




International
Labour
Office
Geneva

Independent evaluation of the ILO's strategy for Technical Cooperation 2010–2015



October 2015



EVALUATION
OFFICE

Independent evaluation
of the ILO's strategy for Technical Cooperation
2010–2015

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EVALUATION OFFICE

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ABBREVIATIONS

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping
CO	Country office
DC	Development cooperation
DDG/FOP	Field Operations and Partnerships, ILO
DDG/MR	Management and Reform Portfolio, ILO
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
DWT	Decent Work Technical Support Team
GB	Governing Body
HQ	Headquarters
IFI	International financial institution
ILS	International labour standard
IRIS	Integrated Resource Information System
LDC	Least developed country
MIC	Middle-income country
MoL	Ministry of labour
MULTILATERALS	Multilateral Cooperation Department, ILO
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance
P&B	Programme and budget
PARDEV	Partnerships and Field Support Department, ILO
PROGRAM	Strategic Programming and Management Department, ILO
PSI	Programme support income
RB	Regular budget
RBM	Results-based management
RBSA	Regular budget supplementary account
RO	Regional office

SIDS	Small Island Developing States
TC	Technical cooperation
TOC	Theory of change
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDAP	UN Development Assistance Plan
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
XBTC	Extra-budgetary technical cooperation

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Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the Evaluation Office.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The evaluation of the Technical Cooperation Strategy, 2010–2015, was undertaken with a view to informing the preparation of the forthcoming Development Cooperation Strategy. Following consultations with constituents and senior ILO officials at the inception stage, it was determined that, in order to provide a useful analysis, the team of evaluators would need to evaluate the overall performance of ILO's technical cooperation (TC) in the context of its intended normative and development results.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Relevance

The Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010–2015 appears to be largely an action plan for the implementation of ILO's reforms as they pertain to TC, focusing on internal institutional objectives. It is weak in terms of explicit development-oriented objectives, reducing its value added and relevance as a framework for the implementation of ILO TC during the period in question.

Among member States, ILO's value added is seen to be its relevance to economic growth and transformation, as a source of technical expertise and a repository of knowledge and comparative experience on labour. TC is the principal channel by which member States and constituents access this knowledge and expertise. It is, therefore, critical for the ILO's core standard-setting mandate. The evaluation found that national stakeholders value highly the substantive role of ILO.

Constituents praised ILO's responsiveness to their requests and the access they received to targeted technical advice and support through regular budget (RB) and regular budget supplementary account (RBSA) funds.

Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs) are the main instrument for the implementation of TC. They are developed in consultation with tripartite partners, particularly with governments, and are usually aligned with national development strategies, policies and planning instruments. As employment is fundamental to poverty reduction and development in most countries receiving TC, aspects of the DWCP outcomes were also regularly found to appear in key UN system-wide documents. Recognition of the mandate and value of ILO is consistently high among its constituents and ministries of labour (MoLs), but less so among other ministries. In the countries visited, ILO tended to identify TC projects that directly addressed issues of special concern to women. They may be the transformation of the informal sector as a whole, or labour rights in sectors where women dominate, such as migrant domestic workers in South Asia and countries in the Arabian Gulf, or garment factories in Bangladesh and South-East Asia, or even HIV/AIDS in the workplace in Eastern and Southern Africa.

B. Coherence

The majority of ILO projects reviewed were of less than three years' duration due to the structure of extra-budgetary funding. This limited design coherence, since it is understood that: (a) projects cannot deliver their intended results within the available time; and (b) the achievement of outcomes and impacts largely occurs after the projects' closure. Despite these challenges, the evaluation noted that, in response to donor requirements, programming documents continue to try to define the results of these short-duration projects in terms of national impact.

At countrywide level, DWCPs, United Nations Development Action Frameworks (UNDAFs) and United Nations Development Assistance Plans (UNDAPs) were found to assist in establishing coherence among the projects formulated and implemented by various UN entities. The lowest level of coherence was found in countries that did not have formal ILO representation. Here, project teams tend to run their projects separately, and there is less systematic coherence and coordination.

C. Effectiveness

Among constituents, there is widespread satisfaction with the effectiveness of ILO TC activities. They generally deliver their intended outputs at the expected professional level, reinforcing and complementing work on international labour standards (ILS). However, this perception is tempered by the fact that interventions are often too small to have a national impact, resulting in the need for other stakeholders to implement the changes at scale. However, it is often beyond the limited capacity of ILO country teams to influence larger donors or development banks, particularly where there is no country office (CO).

Overall, DWCPs tend to be conceptual documents, consisting of broad sectoral analyses followed by proposed priorities with outcomes and indicators. In none of the cases reviewed were the DWCPs costed and anchored in budgets. As a result, they are somewhat theoretical and, unless costed, cannot be the basis for realistic results-based management (RBM).

D. Efficiency

Many donors interviewed consider ILO's 13 per cent charge for extra-budgetary technical cooperation (XBTC) support costs to be high and uncompetitive. This figure contrasts negatively with the 5 or 7 per cent support costs charged by several other UN funds and programmes and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the 5 per cent that is rapidly becoming the norm under UNDAPs. However, it is not clear whether the overheads charged by other agencies and NGOs are an accurate or realistic reflection of their administrative costs or whether they include the same elements in their calculations as the ILO when determining support costs.

Several donors reported negative experiences with the efficiency of ILO TC, particularly at start-up, often resulting in project extensions. These were mostly associated with delays in recruitment or procurement. Some ILO TC project personnel, in countries lacking a country representative, were strongly critical of the difficulties they face because of their lack of authority over recruitment, procurement and financial management. This has proved particularly challenging in instances where their managers (based in other offices) are unavailable for long periods of time and have failed to nominate temporary replacements.

There are substantial routine business inefficiencies associated with the practice of giving out-of-country managers onerous portfolios. This results in infrequent or insufficient field missions, particularly with regard to country portfolio and policy development, and results in missed opportunities. It is for programme staff to develop relationships of trust and conduct a sustained policy dialogue under such conditions. Furthermore, some project personnel perform representational and administrative support functions beyond their core responsibilities in countries without country directors, cutting into their core project management responsibilities.

E. Impact

The few impact evaluation reports that exist are insufficient to allow aggregation at global, regional or national levels. With few exceptions, most projects collect information on inputs and outputs, but relatively little on outcomes or impact. Furthermore, ILO still tends to apply a project, rather than programme approach with narrow standards of attribution, thereby tending not to assess the broader impact that would require that other stakeholders' contributions also be taken into account. The evaluation, therefore, concludes that there are currently insufficient data to enable the impact of ILO TC to be evaluated.

F. Sustainability

ILO TC projects were often found to target sustainability through follow-on phases of the same activity, sometimes by scaling them up. This is largely because of the funding requirements of many donors, under which project durations are too short to deliver sustainable results, making a second phase essential. The reliance on second phase funding was observed to face increasing challenges, since traditional donor funding is declining in many countries.

Sustainability is also limited by a narrow understanding of “capacity development” which at the ILO is apparently usually equated with training rather than with a more holistic approach to systems that address institution building, structures, processes and national policy frameworks.

A major approach, which has been used with considerable success, is to ensure a strong focus on national legal, policy and/or strategy changes. Where such focus can be achieved with the assistance of ILO, TC projects can claim a basic element of sustainability, namely, by helping to put improved systems in place.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY

Table 1 provides the overall ratings assigned to ILO TC on the basis of the survey of constituents, donors and staff, and the independent consultant's overall assessment. Figure 1 converts these figures into an average performance score by criterion.

Table 1. Overall ratings by criterion

Criterion	Survey ratings			Independent consultants' ratings	
	Constituents	Donors	ILO staff	Evaluation specialist	Team leader
Relevance	4.65	4.85	4.70	5.00	5.50
Coherence and design	4.65	4.85	4.70	4.00	4.00
Effectiveness	4.46	4.74	4.25	5.00	4.75
Efficiency	4.52	3.95	4.05	3.00	4.00
Sustainability	4.23	4.20	3.93	3.00	3.00
Mean	4.50	4.52	4.33	4.00	4.25

Scale: 6 = Highly satisfactory; 5 = Satisfactory; 4 = Somewhat satisfactory; 3 = Somewhat unsatisfactory; 2 = Unsatisfactory; 1 = Highly unsatisfactory.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

TC serves the important purpose of supporting the implementation of ILSat the country level and is, therefore, mission critical for ILO.

As conditions become more diverse among member States, the shifting nature of demand requires added, diversified and targeted capacity at country and subregional levels. Yet, the ILO is facing contradictory pressures, forcing it to cope with zero real growth of its RB. While this can be partially offset through the re-allocation and realignment of capacity closer to the country level, the more radical reforms already initiated to change the staffing imbalance between headquarters (HQ) and the field will need to be further enhanced.

Bringing the Organization closer to the field is of vital importance in raising the effectiveness of its TC. Locating representational and specialized technical capacity appropriately is, therefore, a high priority. At the same time, with the expansion of inter-country trade and moves towards economic integration, the relevance of ILO's mandate to many of the objectives of subregional and regional organs and institutions has increased. Consequently, ILO must enhance the way it engages in policy dialogue with these bodies. Consideration may need to be given to re-profiling field office structures in the context of regional integration processes in coordination with other UN agencies if it is to strengthen its participation in joint UN programming.

With respect to programme design, the common understanding of “capacity development” at ILO should be replaced by a more holistic and current approach. This should address all human and financial resources, processes and systems requirements as well as the national policy framework the target institutions need to function effectively. A failure to update the approach in this area will compromise the sustainability of TC results.

The ILO needs to be more proactive in resource mobilization, focusing at the country level and moving beyond traditional sources of Official Development Assistance (ODA). A dependable and steady stream of resources for TC can only be achieved through the location of resource capacity close to the country level and the implementation of country-specific resource mobilization strategies. Centrally funded flagship programmes that provide a certain dependability and continuity of funding beyond the basic biennial or annual funding cycles could also play an important role. The use of programme support income (PSI) should be more transparent and support project implementation as well as capacity for resource mobilization, marketing and communications, particularly when there are troughs in programme funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The forthcoming Development Cooperation Strategy should be outward looking and focus on development objectives that implement ILO's ILS, emphasizing results at the level of outcomes and impacts. It should include a realistically costed and budgeted action plan for creating the capacity required in the field to further raise the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of TC. Mainstreaming gender issues alone is not sufficient, and the strategy should continue to promote the current practice of having major projects target issues affecting women workers and employers. Notwithstanding the fact that the RB is being undertaken in a zero growth environment, these resources should be viewed as an investment that can both raise effectiveness and access to XBTC resources.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	High	Ongoing	Medium

Recommendation 2: ILO should carefully assess how it can best meet the development cooperation (DC) priorities of different categories of countries based on demand and how to structure the expertise to support clusters with similar development conditions. The current practice of placing gender specialists in Decent Work Teams (DWTs) should continue irrespective of the country category and state of development, as it is apparent that gender issues in the labour market remain a major area of concern irrespective of country category. The distribution and coverage of country, multi-country, DWT and regional offices

(ROs) should be rationalized taking into account technical and administrative support requirements as well as the structure and location of other key partners and stakeholders.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP – DDG/MR, PROGRAM, REGIONS	High	Ongoing	Medium

Recommendation 3: ILO should continue to deepen the use of decent work as the core of its brand, building on the expected inclusion of the concept under the new sustainable development goal (SDG 8). In this respect, the use of annual flagship publications envisaged under the Director-General’s reform commitment linked to clear communications strategies should also be implemented without delay. More research and publications should emphasize the evidence of the socio-economic impact of specific national legislation, policies and strategies with a view to supporting the implementation of ILO’s ILS.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/P, DDG/FOP, MULTILATERALS, RESEARCH	Medium	Ongoing	Low

Recommendation 4: To maximize ownership and sustainability, the principle emphasis of ILO’s DC should be on national programmes. Regional programmes should ideally be applied only where they address cross-border issues. Capacity development should ensure that essential systems and processes are implemented and institutionalized to guarantee the continuation of activities once the ILO exits, including capacity for ex-post monitoring and evaluation to assess and record the developmental impact of DC.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV, PROGRAM, EVAL	Medium	Ongoing Should be incorporated into new DC Strategy	Medium

Recommendation 5: In order to achieve scale for impact, the ILO should actively mobilize resources at country level, moving beyond traditional ODA to government resources, international financial institutions (IFIs), the private sector and related combinations in a way that does not compromise its independence or perspective. The commitment of national resources to complement ILO’s funds and ensure sustainability should be a prerequisite for project approval.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 6: Despite the current constraints on funding, the ILO should find ways to invest in “country managers” in non-resident member States with large TC portfolios with a view to engaging in sustained policy dialogue with constituents to support resource mobilization and achieve scale in its programme.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
PROGRAM	High	Medium-term	Medium

Recommendation 7: In fragile states and those emerging from conflict, project personnel may be “embedded” in ministries, and workers’ and employers’ organizations with a view to serving as mentors, trainers and technical advisers to accelerate implementation, and the development of national capacity where it is particularly low. However, all such instances should be accompanied by a clear exit strategy.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	Medium	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 8: In all countries, clear analysis of the country situation and priorities contained in UNDAFs/UNDAPs should precede the design and implementation of DWCPs, ensuring linkages and mutual reinforcement between activities and United Nations (UN) bodies. Project documents should be less aspirational and incorporate realistic budgets, counterpart contributions and exit strategies. The transition from project to programme design should be conceptualized in terms of national development rather than project framework.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/P – DDG/FOP, PARDEV, PROGRAM	Medium	Medium-term	Low

Recommendation 9: ILO must urgently address the perception that its support costs are higher than those of other agencies. A dedicated study to review actual administrative and technical support costs by ILO, benchmarked against other agencies of the UN system, NGOs and bilateral agencies should be undertaken. This could be incorporated into the recently commissioned business process review. PSI should be used closer to where it is generated and should cover: (i) capacity to monitor and report on projects and programme implementation to donors and for accountability purposes; (ii) advocacy, communication and mobilization of resources; and (iii) financial and administrative management of resources, and of the project that has generated the resources. PSI should also be allocated as early as possible for sound planning purposes.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, DDG/FOP, DDG/P, FINANCE, PROGRAM, PARDEV	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 10: ILO must make a concerted effort to reduce time lags in project start-up. Consideration should be given to establishing a pool of pre-screened project personnel who can be tapped quickly without extensive re-interviewing. Overall, ILO needs to distribute sufficient authority to each level of the system to achieve its objectives, whilst ensuring clear accountability.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, DDG/FOP, HRD, PARDEV, PROGRAM	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 11: With regard to administrative and financial management, the rollout of the Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) to all COs and projects should be accelerated. At the same time, the level of budget authorization available at CO level should be raised to reduce the amount of procurement and recruitment activities needing to be referred back to ROs or HQ.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, FINANCE, INFOTEC	High	Ongoing	High

Recommendation 12: While resources for global and inter-country projects and programmes should continue to be mobilized by the Partnerships and Field Support Department (PARDEV) HQ and ROs, it is strongly recommended that some of its capacity should be out-posted. This should create resource mobilization and monitoring units uniformly across ROs or COs with a mandate to support mobilization at country level.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, DDG/MR, PARDEV, PROGRAM, REGIONS	Medium	Short- to medium-term	Medium

Recommendation 13: ILO should enhance its approach to building communities of practice around priority issues in different categories of countries to enhance knowledge management. They should aim to transcend regions, going global across the Organization. The institutional objective should be to move the Office from being a hierarchical Organization to a much flatter, network-based knowledge exchange built around ILO's mission critical concerns.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG-P, RESEARCH, REGIONS	Medium	Medium	Medium

Recommendation 14: ILO's staff mobility policy should be rolled out providing strong professional and financial incentives linked to the number of field positions staff members have served in as well as their performance, with senior staff positions being filled by staff with extensive field experience. In order to compete for the best national staff, ILO should reconsider its policy of limiting the maximum grade of national officers to the NO-B level. Top-performing national professional officers should be considered through appropriate mechanisms for long-term assignments as international staff and for short-term developmental opportunities.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, HRD	High	Medium-term	Medium

1. PURPOSE, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation was requested by the Governing Body (GB) of ILO and commissioned by ILO's Independent Evaluation Office (EVAL) with the following main objectives:

- To evaluate ILO's technical cooperation and performance in implementing the result-based Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 against the intended goals articulated in the 2008 Declaration;
- To inform the positioning and design of the revised Strategy for 2015–17 to be reviewed and adopted at the 325th Session of the ILO's Governing Body in November 2015;
- To fulfil ILO/EVAL's responsibilities with respect to independent reporting and accountability to its Governing Body, donors and national constituents/partners;
- To facilitate and provide a basis for organizational learning and the continuing improvement of ILO's management and technical work; and
- To record and to raise the visibility of ILO's contribution to sustainable improvements at the country, regional and global levels.

The principal client for this evaluation is the ILO's GB. ILO's own management and staff is also a significant client and the evaluation team's independent findings and recommendations have been presented in a manner to facilitate follow-up.

The outcomes of the ILO technical cooperation (TC) strategy can be divided into two clusters: (i) three organizational/institutional outcomes; and (ii) 19 developmental outcomes.

The **organizational/institutional outcomes** are defined as follows:


- *Outcome 1: Resources* – ILO extra-budgetary and RBSA resources are aligned with Decent Work Country Programme and programme and budget outcomes;
- *Outcome 2: Results-based management* – ILO TC programmes and projects fully meet results-based management and ILO quality requirements; and
- *Outcome 3: Institutional capacity of constituents* – Through technical cooperation, ILO constituents attain technical and institutional capacity to successfully engage in development planning through Decent Work Country Programmes, in the context of UNDAFs and UN reform.

Intended as an evaluation of the ILO's *Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010–2015* with a view to informing the preparation of the forthcoming strategy (Strategy for Development Cooperation 2016–2020), it was determined that in order to provide a useful analysis, the team of evaluators would need to go beyond

the TC strategy and evaluate the overall performance of ILO TC in the context of its intended normative and development results. Nevertheless case studies of the TC strategy and the draft development cooperation (DC) strategy were prepared to inform the evaluation.¹

In terms of the alignment of programming instruments (mentioned in organizational outcome (1), it is understood that the various planning and programming instruments related are illustrated in figure 1 below.

Figure 1.1 Instruments applied in ILO's results-based programming (RBM)



(Adapted from ILO, *Applying Results-Based Management in the International Labour Organization: A Guidebook*, Version 2, ILO, June 2011)

1.2 PREMISES AND ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNDERPIN THE EVALUATION


In line with the Director-General's directives geared to working across internal institutional divisions, this evaluation included both direct advisory services and studies undertaken by headquarters (HQ) technical staff and decent work technical support teams (DWTs) funded from the regular budget (RB) as well as more project- and programme-based, capacity-building activities within its definition of TC.

