



# ILO EVALUATION

<b>Evaluation Title:</b>	<b>Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA Support to Selected Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs) Concerning Promotion of Employment during the 2012 - 2013 Biennium</b>
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*This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Unit.*



**INDEPENDENT THEMATIC EVALUATION OF RBSA SUPPORT  
TO SELECTED COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOMES (CPOs)  
CONCERNING PROMOTION OF EMPLOYMENT  
DURING 2012 - 2013 BIENNIUM**

<b>CPOs:</b>	<b>RAF 107</b> - covering Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia;	
	<b>ETH 127</b> - covering Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.	
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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB	African Development Bank
CO	Country Office
CPOs	Country Programme Outcomes
DG	Director General
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DWAA	Decent Work Agenda for Africa
DWCPs	Decent Work Country Programmes
DWT	Decent Work Team
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EIA	Employment Intensive Approaches
EII	Employment Intensive Investment
EIIP	Employment Intensive Investment Programme
EMP/Enterprise	ILO Job Creation and Enterprise Development Department;
EMP/SEED	Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise Development
EMP/Skills	Skills and Employability Department
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GJP	Global Jobs Pact
GOB	Government of Burundi
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
GOG	Government of Ghana
GON	Government of Nigeria
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
GPs	Global Products
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HLE	High-Level Evaluation
HQ	Head Quarter
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IRIS	Integrated Resource Information System
KMs	Kilometres
KTC	Koforidua Training Centre
LBPWP	Labour-Based Public Works Programme
LCNA	Libyan Coordinated Needs Assessment
LIPW	Labour Intensive Public Works
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
OBWs	Outcome-Based Work Plans
OCs	Outcome Coordinators
ODA	Official Development Assistance
P&B	Programme & Budget
PARDEV	Partnerships and Development Cooperation Department
PDM	Programme Decision Minute
PROGRAM	Bureau of Programming and Management
RAF	Regional Office for Africa
RB	Regular Budget
RBSA	Regular Budget Supplementary Account
RBTC	Regular Budget for Technical Cooperation
ROAF	Regional Office for Africa
RPO	Regional Priority Outcome
RPU	Regional Programme Unit

SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SPF	Strategic Policy Framework
STAREC	Stabilization and Eastern Reconstruction Plan
TC	Technical Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations-Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
URAP	Universal Rural Access Programme
US\$	United States Dollar
VT	Vocational Training
WB	World Bank
WMs	Work Months
XBTC	Extra-Budgetary Technical Cooperation

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DISCLAIMER

This “*Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA support to Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs) Concerning Promotion of Employment* under the RAF 107 and ETH 127 CPOs covering ILO work in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia” was prepared by **Stanley Karuga**.

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In addition, the author would also like thank to extend gratitude to all other respondents met physically or contacted through skype/telephone for taking time out of their busy schedule to offer relevant and/or information which contributed immensely to the work of the Evaluation Mission.

Although the author made every effort to interpret and reflect as accurately as possible the information and data provided by the various respondents, views expressed in this report are those of the author and not the ILO staff or other respondents contacted during the Mission. . Any misrepresentations that may be found in the report are entirely the responsibility of the author.

**Stanley Karuga**

June 2015

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<sup>1</sup> *At the time of Mission, Evaluation Manager was away following his re-location to the ILO-Pretoria Office.*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1.0 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

#### 1.1 Project Purpose, Logic and Structure

Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) is a category of voluntary resources set up by the ILO in 2008 to increase the funding of its Decent Work Agenda through flexible unearmarked voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation programme. In the ILO Strategic Framework for 2010-2015, Employment Promotion (Outcome 1) is one of key outcomes towards fostering Office's decent work agenda. During the 2012-2013 biennium, the ILO allocated a total of US\$ 5,947,921 for employment promotion in the African region distributed across 19 CPOs – one (1) regional outcome and one (1) sub-regional outcome.

While several of these CPOs were linked to specific projects and were to be evaluated within the framework of project evaluation, some CPOs were not linked to any specific project and have to be evaluated independently. In this regard, eleven (11) CPOs were selected for independent thematic evaluation of RBSA support. The CPOs selected for evaluation are grouped into two Regional Country Priority Outcomes (RPO<sup>2</sup>) as follows:

-  **RAF 107** - comprising the following CPOs: BDI 101 (Burundi), COD 102 (Democratic Republic of Congo), LBY 126 (Libya), SOM 101 (Somalia), SSD 101 and SSD 103 (South Sudan) and TUN 104 (Tunisia). RBSA resources linked to this outcome, which amounted to US\$ 285,337, were to cover the responsible ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Senior Technical Expert position for work related to the achievement of social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts in these group of countries. The anticipated outcome of RAF 107, was *“Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”*. ILO work in this regard aimed at supporting Country Directors and Constituents in most conflict-affected countries in the African continent by applying the UN Policy for Employment in Post-Conflict environments at the national and sub-regional levels, to support prevention and recovery from conflicts through creation of decent work.
  
-  **ETH 127** – comprising the following CPOs: ETH 127 (Ethiopia), GHA 101 (Ghana), LBR 101 (Liberia), SLE 103 (Sierra Leone) and SSD 101 (South Sudan). RBSA resources linked to this outcome, which amounted to US\$ 43,898, were to cover the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert position for his work in these group of countries. The anticipated outcome of CPOs under ETH 127 was *“Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focusing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment”*. ILO support in this regard aimed at availing EIIP related

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<sup>2</sup> While ETH 127 is country priority outcome and not a regional CPO as such, lumping other country priority outcomes under this CPO code was for administrative reasons to allow for processing of budgetary allocation against ETH 127 given that Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert position under Addis CO was to provide support to these other CPOs as well.

services to the respective governments and other stakeholders through knowledge sharing and management in the planning, designing and implementing access roads projects.

## **1.2 Present Situation of the Project**

While the bulk of activities for CPOs under review were implemented during the 2012-2013 biennium, some activities e.g. under ETH 127 continued to be implemented during the first quarter of the 2014 – 2015 biennium. The process for this evaluation started way back in mid-2014, but the lack of a good consultant who knows how the ILO works on RBSA-related interventions delayed its execution for several months. While acknowledging this fact, it is vital for evaluations to be conducted more promptly so as to inform the Office more effectively and in a timely manner.

## **1.3 Purpose, Scope and Clients of the Evaluation**

This independent thematic evaluation has been undertaken in accordance with ILO's Evaluation Policy adopted by the Governing Body in November 2005, which requires systematic evaluation of all initiatives of the Office including RBSA-related work in order to improve quality, accountability and transparency of the ILO's work, strengthen the decision-making process and support constituents in forwarding decent work and social justice. The evaluation is specifically concerned with the contribution of ILO's technical support of the RBSA funds to ETH 127 and RAF 107. The primary clients of the evaluation include relevant ILO staff at the HQ in Geneva, ROAF in Addis Ababa, relevant country offices and the DWTs as well as the ILO tripartite constituents.

## **2.0 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation approach was participatory while the methodology comprised the following research instruments: (i) literature review of key relevant documents; and (ii) field interviews with a limited number key stakeholders.

## **3.0 KEY CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY THE MISSION**

The main challenges encountered by the Mission included unavailability of potential key respondents especially those that were directly involved in the implementation of the CPOs; last minute cancellation of the planned visit to Burundi following the eruption of political violence; and most importantly, the lack of formal M&E information which is apparently a generic issue for all RBSA-funded CPOs within the Office. Despite these challenges, the Mission was able to gather fairly sufficient data and information to inform the overall evaluation.

## **4.0 MAIN FINDINGS**

Notwithstanding limitations related to lack of requisite secondary data and information as well the limited number of respondents reached, the Mission was of the view that RBSA support to CPOs under review made notable achievements, which have the potential for impact and sustainability. This is in particular with respect to capacity building of stakeholders in various forms including training and exposure tours; employment creation using EII methods; dis-armament and business start through seed capital support; and mainstreaming of strategic interventions in government strategies, policies and plans.

## 4.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit

Interventions of CPOs under review were derived from DWCPs - where they were available especially in the case of CPOs under ETH 127 and also the ILO sub-regional Strategy for North Africa, 2011-2015- in the case of CPOs under RAF 107. Taking this into account, it can be reasonably inferred that the interventions were generally relevant to the stakeholders as the DWCPs as well as the sub-regional strategy were developed through consultative processes with key stakeholders. Additionally, while the Mission's review of CPO interventions indicated significant relevance and strategic fit with key relevant national policies, strategies and plans; interviews with key ILO respondents (ROAF, DWT/Pretoria CO, and the regional technical expert for CPOs under RAF 107) also indicated high relevance not only to the ILO decent work agenda but also to development aspirations of the government of member states and primary beneficiaries.

## 4.2 Validity of Design

By and large, the Mission found the CPO design processes to have been generally logical and coherent based on a number of parameters including information base upon which the CPOs were formulated and the inherent stakeholder consultations (with DWCP having formed the main basis); efficacy of the development models applied (the ILO-based EII methods and UN framework for prevention and recovery from conflicts through decent work creation); and the systematic application of ILO criteria for CPO selection, planning and approval processes. The problem lies in the hurry in which the CPOs were prepared given the short notice on the available RBSA resources and consequently the amount of stakeholders' consultations at that stage of the process.

## 4.3 Progress and Effectiveness

Albeit limitations encountered in terms of availability of M&E data and information pertaining to implementation and achievements of most of the CPOs, as well as the limited number of respondents interviewed, the Mission concludes that RBSA support contributed significantly to the decent work agenda, through employment creation as well as prevention and recovery from conflict. In particular, the Mission noted the following interventions and/or achievements which are likely to have sustainable impact beyond the biennium 2012-2013.

- ✚ *Capacity building of stakeholders e.g.* COD 102 -where a significant number of ex-combatants (6,799) were taken through life skills and other forms of training; ETH 127 - where training materials on the application of EIIP methods in infrastructural development were developed and fifty-nine (59) trainers trained; GHA 101 - where guidelines for promoting employment creation through the construction of dams, protection of soil erosion and other interventions related to environmental conservation were developed, and thirty (30) emerging entrepreneurs trained; LBR 101 - where a total of sixty-two (62) community roads maintenance groups were mobilized, and trained to act as service providers on road maintenance using labour-based methods; 30 MPW engineers and technicians trained in labour-based methods of infrastructural development; and four (4) study tours for the MPW members of staff organized and facilitated; SLE 103 - where fifteen (15) senior government officials were trained on appropriate planning, designing and implementation of infrastructural works using EII methods, forty-six (46) community representatives trained on routine maintenance, and twenty (20) Sierra Leone

Roads Authority engineers at the national and regional levels trained; and SSD 101 – where twenty (20) senior staff at decision-making level were introduced to the appropriate use of EII methods.

- + *Creation of requisite socio-economic and political enabling environment* – where interventions mainly under BND 101, COD 102, LBY 126, SOM 101, SSD 101 and SSD 103 were strongly oriented towards promotion of peace, security and development of infrastructural facilities.
- + *Promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation* – where ex-combatants under COD 102 were provided with professional kits for business-starts in a wide range of areas including bakery, butchery, tailoring, carpentry, vehicle repair, soap making, and hair dressing, among others; ex-combatants and persons with disabilities under SSD 101 were reintegrated into public works, urban jobs and livelihoods; and under SLE 103 -where some 127,875 person-days of employment were created in just two districts.
- + *Information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration* – where this was undertaken (especially under RAF 107) with strategic partners such as the World Bank, IGAD, UNDP, ECA and UNHCR.
- + *Mainstreaming interventions into government policies* – especially in the case of ETH 127, GHA 101, NGA 102 and SLE 103 – where EII methods were endorsed by the respective governments and practiced in

#### **4.4 Effectiveness of Management Arrangements**

Implementation of CPOs was under the management of ROAF. The two Regional Senior Technical Experts were reporting to the ILO Regional Office for Africa in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia); and by extension to the relevant headquarter units of the ILO. While this arrangement was said to have worked well process-wise, it had three operational and/or structural weaknesses.

- + *Firstly*, and notwithstanding the administrative reasons advanced by ROAF for lumping several CPOs under a country office – based CPO such as ETH 127, it was evident that putting the salary of an expert under 7 or 8 CPOs again under as many as 3 to 4 country offices was bound to be problematic for several reasons including the fact that a country office like Addis CO neither had direct responsibility nor control over what other CPOs did.
- + *Secondly*, the management arrangement was devoid of a regional strategy as the basis for addressing regional-oriented issues.
- + *Thirdly*, and very importantly, the management arrangement lacked a clear and formal framework for monitoring and reporting on the progress and achievements of the CPO under review – which made the work of the Mission extremely difficult.

#### **4.5 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Resource Use**

The total amount of RBSA allocated to the CPOs under review amounted to only US\$ 329,235. According to virtually all respondents met during field interviews, these resources are extremely important despite being quite small and inadequate given the huge problems associated with deficiency of decent work in the African region. In this regard, one key respondent said that *“albeit small, RBSA resources are like gold to us as they help the country offices in financing high-return intervention e.g. strategic policy issues. In addition, and given the financial constraints, these resources are extremely important for countries that have few or no technical cooperation projects”*. Despite being small, the RBSA resources are useful mechanisms for bringing about *“trigger” or “catalytic”*

*effects which in some cases results in attracting external resources – from other development partners as well as host governments”. In this respect, the Mission is of the view that it is not so much the amount, but how strategically the resources are used and the ILO staff should try to focus on “high-impact”, “quick-results” and “sustainable” type of interventions given the small amounts and the short time line available for implementation (biennium).*

Aside from the inadequacy of RBSA resource, other important issues identified by the Mission with regard to effectiveness and efficiency of resources included: (a) the short period provided between notification by PROGRAM and request for proposals – in some instances resulting in the implementing staff going for the “low-lying fruits” that may not necessary have the greatest impact; (b) backsliding on the gains previously made in terms of the timeliness of release of funds with those of 2014-2015 coming nearly half a year late; and (c) the continued presentation of ambitious workplans and budgets by the implementing staff against the well-known fact about the scarcity of RBSA resources.

#### **4.6 Impact Orientation and Sustainability**

While it was not possible to establish the full extent of impact and sustainability of interventions of the CPOs under review, the Mission observed the following interventions that have real potential to contribute to impact and sustainability:

- ✚ Initial stakeholder consultations which were in-built in the design of - not so much the CPOs, but the DWCP from which the CPOs were derived, as well as during the formulation of the ILO Regional Strategy for North Africa (2011-2015) - which are actions that are likely to have enhanced stakeholder ownership, commitment and “buy-in” into CPO objectives and interventions;
- ✚ Capacity building of local stakeholder and relevant institutions through training and exposure tours among other things;
- ✚ Creation of requisite enabling environment in terms of promoting peace, security and development of infrastructural facilities – particularly rural access roads;
- ✚ Promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation;
- ✚ Information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration;
- ✚ Mainstreaming interventions into government policies, strategies and plans.

However, the problem is that sustainability and impact of these interventions were likely to have been undermined by the following challenges which characterized the environment in which most CPO -especially under RAF 107, were being implemented:

- (a) The low capacity of many partner government institutions;
- (b) The high turnover of personnel especially among the ILO Tripartite Constituents;
- (c) The apparent insufficient political will and commitment by some governments especially under RAF 107;
- (d) The short-term duration nature of bienniums;
- (e) Lack of effective follow-up and timely consolidation of results of nearly all CPOs under review for lesson learning and action on the part of the ILO; and

(f) Continued fragility and conflict in some of the countries (especially those under RAF 107).

## **5.0 Key Emerging Lessons Learned**

The following are the key emerging lessons learned:

1. *Strategic use of Resources:* It is not so much the amount RBSA resources allocated for implementation of a CPO, but rather how strategically such resources are utilized towards delivering planned outputs, anticipated outcomes and desired impact; and also how strategic the implementers are in terms of networking and forging strategic partnerships and collaboration with other development partners.
2. *Stakeholder Consultations:* While tying RBSA to DWCP-based CPOs in the case of the ETH 127 regional priority outcome, and the “ILO Strategy on Employment for Stability and Socio-Economic Progress for North Africa - 2011-2015” in the case of CPOs under RAF 107 was appropriate to ensure coherence of ILO decent work agenda in the region, proactive engagement of stakeholders (especially the tripartite constituents) by ILO staff in the selection of CPOs for RBSA funding and not just counting on their involvement during the design of the relevant DWCP, is essential for eliciting requisite ownership, “buy-in” and support of the selected CPO interventions.
3. *Popularity of ILO Training and Knowledge Tools and the need for Information Exchange:* With ILO training and knowledge products in EII methods having been so popular and having been proven as effective mechanisms for fostering the decent work agenda as well as for prevention of social conflict in Africa, it is prudent for the Office to invest in methods and assets to ensure knowledge exchange and to maintain proper evaluation record and follow-up.
4. *Maintaining Timely Release of Funds:* Timely notification and release of RBSA resources remains critical factors to the achievements of planned outputs and anticipated outcomes of CPOs; and also as a means towards avoiding implementers from going for the “low lying fruits” which may not necessarily have high and sustainable impact.
5. *The need to be Realistic in the Selection of Outputs and Outcomes:* Selecting outputs and/or outcome achievement indicators such as “Policy on EII [developed and...] legislated” and “Final draft EII legislation passed by the parliament” in the case of GHA 101 should as much as possible be avoided as the ILO staff may not have full control over the achievement.
6. *The need for Realism in Planning CPO Interventions:* Unrealistic planning of CPO outputs and outcomes should consciously be avoided in light of the limited timeline of the bienniums as well as the invariable limitations of resources available under the RBSA budget of the ILO; and the relevant regional and field level staff should instead go for “high-impact”, “quick-results” and “sustainable” type of outcomes.
7. *The need for Regional Strategies:* Having an ILO regional strategy and regional outcomes, particularly towards addressing the interventions relating to “Social Justice, Peace and Stability” rather than having disjointed country-level strategies and outcomes was essential not just to ensure coherence of ILO work in this regard, but also because some of the issues that were being addressed e.g. cross border conflict and migration under RAF 107 were regional in nature and therefore required a regional approach.
8. *The need for systematic and timely M&E and reporting of progress of CPOs:* The M&E framework for data and information collection as well as reporting systems and functions should form part and parcel of the ILO official requirements for CPO proposals to avoid a situation like the one experienced during this particular Evaluation Mission where such data was either totally unavailable or very scanty for nearly all CPOs under review.
9. *The need for Flexibility in CPO Implementation and Management:* The ILO should have allowed some degree of flexibility of procedures and autonomy for ground-level decision making to

facilitate quicker and more empathized response-especially where circumstances have a tendency to change quickly- e.g. the case countries facing fragility and instability such as DRC, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya;

10. *The need to avoid lumping several CPOs under CO Priority Outcomes and putting the salary of an expert across several CPOs and/or several country offices:* Lumping of several CPOs under a CO-based CPO like ETH 127, and/or putting the salary of an expert under 7 or 8 CPOs again under as many as 3 to 4 country offices should be avoided as the CO has or no responsibility and/or powers over what happens in other CPOs.

## 6.0 Main Recommendations

The following are the main recommendations:

1. *Performance Monitoring and Reporting Framework:* M&E framework for data and information collection as well as reporting systems and functions should form part and parcel of the ILO official requirements for CPO proposals. This is important to avoid a situation like the one experienced during this particular Evaluation Mission where such data totally unavailable or very scanty for nearly all CPOs under review.
2. *Regional Strategy:* For coherence and effective implementation of interventions towards addressing issues that are regional in nature e.g. migration and cross-border conflict, the ILO should in future first have in place a Regional Strategy rather than operating disjointed country-level strategies and outcomes was essential not just to ensure coherence of ILO work in this regard, but also because some of the issues that were being addressed e.g. cross border conflict and migration under RAF 107 were regional in nature and therefore required a regional approach.
3. *Appropriate CPO Management and Implementation Arrangements:* Lumping CPOs under a CO-based CPO should be avoided in future to avoid management problems as experienced under ETH 127 during the 2012-2013 biennium.
4. *Building of Strategic Partnership:* Building strategic partnership, fostering networks and collaboration should in future form part and parcel of Office requirements with respect to CPO proposal. This is essential not only from the point of view of scarcity of RBSA resources, but also for derivation of synergy with activities of other players as well as enhancing prospects for sustainability.
5. *Flexibility in CPO Implementation and Management:* Where the beneficiary Member State is faced with fragile and unstable socio-economic and political environment, the ILO should allow for some degree of flexibility of procedures and autonomy for ground-level decision making to facilitate quicker and more empathized response.
6. *Timely Release of RBSA funds:* The complex resource allocation processes of RBSA and associated transaction cost stand in contrast to the small amounts at stake. While the ILO has made commendable improvements in terms of timeliness of release of funds in recent years, it is crucial to ensure that there is no backsliding on the gains so far made.
7. *Strategic Selection of Outcomes and Realism of Planning:* Given the well-known fact regarding the ever lingering scarcity of RBSA resources and the short-period which is limited to implementation over a two-year period (biennium), the relevant ILO staff should endeavor to give priority to “high-impact”, “quick-results” and “sustainable” type of interventions.
8. *Timely Evaluations:* ILO should conduct evaluations on a timely basis to ensure meaningful analysis and therefore to effectively inform the Office for timely decision-making and undertaking of requisite remedial measures.

