



ILO Evaluation

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This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Unit.

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Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ATKOMA	Ataúro Tourism Association
BDS	Business Development Services
BIF	Business Innovation Facility
BMM	Business Matchmaking Services
BNCTL	National Commercial Bank of Timor-Leste
BOSS	Business Opportunities and Support Services
CCI-TL	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Timor-Leste
CDE	Business development centre
CGE	Cabinet for Gender Equality
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DAC	Developing Agricultural Communities (a USAID project)
DCED	Donor Committee for Enterprise Development
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
ERA	Enhancing Rural Access Programme
ESTATAL	Secretary of State for Administration
ETA	Ataúro Tourism Group
ETDA	East Timor Development Agency
IADE	Institute for Business Support
ILO	International Labour Organization
INDMO	National Labour Force Development Institute
KSTL	East Timor Trade Union Confederation
M4P	Making Markets Work for the Poor
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery
MECAE	Coordinator Ministry for Economic Affairs
MED	Ministry of Economic Development
MDF	Market Development Facility
MIS	Management Information System
MSA	MarketShare Associates
MSE	Micro and small enterprise
MSME	Micro, small and medium enterprises
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NIWA	New Zealand's National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRED	National Directorate of Rural Economic Development
NZAid	New Zealand Aid Programme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PSD	Private Sector Development
RBE	Results-based evaluation
SDP	Strategic Development Plan
SEAPRI	State Secretary for Private Sector Support and Promotion
SEFOPE	Secretariat of State of Professional Training and Employment
SEPI	Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality
SME	Small and medium enterprise
TIS	Tender Information System
TOMAK	Farming for Prosperity (DFAT project)

ToT	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNTL	National University of Timor-Lorosa'e
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VLW	Village Livestock Worker
VSA	New Zealand Volunteer Service Abroad
ZEESM	Zonas Especiais de Economia Social de Mercado; Special economic zone

I. Executive Summary

Project Summary

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Timor-Leste's Business Opportunities and Support Services (BOSS) programme is a six-year, USD \$11.8 million Private Sector Development project with a core purpose to contribute to employment creation and income generation. BOSS was implemented by ILO from January 2011 to December 2016, with initial funding of USD \$7,920,395 by Irish Aid and an additional USD \$3,909,165 of funding provided by the New Zealand Aid Programme starting in 2013.

The BOSS project's **Development Objective** is: *Contributing to the generation of pro-poor economic development and quality employment for women and men by spurring growth of micro and small enterprises (MSEs)*. This was expected to be achieved through the following immediate objectives:

- **Immediate Objective 1:** *Increased business opportunities for MSEs in target sectors and districts.*
- **Immediate Objective 2:** *Nation-wide access to enhanced and innovative market/need orientated business development services (BDS).*
- **Immediate Objective 3:** *Increased SEAPRI (State Secretary for Private Sector Support and Promotion) commitment and capacity to mainstream gender in all policies, programs and activities.*

Evaluation background

A final evaluation was conducted by MarketShare Associates (MSA) from late November 2016 to February 2017. Drawing from a desk review, interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders, the evaluation examines the BOSS program on five key areas: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. MSA assessed the BOSS programme against each of the five key evaluation categories on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being highest):

Score	1	2	3	4	5
Criteria	<i>Clear evidence of unsatisfactory performance</i>	<i>Adequate performance</i>	<i>Good performance</i>	<i>Strong performance</i>	<i>Excellent performance</i>
Implication	<i>Performance <u>does not meet</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>partially meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>mostly meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>fully meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>exceeds</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>

Main Findings

Relevance

Evaluation Criteria: Relevance	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Project clarity and logic	3.5	The project was appropriately designed and informed by needs assessment, but the scope was overly broad for the available resources, and iterative design of program logic was not utilised to maximise relevance over time.
Alignment with ILO, partner, and beneficiary interests	5	BOSS was intentionally and thoroughly designed to align with the strategies and priorities of its stakeholders, and results are relevant to those priorities.

- The overall BOSS causal logic is clear and consistent with stakeholder strategies. The causal framework allowed for piloting of interventions and the flexibility to adjust activities, but the overall

logic was not iterated or formally adjusted in any significant way over the course of the project, and relevance was not maximised over time.

- If the BOSS program had better integrated its components, IADE could have developed capacity to embed technical and business development training and information services within the target value chains themselves.
- The evaluation finds that BOSS was well-informed by other development initiatives in Timor-Leste and many lessons have been learned by multiple stakeholders that will continue to be relevant for value chain development, entrepreneurship development, and policy frameworks around women’s economic empowerment, tender requirements, business development services, and sector regulations in cattle and beef, horticulture, and tourism.

Effectiveness

Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Translating outputs to outcomes	4	Outcome and output targets were largely met and in many cases exceeded, with few shortfalls. The per sector targets were modest relative to BOSS’s scope, though, and analysis of the deeper market impacts of the project was lacking.
Adaptive Management	4	Individual interventions were managed in a highly adaptive way, and learning was a prominent characteristic of the project’s culture. Adaptive management was not systematised at the overall program level, though, and program-level strategic reviews and revisions across interventions were not a regular feature of project processes. Iterative design of the causal logic at the intervention level would have been more conducive to intentional and well-documented adaptive program management.

- The targets set for the three Immediate Objectives, and the Outputs under each, were largely met, with a few shortfalls and a few targets exceeded. Annex 5 is a table of results on each Objective Indicator.
- Immediate Objective 1: Increased business opportunities for MSEs in target sectors and districts
 - Results reported are disaggregated by sector, with cattle meeting or exceeding all of its objective targets, horticulture meeting three out of four of its objective targets, and tourism falling well below its targets across the board.
 - The most detectable positive impact of BOSS’s investments in the three target value chains is around formal and informal rules and norms of doing business in the sectors.
 - There is the greatest potential to continue growing jobs and firm revenues in the cattle sector among the three sectors targeted by BOSS.
 - The vegetable sector holds a lot of potential for sustainable job creation for poor rural households in Timor-Leste.
 - Tourism is a priority sector for Timor-Leste’s development strategy and has significant opportunity for sustainable income generation, but without decisive action from the national government, entrepreneurial opportunities and entrepreneurship in the tourism sector will remain limited.
- Immediate Objective 2: Nationwide access to enhanced and innovative market/ need oriented business development services (BDS)
 - As the main counterpart for the BOSS program, IADE has gone through a major transformation, enhancing and expanding its business development services significantly. IADE BDS are relevant, innovative, valuable, and have been developed in a dynamic, need oriented way over the course of the project.
 - BOSS results have exceeded, and in some cases far exceeded, Immediate Objective 2 targets, which are around enterprises accessing BDS and seeing increased “business turnover” as a result.

- IADE is primarily dependent on government funding, and the budgeting process is arduous and requires up to 18 months of advanced planning. This limits the degree to which IADE is able to respond to client and internal needs in a timely and relevant way.
- IADE tracks and reports the delivery of its services through a Management Information System (MIS), but the MIS is static and is not a major driver of management decision making.
- Immediate Objective 3: Increased SEAPRI commitment and capacity to mainstream gender in all policies, programmes, and activities
 - BOSS facilitated the development of the SEAPRI *National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector*.
 - SEAPRI was unfortunately dissolved in 2015, and it was the institution with the mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan.
 - BOSS effectively ensured that gender was mainstreamed within IADE.
- The project extension, funded by NZAid, allowed for significantly deeper outcome achievements.
- BOSS M&E was not properly systematised, staffed, or resourced. Datasets, M&E and analysis plans, methodological descriptions and detailed indicator definitions were not well-documented or retained. As a result, this evaluation was unable to include a full data quality assessment as originally planned.
- The evaluation found significant qualitative evidence of learning across the BOSS project and within its various interventions. While adaptive management was a prominent feature within interventions, adaptive management was not mainstreamed into overall program management and learning.
- The project was staffed with appropriate experts for the technical work required from the program design, but their intervention teams were not sufficiently staffed or resourced for the ambitious scope of interventions, particularly for BOSS’s value chain development work.

Efficiency

Evaluation Criteria: Efficiency	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Value for Money and additionality	5	The BOSS scope of interventions was ambitious, and results were achieved despite relatively limited resources. Evidence suggests that much of what happened as a result of the BOSS project would not have occurred without it in the same timeframe.

- A major portion of BOSS’s budget was allocated to technical assistance, with the primary aim of stakeholder capacity building, and the use of facilitation as a project implementation modality was effective in building stakeholder capacity to carry interventions forward beyond the project.
- Although BOSS’s Immediate Objective targets were modest, its overall scope was ambitious. The resources available to BOSS were in some ways not sufficient for its broader aspirations, and it would probably not have had the same impact with fewer resources.
- Much of what BOSS accomplished would not have occurred, certainly not in the same timeframe, without the project. BOSS pioneered new approaches for both donors and implementers alike in Timor-Leste. This is especially true for the development of IADE as an institution – and by extension the availability of its services for Timor-Leste’s emerging entrepreneurs – as well as the upgrading of the cattle and horticulture value chains.
- BOSS was fortunate to have strong, strategic relationships and a high level of trust among government and private sector stakeholders who were integral to achieving the project’s results.

Impact

Evaluation Criteria: Impact	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Achieving long-term outcomes	3	Immediate Objective achievements contributed modestly towards impact at the Development Objective level, but impact targets were not set and methods for establishing plausible attribution of higher-level impacts to the project were not defined.

- Though not articulated or quantified in the Development Objective statement itself, the impact BOSS has had on the formal and informal rules governing target sectors is an important achievement of the project. Trust and mutual reliance has been built between producers, aggregators, processors, and retailers in the horticulture and beef sectors, and a collaborative tourism association has been established in Ataúro.
- The methods of this evaluation – due to time and budget allocated – and the project’s own M&E are too limited to truly understand what the lasting impacts of the BOSS program will be. An ex-post evaluation – a year or more after project end – that included a systems-level analysis in the target value chains and beneficiary surveys with control groups and a statistically significant sample of treatment groups for both value chain and BDS interventions would help ILO and other stakeholders establish more confident and comprehensive understanding of BOSS’s full impacts.
- A high proportion of users of IADE’s services to date are women, and anecdotal evidence suggests that women are heavily involved in horticulture and tourism related work. BOSS did not look at gendered inter-household economic dynamics, though this is an important aspect of women’s economic empowerment.

Sustainability

Evaluation Criteria: Sustainability	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Sustainability addressed and achieved	4	Sustainability was earnestly addressed in the project design, implementation, and exit strategy. Gaps and constraints exist, though, that could be a threat to the sustainability of some BOSS results.

- BOSS had a vision for sustainability in both design of development models and a well-developed exit strategy, which includes specific recommendations for each component of BOSS to maximise sustainability as ILO withdrew from the project.
- By facilitating rather than delivering services directly, BOSS has formed partnerships between private companies and farmers, academia and entrepreneurs and between government and enterprises with the intention to sustain services that reach existing and potential entrepreneurs across Timor-Leste.
- There is strong evidence that, although modest, the market shifts brought about by the value chain interventions will be sustained and even built upon over time.
- The arduous MECAE planning and budgeting process, as well as the fixed MIS, will continue to slow IADE’s adaptability. IADE is not as nimble as it may need to be to continue to stay responsive and relevant to market needs.

Conclusions

The BOSS project should be viewed as an overall success as it was designed and resourced. It is important, however, to keep BOSS’s achievements in perspective, as major challenges remain in the areas of program intervention.

- **Relevance:** The evaluation finds the BOSS project focus to have been highly relevant to the context. The project design sacrificed depth of impact, however, for breadth of interventions.

- **Effectiveness:** The BOSS program has been effective in meeting its targets. In all three areas represented by the project's Immediate Objectives, more progress is needed and major challenges remain.
- **Efficiency:** BOSS has converted its resources into meaningful results reasonably efficiently. BOSS allocated a marked portion of its budget to technical assistance for capacity building, which is justified when considering the facilitation approach used by the project.
- **Impact:** BOSS achievements contributed to the project's stated higher-level aspirational impacts, but broad impact on economic growth and quality employment is not demonstrated.
- **Sustainability:** Not all of what has been accomplished through BOSS will be sustained, but capacities, incentives, and resources exist for institutions and market actors to continue to champion initiatives started under the project.
- **Gender issues:** BOSS successfully ensured that gender was systematically considered in both project design and project management, and project results reflect this priority. The project also had significant influence on government prioritization of women in economic development.
- **Tripartite issues:** The evaluation did not reveal any major difficulties engaging the tripartite constituents.
- **Lessons learned and emerging good practice:** Quite a few lessons, some more significant than others, can be extrapolated from the findings and conclusions detailed in this report. Annex 8 details two lessons learned and one emerging good practice examples.

Recommendations

Based in the findings from this end-line evaluation, the following recommendations are made to ILO and its tripartite constituents:

1. Ensure that projects are "evaluation ready" to maximize learning from an external evaluation.
2. Similarly, ensure that monitoring and evaluation is appropriately resourced for the scope and complexity of the project.
3. Key terminology for any project should be clearly defined, particularly for objective statements and indicators. Data collection and analysis methodologies should also be clearly defined.
4. Specific intervention-level causal frameworks – in the form of more detailed results chains – could be defined out of a program-level causal framework that provides clear links between more micro-level progress and macro-level achievements.
5. An ex-post evaluation, at least one year after project end, may be prudent to better understand the lasting impacts of BOSS.
6. IADE should plan to subcontract a firm to upgrade the MIS at regular intervals. With the appropriate consultations with the MIS users (IADE), the firm should be able to iterate the system from end to end as the needs and use cases change over time.
7. Insofar as BOSS stakeholders are able to continue supporting cattle sector development, a focus on breeding centres and, separately, fattening camps could bring important market functions to sustain growth and incentivise entry into the sector by household cattle owners.
8. Follow on BDS initiatives could improve options and increase outlets for the private sector to access needed business development services by working to embed them within the value chain. IADE capacity could be built to identify opportunities to embed BDS within value chains and then work with market actors to develop the appropriate services.

II. Project Background

After decades of struggle to overthrow Indonesian occupation, following centuries of Portuguese colonization, Timor-Leste gained independence in 2002 with its economy and infrastructure weakened from years of war and neglect. Oil resources have fuelled rapid economic growth in recent years, but those resources will likely run out within five years,¹ and the prospects for Timor-Leste's development relies heavily on prudent investments of the country's remaining petroleum resources to finance infrastructure and human capital. There has been strong progress in the development of government function and services, but Timor's human development indicators remain among the lowest in the region, and half of the Timorese population still lives on less than a dollar a day.²

Private sector. Timor-Leste's private sector is by-and-large characterized by small, informal business activities, with some 80% of the population involved in agricultural activities to support their livelihoods. The rural poor rely on a diverse range of livelihood strategies: from exploiting land and natural assets for consumption or for cash crops, to sharecropping and other forms of social exchange, to seasonal labour. Production is usually small-scale, subsistence and self-financed with any surplus sold only locally. Markets in the small island country of just over one million people are thin and uncompetitive, and enterprises are generally small scale and fragile. Businesses lack strong market access, and business-to-business relationships are minimal. Few business development services exist, and there is a lack of information and analysis available to demonstrate areas for potential private sector development.³

Development Plan. The Timor-Leste government has acknowledged the role the private sector must in reducing poverty and has rolled out regulations and reforms aimed at creating a more favourable enabling environment for private sector growth. Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan (SDP), 2011–2030 includes priorities in social capital, infrastructure development, technical and vocational education and training, and economic development. Broad areas outlined in the SDP for economic development are rural development, agriculture, petroleum, tourism, and private sector development, and specifically named sector growth opportunities include tourism, cattle and high-value vegetables, among others.⁴ Consultation led by ILO with private sector, local government and civil society stakeholders in rural Timor identified a willingness and commitment to focus on growth in these sectors. A lack of dialogue and coordination between the public and the private sectors, lack of market access for products and services, limited involvement of the private sector in government service delivery and weak managerial and entrepreneurial knowledge were also confirmed in multi-stakeholder consultations, and entrepreneurs noted challenges accessing financing as well as vocation and business management training.

Horticulture sector. Considerable demand exists at the national level for horticulture products, and a high volume of imported vegetables are sold in Dili supermarkets. The climate, soil quality, and access to water in the mountainous regions of Timor are favourable to horticulture production.⁵ Vegetables can be higher-value crops that are accessible to the resource poor, particularly women, as vegetables require little space, small cash investment, and can be grown close to the home where multiple household and livelihood activities can be coordinated. Timor's vegetable sector is characterized by small-scale production on plots of less than a hectare, often for subsistence purposes.

¹ *Timor and Australia: Line in the Sand*. The Economist, April 9, 2016. <http://econ.st/1S8PCnv>

² *Asian Development Bank Member Fact Sheet: Timor-Leste*. ADB, 2015. <http://bit.ly/2g3ddZP>

³ *The BOSS project in Timor-Leste: Thin Markets, Thick Impact?* Matt Ripley and Annie Major, International Labour Organization (ILO), 2015. <http://bit.ly/2gKBrY2>

⁴ *Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan, 2011-2030*. Government of Timor-Leste, 2011. <http://bit.ly/15cccVb>

⁵ *Horticulture Sector: BOSS Intervention Report*. ILO, 2014.

Six years ago, access to inputs – particularly seeds – was extremely limited, and there was no dedicated input supply outlet even in the capital, Dili. While some mixed retail shops had government licenses to sell agricultural inputs, few staff in these outlets had technical knowledge to pass on to customers on the appropriate use of inputs. Promoting commercial incentives for input supply was challenging when various government agencies and well-meaning non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were providing inputs at no cost to farmers through their programs. Due to high cost of transport and the lack of established relationships with higher-value buyers, district (rural) markets were not linked to more lucrative retail markets in Dili. Only two retailers offered a steady supply of district produced vegetables in Dili: Kmanek Supermarket in partnership with USAID, which sourced from Aileu District, and Pateo, who partnered directly with farmers in Liquica District.⁶ Government extension services were, and remain, limited by insufficient outreach staff and poor agricultural knowledge.