ILO's core mission lies in its international labour standard (ILS) setting mandate. The development negotiation, monitoring and enforcement function of these standards embodied in Conventions and Protocols are implemented at national and regional (inter-country), and global levels.

One of the main functions of TC is to promote and support the implementation of ILS in line with the agreements with member States, to provide evidence-based demonstration of the impact of their implementation, and to promote decent work and rights-based development.

¹ The case studies: "Evaluative Assessment of the TC Strategy 2010–15, May 2015" and "Observations on DC Strategy 2015–17 Supplementary note for the evaluation of TC Strategy 2010–15, June 2015" are available upon request from EVAL.

Figure 1.2 Trends in international financial flows, 1990–2012 (US\$)



Source: OECD, UNDESA/OESC/DCPB, World Bank, UNCTAD and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) FDI (World Bank) to and Illicit Flows (GFI), which is available for only 2001–2011, is out of developing countries.

Because it is normative, ILO's mandate is universal applying to both developed and developing countries. The development context of ILO's member States has become increasingly diversified over the past two decades as development has taken place at a varied pace in different parts of the world. In order to maximize its relevance, the ILO needs to position itself differently depending on the development situation and challenges facing each country.

The diversification of development contexts manifests itself in many ways and the challenges facing countries vary between the categories identified, namely, advanced economies, emerging national economies, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, the People's Republic of China and South Africa), medium-income countries (MICs), small island developing states (SIDS), least developed countries (LDCs), and fragile States. This diversification is manifest also in the range of resources available for development. Generally speaking, while it remains of considerable significance in many fragile states, traditional official development assistance (ODA) has become a very minor portion of the resources available for development (figure 1). With globalization and increased trade as well as the development of stock exchanges and capital markets in many developing countries, foreign and domestic private investment and domestic government resources now constitute the most significant sources of development funding. In 2013, the proportion of ODA channelled through the United Nations (UN) to developing countries was as low as 2 per cent.² As part of its reforms, the ILO has, therefore, initiated TC programmes with non-traditional sources of funding, which are also covered in this evaluation. These include South-South and triangular TC where funds and resources are shared and exchanged between participating countries, domestically funded programmes in association with international financial institution (IFI) loans and public-private

² Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics.

partnerships (PPPs). The evaluation has sought to learn from the relatively limited experience gained so far with these new modalities and patterns of technical cooperation that are intended to tap:

- private sources of funding;
- government budgets including from development bank loans;
- new partnerships with nongovernmental institutions; and
- partnerships with other UN agencies.

The evaluation covers a period of intensive reform at the ILO. It has therefore sought to evaluate the extent to which TC has aligned itself with the Director-General's reform commitments and has supported them. The following are some of the most significant reforms, which the evaluation has taken into account:

- The alignment of all ILO programmes (including TC) with its core normative mandates.
- The continued development and refinement of ILO's RBM including a transition to greater focus and fewer outcomes.
- The promotion of cross-functional collaboration and the breaking down of internal institutional barriers or "silos" with a view to ensuring more holistic planning.
- The development and introduction of key programming and management processes that are cross departmental and require multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral collaboration.
- The decentralization of many of the Organization's functions to regional and country levels, including the relocation of technical and management capabilities, and the implications of these changes on the way in which TC is programmed, formulated, monitored and managed, and the consequent introduction of new mechanisms and methods of work. The effects of these changes on the relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of TC is evaluated. In this respect the management of programme support income (PSI) and the deployment of ILO's technical and administrative capacities, and the implications for performance and alignment with core mandates are also assessed.
- The introduction of new human resources policies that are intended, in conjunction with the decentralization policy, to ensure that ILO TC is more efficiently and effectively delivered closer to its intended beneficiaries.
- The UN reforms with particular reference to the introduction of integrated UN peacekeeping operations in post-conflict settings where a political or peacekeeping mandate for the UN exists, the continuing development of the UNDAF and UN joint programming in the context of "One U.N." and the newer "Delivering as One" initiatives.

Since a recent review in 2013, the Office has also stated its intention to move towards fewer, larger programmes. The Office currently recognizes the existence of five flagship programmes³ each of which are "supportive of relevant elements of the evolving post-2015 agenda" as follows:

- The ILO/IFC Better Work Programme;
- The International Programme on the Elimination of the Child Labour (IPEC) – grounded in the ILO's two child labour conventions (Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) and Worst Forms of Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182);
- Social protection floors (SPF) – based on the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202);
- Occupational safety and health (OSH);
- Jobs for peace and resilience.

The evaluation sought to assess the value added and effectiveness of these flagships as a preferred modality.

³ Director-General's internal Minute of 13 February, 2015.


1.3 METHODOLOGY

Evaluation criteria

The evaluation team assessed ILO TC according to ILO’s evaluation policy, which builds on the standard OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria defined as follows:

- **Relevance:** The extent to which ILO TC addresses high priority issues of a national or regional nature with strong national ownership and potential for high development impact. In country case studies the evaluation also assessed ILO’s positioning in relation to the constituents, government and partners, and the underlying rationale for it. Relevance was also defined in terms of the alignment of TC activities with ILO’s core mandate, and the extent to which they serve as a mechanism for the application of ILO’s mission critical ILS and the extent to which they address gender issues.
- **Coherence and validity of design:** Policy and programmatic coherence among different ILO programmes within the same country as well as an assessment of the extent to which the original design of programmes is appropriate and realistically resourced to produce intended results. The evaluation assessed the way in which gender issues are integrated into overall TC strategies as well as project and programme design. The evaluation also assessed how the ILO ensures programme quality and delivers technical and administrative support to its TC programmes, as well as the support provided by different parts of the Office and their contribution to the effectiveness of ILO TC. The latter will include their role in resource mobilization, the management of partnerships and coordination in addition to the quality of technical support.
- **Effectiveness:** The extent to which programmes achieve intended and specified immediate outcomes and contribute to developmental impact. In most instances, because of the lag time involved in registering development impact, it is understood that this needs to be monitored beyond the limited period of external funding and support. As such, it also constitutes an issue reviewed in the context of the sustainability of project results (see figure 3 below).

Figure 1.3 Calculating efficiency and effectiveness



- **Sustainability:** The degree to which the benefits of a programme continue to be felt beyond the cycle of ILO TC. With respect to capacity building, the extent to which the institutions supported can continue to perform their mandated functions beyond the end of TC.
- **Efficiency:** The extent to which ILO programmes are implemented in a timely manner, the administrative and transaction costs are reasonable and in line with those of other agencies and partners, and inputs are transformed into outputs and outcomes cost-effectively. In this respect, the evaluation team evaluated the efficiency with which the ILO delivers technical and administrative support to its TC programmes in the field.

ILO is required to address gender issues in all of the thematic areas on which it focuses. The evaluation has, therefore, evaluated the extent and way in which gender concerns have been addressed in DWCPs and through TC projects. The evaluation also reviewed management issues insofar as they impact on ILO TC in the field.

Phasing of the evaluation and deliverables

There were three main phases for this evaluation which consisted of: (i) the inception phase; (ii) country case study, documentary analyses and survey phase; and (iii) final analysis, consultation and report writing.

Table 1.1 Principal activities under each phase of the evaluation

i. Inception phase	ii. Country case study phase	iii. Report preparation and debrief
Collection of documents/data	Preparation of country visits	Further data review and analysis
Desk review	Preparation of interview guides	Team consultations (phone)
HQ interviews	Preparation of survey questionnaire	Report drafting
Re-scoping/internal consultation	Implementation of survey	Preparation of PowerPoint debrief
Revision of workplan	Survey compilation and analysis	Internal ILO review of draft report
Preparation of inception report	Country visits «Light»	Finalization of report and submission
Revision of contracts	Country visits Case study summaries prepared	

Evaluation techniques and data collection methods

This evaluation was evidence-based building on data and information collected by the ILO during the implementation of its programmes. It was undertaken using standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and built on the approach presented in ILO EVAL's high-level evaluation (HLE) protocols for outcome strategies.⁴ The evaluation used secondary data sources as well as substantial original surveys and carefully structured and selected sets of country case studies. Data derived from different methods and sources were triangulated to ensure consistency and reliability. A six-point rating scale, ranging from “very unsatisfactory” to “very satisfactory”, was applied to complement the evaluation findings.

The evaluation also used evaluative information contained in past independent projects and thematic outcome evaluations as well as progress reports and internal evaluations. These documents and sources are cited in the analysis contained in the main report. Information gathered from secondary sources was verified through direct evaluation techniques especially individual and group interviews, a thorough re-

⁴ *Protocol 1: High-level evaluation protocol for strategy and policy evaluation*, ILO Evaluation Office, www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_215858/lang--en/index.htm [9 Oct. 2015].

view of data, a review of programme monitoring records, outputs of projects and a review of reports, plans and legislation produced with ILO technical support.

Triangulation was applied as a technique throughout the evaluation to verify information and conclusions drawn from earlier evaluations or internal assessments and from interviews.

The main techniques used were as follows:

- **Semi-structured ‘insider’ stakeholder interviews:** Individual interviews with relevant ILO staff including senior management and relevant operational and policy units. Interviews with representatives of government, and employers’ and workers’ organizations directly involved in the implementation of ILO supported TC programmes. Interviews with donor agency staff directly involved in channeling resources through ILO for these programmes. Interviews with sub-contractors involved with the implementation of the projects.
- **Semi-structured “outsider” stakeholder interviews:** Interviews with multilateral and bilateral partners that collaborate or coordinate with ILO or work in similar sectors, but in parallel with ILO as well as other partners who either work in similar sectors and on similar issues, but do so in parallel and as far as is possible; observers and analysts of relevant sectors such as academics and editors or journalists from national media organizations.
- **Focus group:** The evaluation team used the occasion of the regional directors’ meeting convened with subregional directors, country directors and heads of DWTs in the ILO Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean, Lima, to discuss issues related to the evaluation criteria.
- **Field visits:** A sample of country case studies was made as described below under “Sampling of country cases”.
- **Field visits “Light”:** As a means of extending its coverage, this evaluation piggy backed on other ongoing evaluations. Team members of these evaluations were asked to allocate additional time to interview some relevant stakeholders. An interview guide was prepared and given to a focal point in each mission.
- **Survey:** An electronic global survey, administered using “Survey Monkey” was undertaken to broaden coverage and seek feedback from a much wider array of respondents. The survey targeted ILO staff worldwide, relevant government departments, members of employers’ associations, and members of workers groups and trade unions, donors and ILO staff worldwide.
- **Review of documentation:** The evaluation team reviewed a large selection of key documentation generated by ILO staff and partners to assess relevance, the benchmarking of ILO’s own programmes against those of other agencies of relevance, and the results of the programmes themselves, and to analyse development trends and the contributions made by ILO to the changes recorded.

Sampling of country cases

For the purpose of this evaluation, and using categories generally used by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the ILO TC universe was divided into the following country groupings:

- advanced economies
- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS);
- middle-income countries (MICs);
- Small Island Developing States (SIDS);
- least developed countries (LDCs); and
- states that demonstrate political, institutional or economic fragility.

The category of “states with fragility” was said to apply to those countries which had either recently emerged from a protracted period of armed conflict or those with exceptionally weak institutions that are showing signs of deterioration. It is understood that countries may move between categories and may, in fact, manifest characteristics of more than one category at any given point in time.

Within these typologies, the evaluation team selected countries that had relatively large programme portfolios, included a variety of different management arrangements (e.g. with and without country directors, with and without DWTs, etc.), and had different coordination arrangements with other UN partners (traditional UNCT, One UN and Delivering as One). In order to maximize coverage, the evaluation mounted its own missions to a number of countries, but also requested senior EVAL staff visiting other countries on other independent evaluations being undertaken simultaneously to seek answers to key evaluative questions on its behalf (see table 2).

Table 1.2 Country case studies and rationale for selection

Region/country	Country type ¹	TC portfolio size ² US\$ (est.)	ILO CO (Y/N)	UN partnership	Type of mission
Greece	Advanced economy	407 416	No (has a Senior Liaison Officer)		Limited desk study
India	BRIC	22 109 710	Yes	UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission
South Africa	BRIC	41 711 932	Yes	UNDAF with ILO component	Add-on to independent evaluation on labour inspection
Albania	MIC	7 387 372	No (has a National Coordinator)	One UN (Joint Programmes) UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission
Colombia	MIC	18 386 660	No	UNDAF with ILO component	Add-on to independent evaluation on labour inspection.
Egypt	MIC	33 590 278	Yes	UNDAF with ILO component/ JP	Full mission
Kenya	MIC	15 994 715	No	One UN UNDAF with ILO component/ JP	Full mission covering Kenya and Somalia
Peru	MIC	5 153 603	Yes	JP UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission. Includes participation in meeting with country and DWT directors
Bangladesh	LDC	64 419 633	Yes	UNDAF with ILO component/ JP	Full mission
Cambodia	LDC	24 342 682	No (National Coordinator)	UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission
Tanzania, United Republic of	LDC	35 495 436	Yes	One UN JP/ ILO leads YE UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission
Timor-Leste	Fragile	75 024 042	No.	UNDAF with ILO component	Full mission
Somalia	Fragility	28 908 482	No (CTA)	UNDAF with ILO component/ JP	To be covered during Kenya mission

¹ The basic typology considered for sampling includes LDCs, MICs, SIDS, high-income countries (HICs), countries with fragile situations, and BRICS. Apart from these, regional representation, CO presence and TC portfolio are also being considered. It is understood that countries can show multiple characteristics, for instance SIDS in fragile situations.

² The figures denote total XBTC as on 20 March 2015 (agreement end date during or after 2010).

Notes: CTA = Chief Technical Adviser; UNDAF = UN Development Assistance Framework; YE= Youth Employment.

Limitations of the methodology

There were four principal limitations:

- **Time:** Each country case study was conducted over a period of three to five working days, limiting the number of interviews that could be conducted and the primary data that could be collected. Due to this time scale, in several instances, key respondents were travelling or otherwise unavailable. The shortness of the country visits also limited the amount of time that could be devoted to travel beyond the capital.
- **Monitoring data:** In many cases, monitoring data pertaining to outcomes and impact were not being collected by project staff, limiting the recording of financial information, inputs, activities and outputs in monitoring systems.
- **Aggregate data:** Such data are not currently disaggregated according to country typology, as the categories identified for this evaluation are not institutionalized at the ILO. The Organization generally tends to collect, collate and analyse data on a national, subregional, regional or global basis.
- **Survey response rate:** The surveys were issued to all staff and tripartite partners, not a randomized sample. The sample, therefore, consisted of those who volunteered to respond. Because the sample was ultimately based on those who self-selected for participation rather than a probability sample, it was not possible to estimate margins of error. Furthermore, the data have not been weighted to reflect the demographic composition of each target population.

2. Major findings

2.1 RELEVANCE

The 2010–2015 Technical Cooperation Strategy⁵

ILO staff responding to the survey administered by EVAL, rated the TC strategy at 4.0, or “somewhat satisfactory”. However, it is difficult to conclude that the Technical Cooperation Strategy for 2010–2015 is indeed a full-fledged strategy for ILO TC. It appears rather to be an action plan for the implementation of ILO’s own reforms as they pertain to TC and does not contain any substantive goals or objectives pertaining to ILO’s core mission, which are contained in other documents such as DWCPs, country programme outcomes (CPOs) and programme and budget (P&B) strategies. The strategy focuses on internal institutional objectives. Each of the strategies’ stated outcomes has to do with ILO’s own operational objectives:

- **Outcome one** sets a target for the alignment of ILO Extra-budgetary Technical Cooperation (XBTC) and Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) resources with DWCP and P&B outcomes;
- **Outcome two** states that all TC is to become truly results-based; and
- **Outcome three** aims to create sufficient capacity within ILO’s constituents so that they can benefit from new UN planning and programming mechanisms, such as UNDAF and UNDAF, while applying the principles of decent work.

All three are geared to ILO’s own objectives and meet the reporting requirements of the GB and International Labour Conference (ILC) rather than setting development-oriented objectives that are rights based in accordance with ILO’s core mandate and mission. As such, the strategy has very little direct relevance to the definition of goals or objectives for country-level field operations, which focus on programme implementation and results. Perhaps as a consequence, it was found that relatively few staff, constituents or funding partners at the country level were aware of its contents or indeed, even of its existence.

Positioning

ILO’s value added is seen to be its technical expertise and the fact that it is a repository of knowledge and comparative experience. To remain competitive as more organizations enter sectors within the core competencies of ILO, the Office will need to hone its ability to effectively manage this knowledge and facilitate access to it by applying technology, and new and innovative mechanisms and processes. TC is the principal channel for member States and the constituents to access this repository of knowledge and apply it in the implementation of ILS in accordance with the Conventions’ other legal instruments

⁵ The case studies: “Evaluative Assessment of the TC Strategy 2010–15, May 2015” and “Observations on DC Strategy 2015–17 – Supplementary note for the evaluation of TC Strategy 2010–15, June 2015” are available upon request from EVAL.

to which they are signatories. As such, TC remains mission critical for the implementation of ILO's core ILS-setting mandate.

The technical competence and substantive value added by ILO staff and experts were highly appreciated amongst all categories interviewed, including government, and employers' and workers' organizations, donors and agency partners. Generally, national stakeholders valued the potential substantive role of ILO more highly than that of other multilateral and bilateral agencies working in similar sectors including the international financial institutions (IFIs). A principal concern lies with the low volume of funding of ILO TC activities that was found to prevent adequate scaling up and replication, particularly of pilot programmes. Despite the limited number of technical staff in the field and their substantial country case loads, governments and constituents did not have any complaints about the ability of ILO to respond to their requests for technical support. In this respect ILO staff were more self-critical than their clients.

According to the donors interviewed and survey respondents,⁶ ILO's standard-setting role and mandate, its tripartite constituency and its technical expertise are its key comparative advantages. Donors also rated ILO very highly on its role in the implementation of ILS through its TC.

In the survey, constituents rated the overall relevance of ILO TC at 4.7 out of a maximum score of 6 or somewhere between "somewhat satisfactory" (4), and "satisfactory" (5). Based on the interviews, it would appear that this is at least in part due to the fact that high priorities as perceived by constituents are too numerous to be addressed with ILO's limited TC resources. ILO's degree of focus on implementing ILS was seen to be "satisfactory" with a score of 4.9 out of 6.

The concept of decent work appears to have achieved widespread acceptance, with all of the countries included as case studies having active DWCPs in place. The majority of ILO projects are conceptualized and placed within the framework of a DWCP. This implies wide acceptance of decent work and rights-based programming, and their adoption by governments and constituents alike as a central tenet of ILO's programmes. This acceptance is also reflected in DWTs at subregional or regional levels. The emphasis on rights-based programming is generally reflected in TC programmes, DWCPs and UNDAFs, and in P&B documents.

