



-Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all

- Support for DRC's tripartite constituents in combating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

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SDG(s): [1.3, 8.5 and 10.4 in both countries, 8.8 Democratic Republic of Congo only and 5.4 Eswatini only](#)

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

CO	Country Office
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CPO	Country Programme Outcome
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DWT	Decent Work Team
EMPLOYMENT	Employment Policy Department
EQ	Evaluation question
EVAL	ILO Evaluation Office
HQ	Headquarters
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ITC-ILO	International Training Centre of the ILO
m	Million
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MOLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORMS	International Labour Standards Department
NSSP	National Social Security Policy
OECD- DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OSH	Operational Health and Safety
P&B	Programme and Budget
PSN CSU	Strategic Plan for Universal Health Coverage
RBSA	Regular Budget Supplementary Account
SOCPRO	Social Protection Department
SPF	Social Protection Floor
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SWZ	Swaziland
ToC	Theory of Change
TWG	Technical Working Group
UBF	Unemployment benefit fund
UBS	Unemployment benefit scheme
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
U.S. \$	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

Introduction: This document constitutes the final report of the independent final cluster evaluation of two ILO interventions on social protection in Africa. The evaluation covers the following two interventions funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA):

- Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards comprehensive social protection for all (SWZ/20/01/RBS), timeframe: 08/2020 – 10/2021, extended to 12/2021, budget US\$ 430,000.
- Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19/ Support to DRC tripartite constituents in addressing the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic (COD/20/01/RBS), timeframe: 09/2020 – 11/2021, extended to 07/2022, budget US\$ 460,000.

Intervention background:

The [ILO's Global Flagship Programme on Building Social Protection Floors for All](#), launched in early 2016, supports implementing social protection systems, including floors, guided by ILO's social security standards. In addition, the extension of social protection for all is one of the prioritized areas of work of the [Abidjan Declaration](#), adopted at the ILO 14th African Regional Meeting, held in Abidjan in December 2019. To provide constituents with enhanced support to achieve the priorities identified in the Abidjan Declaration, an Implementation Plan¹ was adopted in the 338th Session (March 2020) of the Governing Body.

Due to the impact of COVID-19, social protection systems have been put under enormous strain. This includes the apparent impact on health systems and health insurance, as well as the need to pay unemployment benefits or provide social assistance to a rapidly growing number of jobless persons.

The intervention « **Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19** » aimed to :

- Strengthen the social protection systems, with a focus on the extension to workers from the informal and rural economy in response to COVID-19, but also to build sustainable systems.
- Operationalize progressively the Universal Health Coverage system.
- Promote Operational Health and Safety (OSH) at the workplace, including the ratification of the Convention N° 176.

The intervention “**Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all**” focused on:

- Supporting the implementation of the National Social Security Implementation Action Plan and Strategy (2019) and, the Government COVID-19 Unemployment Relief Fund, and the United Nations (UN) Multisector COVID-19 Response Plan
- Conducting feasibility studies and setting establishment and implementation arrangements for a gender-inclusive unemployment benefit fund/scheme (UBF/UBS)
- Building capacities of Government, social partners, and stakeholders to enhance social dialogue and good governance of social security.

¹ [Implementation of Abidjan Declaration.pdf](#)

- Linking unemployment protection with measures to facilitate access to employment services, including job matching, skills development, and active labour market policies.

Evaluation background:

The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)² outline the **evaluation purpose** as follows:

- Assess the extent to which the interventions have achieved the stated objectives and expected results while identifying the supporting factors and constraints that have led to them.
- Identify unexpected positive and negative results of the interventions.
- Assess the extent to which the interventions' outcomes will be sustainable.
- Establish the relevance of the intervention design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO, UN, and national development frameworks
- Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further.
- Provide recommendations to intervention stakeholders to promote sustainability and support further development of the intervention outcomes and to ILO towards similar initiatives

Scope: The final evaluation covers the period from the start of the interventions (September 2020 for DRC and August 2020 for Eswatini interventions) until February 2023 (taking into consideration the results of the interventions ex-post). The evaluation covers all the planned outputs and outcomes under the intervention.

The **main evaluation clients** are ILO's constituents, and national and international partners, including the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Protection, and Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the findings of this final evaluation are destined for ILO's management (Kinshasa and Pretoria Country Offices, ILO Decent Work Team (DWT)/Country Office (CO) Yaoundé and Pretoria), SOCPRO, NORMES, EMPLOYMENT, Gender, Social Dialogue, and the Regional Office for Africa.

The evaluator used a **theory-based evaluation approach** for this final cluster evaluation. The cluster evaluation corresponds to a thematic cluster evaluation under a RBSA funding arrangement. This cluster evaluation type has a strong focus on learning about innovative intervention implementation approaches, according to the ILO's guidance note on Clustered Evaluations (2020).

Evaluation criteria and questions

The evaluation covered the following evaluation criteria (in line with the DAC criteria), UNEG guidelines and ILO evaluation policy guidelines:

- a) Relevance
- b) Coherence
- c) Effectiveness
- d) Efficiency
- e) Impact orientation
- f) Sustainability

² ILO, 2022: Terms of Reference. Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo), page 6.

- g) Gender equality and non-discrimination³.

Evaluation methodology

The evaluator used a **theory-based evaluation approach** for this final cluster evaluation.

The cluster evaluation corresponds to a thematic cluster evaluation under a RBSA funding arrangement. This cluster evaluation type has a strong focus on learning about innovative intervention implementation approaches, according to the ILO's guidance note on Clustered Evaluations (2020).

For primary data collection, the evaluator used semi-structured interviews, including during the field visit to Eswatini. The secondary data was derived from the intervention documentation, including workplans and progress reports, allowing for a robust data triangulation.