# I.O INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background and Context

As indicated in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) Information Note of October 2013, the organization's funding base consists of three (3) integrated components, designed to support the delivery of the overall ILO results. These includes the following budget components:

- ✚ **Development Cooperation:** *Earmarked voluntary contributions (XBTC)* which supports specific global and national projects and programmes with a clear timeline and a pre-defined geographic and thematic focus. During the 2012-2013 biennium, the ILO received approximately US\$ 373 million in XBTC.
- ✚ **RBSA:** *Un-earmarked voluntary contributions* provide a pool of flexible resources, which are allocated to strategic areas, underfunded themes, and new priorities in a flexible manner by the ILO. The RBSA complements the ILO's Regular Budget (RB) of assessed contributions by Member States and voluntary contributions to ILO Extra-budgetary Technical Cooperation (XBTC). During the 2012-2013 biennium, the ILO received approximately US\$ 36 million in the RBSA.
- ✚ **Regular budget:** *Regular budget contributions* are provided by all ILO Member States by virtue of their membership with countries' contributions being based on the United Nations allocations assessment. The total regular budget of the ILO in the biennium 2012-13 amounted to US\$ 862 million

RBSA is a category of voluntary resources set up by the ILO in 2008 to increase the funding of its Decent Work Agenda through flexible unearmarked voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation programme<sup>3</sup>. It was introduced to allow donors to channel voluntary contributions to increase the Office's capacity to deliver on the priorities set out in the ILO Programme and Budget (P&B), and in particular the implementation of Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs) through the realisation of Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs). The RBSA resources are used to address the highest priorities of the ILO to achieve the decent work agenda.

The RBSA allows the ILO to allocate funds when and where they are most needed in an independent, flexible, coherent, fast and strategic manner. It enables the Office to expand, accelerate and deepen existing technical cooperation programmes and capacity to deliver on decent work priorities and outcomes, mainly at the country level, in ways that may not otherwise be possible because of restrictions on other forms of funding. It is the flexibility of RBSA and the opportunity to complement and leverage other resources through RBSA that makes it such an important and essential component of the ILO's resource mix. Its flexibility also enables the ILO to respond more efficiently to emerging priorities. The RBSA resources are allocated to ODA-eligible countries and

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<sup>3</sup> ILO – Regular Supplementary Account; Update for the Governing Body 313<sup>th</sup> Session (March 2012)

are covered by all the means of oversight and governance of the ILO's Regular Budget in terms of implementation and reporting<sup>4</sup>.

Employment promotion is among the four important, interdependent and mutually reinforcing strategic pillars of the decent work agenda of the ILO. The African region remains a high priority area for the Office and realizing labour market opportunities to create more and better jobs for women and men is a top agenda of the ILO. The focus of the ILO in the region is on rural employment, the informal economy, youth employment and child labour, gender equality, social protection, social dialogue and rights at work.

During the 2012 - 2013 biennium, the ILO allocated flexible funding amounting to US\$ 5,947,921 from the RBSA to employment promotion in the African region distributed across nineteen (19) CPOs, one (1) regional outcome and one (1) sub-regional outcome. Several of these CPOs are linked to specific projects and are thus evaluated within the framework of the projects. Two CPOs, namely RAF 107 and ETH 127, which have not been or will not be evaluated along with projects, have been selected for this independent thematic evaluation of RBSA support.

## 1.2 Brief Overview of CPOs Selected for Evaluation

The following is a brief overview of the two CPOs selected for evaluation in accordance with the terms of reference.

### 1.2.1: RAF107

Past experience among development partners has shown that fragile and conflict-affected states and territories tend to exhibit the greatest decent work challenges and deficits. It is against this premise that major development partners explicitly recognise that countries experiencing such situations deserve particular emphasis, and specific development approaches. The relevance of the decent work agenda in recovering from conflict and building resilience to prevent relapses is increasingly recognised globally as well as in the concerned countries. In this regard the United Nations Secretary General once stated as follows:

*"Rebuilding a shattered society takes far more than bricks and mortar. Quite often, the deeper challenge is restoring people's sense of opportunity, dignity and hope. Employment and income generation are fundamental elements of the post-conflict solution. For communities and individuals, job creation and regular income can provide the means for survival and recovery. They are also keys to reaching out to young people and reintegrating ex-combatants and returnees. In short, generating employment is crucial to building peace"*

*United Nations Secretary General (June 2009)*

The United Nations (UN) Policy for Employment and Job Creation in Post Conflict which was adopted in 2009 by the General Assembly recognises the centrality of these dynamics and provides a common framework for tailoring interventions to the specific needs and strengths of post-conflict

<sup>4</sup> ILO – Regular Supplementary Account (November 2012 RBSA update note)

countries. This UN Policy places the ILO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the lead of global efforts to respond better and more efficiently to peace-building and reconstruction by means of inclusive and promotion of decent employment, social protection and social dialogue. There is no one harmonized list of fragile and conflict-affected countries globally. However, in recent years, the list by most development partners comprise some thirty (30) states and territories of which two-thirds or about twenty (20) are to be found in Africa. Hence, to the fraternity of development partners, Africa remains a focal area with respect to the fight against socio-economic and political fragility and conflict. The ILO Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) is committed to collective efforts to pull the most disadvantaged in the continent out of the vicious cycles of conflict, poor governance and poverty through decent work<sup>5</sup>.

It is against the above background that RAF107, which is essentially a Regional Programme Outcome (RPO), was approved by the ILO in 2012. The anticipated outcome of the RPO, which is under the responsibility of the Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) is *“Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”*. The RPO is linked to the 2012-2013 biennium Programme and Budget (P&B)<sup>6</sup> outcome 1: *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”*.

RAF 107 aims at supporting Country Directors and Constituents in most conflict-affected countries in the continent in applying the UN Policy for Employment in Post-Conflict environments at the national and sub-regional levels, to support prevention and recovery from conflicts through creation of decent work. This involves effective and conflict sensitive formulation and implementation of ILO interventions, contribution to assistance frameworks, United Nations-Country Team (UNCT) initiatives and inter-agency cooperation. This regional outcome, which builds on the achievements of the work undertaken under RAF107 in 2011-2012, is intended to complement country specific ILO interventions and programmes and contribute to strengthen relevant sub-regional intergovernmental mechanisms. It is also intended, and in partnership with other organizations, to strengthen the inclusion of a strong decent work dimension in addressing or preventing conflict and disaster, focusing on more stable, inclusive and remunerative job and employment opportunities.

The RBSA resources linked to RAF 107, which amounts to US\$ 285,337, covers the responsible ILO Regional Senior Technical Expert position for initiatives undertaken to support the achievement of social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia. The following is a summary of each of the six (6) CPOs covered under the RAF 107 regional outcome (RPO).

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<sup>5</sup> *Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) outcome (RAF107)*

<sup>6</sup> *ILO – Programme and Budget for the Biennium 2012-2013 (2011)*

**Table 1: Summary of RAF 107 Country-Specific DWCP Outcomes (2012-2013 Biennium)**

RAF 107: “Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”.

Country	CPO Code	Outcome Title	P&B Outcome to which the CPO is
BURUNDI	1. BNDI 101	“Economic reintegration of those most affected by the crisis (young people, women, ex-combatants) is enhanced through policies and/or programs based on the promotion of decent and sustainable jobs”.	<b>P&amp;B Outcome 1 – Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
DRC	2. COD 102	“Economic reintegration of those most affected by conflicts strengthened through creative programs of decent self-employment and sustainable’	<b>P&amp;B Outcome 1 – Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
LIBYA	3. LBY 126	“Productive employment, decent work, skills and income opportunities are included in the recovery measures and in conflict prevention, reconstruction and recovery programme”.	<b>P&amp;B Outcome 1 – Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
SOMALIA	4. SOM 101	“Access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities for women and men facilitated”.	<b>P&amp;B Outcome 1 – Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
SOUTH SUDAN	5. SSD 101	“National skills development policy that raises productivity of men and women in the informal economy as well as provides skills to boost the growth of formal economy and decent work is developed and implemented”.	<b>P&amp;B Outcome 2 – Skills Development:</b> “Skills development increases the employability of workers, the competitiveness of enterprises, and the inclusiveness of growth”
TUNISIA	6. TUN 104	Information not yet available	Information not yet available

*Source: Texts of Approved CPOs and Terms of Reference*

## 1.2.2: ETH 127

Under the auspices of its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), the Ethiopian Government has developed a large scale national programme aimed at connecting each Zone to districts with an all-weather road under the Universal Rural Access Programme (URAP). This programme aims at constructing over 72,000 km of access roads over a five-year period (2011-2015) mainly using local resources and in partnership with emerging local entrepreneurs, i.e. both contractors and consultants. Employment intensive approaches (EIA) with equipment support have been identified as the preferred methods of delivery. URAP is fully funded by the government and executed directly by Zonal and District authorities.

While adequate technical capacity is critical to the successful implementation of URAP, such capacity among relevant participating agencies was considered to have been very low. It is against this backdrop that the ILO undertook to provide requisite services to the Government through knowledge sharing and management in the planning, designing and implementing access roads. Also the Government, with financial support from Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)<sup>7</sup>, was implementing an Engineering Capacity Building Programme. In this regard, the ILO intended to introduce Employment Intensive Approaches (EIA) in the curriculum of higher institutions of learning (universities and technology institutes) to ensure that graduates from these institutions were well acquainted with the technology choices when providing infrastructure services.

It was against this background that the ETH 127 was approved by the ILO in 2012. Its anticipated outcome, which is under the responsibility of the ILO Country Office (Co) – Addis Ababa, is *“Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focusing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment”*. The CPO is also linked to the 2012-2013 biennium Programme and Budget (P&B) outcome 1: *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”*.

The RBSA resources linked to this outcome, which amounts to US\$ 43,898, covers the Regional Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) Senior Technical Expert position for work related to the following six (6) CPOs: GHA101, LBR101, SLE103, NGA102, ETH127 and SSD101. **Table 2** below provides a summary of the CPOs covered by ETH 127 Regional outcome (RPO)<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Formerly German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

<sup>8</sup> While ETH 127 is essentially a CPO and not an RPO, available information from ROAF indicates that the rest of the CPOs (GHA 101, LIB 101, SLE 103, NGA 102 and SSD 101) were lumped under ETH 127 CPO for administrative reasons to allow for processing of budgetary allocation against ETH 127 given that Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert position under Addis CO was to provide support to these other CPOs as well.

**Table 2: Summary ETH 127 Country-Specific DWCP Outcomes (2012-2013 Biennium)**

<b>ETH 127: “Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focussing on infrastructure development to promote rural and</b>			
<b>Country</b>	<b>CPO Code</b>	<b>Outcome Title</b>	<b>P&amp;B Outcome to which the CPO is linked to:</b>
<b>GHANA</b>	<b>1. GHA 101</b>	“Employment Intensive Investments Programme for jobs and prosperity in Ghana”.	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
<b>LIBERIA</b>	<b>2. LBR101</b>	“Enhanced Local Economic Development (LED) through labour-intensive infrastructure development”.	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>	<b>3. SLE 103</b>	“In support of the new Sierra Leone Employment Policy and the DWCP, more young men and women have access to decent work and income opportunities”.	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
<b>NIGERIA</b>	<b>4. NGA 102</b>	“Employment Intensive Investments Programme for creation of jobs in Nigeria”.	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>	<b>5. ETH 127</b>	“Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focusing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment”.	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.
<b>SOUTH SUDAN</b>	<b>6. SSD 101</b>	“Sustainable development through productive employment and enterprise creation using employment-intensive approaches in infrastructure development in South Sudan”	<b>P&amp;B - Outcome 1 - Employment Promotion:</b> “More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”.

### 1.3 Present Situation

This independent thematic evaluation has been undertaken in accordance with ILO's Evaluation Policy adopted by the Governing Body in November 2005, which requires systematic evaluation of all initiatives of the Office including RBSA-related work in order to improve quality, accountability and transparency of the ILO's work, strengthen the decision-making process and support constituents in forwarding decent work and social justice. The evaluation is specifically concerned with the contribution of ILO's technical support of the RBSA funds to ETH 127 and RAF 107.

The primary clients of the evaluation include relevant ILO staff at the HQ in Geneva, ROAF in Addis Ababa, relevant country offices and the DWTs as well as the ILO tripartite constituents.

### 1.4 Rationale, Scope and Purpose of the Evaluation

This independent thematic evaluation, has been undertaken in accordance with ILO's Evaluation Policy adopted by the Governing Body in November 2005, which requires systematic evaluation of all Office's initiatives including RBSA-related work in order to improve quality, accountability and transparency of the ILO's work, strengthen the decision-making process and support constituents in forwarding decent work and social justice.

As per the terms of reference (see **Appendix 4**), the main aim of the evaluation is *"to assess the achievements obtained through the support of RBSA to selected CPOs in the African Region concerning the promotion productive employment during the 2012 - 2013 biennium"*. Towards this end, the focus of the evaluation is on the following:

- ✚ **RAF 107** - covering the work of the ILO Crisis and Conflict Senior Technical Expert for Burundi (BND 101), the Democratic Republic of Congo (COD 102), Libya (LBY 126), Somalia (SOM 101), South Sudan (SSD 101) and Tunisia (TUN 104);
- ✚ **ETH 127** - covering the work of the ILO Regional Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) Senior Technical Expert under the following CPOs – Ethiopia (ETH127), Ghana (GHA101), Liberia (LBR101), Sierra Leone (SLE103), Nigeria (NGA102) and Southern Sudan (SSD101). It is important to note that ETH 127 was created for technical support in not just in Ethiopia but also to the rest of the countries included herein. Even though ILO Technical Assistance (TA) was to be provided for Ethiopia and the rest of the countries listed here, the budget was allocated under ETH 127 for ease of financial management and because the TA was located in Addis Ababa.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

- ✚ Assess the contribution of the RBSA resources to the achievement of the selected CPO targets during the biennium 2012-2013;
- ✚ Assess and highlight progress and achievements obtained with the support of RBSA to the respective CPOs, in terms of relevance and strategic fit, validity and adequacy of design, performance and effectiveness, efficiency of resource use; impact orientation and sustainability of CPO strategies, outputs and outcomes and partnerships;
- ✚ Assess the factors that affected the progress and achievements obtained;
- ✚ Identify the major challenges, weaknesses, and strengths;

- + Highlight problems encountered and constraints faced;
- + Identify main lessons learned from the support of RBSA to the respective CPOs;
- + Provide recommendations for the future support of RBSA to the CPOs addressing promotion of employment;

Whereas the evaluation specifically addresses progress and achievements obtained by the two (2) selected CPOs with the support of RBSA resources, it also considers the totality of work undertaken to achieve the CPOs, including with sources of funding other than RBSA.

## 2.0 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation approach was participatory in line with the ILO policy of project and programme design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation methodology entailed a combination of desk review of relevant key documents provided by the ILO staff as well as from internet sources – particular the ILO website; and field interviews with selected key stakeholders based on “one-on-one” discussions either physically or through telephone/skype and email as listed below<sup>9</sup>.

- + ILO ROAF: Management and RPU staff;
- + ILO Decent Work Support Team (DWT) - Pretoria: DWT Director/Co. Pretoria and Skills Development Specialist;
- + ILO Country Offices (Co.) -Addis

The specific research instruments entailed the following:

- + Literature review which was conducted between 20<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> April 2015 (See **Appendix 5** of this report for the main reference documents).
- + Field interviews which were conducted between 27<sup>th</sup> April and 6<sup>th</sup> May 2015 (See **Appendix 1** of this report for people interviewed). In order to cover the two (2) selected RPOs within the short time provided for field work, field visits were initially organized such that the Mission would visit Ethiopia and Burundi. However, due to political violence that erupted in Burundi from around the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of April 2015, it was not possible to visit that country. Field visits were therefore confined to four (4) days in *Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)* during the period 26<sup>th</sup> April to 1<sup>st</sup> May 2015. The Visit to Addis Ababa was strategically selected in order to facilitate in-depth interviews with the ROAF staff for all CPOs concerned as well as for the Regional Outcome of RAF107; and also to liaise with ILO Co (Addis Ababa) concerning ETH127 and SOM101.

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<sup>9</sup> It was not possible for the Mission to interview ILO Headquarters Staff

### **3.0 KEY CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY THE MISSION**

The Evaluation Mission faced the following challenges which significantly hampered the amount of data and information gathered and therefore the breadth and depth of the analysis.

- **Lack of relevant M&E and reporting information** regarding CPOs from the various possible sources including ROAF, Country Offices and even the Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) of the ILO.
- **Unavailability of, and/or memory lapse** among respondents who were involved in the implementation of the selected CPOs;
- The **emergence of political violence in Burundi** beginning the third quarter of April 2015 resulting in the cancellation of the planned two (2) days field to the country for interviews with the country level stakeholders.
- Meeting of the **ILO Governing Body (GB)** which coincided with Mission's field visit to Addis Ababa resulting in some of the target respondents in the Addis CO being busy with associated activities;
- **Absence of the designated evaluation manager** who had just been relocated to Pretoria making it rather difficult to communicate with him during the Mission;

As a result of these challenges, the analysis and conclusions in these report were primarily based on secondary information mainly comprising brief texts of the proposals of the DWCP outcome which were sent to the Mission by outcome coordinators through ROAF during the desk review phase of the assignment, brief texts on achievements by CPO that were sent to the Mission after field work, and other relevant documents which were either provided by the ILO Addis CO staff or sourced from the internet.

## 4.0 MAIN FINDINGS

In accordance with the terms of reference, this chapter provides the main findings with respect to the following thematic areas of evaluation: (i) *Relevance and Strategic Fit* of the CPOs with respective national development aspirations, ILO's strategic policy frameworks, Decent Work Agenda for Africa, and Decent Work Country Programmes; (ii) *Validity of Design* of the CPOs selected for evaluation; (iii) *Progress and Effectiveness*; (iv) *Effectiveness of Management Arrangements*; (v) *Efficiency of Resource use*; and *Impact Orientation and Sustainability* of interventions. The section also distils some key *lessons learned* and makes *recommendations* for enhanced effectiveness of CPO funding through RBSA resources.

### 4.1 RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC FIT

Based on literature review and responses key informants met/interviewed during field visits, the Mission concludes that the RBSA-funded CPOs selected for evaluation were not only relevant and strategically in line with decent work agenda related development needs of ROAF and ILO country offices in their respective areas of jurisdiction, but also the socio-economic needs of target beneficiaries; respective national policies and strategies; ILO strategic policy frameworks and the UN agenda for socio-economic development agenda for Africa.