DWCPs are discussed with tripartite partners, particularly with governments. During this process, they are characteristically aligned with national development strategies, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), where applicable, labour policies and other key planning instruments. Since employment is a fundamental aspect of poverty reduction and development in most countries receiving TC, aspects of the DWCP outcomes were also regularly found to appear in UNDAFs. This does not, however, always predict ILO TC engagement since some UNDAF's include TC projects delivering DWCP outcomes, in which ILO is a minor, or even non-participant, while other bodies (often UNDP) implement them.

In some countries, a proportion of TC projects fall outside the DWCP priorities. These are often donor-funded and therefore correspond with agreements between the donor and the respective government. Whilst their relevance to the country is clearly demonstrated by these agreements, they may not be specifically relevant to the core ILO country programme. In other instances, the activities constitute country-specific components of regional or subregional projects that have not necessarily been designed and approved with the participation of national constituents or the government. Even though these projects/programmes may be outside the DWCP or other programme frameworks, such as the UNDAF or UNDAF, they do generally fall within ILO's core mandate and mission, and remain appropriate and relevant.

In BRICS and MICs, the ILO is addressing the areas of highest priority: (i) formalizing and ensuring rights in the informal or unorganized sector; (ii) aligning skills development and skills development strategies with changing demand; (iii) reforming labour laws and developing national strategies in connection

⁶ Although survey response numbers were not statistically significant, they provide a useful source of qualitative evidence when triangulated with other data.

with a shift towards the liberalization of the economy; (iv) increasing labour rights in connection with globalization and labour mobility; and (v) developing mechanisms and institutions for social protection.

In MICs and BRICs, one of the most pressing and complex problems is making real inroads into the formalization of the labour market in the face of ongoing globalization, liberalization and a campaign to promote foreign and domestic investment. For this effort, there is a need to have a clear theory of change (TOC) to move large numbers of people from the informal to the formal sector and understand how TC can be used effectively for the purpose without derailing national efforts to enhance economic growth and liberalization.

It was noted that, in a number of the MIC and BRIC countries visited, a rush to the liberalization of the economy on the part of the government has created tension, friction and sometimes confrontation between governments and social partners. Across all country categories, it was noted that ILO's country offices (COs) or subregional offices tended to address capacity building and policy development issues with the government and other constituents in parallel rather than using its convening mandate to bring parties together in a broader dialogue. In such cases, while assistance remains relevant, it is not addressing the most critical issues, which could be regarded as transformational in terms of the inter-relationships, in particular between workers' organizations and the government.

It was also noted that in many MICs and BRICs, space for workers' organizations that had flourished in the first decade of this century, showed signs of narrowing or becoming somewhat restricted. The same was also true in the wake of the Arab Spring where civil society organizations, which were given an opportunity to flourish were suddenly being restricted, creating dilemmas for ongoing ILO TC projects that were geared to working with new as well as old institutions. In general, and in line with ILO's core mandate, the TC projects continued to attempt to work with and build the capacity with as wide a range of relevant institutions as possible despite the friction sometimes generated.

Visibility and branding

Recognition of the mandate and value of ILO is consistently high among its constituents and its direct counterpart or nodal ministries. However, awareness of ILO and its programmes is considerably less among other ministries even in instances in which they are directly involved with ILO projects (e.g. ministries of finance with projects on social security).

Decent work serves as the basis for a clear niche for ILO and is a potential focus for its own branding, but more needs to be done to raise awareness of the concept, which is largely restricted to its constituents. It could be more widely publicized along with ILO's programmes and studies supporting the diffusion of decent work. In this respect, the proposed Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG-8), which incorporates the concept, would present a major opportunity for a concerted effort to raise awareness of ILO's mandate and role.

Perhaps paradoxically, given the relatively large financial portfolio of some 'One UN' programme frameworks, in countries where there is an UNDP, ILO's visibility and brand recognition appears to be lower than in countries in which ILO's programmes are undertaken independently. There is some reason to believe that the concept is diluted when placed in the context of UN programming frameworks with a variety of other agencies' mandates vying for recognition. With the large number of UN agencies, funds and programmes involved, the ILO's brand appears to be lost within the broader UN presence. The best known and recognized agencies in such situations are the ones that dedicate resources to active communications and public information.

ILO's visibility in countries where it has fully fledged representation and a CO, and where it is able to sustain a continuous dialogue with policy-makers was consistently higher than in those countries where it is represented by disparate projects and project personnel, despite the best efforts of the latter. In this respect, while attitudes and perceptions varied greatly between countries, some project personnel who are required to represent ILO's interests in countries without an ILO country director or formal representation

claimed to have received very inadequate induction on ILO's strategies and policies. This means that they were not able to represent it optimally to partners. In these cases, this led to a perception in some projects that the teams were only able to act like commercial consultants, rather than as representatives of ILO.

Ownership

The process of project identification and formulation varies somewhat from country to country. Best practice involves close consultation with constituents throughout the project identification and formulation process (in addition to the preparation of DWCP or other broad programme framework) to ensure that national ownership is maximized. Too often, constituents, particularly workers' organizations, have the impression that projects are identified and formulated by ILO in consultation with the donors and government and that they are left with no option but to accept them. This varies from country to country. In the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya, for instance, the constituents felt that there was extensive consultation with them throughout. In fact, in the absence of a CO in Kenya, the constituents were prepared to take on more extensive monitoring responsibilities for the projects because they believed them to be of high priority. This is borne out in the survey by the qualitative comments received from constituents in East Africa.

A good indicator of the level of national ownership is governments' willingness to allocate domestic resources to a project, and to substitute external funding with resources from the national budget upon completion of the project. It was noted particularly in the African country case studies that this was rarely the case. The projects were not designed with a clear exit strategy, and government financial contributions were not included in their initial design. The government counterparts' general expectation was that projects would be extended and external funding renewed. One strategy applied successfully in Timor Leste to generate national ownership over time is that of embedding TC personnel or teams in counterpart institutions. This is not a new modality, but it runs the risk of TC advisers being substituted for counterpart personnel. Nevertheless, the opportunity for mentoring over a period of years appears to increase government commitment to continue with activities and posts under its regular budget. This approach may be most effective in countries under reconstruction after periods of fragility, since they have a strong focus on institution building.

The number of ILO projects that cover several countries on a subregional or regional basis is high. Inevitably, it is more difficult to establish strong ownership for projects that address more than one country. Government representatives in several of the countries visited consider that ILO must demonstrate its value added through targeted intervention models that are relevant to national priorities. They consider that they should rely less on global and regional initiatives that have single development objectives regardless of the diverse developmental realities of the countries selected. While most respondents felt that global and regional interventions can promote and strengthen South-South cooperation, the results have greater impact where participating countries are allowed to develop their respective sub-projects targeting the overarching objective of the wider initiatives. This, however, would require more transparent processes in allocating sub-project budgets.

2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Evidence from country case studies strongly suggests that there is widespread satisfaction with the effectiveness of ILO TC activities. By and large, they deliver their intended outputs and are pursued at the expected professional level. In this respect, the TC programmes create a favourable impression of ILO in many countries, which is coupled with that generated by its ILS work on labour. However, this perceived effectiveness is, in many countries, tempered by a feeling that interventions are often too small to deliver major results or to scale up or follow through with replication of successful models. Wider impact is dependent on stronger commitment from governments or other partners and stakeholders in the sector, which is often not in place by the time the project closes.

Whilst work on policies and standards may have been highly effective in helping governments to establish improved systems, the challenge is that other donors are often needed to implement the changes at scale. In a number of cases observed by the evaluation team, these larger donors preferred to deliver their own programmes, even where these are outside government preferences and systems established jointly with ILO. This was observed with regard to the Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Reform Project in Bangladesh, which delivered important system changes, which have not been adopted by either the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB), both of which have larger and continuing programmes in the field. In such instances, the work of ILO is effective within its own boundaries, but appears to lack the traction to ensure fundamental change, particularly where stakeholders with larger funding capabilities are involved. Furthermore, it is often beyond the limited capacity of ILO's country personnel to influence bigger donors or development banks, particularly where there is no CO and representation is from a remote country director, who may also be handling many other countries. The ILO has been more successful in scaling up in instances such as India, where the government has the resources to replicate and scale-up programmes either at national or subnational levels or is in a position to insist on follow through with resources received from other stakeholders.

Partnership with the government is, therefore, of central importance in mobilizing resources from IFIs and other sources in support of ILO-driven models or pilots. This requires a close relationship of trust with constituents and governments in particular with those who are prepared to advocate on behalf of the ILO's involvement. This appears to be possible in a number of instances where ILO has well-staffed COs with strong and active substantive relationships with governments and constituents such as in Latin America (Peru) and in Asia (India), as was found in the country case studies.

In terms of the scale of effectiveness, it may also be advantageous if ILO were to place more emphasis on the negotiation of regional and/or global agreements with larger scale development financiers in its areas of particular expertise. This could lay the groundwork for its country representatives or COs to press for collaboration with these stakeholders and governments. In Timor Leste, for example, a global implementation agreement with the European Union (Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement – FAFA) greatly facilitated negotiations and procedures for a major project in the labour-intensive roads sector; the large scale of which enhanced its perceived effectiveness in the country. While other global agreements have been entered into, the ILO may wish to look particularly at the possibility of developing something similar with individual IFIs, addressing modalities of engagement, roles and ways in which the Organization can collaborate without being treated as a sub-contractor.

The ILO Decent Work Team for South Asia and Country Office for India (DWT/CO-India), in close collaboration with the nodal ministry (the Ministry of Labour and Employment), have been particularly strategic in implementing their projects. In the face of complex political undercurrents at the federal level that have slowed the ratification of policies and legislation, ILO has proceeded with the implementation of projects that demonstrate the value and practical implications of similar policy provisions at the level of states, which have often proved more ready to take progressive steps. The idea is then to use evidence-based arguments to advocate for and further develop policies and legislation at national level. This strategy appears to have been quite successful and has been commended particularly as scaling up at state level and replication in other states has been undertaken using government resources, particularly where states have strong ownership of the projects.

The DWCPs reviewed in detail tend to be conceptual documents, consisting of wide-ranging sectoral analyses, which include national policies, followed by a proposed set of priorities with intended outcomes and related indicators. The outcomes listed are often a mixture of outputs and activities. None of the DWCPs reviewed were costed and anchored in budgets or financial portfolios. As a result, they are rather theoretical documents based on ambitious expectations of funding.

The implementation of ILO's core standard-setting mandate has major development implications as it affects employment, incomes, economic growth and trade regimes, to mention just a few. The development criteria

and indicators that can be applied in measuring the development outcomes and impact of ILO's programmes are manifold, and limited only by the dimensions that the Organization may wish to monitor directly. As one moves higher on the results chain from outputs to development outcomes and impact, projects need to be viewed within the context of their broader contribution to national programmes to which ILO is not the sole contributor. In other words, the development impact being measured is almost certainly the consequence of the contributions of a number of stakeholders and partners as well as the ILO. The implied loss of control over the ultimate result should not in itself dilute organizational accountability, but will provide a better understanding of the way and the extent to which the immediate results of ILO's projects are being utilized.

In principle, the Organization has accepted that it needs to move towards integrating development dimensions more fully into the planning, design, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of its TC. However, a substantive transition beyond semantic distinctions between "technical cooperation" to "development cooperation" (witnessed, for instance, in the next global TC strategy) is not yet evident either in the programming or the monitoring of ILO projects and programmes. The monitoring of results is, with few exceptions, limited to activities and outputs. Even where ILO is involved in joint programming with other UN agencies, while the relevant UNDP may define broader development results to which ILO contributes, ILO's own internal indicators usually remain limited to activities and outputs. This limits ILO's perspective to project rather than programme level. Because of the often relatively small scale of ILO projects, and consequent limitations on direct causality, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of ILO staff to link outputs to wider development results. To do so, projects would have to acknowledge the contribution made by other partners, including the government, in achieving wider, programme-level development results. This implies a radically different TOC. ILO staff are aware that their own influence over the performance of partners is limited and are, consequently, hesitant to extrapolate development results based on ILO's own contributions.⁷

The ILO International Training Centre, Turin (ITC-ILO) has played an important role in training constituents in key ILS and its courses are perceived to be of a high standard, well conceived and designed, and are highly appreciated. In a few instances, trainers have been trained at the Centre, but records of how many additional people have been trained upon the return of the trainees to their home countries have not been kept at the country level. It is also not clear to what extent or in what way the knowledge gained through these training programmes has been applied by the trainees on their return, as this has not been systematically monitored.

In fragile states, past reviews and Office documents would seem to imply that ILO assistance has to take on aspects of humanitarian assistance and raise the Organization's own flexibility and responsiveness. This is manifest in the use of food-for-work in addition to cash-for-work as a modality on labour-intensive infrastructure projects. However, current TOCs in post-conflict settings and fragile states emphasize the importance of development programmes and capacity/institution building even at the earliest stages following the initiation of a peace process. The priority is, therefore, to have a clear country strategy/TOC to address top priorities that fall within ILO's mandate effectively and efficiently, and as early as possible. Youth employment and the development of standards and key institutions (governments, and workers' and employers' organizations) are all key to the future development and the immediate post-conflict stage presents a tremendous opportunity to lay a strong foundation.

2.3 SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS


Constituents scored the sustainability of the results of ILO TC projects at 4.2 out of 6, or "somewhat satisfactory". Where TC results were found to be unsustainable beyond the duration of the externally funded projects, some 64 per cent of constituents surveyed found that this was due to systemic reasons beyond

⁷ There are some exceptions to this situation. For example, in Timor Leste, the ILO labour-Intensive roads programmes are a substantial proportion of national activities in the sector.

the direct control of ILO, such as the allocation of insufficient funds from the national budget. A total of 62 per cent linked this to the lack of absorptive capacity on the part of counterpart institutions. Some 57 per cent of constituents correlated this with a lack of ownership of the project and project results, whilst 57 per cent also noted that projects lacked a clear or practical exit strategy in their design.

ILO staff surveyed on the other hand, acknowledged the relatively low level of sustainability linking it to various reasons (figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 ILO staff responses regarding the reasons for limited sustainability



Based on the interviews, it would appear that many ILO staff have a narrow and outdated understanding of “capacity development” which appears largely equated with training. ILO TC needs to apply a more holistic approach to capacity development covering the full range of systems required for an institution to perform its functions beyond the duration and scope of external funding. This would appear to be one of the principal reasons for the limited sustainability of project results. A recent update of ILO’s internal manual on DC goes some way towards developing a more current definition of capacity for the specific context of ILO’s projects, but it is clear that the concept still needs to be more widely shared and institutionalized within the Organization itself.⁸

⁸ ILO’s manual on development cooperation, which was updated earlier this year contains a somewhat more complete definition of capacity development, but could be more clear and specific in its presentation. It defines capacity building as: “A process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time. It is necessary to distinguish between technical and functional capacities (human resource development), organizational capacity (the internal mechanisms, tools and procedures) and institutional capacity (constituents’ involvement in social dialogue and the tripartite governance of the labour market). Capacity development methods include training, knowledge sharing, research, experiential learning, coaching and mentoring, and exposure.” ILO: *Development Cooperation: Internal Governance Manual* (Geneva, 2015).

In MICs and BRICs examined in detail, the sustainability of the projects' benefits was found to be limited as a result of increased politicization of the civil service and related continuous turnover of personnel involved in implementation. The increased turnover appears to be associated with political change, increasingly pervasive political appointments in the civil service and institutional reforms linked to an increased policy emphasis on economic growth and private investment (foreign and domestic), which is often accompanied by a dilution of the role of workers' organizations as well as ILO's traditional government counterparts. In general, ILO's nodal ministries are declining in importance and, in some instances, shrinking. For instance, in the case of India, the Ministry of Labour and Employment has been downgraded to state minister level and is no longer headed by a cabinet minister. This has implications for the design and management of ILO TC in these countries.

More broadly, ILO TC projects were often found to target sustainability through follow-on phases of the same activity, sometimes scaled up. This is largely because of the funding requirements of many donors, under which project durations are actually too short to deliver sustainable results, necessitating a second phase. In many cases, representatives of donors in the countries concerned have understood this and attempted to make provision for continuation. However, challenges are faced in this respect because donor funding is decreasing both in scale and predictability. Furthermore, competitive bidding is almost inevitable in such situations and ILO does not necessarily win such bids to continue its activities, even against other UN offices. Because of the unrealistic duration of many TC projects, sustainability is often marginal or even unlikely.

A major approach, which has been used with considerable success, is to ensure that ILO TC has a strong focus on national legal, policy and/or strategy changes. Where such aspects can be achieved with the assistance of ILO TC and, often, supportive technical assistance inputs (from Geneva or specialists based in the region), projects can claim a basic element of sustainability, namely, helping to put improved systems in place. This claim is tempered by an understanding that such measures do not in themselves change the decent work situation in countries, since they need to be supported by implementation programmes. In many cases, these are beyond the capacity or resources of governments to deliver.

A parallel approach is that of raising capacity. This is a major strand of TC across the tripartite constituency and is largely effective. However, sustainability limitations are noted in terms of institutional ability to use the raised capacity, poor continuity of staffing (particularly in government), and the absence of provisions to refresh and update technical knowledge, which can rapidly become outdated. The major strategy to address this challenge is through training-of-trainers approaches. Whilst this is an important measure, it also faces challenges because of the need for ILO's partners to take on the responsibility for running future training programmes, using the skills attained, and the need to sponsor refresher and updating courses for the trainers.

The first step in sustainability has been achieved in a number of programmes visited by field missions, namely, though the incorporation of project staff (including budget provision) into government departments or ministries as mentors and on-the-job-trainers. Implementation units that substitute staff and pay different salaries may raise efficiency and demonstrate results in the short term, but will not in the long term raise sustainability as they have a tendency to be a substitute for national capacity, and result in rapid staff turnover when preferential salaries can no longer be paid. Nevertheless, in countries where absorptive capacity is low such as those that are in the process of rebuilding, such as in (Albania and Timor Leste), the placement of mentors and advisers in ministries was observed to help kick-start capacity development and the implementation of project activities in national institutions, such as ministries and workers organizations.