Cattle sector. Cattle raising is prevalent in rural Timor, with many households owning cattle primarily for cultural purposes – as part of traditional dowry practice – and also as a security asset to sell when cash is needed. It's estimated that around 31% of Timorese households owned cattle, and a much higher proportion in some districts. Raising cattle, however, is generally not seen as a commercial enterprise by rural families. The vast majority of cattle farmers are smallholders with two to five head of cattle, low productivity, and a high incidence of disease and mortality. Six years ago, there were no breeding programs operating in the country, and there is little to no focus on animal fattening. Timor-Leste's Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) provides vaccinations and extension services, but with limited outreach. Livestock medicine suppliers generally only existed in Dili, with few qualified veterinary service providers.



With no operating abattoir (slaughterhouse) in the country just a few years ago, slaughtering and butchering in Dili and the districts was being undertaken in broadly unhygienic and cruel and inhumane conditions. The national abattoir had been rehabilitated but was not being operated, and the markets were mainly being supplied through district-level collectors selling to about 10 slaughter points in Dili. Livestock exports to the Indonesian market were halted entirely in 2011, owing to the Indonesian government's

concerns about the health condition of the animals. High demand for beef in Indonesia and the high prevalence of Australian and New Zealand beef imports to Dili represent significant market opportunities for Timorese cattle farmers.⁷

Tourism sector. Following a long period of occupation and conflict, the tourism sector in Timor-Leste is nascent, and the country receives very few international visitors. Comparing to other tourist destinations in the region, Timor-Leste is relatively expensive and difficult to get to with poor tourism infrastructure and services. The few tourism service providers that exist generally exhibit low business and hospitality skills, and accommodation in the districts in particular is relatively scarce and in poor condition. The national government has done little to effectively market Timor tourism to international travellers. Research shows, however, that the country has good tourism potential to particular market

⁶ *Horticulture Sector: BOSS Intervention Report*. ILO, 2014.

⁷ *Cattle Sector: BOSS Intervention Report*. ILO, 2014.

segments, particularly groups with special interests such as diving, hiking or eco- tourism.⁸ The waters surrounding Ataúro Island, for example, have recently been declared the most biodiverse in the world by Conservation International.⁹

⁸ *Tourism Sector: BOSS Intervention Report*. ILO, 2014.

⁹ *Atauro Island: scientists discover the most biodiverse waters in the world*. Michael Slezak, The Guardian. August 17, 2016.
<http://bit.ly/2brF2VRalue>

III. Project Description

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Timor-Leste's Business Opportunities and Support Services (BOSS) programme is a six-year, USD \$11.8 million Private Sector Development project with a core purpose to contribute to employment creation and income generation. BOSS was implemented by ILO from January 2011 to December 2016, with initial funding of USD \$7,920,395 by Irish Aid and an additional USD \$3,909,165 of funding provided by the New Zealand Aid Programme starting in 2013.

BOSS has played a facilitative role, guided by a Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach, to address underlying constraints in the functions that support core market systems within three priority subsectors for pro-poor income growth: cattle, horticulture, and tourism. The program has also supported the development of a portfolio of business services offered by its main counterpart IADE (Institute for Business Support). IADE now operates under the remit of the Coordinator Ministry for Economic Affairs (MECAE), although for most of the BOSS programme the institution fell under Timor-Leste's State Secretary for the Support and Promotion of the Private Sector (SEAPRI), which has now been dissolved. BOSS worked to mainstream gender in SEAPRI's policies and activities, and in particular within IADE's functions. Annex 6 is a detailed summary of BOSS Project milestones.


The BOSS project's **Development Objective** is: *Contributing to the generation of pro-poor economic development and quality employment for women and men by spurring growth of micro and small enterprises (MSEs)*. This was expected to be achieved through the following immediate objectives:

- **Immediate Objective 1:** *Increased business opportunities for MSEs in target sectors and districts.*
- **Immediate Objective 2:** *Nation-wide access to enhanced and innovative market/need orientated business development services (BDS).*
- **Immediate Objective 3:** *Increased SEAPRI (State Secretary for Private Sector Support and Promotion) commitment and capacity to mainstream gender in all policies, programs and activities.*

ILO has a mandate to "help advance the creation of decent work and the economic and working conditions that give working people and business people a stake in lasting peace, prosperity and progress," and BOSS is its key project focused on advancing the development of the private sector towards these priorities. ILO's focus works in alignment with Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2010-30, which emphasises the support and development of the private sector.

Immediate Objective 1. Under Immediate Objective 1, BOSS followed a market development approach to value chain development within the three priority sub-sectors. These sectors were identified during BOSS's inception phase, based on the criteria of relevance to the poor, growth potential, inclusion in Timor-Leste's SDP and feasibility of intervening. BOSS initially applied a local economic development (LED) lens, which requires that the private sector has a platform to influence local planning and decision making so that the government creates an enabling environment for the private sector. Timor-Leste has not yet decentralized, and decision making power and budget allocations sit at the national level. As it was determined that decentralization would not likely happen in the life of the project, BOSS decided to apply an M4P lens to value chain development.

Value chain analysis mapped the groups within the value chain and assessed their roles, particularly looking at the constraints in the various levels of the value chain. Analysis of underlying constraints within the formal and informal rules and supporting functions to the core supply and demand market was done for each of the sub-sectors, and interventions were designed to address those constraints through market facilitation modalities.¹⁰ BOSS drew from the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) Standard for Results Measurement to provide the evidence base and learning to guide its value chain work.¹¹ This structured approach to data collection and analysis attempts to verify impact through theory, making arguments on the probability of contribution using results chains and attempting to explain change by asking why an expected change has happened, and if not why not.¹² Results chains were developed for each sub-sector (see Annex 7) that established causal logic for expected systemic change, against which the theories are to be regularly tested using monitoring and market assessment data and iteratively redesigned for adaptive implementation management as learning takes place.



Springfield Centre: The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach

Horticulture sector. At the start of the BOSS project, access to inputs, particularly seeds, for the horticulture sector was extremely limited, with no dedicated input supply outlet, even in the capital.



To improve access to inputs for farmers BOSS partnered with Mercy Corps and supported local grocery kiosks to stock and sell seeds, fertilisers, pesticide, organic compost and small agriculture tools. The kiosks received training on product specifications, safe storage and use of chemicals, and marketing support and were linked to input suppliers in Dili. There is now a modest network of kiosks that are reporting profits from the sale of inputs.

BOSS partnered with the only existing Timorese company that focused on

¹⁰ *The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach*, second edition. Springfield Centre. 2015.

<http://bit.ly/2hhL4KQ>

¹¹ *DCED Standard for Measuring Results in Private Sector Development: Control Points and Compliance Criteria*, Version VII. Donor Committee for Enterprise Development. April 2015. <http://bit.ly/2h2do4n>

¹² *The BOSS project in Timor-Leste: Thin Markets, Thick Impact?* Matt Ripley and Annie Major, International Labour Organization (ILO), 2015. <http://bit.ly/2gKBrY2>

horticulture and organic farming methods, Josephina Farm, and piloted contract farming with farmer groups in Maubisse. Through this arrangement, farmers received access to inputs, technical assistance and most importantly a reliable sales market. Farmers groups also received entrepreneurship and business awareness training from BOSS's counterpart, the Institute of Business Support (IADE). Farmers report time-saving, vegetable waste reduction and income increase as the major benefits from selling to Josephina Farm rather than selling their produce themselves in the local market. The Timor-Leste Government agreed to lease three government owned greenhouses in Maubisse to Josephina Farms, which has gone through several harvests with the greenhouses.


Cattle sector. The BOSS beef cattle sector development work included four intervention areas to address market constraints including. First, the program aimed to increase cattle productivity. In partnership with the University of Timor-Lorosa'e (UNTL) Agro-Livestock Department, the project designed and delivered technical trainings to 37 Village Livestock Workers (VLWs) in cattle health, reproduction and nutrition, as well as trainings on business awareness and entrepreneurship. The VLWs then passed on training to 1,014 cattle farmers, 26% of whom were women, earning a modest profit. With support from the Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment Policy (SEFOPE), BOSS facilitated a short-term internship for UNTL Animal Health students. BOSS assisted VLW groups to submit a charter to the Ministry of Justice to formalize an association and produced marketing materials to help create group identity.

To improve access to inputs for livestock farmers, BOSS's partnership with Mercy Corps to support local grocery kiosks to stock and sell inputs also included the sale of animal medicines and linking them to VLWs. The VLWs are able to provide their services to individual cattle farmers to administer medicines as needed. VLWs earn a modest profit from their service, although it remains difficult to get small-scale farmers to pay for a service that is sporadically offered for free by the government or NGOs.



The project made the biggest investment in the cattle sector on the market side, where it facilitated a Public Private Partnership agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF) and a private enterprise called EBAI to operate the national abattoir (slaughterhouse), which had previously been defunct for many years. BOSS facilitated the renovation of the abattoir, which is owned by the government, to ensure sanitary and humane slaughtering conditions for EBAI to operate. The project supported training of slaughter men and butchers and today the abattoir and an associated butcher shop is running according to international hygiene and safety standards. Seeing the opportunities in the sector, a second enterprise, Talho Moris, approached BOSS and received support through IADE Business Incubation Facility to open their butcher shop. The two butcher shops are the only retailers of fresh, hygienic, and humanely slaughtered beef in Timor-Leste.

Tourism sector. The BOSS tourism intervention focused on the island of Ataúro just north of the capital Dili. There the project has contributed to establishing the Ataúro Tourism Association (ATKOMA) and supported them to create a website for the island¹³ with all the attractions,



accommodations and services listed, as well as an Ataúro tourism booklet.

BOSS also partnered with East Timor Development Agency (ETDA), a locally run hospitality-training centre, and developed a three-part training programme on hospitality and food preparation that was delivered to guest houses and restaurants in Ataúro, Maubisse, Baucau and Maliana. IADE also delivered tailored training and counseling on business management for guesthouses, restaurants, and souvenir shops. BOSS and ETDA followed up with tailored support and advice, and IADE with business management trainings, to select guesthouse operators.

At the national level the project has worked with the Ministry of Tourism on marketing and providing tourism information and supported the development of a national tourism website¹⁴ and the formulation of a national tourism policy.

Immediate Objective 2. Under Immediate Objective 2, BOSS focused on institutional strengthening to improve government delivery of Business Development Services (BDS) for small and medium enterprises. To this end, the BOSS program was embedded with the Institute of Business Support (IADE), an autonomous government institution with the mandate of providing services to private businesses, for the six-year life of project. ILO staff worked alongside their national counterparts on a daily basis providing training and support to develop new services and to improve planning and management processes within IADE.

From being a purely business training provider of one unaccredited course before the BOSS project, IADE now offers:

- Accredited *Start and Improve Your Business* training, as well as demand-driven business management training to existing entrepreneurs.
- Business counselling and coaching.
- Business Matchmaking Services (BMM), matching buyers and sellers through events and individual meetings in order to generate new business relationships.
- Business promotion through an online Tender Information System, which also disseminates tender information through text blasts to businesses registered with IADE.
- Hosting of international expos and business-to-business trade fairs.
- Market research, which it conducts for internal learning purposes and as a revenue generating service for private-sector clients.
- Promotion of entrepreneurship through a series of short films in Tetum called Super-Trainer.
- An annual business plan competition.
- Business Incubation Facility (BIF) that provides selected small enterprises with a package of support, including IADEs range of business development services and matching grants.

¹³ www.ataurotourism.org

¹⁴ www.timorleste.tl

During the life of the project, IADE has undergone a transformation of both size (staffing and presence in the districts) and services, which have rapidly expanded with the support of BOSS. From having 77 staff members (20 women) operating in 5 districts and Dili, IADE now has 111 staff members (35 women) and has presence in 12 of Timor-Leste's 13 districts. From having 12 trainers, IADE now has 42 accredited trainers. IADE's training client base has also grown from 665 before BOSS to 5,267 (49% women), and counselling clients have grown from 26 (35% women) to 700 (47% women).

Immediate Objective 3. Under Immediate Objective 3, the BOSS Project worked to ensure that the needs of women entrepreneurs were catered to and that a gender-sensitive approach in private sector development would be taken. A National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector¹⁵ was developed by BOSS and the SEAPRI and was approved by the government in 2013. With government restructuring, however, SEAPRI was dissolved in 2014, and IADE was moved under the newly formed MECAE. Although the Strategy and Action Plan still has relevance within IADE and other areas of government, it is no longer an operationalized government strategy.

The IADE Strategic Plan, as well as its Annual Action Plans, have also been designed to adopt a gender lens. Gender is mainstreamed in all the activities of the project, from design of interventions to implementation and monitoring. Of all the businesses registered with IADE, 49% are women-owned. A total of 29% of contractor training participants are women, 51% of participants of business matchmaking events are women and 63% of exhibitors at trade fairs organised by IADE have been women-owned companies or organisations.

Beneficiaries. The **direct beneficiaries** of the BOSS Project are organizations within the support structure of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and the value chains they are part of. Because the **counterpart structure** of BOSS means that the project is embedded within IADE¹⁶, the public agency and its regional Business Development Centres are the primary direct BOSS beneficiaries. Other direct beneficiaries include private sector service and training providers, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Timor-Leste (CCI-TL), national and local-level government agencies, business associations, workers' organizations, NGOs, women's organizations, and financial institutions. The **ultimate beneficiaries** of the project are the women and men who own, manage or have started MSEs or who work in MSEs. Under paid or unpaid conditions.

Administration. The BOSS project was administered by the ILO Country Office for Indonesia and Timor-Leste under the responsibility of the Director of CO-Jakarta. The project was implemented by a project team comprising of:

- Chief Technical Advisor
- Local Economic Development / Value Chain Development Expert
- Business Management /Enterprise Development Expert
- Management Information Systems Expert
- Monitoring and Communication expert
- Gender Mainstreaming Associate Expert (JPO)

¹⁵ *National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and Private Sector 2014-2017.* ILO, State Secretary for the Support and Promotion of the Private Sector. 2013.

¹⁶ The main counterpart was initially the Ministry of Economy and Development (MED), and each of the three components of the BOSS project coordinated with specific MED institutions: Objective 1 with the National Directorate of Rural Economic Development (NRED), Objective 2 with IADE, and Objective 3 with the Cabinet for Gender Equality (CGE). Once MED was dissolved after the 2012 election of a new government in Timor-Leste, IADE became the main counterpart for all aspects of the BOSS project.

The international experts provided long-term inputs to the project of various durations. There were also inputs by international consultants and New Zealand Volunteers. The project was technically backstopped by the Enterprise Department in ILO Headquarters in Geneva.

Exit Strategy. BOSS employed an exit strategy that focused on the sustainability of investments made during the lifetime of the project. By facilitating rather than delivering services directly, BOSS has formed partnerships between private companies and farmers, academia and entrepreneurs and between government and enterprises with the intention to sustain services that reach existing and potential entrepreneurs across Timor-Leste. As BOSS scaled down its efforts at the end of the project, private-sector firms have taken the lead on ongoing initiatives within the targeted value chains. By embedding BOSS staff within IADE and turning over leadership in the last year of the project, IADE carries forward the projects BDS initiatives.

IV. Evaluation background

ILO requires an independent mid-term and final evaluation for all projects with \$5 million USD budget or greater. A mid-term evaluation of the BOSS Project was conducted in 2013, and with project activities completing in December 2016, a final evaluation was conducted by MarketShare Associates (MSA). The evaluation was led by Matt Styslinger, MSA Managing Consultant, in coordination with Ben Fowler, MSA Principal Consultant. The evaluation Terms of Reference is included as Annex 1 of this report.

Purpose. The purpose of the final evaluation was to independently assess whether the project met its stated objectives, through its chosen modalities and interventions for accountability to donors and wider stakeholders, as well as organisational learning to draw lessons for future projects. The evaluation provides project stakeholders with an independent, transparent and detailed assessment of the project as a whole.

Evaluation clients. The primary clients of this evaluation are: The Government through the Ministry Coordinating Economic Affairs (MECAE) and IADE with its District Business Development Centres, private sector service and training providers, CCI-TL, district, sub-district and suco authorities, the MSEs who are the project's ultimate beneficiaries, Irish AID and New Zealand Aid, and ILO – including the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, field technical specialists and technical units at ILO Headquarters.

Results-based evaluation. Drawing from a desk review, interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders, the evaluation examines the BOSS program on five key areas: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. This is in alignment with the results-based evaluation (RBE) criteria endorsed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The primary evaluation questions, as well as secondary guiding questions, are outlined as Annex 3, grouped by the five RBE categories.

Schedule. The in-country evaluation work took place from November 28 to December 9 and included stakeholder interviews in Dili, Ataúro Island, and Maliana District. A stakeholder workshop was held in Dili to present the evaluator's initial findings and elicit further feedback to be integrated into the evaluation analysis. A summary evaluation work plan is included as Annex 4 to this report.

V. Methodology

This evaluation utilised a variety of methods to address the evaluation questions in order to assess the overall project according to the OECD results-based evaluation criteria. Methods included the following:

- A desk review of key project documentation supplied by the project office in Dili. The purpose of the desk review was to identify initial issues requiring further analysis and investigation during field research.
- Interviews with the project team based in Dili, including the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) and project staff.
- Interviews with project stakeholders, implementing partners and other key actors. This included one-to-one meetings Timor-Leste, group discussions, and phone interviews with stakeholders not present in Timor-Leste at the time of field data collection. Logistical support from the BOSS project team to arrange the interviews.
- Field visits to project sites in selected locations identified by the CTA and the evaluator. Field visits were undertaken with logistical support from ILO.
- A stakeholder workshop in Dili at the end of field work to present preliminary findings and elicit further stakeholder input. Preparation of the stakeholder workshop, including invitation and other administrative arrangements were provided by the BOSS project team.