#### 4.1.1 Stakeholder Development Aspirations

The Mission was not able to interview sufficient number of relevant stakeholders of the selected RBSA-funded CPOs due to the limitations highlighted in Chapter 3. However, having been derived from the DWCPs - which themselves are a reflection of the wishes of the constituents, it is logical and plausible to infer that the CPOs under consideration were relevant to the development aspirations of the ILO constituents and other stakeholders. With regard to financing of CPOs through RBSA resources, virtually all staff interviewed, especially from ROAF, DWT and some country offices firmly indicated that RBSA resources, are extremely important to them despite being very little in relation to the huge needs in terms of promotion of the decent work agenda among many member countries. According to the staff, the resources enable their offices to support strategic, and in many instances, under-funded but critical areas in relation to the decent work agenda under the auspices of the DWCP, sub-regional and regional strategies. According to one key respondent from the DWT, RBSA resources are also very important for countries without technical cooperation projects. In this respect, the respondent further added stated as follows:

*"RBSA resources are like gold to us. They helps us finance the core business that we are in high level strategic policy issues that contribute to ILO strategic objectives of employment, social protection, social dialogue, standards and fundamental principles and rights at work as enshrined in the P&B. Even the little RBSA resources we get helps us a lot in dealing with needy, strategic areas and high-spin off areas. For example, we have big issues in Swaziland with regard to standards, and in particular public order issues, yet the Govt does not have resources to provide towards this end, and therefore the dire need for RBSA resources. In Lesotho we want to hold a job summit but the Government does not have money and RBSA resources could help a lot had there been some money available through this channel. We can finance with the little RBSA money we have, but do not have money for follow-up actions. We would rather have less TC money and more of RBSA resources. RBSA resources are normally directed to most critical/high impact policy areas through the DWCP framework (which represents country priority outcomes) compared to TC resources that are tied to specific projects and often narrow- based interventions or support".*

## 4.1.2 National Policies, Strategies and Plans

Based literature review of relevant documents, and responses by key informants, the Mission concludes that the anticipated outcomes of both RAF107 and ETH 127 are not only relevant but also broadly in line with national development aspirations of the countries falling under each of the CPOs. While it was not possible to access relevant policy and strategy documents for all countries covered by RAF 107 and ETH 127, **table 3** below provides a summary of development aspirations of some of the countries covered in this evaluation.

**Table 3: Relevance & Strategic Fit of RAF 107 & ETH 127 with National Policies, Strategies and Plans**

**RAF 107 - "Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts;**

Country	Relevant Key Policies and Strategies
<b>Burundi</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="354 680 1482 898">✚ <b>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework - SFPR II (2012)</b> - which, in recognition of the unemployment challenges facing the country after a long period of political conflict, general insecurity, breakdown of social cohesion, slowdown of economic development and increase in poverty, aims at encouraging the creation of more and sustainable jobs for her citizens partly through the promotion of projects that are highly labour-intensive (page 20);</li> <li data-bbox="354 932 1482 1066">✚ <b>Vision Burundi 2025 (June 2011)</b> - which, also in recognition of the need for restoration of peace, safety and a favorable socio-economic environment aims to resolve the crucial problem of unemployment for increased household incomes (page 27);</li> </ul>
<b>DRC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="354 1079 1482 1297">✚ <b>The DRC National Development Plan and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2011-2015 GPRSP)</b> - whose two main objectives are to strengthen governance and consolidate peace; and economic diversification, acceleration of growth and employment promotion partly through highly labor-intensive approaches (HIMO) complemented with increased use local building materials to encourage the takeoff of the domestic construction sector as a whole.</li> <li data-bbox="354 1331 1482 1465">✚ The African Development Bank-supported <b>Country Strategy Paper;2013-2017 (June 2013)</b> – whose overall objective is to help to lift DRC out of its fragile situation and create the conditions for strong and inclusive growth induced by the increased dynamism of the economy’s productive sectors (page 15).</li> </ul>
<b>South Sudan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="354 1478 1482 1858">✚ <b>South Sudan Development Plan; 2011-2013 (August 2011)</b> – whose overarching objective is “ <i>to ensure that by 2014 South Sudan is a united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all</i>” through improved governance; achieving rapid rural transformation to improve livelihoods and expand employment opportunities; improving and expanding education and health services; prevent of conflict; deepening peace building and improving security. The Plan also aims at creating jobs through labour-based approaches by constructing up to 1,000 km of Double-Bitumen Surface Treatment (DBST) as well as 700km of interstate and trunk roads to link major towns and cater for local youth employment.</li> </ul>

*ETH 127: Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focusing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment;*

Country	Relevant Key Policies and Strategies
Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ <b>National Employment Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia (November 2009)</b> - which aims at enhancing social welfare, accelerating economic growth, and achieving political stability. In this regard, the policy specifically aims at promoting labour-intensive methods in infrastructural development (page 20)</li> </ul>
Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ <b>National Employment Policy</b> (undated) - which among other things aims at creating more decent jobs mainly based on employment - intensive approach to meet the growing demand for employment and to improve the quality of jobs for those who are employed.</li> </ul>
Liberia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ The <b>Liberia RISING 2030 Vision</b> - which aspires “to transform the country into a middle-income country by the year 2030” partly by emphasizing capacity building through education and provision of stable, secure and better paying jobs.</li> <li>✚ <b>The Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy</b> - which identifies infrastructure rehabilitation and capacity building as key to the country’s recovery, economic growth and poverty reduction.</li> <li>✚ <b>National Employment Policy (2009)</b> - which combines the objectives of infrastructure rehabilitation with rapid employment generation, through expanded use of labour-intensive rehabilitation and public works approach (page 9).</li> </ul>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ <b>National Employment Policy</b> (undated) - which among other things, aims at promoting full employment and enabling all men and women who are available and willing to work, to attain secured and sustainable livelihood through full productive and freely chosen employment and work (page 18)”;</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ <b>The South Sudan Development Plan - SSDP (2011-2013)</b> - whose one of the main development pillars included Conflict Prevention and Security through promotion of employment, capacity building and human rights among others (page 9).</li> <li>✚ <b>Interim Country Strategy Paper - 2012-2014 (October 2012)</b> - whose key development pillars focused on state building through labour intensive approaches of infrastructural development and promotion of employment for reduced social conflict (page 17);</li> </ul>

### 4.1.3 ILO Strategic Policy Framework and Programme and Budget

The thrust of both RAF 107 and ETH 127 are fundamentally founded on the key policy frameworks of the ILO as briefly indicated below:

✚ **ILO Strategic Policy Framework (SPF) 2010-2015-Making Decent Work Happen** (March 2009): In this respect the Mission observed the following:

- **RAF 107** - whose anticipated outcome is *“Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”* is well aligned with ILO-SPF 2010-2015 primarily under the strategic objective, *“Enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for all”*.
- **ETH 127** - whose anticipated outcome is *“Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focusing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment”* is well aligned with ILO SPF 2010-2015 primarily under the strategic objective *“Create greater opportunities for women and men to secure decent employment and income”*;

✚ **ILO Programme and Budget (P&B)**: In this regard the Mission observed the following:

- **RAF 107** is founded on the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013 - primarily under the three strategic objectives, namely *“Social Dialogue”*; *“Social Protection”* and *“Standards and fundamental principles and rights at work*, all of which are also in line with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.
- **ETH 127** is also founded on the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012 -2013 - primarily under the strategic objective on “employment”. In addition, capacity building of Constituents – which ETH 127 aims at achieving is also central to the aspirations of P&B for the biennium 2012-2013 (page 24).

### 4.1.4 ILO Decent Work Agenda and Sub-regional Strategies

The CPOs under the two RPOs are in also in line with the Decent Work Agenda where they have been formulated, and the sub-regional strategy (2011-2015) in the case of North African countries as briefly indicated below:

✚ **Decent Work Agenda for Africa (DWAA)**: In this respect, the Mission observed the following:

- **RAF 107** is strongly aligned with the decent work portfolio of DWAA 2007-2015 (April 2007), particularly with regard to *“crisis response and reconstruction”*- which aims at *accelerating the creation of decent work opportunities in countries emerging from crisis (page 43)*; and *“full and productive employment and enterprise development” (page 31)*.
- **ETH 127** is strongly and strategically aligned not just to the same work portfolio of DWAA as RAF 107 as described above, but also to work portfolio relating to “promoting effective tripartism and social dialogue, including strengthening the capacity of ILO constituents to promote decent work” (page 62).

✚ **Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP):** In this respect, the Mission noted that the CPOs under each of the RPOs (RAF 107 and ETH 127) were strategically in line with either the DWCP of each country where the documents were available e.g. Burundi and DRC under RAF 107 as well as Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ethiopia under ETH 127. The CPOs were indeed derived from relevant DWCPs, the ILO Strategy for North Africa (2011-2015) for the North African States or other relevant documents aimed at promoting decent work agenda.

✚ **ILO sub-regional Strategy for North Africa; 2011-2015** (undated) entitled “*Employment for Stability and Socio-economic Progress in North Africa*”: In this case, CPOs for relevant North African countries, namely Libya and Tunisia under RAF 107 were found to be in line with this ILO sub-regional strategy for North Africa (2011-2015) whose main objective is “*to Contribute to social justice, socioeconomic development and stability in the reform process in North Africa*” through: (i) *creating opportunities for young women and men and the most vulnerable*; (ii) *empowering social partners and other stakeholders through social dialogue*; (iii) *extending and improving social protection - including social security and conditions of work especially for the most vulnerable*” (page 15)

#### 4.1.5 Other ILO Development Initiatives

While it was not possible for the Mission to gather detailed information relating to other ILO development initiatives that RAF 107 and ETH 127 complemented well with, the Mission noted the following:

##### ✚ **RAF 107**

- BND 101 complemented well with BDI100 on “*Decent and sustainable employment in a context of consolidation of peace and reconstruction*”;
- COD 102 complemented well with COD100 on “*Promoting decent jobs for young people (girls and boys in a post-conflict context) and sustainable development*”;
- LBY 126 complemented well with LBY125 on “*More women and men benefit from productive employment and work and decent income opportunities*”;
- SOM 101 complemented well with SOM 100 on “*Enhanced Sustainable Employment Opportunities for Peace and Stability*”;
- SSD 101 complemented well with “SSD 100 on “*Create decent employment for women and men especially for young women and men through improving employability, sustainable enterprise development and labour market policies*”;

##### ✚ **ETH 127**

- ETH127 complemented well with ETH125 on “*Poverty reduction through creating decent employment opportunities for men and women*”;
- GHA101 complemented well with GHA100 – “*Replication of the Ghana Decent Work Country Pilot Programme*”;
- LBR101 complemented well with LBR100 – “*More women and men have access to decent and productive employment*”;
- SLE 103 complemented well with SLE100 on “*Public and Private Investment generate a substantial and growing demand for labour*”;

- SSD 101 complemented well with SSD 100 on “*Create decent employment for women and men especially for young women and men through improving employability, sustainable enterprise development and labour market policies*”;

#### 4.1.6 United Nations Development Policy Frameworks

- ✚ **United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF):** The CPOs were also found to have been generally in line with UNDAF where such frameworks had been developed. For example, CPOs under RAF 107 were well aligned to and were contributing to the achievement of UNDAF outcomes in each of target countries, except for Somalia where the UNDAF framework had not been developed and therefore implemented within the framework of the United Nations Strategic Assistance for Somalia (UNSAS) for 2010-2015. In the case of ETH 127, CPOs for Ethiopia (ETH 127), Ghana (GHA 101), Liberia (LBR 101), Nigeria (NGA 102), Sierra Leone (SLE 103) and South Sudan (SSD 101) were particularly well aligned with UNDAF.
- ✚ **United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (June 2009):** The thrust of RAF 107 whose outcome was “*Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts*” and those of the relevant CPOs falling under this RPO were also found to be well aligned with this United Nations (UN) policy framework which is anchored on three (3) programmatic tracks comprising: (i) “*Stabilizing income generation and emergency employment*”; (ii) “*Local economic recovery for employment opportunities and reintegration*”; and (iii) “*Sustainable employment creation and decent work*” (page 11).

## 4.2 VALIDITY OF DESIGN

With regard to validity of design of the CPOs covered in this evaluation report, and in line with the requirement of the terms of reference, the mission assessed the following issues: (i) *Adequacy of foundational information base* upon which the CPOs for RBSA funding were conceptualized and selected; (ii) the extent of *stakeholders consultations*; (iii) adequacy of *planning and/or selection of the CPOs*; (iv) *internal and/or external factors considered in when selecting the CPOs* for RBSA funding, or for that matter the criteria for selection of the CPOs; (v) the *extent to which planned outcomes were realistic* considering the overall cost, human resources and time available for implementation of planned interventions; and (vi) *the extent to which planned activities and outputs were logically and realistically expected to lead to the desired outcome*.

### 4.2.1 Adequacy of Foundational Information Base

In accordance with the ILO procedures, RBSA funding is supposed to support decent work priorities and outcomes in dialogue with constituents in countries in the framework of United Nations reform and inter-agency cooperation<sup>10</sup>. It is therefore required that CPOs are identified and selected by constituents through consultative processes and as part of the development and formulation of the DWCPs. The DWCPs are planning frameworks for four years and articulate the priorities of constituents which are invariably formulated in a consultative manner with tripartite partners. The CPOs, which are prioritized outcomes of DWCPs are derived from DWCPs and are formulated for a period of two years. The Office consults with constituents who lead the process of identifying CPOs to be supported.

The formulation of the DWCPs themselves, and therefore the identification of the CPOs, are as a matter of Office procedure also based on country situation analysis, particularly with respect to the decent work agenda of the country in question, sub-region or region. The CPOs covered in this evaluation report were indeed established based on the priorities and outcomes identified in respective DWCPs where it had been developed and/or the ILO Sub-regional Strategy (2011-2015) in the case of the North African countries<sup>11</sup>. Based on these observations, the Mission considers the foundational information base upon which the CPOs were selected to have been reasonably adequate.

### 4.2.2 Stakeholder Consultations

Consultations with constituents and other stakeholder in the target country, sub-region and/or region in the formulation of decent work agenda framework or employment promotion strategy is an inherent requirement of the ILO policy framework. However, while significant stakeholder consultations in this regard seems to have been carried out at the DWCP formulation stage – where they exist, the Mission was not able to find firm evidence regarding whether adequate consultations with constituents with respect to the actual selection of CPOs to be funded through the RBSA under RAF 107 and ETH 127 during the biennium 2012-2013 were actually undertaken. The Mission attributes this to the urgency with which the Outcome Coordinators were required to submit their proposals to the ROAF for the initial assessment and subsequent onward submission to the Director of the Policy Integration Department, and the PROGRAM.

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<sup>10</sup> ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account; October 2013 RBSA Information Note.

<sup>11</sup> ILO Employment for Stability and Socio-Economic Progress in Africa; Strategy for North Africa (2011-2015)

In this regard, it is worth noting that the request for submission of proposals was posted by the PROGRAM on 18<sup>th</sup> January 2012, which besides coming after the start of the 2012-2013 biennium, also indicated that the expected delivery rate was required to at least 40% by 31<sup>st</sup> December 2012<sup>12</sup>. Although acknowledging impressive improvements on the timeliness of RBSA funding notifications during recent bienniums, this late submission of Programme Decision Minutes (PDM) and the requirement for not less than 40% delivery rate by the end of the first half of the 2012-2013 biennium. Additionally, the PROGRAM, through the same PDM, required the OCs to submit their proposals to ROAF with a copy to PROGRAM by 31<sup>st</sup> January 2012 (approximately 2 weeks after notification) while it also required the Regional Directors to submit their list of selected CPOs to PROGRAM by 10<sup>th</sup> February 2012 (or approximately 3 weeks after notification). Notwithstanding that the CPOs were to be derived from already existing DWCPs which had previously undergone stakeholder consultations or the ILO Sub-regional Strategy (in the case of North African countries), there was a general feeling that the notice was rather too short. The consequence of this was to put great pressure on the OCs and ROAF in identifying the CPOs as it gave them rather limited time for consultations with constituents. Yet, the aforementioned PDM made an explicit requirement that *“every effort should be made to arrive at a common selection of the CPOs”* – implying consultations with stakeholders.

#### **4.2.3 Efficacy of Development Models Applied and Strategy**

The ILO Member States in Africa have identified increasing unemployment and lack of serviceable infrastructure as the two major bottlenecks for the development of the region. As a result, member countries are increasingly up-scaling and mainstreaming employment creation in economic wide approach with the view to upscale the benefit and the impact of employment creation. Employment has also been used as a conflict prevention and resolution measure in the region.

Over the years, it has generally been established that if appropriately designed and implemented, employment-intensive infrastructure development interventions have great potential to generate far more direct and indirect local employment opportunities and income than conventional machine-based approach to infrastructure development and maintenance, and also prevent social conflict. Employment intensive initiatives carried out in many African countries including Algeria, DRC, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sierra Leone and Somalia are some of the good examples.

However, while the development model applied was considered appropriate, key stakeholders strongly felt that a Regional Strategy should have been put in place, particularly towards addressing the interventions relating to *“Social Justice, Peace and Stability”* rather than having disjointed country-level strategies and outcomes. In this context, county-level CPOs should then be cascaded from the regional CPOs. This recommendation was deemed essential not just to ensure coherence of ILO work in this regard, but also because some of the issues that were being addressed e.g. cross border conflict and migration under RAF 107 were regional in nature and therefore required a regional approach.

#### **4.2.4 Adequacy of Identification, Planning and Selection Criteria of CPOs for RBSA funding**

The general criteria for RBSA funding are very well stipulated in the ILO Office Procedure IGDS Number 182 (Version 1) of 16<sup>th</sup> July 2010. According to the Director General’s announcement (IGDS

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
<sup>12</sup> Minute Sheet, Ref: PROG/PB 12-13 2-8 of 18th January 2012.

179 Version 1) of 1<sup>st</sup> July 2010, the following general criteria should be used in selecting DWCP outcomes-from which the CPOs are derived: (i) Realism in achieving targets established in the P&B; (ii) Tripartite support and involvement; (iii) Contribution to national development objectives and United Nations country programme goals; (iv) Support of the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization and the Global Jobs Pact (GJP), and (v) Office-wide collaboration.

At the same time, and as provided for in the ILO procedures and standards, the following two main criteria was used for the selection of CPOs for RBSA funding: (i) *Technical quality of CPO* proposals based on the information on the CPO available in the online system, popularly known as the Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS)-where quality checks are concerned with whether there is enough and well-articulated information to assure that the delivery of stated outputs and milestones is somewhat guaranteed; and (ii) *Resource gap*-which is normally concerned with the gap between resources already linked and total resource requirements which normally cover “the cost of the Office’s outputs towards achieving the desired results”. It is a requirement that the resource gap be compatible with the resource gaps reflected in the IRIS/SMM for a particular biennium. If the resource gap is big, the Regional Office would normally enquire on how the country office plans to mobilize the rest of the resource. The Office is concerned with the financing plan of the CPO because RBSA funds should only be used to fund outputs within the prioritized CPOs by complementing resources from other sources including RB, XBTC and RBTC.

The overall view of the Mission with respect to the identification and planning processes, as well as the selection criteria of the selected CPOs for RBSA funding is that it they were fairly adequate and in line with ILO Office procedures. This conclusion is based on the observation of the process followed as depicted below:

**Figure 1: CPO Identification and Planning Process**



The criteria for RBSA funding, which the Mission found to have been generally in accordance with the ILO policy and procedures entailed the following: (i) All RBSA funding was targeted at countries and activities that are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) according to OECD standards; (ii) Resource allocations were broadly guided by the RBSA resource framework which specifies distribution across strategic objectives in the P&B; (iii) Outcome-based work plans (OBWs) provided the framework for RBSA allocations – and more specifically on the basis of OBWs review conducted in November 2011; (iv) Selected CPOs were in line with results framework as reflected in DWCP where available or the ILO sub-regional strategy document for North African countries and/or summarized in IRIS SM/IP; and (v) RBSA resources were specifically used to fund outputs within the prioritized CPOs and Global Products (GPs) complementing other sources of funds including XBTC.

While it was not possible to gather sufficient information during this particular Mission with regard to the level of understanding of the overall identification, planning, selection and approval processes of CPOs for RBSA funding by various stakeholders, a recent ILO Evaluation Report for selected RBSA-supported CPOs covering Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, South Africa Southern Africa Sub-Region, and Africa Region concluded that while the processes were fairly well understood by the RPU and Headquarter staff, they were somewhat less understood by staff in ILO country and sub-regional offices. The report was also noted that understanding of the processes was either extremely limited or virtually non-existent especially among ILO tripartite constituents' stakeholders<sup>13</sup>.

#### **4.2.5 Internal and External Factors considered while selecting the CPOs.**

While it was not possible for the Mission to substantially establish the extent to which all the relevant internal and external factors were considered by the OCs in selecting the CPOs, it appears that factors that were rightly taken into account included: (i) The ILO Office policy, procedures and criteria for selecting CPOs as provided for in ILO-DWCP Guide Book (2008); (ii) financial and human resources available for implementation and back stopping (the technical specialist provided by ROAF); (iii) Timeline available for implementation of selected CPOs (less than two years given that the relevant notice was sent to ROAF on January 18<sup>th</sup> 2012); (iv) CPOs that conformed with those identified in the relevant DWCPs, as well as the Sub-regional Strategy on Employment for Stability and Socio-Economic Progress (2011-2015) in the case of North African countries; (v) components or outputs for each CPO proposed by ACTRAV, ACT/EMP, GENDER and ITC/Turin as required in the aforementioned PDM; (vi) OBWs with particular reference to those reviewed in November 2011; and (vii) Strategic objectives of the ILO as contained in the P&B for the 2012-2013 biennium.