2.4 EFFICIENCY

It was repeatedly argued by donors interviewed by the evaluation team that 13 per cent in support costs renders ILO projects less than cost effective. This figure on the surface contrasted negatively with the 5

or 7 per cent support costs charged by several other UN funds and programmes⁹ and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, the evaluation team notes that all of these support cost figures – for ILO as well as other agencies -- do not necessarily accurately reflect the administrative and technical backstopping costs associated with the management of funds and programme implementation. The actual costs are difficult to ascertain without a thorough financial review as these agencies make a concerted effort to incorporate aspects of the costs under other budget lines without clear explanation. The same holds true for ILO. Some technical support received from DWTs, regional offices (ROs) and HQ in terms of staff time is not explicitly costed and may in part constitute a subsidy from the regular budget. It is also noted that other agencies and NGOs that purportedly serve as a benchmark include a large amount of the administration and management costs of their projects under project personnel headings, i.e. beyond the support costs deducted from the project budget.

In conflict-affected countries, the ILO's costs have sometimes escalated considerably. This is not only because of increased security-related costs involved in the implementation of projects and programmes, but also because the lack of operational capacity and experience has sometimes led ILO to outsource to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as a management service provider. In one example, UNOPS management costs amounted to a fee of 7 per cent of the project budget. In addition, direct support costs associated with the Kenya office backstopping much of the Somalia programme, amount to a further 4 per cent. These charges are on top of the 13 per cent support costs for ILO's services. The security costs associated with programme activities are not clear.

Several donors reported negative experiences with the efficiency of ILO TC projects, often requiring (usually no-cost) extensions. These were mostly associated with personnel issues, either in terms of long delays in start-up owing to slow international recruitment processes or because of performance shortfalls, which were not resolved in a timely fashion. A common underlying factor was the lack of in-country authority to resolve personnel issues and the necessity to channel all discussions through remote COs or even to HQ. Delays encountered were lengthy, and donors interviewed regarded them as evidence of ILO's lack of commitment to principles of good project management in country programmes, which seemed to them to have been given low priority by ILO. In specific cases, although donors' representatives were generally satisfied with the quality and effectiveness of ILO TC, they noted that they would be hesitant about future TC contracts with ILO, since delays place them in difficulties with their own HQ RBM systems.

Some ILO TC project personnel, notably in countries lacking a country representative, were critical of the difficulties they face because of their lack of authority on personnel issues, amongst others. This has proved particularly challenging in instances where their managers (based in other offices) are unavailable for long periods of time. Some cited poor work practices at HQ and ROs, where officers with decision-making authority go on leave for long periods and fail to nominate temporary replacements. In one instance, a remote country director's position was vacant for six months, during which time no action was taken on a major personnel issue, which prevented the project from delivering, and created bad relations both with the donor and government counterparts. Indeed, the donor became so concerned that it took up the matter with ILO management in Geneva. The donor reported to the evaluation that it regarded such a situation as unacceptable and outside of its responsibilities as a donor.

⁹ For instance, 5 per cent support costs are rapidly becoming the norm for funds managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and this figure is specified in most of its budgets. However, it is unclear to what extent the actual administrative costs of UNDP projects are higher, and whether they are covered under other budget lines or from UNDP's core budget. The same is true for other funds and programmes of the UN. Other specialized agencies of the UN have support-cost profiles that are closer to that of ILO, but they have changed over time. For instance, at one of the larger agencies, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) at its 115th Session of the Finance Committee in September 2006, endorsed a project servicing cost (PSC) rate for projects in direct support of regular programme activities from 6 per cent to 13 per cent.

More broadly, the evaluation noted that there are substantial routine business inefficiencies associated with the practice of giving out-of-country managers large and onerous portfolios of country activities. This usually means that field missions to each country are insufficient, particularly with regard to country portfolio development and that good opportunities are missed to deliver on the ILO mandate due to the lack of timely discussions between government or other partners and ILO managers with the authority to take decisions. (No doubt the extent and impact of this workload will be analysed further as part of the ongoing business process review) It is also difficult for programme staff to develop relationships of trust and conduct a sustained policy dialogue under such conditions. This compromises the Organization's ability to implement its mandate. The same management system has also often led to damaging delays in decisions on project activities, particularly since the in-country authority on expenditure is extremely limited. Therefore, projects become heavily dependent on the priority afforded to their country at any particular time by the country director and this is reported to vary widely between directors and over time.

It was also noted that, in some countries where there is no country representation, project personnel, who already have the substantial task of managing their projects, take on representation and administrative backstopping responsibilities for ILO missions and activities. In a country such as Kenya which involves a joint programming effort on the part of the UN (an UNDAP), ILO's participation in UNDAP programme working groups is fulfilled by project staff when programme staff from the Country Office for the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda in Dar Es Salaam (CO-Dar es Salaam) are not available. This is often a very considerable burden on staff whose responsibilities are formally limited to their projects. It is noted that because of their considerable professionalism, the feedback from counterparts and constituents was generally positive, and there were no indications that inordinate delays or failures to respond were being experienced and that their personal standing with counterparts was high. Nevertheless, it is clear that by limiting the scope of their responsibilities to their projects and staffing the office with one or more personnel dedicated to broader management and representational responsibilities could increase the efficiency of programme implementation.

The relationship with the ministry of labour (MoL) or similar principal counterpart ministry of the ILO varies from country to country. In some countries, such as in the United Republic of Tanzania, it is almost exclusive; contact with other relevant ministries is either through or in close collaboration with the MoL. In other instances, such as in India, the ILO has excellent relations with the MoL, but also works directly with other line ministries as well as state governments and legislatures. Furthermore, particularly in instances where the MoL is relatively weak, an almost exclusive arrangement can and does tend to reduce the efficiency of programming and project implementation.

The relative importance of the MoL appears to be in decline in some of the MICs and BRICS as they undergo economic and political reforms that see greater importance attached to liberalization and economic growth. The ability of MoLs to lead and coordinate activities in and around TC projects is, as a result reduced. Practically, ILO needs to ensure that it is able to directly access all key ministries and government agencies critical to the development and implementation of relevant policies and the implementation of its TC. In so doing, it also needs to reinforce and promote the role of its nodal ministries and constituents.

The use of UNOPS as a management service provider in conflict countries such as Somalia should be reconsidered. As UNOPS is in a position to buy the necessary technical capacity and can place management staff in-country to manage projects, so should the ILO. Security and added insurance costs cannot be avoided and will need to be included in project budgets at real costs as is done by all other agencies working under such conditions. A failure to do this runs the risk of ultimately having donors cut ILO out entirely on cost-efficiency considerations alone.

There are too often significant lag times associated with project start-up and the lengthy procedure involved in initial recruitment of project personnel. Consideration should be given to establishing a pool of pre-screened project personnel who can be tapped relatively quickly without extensive interviewing and review processes.

ILO's constituents scored the efficiency of ILO TC at 4.5 out of a possible 6 (between "somewhat satisfactory" and "satisfactory"). Despite low thresholds for competitive bidding and procedures that require project and CO staff to refer back to regional or global levels for expenditure authorization, 56 per cent of constituents surveyed considered ILO's procedures easy to follow, while providing an acceptable level of accountability. Just 17 per cent found them difficult to follow.

2.5 COHERENCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN

The majority of ILO projects reviewed had a duration of less than three years, a function in most instances of extra-budgetary funding. This limits the ability of the ILO to monitor the achievement of outcomes and impacts, both of which in most cases take longer to register. Ex- post monitoring and evaluation systems need to be established in order to track the longer term results of ILO's projects and programmes. Almost by definition ex-post monitoring and evaluation mechanisms would need to be managed by national stakeholders that continue beyond the duration of ILO's own involvement. Nevertheless, it was noted that programme documents (DWCPs, UNDAFs, etc.) tended to try to define the results of projects of short duration in terms of national impact – in response to donor requirements – knowing full well that impact cannot be registered within the timeframe of the project itself.

Current programming instruments call for ILO to plan based on resources that are not yet secured and to use the same instruments as tools for resource mobilization. The reality is that, in many instances, the XBTC funds that are mobilized are insufficient to achieve the level of impact intended, and ILO staff are working on a shoestring, subsidizing projects with their time and undertaking no-cost extensions.

Progress has been made towards creating greater programmatic coherence among TC interventions at country level. In the case studies for Egypt, India and Peru, a coherent strategy could be seen, and a strategy for the insertion of rights-based concerns in the form of ILS throughout all the TC projects could be discerned. DWCPs, UNDAFs and UNDAPs undoubtedly also ensure greater coherence between the projects formulated and implemented in any given country. The lowest level of coherence among projects was found in countries that did not have a formal CO led by a country director. Here, project staff tended to run their projects separately, and with less overt coherence and coordination in design and implementation.

Programming procedures have made strides towards ensuring that gender issues are mainstreamed in all projects and programmes at the design stage. The appraisal of all ILO TC projects incorporates an assessment of gender responsiveness. Projects are scored according to the following markers or criteria:

- Marker One: Project contains no objectives, outcomes, outputs that aim to promote gender equality;
- Marker Two: Project does not include gender equality as an outcome, but some outputs and/or activities specifically address gender issues;
- Marker Three: Includes gender equality as an outcome, and some outputs/activities specifically address gender issues;
- Marker Four: Main stated objective is to promote gender equality, and outcomes and activities are designed to promote gender equality.

Despite these measures, which largely pertain to the mainstreaming of gender, DWCPs did not usually exhibit a coherent programme-wide approach towards gender. Rather, the issue appears in a disconnected fashion under other specific headings, with limited intentions to measure progress achieved or to generate labour-market benefits across the board. DWCPs in some of the country case studies did, however, have important projects directly targeting some of the main gender-related labour issues in the countries concerned. There is no doubt that in these countries, the ILO staff are fully aware of gender issues in their programming and have sought to make them central to ILO TC interventions through dedicated projects.

2.6 MANAGEMENT ISSUES

The use of programme support income (PSI)

COs included in the case studies indicated that they did not place great stock in PSI as it is currently managed, as its use remained relatively opaque to them, and most of it was allocated through HQ and ROs.

PSI is currently calculated based on actual delivery, perhaps the most cautious approach to the management of income possible. However, as a result, it makes it difficult to plan the use of PSI effectively. A good use of PSI would be to provide for national staff at country level to mobilize resources for project extensions or revisions or indeed for new projects focusing on high priority needs. Yet, because PSI is based on actual delivery, it is unavailable at the time when resources are most needed for bridging and mobilizing additional funds.

Resource mobilization

In the ILO, formal resource mobilization mechanisms remain centralized despite some recent efforts to reduce it by outposting staff from the Partnerships and Field Support Department (PARDEV) to ROs. Despite this centralized system, some 60 per cent of XBTC is actually mobilized at country level. By contrast, RBSA resources are mobilized mostly from HQ. By comparison, other UN agencies, funds and programmes such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) secure the vast majority of their extra-budgetary resources at country level. They have established units within their COs to serve as an interface with donors, in order to promote the work of their organizations, mobilize resources and coordinate the reporting on their use.

Given the significant dependence of the Organization on XBTC to implement its TC programmes and to ensure the implementation of ILS at country level, ILO urgently needs additional capacity in order to mobilize resources efficiently at that level.

Traditional ODA is being targeted more selectively and is rapidly declining in importance particularly in BRICs and MICs as they diversify their own sources of development financing mostly through the growth of fiscal revenues, foreign and domestic private investment, the development of domestic stock exchanges and private capital markets (bonds and equities) as well as private financial institutions. Some BRICs – most notably Brazil, China and India – have become significant sources of ODA themselves. Of these countries, Brazil is an important source of multilateral development funding for multi-country programmes through the ILO in Latin America, and to a lesser degree in parts of Africa. China and India have so far opted primarily for bilateral funding, yet the potential for channeling resources through ILO remains. In BRICs and MICs, the pressing challenge for ILO is to identify and mobilize non-traditional sources of funding for the implementation of its mandate through TC. While there are examples of this, success has been mixed and greater attention needs to be paid to drawing lessons from the experience gained, developing strategies for building new partnerships, and securing resources from non-traditional sources of funding.

In India, large and complex programmes have mostly been implemented with ILO technical support, but with considerable domestic resources allocated by the government. Projects have also involved the use of ILO technical expertise to guide technical assistance components of World Bank loans. This has been possible because of the relationship of trust that has been established between relevant ministries of the government and the ILO. While there have been some glitches in terms of the use of resources (for international rather than national personnel) in implementation, the modality has proven quite effective and could perhaps be replicated both in India and elsewhere. It is, however, noted that the ILO's own projects remained relatively small as the majority of technical assistance resources were channeled in parallel with, rather than through, the ILO. In order to convince governments to channel more resources through

the ILO, it will need to demonstrate that it is administratively and financially efficient enough to warrant this.¹⁰

For countries that qualify for less ODA, it would appear that there are a significant number of subregional projects and programmes. Currently of 630 ongoing projects, fully 121, or 19 per cent are multi-country projects. In light of the potential role that ILO could play in transborder, trade-related and labour migration issues, this is potentially an important source of demand for ILO TC. This would require ILO to have strong subregional operational strategies anchored by country programme outcomes aligned to subregional priorities. This may require greater consultation with subregional political and economic organizations, for which the ILO is better set up in some regions than others. Examples of such organizations include:

- *In the Americas:* The Andean Community (CAN), The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
- *In Africa:* African Union (AU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
- *In the Arab States:* The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League.
- *In Asia and the Pacific:* Asia and Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Field office structure and processes

There is a need to distribute specialist technical advisers across the ILO system, so that they can be more engaged in country programmes, as well as to build capacity to engage effectively in policy dialogue so as to be in a stronger position to influence it. This issue is particularly urgent in countries in which ILO does not have a representative CO and is served by a non-resident DWT.

DWTs are unevenly distributed in different regions and the rationale for the distribution is not always clear. The arrangements in place in the Latin America and Caribbean region, and the Asia and Pacific region are perhaps the most rational, with teams being located in offices with reasonable subregional coverage. The effectiveness of DWTs and by extension, ILO TC is maximized when experts can devote enough time to conduct regular and intensive policy dialogue with government, constituents and other stakeholders, and build relationships of trust. This is difficult to do in a meaningful way where individual experts are required to cover more than, say, four or five countries. In Africa, for instance, experts located in an extended DWT in Pretoria, South Africa, each have to cover some 15 countries. Accountability is also diffused when, for instance, the Somalia CO is administered from Kenya (itself a large and important country without a country director), its country director is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and it is supported by a 17 person DWT covering 14 other countries, located at the other end of the continent, in Pretoria, South Africa.

Technical backstopping

DWTs play an important role in providing technical backstopping and advisory services both to RB activities and to XBTC programmes and projects. This being so, the core budget of ILO subsidizes XBTC projects, although, because the time of DWT experts is not tracked or costed beyond the mission travel expenses (tickets and per diem), it is difficult to determine the extent of this subsidy.

¹⁰ It is worth noting that organizations such as the UNDP and UNOPS have for years served as a conduit for major components of World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) loans because of value added that governments have seen in using their administrative and financial management capacities.

Knowledge management

As a specialized technical agency, ILO's comparative competitive strength rests in its knowledge management and ability to serve as a conduit and disseminator of systematized, cutting edge information and knowledge. Repositories of relevant knowledge and information are increasingly diversified and reside both in developed and developing countries. The experience and lessons learned by ILO over its nearly 100 years of existence are rich and diverse. Constituents interviewed consistently advanced ILO's experience and ability to draw on its own global comparative experience as the feature that sets it apart from other organizations and institutions operating in the same field.

ILO has responded to this by beginning a process of working more as a network. During the period under review, it decentralized some of its expertise to the field in the form of DWTs who are in a position and have, to varying degrees, developed strong, long-term partnerships with national academic institutions and think tanks in programme countries.

So far, the networks established are principally at country level and within the Organization itself, at subregional and regional levels as a function of its changing field office structure. Continuous email consultations and exchanges of information at regional and subregional levels as well as between HQ and the field are evident. Periodic meetings of DWT members, country directors, subregional office directors (where they still exist), and regional directors and office staff take place and serve as a platform for discussing substantive issues and sharing knowledge. ILO would also benefit from inter-regional exchanges and the convening of task forces around areas of practice or issues of high priority in different categories of countries. For instance, experts working in different regions on the formalization of labour could be brought together to develop office-wide approaches and strategies for tackling the complex task of bringing more employers and workers into the formal sector – particularly in an era when the imperatives of economic growth and private investment are front and centre, and the influence of employers' organizations appears to be waning. In this respect, it is noted that the Director-General has instituted "global teams" for the purpose, but based on what the evaluation team was able to glean during its country case studies, the teams are not yet in place and most staff remain unaware of the directive.

Human resource considerations

ILO is in competition with the private sector and with other UN agencies for highly qualified and technically sound national staff – particularly in MICs and BRICS – where labour markets are mobile and the private sector is vibrant. Especially during bridging periods when gaps in funding are experienced, this tends to result in the loss of highly qualified and experienced national staff. This is further exacerbated by the fact that ILO apparently only issues NO-A and NO-B contracts, limiting career advancement and pay. Although ILO staff are generally dedicated to the principles and rights-based mandate of the Organization, this can only stem the loss of staff for a short while as the employment options in sectors central to ILO's mandate continue to diversify.

Administrative and financial management

The Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) is essential to effective RBM and to the overall process of decentralizing the management of TC. It is also an important element in laying the foundation for effective knowledge management across ILO offices globally. Several reasons have been presented for the extraordinary 10-year delay in rolling IRIS out to all ILO programme countries to date.¹¹ However,

¹¹ The ILO implemented IRIS, which is an Oracle e-Business ERP suite for Geneva-based users in 2005 and is currently on version 12.1.3. The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system has recently been implemented in the ROs and a few field offices while other established field offices continue to operate the legacy financial system. Project offices manually feed information to other offices for processing.

arguments presented about the need to train staff and to sufficiently prepare them for the use of IRIS, associated with inherent limitations in ILO's country presence cannot suffice. For instance, all of the UN funds and programmes rolled out their ERPs to COs globally following one or two trial runs in selected COs. So far, IRIS is only working in ILO's HQ, ROs and a handful of COs. In the case of Africa, this functionality was only in place by the third quarter of 2014. Only a few COs have seen IRIS rolled out (mostly in Latin America). Elsewhere, even large offices, such as in India, use the legacy systems (Financial Information System for External Offices - FISEXT).

This means that staff are working with real-time information only with respect to local financial transactions¹² and that information is subsequently inputted at the regional level on a fortnightly basis to compile aggregate data. This means that project staff managing resources including staff and procurement, do not have a clear real-time picture of the resources available to them. Some COs, such as in Somalia, do not even have access to the legacy systems and register data on Excel spread sheets, which are then inputted into the legacy system and only subsequently into IRIS. The latter situation has contributed to over commitment and over expenditure on some TC projects.