M&E review. Through the document review and interviews, an overview assessment of the quality of the BOSS program team’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system – including review of primary data, collection tools, analysis methods, results chains, and interviews with staff with monitoring and evaluation roles. Data collected by the program team over the course of implementation was necessarily utilized in evaluating the program. MSA conducted a deeper investigation into the quality of M&E associated with the BOSS horticulture intervention, looking at the level of rigor in both data collection as well as analysis, and assessing the degree to which the intervention was evidence driven. The horticulture sector was selected as a sample for the M&E “deep dive” primarily because it had the most robust documentation to review and can be seen as the intervention that most follows M&E standards for market development programming. Sufficient documentation was not available to conduct a full data quality assessment.

Interviews. Stakeholder interviews, although guided by the evaluation questions, took a semi-structured approach. Semi-structured and open-ended discussions allow for the capture of unexpected information, yet highly useful context, feedback, and learning. Based on the data collection plan, a customized set of guiding questions will be prepared before each interview aimed at pulling out intended information from any given stakeholder. A list of stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation is included at the end of this report as Annex 2.

At the end of the in-country phase of the evaluation, the evaluator facilitated a session with key stakeholders to brief them on preliminary findings and allow for further stakeholder feedback and insights to be captured and considered in the subsequent analysis. Long-distance correspondence by phone and email with key ILO stakeholders, including the current and former Chief Technical Advisor and donor representatives, before and after the in-country evaluation work also contributed information and reflection to the evaluation.

Scoring. MSA assessed the BOSS programme against each of the five key evaluation categories (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being highest).

This numerical score was informed by MSA’s assessment of BOSS’s performance within each of the sub-categories:

Score	1	2	3	4	5
Criteria	<i>Clear evidence of unsatisfactory performance</i>	<i>Adequate performance</i>	<i>Good performance</i>	<i>Strong performance</i>	<i>Excellent performance</i>
Implication	<i>Performance <u>does not meet</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>partially meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>mostly meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>fully meets</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>	<i>Performance <u>exceeds</u> expectations in the evaluation category.</i>

Limitations. Analysis was constrained by the limitations of the methods employed. Methodologies for the evaluation were entirely qualitative, and primary quantitative data around incomes, jobs, and other value chain and market shifts the program may have had an impact on was not collected. A mixed-methods approach would have allowed for stronger triangulation of evidence for programme impact and validation of findings derived from one method against another. Any quantitative results outlined in this report are taken directly from project and IADE staff and reports, which comes with the risk of positive reporting bias, as well as gaps and inaccuracies resulting from errors or oversights in data collection, storage, calculation, or reporting that may have occurred. Wherever possible, methods were reviewed to gauge reliability of project data.

A major challenge of the evaluation was that the BOSS project was not “evaluation ready,” particularly in the case of documented M&E. At the time of evaluation key staff involved in implementation had left the project. Several of former BOSS team members were consulted for the evaluation, and those consultations helped to fill some information gaps. Those consultations were brief, however, and only overview perspective could be obtained. Many of the details that sit with former staff, and could have informed the evaluation, remained as gaps.

VI. Main findings

The evaluation findings are detailed in this section, organized by evaluation category. A score is assigned for each sub-category with a brief summary justifying the score assigned. An overall assessment of each category is articulated, followed by the primary evaluation questions and the evaluation's answer to them.

Relevance

Evaluation Criteria: Relevance	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Project clarity and logic	3.5	The project was appropriately designed and informed by needs assessment, but the scope was overly broad for the available resources, and iterative design of program logic was not utilised to maximise relevance throughout the project life cycle.
Alignment with ILO, partner, and beneficiary interests	5	BOSS was intentionally and thoroughly designed to align with the strategies and priorities of its stakeholders, and results are relevant to those priorities.

The evaluation finds the BOSS program to have been highly relevant to the context of Timor-Leste's development needs, the livelihood needs of micro-entrepreneurs and the rural poor, and the business enabling environment needs of Timor's fledgling and fragile private sector. Furthermore, the project objectives are well-aligned with the Government of Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan, which includes technical and vocational training, pro-poor economic development in BOSS's target sectors, and women's equality and economic empowerment. The project has strong relevance to ILO's mandate, as well as the priorities of BOSS partners and donors.

The BOSS program design identifies relevant interventions to achieve three Immediate Objectives, which have demonstrated potential to contribute to the program's higher-level Development Objective of increased incomes and quality employment for the poor. In practice, however, the Development Objective was treated primarily as a rationale for project interventions rather than their ultimate goal, and as a result interventions were not coordinated or configured to maximize impact at the Development Objective level. Immediate Objectives were in large part treated in isolation from each other, and achievement of their targets – which are modest – does not necessarily translate to meaningful contribution towards the achievement of the Development Objective – which is broad and ambitious.

The BOSS M&E framework includes relevant, well-articulated, and meaningful indicators at the Development Objective, Immediate Objective, and Output levels. Definitions for some of the key terminology used in the indicators, however, are not clearly articulated, and data collection and analysis methodologies were not clearly defined. This may have resulted in less rigorous interpretations being applied to terms like *jobs*, *enterprises*, and *business turnover*, as well as less rigorous methods utilised to establish attribution of changes measured to the project.

Analysis of project documentation and qualitative information collected for this evaluation shows that market needs and the needs of the target population were accurately identified by ILO, and interventions designed were appropriately tailored to those needs. The scope of the interventions, however, was broad and overly ambitious for the resources available to the project, and depth of intervention suffered as a result. Project resources focused on the development of one value chain

rather than three, for example, may have allowed for more tangible and sustainable improvements within that subsector.

Evaluation question: *Does the project have clear causal logic that supports its selected strategy?*

- The overall BOSS causal logic is clear and consistent with stakeholder strategies. The defined outputs have clear, logical connections to the intended objectives, and the indicators for both outputs and objectives help to specify the stepwise logic of achievements required to meet targets.
- The program causal framework allowed for piloting of interventions and the flexibility to adjust activities based on lessons learned from testing. The overall logic, however, was not iterated or formally adjusted in any significant way over the course of the project, even though lessons learned justified changes, and implementation naturally shifted emphasis anyway. As an example, outputs under Immediate Objective 1 assign responsibilities for value chain development to IADE, with technical capacity building by ILO. This did not turn out to be feasible, and instead the ILO value chain expert lead facilitation of value chain development directly with market actors, with little to no involvement from IADE in many aspects of implementation. The program-level causal logic was never adjusted to reflect this shift, as well as others. Adaptive management and iterative program design are major strengths of the M4P approach to program management and the DCED approach to results measurement and learning. The BOSS program could have benefitted from regular reflection and refining of the overall casual logic, improving the relevance of the program's design throughout its life cycle.
- Clear causal logic is developed for each of the subsectors under Immediate Objective 1 through well-defined results chains. The results chains reflect context and lessons that were learned well into implementation, and therefore are especially relevant and accurately outline how outcomes ultimately resulted from changes in service provision. But the results chains came late into implementation, and earlier iterations are not documented, as is called for in the DCED Standard. Interviews confirmed that BOSS value chain interventions were, in fact, iterative in their approach, relying on the cumulative knowledge of the project team and relevant market actors. Learning and course correction, however, was not systematically documented.

Evaluation question: *Do the project's sectors and interventions all clearly align with that of the program-level causal logic?*

- The sectors and interventions included in BOSS programming clearly align with the program-level causal logic. Within Immediate Objective 1, the causal logic created for each of the targeted sectors – in the form of results chains – clearly align with the objective to increase business opportunities in the sectors and, thus, the overall causal logic.
- Like the program level, iterative design of the causal logic at the intervention level would have allowed for better alignment and relevance of sectors and interventions throughout the project timeframe.
- Development in the tourism sector did not see significant progress as a result of BOSS, as there were challenges and constraints that were bigger than the project's scope of influence – for example the absence of land title policy in Timor-Leste has kept investments in tourist businesses low, and the national government has not promoted a coherent tourism marketing strategy for the country. While these challenges justify the modest results, they are not new and would have been clear from the outset of BOSS. Tourism is a priority sector for Timor-Leste's development strategy with significant opportunity for sustainable income generation, but without decisive action from the national government on land titles, basic infrastructure, and international marketing, tourist-based

entrepreneurship will remain stunted. As a target sector for BOSS's value chain work, tourism may not have been the most relevant use of project resources.

- Immediate Objective 2 is to bring nationwide access to BDS to target beneficiaries, which BOSS achieved by developing new services and curriculums through IADE, as well as IADE institutional capacity building. These services build basic financial literacy and business planning and management capacity among MSEs, which is indeed relevant to the overall program-level causal logic. But while some tailoring of BDS to specific sectors occurred, IADE primarily delivers more generic BDS that can apply across the wide range of enterprises that its constituents are engaged in. BOSS's work to develop IADE's capacity happened largely in isolation from the value chain work, and in some ways took priority over it. Because the high-level objective of BOSS is to improve incomes and jobs, it is essential that programming within Objective 1 and Objective 2 complement each other towards that end. Discussions with IADE staff confirm that they have been insulated from BOSS's value chain work, do not understand the technical approaches or the eventual results, and do not view value chain development as an ultimate objective of their own work. If the BOSS program had better integrated its components, IADE could have developed capacity to embed technical and business development training and information services within the target value chains themselves. For example, Josephina Farms has a business incentive to ensure the success of the individual vegetable farmers it contracts with, and therefore would have an incentive to provide basic agricultural technical training and financial literacy and business management training to those farmers using its own resources. As it is, individual MSEs are by and large not willing to pay out of pocket for IADE's services, and they only access BDS from IADE when funding is provided by the government or NGO programs. IADE is able to raise its own revenue by contracting its services, but it is largely dependent on the MECAE budget. A BOSS focus on embedding BDS within the value chain could have proven to be more relevant to the needs in the targeted value chains and more sustainable over time.

Evaluation question: *Are important assumptions made explicit and relevant?*

- A Risk-Assumptions Plan exists and is relevant. The plan analyses the likelihood and impact of each risk and assigns a risk level. A mitigation strategy is summarized for each risk in the plan.
- The assumptions detailed in the Risk-Assumptions Plan may not have sufficiently considered other existing risks. Specific risks around BOSS's value chain work, for example, are not strongly represented in the plan. The risk of developing IADE as a part government, part private entity as BOSS's BDS solution is also not included in the plan. IADE is primarily dependent on government funding, and they are highly vulnerable to potential budget cuts. The private funding available to IADE by contracting its services primarily depends on government or donor-funded initiatives, which are also vulnerable to shifts in priorities. Because the government budgeting process requires planning on IADE's part up to 18 months in advance of any new services or initiatives it wants to add, it runs the risk of not being nimble enough to stay relevant to its main constituents as unpredicted shifts occur in the private sector context.
- Many of the assumptions listed are not expressed in relevant terms. For example, there are quite a few references to the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), which was dissolved in the second year of the BOSS project. There are also assumptions and risks that relate to the 2012 election in Timor-Leste, which has long since passed. The Risk-Assumptions Plan, therefore, could not have served as a meaningful tool for evidence-based adaptive management in the later years of the BOSS program.
- Several of the assumptions around gender equality did not hold, particularly those around institutionalisation of gender strategies and policy. BOSS invested heavily in the development of the

Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan for SEAPRI, but the ministry was dissolved and the formal Strategy and Action Plan retains very little influence.

Evaluation question: *Are expected results relevant to the strategies of ILO, CCI-TL, KSTL, Irish Aid and New Zealand Aid, national development frameworks and target populations?*

- The expected and achieved economic and capacity development results of BOSS are highly relevant to the main project stakeholders.
- ILO has a mandate to “help advance the creation of decent work and the economic and working conditions that give working people and business people a stake in lasting peace, prosperity and progress,” and BOSS is its key project focused on advancing the development of the private sector towards these priorities. BOSS was also designed to complement other ongoing ILO interventions in Timor-Leste, particularly the Enhanced Rural Access (ERA) Programme – which worked to ensure that roads were built where the BOSS project indicated a socio-economic priority.
- The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Timor-Leste (CCI-TL) represents the country’s private sector, and it has a strong interest in value chain development in BOSS-selected sectors and business capacity of entrepreneurs. CCI-TL played an active role in informing the selection of BOSS target value chains, provided input on training needs, and played a role in judging IADE’s annual business plan competitions.
- Konfederacao Sindicato de Timor-Leste (KSTL) is a labour union and part of ILO’s tripartite structure in Timor-Leste, and BOSS’s objectives to create quality jobs is highly relevant to KSTL’s interests. That said, the scale of jobs created by the end of the program period is modest, and KSTL did not have significant involvement in BOSS implementation or grow its membership as a direct result of BOSS outcomes.
- Irish Aid’s strategy in Timor-Leste has been *Building Peace and Reducing Poverty*, both of which are high-level goals of the BOSS project. Poverty reduction is the main impetus of the project, while contribution to peace and consolidation is an indirect goal.
- New Zealand Aid’s strategy in Timor-Leste is to identify and develop economically sustainable industries in sectors where the country has a competitive advantage. Support the development of a sustainable and growing economy. Together we’re focused on private sector development, education and training, and value chain development in particular are an area of strong interest for the donor. Interviews with NZAID confirmed that BOSS is its flagship investment in value chain development in Timor-Leste to date, and the lessons and challenges of BOSS will inform future investments. Particular BOSS challenges highlighted by NZAID are thin markets and lack of economies of scale, Timor-Leste’s nascent institutions, and the lack of sophistication around entrepreneurship among Timorese micro-entrepreneurs.
- BOSS results and the strategies of its primary stakeholders all align directly with Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2010-30, which emphasises the support and development of the private sector.

Evaluation question: *Are interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other donor organizations in Timor-Leste?*

- The evaluation finds that BOSS was well-informed by other development initiatives in Timor-Leste and regular coordination and collaboration was present throughout the project. At the time of its inception, BOSS was one of the first initiatives in Timor-Leste that focused on value chain development, as well as the availability of business development services.

- USAID’s Developing Agricultural Communities (DAC) project, which ended in 2015, partnered with Timorese private-sector actors, including two of the largest local supermarkets – K’manek and Dilimart – to support farm families through training in business skills and horticulture technologies and by connecting smallholder farmers to retail traders. BOSS horticulture interventions facilitated business relationships between produce aggregator Josephina Farms and retailers in Dili, including K’manek and Dilimart. DAC also worked to promote economic empowerment of Timorese women, which is consistent with BOSS’s approach.
- USAID’s Avansa Agrikultura Project, which began in 2015, aims to accelerate inclusive sustainable economic growth through increased productivity and profitability of the horticulture value chain – a priority within BOSS. Women’s empowerment is also a priority for both projects. The Avansa project contracted IADE in 2016 to deliver training and counselling to women in rural areas – IADE services developed through BOSS.
- BOSS has ventured into new territory for development initiatives in Timor-Leste, and many lessons have been learned by multiple stakeholders that will continue to be relevant for value chain development, entrepreneurship development, and policy frameworks around women’s economic empowerment, tender requirements, business development services, and sector regulations in cattle and beef, horticulture, and tourism. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has funded a new larger-scale agricultural value chain development program in Timor-Leste, for example, called TOMAK – Farming for Prosperity. The program runs from 2016 to 2021, and it aims to enable sustainable prosperity for rural households by linking farmers of a range of crops to markets and income generating opportunities. TOMAK draws heavily from the lessons learned through BOSS and is able to take value chain interventions to scale.

Effectiveness

Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Translating outputs to outcomes	4	Outcome and output targets were largely met and in many cases exceeded, with few shortfalls. The targets are modest, though, and analysis on the deeper market impacts is lacking.
Adaptive Management	4	Individual interventions were managed in a highly adaptive way, and learning is a prominent characteristic of the project’s culture. Adaptive management was not systematised at the overall program level, though, and program-level strategic reviews and revisions across interventions were not a regular feature of project processes.

The BOSS program has been effective in meeting its stated targets, creating jobs and increasing sales in target value chains, significantly increasing access to need-based business development services, and building commitment and capacity for government mainstreaming of gender sensitivity in policies, programmes, and activities. In all three areas represented by the project’s Immediate Objectives, more progress is needed and major challenges remain.

BOSS’s value chain work has had the strongest impact on the rules, both formal and informal, governing the project’s target sectors, facilitating the development of new regulations, fostering new types of lasting relationships between value chain actors, and promoting a culture of entrepreneurship. Although the absolute numbers of entrepreneurs are small, cattle farmers, vegetable producers, and guesthouse and restaurant operators are thinking and acting more strategically as a result of their involvement with the BOSS project. Trust and mutual reliance has been built between producers, aggregators, processors, and retailers in the horticulture and beef sectors, and a collaborative tourism association has been established in Ataúro that continues to advance the collective interests of local tourism-based businesses. The project achievements around the value chain rules are not quantified, and evidence of whether those achievements will translate to a sustainable growth of jobs and income in the sectors remains to be established, but the shifts in the market culture facilitated by BOSS are lasting.

The value chain work, however, was undertaken quite separately from the work with IADE – the organization that the BOSS project was embedded with. Opportunities were lost to leverage synergies between the two sets of interventions, and capacity on value chain development, or even value chain analysis, was not established within IADE as an institution. There are pragmatic reasons for this, like the project’s ambitious scope and limited timeframe, as well as the limited capacity and experience of available staff. But even so, more collaboration between BOSS teams addressing the different Immediate Objectives could have helped IADE build awareness of development in target sectors and ensure that its services maintain limited relevance going forward.