While it is important to select CPOs that can effectively be delivered in a given biennium given the available financial and human resources, the Mission observed that there were general tendencies

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<sup>13</sup> ILO: *Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA Support to Selected CPOs Concerning Promotion of Employment during 2010-2011 Biennium (covering Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, South Africa Southern Africa Sub-Region, and Africa Region)* by Stanley Karuga (Dec 2012)

on the part of the OCs to propose CPOs that required significantly more human and financial resources than was provided for in the aforementioned PDM. The end result of this is for OCS to re-categorise CPOs that are not fully delivered in a given biennium from target CPOs to pipeline CPOs.

#### **4.2.6 Realism of Timeline for Planned Outcomes**

While the Mission found the CPO proposal reports submitted by the OCs to have been generally brief and of varying quality, it also observed that planned outcomes and outputs for some of the selected CPOs to have been rather ambitious from the point of view of available financial and human resources, as well as available timeline for effective implementation. This is particularly with respect to RAF 107 whose CPO was *“Constituents realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”*. While this is no doubt an important and highly desirable outcome, the issue is that aside from the OCs having no prior knowledge of the nature and magnitude of the underlying causes of conflict e.g. ethnicity, political and resource-ownership based conflicts, two-year timeline (2012-2013 biennium) may be too short to deal with such underlying causes of conflict – which is most likely to result in re-categorizing CPOs from “target” to “pipeline” outcomes. The mission considers a two-year timeline (202-2013) to be too short a period to also effectively implement ETH 127 whose CPO was *“enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focussing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment”* as capacity building is a longer term activity especially in countries that are characterised low education and technical capacity.

#### **4.2.7 Plausibility of Causality between Activities, Outputs and Outcomes**

As would be expected, the plausibility of causal linkage between activities/outputs and anticipated outcome varied from one CPO to another. While the Mission was not able to access actual detailed proposals with respect to the CPOs presented for RBSA funding during the 2012-13 biennium, a rapid appraisal of the P&B outcome under each of the DWCP outcome briefs provided to the Mission by the respective OCs indicated a fairly plausible linkages between planned activities/outputs/milestones and anticipated outcomes-which were themselves derived from the P&B 2012-13 biennium.

### 4.3 PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

As per the terms of reference the Mission assessed performance and effectiveness of the CPOs based on the following key criteria: (i) the extent to which respective CPO outputs and outcomes had been achieved; (ii) the extent to which the RBSA funding was helpful towards achieving the respective CPO planned outputs and anticipated outcome targets during the 2012-2013 biennium; (iii) whether planned outputs and anticipated outcomes were delivered as per the work plans and milestones; (iv) Whether the quantity and quality of outputs were satisfactory and how the stakeholders perceived them; (v) whether the RBSA-funded outputs can credibly linked to the achievement of the outcome; (vi) the extent to which RBSA funded interventions influenced ILO Tripartite Constituents in the area of employment promotion; (vii) whether the constituents were adequately involved in the implementation of activities; and (viii) whether the interventions had addressed gender equality concerns.

As field work was confined to Addis Ababa, the analysis provided below is based on secondary data and information and primarily on the brief notes on achievements by each CPO which were sent to the Mission. As such, the Mission was not able to triangulate and validate the information.

#### 4.3.1 RAF 107

As mentioned earlier, the anticipated outcome of this RPO, was “*Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts*“. Based on the terms of reference, the CPOs being evaluated under this RPO include Burundi (BDI 101), DRC (COD 102), Libya (LBY 126), Somalia (SOM 101), South Sudan (SSD 101) and Tunisia (TUN 101).

The three planned outputs/milestones to address the employment-for-peace challenge in the three sub regions in Africa; North Africa; West Africa and the Horn of Africa included: (i) Knowledge on the role of employment for peace will have been built and shared; (ii) Capacity of constituents built; and (iii) Strategic partnerships and capacity building with other important players. Although the total amount sought for interventions under this RPO was US\$ 854,572, the actual RBSA resources allocated amounted to US\$ 285,337. These RBSA resources were intended to cover the ILO Specialist on crisis and post-conflict position for work related to these CPOs.

According to the ILO report on “*Independent evaluation of the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North-Africa: 2010-2013 - September 2014*”; RBSA-supported interventions under RAF 107 were not as effective as envisaged at their inception, largely because of a number of factors including weak involvement of ILO tripartite; low capacity in labour administration entities; cumbersome administrative procedures; internal resource limitations; the tenuous political atmosphere within some of the countries such as Libya, Somalia, Tunisia and South Sudan; and ILO’s security concerns to work in crisis situations. According to the report, this was aggravated by the fact that some of the TC and TA activities are overly ambitious and of very short duration, limiting the possibility of achieving all of the intended results. The Mission’s skype interview with the Crisis and Conflict Expert, seemed to lead to the same conclusion.

That notwithstanding, the Mission noted the following contributions of the RBSA-supported CPO under RAF 107 through the work of the ILO Specialist on crisis and post-conflict based in Addis Ababa.

#### **4.3.1.1: BND 101**

This CPO which was entitled *“Economic reintegration of those most affected by the crisis (young people, women, ex-combatants) is enhanced through policies and/or programs based on the promotion of decent and sustainable jobs”* was also linked to outcome 1 on *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”* of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013; and related to BND 100 on *“Decent and sustainable employment in a context of consolidation of peace and reconstruction”*. BDI100 – *“Decent and sustainable employment in a context of consolidation of peace and reconstruction”*

The CPO had Three (3) main outputs included: (i) *“the United Nations Policy for Job Creation and Income Generation in countries emerging from conflict is popularized and Implementation”*; (ii) *“Two joint programs of ILO/UN other agencies are developed and financed in the field of employment and reintegration”*; and (iii) *the dimension “crisis and reintegration” is integrated into the revised DWCPs and operationalized through policies and programs to formulate/update.*

Towards this end, planned milestones were as follows: (i) *“The joint program for the consolidation of peace made (in 2010) completed (in 2011) and mobilized resources for the implementation of the ILO component financed by the Peace Building Fund”*; and (ii) *“The program to support the Market Development and Employment Creation for the Rural Population of Burundi initiated in 2010 and the job creation program through cooperative entrepreneurship are updated and finalized in 2011 and are the subject of resource Mobilization”*. RBSA resources provided to cover 3 work months (WMs) for the ILO specialist amounted US\$ 65,847. The ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist was to support the development of economic rehabilitation program through the implementation of the UN policy for job creation in post.

#### **BOX 1: BND 101: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

Information regarding achievements under this CPO was not available.

#### **4.3.1.2: COD 102**

This CPO which was entitled *“the economic reintegration of those most affected by conflict is enhanced through creative programs of based on the promotion of decent work and sustainable income”* was linked to outcome 1 on *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”* of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013. It was also related to COD100 – *“Promoting decent jobs for young people (girls and boys in a post-conflict context) and sustainable development”*.

The main outputs under this CPO were: (i) The capacity of demobilized cooperatives with members of host communities are strengthened to sustainable economic reintegration; (ii) Technical and

operational monitoring of the program is provided; (iii) The final evaluation report of the program implemented by the BITest available and disseminated; and (iv) At least one pilot project is formulated and funded under STAREC. To this end, the key milestones included: (i) implementation of the support program ALA reintegration of demobilized is finalized by September 2012; (ii) Lessons of the program are shared with tripartite constituents before the end of 2012; and (iii) At least one program is finalized in the Stabilisation and Eastern Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) by the end of 2012.

In this regard, the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist was to provide strategic support, management, monitoring and evaluation of the project for re-integration of ex-combatants; inter-agency participation in activities relating to the peace-building program and the Mohammad. RBSA resources provided to this CPO to cover 8 WMs for the ILO specialist amounted to US\$ 175,592.

**Box 2** below summarizes the contribution of the *ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist* towards the achievements of the CPO<sup>14</sup>.

#### **BOX 2: COD 102: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

- ✦ A total of 6,799 ex-combatants (of which women accounted for 4%) from across six provinces were taken through the life skills and other re-orientation processes, trained, effectively demobilized and provided with bikes and professional kits to start micro enterprises in diverse areas including baking, butchery, tailoring, carpentry, vehicle repair, soap making, and hair dressing among others – thereby attaining 100% of the original target under ARED II Project.
- ✦ A total of 240 associations consisting of 2,934 people were selected for support during the ARED extension phase for various trade activities.

It was however not possible for the Mission to establish the status of the rest of the outputs, namely:

- ✦ The final evaluation report of the program implemented by the BITest available and disseminated;
- ✦ At least one pilot project is formulated and funded under STAREC.

Implementation of the DSCR2 plans, the UNDAF 2013-2017 and the consolidation of peace (CFP) program strongly integrate the creation of employment and income in their analyses and their strategies. Implemented at the provincial level (Katanga Province) of some of the recommendations related to the promotion of employment of youth in the NCB through the project TC PAEJK continuation of the support of the ILO (started in 2011) the Government (ministries of the Plan and employment) for the completion of the DSCR2 and the development of the priority Programme and expenditure framework in the medium term with a focus on the integration of the employment dimension. ILO participation in the interagency, in the preparation of the UNDAF 2013 - 2017. Continuation of advocacy for taking into account the use of youth among the axes.

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<sup>14</sup> As indicated in the Independent Evaluation Report: Programme Support for Sustainable Economic Reintegration of Ex-Fighters in Democratic Republic of Congo - ARED II: Recovery phase and phase Extension (ILO, May 2012)

#### 4.3.1.3: LBY 126

This CPO which was entitled “*Productive employment, decent work, skills and income opportunities are included in the recovery measures and in conflict prevention, reconstruction and recovery programme*” was also linked to outcome 1 on “*Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013. The CPO was also related to LBY125 – “*More women and men benefit from productive employment and work and decent income opportunities*”. With respect to this CPO, the ILO aimed at supporting the Libyan Government to achieve a post conflict recovery that is job-rich and inclusive with special focus on women, young men and women, persons with disabilities and the other vulnerable groups. The activities aimed at supporting stabilization and peace-building efforts in Libya and firmly positioning the decent work agenda within Libya’s reconstruction and recovery agenda.

The immediate objectives of the CPO were to provide support to the interim Libyan Government towards socio-economic stabilization, recovery, and sustainable development; promote the decent work agenda as a key instrument for post conflict recovery and peace-building within UN, key development partners, and transitional government policy and technical cooperation agendas; and to undertake “seed” activities to position the decent work agenda at the centre of policy and technical cooperation initiatives in Libya including participating in the Libyan Coordinated Needs Assessment (LCNA) through a joint post-conflict needs assessment.

The main outputs/milestones of the CPO included: (i) Emergency employment programmes provide immediate jobs and income in conflict-affected areas and for the vulnerable; (ii) Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and social economy organizations are supported, with a focus on recovering lost assets and facilitating resumption of business; (iii) Capacities for employment services and vocational training (VT) strengthened to ensure the economic participation of all in Libya’s recovery initiatives; (iv) Reintegration and rehabilitation programmes; (v) Capacities established for the development of employability (skills development) and employment policy; (vi) support provided to address skills gap for the youth to enable them find employment opportunities; (vii) Fast track modular VT services (skills for recovery) initiated; (viii) the “High Employment Committee” established and able to measure employment impact of potential reforms and advise on maximizing employment; (ix) Key indicators for labour market developed; (x) Support provided to the development of a social protection policy to ensure a social protection floor for all; (xi) Support provided for drafting a new labour code law in line with the international standard and the review of labour legislation in view of participatory rights of labourers; (xii) Labour market and labour administration institutions supported in the establishment of labour market information system, public employment offices, labour inspection and management of migration.

Under this CPO, the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist was to support reconstruction and recovery interventions and development of programmes. RBSA resources provided to cover the work 2 WMs of the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist amounted to US\$ 43,898.

#### **BOX 3: LBY 126: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

Information regarding achievements under this CPO was not available.

#### 4.3.1.4: SOM 101

This CPO which was entitled “*Access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities for women and men facilitated.*” was also linked to outcome 1 on “Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive *employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013. This CPO aimed at implementing programmes for promoting productive employment as a means of recovery; decent work and income opportunities and also undertaking the necessary research on labour-related issues (labour and enterprise surveys and quality of work issues).

The key milestone/output to which the ILO specialist on crisis and post-conflict was to contribute to by the end of 2013 was to create 1,000 short term employment opportunities for vulnerable groups in Somalia. RBSA resources provided, which amounted to US\$ 21,949 were to cover 1 WM for the ILO specialist. In this regard, the Mission noted the following contributions of the ILO RBSA-supported work of the EIIP Senior Technical Expert position.

**Box 4** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist towards the achievements of the CPO.

#### **BOX 4: SOM 101: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

- ✚ 150,000 Somali refugees have settled in Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, since 2010, and are set to stay for the medium-long term.
- ✚ After several field assessment missions and negotiations with UNHCR, the ILO signed US\$ 1.6 million project to support livelihoods and self-reliance for these refugees;
- ✚ Four (4) labour intensive projects have been completed creating temporary decent work opportunities for 1,174 young men and women;
- ✚ Thirty (30) technical personnel from the government trained on labour based technology and to implement employment intensive projects. These personnel have been engaged in providing monitoring and supervision support for on-going ILO labour intensive projects.
- ✚ A new employment strategy was developed and presented at the employment Conference conducted engaging all the tripartite/social partners;
- ✚ Labour-Based Projects implemented (flood retaining walls in the rivers banks of Somaliland, Road and irrigation canals.
- ✚ About US\$ 420,000 was injected into the local economy as wages for youth, procurement of tools and technical assistance for capacity development of government staff.

#### 4.3.1.5: SSD 101

This CPO which was entitled “*National skills development policy that raises productivity of men and women in the informal economy as well as provides skills to boost the growth of formal economy and decent work is developed and implemented*” was linked to Outcome 2 on Skills Development: “*Skills development increases the employability of workers, the competitiveness of enterprises, and the inclusiveness of growth*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013. The CPO was related to SOM100 on “*Enhanced Sustainable Employment Opportunities for Peace and Stability*”. The CPO aimed at promoting productive employment as a means of recovery socio-political instability through creation of decent work and income opportunities.

A key output/milestone to which the ILO specialist on crisis and post-conflict was to contribute to under this CPO was “*the creation of at least 1,000 short-term employment opportunities for vulnerable groups provided*”. Other outputs/milestone for this CPO by the end of 2013 were: (i) “*Constituents’ capacity is further strengthened through their participation in the design and validation of the new vocational Training (VT) policy and implementation strategy*”; (ii) “*The VT policy and implementation strategy are validated and presented to the donors’ community as a result of a joint ILO/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) strategy on skills development, through a national workshop*”; (iii) “*The assessment of the VT system in Darfur is completed*”; and (iv) “*A Technical Cooperation (TC) project to support implementation of TVET of the policy and strategy is designed and TC project proposals on establishment/ development of vocational training centres in East Sudan and Darfur are updated and submitted to donors*”. On the basis of available information.

Information with respect to the achievement of the above specific outputs/milestones was not available. However, **Box 5** below summarizes the achievement of the CPO with contribution of the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist.

#### **BOX 5: SSD 101: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

- ✦ Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in South Sudan – In this regard, the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Expert extensively contributed to the design of the National DDR Programme that was also approved by the National DDR Commission of South Sudan as early as June 2012. The Programme, which was funded by the international donors with national cost-sharing, aimed at reintegrating 150,000 ex-combatants over a period of eight (8 years).
- ✦ The ILO, in collaboration with other donor agencies, contributed to the reintegration of Ex-combatants into public works, urban jobs and livelihoods; children associated with Armed Forces; and persons with disabilities.
- ✦ Capacity of the private and public sector organizations and civil societies enhanced for an efficient implementation of employment-intensive infrastructure programmes.
- ✦ A draft TVET strategy was developed.
- ✦ Ministry of labour assisted to establish a TVET unit to elaborate and manage a TVET policy.
- ✦ Direct assistance was provided to establish 10 new curricula for short courses for youth in rural and pastoralist areas; standardized modules on HIV/AIDS, career guidance and entrepreneurial skills; curricula for short courses in 6 basic trades; and a framework and guidance for mobile skills

training.

- ✦ In addition, the ILO provided support on strengthening TVET data reporting to the Ministry of Education and establishment of Management Information System (MIS).

#### 4.3.1.5: SSD 103

For SSD 103, the Mission was not able to access detailed information. However, **Box 6** below indicates the only achievement that that the ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist was able to provide.

#### **BOX 6: SSD 103: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

- ✦ Following a field assessment mission, a draft Project Document (PRODoc) was been developed with UNHABITAT for the reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in urban centres of Darfur.
- ✦ ILO tools to promote enterprise among the youth and women (KAB, GYB and Get ahead) presented and explained (to social partners and stakeholders in South Sudan);
- ✦ LER and livelihood needs assessment in Warrap conducted
- ✦ LER sensitization workshop in Kuajok-Warrap state conducted;
- ✦ Skills training activities to improve livelihoods of local communities especially women conducted;
- ✦ Linkages established with micro finance institutions and development partners for small grants and other financing opportunities for the entrepreneurs.

#### 4.3.1.6: TUN 104

Following several field missions and negotiations with the EU delegation of Tunisia, an agreement for EUR 6 Million was signed in November 2011 to finance a project on employment intensive investment and youth employment.

#### **BOX 7: TUN 104: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist**

Information regarding achievements under this CPO was not available.

### 4.3.2 ETH 127

In the absence of a Regional Programme Outcome for EIIP and also for administrative reasons, the ROAF requested the Addis CO to link the RBSA resources to ETH 127. The RBSA resource linked to this outcome were intended to cover the Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert position for his work on Employment-Intensive Investments related to the CPOs: ETH127, GHA101, LBR101, NGA102, SLE103 and SSD101.

The main task of the Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert was to provide support and advice to ILO constituents on policies and approaches aimed at introducing the objectives of employment generation and poverty reduction in public investments in the infrastructure and construction sectors. The expert was expected to participate in operational policy and programme development, support to public and private sector in improvements to procurements systems and procedures and contracting approaches, training and capacity building and the evaluation of on-going schemes. The expert was also expected to provide the necessary technical backstopping and guidance ensuring the successful achievements of the above-mentioned CPOs and also contribute to the development and implementation of the EIIP globally using the lessons learned from the Africa Region.

More specifically, and according to the job description of the Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert, the main duties included:

- ✚ Analyses of training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players; developing concepts, elaborating on training material and organizing training and capacity-building programmes for labour-based small- and medium- enterprises (SMEs), with staff at different levels including consulting engineers as well as government staff, at central and decentralized levels, and also local communities concerned;
- ✚ Enhancing appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of employment content and technology choices in a variety of sectoral infrastructure development programmes and projects, and introducing the tools in technical cooperation programmes and promoting them with ILO constituents;
- ✚ Elaborating national employment creation programmes devised to absorb temporary labour surpluses to reduce shocks of financial, economic or political crisis, or local programmes designed and implemented directly by local communities for rapid implementation of emergency employment programmes aimed at coping with the consequences of natural catastrophes or man-made disasters;
- ✚ Providing policy advice and technical and backstopping services on the various forms which employment-intensive investment programmes can assume at the national level; assisting in the development and implementation of programmes and strategies aimed at optimizing employment opportunities in infrastructure investment at national and (sub-) regional levels; developing sustainable employment-intensive infrastructure works which can be incorporated into national development frameworks and public investment;
- ✚ Analyzing procurement systems, regulations and practices in order to integrate Decent Work issues into national regulations and international guidelines on procurement; promoting approaches and reforms in the contract systems with a view to facilitating access of labour-based SMEs to public tenders, and to integrate and operationalize relevant labour standards into contract documentation; providing practical guidelines to government departments or local consulting firms responsible for rural/urban employment-intensive infrastructure

projects on how to prepare tender and contract documents and how to administer and supervise such contracts for the type of investment; and

- ✚ Carrying out and supporting research that has the capacity to promote and widen the scope of creation of employment and business opportunities in infrastructure works and its mainstreaming in government operations;

The following is a summary of the planned milestones and outputs with regard to CPOs linked to the work of the EIIP position under the ETH 127 RPO, namely ETH127, GHA101, LBR101, NGA102, SLE103 and SSD101; contribution of the EIIP Senior Technical Expert position and achievements under each of these CPOs:

#### 4.3.2.1: ETH127

This CPO which was entitled “*Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focussing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment*” was linked to Outcome 1 on “*Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013; and related to ETH125 on “*Poverty reduction through creating decent employment opportunities for men and women*”.