While more liberal than in the past, the procedures for ILO are relatively restrictive and time consuming. ILO's current procurement procedures¹³ require "informal competitive bidding" with quotations sought from at least three qualified suppliers for procurement actions below US\$30,000. The threshold for formal competitive bidding is, therefore, \$30,000, above which formal proposals/bids are sought from at least three vendors. The ILO Procurement Unit (PROCUREMENT) reserves the right to assess the proposed competitive bidding procedure and documentation before tendering is initiated. Up to a ceiling of \$150,000, all such bids are reviewed by the Local Contracts Committee (LCC), wherever one has been established. If not, the review reverts to the Headquarters Contracts Committee (HCC). All purchasing actions that result in the possible award or amendment of a contract exceeding \$150,000 have to be submitted to the HCC through the Chief of Procurement, who, if the action exceeds \$300,000, may refer the relevant invitation to bid, or request for proposals to the HCC for review and advice before the tender is published. All recruitment and personnel actions are taken at the RO for national staff and at HQ for international staff. By contrast, at UNDP, all COs have LCCs and are delegated procurement authority up to \$150,000. Many have further delegation up to \$300,000, particularly in crisis situations. Up to the \$300,000 ceiling, COs do not have to revert to HQ at any stage of the process. Furthermore, UNDP country directors have the authority to enter into TC project agreements of unlimited size and commit the organization as long as the project is mentioned in the approved Country Programme Framework.¹⁴ Although ILO staff have grown accustomed to the current thresholds, considerable streamlining in efficiency and reduction in transaction costs could be achieved without compromising accountability through a further relaxing of the thresholds in keeping with those used by the UN funds and programmes. Harmonization of this type will also lay the groundwork for future joint programme management within the UN system under UNDAPs.

¹² This information cannot be accessed from locations other than where it is inputted.

¹³ ILO: "Procurement thresholds", in *Internal Governance Document System (IGDS)* (2013, No. 216, Version 3.1, October).

¹⁴ Based on a telephone conversation with the UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Management, 11 September 2015.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

TC serves an important purpose in ensuring that ILS negotiated and ratified in Geneva are adapted and implemented at country level among signatory countries. As such, there should be no doubt; TC is mission critical for the ILO.

As it approaches its centenary, ILO's mandate at country level is more valid than ever as the constituents face new challenges in rapidly changing economies and the acceleration of globalization. Yet, the Organization is facing contradictory pressures as it is forced to continue to cope with zero real growth of its regular budget. As conditions become more diverse between different categories of countries, the shifting nature of demand would seem to suggest the need for more, not less, capacity at country and subregional levels. While this can be offset to some extent by efficient and judicious reallocation and realignment of capacity close to the country level, it is evident that, unless the Organization is prepared to change the current imbalance between HQ and the field and to re-profile its presence in many of its programme countries, continuing to request the staff in the field to do more with less will result in diminishing returns for the Organization.

Bringing the Organization closer to the field must be more than an ideological statement, since it is of central importance to raising the effectiveness of ILO TC and of the Organization as a whole. It also requires a substantial change in organizational culture and methods of work if it is to result in a quantum increment in performance. The ability to develop and maintain a substantive dialogue on policies, and a relationship of confidence with constituents and other partners on a sustainable basis, is of critical importance to the implementation of ILS that ILO champions through TC. Therefore, locating representational and specialized technical capacity is essential.

Countries with a country director should not have to revert to regional directors for project management decisions and procurement authorizations. Offices covering multiple countries, however, should serve as substantive and administrative service hubs for clusters of not more than four to five countries.

As the issues where it is most effective become more complex and multisectoral, the ILO is working with an array of different government agencies. However, as a matter of principle, the Organization should, therefore, work with a wider array of government agencies and other nongovernmental and private entities while keeping the nodal ministry and constituents fully informed and involved in programming, and the monitoring of implementation.

However, although ILO is progressively attaining greater focus in its TC, more needs to be done. It should be increasingly willing to decline participation in projects and funding opportunities that fall outside the scope of agreed DCWP priorities. Acceptance should be based on a case-by-case review and a clear understanding of how the proposed project contributes to the implementation of ILO's core mandate. ILO staff are well aware of the issue and are actively working in this direction.

Decent work has clearly become the core of the ILO brand and inspires much of its programming. Most programme countries have also fully adopted the concept as a basis for national programmes. As currently formulated, SDG-8 sets decent work up to serve as the basis for ILO's resource mobilization and programming at national, subregional, regional and global levels during the period of the forthcoming strategy.

M&E regimes and systems should rapidly transition to the monitoring of indicators and measures of development at outcome and impact levels. Where this requires the establishment of ex-post M&E mechanisms, they should be located in constituents' organizations or in newly created projects. Sufficient resources need to be allocated and capacity created for the purpose by way of a dedicated TC project predicated on the mobilization of resources.

To be relevant, ILO needs to differentiate countries' DC priorities by category (possibly as identified in this evaluation) and to structure the expertise in DWTs to support clusters of countries in the subregion with similar conditions and DC needs. Clusters of countries should be identified (four to five countries in each cluster at most) with similar economic, social and political conditions, and the most common priority issues for each category (and cluster) identified. Consideration should be given to dedicating a DWT to each cluster of countries. The profile of the DWTs should ideally reflect the mix of priorities in the cluster covered by each. Working with technical departments, PROGRAM and PARDEV should develop TOC for each of the major priority themes and for the categories of programme countries and targeted DC strategies built around them.

With the expansion of inter-country trade and, in particular, South-South trade as well as moves towards economic integration and the relevance of ILO's mandate to so many of the objectives of regional and subregional organs, and institutions, it is vital that ILO should enhance the way it engages in policy dialogue with such organizations. This includes the co-location of sufficient capacity to enter into substantive dialogue.

On the other hand, this evaluation has shown that ownership is clearest and highest in national projects and programmes. Regional programmes have greatest value where they address cross-border issues such as the mobility and migration of labour, and trade or the cross-border harmonization of policies and practices. Even for such programmes, national ownership constitutes a challenge. In the case of assertive governments and constituents with ample domestic resources, ILO DC attains maximum ownership when it seeks to target key bottlenecks in nationally led programmes, thereby ensuring that they are demand, rather than supply driven.

Ongoing efforts to pull together must continue to ensure coherence among projects including those in countries that do not have a country director or formal representation. The clear analysis of priorities contained in DWCPs, UNDAFs or UNDAFs that lay the basis for a coherent programmatic strategy should be followed through in implementation, ensuring continued exploitation of the linkages between projects to reinforce each other and the implementation of ILS.

While bearing in mind the potential risks, the ILO could utilize its convening role to bring constituents together for active social dialogue more frequently rather than acting as a go-between or working with each government, and worker's and employer's organization separately.

Despite pressures that may be felt from governments in light of economic and political trends, the ILO should continue to work to capacitate and encourage as many constituent organizations as possible.

The type of change that ILO attempts to introduce through its TC takes much longer than the typical two to three year duration of most projects. It is important for ILO to have a clear TOC that realistically outlines a pathway for that change under different development, political and economic conditions, and looks beyond the immediate two to three year programming cycle. Resources need continuous proactive mobilization to ensure that the phases envisaged in this process are adequately funded. Furthermore, with respect to programme design, the common understanding among ILO staff of "capacity development" appears to be narrow and outdated, focusing almost exclusively on the training of human resources. A more holistic and current approach to capacity development needs to be developed and shared within the

ILO. The approach should identify all of the human and financial resources, processes and systems that an institution needs to function, and incorporate these into project design, which should be addressed either by the ILO or in partnership with other stakeholders. A failure to adopt such a strengthened planning approach would continue to compromise the sustainability of ILO's capacity-building projects.

ILO needs to be more proactive in its resource mobilization, which must increase its focus at country level. The range of resources and sources of funding for development has widened considerably in almost all categories of countries, but particularly in BRICS, MICs and SIDS. ILO needs to further develop models for accessing different types of resources. Mobilization strategies need to be differentiated to reflect conditions and priorities at country level and a concerted effort needs to be made to move beyond the traditional sources of ODA. Resource mobilization and public information cannot be generated without dedicated capacity close to the client. Capacity needs to be created in subregional offices to promote ILO's profile, publicizing the achievements of ILO TC, and actively working with potential contributors at national level to mobilize resources, and manage or coordinate donor reporting and other needs.

TC is heavily dependent on resource mobilization, and the development and renewal of a dependable and steady stream of resources for programmes. This can only be achieved through the location of capacity close to the country level, and the development and implementation of resource mobilization strategies that are country-specific. Flagship programmes that are centrally funded, but which provide a certain dependability and continuity of funding beyond the basic biennial or annual funding cycles could perhaps be tapped for their experience in securing longer-term staff capacity. Another alternative would be to use PSI (subject to any necessary enabling policy changes regarding its use), which would need to be calculated on allocations rather than on actual expenditures in order to provide for resource mobilization, marketing and communications during peaks and troughs in project funding at country level.

The provision of ILO technical support in connection with the implementation of IFI loans is a valuable service to constituents, and particularly governments, and is an effective way of leveraging ILO's capacity. This is only likely to develop into a regular modality if governments are willing to advocate for ILO's involvement at country level. This may then ultimately lead to the negotiation of regional and/or global agreements with IFIs in ILO's areas of expertise.

Pilot programmes implemented as strategies to produce evidence to influence policies and legislation should only be entered into if sufficient resources can be mobilized to demonstrate impact either directly or in partnership with other stakeholders including central or subnational governments. Where this is not the case, the original investment in the pilot risks being lost.

Branding, communications strategies, advocacy and marketing are essential to the mobilization of sufficient resources to raise the impact of ILO's projects, and to scale up pilot programmes that are so important to ILO's efforts to introduce ILS into policies and legislation.

ILO's comparative advantage in an increasingly crowded field lies in its ability to manage the vast repository of knowledge and experience that it possesses among its staff and wider network of institutions with which it collaborates closely on policy studies and research. Maintaining its cutting edge in this respect is crucial to its continuing value added to its constituents.

ILO has most influence on policies and can effectively integrate these into broader UN-wide programming in countries where it can consistently bring to bear a substantive and credible presence by building relationships of trust. It should find ways to invest in countries with demonstrated potential for resource mobilization by placing country directors in them with a view to engaging in sustained policy dialogue with governments, constituents and partners, and to support the mobilization of resources with a view to achieving scale in its programmes. This may require the placement of senior HQ staff in the field in the role of country director. This should be viewed as an investment, since a programme with a certain minimum level of funding demonstrates that demand exists and policy dialogue is likely to help mobilize additional funds as long as ILO is visible at country level and viewed as credible.

While gender issues can be mainstreamed (and both the presence of gender experts on DWTs and the application of gender markers in the programming process serve to achieve this), concerns pertaining to women in the labour market are often so significant that they need to be addressed more directly through large targeted programmes. This has clearly been recognized by ILO staff and projects that target priority issues affecting the rights and conditions of work of women are a feature of several of the DWCPs in the countries selected for the case studies.

A TOC is urgently required for ILO programmes in post-conflict and fragile states. Rather than attempting to integrate ILO TC into humanitarian assistance regimes followed by other UN agencies, e.g. UNICEF, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), etc., the emphasis should be on creating the necessary institutions for the implementation of ILO's core ILS as early as possible. This involves ensuring that all of the essential institutions are in place for the implementation of ILO's priority ILS early on during the transition phase instead of waiting until peace agreements have been fully implemented in accordance with past practice.

The allocation of national resources to substitute for ILO funds, and to ensure operations of all projects beyond the duration of ILO projects should be a prerequisite for the approval and signature of projects. This should be accompanied in all cases by an explicit exit strategy that should be outlined in the project document itself.

Sustainability of TC results presents a major challenge to long-term effectiveness. Project duration limits impact, but project/programme design is equally to blame for the lack of sustainability. Projects rarely stipulate national contributions to the budget nor do they have an explicit exit strategy. The turnover of national counterpart staff is a major issue not only in LDCs and fragile states where salaries are low, but also in BRICS and MICs, which are undergoing rapid political and administrative change. This should be accepted as a likely event for all ILO projects and programmes and, as a consequence, capacity building needs to be viewed from a holistic perspective, ensuring that essential systems and processes are developed, implemented and institutionalized to guarantee continued functioning both beyond external ILO-supported projects and in the event of personnel attrition.

Institutionalization includes the development of rules, regulations, guidelines and procedures as well as systems that should be a part of the planned outputs of all capacity-building projects and programmes.

In fragile states and those emerging from conflict, project personnel may be "embedded" in ministries, and workers' and employers' organizations (where they exist) with a view to serving as mentors, trainers and technical advisers, thereby accelerating implementation and developing national capacity where it is particularly low. However, all such instances should be accompanied by a clear exit strategy where responsibilities can be progressively taken over by counterpart personnel and any operational costs met through ILO funding can be replaced by national budgets or the organizations' own budgets.

A perception appears to have gained currency among the donors interviewed that ILO's perceived high support costs are no longer justified. There are indications that while other UN entities and NGO contractors report lower administrative costs (5–8 per cent), this may not reflect their actual costs, which may in fact be substantially higher than those of ILO and be paid under other budget lines. Clarity on the subject will not be reached unless a dedicated study is conducted to review actual costs and benchmark them against other agencies of the UN system, NGOs and bilateral agencies. Such a study should review both the amounts formally reported by other agencies and NGOs as support costs as well as those covered by funds included in other budget lines. In this respect, it is understood that the ILO is conducting a major business process review¹⁵ for which McKinsey & Company has been recruited. The costing of relevant processes and inputs involved in administrative and financial support as well as substantive backstopping of ILO projects should ideally be integrated into such a study.

¹⁵ The study is formally known as the "Review of administrative, business and processing functions for development of alternative approaches for service delivery" and is currently underway.

PSI should be calculated on the basis of programme budget allocations rather than actual delivery with a view to rendering it a more dependable source of funding. PSI should, as a general rule, be used closer to where it is generated. Subject to a few adjustments to current policies, credible uses of PSI could reasonably include: (i) capacity to monitor and report on the implementation of projects and programmes to donors and for accountability purposes; (ii) advocacy, communication and mobilization of resources; and (iii) financial and administrative management of resources of the projects that have generated the resources. PSI could also be used to buy the services of DWT experts, as necessary. In the interests of decentralization and creating capacity closer to the field, the proportion of PSI that reverts to ROs and HQ should be substantially reduced in favour of the country level.

Country directors should have the option of back-loading the use of PSI when added capacity is needed to mobilize resources for follow through or for subsequent or related project activities required to deepen the results achieved, or to widen the scope of activities in a subsequent phase.

The use of UNOPS as a management service provider in conflict countries such as Somalia has facilitated implementation under insecure conditions. It also increases costs substantially over and above the 13 per cent support costs charged by ILO. This is likely to constitute a problem in the not too distant future. Other agencies are increasingly in a position to buy the type of expertise that ILO supplies and can, with varying degrees of success and credibility, substitute them. As long as UNOPS can place management staff in countries to manage projects, so should the ILO. Security and added insurance costs cannot be avoided, and will need to be included at actual costs in project budgets as is done by all other agencies working under such conditions. A failure to do so runs the risk of ultimately having donors exclude ILO entirely on cost-efficiency considerations alone.

ILO needs to urgently make a concerted effort to reduce lag times involved with project start-up and the lengthy procedure involved in the initial recruitment of project personnel. Consideration should be given to establishing a pool of pre-screened project personnel who can be tapped relatively quickly without the need for extensive interviewing or review processes.

Incentives for staff mobility are required if ILO is to be able to capacitate its field offices appropriately. Strong professional incentives are required, linked to the number of field positions staff have served in, with senior staff positions preferably being filled by staff who have served in three or more field postings.

National personnel play an extremely important role in TC management in the field. In order to compete for the very best national staff on TC projects and for the backstopping of TC projects, ILO should reconsider its policy of limiting national officers to NO-A and NO-B grades. Top performing national officers who gain substantial experience on ILO projects or on programme management should be considered for short- or long-term assignments as international staff.

4. OVERALL RATINGS

The following ratings (table 4.1) were assigned for ILO TC. The survey ratings consist of average ratings for each category of respondent, while the two columns to the right contain the ratings of each of the two independent consultants tasked with this evaluation. The rationale for the ratings assigned by the two independent consultants is explained in Annex I.