IADE has been established as a high-functioning institution with a culture of critical thinking, learning and adaptability, and whose services are relevant in the context of MSE’s in Timor-Leste. Over time IADE will need to develop more specialized and tailored curriculums and services, as new populations embrace entrepreneurship and as IADE’s current clientele becomes more experienced and sophisticated. Although the culture and capacities BOSS has built within IADE are conducive to making the requisite adaptations to its services, there are institutional constraints that will hamper that adaptability, such as reliance on a lengthy government planning and budgeting process and lack of capacity to reconfigure the MIS as needed.

BOSS successfully facilitated the development of SEAPRI's National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector, which is a comprehensive institutional framework. But since SEAPRI was dissolved in 2015, government private-sector development is now under MECAE, and the BOSS efforts to mainstream gender sensitivity into it are less influential. But those efforts establish important precedence, and IADE itself was assigned responsibility for many of the activities in the National Strategy and Action Plan and retains them in its own action plan.

BOSS investments in M&E fell short of what the project called for. Budget allocations and staff dedicated to M&E were minimal for the complexity of BOSS's interventions, and overall program-level M&E was not truly established. A better defined M&E framework – more clearly articulated indicators and methodologies - and more rigorous data collection and systems level analysis could have been integrated into project protocols. Although learning was significant throughout the project and some valuable one-off studies were conducted, stronger prioritization of project M&E would have enhanced that, and more meaningful and definitive lessons could have been distilled out of the BOSS project.

Evaluation question: *Have the programme's output and objective targets been achieved?*

- The targets set for the three Immediate Objectives, and the Outputs under each, were largely met, with a few shortfalls and a few targets exceeded. These are discussed in more detail below, by Immediate Objective. Annex 5 is a table of results on each Objective Indicator.

Immediate Objective 1: Increased business opportunities for MSEs in target sectors and districts

- Achievement of the objective is determined by the project in terms of sales in the sector, jobs created, businesses started, and new investments. Results reported are disaggregated by sector, with cattle showing the strongest results in all categories, horticulture falling just short or just meeting targets, and tourism falling well below its targets across the board. Primary data was not collected on objective indicators as part of the evaluation. Accuracy of the results could not be verified, but qualitative discussions suggested a reasonable level of confidence that the numbers are faithfully reported.
- The most detectable positive impact of BOSS's investments in the three target value chains is around formal and informal rules and norms of doing business in the sectors. BOSS facilitated the establishment of critical regulations (decree laws) in the cattle sector on the licensing of slaughterhouses, the circulation of animals, livestock zoning, and slaughterhouse hygiene and sanitation. Challenges still remain around the implementation and enforcement of those rules, but the supply of hygienic, humanely produced beef continues to grow as a result of BOSS's efforts, as does the consumer demand. Similarly, BOSS has stimulated the shift to commercial vegetable production for farmers who contracted with Josephina Farms, and the contractual relationships between the farmers and the produce aggregator are new in the context. The link between Josephina Farms and high-value Dili supermarkets can also be seen as an upgrade in the norms of doing business in the vegetable sector. BOSS interventions in the tourism sector on Ataúro Island have significantly shifted the mind set and level of coordination of tourism entrepreneurs towards a coherent vision for themselves. The Ataúro tourism website and pamphlet, which BOSS facilitated the development of, has given community-based tourism businesses a platform for influence at the national level. Although competing initiatives like *Zonas Especiais de Economia Social de Mercado (ZEESM)*¹⁷ threaten to overrun Ataúro community-based tourism, the Ministry of Tourism Arts and Culture has been heavily influenced by BOSS's work in Ataúro. In discussions for this evaluation, the Director General of Tourism referred to Ataúro as a "gold standard" for tourism development in

¹⁷Special economic zone project for Oecusse and Atauro Island: www.zeesm.com

Timor-Leste as a whole, and the Ministry has prioritized inclusive development of the tourism sector and emphasizes the need for cultural and ecological sustainability.

- These targets are modest for the scope of the BOSS program. Given the scale of intervention to establish policy frameworks and connect value chain actors (particularly in the cattle and horticulture sectors), the number of jobs created and increase seen in private sector investment is moderate. The rationale for investing in the development of beef sector regulations, as well as the establishment of a private-sector run slaughterhouse, is that it will stimulate growth and create jobs and income for cattle farmers. With such broad achievements in upgrading the sector, it would make sense to have more ambitious jobs targets.
- Some of the definitions used for the targets are also not as rigorous as they could be. For example, one cattle farmer *job* is defined as a farmer owning at least 2.5 cattle. That was calculated, though, by dividing the total number of cattle sold to the slaughterhouse by the number of farmers. The calculation does not factor in attribution to the program, and some of the same farmers may have already been selling cattle through other channels before the slaughterhouse was an option. They may also have another primary source of income, with cattle representing additional income-generation rather than the creation of a job. A similar argument can be made for the jobs counted by BOSS in the horticulture sector. The total number of jobs counted towards BOSS's results – using BOSS's own methods of counting jobs – is probably less meaningful than understanding qualitative dimensions of those jobs, such as stability and sustainability of income. There is a wide range in the quality of jobs created through BOSS investments, and these are only understood anecdotally by the project. A case study report on BOSS called *The BOSS project in Timor-Leste: Thin Markets, Thick Impact?*, written and published by BOSS and ILO's research The Lab, references the testing of an indicator on productive employment, which it define as: "employment yielding sufficient returns to labour to permit the worker and his/ her dependents a level of consumption above the poverty line." At the time of the evaluation, however, there was no evidence that this measure was adopted by the project, and no related reports or datasets were available for review.
- There is the greatest potential to continue growing jobs and firm revenues in the cattle sector among the three sectors targeted by BOSS. Cattle value chain actors, particularly the butchers, have thriving businesses that are seeing steady increases in demand, and they have the incentive and capacity to ensure that the supply of hygienically produced and humanely slaughtered beef is sustained. Sufficient grazing land is available to cattle farmers currently, although it is unclear how that would hold up if any one cattle farmer were to substantially scale up production. At a certain point, commercial production that utilizes communal resources could create tensions and limitations, but discussions with the community and other value chain actors suggest that that threshold is far from being crossed.
- The vegetable sector holds a lot of potential for sustainable job creation for poor rural households in Timor-Leste. Considerable demand exists for both high-value and lower-value horticulture products, and the climate, soil quality, and access to water in the mountainous regions of Timor are favourable. Vegetable production is accessible to the resource poor, particularly women, as vegetables require little space, small cash investment, and can be grown close to the home where multiple household and livelihood activities can be coordinated. BOSS's investments in the sector, however, have not resulted in a substantial number of sustainable jobs being created. Josephina Farms fell on hard times because of the declining health of its owner, and sales through contract farming have suffered as a result. Significant investment was made in Josephina Farms, and it is unclear if the business will be able to bounce back. This turn of events is obviously beyond the control of the BOSS project, but it highlights the risks of investing in only one vegetable aggregator business. Qualitative discussions with the BOSS team suggest that a suitable competitor could not be identified during implementation, as the market is still very thin. Several other development

initiatives have invested in Timor-Leste's vegetable sector, and the groundwork laid by the BOSS intervention will positively influence initiatives going forward. But at project end, much of the attributable progress made in job creation in the horticulture sector has not been sustained.


- As mentioned in the *Relevance* section of this report, jobs and income targets were not met for the tourism sector. There were challenges and constraints larger than the project's scope of influence, namely the lack of permanent land titles in Timor-Leste and the lack of international marketing by the Timorese government. Tourist numbers are still minimal, and there are still limited investments in tourist infrastructure and services. Tourism is a priority sector for Timor-Leste's development strategy and has significant opportunity for sustainable income generation, but without decisive action from the national government, entrepreneurship in the tourism sector will remain limited.
- Public and private investments in the beef cattle sector were more than double their targets, while investments in the horticulture sector fell short of the targets. No public investment was reported for the tourism sector, and only small private investments were reported, primarily for upgrades in hotel or restaurant facilities or in staffing.
- The outputs for Immediate Objective 1 include IADE having the capacity to facilitate value chain development and to lead market research relevant to the target sectors. At the time of the evaluation, IADE staff were largely unaware of the project's achievements in value chain development, and by all accounts BOSS's value chain interventions were managed independently from the project's work with IADE. IADE has led basic market research, some of which has been in target value chains, but would be challenged to produce prescriptive findings or recommendations for public or private investments in the sectors. Discussions with IADE staff confirm that as an institution IADE does not yet have the capacity for value chain development.
- Anecdotal evidence collected from Mercy Corps suggests that "imitation" occurred in the sale of inputs for vegetable production. BOSS facilitated the introduction of the sale of seeds and other inputs in rural kiosks and shops, with information on the appropriate use of the products being provided to customers by the shopkeepers at the point of sale. Mercy Corps observed that, after the intervention was completed, these products and services were made available by shops that had not participated in the project. System-level analysis was not included in the evaluation, and it is not possible to determine whether other examples of imitation of products and services introduced by BOSS have occurred in the market.

Immediate Objective 2: Nationwide access to enhanced and innovative market/ need oriented business development services (BDS)

- As the main counterpart for the BOSS program, IADE has gone through a major transformation, enhancing and expanding its business development services significantly. IADE BDS are relevant, innovative, valuable, and have been developed in a dynamic, need oriented way over the course of the project. IADE as an institution is cohesive, has vision, and has momentum in building the business capacity of small and medium enterprises across Timor-Leste.
- BOSS results have exceeded, and in some cases far exceeded, Immediate Objective 2 targets, which are around enterprises accessing BDS and seeing increased "business turnover" as a result. This includes targets set for the participation of women. IADE and Don Bosco conducted a BDS impact assessment¹⁸ in 2016 that found that 52% of survey respondents felt that IADE trainings improved their chances of winning a bid for new business. BOSS facilitated the establishment of regulations that require certification before contractors can bid on government contracts. BOSS supported IADE to become accredited, and it now offers the certification course that will allow entrepreneurs to bid.

¹⁸ Methods not verified by the evaluation.

- Feedback from qualitative discussions for this evaluation revealed that some of the BDS curriculums are too generic for many micro-entrepreneurs in rural areas. The trainings are targeted at a range of entrepreneurial activities and are necessarily conceptual, and training participants often run very basic enterprises, like food carts or vegetable and fruit selling. These nascent entrepreneurs may have difficulty translating even basic business concepts into guidance they can follow in their own business activities. Several evaluation discussants also noted that while the capacity of IADE staff in Dili is sophisticated, many of the rural trainers are routine in the delivery of curriculums and do not effectively engage training participants to connect them with the lessons.
- IADE is primarily dependent on government funding, and the budgeting process is arduous and requires up to 18 months of advanced planning. This limits the degree to which IADE is able to respond to client and internal needs in a timely and relevant way. As unpredictable shifts occur in the private sector, IADE requires significant lag time before it can iterate its services.
- That is. Because the online portal, database, and dashboards were created by international consultants, the MIS is static, and IADE does not have the capacity to make adjustments without external assistance. If IADE decides it needs to hire a consultant to make adjustments to the MIS, it has to go through the 18-month budgeting process before it can do so – by which time the technological requirements will have changed, along with the needs that the proposed adjustments were meant to address. As it is, the MIS is not a major driver of management decision making, which makes it less of an MIS and more of a mechanism for reporting monitoring data. If the system is unable to iterate at the pace of need, the MIS may have even less influence on IADE functions and services. In inquiries as part of this evaluation, it was revealed that some staff have already begun creating their own ad hoc tracking tools to mitigate the gaps in utility of the existing MIS.
- BOSS originally intended to build the capacity of multiple BDS providers to create competition and specialization. That turned out not to be feasible, and a second counterpart ceased to partner with the project. This means that IADE has become the lone outlet for BDS for many entrepreneurs in Timor-Leste. On the one hand, this means fewer BDS options and lack of competition-driven incentive to improve services, but on the other hand it has meant that BOSS was able to provide much deeper support to IADE service development and institution building than otherwise would have been possible. Rather than stretching resources thin to support multiple counterparts, IADE became the primary counterpart of the BOSS project.
- Below is a chart summarizing the number of IADE training participants and recipients of IADE counselling services annually over the BOSS program period, disaggregated by gender. Training participation has remained steady since the first years of the project, and recipients of business counselling has tripled since it was first introduced. Participation by gender has been largely balanced, with slightly more men receiving IADE training and counselling services than women:



- The following tables summarise investments through IADE’s Business Incubation Facility (BIF) and Business Plan Competitions, as well as Tender Information Services provided during the BOSS program period. BIF and Business Plan Competition investments, as well as Tender Information Services, have all been weighted more heavily towards men-owned businesses than women owned businesses. The majority of BIF investments went to agriculture enterprises, and a larger portion of BIF investments overall came from IADE’s budget. Both IADE and private-sector funding for Business Plan Competitions surpassed the contributions from the BOSS project budget. The ability to leverage the project to secure so much government and private sector funding is a success of BOSS’s facilitation approach. Notices sent through IADE’s Tender Information Service have risen steadily year-by-year, reaching entrepreneurs across a wide range of sectors:

Business Incubation Facility Investments (USD)										
Year	2013		2014		2015		2016		Total	
Budget	IADE	BOSS	IADE	BOSS	IADE	BOSS	IADE	BOSS	IADE	BOSS
Men-owned	\$0	\$13,500	\$117,920	\$0	\$23,100	\$9,720	\$38,900	\$0	\$179,920	\$23,220
Women-owned	\$0	\$0	\$33,122	\$0	\$9,740	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$42,862	\$0
Horticulture investments	\$0	\$0	\$39,566	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$39,566	\$0
Total agriculture investments	\$0	\$0	\$67,788	\$0	\$32,840	\$0	\$38,900	\$0	\$139,528	\$0
Livestock investments	\$0	\$13,500	\$13,872	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$13,872	\$13,500
Tourism investments	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Other sector investments	\$0	\$0	\$29,816	\$0	\$0	\$9,720	\$0	\$0	\$29,816	\$9,720

Business Plan Competitions							
Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Project total
Total businesses participating	0	0	204	332	275	222	1,033
Men-owned participating businesses	0	0	121	215	165	138	639
Women-owned participating businesses	0	0	83	117	110	84	394
BOSS funding	\$0	\$0	\$18,700	\$39,000	\$30,000	\$15,000	\$102,700
IADE funding	\$0	\$0	\$24,800	\$40,000	\$43,000	\$58,000	\$165,800
Private-sector funding	\$0	\$0	\$24,100	\$33,540	\$34,750	\$32,000	\$124,390

Tender Information Services – notices sent to IADE-registered business					
Sector	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Agriculture – including farming and livestock	169	201	134	124	114
Restaurants and catering	223	14	21	13	39
Travel, accommodation, rental, and leasing	101	4	3	4	4
Construction and renovation	1,243	152	202	175	33
Goods wholesale and retail	5	16	11	58	179
Food and beverage product processing	455	492	520	108	504
Arts	82	37	18	20	21
Automotive	233	15	23	6	15
Heavy equipment, generators, A/C and solar panels	142	3	1	0	4
Laundry	2	0	11	1	0
Manufacturing	69	9	17	13	8
Media and Communications	26	0	1	2	1
Oil, coal and natural gas	84	16	11	5	12
Furniture and office supplies	260	7	12	2	7
Clothes and shoes	174	39	49	63	40
Home appliances	161	8	18	53	24
Health and medicine	143	1	8	2	5
Real estate	1	0	6	0	0
Business consultant services	201	2	3	4	2
Finance and legal services	5	15	8	3	18
Photocopy and printing services	34	4	14	4	11
Security services and equipment	8	0	0	1	0
Information technology services and ICT equipment	34	3	1	2	1
Telecommunications services and equipment	24	1	3	0	2
Household domestic activities	27	3	1	2	7
Transportation, logistics, postal and courier services	77	5	1	1	1
Technical and scientific training and consulting	50	2	1	4	2
Businesses receiving tender notices	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Men-owned businesses	2,303	2,812	3,382	3,779	4,221
Women-owned businesses	910	1,423	1,909	2,171	2,776

Immediate Objective 3: Increased SEAPRI commitment and capacity to mainstream gender in all policies, programmes, and activities

- BOSS facilitated the development of the SEAPRI National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector is a comprehensive institutional framework with the objective to contribute to the generation of inclusive, pro-poor economic development and quality employment for women and men through engendered private sector policies and programmes. Its primary goal is to ensure that the needs of women entrepreneurs are addressed alongside those of men at the district and national levels. Further, it aims to guarantee a gender-sensitive approach in private sector development. The action plan commits to the following strategic objectives:

- Improved institutional framework and business enabling environment to support the potential of women and men micro and small entrepreneurs.
 - Increased access to credit and financial services for MSMEs and women entrepreneurs in Timor-Leste.
 - Increased access to Business Development Services and information for potential and existing women and men entrepreneurs.
 - Enhanced market access for MSMEs, especially for women and men living in rural areas.
 - Increased access to formal networks for women entrepreneurs, especially for rural women running micro, small, and medium-sized businesses.
- SEAPRI was unfortunately dissolved in 2015, and it was the institution with the mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan. The champion of the framework at SEAPRI is now the Secretary of State for the Support and Socio-Economical Promotion of Women. Although in this role she is unable to implement the National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector, she carries forward the priorities and principles that affirm the importance of women entrepreneurs as engines of growth. Private-sector development is now under MECAE, however, and she has little influence in that ministry to mainstream gender in its policies, programmes, and activities.
 - BOSS effectively ensured that gender was mainstreamed within IADE, and they have integrated gender-sensitivity in their policies, programmes, and activities. IADE was originally housed under SEAPRI, and within the National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector, IADE was assigned responsibility for many of the activities. Now that IADE is under MECAE, those responsibilities are no longer mandated, but IADE retains them in its own action planning.
 - BOSS's stated targets for Immediate Objective 3 were met, which are at the policy and institutional level. The project did not look at women's inter-household economic empowerment. Anecdotal evidence from qualitative discussions suggest that inter-household gender dynamics in Timor-Leste are often disempowering for women. Women may have access to income generating economic opportunities, but within their households they may not have strong decision making power around financial resources.