The actual amount of RBSA resources provided to cover 2 WMs for the EIIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 43,898. The main planned outputs under this CPO comprised: (i) Implementation capacity of regional and national governments strengthened to plan and implement infrastructure works using EII approaches; (ii) Research and innovations supported on widening the applicability of EII approaches beyond areas where they were being used; and (iii) Use of EIIP strategies and approaches scaled up through improved knowledge of the various role players and availability of fact based data that clearly shows the benefit and impact of EIIP.

Towards this end, planned milestones were as follows: (i) *By end of 2012*: (a) Training needs assessment conducted to identify the knowledge gap of Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) training centres i.e. Chanco and Ginchi; (b) sixty (60) trainers trained on the appropriate application of EII (in line with the training needs assessment); and (c) The study on Rapid Assessment of Poverty Impacts and the Comparative Study on the Impact of Labour-based and Equipment-based methods in Road Works in Ethiopia published and disseminated; and (ii) *By end of 2013*: (a) Trainers guide developed and applied; and (b) New area for EII application endorsed/practiced.

In this regard, the Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert was expected to contribute to the following:

- ✚ Analyses training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players;
- ✚ Carry out training on EII and fully participate as resource person;
- ✚ Assist the development of the training guideline;
- ✚ Assist researches that will promote EII;
- ✚ Provide policy advice on employment centered infrastructure development;
- ✚ Mobilize resources.

**Box 8** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO.

## BOX 8: ETH 127: Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert

- ✦ The study entitled *“Training Needs Assessment at ERA Labour Based Training Centers”* which identified the knowledge gap of Chancho and Ginchi ERA Training Centers was produced in January 2012<sup>15</sup>. The study highlighted the demand and supply imbalance in terms of qualified trainers- required education level, practical LB experience, teaching language capacity and training techniques; appropriate manuals and training materials; support facilities such as library and IT equipment; refresher trainings and international exposure of trainers; self-evaluation and using the expertise of a consultant for continual learning and improvement, and taping international experiences and development partners’ assistance
- ✦ A Training Manual<sup>16</sup>, which the Mission found to have been of fairly good quality had been developed by June 2013;
- ✦ Trainers’ Guide<sup>17</sup>, which the Mission also found to have been of fairly good quality had been developed by June 2013;
- ✦ A training of trainers’ course in labour-based technology was conducted between 14th and 29th May 2012 at the Chancho training centre with a total of 59 trainers being trained on the appropriate application of EII-thereby attaining about 98.3% of target<sup>18</sup>. Of this total, thirteen (13) or 22% were women. Thirty one (31) trainers were from ERA Training Centers of Chancho (13) and Ginchi (18), nine (9) trainers from Regional Roads Authorities Training Centres, fifteen (15) trainers from Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVETs) and Polytechnics that are providing courses on LBT, and four (4) participants from South Sudan where one was female.
- ✦ The *“Final Report on Training Course Content and Outline For Introducing Appropriate use of Labour-Based Technology (LBT) to Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) Field Practitioners”* had been produced by October 2013 with support of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert;
- ✦ The study entitled *“Comparative Study on the Impact of Labour-based and Equipment-based Methods in Roadworks in Ethiopia – Operationalizing Pro-poor Growth in Ethiopia* was published jointly the ILO, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in 2012 and disseminated;
- ✦ EII methods have been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia and currently being practiced. According to information gathered from the *“ILO Programme Implementation Report 2012-13”* (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/ir/2012-13.htm>); the Government of Ethiopia promoted Universal Access Rural Roads programme being implemented using EII. This source also indicates that EII became the preferred means of delivery under the Poverty Safety Net Programme - a programme with a social protection focus. The source also indicates that ILO’s contribution included the production of two Ethiopia-specific reports on the impact of EII application on poverty reduction and economic development published and widely disseminated; sharing of the new tool developed by the ILO, i.e. DySAM for using the data collected to document the impact of the programme; technical advice provided on the appropriate application of EII supporting the government’s effort on making employment as one part of the social protection.

<sup>15</sup> ILO-Training Need Assessment at ERA Labour Based Training Centers (January 2012);

<sup>16</sup> ILO - Bituminous Sealing of Low Volume Roads using Labour-based Methods (ERA – Training Manual, June 2013);

<sup>17</sup> ILO - Bituminous Sealing of Low Volume Roads using Labour-based Methods (ERA – Trainers Guide, June 2013);

<sup>18</sup> ILO and the Government of Ethiopia - Training of Trainers’ Course n Labour-Based Technology (June 2012);

#### 4.3.2.2: GHA 101

This CPO which was entitled “*Employment Intensive Investments Programme for jobs and prosperity in Ghana*” was also linked to Outcome 1 on “*Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013; and related to GHA100 on “*Replication of the Ghana Decent Work Country Pilot Programme (GDWCP)*”. The actual RBSA resources provided which were to cover 2 WMs for the EIIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 43,898

The main planned outputs under this CPO comprised: (i) Policy on EII developed and legislated; (ii) Multi sectoral training material on the appropriate use of EII developed; (iii) Fifty (50) district officials trained on the appropriate use of EII; and (iii) The capacity of the Koforidua Training Centre (KTC), district authorities and national departments and ministries strengthened enabling them effectively apply EII where appropriate. Towards this end, planned milestones were as follows: (i) By end of 2012: (a) Draft multi sectoral training material developed and circulated for comment, (b) Policy document developed and submitted to the cabinet for review, (iii) the capacity of KTC strengthened and (ii) By end 2013: (a) Final draft EII legislation passed by the parliament, (b) Multi-sectoral training materials produced; and (c) Fifty (50) district officials trained on the appropriate use of EII method. The EIIP Senior Technical Expert was expected to contribute towards the achievements of the above outputs and milestones by:

- ✚ Backstopping and monitoring project progress of GHA/11/01/IBR;
- ✚ Monitoring the above mentioned TC project progress for meeting the set outputs in timely manner as agreed with the stakeholders;
- ✚ Contributing to the development of the training materials;
- ✚ Supporting and providing inputs to the policy development on EII;
- ✚ Participating on Technical Cooperation (TC) projects evaluation.

**Box 9** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO.

#### **BOX 9: GHA 101 - Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert**

- ✚ Development of “*Guidelines Promoting Employment Creation in Dams, Erosion Protection and other environmental adaptation interventions*”;
- ✚ Training of thirty (30) emerging entrepreneurs conducted thereby achieving only 60% of target;
- ✚ A National Policy on Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW) was developed and a National Steering Committee comprising of Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, Ministry of Roads and Highways, etc. was established to develop and ensure the coordination and mainstreaming of labour intensive methods in infrastructure development in the country.

✚ Programmes using labour-based methods of construction and maintenance are developing in different sectors.

✚ Other areas that the ILO contributed to included<sup>19</sup>:

- (i) Preparation of a background study on the details of Ghana's experience on the application of labour-based method at both policy and implementation levels;
- (ii) Participated in a national stakeholders' workshop leading to the formulation of a first draft of LIPW Policy;
- (iii) Preparation of the National Policy and Action Plan on LIPW –which was submitted by the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations to the Cabinet for approval;
- (iv) Training of 834 personnel up to June 2013 (including personnel from district assemblies, relevant ministries and private sector contractors);
- (v) Took the lead role in planning and organizing training on LIPW for various target groups in the absence of Koforidua Training Centre technical staff to manage trainings.

As a result of ILO support, the Koforidua Training Centre (KTC) is now operational and well-equipped with technical capacity to run LIPW training, including multi-sectoral training material on appropriate use of EII developed (Roads, Dams, Irrigation, Climate Change) and trained personnel from district assemblies, relevant ministries and private sector are able to support different investment. As a result of ILO support under the Technical Assistance for Capacity Building Support to the Ghana Social Opportunities Project a there was increased appreciation of the training received by all cadres and participants; the capacity at District level to manage Labour Intensive projects was appreciably enhanced and a sustainable level of awareness of labour Intensive approach created; communities' involvement in the project and level of awareness and appreciation of the Labour Intensive work approach and its benefits was considerably increased; transfer of skills to communities increased the capacity of local/village-based maintenance; and the capacity of local small-scale contractors to carry out Labour Intensive work contracts was significantly improved.

#### 4.3.2.3: LBR101

This CPO which was entitled *“Enhanced Local Economic Development through labour-intensive infrastructure development”* was also linked to Outcome 1 on *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”* of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013 and related to LBR100 on *“more women and men have access to decent and productive employment”*. The actual RBSA resources provided cover one (1) WM for the EIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 21,949.

The main planned outputs under this CPO comprised: (i) Output 1 –*“Employment opportunities created directly by the project activities”*; (ii) Output 2 - *“Local capacity on the use of Labour intensive infrastructure methodologies strengthened”*. Towards this end, planned milestones were as follows: (i) Milestone 1 – *“At least 2,000 labour-based jobs created by the end of the fourth quarter of 2012”*; (ii) Milestone 2 – *“Over sixty (60) Communities trained for future maintenance of roads”*; Milestone 3

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<sup>19</sup> Source: *“ILO Programme Implementation Report 2012-13”* – see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/ir/2012-13.htm>;

*“At least 10 Domestic private contractors receive training LB infrastructure approaches PW staff trained to train others on the maintenance of road using LB methods. The EIIP Senior Technical Expert was expected to contribute towards the achievements of the above outputs and milestones by undertaking the following:*

-  Backstopping ILO supported projects including LIR/09/01/LIR, LIR/10/01/BAD and LIR/10/03/IDA;
-  Carrying out impact assessments to review and document the benefits of using EII under the above mentioned projects;
-  Supporting policy-makers in making employment central in national development and specifically in infrastructure sector;
-  Monitoring the above mentioned TC projects progress towards meeting the set outputs in timely manner as agreed with the stakeholders; and
-  Participating in TC projects’ evaluation.

**Box 10** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO.

#### **BOX 10: LBR 101-Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert**

-  A total of sixty-two (62) community roads maintenance groups<sup>20</sup>, each comprising 10 members and a total of nine (9) management teams had been mobilized, established and trained to act as service providers on road maintenance on LB methods by the end of the time of Independent Evaluation of the Labour-Based Public Works (LBPWP) of Liberia<sup>21</sup> in March 2014 – thereby surpassing the original project target of sixty (60) community groups by approximately 3%.
-  A total of twenty-four (24) or about 80% of the total planned 30 trainee beneficiaries—primarily comprising MPW engineers and/or technicians had been trained by the time of the aforementioned independence evaluation, while MPW had already provided the list of the remaining 6 engineers and technicians to be trained, targeting the South Eastern Counties;
-  A total of thirty (30) small-scale local contractors had also been trained by the time of the aforementioned Independence evaluation- therefore attaining 100% in relation to the original target of 30 small-scale local contractors;
-  Demonstration works stretching over a total of 39.6 kilometers (KMs) or about 60% of the original target of sixty-six (66) KMs of access roads to productive farm land had been undertaken resulting in improved food security situation;
-  A total of four (4) study tours for the MPW members of staff had been organized and facilitated - thereby surpassing planned project target of two (2) by up to 100%;

#### **4.3.2.4: NGA 102**

<sup>20</sup> With a total outreach of 620 individual beneficiaries of whom 392 or about 63% were women.

<sup>21</sup> Labour-Based Works Project – Independent Evaluation (ILO – March 2014)

This CPO which was entitled “Employment Intensive Investments Programme for creation of jobs in Nigeria” was also linked to Outcome 1 on “*Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013 and related to NGA100 on “*Job creation for men, women and youth through National Jobs Pact and strengthened Partnerships for Decent Work*”. The actual RBSA resources provided to cover one (1) WM for the EIIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 21,949.

The main planned output under this CPO was “*employment Intensive Investment (EII) methodology adopted in infrastructure development*” while the main milestones were: (i) “*Project proposal on the roll-out of EIIP developed by second quarter of 2012*”; (ii) “*Policy on the wider application of EII developed by third quarter of 2012*”; (iii) “*EII introduced in at least three (3) states by the third quarter of 2012*”; and (iv) “*Capacity Twenty (20) entrepreneurs capable of carrying out works using EII built*”. The EIIP Senior Technical Expert was expected to contribute towards the achievements of the above outputs and milestones by:

- ✚ Producing and submitting proposal on EII for funding by the government and/or development partners; and
- ✚ Analyzing training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players.

**Box 11** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO.

#### **BOX 11: NGA 102 - Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert**

- ✚ Analysis of training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players conducted;
- ✚ Development of the proposal for adoption and roll-out plan of the EII methods for funding by Government and Development Partners –resulting in employment Intensive Investment (EII) methodology being increasingly adopted in infrastructure development in Nigeria as evidenced in the National Employment Policy document and the DWCP II for Nigeria (2012-2015) which put a lot of emphasis on the EII methodology in infrastructural development initiatives.

While the Mission observed that the EII methodology as a means to creating employment and business opportunities was increasingly being adopted in Government policies, it was not clear the extent to which the milestones on “*Capacity building of twenty (20) entrepreneurs to carry-out works using EII*” had been attained.

#### **4.3.2.5: SLE 103**

This CPO which was entitled “*In support of the new Sierra Leone Employment Policy and the DWCP, more young men and women have access to decent work and income opportunities*” was also linked to Outcome 1 on “*Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities*” of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013, and related to SLE100 on “*Public and Private Investment generate a substantial and growing demand for labour*”. The actual RBSA resources provided to cover two (2) WMs for the EIIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 43,898. The main outputs of the CPO to which the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert was to contribute to included: (i) “*Increased access to employment opportunities for*

young men and women”; (ii) “Capacity of local contractors to implement EII developed by fourth quarter 2012”; (iii) “Capacity of Ministry of Public works to implement EIIP strengthened”.

In relation to these outputs, the key milestones included: (i) “A total of 150,000 person-days of employment created directly by the fourth quarter of 2012”; (ii) Ten (10) women and five (5) community groups trained to undertake routine maintenance using EII; (iii) “Capacities of 2 youth-led cooperatives and 100 youth-led groups enhanced to set up viable businesses by the third quarter 2012”. (iv) Ten (10) domestic private contractors trained to execute works using EII by the second quarter 2012; and (v) “At least six (6) engineers trained to plan, monitor and supervise labour-based feeder projects by the second quarter 2012”. Planned and specific contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert entailed the following:

- ✚ Backstopping and supporting relevant projects including SIL/10/01/OUF, SIL/11/01/IBR and SIL/12/01/JCA;
- ✚ Monitoring the above mentioned TC projects progress towards meeting the set outputs in timely manner as agreed with the stakeholders;
- ✚ Analyses of training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players;
- ✚ Designing and developing projects that promote the application of EII; and,
- ✚ Participating in the evaluation TC projects.

**Box 12** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO<sup>22</sup>.

#### **BOX 12: SLE 103- Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert**

- ✚ Training of fifteen (15) senior government officials on appropriate planning, designing and implementation of infra-works using EII methods;
- ✚ Mainstreaming the use of EII methods into district operations;
- ✚ A total of 127,875 person-days created in Bombali and Moyamba Districts - thereby attaining approximately 29% of the original target of 440,000 person-days;
- ✚ Ten (10) and five (5) domestic private contractors trained to execute road construction works and drainage works respectively using EII respectively – thereby surpassing the target by 50%;
- ✚ Forty-six (46) community representatives trained on routine maintenance;
- ✚ Twenty (20) Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) engineers at the national and regional levels trained.

The Mission was however not able to access evidence on performance with respect to outputs relating to: (i) Analyses of training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players; and (ii) Designing and developing projects that promote the application of EII.

#### **4.3.2.6: SSD 101**

<sup>22</sup> Based on the Project Implementation Report of the Quick Impact Employment Creation Project – QIECP (ILO May 2014).

This CPO which was entitled *“Sustainable development through productive employment and enterprise creation using employment-intensive approaches in infrastructure development in South Sudan”* was also linked to Outcome 1 on *“Employment Promotion: More women and men have access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities”* of the ILO P&B for the biennium 2012-2013, and related to *SSD100 on “Create decent employment especially for youth through improving employability, sustainable enterprise development and labour market policies.”*. The actual RBSA resources provided to cover three (3) WMs for the EIIP Senior Technical Expert amounted to US\$ 65,847.

The main outputs of the CPO to which the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert was to contribute to included: (i) *“Increased number of productive job opportunities in employment-intensive infrastructure projects”*; and (ii) *“Local contractors and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are better equipped to operate and manage labour intensive projects”*.

In relation to these outputs, the key milestones included: (i) *“National and states strategies that incorporate employment intensive approaches to increase job creation”*; (ii) *“Capacity of the private and public sector organizations and civil societies enhanced for an efficient implementation of employment-intensive infrastructure programmes”*.

Planned and specific contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert entailed the following:

- ✚ Develop concept notes on the introduction of EII and share with UN family and development partners for possible funding;
- ✚ Develop programme document on capacity building at all levels of government and share with possible funding institution;
- ✚ Carry out training to senior government official on introducing EII;
- ✚ Carry out a training of trainers course to future trainers on EII;
- ✚ Provide policy advice on employment centered infrastructure development;
- ✚ Analyses of training and capacity building needs of both public and private sector players.

**Box 13** below summarizes the contribution of the ILO Regional EIIP Senior Expert towards the achievements of the CPO.

#### **BOX 13: SSD 101- Summary of Results Associated with the work of ILO Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert**

- ✚ Concept note on the introduction of EII developed;
- ✚ Capacity building strategies developed, implementation plan agreed and started;
- ✚ Twenty (20) senior staff at decision-makers level introduced to the appropriate use of EII;
- ✚ Capacity of the private and public sector organizations and civil societies enhanced for an efficient implementation of employment-intensive infrastructure programmes.

## 4.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

### 4.4.1 Effectiveness of CPOs Implementation Arrangements

The implementation of CPOs under RAF 107 and ETH 127 was under the management of ROAF. Under this management arrangement, both the ILO EIIP Senior Technical Expert –who was responsible for CPOs under ETH 127, and the ILO and Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist – who was responsible for CPOs under RAF 107 were based in the ILO Regional Office for Africa in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. The two experts were reporting directly to the ILO Deputy and Regional Directors for Africa based in Addis Ababa as well as the relevant units in Geneva (i.e. the Crisis and EIIP units). All activities of the Employment-Intensive Investment and Crisis and Post-Conflict programmes were carried out in full consultation and cooperation with other departments at ILO field structure including the relevant ILO specialists in a number of ILO Offices in the regions, ILO HQ and ILO Country Offices.

With regard to the implementation management arrangement of the CPOs, the Mission observed the following issues.

- ✚ *Firstly*, and notwithstanding the administrative reasons advanced by ROAF for lumping several CPOs under a country office – based CPO such as ETH 127, it was evident that putting the salary of an expert under 7 or 8 CPOs again under as many as 3 to 4 country offices was bound to be problematic for several reasons including the fact that a country office like Addis CO neither had direct responsibility nor control over what other CPOs did.
- ✚ *Secondly*, while the respective Country Offices (COs), ROAF and ILO Headquarter staff were reasonably involved in the planning and implementation of the respective CPOs, there appears to have been limited involvement of the Decent Work Teams (DWTs).
- ✚ *Thirdly*, the management arrangement did not have a regional strategy upon which to implement interventions with regional perspectives.

### 4.4.2 Understanding of Roles and Responsibilities by Parties Involved

The overall criteria for RBSA funding, management and allocation of RBSA funds, roles and responsibilities, monitoring are well stipulated in the Office Procedure (IGDS Number 182 version 1) of 16<sup>th</sup> July 2010 (See **Appendix 2** for the Summary). The Mission established that while these procedures were readily accessible to, and generally well understood by CPO implementing staff, understanding of RBSA funding criteria, management and allocation as well as roles and responsibilities was relatively limited on the part of other stakeholders including the ILO tripartite constituents.