Table 4.1 Overall ratings by criterion

Criteria	Survey ratings			Independent consultants' ratings	
	Constituents	Donors	ILO staff	Evaluation specialist	Team leader
Relevance	4.65	4.85	4.70	5.00	5.50
Coherence and design	4.65	4.85	4.70	4.00	4.00
Effectiveness	4.46	4.74	4.25	5.00	4.75
Efficiency	4.52	3.95	4.05	3.00	4.00
Sustainability	4.23	4.20	3.93	3.00	3.00
Mean	4.50	4.52	4.33	4.00	4.25

Scale: 6 = Highly satisfactory; 5 = Satisfactory; 4 = Somewhat satisfactory; 3 = Somewhat unsatisfactory; 2 = Unsatisfactory; 1 = Highly unsatisfactory.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The forthcoming Development Cooperation Strategy should be outward looking and focus on development objectives that implement ILO’s ILS, emphasizing results at the level of outcomes and impacts. It should include a realistically costed and budgeted action plan for creating the capacity required in the field to further raise the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of TC. Mainstreaming gender issues alone is not sufficient, and the strategy should continue to promote the current practice of having major projects target issues affecting women workers and employers. Notwithstanding the fact that the RB is being undertaken in a zero growth environment, these resources should be viewed as an investment that can both raise effectiveness and access to XBTC resources.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	High	Ongoing	Medium

Recommendation 2: ILO should carefully assess how it can best meet the DC priorities of different categories of countries based on demand and how to structure the expertise to support clusters with similar development conditions. The current practice of placing gender specialists in DWTs should continue irrespective of the country category and state of development, as it is apparent that gender issues in the labour market remain a major area of concern irrespective of country category. The distribution and coverage of country, multi-country, DWT and ROs should be rationalized taking into account technical and administrative support requirements as well as the structure and location of other key partners and stakeholders.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP – DDG/MR, PROGRAM, REGIONS	High	Ongoing	Medium

Recommendation 3: ILO should continue to deepen the use of decent work as the core of its brand, building on the expected inclusion of the concept under the new sustainable development goal (SDG 8). In this respect, the use of annual flagship publications envisaged under the Director-General’s reform commitment linked to clear communications strategies should also be implemented without delay. More research and publications should emphasize the evidence of the socio-economic impact of specific national legislation, policies and strategies with a view to supporting the implementation of ILO’s ILS.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/P, DDG/FOP, MULTILATERALS, RESEARCH	Medium	Ongoing	Low

Recommendation 4: To maximize ownership and sustainability, the principle emphasis of ILO's DC should be on national programmes. Regional programmes should ideally be applied only where they address cross-border issues. Capacity development should ensure that essential systems and processes are implemented and institutionalized to guarantee the continuation of activities once the ILO exits, including capacity for ex-post monitoring and evaluation to assess and record the developmental impact of DC.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV, PROGRAM, EVAL	Medium	Ongoing Should be incorporated into new DC Strategy	Medium

Recommendation 5: In order to achieve scale for impact, the ILO should actively mobilize resources at country level, moving beyond traditional ODA to government resources, IFIs, the private sector and related combinations in a way that does not compromise its independence or perspective. The commitment of national resources to complement ILO's funds and ensure sustainability should be a prerequisite for project approval.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 6: Despite the current constraints on funding, the ILO should find ways to invest in "country managers" in non-resident member States with large TC portfolios with a view to engaging in sustained policy dialogue with constituents to support resource mobilization and achieve scale in its programme.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
PROGRAM	High	Medium-term	Medium

Recommendation 7: In fragile states and those emerging from conflict, project personnel may be "embedded" in ministries, and workers' and employers' organizations with a view to serving as mentors, trainers and technical advisers to accelerate implementation, and the development of national capacity where it is particularly low. However, all such instances should be accompanied by a clear exit strategy.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, PARDEV	Medium	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 8: In all countries, clear analysis of the country situation and priorities contained in UN-DAFs/UNDAPs should precede the design and implementation of DWCPs, ensuring linkages and mutual

reinforcement between activities and UN bodies. Project documents should be less aspirational and incorporate realistic budgets, counterpart contributions and exit strategies. The transition from project to programme design should be conceptualized in terms of national development rather than project framework.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/P – DDG/FOP, PARDEV, PROGRAM	Medium	Medium- term	Low

Recommendation 9: ILO must urgently address the perception that its support costs are higher than those of other agencies. A dedicated study to review actual administrative and technical support costs by ILO, benchmarked against other agencies of the UN system, NGOs and bilateral agencies should be undertaken. This could be incorporated into the recently commissioned business process review. PSI should be used closer to where it is generated and should cover: (i) capacity to monitor and report on projects and programme implementation to donors and for accountability purposes; (ii) advocacy, communication and mobilization of resources; and (iii) financial and administrative management of resources, and of the project that has generated the resources. PSI should also be allocated as early as possible for sound planning purposes.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, DDG/FOP, DDG/P, FINANCE, PROGRAM, PARDEV	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 10: ILO must make a concerted effort to reduce time lags in project start-up. Consideration should be given to establishing a pool of pre-screened project personnel who can be tapped quickly without extensive re-interviewing. Overall, ILO needs to distribute sufficient authority to each level of the system to achieve its objectives, whilst ensuring clear accountability.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, DDG/FOP, HRD, PARDEV, PROGRAM	High	Short-term	Low

Recommendation 11: With regard to administrative and financial management, the rollout of IRIS to all COs and projects should be accelerated. At the same time, the level of budget authorization available at CO level should be raised to reduce the amount of procurement and recruitment activities needing to be referred back to ROs or HQ.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, FINANCE, INFOTEC	High	Ongoing	High

Recommendation 12: While resources for global and inter-country projects and programmes should continue to be mobilized by PARDEV HQ and ROs, it is strongly recommended that some of its capacity should be out-posted. This should create resource mobilization and monitoring units uniformly across ROs or COs with a mandate to support mobilization at country level.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/FOP, DDG/MR, PARDEV, PROGRAM, REGIONS	Medium	Short- to medium-term	Medium

Recommendation 13: ILO should enhance its approach to building communities of practice around priority issues in different categories of countries to enhance knowledge management. They should aim to transcend regions, going global across the Organization. The institutional objective should be to move the Office from being a hierarchical Organization to a much flatter, network-based knowledge exchange built around ILO's mission critical concerns.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG-P, RESEARCH, REGIONS	Medium	Medium	Medium

Recommendation 14: ILO's staff mobility policy should be rolled out providing strong professional and financial incentives linked to the number of field positions staff members have served in as well as their performance, with senior staff positions being filled by staff with extensive field experience. In order to compete for the best national staff, ILO should reconsider its policy of limiting the maximum grade of national officers to the NO-B level. Top-performing national professional officers should be considered through appropriate mechanisms for long-term assignments as international staff and for short-term developmental opportunities.

Responsible units	Priority	Time implication	Resource implication
DDG/MR, HRD	High	Medium-term	Medium

6. OFFICE RESPONSE

The Office welcomes the independent evaluation of the ILO Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010–15, and notes with appreciation that the evaluation team decided to evaluate not only ILO’s technical cooperation *strategy* but to expand the scope to include an overall assessment of the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of ILO’s DC *programme*, thus adding considerable value to the evaluation. The Office endorses the majority of the 14 Recommendations with the following remarks:

Recommendations related to ILO’s Development Cooperation Strategy (Nr 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13).

The revised Development Cooperation Strategy 2015–17 (see GB.325/POL/6) emphasizes the important role of DC in advancing all four pillars of the DWA, including ILS and the cross-cutting theme of gender. The strategy provides a comprehensive list of tangible deliverables and measurable targets, and includes concrete measures to enhance the capacity of both constituents and staff in the field of DC.

The Office is in the process of finalizing a comprehensive SDG preparedness plan. Three flagship reports have been identified as key tools for disseminating empirical evidence and sound analysis on key employment and social policy issues, and informing ILO policy advice and capacity-building work, both globally and nationally.

Global, regional and national programmes pursue different objectives, address different target groups, and follow different implementation modalities, and therefore complement each other. Moreover, global and regional programmes can fully comply with the principle of national ownership if embedded into DWCPs.

The Office fully agrees with the centrality of capacity building in DC, as also emphasized in the revised DC strategy 2015–17.

A greater focus on domestic resource mobilization has already been included in the Development Cooperation Strategy 2015–17. The Office notes, however, that the recommendation to make the allocation of national resources a prerequisite for project approval could put a serious strain on the ILO’s capacity to service its constituents, as not all may be able to provide such resources. The allocation of national resources, however, in the form of in-kind contributions may prove valuable, as the current practice shows.

DWCPs provide the Office with a country-specific programming framework that serves as a conceptual umbrella for individual projects. Guidelines for Decent Work Country Diagnostics have just been published. The revised DWCP Guidebook will provide guidance for better linkages with UN frameworks and processes at country level throughout the DWCP cycle. All DWCPs are aligned with UNDAFs, but not all DWCPs are yet fully costed and budgeted upfront.

The Office is of the view that DC field support could be more effectively organized through the establishment of an Office-wide global Development Cooperation Team, consisting mainly of relevant staff at HQ and in the field coordinated by PARDEV staff.

The establishment of Global Technical Teams is underway as part of the Office's reform commitment.

Recommendations related to ILO's field structure and operations (Nr 2, 6, 7).

A typology of member States is being elaborated by the Office as part of the implementation of the decisions flowing from the *ILO Field Operations & Structure and Technical Cooperation Review, 2013*. Adjustments to the Office's field structure are being made under the same exercise within the limits of a zero growth budget, some of which are already reflected in the P&B 2016–17.

As part of the field operations reform, the Office has identified the need to pursue ongoing efforts to strengthen technical capacity in the field closer to constituents where ILO services are delivered. The P&B 2016–17 includes a major effort in this regard, with a substantial transfer of resources from management, administration and support functions to technical work, in particular in the regions. Flagship programmes combined with the enhancement of technical capacity in the field will continue to be a priority in the future within the limits of a zero growth budget. In parallel, opportunities to assess the feasibility of appointing country managers in non-resident member States that register very substantial XBTC will be explored.

The Office is of the view that the “embedded” approach should apply to DC in all member States, not just fragile States, provided the required security conditions are fulfilled.

Recommendations related to administrative, financial and HR issues (Nr 6, 9, 10, 11, 14)

Under the reform commitment, the Office has identified the need to review its policy on programme support costs and distribution of the resulting income. Any changes in existing policy will be aligned to the extent possible to best practices in other specialized agencies of the UN to ensure cost recovery in accordance with the requirements of the financial regulations and to ascertain a more direct linkage to the delivery of support activities.

The business process review being conducted under the reform commitment aims inter alia at reducing time lags, and aligning responsibility, authority and accountability. However, this also requires engagement by development partners, some of whom require customized and complex, and, therefore, costly and time-consuming administrative requirements on the projects they finance.

The progressive rollout of IRIS continues within the available resources. Comparative studies are being undertaken to review whether there is a need to modify the levels of decentralized authority, and the business process review is considering opportunities to simplify certain procedures.

The Office has put in place a new mobility policy. The ILO Staff Regulations do foresee grades beyond NO-B. Moreover, several high performing national officers have been appointed to international positions.

ANNEX I. EXPLANATION FOR OVERALL RATINGS

The following table provides a brief summary of the rationale used to reach the ratings assigned for each criterion:

Criteria	Ratings		Rationale	
	David Todd	David Todd	Rajeev Pillay	Rajeev Pillay
Relevance	4.00	DWCPs mostly appear relevant to country aspirations and plans, and most ILO activities are in DWCPs. The Programmes also often relate to UNDAFs/UNDAPs/DaO and are therefore relevant to UN-wide strategy.	5.50	ILO has generally identified high priority areas in conjunction with constituents, which are perceived as highly relevant. Relevance is tempered by lack of scale.
Coherence and design	4.00	There is a major tendency for TC projects to be designed for a shorter period than is needed to achieve their intended results. Although this is to a large extent imposed upon ILO by its heavy reliance on extra budgetary funding for TC activities, it is still a factor, which prevents coherence from being rated as satisfactory. There is often an assumption, sometimes more grounded than others, that a second phase of funding will be attained, thereby increasing coherence of the design and results, but this is by no means reliable. In terms of the inter-relationship among projects, there is evidence of strategic coherence in some countries, but this is far less evident in non-resident countries, where programmes are often an aggregation of unrelated or very loosely-related component projects.	4.00	DWCPs and UNDAFs/UNDAPs demonstrate coherence. Design of individual projects could be better with a view in particular to ensuring sustainability. Resource constraints sometimes render projects unrealistic as designed. Unrealistically short project durations that are in large part imposed due to donor funding cycles constrain project design limiting both impact and sustainability. In general ILO staff have done a good job of building linkages between projects where DWTs and programme staff are readily available. Where there are only projects, coherence and potential linkages tend to be underexploited.

Criteria	Ratings		Rationale	
	David Todd	David Todd	Rajeev Pillay	Rajeev Pillay
Effectiveness	5.00	TC activities generally deliver their intended outputs at the expected level and are well-regarded by the constituents. Whilst the contribution of ILO TC activities to national policies, strategies, regulations and the like is effective, they cannot be seen as highly satisfactory because of common reservations concerning the scale at which they can contribute to field level changes, which is often limited to a “pilot” approach. ILO lacks the funds to scale up to become highly satisfactory and also often has insufficient influence to ensure that stakeholders with more resources adopt its approaches.	4.75	Outputs of TC activities are delivered to a high standard and on time and are highly regarded by constituents and other stakeholders alike. Technical quality is admired. Limitations are placed on effectiveness largely as a result of factors beyond the control of ILO. Measurement of impact remains a problem as indicators collected are usually limited to outputs. Scaling up remains a significant problem due to lack of TC resources.
Efficiency	3.00	In terms of the cost-effectiveness element of efficiency, ILO's charge of 13% support costs is regarded unfavourably by donors. It may be that this charge is actually comparable with those of other agencies, which appear more cost-effective by including fewer items under support costs than ILO and recording these under different financial headings. An authoritative comparison of how support costs are categorised in different agency (UN and others) systems would be helpful in this regard, but does not appear to be available. On the operational dimension of efficiency, the evaluation team received numerous reports of negative experiences from donors with regard to delays (sometimes substantial) in ILO TC project delivery. Underlying factors include the low level of delegation on staffing and financial matters to country level staff and the apparent lack of priority given by ILO senior management to ensuring that TC activities are adequately supported, particularly with regard to initial recruitment and staff performance issues. Some donors were so dissatisfied with ILO TC project efficiency that they expressed hesitation to work with the Organization again. Against these reported challenges, which might tend towards a “highly unsatisfactory” rating, many other projects were found to have delivered on time, based on good initial recruitment and an absence of staffing “issues” during implementation.	4.00	Efficiency is frequently compromised by delays in startup. During implementation staff are generally praised by constituents and other partners for timeliness despite the need to seek authorisation from higher levels due to unreasonably low thresholds. Transaction costs are therefore higher than perhaps necessary.

Criteria	Ratings		Rationale	
	David Todd	David Todd	Rajeev Pillay	Rajeev Pillay
Sustainability	3.00	<p>Sustainability is often unsatisfactory because of the lack of project design coherence (see above), under which projects are knowingly designed to deliver outcomes, which cannot be achieved within their time span. This is largely because of funding approaches by donors under XBTC. A major focus of sustainability is on assisting (usually) governments to put improved systems (policies, strategies, regulations) in place in areas targeted by the mandate. However, this approach does not guarantee sustainability of benefits, since governments often lack resources or commitment to implement the revised systems. Further, the ILO emphasis on capacity building as a means of ensuring sustainability is not optimally effective, since it often reflects a rather outdated approach, focussed on the provision of limited short-term technical training to local counterparts. The approach of longer-term mentoring through “embedding” of ILO TC specialists has shown good results, particularly in countries reconstructing after periods of fragility; but also runs the risk of substituting for regular government officers. Other trends reducing sustainability of gains from ILO TC (particularly noticed in MICS and BRICS) include high civil service staff turnover, politicisation of the Civil Service, reduced role of Trade Unions and declining importance of Ministries of Labour. Overall, there appears to be inadequate conceptualisation during project design of how sustainability might be generated, manifested by inadequate attention to raising systemic (rather than individual) capacity throughout the project and poorly defined “exit strategies”. An underlying challenge relates to the declining role of “traditional” development cooperation and the rise of new approaches to financing from governments themselves, the private sector and other sources. If ILO TC is to become more sustainable, it needs to establish its relevance to these new financial streams and their effects on the labour market.</p>	3.00	<p>Sustainability is the weakest criterion for ILO TC projects due both to design shortcomings, the absence of clear exit strategies and the failure of government and constituents to allocate human and financial resources to sustain implementation beyond the externally funded. project cycle.</p>
Mean	3.80		4.25	

ANNEX II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

Every year the ILO's Evaluation Office (EVAL) holds annual consultations with senior management, the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) and constituents to select topics for future high-level evaluations. The selection of strategic evaluations customarily focuses on strategic outcomes but may also focus on institutional capacity issues. *In 2012, the constituents requested an evaluation of the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 to be undertaken in 2013.* Due to the on-going review on ILO's technical cooperation by the Office of the Field Structure and Technical Cooperation, it was agreed with the EAC, management and constituents *to postpone the evaluation to 2015.* In the meantime, the report of the Field Review Team to the Director General has been released. Further, as requested by the Governing Body (GB) in March 2014, a new Technical Cooperation Strategy 2015-17 was presented to the GB in November 2014.¹⁶ The GB took note that adjustments to the strategy might be necessary to take into account the sustainable development goals, the transitional strategic Programme and Budget (P&B) 2016-17, the on-going internal reform, as well as the findings of the present evaluation of the TC strategy.¹⁷ The Office was also requested to present refined deliverables and/or targets in March 2015 and a revised strategy, for adoption, at the 325th session of the Governing Body in November 2015.

BACKGROUND: ILO'S TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Technical Cooperation (TC) is one of the major instruments used by the ILO to achieve its overall goal of promoting full and productive employment and decent work for women and men in all countries.¹⁸ The ILO TC programme is essential to implementing the Decent Work Agenda at a national level, assisting constituents to make this concept a reality for all men and women.

The **Partnerships and Field Support Department (PARDEV)** ensures the overall management of ILO's development cooperation programme, as well as partnerships with a broad range of organizations and institutions. PARDEV leads consultations and negotiations with development partners and assists headquarter units and field offices in establishing and nurturing partnerships with like-minded organizations. The Department mobilizes resources, including RBSA, for ILO's technical cooperation programme

¹⁶ ILO: *Technical Cooperation Strategy proposals for 2015-17*, Governing Body, 322th Session, Geneva, 2014, GB.322/POL/6.

¹⁷ ILO. Governing Body: *Decision on the sixth item on the agenda: ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2015-17*, GB.322/Pol/6, 322th Session, Geneva, 2014. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_314449.pdf.

¹⁸ ILO. Partnership and Field Support Department (PARDEV). *ILO Technical Cooperation Manual*. p. 5.

and ensures that quality standards and reporting requirements are met. PARDEV promotes and serves partnerships with international NGOs, faith-based organizations, the members of the UN Development Group, the academia, parliamentarians, regional organizations and banks, and many other external partners. PARDEV is also in charge of ILO's Public-Private Partnerships and South-South and Triangular Cooperation Programme. The Department places particular emphasis on knowledge management and sharing through a variety of means.

As of November 2014, the ILO was conducting 608 technical cooperation projects in 105 countries¹⁹ with the help of over 100²⁰ development partners worldwide. Some of these projects are clustered in global programmes with coordinated management (e.g. International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC); the Better Work Programme or the Sustaining Competitive and Responsible Enterprises Programme) or they form part of an allocation in support of a P&B outcome, which is broken down into country-specific allocations. These are funded both by regular budget and extra-budgetary resources. Extra-budgetary expenditure in 2013 amounted to US\$228.6 million, accounting for over 80 per cent of all TC expenditure.²¹

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND CLIENTS

The ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization adopted in June 2008 (the 2008 Declaration) identified technical cooperation as a means of action for realization of fair globalization based on Decent Work as well as for implementation of the Decent Work Agenda at the country level. By strengthening and streamlining ILO's technical cooperation, progress towards all the strategic objectives reflected in the Strategic Policy Framework (SPF) is expected to be achieved on a tripartite basis through Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs) as well as within the framework of the UN system. Further, the institutional capacity of constituents is to be increased to facilitate meaningful and coherent social policy and sustainable development.

These principles were reflected in the current *Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 (the Strategy 2010-15)* presented in a result-based manner with three outcomes:

- Outcome 1: ILO extra-budgetary and RBSA resources are aligned with Decent Work Country Programme and programme and budget outcomes;²²
- Outcome 2: ILO technical cooperation programmes and projects fully meet results-based management and ILO quality requirements; and
- Outcome 3: Through technical cooperation, ILO constituents attain technical and institutional capacity to successfully engage in development planning through Decent Work Country Programmes, in the context of UNDAFs and UN reform.