Evaluation question: *Were the stated objectives of extending the project met; e.g. to deepen the work in the three value chains selected – cattle, horticulture, and tourism – and to widen the portfolio of business services offered by IADE?*

- The project extension, funded by NZAid, allowed for significantly deeper outcome achievements than would have otherwise been possible under BOSS's original Irish Aid-funded timeframe. BOSS's objectives are broad and ambitious, and the additional timeframe allowed for more sustainable upgrades to take hold in the target value chains and for IADE to add and refine its services and to further build its institutional capacity.
- Targets were largely not adjusted from their original level in the program extension period, but results on those targets increased significantly, according to BOSS's own reporting. This was particularly true for sales and "business start-ups" in the cattle sector and for IADE clients being trained as well as receiving business counselling services.
- Development in the cattle value chain benefitted markedly from the project extension. During the extension period, BOSS restarted marketing and promotion for agri-shops to provide animal treatment, MAF provided a refrigerated truck to EBAI (the slaughterhouse operator), and Talho Moris (butcher shop) increased the per-day number of cattle slaughtered through increased consumer demand. Talho Morris and EBAI both received training from a meat industry expert on

producing value added meat products, and Talho Moris secured a matching grant to finance the expansion of its processing plant.

- In the extension period, BOSS facilitated the accreditation of IADE's Business Plan Development course by the National Labour Force Development Institute (INDMO), the commercialization of IADE services with support from a New Zealand Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA) volunteer, and the deployment of an accounting system and opening of a bank account to manage IADE's non-government budget. Additionally, IADE's Business Incubation Facility, Business Plan Competition, and Market Research Department were established in the extension phase. Sustainability of the project's impact on IADE's capacity was deepened as a result of the extension, owing to the additional time for handover and mentoring by ILO's team.
- Both NZAid and ILO reported significant learning from the extended project period about the challenges and opportunities in value chain development, in particular. For example, many of the principles of market development, like scaling up a successful pilot and *crowding in* by market actors not partnering with the program, assume much larger and more dynamic markets than Timor-Leste's. Timor-Leste does not have the potential for economies of scale that many countries do, especially given the insufficient regulatory framework for exports. Crowding in is difficult to achieve given the relatively small pool of potential entrepreneurs to copy business models demonstrated by the project. Because the markets are so thin, personal relationships between specific market actors can become essential to functions within a target value chain, and a project cannot simply consider roles and incentives. Both NZAid and ILO hope to steward market development initiatives in Timor-Leste going forward, and these insights should inform interventions tailored to the unique Timor context.

Evaluation Question: Is there evidence that gender mainstreaming under Objective 3 was institutionalized?

- Gender mainstreaming is successfully institutionalised within IADE, and although the Ministry has now been dissolved, gender mainstreaming was institutionalized within SEAPRI. This is discussed at length in the response to the first question on outputs translating to outcomes in the *Effectiveness* section (this section) of this report.

Evaluation Question: Did the project have a robust monitoring system that regularly assessed progress against expected achievements, monitored and revised key assumptions, and used the information to revise its approach? Was this documented?

- As mentioned in the *Relevance* section of this report, the BOSS M&E framework includes relevant, well-articulated, and meaningful indicators at the Development Objective, Immediate Objective, and Output levels. But definitions for some of the key terminology used in the indicators are not clearly articulated, and data collection and analysis methodologies are not clearly defined. This may have resulted in less rigorous interpretations being applied to terms like *jobs*, *enterprises*, and *business turnover*, as well as less rigorous methods utilized to establish attribution of changes measured to the project.
- Within the value chain interventions, there were M&E protocols, with varying levels of rigour. The value chain interventions relied on data and analysis for decision making and revising the approach more than the other aspects of the BOSS project, but this was largely not documented, and at the time of evaluation very little M&E documentation could be reviewed. With support from The Lab (a global ILO research project), deeper impact analysis was done within the horticulture sector. While the findings from that analysis was used for decision making and project revisions, the methodology was not systematised within the project or iterated in an ongoing way. Discussions for this

evaluation confirmed that systematic analysis and learning was an integral part of the management of the value chain work, but it relied primarily on the collective knowledge and intuition of the BOSS team and other value chain stakeholders, rather than well documented quantitative analysis.

- As mentioned above, BOSS's BDS work with IADE included the development of an MIS that primarily supports tracking and tallying of service delivery by IADE. Although this output summary information is useful for reflection and decision making, deeper analysis on IADE's impact on specific sectors would have meaningful and far reaching utility for learning and revising approaches. BOSS as a project did not have an M&E system for Immediate Objective 2 (BDS) or Immediate Objective 3 (mainstreaming gender in government private sector development) separate from the IADE MIS. Meaningful data and information on BDS was collected and analysed in an ad hoc way throughout the project timeframe, but M&E was not systematised.
- A program-level M&E system was not meaningfully implemented in the BOSS project overall. Insufficient budget was allocated to M&E, and there was no BOSS program-level M&E staff. The program-level causal logic was not iterated based on data and learning, and data on indicators within the existing M&E plan were not coordinated at the program level, but rather managed at the intervention level. Iterative program design is a major strength of the M4P approach to program management and the DCED approach to results measurement and learning. As the BOSS project drew from these frameworks, it could have benefitted from regular reflection and evidence-driven revision of the overall program casual logic. Regular, program-level strategic review meetings and workshops to gauge project progress, effectiveness, and course-correction needed, led by an M&E team with a clear M&E system, could have strengthened cohesion and synergies across the project's disparate interventions.
- In general, the program outputs align well with their respective Immediate Objectives, but many are stated in broad terms. For the purpose of implementation management, a more detailed tier of causal logic at the intervention level – aligned with the broader program-level tier – would have provided a more nuanced and relevant evidence base for decision making and course correction. Iterative design of the intervention-level tier of causal logic would have been more conducive to intentional and well-documented adaptive program management.
- Attribution strategies are not defined for objective indicators within BOSS's results measurement plan. Plausible attribution of detected changes is important to validate whether or not a project's causal logic stands up to the evidence. Attribution of results reported should be clearly documented, along with detailed methodological descriptions. One of the indicators for Immediate Objective 2, for example, looks at increase in "business turnover" resulting from IADE BDS. In practice, measuring this relied solely on the reported perceptions of micro-entrepreneurs who had received IADE business development services, and non-participating micro-entrepreneurs (with similar types of businesses) were not surveyed to check whether they had seen similar increases in business – which would have suggested influences from external factors.
- Again, as mentioned in the *Relevance* section of this report, risks and assumptions were initially documented, but they were not regularly monitored or revised – and to the extent that they were, revisions or rationale for those revisions were not documented. The Risk-Assumptions Plan could not have been utilized for evidenced-based adaptive management throughout the BOSS program.
- It is important to note that the BOSS project was constrained by the technical and analytical capacity of staff and potential candidates. Qualitative discussions with BOSS management revealed that some of the programmatic technical gaps, including M&E, were identified and even prioritised. The availability of the requisite skillsets to implement the M&E system the project needed, however, was significantly limited. This is not an uncommon challenge in Timor-Leste, where the more technical talent pool is stretched thin.

- A major challenge of this evaluation has been that the BOSS project was not “evaluation ready,” particularly in the case of documented M&E. Datasets, M&E and analysis plans, methodological descriptions, and detailed indicator definitions were not available for review by the evaluator, and the remaining staff were not able to speak meaningfully to M&E protocols and technical approaches. With repeated probing in qualitative discussions, a meaningful amount of information on the level of M&E rigour utilised across the project was ultimately revealed.

Evaluation Question: Can the project provide evidence of learning during implementation?

- The evaluation found significant qualitative evidence of learning across the BOSS project and within its various interventions. Though not systematically, approaches were piloted, reviewed, and adapted in an informed way that improved the project over the course of implementation. There is a gap, however, in systematic documentation of the learning, project revisions, as well as rationale for those revisions. That said, the intervention reports produced for each BOSS target value chain, The Lab Report on horticulture and cattle, and various other project publications provide comprehensive and meaningful narrative descriptions and anecdotes of learning.
- At the design phase, BOSS based the design of the interventions on the experience of previous projects. Embedding ILO staff with the main counterpart (IADE), for example, was an approach taken based on learning from previous projects in Timor-Leste. Trust and buy in is critical in collaborating with Timorese businesses and government towards a common goal, and projects and teams that are not well understood or inclusive of local institutions do not do as well in the Timor context.
- The majority of stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation expressed a keen interest in learning and did not shy away from critical thinking. ILO and NZAid expressed genuine eagerness to learn from this external review, and ILO and IADE staff demonstrated a culture of critical thinking and learning.
- As mentioned in the *Relevance* section of this report, BOSS has been a trailblazer for development initiatives in Timor-Leste. Many lessons have been learned by multiple stakeholders that will continue to be relevant for ongoing and future initiatives in value chain development, entrepreneurship development, and policy frameworks around women’s economic empowerment, tender requirements, business development services, and sector regulations in cattle and beef, horticulture, and tourism.

Evaluation Question: Do the project’s culture, leadership and rules support adaptive management?

- Throughout the project, trial and error was a key feature to the modality of implementation. Change has been both forced onto and intentionally invoked by the BOSS project, and the culture, leadership, and rules of the project are supportive of adaptive management.
- That said, while adaptive management was a prominent feature within interventions, adaptive management was not mainstreamed into overall program management and learning. As mentioned earlier in this section, strategic reviews at the program level were not a regular feature of program management, and revisions tended to happen within intervention in isolation from other interventions. That is not to say that overall program management was not adaptive, just that adaptations were more ad hoc than systematised.
- Because of the influence of M4P and DCED, BOSS’s value chain work was particularly adaptive. There are many examples, but a strong example was the work BOSS did to establish the decree laws for the beef industry. These regulations were not originally part of the intervention design, but BOSS was approached to help develop them, and they hold strong potential to drive growth in the sector.

There remains an issue of weak implementation of the laws, but as demand for quality, hygienic beef grows, the decree laws will become increasingly relevant to both consumers and value chain actors. Another good example of BOSS's adaptive management relates to the IADE provision of accredited certificate course for contractors. The government was not getting qualified bids for tenders, and they put in place a regulation that required contractors to be certified before submitting a bid. Facilitated by BOSS, IADE designed and rolled out an appropriate course to provide that certification, and the course was accredited.

- The project was staffed with appropriate experts for the technical work required from the program design, but intervention teams were not sufficiently staffed or resourced for the ambitious scope of interventions, particularly for BOSS's value chain development work. More comprehensive teams with deeper focus may have allowed for more depth of results, and therefore more significant improvements in market capacities and functions to achieve the desired impacts for the project's ultimate beneficiaries. Additionally, M&E was not sufficiently systematised, staffed, or resourced.

Efficiency

Evaluation Criteria: Efficiency	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Value for Money and additionality	5	The BOSS scope of interventions was ambitious, and results were achieved within them with relatively limited resources. Evidence suggests that much of what happened as a result of the BOSS project would not have occurred without it.

The evaluation finds that BOSS has converted its resources into meaningful results reasonably efficiently. The original project design could only take into account a budget and timeframe of about 75% of what they ultimately became with NZAid funding to expand the project. This limited the scale of interventions, but the modest additional funding then allowed for them to be deepened and become more sustainable.

BOSS allocated a marked portion of its budget to technical assistance for capacity building, which is not directly linked to results. But this is justified when considering the facilitation role of the project, which prioritises sustainability of impact. That said, a facilitation approach also prioritises scalability of results beyond the life of a project, and BOSS has not demonstrated that its results will be directly scalable after the project period.

The method of implementation was, in general, appropriate and innovative. The results achieved by BOSS would likely not have occurred within the same timeframe had it not been for the project.

Evaluation Question: Could the results that the project achieved have been obtained through different modalities and/ or with fewer resources, and if so would the timing of results have been different?

- BOSS was ambitious and innovative in the context of private-sector development in Timor-Leste, and its interventions were a first in many ways. It is possible that somewhat different modalities could have achieved the same results, but there were often few examples, in value chain development for example, for BOSS to follow, and it had to pioneer its own way. In cases where there were previous examples, BOSS adopted and adapted the approaches appropriately.
- A major portion of BOSS's budget was allocated technical assistance, with the primary aim of stakeholder capacity building. Along with achieving its targets, the use of facilitation as a project

implementation modality was effective in building stakeholder capacity to carry interventions forward beyond the project. The evaluation did not find evidence that the jobs and income results will be significantly scalable without further development interventions.

- The resources available to BOSS were in some ways not sufficient for its aspirations, and it would probably not have been possible to achieve the same results with fewer resources. BOSS was somewhat constrained for the ultimate size of its overall budget, as it was originally a US\$7.9 million project with a timeframe of less than four years and had to plan accordingly. Ultimately, US\$3.9 million and more than two years was added to the project, but the design could not have accounted for that from the beginning. BOSS was successful in leveraging its own funds to secure significant amounts of cost-share on its initiatives from both the public and private sectors, and as a result was able to accomplish more with limited resources.
- As mentioned, BOSS's work on value chain development and entrepreneurship was pioneering, and it is unlikely that a project with different modalities or fewer resources would have been able to accomplish the same results more quickly. Some of what BOSS set out to do was actually premature, like tourism development given the lack of land policy and coherent national strategy, and it is hard to imagine overcoming that with in a shorter timeframe through any other modality.

Evaluation Question: Is there evidence that these impacts would not have occurred without the programme? (i.e., what was the project's additionality?)

- Much of what BOSS accomplished would not have occurred, certainly not in the same timeframe, without the project. This is especially true for the development of IADE as an institution, and by extension the availability of its services for Timor-Leste's emerging entrepreneurs. The method of embedding ILO staff within IADE was key to developing the portfolio of services that IADE can now deliver without external assistance, and IADE would not have developed the same level of competency and confidence without that.
- The results in upgrading the cattle and horticulture value chains would not have occurred without external intervention, and the same can be said about the capacity building of the Atauro tourism Association. Contract farming, for example, was entirely new in Timor when BOSS introduced it to the horticulture sector, and now other programs are following the example. Other projects may have been able to establish successful contract farming, but as it is they are doing so because BOSS has already paved the way. Contract farming would not likely have emerged in Timor-Leste organically without external intervention.
- BOSS was fortunate to have strong, strategic relationships and a high level of trust among government and private sector stakeholders who were integral to achieving the project's results. In the close-knit context of Timor-Leste, relationships are especially important. Without the buy in of key people in the government and champions in the private sector, any development initiative could not have achieved the same results.
- Because of BOSS's tight embeddedness within IADE, it was able to leave behind functioning systems that can be built on. In its value chain work, BOSS left behind market functions that will form the foundations for market systems going forward. This is important additionality that BOSS has brought to the context.

Impact

Evaluation Criteria: Impact	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Achieving long-term outcomes	3	Immediate Objective achievements contributed modestly towards impact at the Development Objective level, but impact targets were not set and methods for establishing plausible attribution of higher-level impacts to the project were not defined.

The evaluation finds that BOSS achievements contributed to the project's stated higher-level aspirational impacts. Broad impact on economic growth and quality employment, however, is not measured.

Evaluation Question: Have the programme's impact targets been achieved?

- Impact achievements are those at the Development Objective level. BOSS's Development Objective is: *Contribute to the generation of pro-poor economic development and quality employment for women and men by spurring growth of micro and small enterprises (MSEs)*. Owing to the methodological limitations of this evaluation and the lack of availability of project-generated impact data, it is not possible to make a definitive determination as to what the direct results on Development Objective indicators have been. Targets for indicators at this aspirational level of the project's causal logic are not defined. BOSS's stated Development Objective indicators are:
 - Increase in household income
 - % of self and wage employment (sex disaggregated)
- Increase in sales and jobs created by BOSS's value chain interventions are reported under Immediate Objective 1. As mentioned in the *Effectiveness* section of this report, these targets are modest. That said, there is evidence that some level of economic development and generation of jobs has occurred as a direct result of the BOSS project, with 98% of the projects jobs targets met and increase in sales targets met for the cattle and horticulture sectors.
- As mentioned in the *Relevance* section of this report, Immediate Objectives were in large part treated separately from each other in their implementation, and as a result interventions were not coordinated or configured to maximize impact at the Development Objective level. It is not clear that achievement of the Immediate Objective targets has resulted in any complementarity – or in other words, the Immediate Objective achievements did not culminate in an impact that is different or larger than their individual results. The Immediate Objective achievements, however, are relevant and in some way contribute to BOSS's Development Objective of generating pro-poor economic growth and quality employment.
- Though not articulated or quantified in the Development Objective statement itself, the impact BOSS has had on the formal and informal rules governing target sectors is an important achievement of the project. Trust and mutual reliance has been built between producers, aggregators, processors, and retailers in the horticulture and beef sectors, and a collaborative tourism association has been established in Ataúro that continues to advance the collective interests of local tourism-based businesses. Qualitative discussions provided anecdotal evidence of this higher-level impact. For example, before the BOSS project interventions in the cattle sector, almost nobody would have considered selling their healthy cattle for any other reasons than cultural purposes. Cattle are seen as a status symbol, and they also traditionally serve as a kind of savings account for rural households. Towards the beginning of the project, butchers and meat sellers in Dili had to travel to the rural districts to find cattle to buy. By the end of the project, they no longer need to do so, and cattle farmers seek out butchers and other buyers themselves. This and other shifts in the market culture brought about by BOSS are likely to be lasting.

- Owing to time and budget limitations, the methods of this evaluation and the project's own M&E are too limited to truly understand what the lasting impacts of the BOSS program will be. An ex-post evaluation - a year or more after project end – that included market analysis in the target value chains and beneficiary surveys with control groups and a statistically significant sample of treatment groups for both value chain and BDS interventions would help ILO and other stakeholders establish more confident and comprehensive understanding of BOSS's lasting impacts.