### 4.4.3 RBSA Planning and Approval Processes

The normal ILO planning and approval processes of CPOs is summarised in **Appendix 3** of this report. In general, the processes were not only well understood by the ILO staff but were also generally followed. However, while nearly all respondents indicated that there was notable improvements in terms of reduction of the period between RBSA approval, resource allocation and

actual release of funds since the 2009-2010 biennium, with allocations in the 2012- 2013 taking place within a few days after the approval, the following issues were raised by some respondents<sup>23</sup>:

- The continued lack of prior knowledge regarding the amount of resources available from RBSA resulting in uninformed CPO planning and budgeting on the part of outcome coordinators- though the Mission observed that the amount available for the region for the 2012-2013 biennium was actually communicated early in the biennium (January 18<sup>th</sup> 2012) unlike before where such communication was provided several months into the biennium. However, according to some key respondents, the Office is sliding-back on past improvements in that RBSA resources for the 2014-2015 biennium were released as late as July 2014 thereby leaving only 1½ years for implementation of CPOs.
- The short biennium periods, coupled with occasional delays in the disbursement of RBSAs funds has often resulted in CPO implementation staff rushing to spend the money so as to meet the required “high delivery rate”<sup>24</sup>. In the words of one key ILO respondent, this forces implementing staff to go for the “*low hanging fruits, such as workshops so as to exhaust the resources within the remaining time of the biennium*”.

#### 4.4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting

According to the ILO official provisions, the responsibility for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting on the management and use of RBSA funds primarily rests with Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of Policy Integration Department. The use of funds and levels of delivery are monitored by PROGRAM. Delivery is monitored closely over the biennium with a possibility for re-programming decisions being made where delivery is seen to be low. Contributions and expenditures under the RBSA are reported to the Governing Body through the standard annual financial reports and the biennial Programme Implementation Report. Results achieved are then reported in the biennial Programme Implementation Report. With regard to M&E and reporting on the CPOs, the Mission observed the following:

- ✚ Firstly, while both the EIIP and Crisis and Post-Conflict specialists were supposed to monitor and report on CPO implementation progress to the ILO ROAF, the Mission found no implementation progress reports making it quite difficult to track the work of the specialists and issues that affected implementation of the programmes. In this regard, a review of the job description document for the EIIP Specialist by the Mission revealed that was no clear guideline on how reporting would be done- whether written briefs or verbal reporting and also how regularly such reporting would be done<sup>25</sup>. The job description document simply stated as follows: “*The ILO EIIP Senior Technical Expert will report to the ILO Regional Director for Africa based in Addis Ababa. All activities of the Employment-Intensive Investment Programme are {shall be} carried out in full consultation and cooperation with other departments at ILO field structure including EIIP Specialists in a number of ILO Offices in the regions, ILO HQ and ILO Country Offices*”. While the Director-General’s Announcement (IGDS Number 179, Version1 of 1<sup>st</sup> July

<sup>23</sup> Some of these issues were raised in the ILO report on “Independent Thematic Evaluation Of RBSA Support Selected Country Programme Outcomes Concerning Promotion Of Employment during 2010-2011 Biennium covering Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, South Africa Southern Africa Sub-Region, and Africa Region (ILO Report by Stanley Karuga December 2012) ;

<sup>24</sup> Which the Programme Minute Sheet of 18<sup>th</sup> January 2012 indicated as 40% by December 2012

<sup>25</sup> The Mission was not able to access the job description document for the Crisis and Post-Conflict Specialist.

2010) states that *“the RBSA is subject to the established ILO evaluation framework and policies”*, there was no regular, formal and systematic M&E and reporting of progress of implementation of the CPOs in accordance with the Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) framework of the ILO. In most cases, monitoring and reporting was mainly done as part of the review of the Outcome-Based Workplans (OBWs). In this respect, the above referenced Director General’s Announcement states *“PROGRAM will monitor the use of RBSA within the context of the periodic OBWs reviews and FINANCE will review spending patterns within the context of established periodic resource reviews”*. Overall, the Mission is of the view that lack of regular, formal and systematic M&E and reporting framework of the CPO that is similar to what is applied under Technical Cooperation projects was primarily responsible for the limited or no information on CPO implementation progress.

- ✚ Secondly, the brief nature of information provided in the CPO proposals as well as status assessment reports (where available)-a matter that in fact necessitated the request by the Office during the second annual OBW review (2012) for more detailed information on planned outputs and achievements.
- ✚ Thirdly, lack of conventional and well-defined CPO log-frames<sup>26</sup> for the implementation of the CPOs, in addition to the fact that while most indicators of achievement (milestones and outputs) were well-defined and compliant to SMART<sup>27</sup> principles in the context of monitoring and evaluation frameworks some were not time-bound (though this is implied by the fact that it were expected to occur during the biennium 2012-2013) others had included some milestones and/or outputs which ILO had no full control over their achievements e.g. *“Policy on EII [developed and..] legislated”* and *“Final draft EII legislation passed by the parliament”* in the case of GHA 101. With regard to this latter issue, the ILO may have had the ability to ensure their development but not their legislation.
- ✚ Fourthly, lack of final Implementation Reports in the IRIS system for some CPOs making it rather difficult to establish the level of achievements on the part of the Mission.

With respect to monitoring and reporting, the Mission recommends the following:

- That a simple and standardized template, providing key aspects to be applied to CPO appraisal reports be developed and circulated to concerned parties;
- That in future, and for ease of monitoring performance, all CPO appraisal (proposal) reports be required to provide standardized but brief log frame with SMART indicators regardless of the fact that they are derived from DWCPs.
- That timely preparation of standardized annual CPO Implementation Reports and forwarding of the same for storage in the IRIS system becomes a standard requirement of the Office;

<sup>26</sup> While it is acknowledged that the CPOs are normally derived from the DWCPs, they should have specific log frames to allow for effective monitoring of performance and management,

<sup>27</sup> An acronym standing for **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**tttributable **R**ealistic and **T**ime-bound-that is used as a measure appropriateness of indicators of achievements for a project or a programme.

## 4.5 RESOURCE AND EFFICIENCY OF UTILISATION

As per the terms of reference, this section provides a brief assessment efficiency of RBSA resource use in terms of *adequacy* in relation to the achievement of planned outputs and outcomes; *effectiveness of RBSA funding modality*; timeliness release of allocated resources; the extent to which resources were strategically allocated; whether activities/outputs were in line with the schedule of outputs/milestones as defined in the CO workplans; and whether disbursements and expenditures were in line with budgetary plans as well as bottlenecks encountered (if any).

### 4.5.1 Allocation and Adequacy of Resources

In 2012-2103 biennium, the ILO allocated flexible funding amounting to US\$ 5,947,921 from the RBSA to employment promotion in the African region distributed across 19 CPOs, one regional outcome and one sub-regional outcome. Of this total, the total amount of funds allocated to the CPOs under review amounted to US\$ 329,235 to cover a total 15 WMs for the work or positions of the EIIP and Crisis and Conflict experts. Of this of the total allocated amount for the CPOs under review, the share for CPOs falling under RAF 107 amounted to US\$ 285,337 or about 86.7% of total while CPOs falling under ETH 127 received US\$ 43,898 or about 13.3% of total<sup>28</sup>.

While acknowledging that RBSA funds are meant to complement resources from other sources, most respondents felt that the allocated RBSA funds were grossly inadequate for effective delivery on the planned outputs and outcome. In fact, one respondent put it that RBSA funds are like “*a drop of water into the ocean*”. Nonetheless, virtually all respondents indicated that albeit being quite small, RBSA resource were extremely important as it enabled the ILO to support strategic interventions whose spin-off benefits are often disproportionately large than the amount of resources used. The resources are also said to be quite important and critical in countries where there are no TC projects. In this regard, one key respondent said that “*albeit small, RBSA resources are like gold to us as they help us to finance high returns intervention e.g. strategic policy issue*”.

However, the Mission is of the view that some of the CPOs seemed rather ambitious given the general expectations [based on past experience] with regard to the limited RBSA funding and the short timeline that is normally available [two years or less] for implementation.

While acknowledging that ILO has mechanisms under the OBW Review framework to re-categorize outcomes from target to pipeline an even from pipeline to maintenance, it is important for the ILO field staff to be strategic in how they select target outcomes ensure that they are achieved in time and also to avoid loss of credibility in the eyes of donors and other strategic partners. While addressing underlying causes of conflict as was intended by the ILO under RAF 107 sounds a very attractive intervention [and a easily justifiable], the truth is that some of the underlying causes [whose nature in the case RAF 107 were not necessary known in advance by the ILO] can take a very long time to resolve leave alone the limitations the availability of resources, particularly under the RBSA

In terms of resource allocation, RBSA funding in the 2012-2013 biennium seemed more biased towards RAF 107 [*“Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realise social*

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<sup>28</sup> The Mission was not able to disaggregate the allocations by each of the CPOs covered in this report due to lack of adequate information as data was only available for some of the CPOs.

*justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts”], some respondents felt that enhancing the capacity of constituents to develop and implement EIIP related policies and programme [under ETH 127) is also important given that it is well established that unemployment is very often a major factor underlying fragility and conflict. The general feeling as that the Office should not down play the importance of strengthening the capacity of constituents to develop and implement employment creation related interventions.*

With regard to resources, the Mission recommends the following:

- ✚ ILO regional and country office staff should in future consistently endeavor be more realistic in planning and budgeting of activities to be funded through RBSA resources and also be more strategic by way of giving priority to high-impact, quick-results and sustainable outcomes so as to attract donor funds including the host government of the Member States.
- ✚ The ILO should strengthen country offices in terms of governance, financial management and delivery of high-impact-quick results so as to attract more donor funds.
- ✚ The ILO should proactively engage the ministries of finance in Member States towards increasing resources linked to DWCP outcomes as it has the potential to attract donor funding of RBSA related work (i.e. linking government budgets towards DWCP & hence RBSA funding).

#### 4.5.2 Effectiveness of RBSA Funding

Notwithstanding the relatively small amounts of RBSA funding allocated to the CPOs under review, responses from nearly all informants interviewed during the Mission and information from previous relevant evaluations affirmatively indicated<sup>29</sup> that RBSA funding is definitely making a positive difference in a number of ways:

- ✚ Firstly, by contributing to planned outputs and anticipated outcomes in the little way as it may have been, undoubtedly added value into resources geared towards fighting the problem of fragility and conflict as well unemployment;
- ✚ Secondly, the presence of the ILO-which is re-knowned for expertise and leadership in the field of decent work and employment promotion, has created the much needed confidence among other organizations including those that are not specialized in labour/employment issues to join the employment agenda;
- ✚ Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, RBSA funding caused the much needed “*trigger*” or “*catalytic*” effects which results in the leveraging external resources. While it was not possible for the Mission to get full and detailed information on the overall level of external resources leveraged through RBSA funding, the work of the Crisis and Conflict expert under RAF 107 or ETH 127, such initiatives are said to have been able to lead to have led to important breakthroughs in terms of mobilizing external resources. In the case of RAF 107, some US\$ 8 million were leveraged from other development partners besides opening new

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<sup>29</sup> E.g. the ILO report on “Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA Support to Selected CPOs Concerning Promotion of Employment during 2010-2011 Biennium (covering Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, South Africa Southern Africa Sub-Region, and Africa Region) by Stanley Karuga (Dec 2012);

doors with key strategic partners such as the World Bank, IGAD, UNDP, ECA and UNHCR among others.

### **2.5.3 Efficiency of Resource Use**

The Mission was neither able nor required by the terms of reference to undertake “value for money audit” to be able to determine in detail efficiency in the use of RBSA funds. However, a cursory assessment of costs associated with various activities across the CPOs being evaluated indicated general efficiency in resource use. The work of the ILO experts not only went beyond the work-months indicated in each of the CPO proposal but the experts also responded to other related technical support needs in a fairly flexible manner<sup>30</sup>.

### **2.5.4 Timeliness of Delivery of Resources Allocated**

Timeliness of request for proposals, approval and release of RBSA funds within the ILO has undergone considerable improvements since the 2010-2011 when PARDEV and PROGRAM requested for proposals [through a joint minute sheet dated 12<sup>th</sup> August 2010] seven and a half (7½) months into the biennium. During the biennium under review, official communication of the amounts RBSA allocated came in on 18<sup>th</sup> January 2012. According to key respondents the approval of proposals and release of RBSA funds for the 2012-2013 biennium were fairly prompt with the release of funds taking place within a few days after the approval. However, as said earlier, this laudable performance of the ILO are seemingly sliding back in that RBSA funds for the 2014-2015 biennium came as late as July 2014 as indicated by one key respondent.

In this regard, the Mission recommends that the ILO should strive to maintain timely communication regarding the available RBSA resources for each biennium, and also reduction of time lapses between submission of proposals, approval and release of funds.

### **2.5.4 Alignment of Disbursements and Expenditures with Budgetary and Workplans;**

As earlier indicated, there has been general trend towards improved timeliness of notification of available RBSA resources, request for proposal, approval and release of funds within the ILO in recent years (with the exception of 2014-2015). As a result of this, there was reasonable alignment between expenditure, budgetary plans and activities during 2012-2013 compared with some of the previous bienniums.

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<sup>30</sup> According to the ILO Crisis and Conflict expert.

## 4.7 IMPACT ORIENTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

The Development Assistance Committee of the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) defines impact as *"Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended"*. The Committee also defines sustainability as *"a measure of whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding or support has been withdrawn"*. That is whether the interventions and accruing benefits are likely to continue beyond the life time of a project.

Some of the key interventions with potential for resulting in positive impact and sustainability of RBSA funded CPO initiatives that were identified by the Mission included: (i) stakeholder consultations for enhanced ownership, commitment and "buy-in" into CPO objectives and interventions-which are hinged on relevance and strategic fit of interventions to the livelihood and development needs of target stakeholders; (ii) capacity building of local stakeholder and relevant institutions through training and exposure tours among other things (iii) creation of requisite enabling environment in terms of promoting peace, security and development of infrastructural facilities – particularly rural access roads; (iv) promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation; (v) information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration; and (vi) mainstreaming interventions into government policies.

The results and impacts of ILO actions were difficult to gauge due to a lack of relevant monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data and information, both within the ILO and among national implementation partners. There was also no evidence of sustainability strategies in virtually all the CPOs under review. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Mission observed the following type of interventions that had good potential to bring about positive impact and sustainability of CPO interventions beyond the 2012-2013 biennium.

- ✚ *Stakeholder Consultations:* Stakeholder participation in the formulation of interventions that affect their lives, ownership and "buy-in" of interventions are all critical to the sustainability of interventions. While the Mission was not able to find concrete evidence that stakeholders, including tripartite constituents, were adequately consulted during the CPO selection process, it was noted that most stakeholders had been consulted during the formulation of the DWCP [where they existed] from which the CPOs were derived, and also during the formulation of the Strategy on Employment for Stability and Socio-Economic Progress for North Africa (2011-2015) in the case of some CPOs under RAF 107 such as LBY 126 (Libya) and TUN 104 (Tunisia) in this case.
- ✚ *Capacity building of stakeholders:* A notable number of CPOs also incorporated various forms of capacity building as major interventions. This was for example:
  - COD 102 - where a significant number of ex-combatants (6,799) were taken through life skills and other forms of training;
  - ETH 127 – where training materials on application of EIIP methods of infrastructural development were developed and fifty-nine (59) trainers were trained;
  - GHA 101 – where guidelines for promoting employment creation through the construction of dams, protection of soil erosion protection and other interventions

related to environmental conservation were developed, and thirty (30) emerging entrepreneurs trained;

- LBR 101 – where a total of sixty-two (62) community roads maintenance groups were mobilized, and trained to act as service providers on road maintenance using labour-based methods; 30 MPW engineers and technicians trained in labour-based methods of infrastructural development; and four (4) study tours for the MPW members of staff organized and facilitated.
- SLE 103 – where fifteen (15) senior government officials were trained on appropriate planning, designing and implementation of infrastructural works using EII methods; ten (10) and five (5) domestic private contractors trained to execute road construction works and drainage works respectively using EII respectively; forty-six (46) community representatives trained on routine maintenance; and twenty (20) Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) engineers at the national and regional levels trained;
- SSD 101 – where twenty (20) senior staff at decision-makers level were introduced to the appropriate use of EII;

✚ *Creation of requisite enabling environment:* Interventions of CPOs, mainly under RAF 107 were strongly oriented to the promotion of peace, security and development of infrastructural facilities. This was for example in the case of BND 101, COD 102, LBY 126, SOM 101, SSD 101 and SSD 103

✚ *Promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation:* Some of the CPOs promoted income generating opportunities and employment creation. This was for example:

- COD 102 - where a significant number ex-combatants were provided with professional kits for business-starts in a wide range of areas including bakery, butchery, tailoring, carpentry, vehicle repair, soap making, and hair dressing, among others;
- SSD 101 – where reintegration of ex-combatants and persons with disabilities into public works; urban jobs and livelihoods was carried out.
- SLE 103 – where some 127,875 person-days of employment were created in Bombali and Moyamba Districts

✚ *Information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration:* While it was not possible to establish the full extent of gains under each CPO in terms of information sharing, networking and promotion of strategic partnerships and collaboration, the Mission noted commendable efforts of CPOs under RAF 1-07 in this regard especially with the World Bank, IGAD, UNDP, ECA and UNHCR.

✚ *Mainstreaming interventions into government policies:* Some CPOs were able to have some interventions mainstreamed into government policies. This is for example:

- ETH 127 – where EII methods were endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia and practiced in rural infrastructural development initiatives;
- GHA 101 – where EII methods were endorsed and practiced by the Government of Ghana;
- NGA 102 – where EII methods in infrastructural development were adopted by the Government of Nigeria and mainstreamed in the National Employment Policy document and the DWCP II for Nigeria (2012-2015);
- SLE 103 – where EII methods were mainstreaming into district infrastructural development operations;

Notwithstanding the above listed interventions in relation to impact orientation and sustainability, and also as observed by the ILO High-Level Evaluation (HLE) report entitled *“Independent Evaluation of the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North-Africa; 2010-2013 (September 2014)”*, prospects for impact and sustainability is likely to have been undermined by a number of factors including:

- (i) The low capacity of many partner government institutions;
- (ii) The high turnover of personnel not just among ILO Tripartite Constituents, but also within the ILO itself – for example, the premature departure of the Crisis and Post Conflict Expert responsible for RAF 107 who left the position quite early in the biennium (mid-2012);
- (iii) The apparent insufficient political will and commitment by some governments;
- (iv) The need for greater ownership of results by the social partners ultimately hamper sustainability;
- (v) The short-term duration nature of bienniums and therefore of CPO interventions – even for projects with longer orientation;
- (vi) Limited focus and capacity of the ILO and the governments for programming;
- (vii) Lack of effective follow-up and consolidation of results of nearly all CPOs under review;
- (viii) Fragility and conflict in some of the countries (especially those under RAF 107); and,
- (ix) Lack of a regional strategy even where the interventions are or regional nature (e.g. conflict resolution, disarmament and settlement of refugees).

## 5.0 MAIN LESSONS LEARNED

The following is a summary of lessons learned with respect to the implementation of RBSA-funded CPOs under review for the 2012-2013 biennium. Some of these lessons are fairly similar to those that were identified by the ILO report entitled “*Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA Support to Selected CPOs Concerning Promotion of Employment during 2010-2011 Biennium -Covering Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, South Africa Southern Africa Sub-Region, and Africa Region (Dec 2012)*” which was also undertaken by the author of this report.

### 5.1 What good practices were observed?

- ✚ **Strategic Use of Resources:** It is not so much the amount RBSA resources allocated for implementation of a CPO, but rather how strategically such resources are utilized towards delivering planned outputs, anticipated outcomes and desired impact; and also how strategic the implementers are in terms of networking and forging strategic partnerships and collaboration with other development partners – as was in the case of RAF 107 where some US\$ 8 million were leveraged from external sources besides opening new doors with key strategic partners such as the World Bank, IGAD, UNDP, ECA and UNHCR among others; as well as in Ethiopia. In other words, if used strategically as “trigger” or “catalytic” resources, the little RBSA resources that are normally available can have disproportionately bigger results. In this regard, ILO review of outcomes concluded as follows: “*Political commitment by member states, key donor support and partnerships with other international and regional institutions proved critical in the effective and timely delivery of services to constituents especially under P&B Outcome 1*”.
- ✚ **Stakeholder Consultations:** While tying RBSA to DWCP-based CPOs in the case of the ETH 127 regional priority outcome, and the “ILO Strategy on Employment for Stability and Socio-Economic Progress for North Africa - 2011-2015” in the case of CPOs under RAF 107 was appropriate to ensure coherence of ILO decent work agenda in the region, proactive engagement of stakeholders (especially the tripartite constituents) by ILO staff in the selection of CPOs for RBSA funding and not just counting on their involvement during the design of the relevant DWCP, is essential for eliciting requisite ownership, “buy-in” and support of the selected CPO interventions.
- ✚ **Popularity of ILO Training and Knowledge Tools and the need for Information Exchange:** With ILO training and knowledge products in EII methods having been so popular and having been proven as effective mechanisms for fostering the decent work agenda as well as for prevention of social conflict in Africa, it is prudent for the Office to invest in methods and assets to ensure knowledge exchange and to maintain and record proper evaluation and follow-up.
- ✚ **Maintaining Timely Release of Funds:** Timely notification and release of RBSA resources remains a critical factor to the achievements of planned outputs and anticipated outcomes of CPOs; and also as a means towards avoiding implementers from going for the “low lying fruits” which may not necessarily have high and sustainable impact.