The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the performance of the ILO in implementing the Results-based Strategies 2010-15²³ against the intended goals related to technical cooperation articulated in paragraph II A (ii) of the 2008 Declaration. The evaluation findings and recommendations should be incorporated in the revised strategy for 2015-17, which is to be adopted in November 2015. This evaluation will touch upon the role of the field structure and capacity building in technical cooperation delivery but not cover them in-depth, as separate evaluations on these topics have been requested by the constituents

¹⁹ Excluding regional, sub-regional, interregional and global projects.

²⁰ As per 31 December 2013.

²¹ ILO. PARDEV. 2013. *Extra Budgetary Technical Cooperation Annual Report 2013*, <https://www.ilo.org/intranet/english/bureau/pardev/statistics/download/annual/2013delivery.pdf>.

²² This outcome will require that the evaluation also looks into the contribution TC has made to the realization of ILO's SPF and PB deliverables.

²³ ILO. Results-based strategies 2010-15: Overview, GB.206/PFA/12/1, 306th Session, Geneva, Nov. 1999. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_116296.pdf

for 2016 and 2017 respectively. This evaluation instead will focus mainly on determining how ILO's TC strategy and related resource mobilization have been implemented and how this has contributed to decent work achievements called for in the ILO's Strategic Policy Framework (SPF) 2010-15, using the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15, and relevant technical and management departments, as well as field offices responsible for its implementation as a starting point.

The evaluation will cover 2010 to 2015 as it is the implementation period of the Strategy 2010-15, but also will be formative in nature and look forward to the new Evaluation Strategy under discussion. As part of the scoping exercise, the evaluation inception report will address the variety of definitions for terms used in ILO, including technical cooperation, technical assistance, technical advisory services, as well as the new concept of development cooperation.

The evaluation will review resource mobilization and allocation in the ILO, particularly in the context of the contribution it currently makes or potentially could make to ILO's results-based programming framework - including mechanisms to correct underfunding of certain outcomes. To this end, the evaluation is expected to review the systems and processes²⁴ in place for mobilization and allocation of resources and TC implementation and provide recommendations to optimize both. The recommendations should be forward-looking, focusing on ways to improve and enhance the ILO's technical cooperation strategy and implementation, and aiming at achieving realistic added value to the ILO's objectives as laid out in the SPF, Programme and Budget documents, and in Decent Work Country Programmes. Regional perspectives and dimensions in this respect will be explored as well. The principal client for the evaluation is the Governing Body, which is responsible for governance-level decisions on the findings and recommendations of the evaluation. Other key stakeholders include the Director General and members of the Senior Management Team at Headquarters, as well as Directors and staff of field offices working directly on technical cooperation. It should also serve as a source of information for ILO donors, partners and policy makers.

KEY QUESTIONS

In the assessment of (i) relevance, (ii) coherence and validity of design, (iii) effectiveness, (iv) efficiency, and (v) impact and sustainability of the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15, the evaluation will seek to address the following evaluation questions:

Assessment Criteria	Questions to be addressed
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent does the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 reflect the established priorities and outcomes of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice? How well does the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 outcomes align with those of ILO's SPF 2010-15, P&Bs and DWCPs as well as UN global (MDGs) and country strategies (UNDAFs)? What means are there to ensure continuing relevance vis-à-vis changing needs and new developments?
Coherence & Validity of Design ²⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the baseline conditions for the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15? Are the planned objectives and outcomes of the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 properly responding to the perceived needs and situation globally and on the ground and how are these needs identified? Are the objectives and outcomes of the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 logical and realistic? Do the priorities and objectives identify the principal means of action for achieving Decent Work outcomes within the PB and SPF framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15? Do they effectively assess its results and progress? Are the indicators measurable and traceable? Are the indicators comparable to those that aim to measure similar outcomes within the UN system?

²⁴ Traditional Technical Cooperation mechanisms as well as newer modalities such as (Regular Budget Supplementary Allocation - RBSA; Outcome Based Funding- OBF, ILO's Public-Private Partnerships and South-South and Triangular Cooperation Programmes etc..)

²⁵ There are some gaps and no clear linkage found between the outcomes of the Strategy 2010-15 and the relevant goals and actions to be taken set out in the 2008 Declaration and the Follow-up to the Declaration. This evaluation will have to point this out in assessing the validity of design of the Strategy 2010-15 and make necessary suggestions for the new Strategy for 2015-17.

Assessment Criteria	Questions to be addressed
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What results have been achieved and/or what progress has been made by the ILO's technical cooperation measured against Decent Work outcomes within the PB and SPF framework and the targets of the TC Strategy 2010-15 during the review period? • How has the ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 (including design quality control mechanisms and helpdesks) worked to support successfully the full project cycle of technical cooperation and contribute to continued resource mobilization? • Are the roles and responsibilities of ILO officials responsible for the delivery of TC clearly defined? • How is TC coordinated within the Office and with other intergovernmental bodies? Has TC been delivered in cooperation with other UN organizations? Are there any differences noticeable on these aspects between centralized and decentralized project activities? • Are the types of TC interventions (e.g. meetings, advisory services, research, direct supported) and their delivery supporting ILOs' result-based framework at all levels and are funding gaps for certain outcomes being filled through allocation correction mechanisms?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are resources for TC being used in the most efficient manner? How economically are resources and inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) converted to results? Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? Do the results achieved justify the costs? • What time and cost efficiency measures could be introduced without impeding the achievement of results? • How have organizational (field structure), administrative, and managerial issues influenced the achievements of TC activities? Are there any differences noticeable on these aspects between centralized and decentralized project activities? • What are the mechanisms in place for tracking the resource allocations and expenditures for TC activities? Do they provide a sound basis for monitoring the related expenditure? • Is the overhead cost charged in TC and RBSA competitive, and does it allow the ILO to recover implementation costs? (to be discussed as part of scoping as answering this question could be a very extensive exercise) • Are there benefits/trade-offs to delivering TC services through larger (flagship) programmes?
Impact & Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can observed changes and results be causally linked to the TC interventions? Did the changes result from the ILO TC interventions? Are there impact assessments that can support attribution of results to TC activities, and if not, what other evidence is there? • What are the tripartite constituents' perceived benefits from the TC activities (differentiated by groups)? • Is it likely that the results of the TC interventions are durable and can be maintained or even up-scaled and replicated by constituents after the provision of ILO's TC? Are there any differences noticeable on these aspects between centralized and decentralized project activities? • What actions and conditions are required for achieving broader, long-term impact?
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How have the issues identified above been addressed in the new ILO Technical Cooperation Strategy proposed for 2015-17 and what are the recommendations for the foreseen revision of the Strategy to be adopted by the GB in November 2015?

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

This evaluation will be based upon the ILO's evaluation policy and procedures which adhere to international standards and best practices, articulated in the OECD/DAC Principles and the Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the United Nations System approved by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in April 2005. More specifically the evaluation will be conducted in accordance with *Eval Protocol No 1: High-level Evaluation Protocol for Strategy and Policy Evaluations*.

The evaluation team is encouraged to look at the methodologies used by independent evaluation of the technical cooperation of other UN Agencies, but should develop its own approach, based on the core norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), to reflect the particularities of ILO's technical cooperation system including: its tripartite governance structure, its Decent Work Agenda, and its membership of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). The team will also assess the role of national constituents in the evaluation process and ensure stakeholder participation in the evaluation. A self-assessment checklist of ILO's Technical Cooperation Strategy 2010-15 will be carried out by PARDEV prior to the evaluation and included in the background documentation for the independent evaluation team. In drawing conclusions and recommendations, the evaluation team is also expected to review the comparable TC strategies of peer UN organizations as potential benchmark.

The gender dimension should be considered as a cross-cutting concern throughout the methodology, deliverables and final report of the evaluation. In terms of this evaluation, this implies involving both men and women in the consultation, evaluation analysis and evaluation team. Moreover the evaluators should review data and information that is disaggregated by sex and gender and assess the relevance and effectiveness of gender-related strategies and outcomes to improve lives of women and men. All this information should be accurately included in the inception report and final evaluation report.

The details of the methodology will be elaborated by the selected team of evaluators on the basis of the Terms of Reference (TORs) and documented in their proposal and their inception report, which are subject to EVAL's approval. It is expected that the evaluation team will apply mixed methods, which draw on both quantitative and qualitative evidence and involve multiple means of analysis.

These include but are not limited to:

- Desk review of relevant documents, including evaluation reports, TC design quality appraisals, the ILO's field operations and structure and TC review and its implementation plan, reports and meta-studies on funds and programs, technical cooperation, capacity development, etc.;
- Reviewing the self-assessment carried out by PARDEV and discussion with relevant ILO officials;
- Reviewing of the TC strategies of peer UN organizations including WHO and FAO;
- Reviewing evidence of follow up to relevant evaluation recommendations and use of lessons learned by ILO management;
- Interviewing key stakeholders which should reflect a diversity of backgrounds inside the Office, according to sector, technical unit, regions and country situations, and representing both providers and recipients of ILO's technical cooperation;
- Interviewing stakeholders outside the Office, including Governing Body members, tripartite partners, members of multilateral and bilateral partners;
- Conducting online surveys and other methodologies to obtain feedback and/or information from constituents and other key stakeholders; and
- Field visits to further develop country case studies.

Additional criteria may be added by the evaluation team. The initial proposal should present a detailed evaluation approach and a range of methodologies. Key questions to take into account when developing an evaluation approach for the proposal are provided above.

A summary rating shall be expressed by the independent evaluation team at the end of the six evaluation criteria and the respective questions listed above²⁶. The evaluation shall use a six point scale ranging from "highly satisfactory," "satisfactory," "somewhat satisfactory," "somewhat unsatisfactory," "unsatisfactory," and "highly unsatisfactory."

- **Highly satisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that ILO performance related to criterion has produced outcomes which go beyond expectation, expressed specific comparative advantages and added value, produced best practices;
- **Satisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that the objectives have been mostly attained and the expected level of performance can be considered coherent with the expectations of the national tripartite constituents, beneficiaries and of the ILO itself;
- **Somewhat satisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that the objectives have been partially attained and there that expected level of performance could be for the most part considered coherent with the expectations of the national tripartite constituents, beneficiaries and of the ILO itself ;

²⁶ Independent evaluations in the ILO are conducted by independent external evaluators. The final project ratings are produced by the external evaluators as an outcome of the evaluation process. These ratings are based on actual programme data, interaction with beneficiaries and stakeholders as well as on project performance documents (which include self-assessed ratings).

- **Somewhat unsatisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that the objectives have been partially attained and the level of performance show minor shortcoming and are not fully considered acceptable in the view of the ILO national tripartite constituents, partners and beneficiaries;
- **Unsatisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that the objectives have not been attained and the level of performance show major shortcoming and are not fully considered acceptable in the view of the ILO national tripartite constituents, partners and beneficiaries; and
- **Highly unsatisfactory:** when the findings related to the evaluation criterion show that expected results have not been attained, and there have been important shortcomings, and the resources have not been utilized effectively and/or efficiently.

MAIN OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES/TIMEFRAME

The proposed time frame for this evaluation is from December 2014 to July 2015 in accordance with the following schedule:

- TORs drafted and circulated among stakeholders December 2014
- Feedback received and incorporated January/February 2015
- Evaluation team formed. February 2015
- Kick off meeting February 2015
- Inception report March 2015
- Interviews of GB members and constituents. March 2015
- Interviews of Senior Management Team and other management and staff of ILO March 2015
- Telephone and video conference interviews of ILO field staff and other UN peers March/April 2015
- Field visits and case studies. March/April 2015
- First draft report. April&2015
- First draft report circulated for comments. April/May 2015
- Second draft report circulated for comments. May 2015
- Revising the second draft. June 2015
- Presentation of findings and recommendations to ILO prior to finalizing the report June/July 2015
- Final report. July 2015

MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES

EVAL will take the lead role for funding, tendering, contracting, and implementation management. The Director of the EVAL will oversee the evaluation process and participate together with selected officials of EVAL as members of the coordinating team. An officer from PARDEV will be appointed to facilitate coordination with sector experts and provide relevant documentation as requested by the team. This person will observe as the key technical liaison to the evaluation team, assisting in the identification of key stakeholders at Headquarters and the field, and will coordinate the internal review and timely feedback on the evaluation drafts.

The leading external evaluator will provide technical leadership and is responsible for:

- Drafting the inception report, producing the draft reports and presenting a final report;
- Providing any technical and methodological advice necessary for this evaluation within the team;

- Ensuring the quality of data (validity, reliability, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.
- Managing the external evaluation team, ensuring the evaluation is conducted as per TORs, including following ILO EVAL guidelines, methodology and formatting requirements; and
- Producing reliable, triangulated findings that are linked to the evaluation questions and presenting useful and insightful conclusions and recommendations according to international standards.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

The lead evaluator will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, reliability, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. It is expected that the report shall be written in an evidence-based manner such that all observations, conclusions, recommendations, etc., are supported by evidence and analysis.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EVALUATORS

This evaluation includes a broad range of questions and will require a range of skills within but also beyond labour issues and technical cooperation. This evaluation will be managed by EVAL and conducted by a team of independent evaluators with the following competency mix:

- Prior knowledge of the ILO's roles and activities, and solid understanding of technical cooperation in the context of international development cooperation and funding (essential);
- Demonstrated executive-level management experience in reviewing and advising complex organizational structures, preferably in the field of labour issues and/or technical cooperation;
- At least 10 years' experience in evaluation policies, strategies, country programmes and organizational effectiveness;
- At least 7 years working experience in the evaluation function of national and international organizations and a full understanding of the UN evaluation norms and standards;
- At least 7 years' experience in result-based management and UN reform;
- Proven experience in the design of monitoring and evaluation systems for decision-making;
- No relevant bias related to ILO, or work experience with ILO in the last ten years; and
- Fluency in English, spoken and written (essential); knowledge of another ILO official language (French or Spanish) would be highly desirable.

All team members and their qualifications and roles within the team should be made available in the proposal, indicating proven ability to work with others in the development and timely delivery of high-quality deliverables. The organization of the work should be specified and explained clearly in a detailed timeline.

SELECTION CRITERIA

In assessing candidates EVAL will allocate greater importance to technical factors including the design and methods proposed than to cost factors. Proposals will be assessed in terms of best value to the ILO, with price and other factors considered.

ANNEX III: PERSONS INTERVIEWED

ILO HEADQUARTERS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND		
Person(s)	Title	Department
Greg Vines	Deputy Director- General, Management and Reform (DDG/MR)	Senior Management Team
Gilbert Hougbo	Deputy Director- General, Field Operations and Partnerships (DDG/FOP)	Senior Management Team
Sandra Polaski	Deputy Director-General for Policy (DDG/P)	Senior Management Team
Paulo Barcia	Director, Office of the DG (Secretary)	CABINET
Yasser Hassan	Advisor to the DG	CABINET
Annette Ching	Deputy- Director , Office of the DG	CABINET
Shengjie Li	Senior Advisor (Asia), Office of the DG	CABINET
Jurgen Schwettman	Director	PARDEV
Juan Felipe Hunt Ortiz	Deputy Director	PARDEV
Peter Rademaker	Head, Development Partners' Relations	PARDEV
Ramiro Pizzaro	Senior Programme Office	PARDEV
Carlien Van Empel	Head, Development Cooperation Support	PARDEV
Anita Amorim	Head, Emerging and Special Partnerships Unit (ESPU)	PARDEV
Andre Bogui	Director	PROGRAM
Giovanna Rossignotti	Deputy Director	PROGRAM
Oktavianto Pasaribu	Senior Programme Analyst	PROGRAM
Anthony Watson	Director of the Internal Audit Office	Internal Audit Office (IAO)
Adnan Chughtai	Chief	BUDFIN
Sietse Buijze	Head	BUDFIN
Stewart Kershner	Branch Chief EMS	IRIS
Bala Krishnan	Senior Functional Analyst	IRIS
Lily Nieh	Senior Functional Analyst	IRIS
Kamran Fannizadeh	Deputy Director	GOVERNANCE
Azita Berar Awad	Director	EMPLOYMENT

ILO HEADQUARTERS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND		
Person(s)	Title	Department
Terje Tessem	Chief, DEVINVEST	EMPLOYMENT
Iyanatul Islam	Chief, Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch (EMPLAB)	EMPLOYMENT
Gianni Rosas	Head, Youth Employment Programme	EMPLOYMENT
Dorothea Schmidt-Klau	Head, Dept Management and Coordination Unit	EMPLOYMENT
J-F. Klein	Senior Officer, Dept Management and Coordination Unit	EMPLOYMENT
Alfredo Lazarte	Senior Advisor	EMP/INVEST
Mito Tsukamoto	Senior Officer	EMP/INVEST
Girma Agune	Acting Director	EMP/SKILSS
Dan Rees	Chief, BETTERWORK	GOVERNANCE
Enrico Cariola	Senior Specialist in Workers' Activities	ACTRAV
Corrine Vargha	Director FPRW	FPRW (FUNDAMENTALS)
Beate Andre	Senior Officer	FPRW (FUNDAMENTALS)
Lisa Wong	Senior Officer	FPRW (FUNDAMENTALS)
Herve Berger	Operations	FPRW (FUNDAMENTALS)
Peter Wichmand	Evaluation and Design	FPRW (FUNDAMENTALS)
Alette H J E van Leur	Director	SECTOR
Peter Poschen	Director	ENTERPRISE
Michelle Leighton	Chief, Labour Migration Branch	Work Quality
Shauna Olney	Chief, Gender, Equality and Diversity Branch	Work Quality
Edward Lawton	CTA, Gender, Equality and Diversity Branch	Work Quality
Brigitte Zug-Castillo	Senior Programme Officer, ILOAIDS	Work Quality
Frank Hagemann	Officer-in-Charge for Arab States	ILO RO for Arab States
Aeneas C. Chuma	Regional Director	ILO RO for Africa
Geir Tonstol	Senior Operations Officer	ILO RO for Africa
Tomoko Nishimoto	Regional Director	ILO RO for Asia and the Pacific
Elizabeth Tinoco	Regional Director	ILO RO for Latin America and the Caribbean
Heinz Koller	Regional Director	ILO RO for Europe and Central Asia
Pierre De Lame	Senior Administrator and Relations Officer	ILO RO for Europe and Central Asia
Daniel Smith	Liaison Officer UK and Ireland/Programming Officer	ILO RO for Europe and Central Asia
WORKERS' Group	Esther Busser- ITUC-CSI; Representatives	GB Workers Members from Canada, Myanmar, China, Fiji, Nepal, Panama, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Angola, Dominican Republic, Bulgaria attended
EMPLOYERS' Group	Frederick Muia-IOE; Representatives	GB Employers' representatives from Barbados, China, Canada, Kenya, Bangladesh and Thailand attended
GRULAC	Presentation and Q&A during one of their regular consultations sessions.	All GB Government members of the America Group attended
ASPAC	Presentation and Q&A during one of their regular consultations sessions.	All GB Government members of the Asia, Pacific and Arab States Group attended