Evaluation Question: What have been the gendered impacts of the programme?

- BOSS successfully facilitated the development of SEAPRI's National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector, which is a comprehensive institutional framework that has the primary goal of ensuring that the needs of women entrepreneurs are addressed alongside those of men at the district and national levels. Further, it aims to guarantee a gender-sensitive approach in private sector development. SEAPRI was dissolved in 2015, but IADE retains many of these priorities in its own action plans.
- Gender disaggregated job creation and sales data under BOSS's value chain work are not reported, though anecdotally women are heavily involved in horticulture and tourism related work. BOSS did not look at gendered inter-household economic dynamics, but decision making power around financial resources – and not just access to those resources – is an important aspect of women's economic empowerment.
- A high proportion of users of IADE's services to date are women. Of the 6,396 IADE training clients, 50% have been women. Clients receiving civil works contractor training were only 25% women. Nearly 50% of clients receiving business counselling from IADE, 50% of people attending trade fairs on behalf of MSEs, and 56% of business matchmaking event participants were women. These results are not impact-level, but they could be an indication that impacts would be more equitable. Attributable impact-level data was not ascertained by the project, gender disaggregated or otherwise.

Evaluation Question: Is there an evidence-based case for plausible attribution of impacts to BOSS interventions and are external influences accounted for?

- BOSS cites the National Labour Force Survey and the National Census as data sources for its Development Objective indicators, but there is no methodological strategy in place to attribute any change to the BOSS project, and impact-level data was not ascertained by BOSS. It would be unlikely that attributable change in household income or wage employment could be detected from these national surveys.
- Because of the way that interventions were managed separately and expertise on value chain development was not built within IADE, the attributable impact that IADE BDS has had on the development of targeted value chains as a whole is negligible.
- An ex-post evaluation could help to establish plausible attribution of higher-level impacts to BOSS interventions.

Evaluation Question: Are there any unintended impacts (either positive or negative) arising from the project interventions?

- The BOSS program was able to leverage far more government and private-sector resources to contribute to its initiatives than was originally expected. ILO believes this to be a result of trust between the project, IADE, and government and private sector stakeholders. Government budget allocations to IADE in particular are higher than expected.

- There are numerous examples of unexpected outputs of the project, like cattle legislation being put in place and major government contributions to BOSS organized trade fairs. As already explained, it is difficult to articulate the attributable impact, expected or unexpected, of the project.
- Because of the way that BOSS managed the handover of responsibilities to IADE, much of the last year of the project did not require expenditures from the BOSS budget. This allowed BOSS staff to continue to mentor and support IADE as they took the lead.

Sustainability

Evaluation Criteria: Sustainability	Score (1 = low, 5 = high)	Evaluation Summary
Sustainability addressed and achieved	4	Sustainability was earnestly addressed in the project design, implementation, and exit strategy. Gaps and constraints exist, though, that could be a threat to the sustainability of some BOSS results.

Sustainability has been a core priority for BOSS's selected development model. Incentives and resources exist to carry forward important aspects of BOSS's achievements and of its vision for sustainability. Market actors and IADE have been capacitated to champion initiatives started under BOSS, but not all of what has been accomplished through BOSS will be sustained.

Evaluation Question: Did the project and its interventions have a vision for sustainability in terms of both the development model and the development impacts, and has that vision been achieved?

- BOSS had a vision for sustainability in both design of development models and a well-developed exit strategy. The development models were selected for their potential to create sustainable impact, and the exit strategy includes specific recommendations for each component of BOSS to maximise sustainability as ILO withdrew from the project.
- By facilitating rather than delivering services directly, BOSS has formed partnerships between private companies and farmers, academia and entrepreneurs and between government and enterprises with the intention to sustain services that reach existing and potential entrepreneurs across Timor-Leste. As BOSS scaled down its efforts at the end of the project, private-sector firms have taken the lead on ongoing initiatives within the targeted value chains.
- Embedding BOSS staff within IADE contributed significantly to sustainable institutional capacity building and ownership. Some issues around IADE's funding model, being primarily dependent on government budget allocations, threaten sustainability of BOSS's work with the institution. The components of BOSS's exit strategy around IADE included coaching and mentoring, consolidation of materials and documentation, and improving IADE marketing and knowledge management. This vision was largely achieved, although knowledge management is still somewhat weak within IADE.
- In its value chain work, M4P as a program management modality and DCED as a results measurement modality were selected because of their potential to bring about sustainable development impacts. There is strong evidence that, although modest, the market shifts brought about by value chain interventions will be sustained and even built upon over time. BOSS's exit strategy for value chain development included a recommendation to carefully and profoundly document achievements, lessons learned and important recommendations and make them easily

available for current and future initiatives driven by other organizations or projects. This was not sufficiently undertaken or achieved.

- An ex-post evaluation could help to more thoroughly answer the question of sustainability of impact.

Evaluation Question: Do the requisite incentives and resources (i.e., human and financial resources) exist for the vision of sustainability to be realistic?

- In the cattle sector, BOSS has helped establish strong incentives between value chain actors that will likely keep the sector growing well. It has been growing steadily, even after BOSS has phased out its interventions. Consumer demand will fuel incentives, from butchers to slaughterhouse to cattle producers, that will continue to drive growth. Profit margins are sufficient to incentivise market actors, but those margins are thin, and upgrades are still needed in the value chain. Cattle breeding businesses and fattening operations, for example, would help to provide more reliability in beef supply and incentivise producers to become more entrepreneurial.
- Greenhouses rehabilitated as a result of BOSS interventions remain intact and functioning and are a resource that will continue to incentivise Josephina Farms' horticulture production. The prospect of high-value sales to Dili supermarkets will continue to incentivise contract farming with smallholder producers. But the declining health of Josephina Farm's Director and damaged relationships between Josephina Farms and other key market actors may prove to be more of a challenge than the business can overcome. The horticulture sector overall, though, will continue to benefit from the lessons learned from BOSS, and more investments are already being made to upgrade the sector. There is high domestic demand for vegetables, and the low start-up costs make entry points accessible to rural households.
- The tourism sector does not have the requisite incentives or resources to sustain investment and growth. Tourist numbers remain very low for Timor-Leste, and the lack of related infrastructure, land title laws, and a cohesive national marketing strategy will continue to keep investments and tourist numbers low.
- IADE has the requisite human and financial resources to continue to provide BDS services developed through BOSS facilitation. Because IADE is primarily dependent on the government, however, it could be vulnerable to shifts in priorities within the ministry. IADE has the ability to raise its own revenue by charging for its services, but there is little evidence that this will occur on a scale that will be able to support the institution in any significant way in the near future.
- The arduous MECAE planning and budgeting process, as well as the fixed MIS, will continue to slow IADE's adaptability. IADE, as a result, is not as nimble as it may need to be to continue to stay responsive and relevant to market needs.

VII. Conclusions

The BOSS project should be viewed as an overall success as it was designed and resourced. Targets were largely met, sustainable results were achieved, and important lessons were learned that will continue to benefit the target value chains, provision of business development services for MSEs, and strategies to promote women's economic empowerment in Timor-Leste. It is important, however, to keep BOSS's achievements in perspective, as major challenges remain in the areas of program intervention. All of the stakeholders consulted for this evaluation expressed the idea that BOSS was a learning project, ambitious in its scope, but realistic in its expectations. Key stakeholders have learned valuable lessons that will continue to be relevant far beyond the life of the project, and even in its failures, BOSS serves as a foundation for follow on development initiatives.

Relevance: The evaluation finds the BOSS project to have been highly relevant to the context of Timor-Leste's development needs, the livelihood needs of micro-entrepreneurs and the rural poor, and the business enabling environment needs of Timor's fledgling and fragile private sector. The project implemented relevant interventions to achieve its stated objectives, which have, to a very modest degree, contributed to the program's higher-level goal of increased incomes and quality employment for the poor. The project design sacrificed depth of impact, however, for breadth of interventions.

Effectiveness: The BOSS program has been effective in meeting its stated targets, creating jobs and increasing sales in target value chains, significantly increasing access to need-based business development services, and building commitment and capacity for government mainstreaming of gender sensitivity in policies, programmes, and activities. In all three areas represented by the project's Immediate Objectives, more progress is needed and major challenges remain.

- **Immediate Objective 1:** BOSS has had the most significant effect on the formal and informal rules that govern the market systems in the target value chains. The project has facilitated the development of new regulations that provide a frame for sector growth – particularly for cattle, fostered new types of business relationships between value chain actors, and promoted a culture of entrepreneurship. In the horticulture and cattle sectors, BOSS has better integrated the value chains by building trust and mutual reliance between producers, aggregators, processors, and retailers. Major national policy issues will need to be addressed before the tourism sector can be better integrated or see any real growth.
- **Immediate Objective 2:** BOSS has increased access for MSEs to a portfolio of relevant BDS through its work embedded with IADE. IADE has been established as a high-functioning institution with a culture of critical thinking, learning and adaptability. Over time IADE will need to develop more specialized and tailored curriculums and services, and there are institutional constraints that will hinder IADE's nimbleness.
- **Immediate Objective 3:** BOSS successfully facilitated the development of SEAPRI's National Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector, but due to restructuring in the government beyond the control of the project, the document is substantially less influential than was intended. BOSS's efforts establish important precedence, though, and IADE itself retains many of the Strategy and Action Plan's activities in its own action plan.

The project was staffed with appropriate experts for the technical work required from the program design, but their intervention teams were not sufficiently staffed or resourced for the ambitious scope of interventions, particularly for BOSS's value chain development work. Additionally, M&E was not properly systematised, staffed, or resourced.

Efficiency: The evaluation finds that BOSS has converted its resources into meaningful results reasonably efficiently. BOSS allocated a marked portion of its budget to technical assistance for capacity building, which is justified when considering the facilitation role of the project, which prioritises sustainability of impact. The method of implementation was, in general, appropriate and innovative. The results achieved by BOSS would likely not have occurred within the same timeframe had it not been for the project, but BOSS has not demonstrated that its results will continue to be scaled after the project period.

Impact: The evaluation finds that BOSS achievements contributed to the project's stated higher-level aspirational impacts, but broad impact on economic growth and quality employment is not measured.

Sustainability: Sustainability of achievements has been a high priority in the design and implementation of the BOSS project. Not all of what has been accomplished through BOSS will be sustained, but capacities, incentives, and resources exist for institutions and market actors to champion initiatives started under the project.

Gender issues: BOSS successfully ensured that gender was systematically considered in both project design and project management, and project results reflect this priority. A process was established within BOSS for appraisal by a staff gender expert that ensured that the project addressed gender concerns in the design of new interventions. Staff were sensitized on how to include gender in planning, implementation, monitoring, and progress reporting, and buy in was high throughout.

Gender-related knowledge has been generated through disaggregated monitoring and reporting, particularly around IADE activities and services where an average of nearly 50% of beneficiaries reached have been women. Gender disaggregated data on the impact of BOSS's value chain work is not captured, but anecdotal evidence suggests that women represent a substantial portion of beneficiaries within two of the three target value chains.

BOSS dedicated one of its three objectives to institutionalizing gender equality as a priority in private sector and economic development. Although the formal framework developed is no longer implementable as is, the project had significant influence on government prioritization of women in economic development.

Tripartite issues: For ILO, the most important program stakeholders are its tripartite constituents: member States, workers' organizations, and employers' organizations. ILO in Timor-Leste has engaged relevant government ministries (in the case of BOSS this includes MECAE, SEPI, and MAF), CCI-TL, and KSTL. The evaluation did not reveal any major difficulties engaging the tripartite constituents. BOSS had strong buy in in the Government, including champions that became central to the project's achievements. CCI-TL was heavily involved in the selection of BOSS's target value chains, and coordination between BOSS and CCI-TL was regular. KSTL was involved, but to a lesser degree. Because most of the *jobs* created as a result of BOSS were independent enterprises (cattle farming, horticulture), the project was not a major contributor to the labour union's membership. Even so, BOSS coordination with KSTL could have been stronger.

Lessons learned and emerging good practice: Quite a few lessons, some more significant than others, can be extrapolated from the findings and conclusions detailed in this report. A couple of pertinent lessons, as well as a couple of emerging good practices, are detailed in Annex 8.

VIII. Recommendations

Based in the findings from this end-line evaluation, the following recommendations are made to ILO and its tripartite constituents:

1. Ensure that projects are “evaluation ready” to maximize learning from an external evaluation. Above all, this requires a process of documentation throughout the project period with a final evaluation in mind, following a general principle that every project aims to contribute to the body of knowledge in development. Documentation needs to be succinct and well organized for an external evaluator to be able to assess the intricacies of how the project unfolded. It is difficult to assess how a project did if it is not clear what it did. Monitoring and evaluation documentation is particularly important for assessing whether a project was evidence based, learned, and adapted. In the case of BOSS, datasets, M&E and analysis plans, methodological descriptions, and detailed indicator definitions were not available for review by the evaluator, and the remaining staff were not able to speak meaningfully to M&E protocols and technical approaches. If a project is able to utilise adaptive management and iterative design – which is ideal – it is important to document the iterations and the rationale for any changes. The preparation of a simple timeline of project milestones, which was obtained from BOSS for this evaluation in the course of field work, can go a long way towards being evaluation ready.
2. Similarly, ensure that monitoring and evaluation is appropriately resourced for the scope and complexity of the project. BOSS implemented a complex set of interventions with ambitious objectives, but M&E staffing and methodologies utilised for both process and impact monitoring were not scaled to generate sufficient evidence for strategic project management. The project also did not contract a sufficient or rigorous enough final evaluation to objectively demonstrate impact on the ultimate beneficiaries or market functions and dynamics. BOSS leadership indicate that the project budget did not allow for more rigorous M&E.
3. Key terminology for any project should be clearly defined, particularly for objective statements and indicators. Seemingly straightforward terms, like *income*, *job*, or *increase* can be highly ambiguous when it comes to implementation, and particularly when it comes to measuring progress or impact. The definitions that a project works from can influence decisions around staffing, budgeting, planning, and partnerships, as well as shape expectations from stakeholders on deliverables and intended impact. Along with terminology, data collection and analysis methodologies should also be clearly defined. The level of rigor required to utilise stated methodologies may affect staff capacity needs, planning, and budgeting. Because decisions around definitions and methodologies have major staffing, work planning, and budgeting implications, they need to be endorsed at the program management level. Even though the day-to-day implications may fall on project technical staff, like M&E team members, it is important that project leadership take a clear position on specific definitions and methodologies.
4. BOSS is a multi-faceted, complex program that has simultaneously addressed multiple influences on jobs and income for its intended beneficiaries. Separate teams, with different technical focuses, managed the implementation of the project’s various interventions. BOSS had a clear causal framework in place at the program level, which each of its separate intervention teams could reference to infer how their portion of the project affects the whole. But specific intervention-level causal frameworks – in the form of more detailed results chains – can be defined out of the program-level causal framework, which can provide clear links between more micro-level progress and macro-level achievements. Each Immediate Objective, for example, could be broken out into its own results chain that aligns with the program-level logic, but provides more detail. Like the program-level tier of causal logic, indicators would need to be defined for each element (or results chain box) in order to track progress and determine whether completion of outputs has led to

achievement of outcomes. For the purpose of implementation management, a more detailed tier of causal logic at the intervention level provides a more nuanced and relevant evidence base for decision making and course correction within interventions, ensuring that measurable links to higher-level logic are kept intact and that the higher-level logic is appropriately influenced by intervention-level logic. Regular program-wide strategic review meetings should examine whether the logic of intervention-level results chains holds up, and whether changes need to be made to the intervention-level logic, program-level logic, or both.

5. An ex-post evaluation, at least one year after project end, may be prudent to better understand the lasting impacts of BOSS. The methods of this evaluation and the project's own M&E are limited, and to understand whether impacts have been sustained or even scaled – for example through crowding in – requires that some time has passed. An ex-post evaluation should include market analysis in the target value chains and beneficiary surveys with control groups and a statistically significant sample of treatment groups for both value chain and BDS interventions. As BOSS has laid the foundation for follow on initiatives and has influence within various stakeholder institutions, an ex-post study would help ILO and other stakeholders establish more confident and comprehensive understanding of both the successes and the challenges of the project.
6. The IADE management information system, as discussed earlier in this report, has limited functionality, primarily used for basic tracking and reporting of services delivered. The decision to keep the MIS “light” was made based on the technical capacities within IADE. Even so, the current MIS still requires external technical assistance to make adjustments, and at some point IADE will need to seek that external assistance. When IADE decides to hire a consultant to make adjustments to the MIS, it has to go through the 18-month budgeting process before it can do so – by which time the technological requirements will have changed, along with the needs that the proposed adjustments were meant to address. Since that is the case, it is recommended that IADE plan to subcontract a firm to upgrade the MIS at regular intervals. With the appropriate consultations with the MIS users (IADE), the firm should be able to iterate the system from end to end as the needs and use cases change over time.
7. It is mentioned earlier in this report that BOSS's value chain work may have been spread too thin, correctly identifying constraints but not able to address them as thoroughly as may have been needed to bring the sectors across a threshold of sustainable improvement. BOSS had the most success upgrading the cattle sector, but a couple of key constraints remain. Insofar as BOSS stakeholders are able to continue supporting cattle sector development, a focus on breeding centres and, separately, fattening camps could bring important market functions to sustain growth and incentivise entry into the sector by household cattle owners. The possession of cattle in Timor-Leste is still culturally seen as a symbol of status, and households view them as a kind of savings rather than a mechanism for generating regular income. When households do decide to sell a cow, it may not be in optimal health or at optimal weight. Affordable access to breeding services would encourage the turnover of cattle assets. Fattening centres would allow individual cattle owners to sell their cows at whatever weight and still reinforce the steady supply of quality meat to butchers.
8. The breadth and quality of services that IADE is able to provide to entrepreneurs is an important value addition that BOSS has contributed to Timor's emerging private sector. Limitations of IADE's service provision include the fact that its trainings are somewhat genericised, and that private sector clients are unlikely to pay for the services without government or NGO support. Follow on BDS initiatives could improve options and increase outlets for the private sector to access needed business development services by working to embed them within the value chain. Where buyers have an incentive to improve and maintain the technical and business capacity of producers, for example, trainings and counselling services could be provided by the buyer as part of a contractual relationship. Trainings would then be specifically relevant to that value chain and also

be accessible to poorer producers. IADE could be capacitated to identify opportunities to embed BDS within value chains and then work with market actors to develop the appropriate services.