## 5.2 What should have been different and/or should be avoided in Future?

- ✚ **The need for Timely Release of RBSA funds:** Delays in the release of RBSA funds should be avoided if CPO are to effectively deliver planned outputs and anticipated outcomes and on time and also to avoid implementers going for the “low lying fruits” which may not necessarily have high and sustainable impact.
- ✚ **The need to be Realistic in the Selection of Outputs and Outcomes:** Selecting outputs and/or outcomes achievement indicators such as “*Policy on EII [developed and...] legislated*” and “*Final draft EII legislation passed by the parliament*” in the case of GHA 101 should as much as possible be avoided as the ILO staff may not have full control over the achievement.
- ✚ **The need for Realism in Planning CPO Interventions:** Unrealistic planning of CPO outputs and outcomes should consciously be avoided in light of the limited timeline of the bienniums as well as the invariable limitations of resources available under the RBSA budget of the ILO; and the relevant regional and field level staff should instead go for “high-impact”, “quick-results” and “sustainable” type of outcomes.
- ✚ **The need for Regional Strategies:** Having an ILO regional strategy and regional outcomes, particularly towards addressing the interventions relating to “Social Justice, Peace and Stability” rather than having disjointed country-level strategies and outcomes was essential not just to ensure coherence of ILO work in this regard, but also because some of the issues that were being addressed e.g. cross border conflict and migration under RAF 107 were regional in nature and therefore required a regional approach.
- ✚ **The need for Systematic M&E and Reporting of Progress of CPOs:** The M&E framework for data and information collection as well as reporting systems and functions should form part and parcel of the ILO official requirements for CPO proposals to avoid a situation like the one experienced during this particular Evaluation Mission where such data was either totally unavailable or very scanty for nearly all CPOs under review.
- ✚ **The need for Flexibility in CPO Implementation and Management:** The ILO should have allowed some degree of flexibility of procedures and autonomy for ground-level decision making to facilitate quicker and more empathized response-especially where circumstances have a tendency to change quickly- e.g. the case countries facing fragility and instability such as DRC, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya;
- ✚ **The need to use Internal Experts to Implement and Manage CPOs instead of External Short-Term Experts:** While acknowledging that short-term external EIIP and Crisis and Post Conflict experts were used to implement CPOs with the oversight of the Regional Directors and the relevant HQ Units, due to lack of requisite expertise capacity within ROAF, it seems, in retrospect, that this was not strategic and should have been avoided, primarily because these external personnel had no official mandate or powers to commit ILO in strategic partnerships that the interventions entailed, it failed to guarantee continuity [as the experts left prematurely] and also did not give the Office an opportunity to build and benefit from the much needed “institutional memory” in terms of knowledge regarding the CPOs under review.

- ✚ **The need to avoid lumping several CPOs under CO Priority Outcomes and putting the salary of an expert across several CPOs and/or several country offices:** Lumping of several CPOs under a CO-based CPO like ETH 127, and/or putting the salary of an expert under 7 or 8 CPOs again under as many as 3 to 4 country offices should be avoided as the CO has or no responsibility and/or powers over what happens in other CPOs.

## 6.0 MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis of the available, but rather limited data and information pertaining to the implementation of CPOs under review, the Mission recommends the following:

1. **Performance Monitoring and Reporting Framework:** M&E framework for data and information collection as well as reporting systems and functions should form part and parcel of the ILO official requirements for CPO proposals. This is important to avoid a situation like the one experienced during this particular Evaluation Mission where such data totally unavailable or very scanty for nearly all CPOs under review.
2. **Regional Strategy:** For coherence and effective implementation of interventions towards addressing issues that are regional in nature e.g. migration and cross-border conflict, the ILO should in future first have in place a Regional Strategy rather than operating disjointed country-level strategies and outcomes was essential not just to ensure coherence of ILO work in this regard, but also because some of the issues that were being addressed e.g. cross border conflict and migration under RAF 107 were regional in nature and therefore required a regional approach.
3. **Appropriate CPO Management and Implementation Arrangements:** Lumping CPOs under a CO-based CPO should be avoided in future to avoid management problems as experienced under ETH 127 during the 2012-2013 biennium.
4. **Building of Strategic Partnership:** Building strategic partnership, fostering networks and collaboration should in future form part and parcel of Office requirements with respect to CPO proposal. This is essential not only from the point of view of scarcity of RBSA resources, but also for derivation of synergy with activities of other players as well as enhancing prospects for sustainability.
5. **Use of Internal Experts:** For purposes of fostering the development strategic partnerships with other key players, deriving the benefits of “institutional memory” and allowing for continuity of support, the ILO should give preference to the use of internal staff if such capacity is available. If not, the ILO may want consider recruitment of relevant staff on a longer term basis.
6. **Flexibility in CPO Implementation and Management:** Where the beneficiary Member State is faced with fragile and unstable socio-economic and political environment, the ILO should allow for some degree of flexibility of procedures and autonomy for ground-level decision making to facilitate quicker and more empathized response.
7. **Timely Release of RBSA funds:** The complex resource allocation processes of RBSA and associated transaction cost stand in contrast to the small amounts at stake. While the ILO has made commendable improvements in terms of timeliness of release of funds in recent years, it is crucial to ensure that there is no backsliding on the gains so far made.
8. **Strategic Selection of Outcomes and Realism of Planning:** Given the well-known fact regarding the ever lingering scarcity of RBSA resources and the short-period which is limited to implementation over a two-year period (biennium), the relevant ILO staff should endeavor to give priority to “high-impact”, “quick-results” and “sustainable” type of interventions.

9. **Timely Evaluations:** While acknowledging that this evaluation whose process started way back in November 2014 was delayed by lack of a good consultant who knows how the ILO works on RBSA-related interventions, ILO should endeavor to conduct evaluations on a timely basis to ensure meaningful analysis and therefore to effectively inform the Office for timely decision-making and undertaking of requisite remedial measures.

## 7.0: APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: List of People Interviewed

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>CPO Focus</b>
1.	Gugsa Yimer Farice	ILO	Senior M&E Officer	Addis Ababa	All CPOs
2.	Cynthia S. Olonjuwon	ILO	Chief – RPU	Addis Ababa	ALL CPOs
3.	Ms. Dayina Mayenga,		Deputy Regional Director	Addis Ababa	ALL CPOs
4.	George Okutho	ILO	Country Director; CO Addis	Addis Ababa	ETH 127/SOM 101
5.	Kidist Chala	ILO	Programme Officer	Addis Ababa	ETH 127
6.	Derje Alemu	ILO	Programme Officer	Addis Ababa	ETH 127
7.	Luca Fedi	ILO	Crisis Specialist	Cairo	RAF 107

8.	Mr. Vic van Vuuren	ILO	Country Director/DWT-CO. Pretoria	Addis Ababa	All CPOs
9.	Ashwani Aggarwal	ILO	EMP/SKILLS Senior Skills & Employability Specialist	Addis Ababa	All CPOs
10.	Kidest Getahun	ILO	RPU-Programme Assistant	Addis Ababa	All CPOs

## **APPENDIX 2: RBSA Funding Criteria, Management and Allocation, Roles and Responsibilities**

### **1.0 Criteria for Selecting CPOs for RBSA Funding**

- (i) All RBSA funding shall be spent on countries and activities that are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) according to OECD standards;
- (ii) RBSA allocations shall be broadly guided by the RBSA resource framework specifying distribution across strategic objectives and regions found in the P&B;
- (iii) Outcome-based work plans (OBWs) provide the framework for RBSA allocations where in principle, RBSA funding is used for achieving a limited number of prioritized CPOs in Decent Work Country Programmes; and Global Products (GPs) with the CPOs identified as targets for the biennium normally being accorded priority;
- (iv) In line with the principles of results-based management, CPOs shall be supported by a results framework as reflected in DWCP documents and/or summarized in IRIS SM/IP. GPs shall be supported by expanded strategies of OBWs and shall specify outputs leading to reportable contributions to knowledge, standards and/or capacity building of governments, employers' and workers' organizations in ODA eligible countries. This information along with total resource requirements and resource gaps for each CPO and GP shall be reflected in IRIS SM/IP and will constitute the basis of appraisals.
- (v) RBSA shall be used to fund outputs within the prioritized CPOs and GPs complementing other sources of funds including XBTC. RBSA may be used on a fee-for-service basis for inputs from both headquarters technical programmes and DWTs in the regions contributing to the achievement of prioritized CPOs and the delivery of GPs.
- (vi) Additionally, in selecting Decent Work Country Programme outcomes, the criteria should include: (a) the achievement of targets established in the programme and budget; (b) tripartite support and involvement; (c) the contribution to national development objectives and United Nations country programme goals; (d) support of the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization and the Global Jobs Pact, and (e) Office-wide collaboration.

### **2.0 Management and Allocation**

- (i) On the basis of resource gaps identified, Outcome Coordinators (OCs) submit to Regional Directors, to Executive Directors and to the Director of the Policy Integration Department with a copy to PROGRAM a list of proposed prioritized CPOs and GPs for the Outcome under their responsibility (using a specified format);
- (ii) On the basis of this, Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department rank the prioritized CPOs and GPs and indicate the RBSA amount to be allocated taking into consideration the estimated distribution of RBSA across strategic objectives and regions-with the rankings permitting allocation of RBSA as contributions are received by the Office;
- (iii) Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department submit the lists of prioritized and ranked CPOs and GPs to PROGRAM with copy to PARDEV (using a specified format);
- (iv) PROGRAM and PARDEV appraise the CPOs lists against the above-described funding criteria-with the appraisal being based on information reflected in IRIS SM/IP at the time of the appraisal process. Where priorities identified for RBSA are linked to ongoing or future extra-budgetary projects, PARDEV carries out a complementary analysis of the

relevance and logical fit of the link and where necessary request for additional information.

- (v) Upon signature of a contribution agreement, PARDEV notifies PROGRAM and FINANCE, and the PROGRAM notifies Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department on the level of RBSA funding available for allocations in the sector and/or in the region under their responsibility.
- (vi) On completion of the above processes, and on receipt of appropriate funding, PROGRAM issues a Programme Decision Minute (PDM) with the final amounts allocated depending on actual amounts received in USD.

### 3.0 Roles and Responsibilities

- (i) Outcome Coordinators are responsible for initially proposing prioritized CPOs and GPs.
- (ii) Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department are responsible for ranking and for submitting to PROGRAM the CPOs and GPs to be funded through RBSA and for identifying the level of resource needs- with Regional Directors taking the lead for CPOs, and the Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department taking the lead for GPs.
- (iii) Regional Directors, Executive Directors and the Director of the Policy Integration Department are also primarily responsible for monitoring the use of RBSA within their sectors or regions.
- (iv) PROGRAM is responsible for overall management of RBSA as a source of funds in application of this Procedure-which includes appraising selected prioritized CPOs and GPs in coordination with PARDEV and monitoring delivery.
- (v) PARDEV, in coordination with PROGRAM, is responsible for coordinating the mobilization of RBSA resources and for carrying out an analysis where selected RBSA priorities are linked to extra budgetary projects;
- (vi) FINANCE is responsible for accounting for RBSA funds in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules, managing the release of allocations and the production of financial reports.
- (vii) JUR is responsible for establishing, and when appropriate, revising the model contribution agreement and its variations and for advising on any questions relating to its use.

### 4.0 Monitoring and Reporting

The responsibility for monitoring and reporting management and use of RBSA funds primarily rests with **Regional Directors** (in this case ROAF), **Executive Directors and the Director of Policy Integration Department**. The use of funds and levels of delivery are monitored by PROGRAM. Delivery is monitored closely over the biennium with a possibility for re-programming decisions where delivery is seen to be low. Contributions and expenditures under the RBSA are reported to the Governing Body through the standard annual financial reports and the biennial Programme Implementation Report. Results achieved are then reported in the biennial Programme Implementation Report.

### APPENDIX 3: RBSA Planning, Approval and Monitoring Processes

The normal ILO planning process and approval of CPOs entails the following steps:

- **Step 1:** PARDEV and PROGRAM indicates the status and perspective of RBSA funding for the relevant biennium and at the same time request for proposals from Outcome Coordinators in HQ-who, in collaboration with Country Offices, are responsible for the initial proposal of prioritized CPOs<sup>31</sup>;
- **Step 2:** Outcome Coordinators make proposals taking into account ILO strategic objectives as contained in the P&B for the relevant biennium;
- **Step 3:** The initial prioritized list of CPOs submitted by the Outcome Coordinators are then shared within PARDEV and PROGRAM-who based on the CPOs initial list request for submission of their final prioritized list (through Minute Sheet to regional directors);
- **Step 4:** The Regional Offices-which are responsible for submitting the final list of prioritized CPOs to PARDEV and PROGRAM based on the initial priority list provided by Outcome Coordinators, and taking due cognizance of the estimated distribution of RBSA across the various Strategic Objectives of the Office, asks country and sub-regional offices to submit an assessment of the status of CPOs covered by each office covering planned milestones, outputs, results achieved, planned follow up actions and support required. Proposals for priority CPOs to be funded from RBSA and resources required amounts requested are then sent to PARDEV and PROGRAM.
- **Step 5:** The Regional Office (Regional Management) appraises the prioritized list submitted from country offices and from Outcome Coordinators and submit the region's proposal to PROGRAM and PARDEV.
- **Step 6:** PROGRAM and PARDEV appraises the prioritized list based on the specified general criteria as provided in **Appendix 2**, technical criteria on quality and resource gaps, as well as other information contained on the IRIS SM/IP at the time of the appraisal process.
- **Step 7:** PROGRAM then notifies Regional Directors, Executive Directors and Director of the Policy Integration Department on the level of RBSA funding available for allocations in the sectors and/or region;
- **Step 8:** Approvals are then issued through Programme Decision Minute (PDM) and funds are then released<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> According to the roles and responsibilities outlined in the Office Procedures dated July 16<sup>th</sup> 2010

<sup>32</sup> There has been notable improvements on the lapse between RBSA approval/allocation and actual release of funds which in 2012/13 was within a few days after the approval.

## APPENDIX 4: Terms of Reference

### **Independent thematic evaluation of RBSA support to Country Programme Outcomes concerning promotion of employment in Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia.**

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

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In the 2012 - 2013 biennium, the ILO allocated flexible funding to the amount of USD 5,947,921 from the Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) to employment promotion in the African region distributed across 19 country programme outcomes (CPOs), 1 regional outcome and 1 sub-regional outcome (*See annex for the full list*). Several of these CPOs are linked to specific projects and are thus evaluated within the framework of the projects. The following ten CPOs, which have not been or will not be evaluated along with projects, have been selected for this independent thematic evaluation of RBSA support.

CPO: RAF 107: Constituents in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa and in North Africa realize social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts

Office: ROAF

Amount: \$285,337.00

P&B Outcome: 1

Approval date: 2012

CPO: ETH 127: Enhanced capacity of constituents to develop and implement policies and programmes of employment intensive programmes focussing on infrastructure development to promote rural and urban employment

Office: CO-Addis Ababa

Amount: \$ 43,898.00

P&B Outcome: 1

Approval date: 2012

The full text and description of relevant CPOs will be made available to the consultant along with a breakdown of expenditure per outcome (Programme Decision Minutes -PDMs). In line with the ILO's policy for evaluations, an independent evaluation will take place from March to April 2015 of the support provided by the RBSA to the above-mentioned CPOs.

#### **1.2 Background**

The Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) was introduced by the ILO to allow donors to channel voluntary contributions to increase the Office's capacity to deliver on the priorities set out in the ILO Programme and Budget, in particular the implementation of Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs) through the realisation of Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs). RBSA resources are allocated to ODA-eligible countries and are covered by all the means of oversight and governance of the ILO's Regular Budget in terms of implementation and reporting.

RBSA is used to address the highest priorities of the ILO to achieve the decent work agenda. It is the flexibility of RBSA and the opportunity to complement and leverage other resources through RBSA that makes it such an essential component of the ILO's resource mix.

#### **RAF107**

The RBSA resource linked to this outcome will cover the responsible Regional Senior Technical Expert position for initiatives undertaken to support the achievement of social justice, peace and stability by addressing underlying causes of conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia.

The CPO aims at supporting Country Directors and constituents in most conflict-affected countries in the Continent in applying the UN Policy for Employment in Post-Conflict environments at the national and sub-regional levels, to support prevention and recovery from conflicts through decent work. This will involve effective and conflict sensitive formulation and implementation of ILO interventions, contribution to assistance frameworks, UNCT initiatives and inter-agency cooperation.

This work will build on the achievements of the work undertaken under RAF 107 in 2011-2012.

### **ETH127**

The RBSA resource linked to this outcome will cover the Regional EIIP Senior Technical Expert position for his work related to the CPOs: GHA101, LBR101, SLE103, NGA102, ETH127, and SSD101.

The Ethiopian government as part of its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) has developed a large scale national programme aimed at connecting each Zone to districts with an all-weather road. The Universal Rural Access Programme (URAP) aims at constructing over 72,000 km of access roads over a five-year life span ( 2011-2015) mainly using local resources and in partnership with emerging local entrepreneurs, i.e. both contractors and consultants. Employment intensive approaches with equipment support have been identified as the preferred methods of delivery. URAP is fully funded by the government and executed directly by Zonal and District authorities.

The implementation capacity of the various participating agencies is very low. As this is critical for the successful implementation of the programme, the ILO intends to avail its services to the Government through knowledge sharing and management in the planning, designing and implementing access roads.

Also the government with financial support from GTZ, is implementing an Engineering Capacity Building programme and the ILO intended to introduce Employment intensive approaches (EIA) in the curriculum of higher learning institutions (universities and technology institutes). This measure would ensure that graduates from these institutions are acquainted with the technology choices when providing infrastructure services.

### **1.3 Evaluation**

In line with ILO's policy for evaluation, it is proposed that an independent evaluation is conducted to assess the achievements obtained through the support of RBSA to CPOs in the African Region concerning the promotion productive employment. More specifically, the evaluation, which will be conducted by an external collaborator/evaluator, will cover 2 CPOs namely RAF107 and ETH127 covering work in Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia

The evaluation will be thematic in scope and will cover RBSA allocated for the 2012-13 biennium.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are:

1. Assess the contribution of the RBSA fund to achieve the biennium CPO targets;
2. Review the appropriateness and adequacy of the design
3. Assess and highlight progress and achievements obtained with the support of RBSA to the respective CPOs, in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the strategies, outputs and outcomes, partnerships;
4. Assess the factors that affected the progress and achievements obtained;
5. Identify the major challenges, weaknesses, and strengths;
6. Highlight problems encountered and constraints faced;
7. Identify main lessons from the support of RBSA to the respective CPOs;
8. Provide recommendations for the future support of RBSA to the CPOs addressing promotion of employment;

Whereas the evaluation would specifically address progress and achievements obtained with the support of RBSA, the evaluation would also consider the totality of work undertaken to achieve the CPOs, including with sources of funding other than RBSA.

In particular, the evaluation will cover the following questions:

#### ***Design***

- The adequacy of the planning/CPO selection process.
- What internal and external factors were considered when selecting these ten CPOs for RBSA funding?  
Criteria for selection of the 10 CPOs
- The extent to which planned objectives/outcomes were realistic considering the cost, human resources and time available and required;
- The extent to which planned activities and outputs could logically and realistically be expected to meet desired objectives/outcomes.