ILO HEADQUARTERS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND		
Person(s)	Title	Department
Africa Group	Presentation and Q&A during one of their regular consultations sessions.	All GB Government members of the Africa Group attended
IMEC	Presentation and Q&A during one of their regular consultations sessions.	All GB Government members of the Industrialised Market Economy Countries (IMEC) attended

PERU			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Agency/Organization
Maria	Olave	IPEC Regional Project	
Irené	Garcia		AECID
Ana	Lopez		AECID
Martin	Perez Monteverde	President	CONFIEP – Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas
Virginia	Baffigo Torrè de Pinillos	Executive Director	EsSALUD
Maria	Arteta	Deputy Director, Office for the Andean Countries	ILO
Eduardo Rodriguez	Calderon	Senior Specialist, Workers Activities	ILO
Italo	Cardona	Specialist in Labour Law and Labour Administration	ILO
Pablo	Casali	Specialist in Labour Protection	ILO
Melva	Diaz	Promoting Compliance of ILS project	ILO
Julio	Gamero	Employment and Employment Policy Specialist	ILO
Javier	Gonzales-Olaechea Franco	Specialist in Labour Norms	ILO
Florencio	Gudiño	Chief, Programme Unit	ILO
Valkyrie	Hanson	Promoting Compliance of ILS project	ILO
Elena	Motobio	IPEC Regional Project	ILO
Effrain	Quincaña	Occupational Safety and Health Project	ILO
Roberto	Villamil	Senior Specialist, Employers Activities	ILO
Silvia	Caceres	Former Adviser to the Vice Minister	Ministry of Labour
Edgard	Quispe	Former Vice Minister	Ministry of Labour
Carmen	Moreno	ILO Director, DWT/CO-Lima	ILO

INDIA			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Organization/Agency
Panooda	Boonapala	Country Director (Designate)	ILO
Anjana	Chellani	Senior Programme Officer	ILO
Sudipta	Bhadra	National Project Manager, SCORE	ILO
Bharti	Birla	National Project Manager, Work in Freedom Project	ILO
P. P.	Mitra	Principal Labour and Employment Adviser	V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, MOLE
S.K.	Sasikumar	Senior Faculty Member	V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, MOLE
Raakhee	Thimoty	Faculty Member	V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, MOLE
K.	Sarkar	Faculty Member	V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, MOLE
Suneetha	Eluri	National Project Manager, Gender and Domestic Workers Project	ILO
K.C.	Raghavan (Telephone)	Master Trainer, SCORE, Independent Productivity Consultant,	ILO
P.C.	Sharma		Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh
O.P.	Sharma		Indian National Trade Union Congress
Anand	Swaroop		Hind Mazdoor Sabha
N.M.	Adyanthaya	Former Delegate, ILO Governing Body (Workers)	
Sunita	Sanghi	Adviser	Niti Ayog
Manish	Gupta	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Labour and Employment
S.A.	Khan	General Manager	Standing Conference of Public Enterprises (SCOPE)
B.P.	Pant	Secretary (Coordination) and Adviser,	All India Organization of Employers/FICCI
Sher	Verick	Senior Employment Specialist, DWT	ILO
Alakh N.	Sharma	Director	Institute for Human Development
Parisha	Singh		All India Organisation of Employers
S.	Taye		All India Organization of Employers
A.	Sukesh	Senior Adviser (Labour and Political)	U.S. Embassy
Suresh	Kennit	National Programme Officer,, SECO	Embassy of Switzerland
Madhav	Lal	Secretary,	Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
R.S.	Maker (Telephone)	Director-General	Employers Federation of India
Rakesh	Gupta	Chief Engineer, Public Works Department	Government of Himachal Pradesh
Divya	Verma	National Programme Officer, HIV/AIDS Programme and Bonded Labour Programme	ILO
Rajender	Giri	National Programme Coordinator, Project on Trade Unions for Social Justice (ACTRAV)	ILO
A.C.	Pandey	Secretary, Planning Department, Lucknow (Former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Employment)	State Government of Uttar Pradesh
J.P.	Rai (Telephone)	Former Director-General, National Skills Development Agency	Ministry of Skills, Development and Entrepreneurship
Rani	Selvakumar	Programme Unit	ILO

INDIA			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Organization/Agency
Anandan	Menon (Telephone)	Programme Unit	ILO
Sharad	Patil (Telephone)	Former President	Employers Federation of India
Sherin	Khan	Senior Adviser, Planning Commission/Niti Aayog	ILO
Radhika	Kaul Batra	UN Coordination Adviser	Office of the Resident Coordinator
Seeta	Sharma	National Programme Manager	ILO
Piyush	Sharma (Telephone)	ILO Consultant (Former-Delhi Labour Commissioner and Former-Chief Labour Commissioner a.i.)	Ministry of Labour and Employment
Mukesh	Gupta (Telephone)	Former Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Investments, DWT	ILO
Sharda	Prasad		
Sudha	Pillai	Former Secretary of Labour, Former Member-Secretary, Planning Commission (Member Bachelet Commission)	Ministry of Labour and Employment

EGYPT			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Organization/Agency
Magdy	Hassan	Vice President	Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC)
Tarek	Tawfik	Vice Chairman	Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI)
Suzan	Abdelsalam	Programme Officer	ILO
Peri	Adel Abou Zied	Founder, Consultant	ILO
Badra	Alawa	Chief Technical Adviser, Decent Work for Women in Egypt and Tunisia	ILO
Rim	Aljabi	Senior Technical Officer, Women Employment Project	ILO
Kholoud	Alkhalidi	Enterprise/Management/Development Specialist	ILO
Adnan	Alrababh	Chief Technical Adviser, Promoting Worker Rights and Competitiveness in Egyptian Export Industries	ILO
Samaya	Aly	Senior Finance Administration Assistant	ILO
Nashwa	Belal	Senior Programme Officer	ILO
Sudipta	Bhadra	National Project Manager, SCORE	ILO
Yasmine	El Essawy	National Coordinator, Decent Work Team for North Africa	ILO
Marwa	El Feky	Administrative Assistant	ILO
Gehan	El Sharkawy	Senior Programme Assistant (Morocco and Tunisia)	ILO
Luca	Fedi	Senior Administrator	ILO
Christine	Hofmann	Skills and Employability Specialist	ILO

EGYPT			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Organization/Agency
Alia	Jamal	Senior International Labour Standards Specialist	ILO
Amal	Mowafy	Chief Technical Adviser, Decent Jobs for Egypt's Young People Project	ILO
Eric	Oechslein	Senior Specialist, Employer Activities	ILO
Asmaa	Rezk	Communications Assistant	ILO
Mohamed	Trabelsi	Senior Specialist, Workers' Activities	ILO
Arthur	Van de Meerendonk	Social Protection Specialist	ILO
Peter	Van Rooij	Country Director	ILO
Daniela	Zampini	Employment Specialist	ILO
Nahed	Al Ashtry	Minister	Ministry of Manpower and Migration
Nihal	Megharbel	Assistant to the Minister of Planning	Ministry of Planning
Omar	Hassan		Ministry of Social Solidarity
Nevine	Kabbaj	Assistant Minister	Ministry of Social Solidarity
Meervat	Sabreen	Adviser	Ministry of Social Solidarity
Ghada	Waly	Minister	Ministry of Social Solidarity

TANZANIA			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Organization/Agency
Noreen	Toroka	National Project Coordinator, WEDEE	ILO
Ally	Msaki	Director of Employment	Ministry of Labour and Employment
Maridadi	Phanuel	National Project Coordinator, Labour Laws and Governance	ILO
C.	Kaaya	President	Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA)
Samwel	Kilua	Project Officer, Business Sector	Embassy of Denmark
Marcelo	Grimberg Vaz de Campos	Deputy Head of Mission	Embassy of Brazil
Ekingo	Magembe	Director	Ministry of Finance
Gertrude	Sima	National Project Coordinator, HIV/AIDS	ILO
Helga	Gibbons	Senior Adviser	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
Samwel	Wangwei	Director	Research for Policy Development, REPOA
Suzanne	Ndomba	Legal Services Manager	Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE)
Gerald	Runyoro	Senior Programme Officer	UNIDO
Nancy	Lazaro	National Project Coordinator, Youth Employment	ILO
Flaviana	Charles	Legal Counsel	Legal and Human Rights Centre
Massoud	George	Legal Counsel	Legal and Human Rights Centre

KENYA			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Agency/Organisation
Ruth	Charo	Senior Loan Officer	African Development Bank
Helen	Mudora Obande	Executive Director	Association of Media Women in Kenya
Helen	Mudora Obande	Executive Director	Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK)
Yo	Ito	First Secretary	Embassy of Japan
Kennedy	Kandet	Registrar	Employment and Labour Relations Court
Nduma	Nderi	Justice	Employment and Labour Relations Court
Nzioki	Wa Makau	Judge	Employment and Labour Relations Court
Jacqueline	Mugo	Executive Director	Federation of Kenyan Employers
Helen	Magutu	National Programme Coordinator, UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS	ILO
Jane	Maigua	National Programme Coordinator, Women's Entrepreneurship and Development and Economic Empowerment (WEDEE)	ILO
Eunice	Mathenge	National Programme Coordinator, Labour Growth Nexus	ILO
Tasiana	Mzozo	National Programme Coordinator, International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)	ILO
Jacob	Omollo	Labour Economist	ILO
Msamua	Wafula	Ex-Board Member COTU	
General Secretary, KAMWU	KAMWU		
Richard	Kanoru	Chief Executive Officer	Matatu Owners' Association
I.B.	Kirigua	Deputy Labour Commissioner	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
James	Ndilio	Senior Assistant Labour Commissioner, Labour Department	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Christine	Otieno	Principal Liaison Officer, Labour Department	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Isaiah B.	Kirigua	SALC	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
James K.	Maru	Ag. Director, NHRPD	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
David	Cheboryot	Youth Employment (Green Jobs)	Tangaza College, St. Paul's University
Joanne	Bosworth	Senior Programme Officer	UNICEF
Anne	Kawira Bucyana	Senior Programme Officer	UNIDO

SOMALIA (IN NAIROBI, KENYA)			
First Name	Last Name	Title/Department	Agency/Organisation
Zainab	Adam Ali		Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mohamed	Musse Mohamed		FESTU
Omar Faruq	Osman Nur	Executive Secretary	Federation of Somali Trade Union (FESTU)
Mohamed	Osman Haji	Chairman	Somali Congress of Trade Union (SCTU)
Mohamoud	Abdikarim Gabeyrey	President	Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Abdi	Dirshe	Permanent secretary	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
Mohamed	Cade	Director General	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Maryan Ali	Obsiye	Chair-Person	Somalia Women Entrepreneurs Association

BANGLADESH			
First Name	Family Name	Title/Department	Agency/Organization
Farooq	Ahmed	Secretary General	Bangladesh Employers' Confederation
Shantesh	Datta		Bangladesh Employers' Confederation
Wajed-ul Islam	Khan	General Secretary,	Bangladesh Trade Union Centre
Md. Babar	Ali	Director, Planning and Development	Directorate of Technical Education
A.N.M. Salah Uddin	Khan	Director (PIU)	Directorate of Technical Education
Md. Shahjahan	Mian	Director General	Directorate of Technical Education
Nicole	Malpas	Programme Manager, Economic Cooperation	European Commission
Nisha		Chief Technical Adviser Promoting Decent Work through Improved Immigration Policy	ILO
Saidul		Programme Officer	ILO
Francis Dilip	De Silva	Senior Specialist	ILO
Cezar	Dragutan	Chief Technical Adviser, Skills for Employment and Productivity Project (BSEP)	ILO
Yoshie	Ichinohe	Senior Programme Support Officer	ILO
Khadija	Khondker	Programme Officer	ILO
Tauvik	Muhamed	Workers Education Expert	ILO
Srinivas B.	Reddy	Country Director	ILO
Arthur Earl	Shears	Senior Specialist, Technical and Vocational Education and Training	ILO
Louis B.	Vanegas	Programme Manager, Better Work, Bangladesh	ILO
Knondaker	Mostan Hossain	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Labour and Employment
Mukit	Khan	Chairman	National Coordination Committee for Workers

SOUTH AFRICA			
First Name	Family Name	Title/Department	Agency/Organization
Joni	Musabayana	Deputy Director, ILO DWT/CO-Pretoria	ILO
Limpho	Mandoro	Social Dialogue/Labour Admin Specialist, ILO DWT/CO-Pretoria	ILO
Sipho	Ndlovu	Senior Programme Officer, ILO DWT/CO-Pretoria	ILO
Sindile	Moitsi	Programme Officer, ILO DWT/CO-Pretoria	ILO

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO			
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TIMOR LESTE			
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Nuno	Trindade		CCITL Employers' Organization
Neryl	Lewis	Counsellor for Development, Rural Development Management	Embassy of Australia
Paul	Regnault	Second Secretary, Rural Development, DFAT	Embassy of Australia
Ambrani	Manuel	Development Programme Coordinator	Embassy of New Zealand
Charles	Dubay	Attaché, Finance and Contracts Manager	European Union
Nick	Heilegger	Attaché, Deputy Head of Finance, Contracts and Audit	European Union
Henani	Soares		IADE
Melissa		Child Labour Project	ILO
Bas	Athmer	Chief Technical Adviser, R4D Project	ILO
Jenny	Ikelberg	Chief Technical Adviser, BOSS Project	ILO
Michiko	Miyamoto (Skype)	Country Director	ILO
Roberto	Pes	Head of Mission, Chief Technical Adviser	ILO
Tomas	Strenstrom	Chief Technical Adviser, ERA Project	ILO
	Zito		KSTL Workers' Organization
Jacinto	Barros Gusmao	Director General	SEPFOPE

CAMBODIA			
First Name	Family Name	Title	Organization
Oknha	Ung Seangrithy	Chair,	Association of Cambodia Recruiting Agencies (ACRA)
Pin	Vireak	Secretary	Association of Cambodia Recruiting Agencies (ACRA)
Yusou	Solaiman	Vice-Chair	Association of Cambodia Recruiting Agencies (ACRA)
Chun	Bora	Executive Director	Cambodia Business Coalition on AIDS (CBCA)
Van	Souieng	Chairman	Cambodia Federation of Employers and Business Associations (CEMFEB)
Sandra	D'Amico,	Vice President,	Cambodian Federation of Employers and Business Association (CAMFEBA)
Tep	Kimvannary		CCTU (Trade Union)
Soung	Houts,		Trade Union
Sann	Vathana	Deputy Secretary General	Council for Agriculture and Rural Development
Andreas	Johansson	First Secretary	Embassy of Sweden
Ludgera	Klemp	Counsellor and Head of Cooperation	Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Johah	Wigerhäll	Sustainability Country Manager	H&M
Hout	Chea	Wages Project	ILO
Veyara	Chhieu	IR Project	ILO
Esther	Germans	Chief Technical Adviser, Better Factories, Cambodia	ILO
Rim	Khleang	Triangle Project	ILO
Malika	Ok	SSDM Project	ILO
Chuong	Por	HIV/AIDS	ILO
Sophorn	Sek	ITP Project	ILO
Sophorn	Tun	National Coordinator	ILO
Mom	Sokchar	Programme Manager	Legal Support for Children and Women
Mak	Ousphea	Deputy Director General of Trade Support Services	Ministry of Commerce
Tort	Chhengtieng	Department of International Cooperation	Ministry of Labour
Sa	Kennuidy	Deputy Director, Child Labour Department	Ministry of Labour
Phy	Maly	Department of Occupation Safety and Health	Ministry of Labour
Chuots	Narath	General Department of Labour	Ministry of Labour
Em	Sophonrith	Deputy Director, Child Labour Department	Ministry of Labour
Kry	Sreinath	General Department of Labour	Ministry of Labour
Hap	Omaly	Under Secretary of State	Ministry of Rural Development
Ouch	Cheachanmolika	Adviser	National Employment Agency
Santosh	Khatri	Education Specialist	UNESCO

ALBANIA			
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Gezim	Kalaja		BSPSH (WO)
Luan	Bregasi		Business Albania (EO)
Silvana	Mjeda	Swiss Development Cooperation	Embassy of Switzerland
Teuta	Zejno	Coordinator, Local Level Responses	Employment Challenge
	Sinakoli		European Commission
Ylli	Cabiri		HDPC (NGO)
Maria	Gomes	RBSA Project	ILO
Alfred	Topi	National Coordinator	ILO
Kol	Nikollaj		KSSH (WO)
Eralda	Marjani		Ministry of Health
Genta	Prodani	Director, Employment Policy	Ministry of Labour
Silva	Radovani	Director General	Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth
Genji	Kojdheli		National Employment Service
Sonila	Limaj	Director	NAVETQ
Astrit	Hado		Social Insurance Institute
Eda	Beqiri		State Labour Inspectorate
Zineb	Touimi-Benjelloun	Resident Coordinator	UN
Yesim	Oruc	Country Director	UNDP
Teuta	Tejno	Project Coordinator	Youth Employment

COLUMBIA			
First Name	Family Name	Title	Organization
Valkyrie	Hanson	Chief Technical Officer, ILO-USDOL Promoción del Cumplimiento de las Normas Internacionales del Trabajo en Colombia (Promoting Compliance with International Labour Standards in Colombia)	ILO
Melva Díaz	Better	Project Coordinator, Institutional strengthening component	ILO
Beethoven	Herrera Valencia	Project Coordinator, Social Dialogue	ILO
Miguel	Morantes Alfonso	Presidente, Confederación de trabajadores de Colombia, CTC	ILO
Carolina	Trevisi	Project Coordinator, SCORE	ILO
Luciano	Sanín	Director General, Escuela Nacional Sindical	Escuela Nacional Sindical
Patricia	Marulanda	Directora, Subdirección de inspección, Ministerio del Trabajo	Ministerio del Trabajo
Stella Salazar	Molina	Subdirectora, Subdirección de inspección, Ministerio del Trabajo	Ministerio del Trabajo

COLUMBIA			
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Gloria	Gaviria	Jefe Oficina de Cooperación Internacional; Ministerio del Trabajo	Ministerio del Trabajo
Julio Roberto	Robles	Presidencia, Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT	Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT
Myriam Luz	Triana	Secretaria General, Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT	Myriam Luz Triana
Diógenes	Orjuela	Jefe Relaciones Internacionales, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia , CUT	Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia, CUT
Brenna	Dougan	Labour Attaché, US Department of Labour	US Department of Labour
Nathan	Tenny	Project Officer	USAID
Alberto	Echavarria	Vicepresidente	Asuntos jurídicos, ANDI