IX. Annexes

Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference



Call for Expression of Interest

Final Independent Evaluation
ILO BOSS Project Timor Leste

Location	Dili, Timor Leste
Application deadline	20 October 2016
Type of contract	External Collaboration Contract
Post level	International Consultant
Languages required	Proficiency in written and spoken English
Expected duration	30 days (between November and 15 February 2017) with field work during

1.0 Background

The Business Opportunities and Support Services (BOSS) project in Timor Leste has been implemented by the ILO Country Office for Indonesia and Timor-Leste (CO-Jakarta). This project will end in December 2016 and will undergo a final independent evaluation in accordance with ILO evaluation procedures. An independent mid- term and final evaluation is mandatory for all ILO projects with \$5 million USD budget greater.

A mid-term evaluation of the BOSS Project was previously conducted in 2013 and now a final evaluation is required. The purpose of the final evaluation is to independently assess the effectiveness of the BOSS project for the purposes of ILO organisational accountability (to donors and wider stakeholders) and organisational learning (to understand what lessons can be learned for future projects). The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved using the ILO guidelines for evaluations including, quality of outputs, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness of management arrangements and project sustainability.

The BOSS project is a six-year Private Sector Development project initially funded by Irish Aid (US \$7,920,395) starting in September 2010 and planned for 4 years. Since early June 2013, the New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAid) has provided additional donor support (US \$ 3,909,165) which extended the project duration to six years (until December 2016). This support was provided to deepen the work in the three value chains selected (cattle, horticulture, tourism) and to widen the portfolio of business services offered by the main counterpart, the Institute for Business Support (IADE).

The project aims to address the problem of an underdeveloped private sector in Timor-Leste in order to stimulate growth and fight poverty in the country. This is done by upgrading selected value chains and economic subsectors, improving their business and regulatory support structures and stimulating public- private dialogue and coordination.

The project strategy is to take a systemic approach to enterprise development that addresses a range of needs and challenges for Timorese MSEs. The project intention is to address the main problems and constraints identified including coordination between the public and private sectors, lack of market access for products and services, ineffective utilization of local resources and opportunities, limited involvement of the private sector in Government service delivery and overall weak managerial and entrepreneurial knowledge. Further, the project strategy includes considering how female entrepreneurs could be better catered for in private sector development.

The Project intention is to support the Institute for Business Support (IADE), Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Timor-Leste and other relevant stakeholders, at national and local levels, to deliver need/market orientated services to MSEs and contracts, develop value chains in selected sectors, promote better coordination and alignment of private sector initiatives and contribute to a “private-sector-sound” development. The Project incorporates institutional strengthening of its partners and acts as a facilitator, focusing on technical assistance, coordination, networking, and information, and integrates gender equality at all levels. The project has adopted an embedded implementation methodology to increase the degree of local ownership.

2.0 Purpose and scope

This evaluation is a final evaluation of the BOSS project. The purpose of the final evaluation is to independently assess the effectiveness of the BOSS project for the purpose of ILO organisational accountability (to donors and wider stakeholders) and organisational learning (to understand what lessons can be learned for future projects). Therefore it should provide clients with an independent, transparent and detailed assessment of the project as a whole.

The objective is to assess whether the project met its stated objectives through the chosen modalities and interventions. This includes assessing the quality of outputs against the design and relevance to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries; assess the overall efficiency of delivery and

effectiveness of management arrangements; assess the impact of the project and sustainability; and identify the lessons learned.

The evaluation will cover BOSS project activities undertaken under the Irish Aid Project, originally covering a period of 30 September 2010 to 29 September 2014, however with no cost extensions to remain active alongside the new project funding from New Zealand Aid, covering the period from 01 July 2013 to 31 December 2016. The evaluation will cover all project activities, with particular attention the gender responsiveness of the project.

3.0 Evaluation approach and schedule

This evaluation will utilise a variety of methods to address the evaluation questions referred to above. It will include the following:

A desk review of key project documentation supplied by the project office in Dili. The purpose of the desk review is to identify any initial issues requiring further analysis and investigation during field research.

Interviews with the project team based in Dili, including the Chief Technical Adviser and project staff. The project team will make arrangements directly with the evaluator about the staff to be interviewed.

Interviews with project stakeholders, implementing partners and other key actors and may utilise one-to-one meetings, focus groups, phone interviews and other methods of engagement as appropriate. Such interviews would be supported with logistical support from the BOSS project team.

Field visits to project sites in selected locations identified by the evaluator. Field visits would be supported with logistical support from the BOSS project team.

At least one stakeholder workshop. Preparation of the stakeholder workshop, including invitations and other administrative arrangements would be provided by the BOSS project team.

Data collection should be gathered through multiple perspectives and include disaggregated data based on gender. Further, analysis of the project as a whole should include gender analysis as part of the report. As the evaluation will rely significantly on qualitative information, the evaluator will ensure that data is triangulated to compare, cross validate and substantiate any assessments made during the course of the evaluation for the purpose of ensuring any inferences and conclusions are justifiable and reasonable. The evaluator may propose adjustments to the methods of conducting the evaluation based on desk research where it suggests changes could be made to enhance the quality of evaluation questions to be answered. Such adjustments must be recommended during the inception phase and accepted by the ILO. The evaluation must strictly abide with ILO standards and procedures relating to ethical conduct of evaluations.

4.0 Professional requirements

The evaluation will be conducted by an external evaluation consultant who is suitably qualified to undertake evaluations of this scope and subject matter. The ideal candidate will have:

- At least 10 years' experience conducting evaluations (ideally in the international development field).
- A strong understanding of evaluation methodologies in a development context.
- Experience in collecting and analysing gender disaggregated data and applying gender analysis as part of evaluative work.
- Excellent report writing skills.
- Excellent analytical skills with the ability to analyse and interpret data from a range of sources.
- Excellent interpersonal and engagement skills, including previous experience applying qualitative questionnaires or interview techniques, engaging focus groups and other forms information gathering in the field.

The following would be advantageous:

An understanding of the development context and/or experience working in Timor Leste.

An understanding of the evaluation context and standards for managing UN or ILO evaluations.

An understanding of, or previous experience in relation business development projects.

The ILO will also recruit an independent national consultant who will work alongside the external evaluation consultant and assist with logistics, and interpretation and other tasks assigned by the lead consultant.

Candidates intending to submit an expression of interest must supply the following information:

1. A description of how their skills, qualifications and experience are relevant to the requirements of this assignment
2. A list of previous evaluations that are relevant to the context and subject matter of this assignment.
3. A statement confirming their availability to conduct this assignment and the daily professional fee expressed in US dollars.
4. A copy of the candidate's curriculum vitae (which must include information about the qualifications held by the candidate).
5. A statement confirming that the candidate has no previous involvement in the delivery of the BOSS project in Timor-Leste or a personal relationship with any ILO Officials who are engaged in the project.
6. The names of two referees who are able to be contacted.

The deadline to submit expressions of interest for the evaluation is by **close of business on 20 October 2016** sent by e-mail with the subject header "Evaluation of Timor Leste BOSS Project" to the **Evaluation Manager, Anne Boyd at boyda@ilo.org** and copied to Ms Pamornrat Pringsulaka, pamornrat@ilo.org.

Annex 2: List of stakeholder entities interviewed for the evaluation

Organization/ entity	Location
ILO and former ILO	Dili
IADE	Dili
LUAN	Ataúro
Ministry of Tourism	Ataúro
Berry's Ecolodge	Ataúro
ETDA	Dili
MECAE	Dili
MAF	Dili
Mercy Corps	Dili
CCI-TL	Dili
KSTL	Dili
EBAI	Dili
Josephina Farms	Dili
NZAID	Dili
Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality	Dili
Ministry of Economy and Development	Dili
Conoco Phillips	Dili
Independent contracting company	Dili
Database and website consultant	Dili
Ataúro hospitality worker	Ataúro
Independent cattle rancher and animal health service provider	Maliana
Independent animal health service provider	Maliana

Annex 3: Evaluation questions by category

Category ¹⁹	Sub-Category	Primary Evaluation Questions	Secondary Evaluation Questions (guided discussions, but not fully addressed)
Relevance <i>The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.</i>	Project clarity and logic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the project have clear causal logic that supports its selected strategy? Do the project's sectors and interventions all clearly align with that of the program-level causal logic? Are important assumptions made explicit and relevant? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were needs assessments conducted at the beginning and at regular intervals throughout the project and did they appropriately influence design and implementation? Do all programme implementers have a working understanding of the programme logic? Was the choice of interventions (e.g. embedding advisors, training, awareness raising and other activities) appropriately selected to deliver results in the context?
	Alignment with ILO, partner, and beneficiary interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are expected results relevant to the strategies of ILO, CCI-TL, KSTL, Irish Aid and New Zealand Aid, national development frameworks and target populations? Are interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other donor organizations in Timor-Leste? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was the choice of project sites appropriately aligned to the objectives? Are the programme partners appropriate in terms of mandate, influence, capacities, and commitment? Do outcomes contribute to ILO's aggregate strategic outcomes?
Effectiveness <i>A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. It is useful to consider what the major factors were influencing the achievement of the objectives.</i>	Translating outputs to outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the project's output and objective targets been achieved? Were the stated objectives of extending the project met; e.g. to deepen the work in the three value chains selected – cattle, horticulture, and tourism – and to widen the portfolio of business services offered by the Institute for Business Support (IADE)? Is there evidence that gender mainstreaming under Objective 3 was institutionalized? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there urban and rural differences in the extent to which project objectives were achieved? If so, what were the contributing factors? What were the major difficulties and constraints, both internal and external, that affected program results and analyses?
	Adaptive management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the project have a robust monitoring system that regularly assessed progress against expected achievements, monitored and revised key assumptions, and used the information to revise its approach? Was this documented? Can the project provide evidence of learning during implementation? Do the project's culture, leadership and rules support adaptive management? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were the expected results achieved on time and within budget? How efficient were the programme management processes? Were the number, quality, and roles of staff appropriate for the requirements of programme implementation?


¹⁹ OECD Evaluation Criteria

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would another implementation methodology have been more cost-effective? • What was the cost to benefit ratio of the programme's investments – funds, expertise, time?
<p>Efficiency</p> <p><i>Efficiency measures the outputs in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.</i></p>	Value for Money and additionality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could the results that the project achieved have been obtained through different modalities and/ or with fewer resources, and if so would the timing of results have been different? • Is there evidence that these impacts would not have occurred without the programme? (i.e., what was the project's additionality?) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the expected results achieved on time and within budget? • How efficient were the programme management processes? • Were the number, quality, and roles of staff appropriate for the requirements of programme implementation? • Would another implementation methodology have been more cost-effective? • What was the cost to benefit ratio of the programme's investments – funds, expertise, time?
<p>Impact</p> <p><i>The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental</i></p>	Achieving long-term outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the programme's impact targets been achieved? • What have been the gendered impacts of the programme? • Is there an evidence-based case for plausible attribution of impacts to BOSS interventions and are external influences accounted for? • Are there any unintended impacts (either positive or negative) arising from the project interventions? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How appropriate are the indicators and means of verification used for assessing the project's progress, results and impact? • Are impacts differentiated for men and women? • What were the differences in impact between different interventions, taking into account the value of various positive or negative changes detected?

<i>and other development indicators.</i>			
Sustainability <i>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.</i>	Sustainability addressed and achieved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the project and its interventions have a vision for sustainability in terms of both the development model and the development impacts, and has that vision been achieved? • Do the requisite incentives and resources (i.e., human and financial resources) exist for the vision of sustainability to be realistic? 	

Annex 4: Evaluation work plan

The evaluation contract commenced 14 November 2016, with evaluation activities complete by February 2017. The lead evaluator was in Timor-Leste from 27 November to 10 December, which included meetings and interviews in Dili, travel to rural districts, and a final stakeholder workshop on 9 December in Dili. A first draft report was submitted by MSA to ILO for review on 6 January, and this final report was submitted 10 February. A timeline for evaluation activities is provided below:



Annex 5: BOSS Objective Indicator Results

Indicator	Sector	Baseline value (2010)	End-line target	Achieved	Method of calculation
Development Objective: The project will contribute directly to the generation of pro-poor economic development and quality employment for women and men by spurring growth of micro and small enterprises (MSEs)					
Increase in household income	All	This data is measured the Labour Force Survey and Census, but was not analysed by the program or for the evaluation and attribution of impacts to BOSS was not assessed.			
% of self and wage employment (sex disaggregated)	All	This data is measured the Labour Force Survey, but was not analysed by the program or for the evaluation and attribution of impacts to BOSS was not assessed.			
Immediate Objective 1: Increased opportunities for micro and small enterprises in target sectors and districts					
Increasing sales in the target sectors and districts per year and cumulatively	Cattle (slaughtered/year)	0	936 head slaughtered/year	1861	Reported by EBAI (abattoir) and Talho Moris (butcher)
	Horticulture	0	55 tons sold	55.3 tons sold	Reported by Josephina Farm
	Tourism	0	30 enterprises w/ new clients		Interviews with businesses from Ataúro and Maubisse
Net additional jobs created in target enterprises as a result of the programme, per year and cumulatively (men and women)	Cattle	0	800 jobs	799 jobs created	Calculation for cattle farmers from sales (2.5 cattle+ per farmer = 1 job), EBAI has 7 new jobs, Talho Moris has 8 new jobs, APS has 37 new jobs
	Horticulture	0	150 jobs	168 jobs (23% women) created	
	Tourism	0	50 jobs	14 new jobs have been created for the past 12 months	Interviews with businesses from Ataúro and Maubisse
Increasing number of business start-ups in the target sectors and districts per year and cumulatively (male and female headed MSEs)	Cattle	0	600	783	Calculation for cattle farmers from sales (2.5 cattle+ per farmer = 1 job), EBAI has 7 new jobs, Talho Moris has 8 new jobs, APS has 37 new jobs
	Horticulture	0	140	166	
	Tourism	0	N/A		
Increasing public and private investment in the target sectors and districts per year and cumulatively	Cattle (public)	0	\$140,000	\$300,000	Public investment in abattoir, refrigerated truck and refrigerated room for the abattoir
	Cattle (private)		\$80,000	\$180,000	EBAI's investment in the abattoir, \$60k Talho Morris, \$50k in refrigerated truck for carcasses
	Horticulture (public)	\$90,000	\$225,000	\$180,000	Greenhouse purchased by the government
	Horticulture (private)	0	\$20,000	\$12,000	Reported by Josephina Farm

	Tourism (public)	0	\$20,000	\$0	
	Tourism (private)	0	\$5,000	67% made small changes and a further 14% made large changes	Interviews with businesses from Ataúro and Maubisse

Indicator	Baseline value (2010)	End-line target	Achieved	Method of calculation
Immediate Objective 2: Nationwide access to enhanced and innovative market/ need oriented business development service				
An increase of at least 50% in the number of enterprises that access innovative market/need oriented business development services offered by IADE/CDEs, 30% of which are women-managed enterprises, by the end of the project	Only one service offered by IADE/CDE: business management training – 665 MSEs trained in 2010.	5,500 IADE clients trained	6,396 (50% women)	IADE database (website)
		500 civil works contractors trained	552 (25% women)	IADE database (website)
		613 IADE clients receiving business counselling	912 (49.2% women)	IADE database (website)
		5,000 MSEs receiving business information	6,962 (39.8% women)	IADE database (website)
		150 MSEs participating in trade fairs	742 (50% women attendees)	From individual report of IADE managed expo event
		260 MSEs participating in business matchmaking events (average 30% women-managed enterprises)	637 (56% women)	From expo individual report and database report
50% of surveyed clients of IADE/CDE and Moris Rasik Business Development Services report increased business turnover as a result of their interaction with the service by the end of the project	No systematic recording on business turnover	50% of MSEs receiving BDS from IADE have increased their turnover	52% respondent felt that IADE training increased their chance of winning a contract	Assessment conducted by IADE and Don Bosco April-October 2016 - interviews
Immediate Objective 3: Increased SEAPRI commitment and capacity to mainstream gender equality in all policies, programs and activities.				
Organic Law of IADE integrates gender mainstreaming responsibilities in each directorate	No Gender Equality Cabinet (2010)	Gender Equality Cabinet integrated in MED structure (2011)	MED dissolved	Project knowledge
SEAPRI Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan developed and implemented	No Gender Strategy and Gender	Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan	SEAPRI dissolved	Project knowledge

	Equality Action Plan (2010)			
IADE Annual Action Plan (AAP) and budget respond to gender sensitive criteria	N/A	IADE AAP and budget respond to gender sensitive criteria	Ongoing IADE AAP includes gender targets, promotional materials and gender sensitive training materials	Approved AAP and training materials

Annex 6: Timeline of BOSS Milestones

2011

- Project kick off.
- Operational structure approved.
- Institutional assessment of IADE conducted.
- 4 new business development centres (CDEs) inaugurated.
- IADE management information system (MIS) completed and tested.
- Report of the business development services needs assessment developed.
- 'Improve your business' training program accredited by the National Labour Force Development Institute (INDMO).
- IADE trainers accredited by INDMO.
- Contractor training program accredited by INDMO.
- Training material for contractor developed.
- Value chain component kickoff in NRED under Ministry of Economic Development (MED).
- Business models and results chains for the cattle sector completed.
- Cattle value chain research produced, including a gender lens.
- NRED institutional assessment conducted.
- MED rapid gender equality assessment conducted.
- TOR developed for the Cabinet for the Promotion of Gender Equality.

