to include decent work aspects in the Service Contracts more comprehensively and allocate resources in these contracts that enable the integration of these aspects. Conditions should also be included in the Service Contracts promoting the participation of women and people with a disability in the work – this would also require the formulation of a gender and social inclusion strategy. Liability issues, including the liabilities of personal harm due to unsafe or sub-standard working conditions or construction work, need to be effectively addressed through the Service Contracts.
6. To increase the effectiveness of the LRB approach, more emphasis should be given to the concept of labour productivity as the basis for the payment of the labourers. More training of contractors is also required, including training on the preparation of bids, understanding technical design drawings, quality control, design standards and specifications, and overall contract management. For the training effective visual training material needs to be developed. A less frequent rotation of the labourers is also recommended to increase productivity of the labourers.
7. To be able to better monitor the intended outcome and the impact, it is recommended that similar future project give more attention to the formulation of SMART outcome indicators and to monitor the outcomes and impacts of the Project. Furthermore, major risks that could prevent the Project from reaching its objectives and outputs should be addressed through the design of the Project and not be left as risks in the logical framework.
8. In a low-capacity environment, like the one in which the Project operated, it is recommended to build in comprehensive and effective financial management- and control procedures that also feature a formal role of the TA in approving/recommending payments for services, goods and works.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation Report

The evaluation shall result in a concise evaluation report detailing:

- The overall and specific performance of the project as assessed in terms of its achievements, including:
 - achievement of outputs and outcomes;
 - relevance and strategic fit of the intervention;
 - validity of intervention design;
 - intervention progress and effectiveness;
 - efficiency of resource use;
 - effectiveness of management arrangements;
 - impact orientation and sustainability of the intervention;
- The assessment shall provide information, such as below, but not limited to;
 - progress made against indicators of achievement;
 - evaluation of the processes applied within the project particularly in terms of the timely delivery of project outcomes;
 - Whether gender parity is properly mainstreamed in the project cycle, from planning to implementation, to monitoring and evaluation;

Management Arrangements, Work Plan and Time Frame

Management and financing arrangements:

This evaluation will be fully financed by the ILO-Mon Peace process support project (MMR/15/02/NOR). The funds will cover the costs of the internal evaluation missions.

Evaluation manager:

Piyamal Pichaiwongse, Deputy Liaison Officer of ILO Liaison Office Myanmar (piyamal@ilo.org) will take the responsibility as Evaluation Manager for this final evaluation of the project, and will develop a TOR in consultation with all concerns and manage the whole evaluation process.
Evaluation team leader reports to the evaluation manager.

Quality assurance:

Regional M&E officer ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok will provide quality control throughout the evaluation process. The final evaluation report will only be considered final when it gets approved by the ILO Evaluation Office.

Administrative and logistic support:

The ILO Project team consisting of the Infrastructure Expert and the National Project Engineer will provide relevant documentations, administrative and logistic support to the evaluation team. The project team will also assist in organizing a detailed evaluation mission agenda, and to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluator. Annex 2 provides a list of relevant documents that will be provided to the Evaluator, not later than a week before the start of the in-country mission.

Roles of other key stakeholders:

All stakeholders particularly those relevant communities, committee, community contractors, New Mon State Party (NMSP), KBPPWG, ILO staff will be consulted throughout the process and will be engaged at different stages during the process.

Work Plan

Key Steps	Deadlines
1. ILO EM drafts and finalizes Terms of Reference (TOR) in consultation with the ILO Project Manager, the stakeholders and the ILO Evaluator.	February 2017
2. Internal Evaluator starts the evaluation assignment. a. Desk-based review of key documents b. In-country mission c. Data analysis and report writing	March 2017
3. A draft internal final evaluation report to be submitted by the Evaluator to the EM. EM to share the draft report with the project stakeholders for comments.	March 2017
4. EM send the consolidates comments to the draft report to the Evaluator and the Evaluator finalizes the report	March 2017
5. The Evaluator sends the final internal evaluation report to the EM. The EM shares the report with the project stakeholders	April 2017

Relevant ILO Evaluation Guidelines and Standard Templates

Guidance note 9 internal evaluation for project

http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_167056/lang--en/index.htm

Template for evaluation summary:

<http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-summary-en.doc>

Annex 2: List of Documents provided and reviewed by the Evaluator

- Project Concept Note
- Progress report August-December 2015
- July 2016 to February 2017 monthly progress reports
- Budget and budget status report December 2016
- Procedures Manual
- Summary of number of Community Meeting Participants and Labour Records of meeting on 20 February 2017
- Implementation Agreement between ILO and Rahmonnya Peace Foundation (RPF)
- Service contract between KBPPWG and Community Contractor of Marau Chai Village
- Work Plan of Mon Pilot Project, Phase II
- Basic information sheets of the 9 project villages
- Logical Framework
- Forms and formats used to capture information about the work site, labour attendance and work tools
- Minutes of meeting with the Norwegian Embassy in Yangon on 22 February 2016
- Job Description Social / Economic Infrastructure Expert
- ILO feasibility report: “A public employment programme (PEP) for Myanmar focusing on local resource-based and community-driven approaches, 2013”.
- ILO draft report: “Social protection assessment based national dialogue: Towards a nationally defined social protection floor in Myanmar”, 2014
- Agreement between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Labour Organization regarding "Support to the Peace Process in Myanmar through an integrated livelihoods approach", MMR/15/02/NOR
- Template contract completion certificate.
- Power point presentation: Experiences of Implementation of PWPs in Myanmar, 2014
- Joint evaluation narrative report, phase I Kroeng Batoi pilot project
- Testing Ceasefires, Building Trust: Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, Operational Review. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014
- Lessons Learned from PSI's work supporting the peace process in Myanmar, The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, Yangon, Myanmar, March 2014
- WATSAN Pilot project phase 1 proposal
- Template public audit summary sheet

Annex 3: Itinerary and List of People and Organizations met

Date	Activity	People met	Notes
05.03.17	Travel BKK-Yangon. Review docs		Overnight stay in Yangon
06.03.17	Meetings at ILO Office Yangon	Piyamal Pichaiwongse Matthew Maguire Sonish Vaidya Aye Min Oo	Overnight stay in Yangon
07.03.17 am	Travel Yangon- Mawlamyine, Mon State		Overnight stay in Mawlamyine
07.03.17 pm	Meeting with NMSP	Mr. Nai Win Hia, Member Executive Committee, Mawlamyine Division	Discussion about roles/responsibilities and decision-making processes in project planning and implementation, assessment of project against its objectives, outcomes and outputs, project achievements and challenges, lessons learned and recommendations for future.
07.03.17 pm	Meeting with SC Chairperson, Secretary and SC Member	Nai Hongsar Bhone Khine (Chairperson) Nai Htaw Rot (Tawoy District officer, NMSP)	
07.03.17 pm	Meeting CSO partners	Nai Seik Chan Oung, MYPO Chan Lawi Marn, MWO Ni Htaw Bee, FPF Ni Pakao Baw, ROF	
07.03.17 pm	Meeting Project Implementation Team	Nai Seik Chan Oung, Coordinator Mi Htaw Bee, Finance officer	
08.03.17 am	Travel Mawlamyine-Ye		Overnight stay in Ye
08.03.17 pm	Courtesy meeting with NMSP-District Liaison Officer	Nai Htaw Rot Nai Tang, Assistant Social Mobilizer Nai Ha Dee, Assistant Social Mobilizer Nai Kyaw, Supervisor	
08.03.17 pm	FGD with 3 female and 8 male Community Contractors (out of total of 20 contractors)	Mi Moe Khine, Tawlawi Mi Tin, Tawlawi Mi Chan Non Dar, Kreng Bai Nai Non, Marau Chai Nai Hla Win, Marau Chai Nai Mon Nyi, Jao Dien Nai Soe Naing, Kroeng Bai Nai Beet, Weang Neat U Win Bo, Kroeng Batoi Nai Ban, Meep Zeep Nai Seik Chan, Meep Zeep	FGD focussed on: - Contribution to the peace process - Challenges encountered - Understanding of work requirements and prior experience - Feedback on provided training - Payment procedures and wages paid - Contracting arrangements and quality control during construction
08.03.17 pm	In-depth discussion with Chairperson and Assistant Cashier of Tawlawi VDC	Nai Pan Nee, chairperson Mi Kong Win, Treasurer	Discussion focussed on: - Usefulness, relevance, sustainability and quality of the received support - Participatory, inclusive and collaborative nature of the project and the decision- making processes - Understanding and appreciation of the functions of the VDC - Feedback on various planning and implementation issues - Lessons learned and recommendations
08.03.17 pm	Meeting with Social Mobilizers of PIT	Nai Halar, Social Mobilizer (SM)	Focus on understanding of roles and responsibilities, challenges, perceived impact of the project in contributing to the peace process.
09.03.17 am	Travel Ye to Project Area		

09.03.17 am and pm	Inspection of infrastructure in villages in project area	Marau Chai Snit Kwee Kroeng Batoi Tawlawi Jao Dein Weang Nai Kroeng Ba Meep Zeep	Concrete footpaths, water supply schemes, clinics, schools
09.03.17 pm	Meeting with villagers and VDC of Snit kwee village (approximately 30 villagers, including some VDC members)	Snit Kwee Village	Discussion about performance, approach and challenges of the project in terms of relevance to the peace process and the improvement of the livelihood situation of the villagers
09.03.17 pm	Travel Project Area to Ye		Overnight stay in Ye
10.03.17	Travel Ye - Yangon		Overnight stay in Yangon
11.03.17	Travel Yangon – BKK		