#### ***Relevance and strategic fit***

- The contribution of the CPOs to the ILO's policy frameworks (Strategic Policy Framework, Programme and Budget, Decent Work agenda for Africa, Decent Work Country Programmes);
- How well the CPOs complemented and fit with other on-going ILO programmes and projects in the countries;
- The extent to which the planned outcomes have been able to influence national, sub regional and regional policy agendas on employment promotion.
- Assess whether the RBSA funded outputs are relevant to the outcome

#### ***Effectiveness***

- To what extent have the ten CPOs and related outputs been achieved or are they likely to be achieved?
- To what extent the RBSA fund helpful to achieve the biennium CPO targets
- Were outputs produced and delivered as per the work plans/milestones?
- Have the quantity and quality of these outputs been satisfactory?
- How do the stakeholders perceive them?
- Can the RBSA funded outputs be credibly linked to the achievement of the outcome?
- More specifically, the following questions need to be given particular emphasis:
  - o Assess to what extent the interventions have influenced ILO's tripartite constituents in the area of employment promotion. Have constituents been involved in the implementation of activities?
  - o Assess how planned outcomes/outputs, and the implementation of activities, have addressed gender equality concerns.

#### ***Efficiency of resource use***

- Assess the effectiveness of the funding modality (RBSA) for the achievement of intended outcomes;
- Assess the quality and timeliness of delivery on allocated resources;
- To what extent have resources (financial, human, institutional and technical) been allocated strategically;
- Are the activities/outputs in line with the schedule of activities/outputs/milestones as defined by the country office and work plans?
- Are the disbursements and expenditures in line with budgetary plans? If not, what were the bottlenecks encountered?

#### ***Effectiveness of management arrangements***

- Assess the effectiveness of work arrangements.
- Has there been a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved?
- Assess the process of planning, approving and monitoring RBSA
- Assess the adequacy of management and technical and administrative backstopping;
- How effectively did the field offices concerned monitor the CPOs? Has relevant information systematically been collected and collated? How have the offices utilized the IRIS system for planning and monitoring the CPOs? Are all relevant stakeholders (HQ, RO, DWTs, COs) involved in an appropriate and sufficient manner?

- To what extent did the work arrangements and RBSA management allow response to changing circumstances and emerging needs?

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### ***Sustainability***

- In view of the above, how likely are achievements on the CPOs to be sustainable?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the identification and design of outcomes/outputs?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account during the execution of activities?
- In what way has the ILO been able to develop sustainable national, sub regional and regional capacities in employment promotion area using RBSA funding? Has the capacity of implementing partners been sufficiently strengthened to ensure sustainability of achievements?

### ***Lessons learned and recommendations***

- Which good practices and lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the CPOs that could be applied in future cycle of RBSA funding?
- What should have been different, and should be avoided in the future cycles?
- What are the relevant recommendations to be considered in view of all points raised up above?

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation will be carried out through a combination of desk review, interviews by telephone/Skype with key ILO staff and stakeholders and field offices in Africa, and field visits to Burundi and Ethiopia<sup>33</sup> for consultations with ILO's regional management, staff and constituents as well as other key stakeholders. Additional consultations may be decided by the evaluation manager. The independent evaluator will review inputs by all ILO and non-ILO stakeholders involved in the implementation of the CPOs. The draft evaluation report will be shared with a selected group of key stakeholders with a request for comments within a specified time frame.

### **2.1 Desk review**

A desk review will analyse CPOs and other documentation provided by the evaluation manager. The desk review will lead to a number of initial findings that in turn may point to additional or fine-tuned evaluation questions. This will guide the final evaluation instrument, which should be finalised in consultation with the evaluation manager. The evaluator will review the documents before conducting any interviews. The desk review is expected to encompass, but will not be restricted to:

- Documents related specifically to the CPOs in question and activities undertaken with support from RBSA under these CPOs. This will include:
  - o Texts of approved CPOs
  - o Programme Decision Minutes (concerning allocation of funding)
  - o Technical reports
  - o RBSA Guidelines/IGDS (internal governance documents)
  - o Programme and Budget for 2012-13
  - o Programme Implementation Report
  - o Decent Work Agenda in Africa
  - o Decent Work Country Programmes
- Relevant national, regional and global policy documents related to the strategic objective of employment promotion.

### **2.2 Interviews**

The external collaborator will undertake interviews through telephone/Skype with relevant ILO staff at headquarters, in particular the Employment Department, and with ILO staff in relevant DWTs and COs in the

<sup>33</sup> Ethiopia is included in order to facilitate in-depth interviews with the Regional Office for Africa for all CPOs concerned as well as for the Regional Outcome of RAF107. In addition, the consultant will be able to liaise with CO-Addis concerning ETH127 and SOM101.

African Region. The external collaborator will also undertake interviews with ILO staff, constituents and stakeholders during field visits. The list of interviews will include, but not be restricted to:

- ILO Headquarters
  - o EMP/Skills (Skills and Employability Department)
  - o EMP/CEPOL (Country Employment Policy)
  - o EMP/SEED (Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise Development)
  - o EMP/Enterprise (Job Creation and Enterprise Development Department)
  - o ILO/Crisis (ILO Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction)
- ILO Regional Office for Africa
  - o Regional Office Management
  - o Regional Office Programming Unit
  - o Employers' and Workers' Specialists
- ILO Decent Work Support Teams (DWTs) in Pretoria
  - o DWT Management
  - o Employment Policy Specialist
  - o Enterprise Specialist
  - o Skills Development Specialist
  - o Programming Unit
- ILO Country Offices (Cos) in Addis, Pretoria, Dar es Salaam
  - o CO Management
  - o Programme Officers
- Constituents in Ethiopia and Burundi during field visits. Additional constituents as required and in consultation with evaluation manager.
- Other stakeholders as required and in consultation with evaluation manager.

### **2.3 Main outputs**

The external collaborator shall prepare the following three outputs in the course of executing his/her assignment:

1. An evaluation summary according to the ILO's template for summaries of independent evaluation reports (to be provided by the evaluation manager);
2. Draft evaluation report;
3. Final evaluation report incorporating comments provided by key stakeholders (comments to be compiled by evaluation manager).

The evaluation report shall be presented as per the proposed structure in the ILO evaluation guidelines:

- Cover page with key evaluation data
- Executive Summary
- Acronyms
- Description of the CPOs
- Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation
- Methodology
- Clearly identified findings for each criterion and CPO
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons learned and good practices
- Annexes

All draft and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided in electronic version compatible with Word for Windows.

## **3. Management arrangements, work plan and time frame**

### **3.1 Evaluator**

The evaluation shall be conducted by an external independent collaborator/evaluator responsible for conducting a participatory and inclusive evaluation process. The external collaborator shall produce the evaluation outputs listed above based on the methodology outlined above.

### 3.2 Evaluation manager

The external collaborator will report to an evaluation manager in the ILO's Regional Office for Africa (Hezron M. Njuguna, njuguna@ilo.org) and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the evaluation manager should issues arise. The evaluation will be carried out with full logistical and administrative support of the Regional Office for Africa and relevant field offices.

### 3.3 Work plan and time frame

The evaluation process is estimated to commence in April and end in May 2015.

The independent consultant will spend at least nine working days on field visits. A first draft of the evaluation report shall be submitted by the external collaborator to the Evaluation Manager 10<sup>th</sup> May, 2015.

The Evaluation Manager, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, will review the draft and submit any comments to the external evaluator 20<sup>th</sup> May, 2015.

The final report, with comments integrated will be submitted to the Evaluation Manager no later than 31<sup>st</sup> May, 2015.

The following work flow breakdown is envisaged for the evaluation process:

Activity	Dates	Number of days
Document review	April 20 – 25 <sup>th</sup> 2015	6
Field visit/consultations and interviews (Addis Ababa)	April 26 – May 1 <sup>st</sup> 2015	6
Field visit/consultations and interviews (Bujumbura)	May 03 – 06 <sup>th</sup> 2015	4
Write-up draft report	May 07 – 12 <sup>th</sup> 2015	5
Final report submission	May 26 <sup>th</sup> 2015	3
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>24</b>

### 3.4 Evaluation process

The evaluation process is foreseen to cover the following steps and time period. Final submission of the evaluation report to the Regional Office for Africa should take place no later than 10<sup>th</sup> June, 2015.

- I.** Tasks: Preparation of TORs, consultation with relevant partners and staff  
Responsible person: Evaluation manager  
Timing/dates: November 2014/February 2015
- II** Identification of independent international evaluator and creating contract and preparation of budgets and logistics  
Responsible person: Evaluation manager  
Timing/dates: March 2015
- III** Telephone briefing with evaluation manager, desk review of relevant documents and evaluation instrument designed based on desk review  
Responsible person: Evaluation manager  
Timing/dates: April 2015
- IV** Field visits - Consultations with constituents and other key stakeholders in the field  
Timing/dates: April 2015
- V** Consultations with key ILO staff in ILO Headquarters and field offices (telephone/Skype)  
Timing/dates: April 2015
- VI** Draft evaluation report based on desk review and consultations from field visits  
Responsible person: Evaluator  
Timing/dates: May 2015
- VII** Circulate draft evaluation report to key stakeholders and consolidate comments and share with evaluator

- Responsible person: Evaluation manager  
Timing/dates: May 2015
- VIII** Finalize the report including explanations if comments were not included  
Responsible person: Evaluator  
Timing/dates: May 2015
- IX** Official submission of evaluation report to ROAF management and HQ  
Responsible person: Evaluator  
Timing/dates: June 2015
- X** Approval of report by EVAL  
Responsible person: EVAL

### **3.5 Qualifications of external collaborator**

The external collaborator is expected to have the following qualifications:

- At least a Master's Degree in Business Management, Economics or related graduate qualification;
- A minimum of 10 years' experience in evaluating international development interventions in the area of labour and employment;
- Proven experience with logical framework approaches and other strategic planning approaches, M&E methods and approaches (including quantitative, qualitative and participatory), information analysis and report writing;
- Experience in evaluating organizational strategies;
- Acquaintance with ILO's Decent Work mandate and familiarity with ILO processes and working methods;
- Knowledge and experience of the UN System;
- Excellent communication and interview skills in English ;
- Excellent report writing skills;
- Understanding of the development context of Africa would be a clear advantage.

## APPENDIX 5: Bibliography

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27. **ILO** - Independent evaluation of the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North-Africa -2010-2013 (September 2014);
28. **ILO** - Independent Evaluation Report: Programme Support for Sustainable Economic Reintegration of Ex-Fighters in Democratic Republic of Congo - ARED II: Recovery phase and phase Extension (May 2012);
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34. **ILO** – Nigeria DWCP II; 2012-2015 (November 2012);
35. **ILO** - Overall Assessment of Decent Work Progress at the Country Level for South Sudan (undated);
36. **ILO** - Programme and Budget for the Biennium 2012-13 (2011);
37. **ILO** - Programme and Budget for the Biennium 2012-2013 (2011);
38. **ILO** - Programme Implementation Report 2012-13” <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/ir/2012-13.htm>);
39. **ILO** - Project Implementation Report of the Quick Impact Employment Creation Project – QIECP (ILO May 2014);
40. **ILO** - Project to Support Sustainable Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilized in DRC ARED; (October 2012);
41. **ILO** - Quick Impact Employment Creation Project –QIECP; Project Implementation Report (Undated);
42. **ILO** – RBSA Review -by John Horekens & Ralf Maurer (September 2014);
43. **ILO** - Regional Strategy- Greater Horn of Africa; Employment for Peace and Development (2010-2015);

44. **ILO** - Regular Budget Supplementary Account; ILO Development Cooperation (November 2014);
45. **ILO** - Regular Budget Supplementary Account; October 2013 RBSA Information Note;
46. **ILO** - Regular Supplementary Account (November 2012 RBSA update note);
47. **ILO** - Regular Supplementary Account-November 2012 RBSA Update Note;
48. **ILO** - Report of Independent Evaluation Programme Support Sustainable Economic Reintegration of Ex-Fighters in Democratic Republic of Congo (ARED II: Recovery phase and phase Extension); May 2012;
49. **ILO** - Results-Based Management in the ILO; A Guidebook Version 2 (June 2011 );
50. **ILO** - Sierra Leone Decent Work Country Programme; 2010-2012 (October 2010);
51. **ILO** - South Sudan Programme Framework (2012-2013);
52. **ILO** - Strategic Policy Framework 2010–15: Making decent work happen; GB.304/PF/2 Rev, 304th Session (March 2009);
53. **ILO** - Technical Assistance for Capacity Building Support to the Ghana Social Opportunities Project; Independent Evaluation (May 2013);
54. **ILO** - The Decent Work Agenda in Africa: 2007–2015 (April 2007);
55. **ILO** - The Decent Work Agenda in Africa: 2007–2015 (April 2007);
56. **ILO** - Training Need Assessment At ERA Labour Based Training Centers (January 2012);
57. **ILO** - Update for the Governing Body 313th Session, March 2012 (March 2012);
58. **ILO** - Up-scaling Local Economic Development Lessons from the Ghana Decent Work Programme (2012);
59. **ILO** -; Update for the Governing Body 313th Session (March 2012);
60. **ILO** -Policy Guidelines for Results-Based Evaluations – Principles, Rationale, Planning & Managing for Evaluations (2012);
61. ILO/African Union Commission & IGAD - Employment for Peace, Stability and Development; Draft: Regional Strategy for the Greater Horn of Africa; 2011 - 2015
62. **ILO/GOL** - Liberia DWCP; 2011-2015 (March 2010);
63. **UN** - Ethiopia UNDAF; 2012-2014 (March 2011);
64. **UN** - Nigeria UNDAF II; 2009 - 2012 (September 2008);
65. **UN** - UNDAF Action Plan; 2012 - 2016 (December 2011)
66. **UN** - UNDAF for Sierra Leone; 2006-2007 (July 2006);
67. **UN** - UNDAF; Liberia 2008-2012;
68. **UN** - UNDAF; Republic of South Sudan 2012-2013;
69. **UN** - United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict, Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (June 2009);

# ILO Lesson Learned Template

**PROJECT TITLE:** RBSA Support to Selected Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs) Concerning Promotion of Employment during the 2012 - 2013 Biennium

**PROJECT CODE:** RAF 107 and ETH 127

**NAME OF EVALUATOR:** Stanley M. Karuga

Date: 8th June 2015

The following lessons learned have been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lessons learned</b> (link to specific action or task)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ The need for strategic use of resources, by forging of strategic partnerships, networks and collaboration with other development partners;</li> <li>✚ The need for stakeholder consultations, not just during the design of the relevant DWCP, but also the selection of CPO for enhanced ownership, “buy-in” and support by stakeholders;</li> <li>✚ The need for ILO to invest in methods and assets to ensure adequate exchange of knowledge and maintenance of proper evaluation record and follow-up;</li> <li>✚ The need for timely notification and release of RBSA Funds to avoid implementers from going for the “low lying fruits” which may not necessarily have high and sustainable impact;</li> <li>✚ The need to be realistic in the selection of outputs/outcomes and budget estimation;</li> <li>✚ The need for Regional Strategies to address regional issues;</li> <li>✚ The need for systematic and timely M&amp;E and reporting of progress of CPOs;</li> <li>✚ The need for Flexibility in CPO Implementation and Management in countries facing fragility and socio-economic and political;</li> <li>✚ The need to avoid lumping several CPOs under CO Priority Outcomes and putting the salary of an expert across several CPOs and/or several country offices.</li> </ul>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ The context and preconditions underpinning these lessons related to socio-economic and political conditions of the beneficiary Member States and beneficiary communities -the majority of whom are poor; a situation that is exacerbated high unemployment and poor condition of infrastructure especially roads; against limited RBSA funds.</li> </ul>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Governments of Member States, ILO Constituents and local communities;</li> </ul>
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	<p>Some of the factors that may affect impact and sustainability included: (a) the low capacity of many partner government institutions; (b) The high turnover of personnel not just among ILO Tripartite Constituents, but also within the ILO itself – for example, the premature departure of the Crisis and Post Conflict Expert responsible for RAF 107 who left the position quite early in the biennium (mid-2012); (c) The apparent insufficient political will and commitment by some governments; (d) lack of adequate ownership and commitment to CPOs social partners; (e) The short-term duration nature of bienniums and therefore of CPO interventions – even for projects with longer orientation; (f) Lack of effective follow-up and consolidation of results of CPOs; (g) Fragility and conflict in some of the countries (especially those under RAF 107); and (h) Lack of a regional strategy even where the interventions are or regional nature (e.g. conflict resolution, disarmament and settlement of refugees).</p>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<p>A major success/positive causal factor was the high relevance of CPO interventions to socio-economic and political development aspirations not just of Government of Member States as reflected in national policies, strategies and plans; but also of ILO constituents and target local communities.</p>
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<p>Key administrative issues identified included: (a) inadequate stakeholder consultations during CPO selection for RBSA support due to the short notice between notification and request for proposals; (b) inappropriateness of lumping several CPOs under a country office – based CPO such as ETH 127, and putting the salary of an expert under 7 or 8 CPOs and also under as many as 3 to 4 country offices- which was bound to be problematic for several reasons including the fact that a country office like Addis CO neither had direct responsibility nor control over what other CPOs did; (c) limited involvement of the Decent Work Teams (DWTs); and (d) lack of a regional strategy upon which to implement interventions with regional perspectives.</p>

## ILO Emerging Good Practice Template

**Project Title:** Independent Thematic Evaluation of RBSA Support to Selected Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs) Concerning Promotion of Employment during the 2012 - 2013 Biennium

**Project Code:** RAF 107 and ETH 127

**Name of Evaluator:** Stanley M. Karuga **Date:** 8<sup>th</sup> June 2015

The following emerging good practices have been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

GP Element	Text
<b>Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)</b>	✚ Key good practices identified include: (i) Designing of CPOs based on a clear understanding of the country context and the actual livelihood needs of target beneficiaries (both the target communities & governments of member states) as part of DWCP formulation processes; (ii) Capacity building of stakeholders; (iii) Creation of requisite socio-economic and political enabling environment; (iv) Promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation; (v) Information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration; and (vi) Mainstreaming interventions into government policies.
<b>Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability</b>	✚ Conditions for applicability and replicability strongly hinges on (i) convergence of project purpose and interventions with socio-economic needs of target beneficiaries; (iii) Capacity building of target beneficiaries; and (iv) Continued political will on the part of target beneficiary governments of member states;
<b>Establish a clear cause-effect relationship</b>	✚ The above listed emerging good practices resulted in broad-based support and ownership of CPO interventions -thereby contributing significantly to the performance and achievement of CPO interventions including training and capacity building of 6,799 ex-combatants under COD 102; fifty-nine 59 trainers and thirty (30) emerging entrepreneurs under GHA 101; sixty-two (62) community roads maintenance groups and 30 MPW engineers under LBR 101; fifteen (15) senior government officials, forty-six (46) community representatives, twenty (20) engineers under SLE 103; and twenty (20) senior staff at decision-making level under SSD 101.
<b>Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries</b>	While it was not possible to establish the full extent of impact and sustainability of interventions of the CPOs under review primarily due to lack of M&E data and information, the Mission observed the following interventions that have real potential to contribute to impact and sustainability: (a) Initial stakeholder consultations which were in-built in the design of DWCP from which the CPOs were derived, as well as during the formulation of the ILO Regional Strategy for North Africa (2011-2015); (b) Capacity building of local stakeholder and relevant institutions through training and exposure tours; (c) Creation of requisite enabling environment in terms of promoting peace, security and development of infrastructural facilities – particularly rural access roads; (d) Promotion of income generating opportunities and employment creation; (e) Information sharing, networking, and promotion of strategic partnership and collaboration; and (f) Mainstreaming interventions into government policies, strategies and plans.
<b>Potential for replication and by whom</b>	The potential for replication of the ILO Employment Intensive Infrastructural development methods and the UN Policy for Employment in Post-Conflict approach, not only by the Governments of beneficiary member states but also ILO Constituents and local communities.
<b>Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)</b>	The CPOs are strongly linked with, and significantly contributes to: (i) ILO's overall goal of promoting opportunities for decent work for women and men in all countries through the provision of technical and institutional assistance to constituents in Member States; (ii) ILO's Strategic Framework for 2010-2015 –specifically in relation to its priority outcomes on employment promotion; and (iii) DWCPs for of Member States – where already formulated.
<b>Other documents or relevant comments</b>	The ILO should have ensured adequate and regular monitoring of progress and performance of CPO interventions as well as follow-up and consolidation of results, not just to inform the decision-making processes, but also to draw lessons for improved implementation of CPO interventions in future.