2012

- State budget included provision for the construction of 2 further CDEs.
- IADE BDS MIS has been set up capturing data on clients. IADE staff trained in database use.
- IADE accredited as training provider by INDMO as a training provider.
- IADE re-started business counselling.
- IADE started to deliver contractors training programme.
- IADE website launched.
- Tender information system launched.
- Business matchmaking services introduced and launched.
- First business-to-business trade fair in Timor-Leste organized.
- 'Super Trainer' campaign materials developed and published through radio, TVTL, website, etc.
- Value chain report for the horticulture sector in Ainaro District produced. Business models, results chains, and action plan for horticulture intervention developed.
- Feasibility study and business plan for the national abattoir completed.
- National abattoir inaugurated.
- The first butcher shop inaugurated.
- Training programme for abattoir and butcher shop staff begins.
- IADE provided business matchmaking services for cattle and horticulture value chain actors.
- Funds to rehabilitate two local abattoirs incorporated into DNDER budget.
- UNTL designed training programme on cattle health, reproduction and nutrition.
- UNTL delivered training to suco-level animal husbandry agents (APS).
- Josephina Farm began contract farming to produce organic vegetables.
- IADE supported Josephina Farm in providing technical training for contract farmers.
- MED Cabinet for Gender Equality approved with an annual budget of \$131,000.
- MED Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan developed.
- Gender analysis of the horticulture sector was included in a value chain report and action plan.
- Gender equality inputs provided for the design of the action plan and implementation of intervention in the cattle sector.

- MED dissolved and the State Secretary for the Support and Promotion of the Private Sector (SEAPRI) formed.

2013

- Establishment of the Directorate of Planning and M&E at IADE.
- The first version of business matchmaking (BMM) section of the database was prepared and training provided for IADE.
- IADE's BDS MIS operational in all CDEs.
- Counselling expanded to potential clients of the National Commercial Bank of Timor-Leste (BNCTL).
- A tracer study for existing business and contractor training conducted.
- First business plan competition organized.
- Organized BMM for entrepreneurs under Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) Forum.
- Market research service started within IADE.
- IADE Business Incubation Facility (BIF) procedures developed.
- Inclusion of IADE contractor training certificate within the Secretary of State for Administration (ESTATAL) pre-qualifications for contractors tendering for contracts valued between \$150,000 and \$500,000.
- Cooperation started with SEAPRI.
- BOSS midterm evaluation conducted in May.
- BOSS collaboration with Mercy Corps in providing capacity development of an agriculture input supply shop.
- EBAI (local company) bought cattle from Lautem, Ermera, Covalima, and Bobonaro. Farmers and collectors began using electronic scales to determine price, moving away from the traditional "by sight" method of pricing.
- Five decree laws for the cattle sector developed in collaboration between the BOSS project and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF).
- Josephina Farm expanded its operations to Ermera.
- Four agricultural stores opened with BOSS provided promotion of services.
- Horticulture "crowding in" was observed in Manelima and Manatutu.
- Value chain development activities and action plan for the tourism sector designed.
- To promote the supply side, focus was given to enhance the quality of tourism offerings in selected districts (Maubisse and Ataúro).
- IADE organizational rules integrated gender mainstreaming responsibilities in each directorate.
- SEAPRI Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan developed and implemented.

2014

- More than 50% of targeted training clients achieved.
- IADE willingness to adopt, adapt, and expand new practices, including embedding funding for new BDS within budgetary processes.
- IADE achieves full operation in 12 districts.
- Marketing strategy of IADE developed and implemented to promote BDS.
- Second business plan competition conducted with corporate and government sponsorship.
- Government invested funding in BIF.
- Government invested funding for staff training.
- SERVE (one-stop shop for business registration and licensing) was started. CDEs collected registration and submitted to SERVE.
- IADE regular six-month review on progress and budget organized.

- Assessment report on IADE training and services developed. Result: 42% of training participants report that their sales and/ or profit had increased.
- First assessment of BMM services conducted. Result: transaction results were low due to disagreements on price and quality. This reinforced the need to provide other services beyond transaction.
- New butcher shop opened: Talho Moris. Talho Moris is a BIF client and received IADE technical training, counselling services, marketing, and matching grant.
- Expanded animal medicines, becoming available in Same, Ainaro, Bobonaro, and Lautem Loja Agricultura.
- Refresher training by UNTL for APS Bobonaro, Manufahi, and Lautem.
- BOSS partnered with ETDA (local NGO) to develop training on tourism and hospitality. Training needs assessment conducted.
- Support began to the Ataúro tourism group.
- A visitor satisfaction survey was developed and rolled out for Ataúro tourists.
- MOU between the Ministry of Tourism and SEAPRI developed to work around destination marketing and branding for Timor-Leste.
- SEAPRI Strategy and Action Plan for Gender and the Private Sector is absorbed into the IADE annual plans, and gender targets are specified.
- IADE applied gender mainstreaming through tailoring of services to the needs of women and men. IADE always disaggregates its activities according to gender.
- IADE supported women entrepreneurs through women targeted trade fairs through the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI).

2015

- SEAPRI dissolved and IADE is moved under the new Coordinator Ministry for Economic Affairs (MECAE).
- Refresher course and on-the-job training for market research staff conducted.
- BOSS supervision reduced of IADE training and counselling services, increasing IADE's role. IADE master trainers certified and fully responsible for the quality of training and counselling services.
- Youth Training Centre becomes regular IADE client.
- First international expo organized by IADE (rather than BOSS). IADE suffered a budget cut under the new ministry, but they received a high satisfaction rate in the feedback from exhibitors and visitors.
- Following on the results of an IADE BMM assessment, client selection criteria was developed and specific clients were referred for further support from other IADE departments.
- BOSS supervision reduced for the third business plan competition, which was organized with corporate and government sponsors, increasing IADE's role.
- Asian Development Bank (ADB) cooperation with IADE began to provide entrepreneurship awareness to students at the Vocational Technical Training Centres in Bacau, Dili, Suai.
- Cooperation with New Zealand's National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) in developing material for fish farmers.
- Business Plan Development course accredited by INDMO.
- GIZ contracted IADE to implement various interventions for carpentry and pig farming.
- IADE's BIF Department's internal organization completed, with staff assigned to each step of the process.
- All BOSS programme BDS activities integrated into the IADE annual plan, including mainstreaming of the maintenance of the MIS.
- Marketing and promotion for agri-shops to provide animal treatment is restarted.
- MAF delivers refrigerated room to the national abattoir (run by EBAI).
- Talho Moris increased the per-day number of cattle slaughtered for their business.


- Josephina Farms signed an MOU with MAF to lease three government-owned greenhouses for five years.
- BOSS facilitated the award of a New Zealand Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA) volunteer to Josephina Farm.
- Mercy Corps, Market Development Facility (MDF), and ILO coordinated agri-supply interventions to avoid duplication.
- Promotional material around Ataúro developed, including Ataúro tourism website, Facebook page, brochure, and highlighting through Guide Post.
- The Ataúro Tourism Group (ETA) members were trained on managing the website.
- ETDA developed and delivered a training on food preparation and guesthouse operations.
- IADE adapted and delivered training on business management for tourism sector businesses, including guesthouses, restaurants, and souvenir shops.


2016


- Revision of general business management and contractor training material.
- Cooperation started with ANZ Bank and IADE, as well as MDF, in adapting and delivering financial literacy training to SMEs.
- Three market research contracts signed by IADE and corporate sponsors.
- IADE implemented BIF independently of BOSS support.
- Fourth business plan competition organized by IADE, independently of BOSS support.
- Carpentry expo organized by IADE, independently of BOSS support.
- The MIS for IADE's BDS was revised by consultant, and staff were trained on the revised version.
- New IADE website launched.
- Commercialization of IADE services begun with support from a VSA volunteer.
- IADE installed MYOB accounting system to manage non-government budget. IADE opened a bank account.
- Impact assessment on contractor training conducted.
- A USAID agriculture development project, Avansa Agrikultura, contracted IADE to deliver training and counselling to women in rural areas. Avansa renewed a second contract for IADE after a successful first contract.
- Assessment and feasibility study of an expansion of Talho Moris butcher shop was supported. Talho Moris had been selling the meat from three head of cattle per day, and with the expansion were able to increase to six head per day.
- A meat industry expert trained Talho Moris and EBAI on producing value added meat products.
- Talho Moris began negotiations with MDF for a matching grant to finance the expansion of the processing plant.
- Greenhouse leased by Josephina Farm from the government produced organic products.
- Josephina Farm piloted a business model to hire labour instead of contract farming.
- VSA volunteer extended to March 2017 to transfer operational management to new staff, owing to the poor health of the farm's Director.
- Partnership with the Ministry of Tourism started to develop a national tourism website for Timor-Leste.
- Tourism policy developed with facilitation from BOSS.
- ETDA training offered in 2 more districts, Bacau and Maliana.
- ETDA formalized into an association, with support from BOSS.
- Second visitor satisfaction survey delivered to Ataúro tourists.
- Impact assessment on training and mentoring in Ataúro and Maubisse conducted.
- MECAE requested ILO to support the Pillar of Economic Reform by conducting an assessment on the business enabling environment in Timor-Leste.
- BOSS project activities completed in December.

Annex 7: Results chains by sector for BOSS value chain work

Results Chain – Cattle Sector







Annex 8: ILO Lessons Learned and Emerging Good Practice Templates

ILO Lessons Learned	
<p>Evaluation Title: Final Independent Evaluation of the ILO BOSS Project in Timor-Leste Project TC/Symbol: TIM/10/02/IRL and TIM/12/02/NZE Name of Evaluator: Matt Styslinger (MarketShare Associates) Date: February 2017</p> <p>The following Lesson Learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.</p>	
LL Element	Text
Brief summary of lesson learned (link to project goal or specific deliverable)	BOSS's Immediate Objectives were achieved through the implementation of project components that were managed quite separately from one another. At the overall program level, BOSS did not regularly reflect on the overall causal logic or make adjustments to it. The lesson learned is that applying a program-wide M4P approach could integrate program management across interventions, even if implemented by separate entities. This maximises the relevance and learning between interventions and will ultimately support broader, more sustainable impacts. Regular, program-level strategic review meetings and workshops to gauge project progress on impact, effectiveness, and needed course-correction could have strengthened cohesion and synergies across BOSS's interventions.
Context and any related preconditions	Adaptive management and iterative program design are major strengths of the M4P approach to program management and the DCED Standard for Results Measurement. BOSS drew from these frameworks in its value chain work, and aligning implementation of the other project components with them would have allowed for more cohesive, insightful, and adaptive management of the project as a whole. Facilitation, rather than direct delivery, in implementation is another strength of the M4P approach, which promotes sustainability of project results. BOSS's BDS work also utilised a facilitation approach, and this would have naturally fit with an overarching M4P framework.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	Project management, market actors, and IADE would have been the direct users of a program-wide M4P approach. Similarly, the implementers, partners, and market actors would be the direct users in future programs.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Mainstreaming M4P in project management requires high capacity staff and intricate coordination between a project's many moving parts. It also requires painstaking documentation and monitoring and evaluation. These can only be accommodated if a project has planned, budgeted, and staffed for it from the beginning, which takes organizational and donor buy in.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	Cohesion and sustainability are positive factors of an M4P approach to implementation. Applying the DCED standard provides a well-documented evidence base for decision making, as well as deeper learning at project end.
ILO administrative issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	In order to implement M4P programming in earnest, ILO will need to design programmes that can accommodate the requisite mechanisms. An M4P programme depends heavily on sufficient technical expertise, as well as heavy M&E. Because it is difficult to build sufficient market development expertise within any one programme, ILO might consider building regional or global cross-programme expertise if it plans to take on multiple market development programmes.
Other relevant comments	M4P programmes require large, flexible budgets. This means that the implementing organisation must be matched with a donor who is willing to fund at the requisite scale and allow for the budget flexibility for the requisite level of adaptive management.

ILO Lessons Learned

Evaluation Title: Final Independent Evaluation of the ILO BOSS Project in Timor-Leste

Project TC/Symbol: TIM/10/02/IRL and TIM/12/02/NZE

Name of Evaluator: Matt Styslinger (MarketShare Associates)

Date: February 2017

The following Lesson Learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
Brief summary of lesson learned (link to project goal or specific deliverable)	M&E documentation is key for a project to be “evaluation ready” to maximize learning from an external evaluation. Above all, this requires a process of documentation throughout the project period with a final evaluation in mind, following a general principle that every project aims to contribute to the body of knowledge in international development. Monitoring and evaluation documentation is particularly important for assessing whether a project was evidence based, learned, and adapted. If a project is able to utilise adaptive management and iterative design – which is ideal – it is important to document the iterations and the rationale for any changes.
Context and any related preconditions	Documentation needs to be succinct and well organized for an external evaluator to be able to assess the intricacies of how the project unfolded. It is difficult to assess how a project did if it is not clear what it did. In the case of BOSS, datasets, M&E and analysis plans, methodological descriptions, and detailed indicator definitions were not available for review by the evaluator, and the remaining staff were not able to speak meaningfully to M&E protocols and technical approaches. The preparation of a simple timeline of project milestones, which was obtained from BOSS for this evaluation in the course of field work, can go a long way towards being evaluation ready.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	The primary beneficiary of well documented M&E and evaluation “readiness” is the project and the implementing organization, as they are the primary clients of an external evaluation. Donors, partners, and other constituents are also beneficiaries.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Two major challenges make it difficult for a project to implement a well-documented robust M&E system. First, a project needs to budget for the associated personnel, time, and research costs. Second, the project team needs to be staffed with the appropriate technical capacities to implement and document the M&E tools, analysis, and reporting required, which can be difficult with a limited talent pool to recruit from. The alternative is to build the capacity of less experienced staff, but that takes time and requires additional resources.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	Well-documented M&E can support program management and cohesion throughout implementation. Ultimately, the benefit of being evaluation ready is the increased ability to articulate relevant and poignant lessons learned from the evaluation itself and use those as a foundation for follow on initiatives.
ILO administrative issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	ILO will need to design programmes that put enough emphasis on M&E staffing and technical inputs. ILO may need to articulate a more detailed and robust set of internal requirements around M&E so that projects are incentivised to implement a higher M&E standard, even if the donor does not explicitly require it. ILO might also consider building regional or global cross-programme expertise around M&E.
Other relevant comments	Language barriers can often constrain both the quantity and quality of project documentation. If the evaluation is to be conducted in English, and if the primary audience for M&E insights is an international one, then a project must

ensure that local M&E staff either have a strong command of English or can have key documentation translated and quality checked.

ILO Emerging Good Practice

Evaluation Title: Final Independent Evaluation of the ILO BOSS Project in Timor-Leste

Project TC/Symbol: TIM/10/02/IRL and TIM/12/02/NZE

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Date: February 2017

The following good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further relevant text can be found within the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	The BOSS project took a facilitation approach to implementation, working to catalyse systemic change among stakeholders rather than delivery a direct service or input. A facilitation approach optimizes sustainability of interventions, with key local actors leading important functions under the guidance of the project, building capacity to carry forward those functions after the project timeframe. BOSS's value chain work used facilitation to promote and incentivise change through market actors, such as cattle owners, slaughterhouse operators, and butchers in the beef value chain. The BOSS team was embedded directly with its main counterpart, IADE, in order to facilitate the development of new services and overall institutional capacity building by working alongside the IADE team. BOSS's Exit Strategy emphasised building agency among the counterpart and private-sector partners to carry its initiatives forward far beyond the project. Broad recommendations are made in the Exit Strategy for BOSS's value chain work, and more extensive recommendations are made to facilitate sustainability of BDS, including a commercialisation strategy for IADE, improving knowledge management within IADE, and sustained coordination and cooperation with current and potential partners.
Relevant conditions and context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability	The facilitation role of a project should be understood by stakeholders in advance so that expectations and responsibilities for follow through are understood. It can be difficult to precisely track progress when facilitation is the main mode of project implementation. Similarly, it can be difficult to calculate value for money invested in a project, as expenditures primarily go towards capacity building and facilitation, and the impact of those investments happens through local actors external to the project.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	Because BOSS faithfully employed a facilitation approach to implementation, market actors in the three project target value chains have taken strong ownership of behaviours, skills and relationships introduced by the project. Additionally, IADE has taken full ownership of services and procedures introduced by BOSS and will continue to build upon them long after the project is complete. In this way, facilitation has led to sustainable outcomes of the BOSS project.
Indicate measureable impact and targeted beneficiaries	It is difficult to measure the impact of BOSS's facilitation quantitatively, but qualitative inquiries for the final evaluation revealed convincing evidence that facilitation led to the sustainability of project outcomes. The ultimate beneficiaries are MSEs. But more directly, IADE, cattle and horticulture value chain actors, as well as the Atauro Tourism Association benefitted from BOSS facilitation.
Potential for replication and by whom	There is strong potential for replication of this approach in other ILO projects, and indeed there are well documented examples beyond BOSS to work from.
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Framework)	The emerging good practice supports ILO's mandate to advance job creation and economic development, in alignment with the Government of Timor-Leste's development strategy, by fostering relationships and building capacities for market actors, including poor households, to steward their own advancement.
Other documents or relevant comments	BOSS has written intervention reports for each of the target value chains and for the project's BDS work that document the facilitation approach well.

Annex 9: List of publications cited and reviewed for the evaluation

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