The evaluator interviewed 31 stakeholders of the RBSA-funded intervention in Eswatini, and 11 stakeholders related to the intervention in DRC.

Limitations: The evaluation encountered two main limitations:

i) The evaluation ToR foresaw visits to both intervention countries. Following the field visit to Eswatini, the evaluator experienced delays in the visa application process for DRC. The official invitation letter for the visa application from Kinshasa did not arrive in time to obtain a visa to undertake the field visit, as envisaged. Hence, the evaluator mitigated this shortcoming through virtual interviews, following close consultation with the evaluation manager.

ii) This evaluation was designed as a cluster evaluation, given the social protection focus of both interventions. However, the interventions do not share a common planning framework or monitoring using similar indicators. Hence, the evaluation found that the evaluability as a cluster was not given. As a mitigation measure, the evaluation results of the two interventions are often presented separately but in one document.

Main evaluation findings are listed according to the evaluation criteria listed in the Terms of Reference: relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, progress towards impact, and sustainability. The numbering of the evaluation questions (EQs) is stated at the end of each finding to show the comprehensiveness of the evaluation and its adequate coverage of the ToR.

The RBSA-funded ILO interventions were highly relevant to both countries in their efforts to establish comprehensive social protection after COVID-19 exposed significant gaps in social protection coverage.

In both countries, the interventions were highly relevant to government objectives and beneficiary needs. In Eswatini, the government planned to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crises or pandemics. In DRC, the government reformed the general social security system in 2019 with the support of the ILO. The interventions contributed to the Programme and Budget (P&B) 2020-2021 outputs 8.1 (Eswatini, DRC), 8.2, and 7.2 (DRC) and at Country Programme Outcome level to CPO SWZ 151 (Eswatini) and CPO 201 (DRC). Concerning Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the interventions contributed to SDG 1.3, 8.5, and 10.4 (Eswatini, DRC), SDG 5.4 (Eswatini), and SDG 8.8. (DRC).

³ As part of the effectiveness section of this report.

Both RBSA-funded interventions contribute to the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, Action area 1: “Enhance coverage and adequacy through strong social protection strategies, legal frameworks, and programmes.” The interventions also align with the Abidjan Declaration’s priority b (iii) to “progressively extending sustainable social protection coverage.” (EQ1.1)

Links to other activities in social protection and COVID-19 measures appeared in both countries. In Eswatini, the intervention was part of a broader reform process to streamline the fragmented unemployment benefit schemes. In DRC, the intervention supported the country’s COVID-19 response plan, e.g., to mitigate the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly by strengthening the social protection system. (EQ 1.2)

The evaluation revealed a catalytic role of both interventions. In Eswatini, the World Bank used Parliament’s approval of the UBS as a trigger for negotiating a loan with the government of Eswatini, later replaced by the approval of the Social Security Policy. In DRC, the RBSA intervention served as a steppingstone to mobilize a new US\$ 945.000 intervention funded by the Belgium Development Cooperation on social protection extension to the Great Lakes region addressing universal health coverage. (EQ 1.3)

The evaluation finds the validity of the design uneven, with unrealistic intervention duration for both interventions while sustainability was strategically addressed. Tripartite structures were overall coherently used for intervention design and implementation.

The original intervention duration of 15 months (DRC) and 17 months (Eswatini) was unrealistic to achieve intervention results, taking into account up to six months required for recruiting the intervention manager (Eswatini) and setting up the intervention. Other intervention design aspects, like the logic of the results chain, were satisfactory. (EQ 2.1)

Tripartite structures served to engage stakeholders in the intervention design of both interventions. (EQ 2.2). A Technical Working Group (TWG, Eswatini) or a Steering Committee (DRC), respectively, using tripartite structures, successfully oversaw the intervention implementation in both countries. (EQ 2.4)

Both interventions did not contain a Theory of Change, as this was not foreseen in the RBSA funding proposal template for 2020-2021. (EQ 2.3)

Sustainability strategy: The ILO intervention matched government funding to establish a UBS in Eswatini. In DRC, the RBSA-funded intervention enabled the sustainability of previous ILO intervention results. The targeted RBSA funding provided the steppingstone to fill an existing gap to further upscale the results of this and previous ILO interventions, serving as a catalyser. (EQ 2.5)

Effectiveness: The results achievement was uneven across the two interventions, with the more complex intervention in DRC showing results in the OSH component, while the intervention in Eswatini showed good delivery across its two components.

In Eswatini, good progress was made with both results (policy, legal and institutional framework and establishing the UBS), and nine out of eleven planned activities were fully delivered and two partly. The UBS will likely be established after the new Parliament gathers

in early 2024. The two results under the social protection components were delayed in DRC, and the other three under the OSH component showed progress. This was particularly good under result 4: *The institutional framework for health and safety at work has been strengthened.* (EQ 3.1)

Factors affecting the intervention performance positively comprised the governments' strong commitment that drove the interventions in both countries, including the government's funding of USD 1.48m in the case of Eswatini. Tripartite committees were instrumental in the intervention implementation in both countries. Finally, the COVID-19 context accelerated the need for the interventions.

In the case of Eswatini, the decision to second the intervention coordinator from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) contributed to a swift start of the intervention after administrative delays on the ILO's side. The secondment also contributed to internal capacity building in MOLSS.

Factors affecting the intervention performance negatively: Overlapping mandates, turf battles, and vested interests of existing institutions concerning OHS in the case of DRC and regarding the UBS housing in Eswatini wasted valuable time. The intervention lacked an intervention manager on the ground in DRC, and an intervention duration of 15 months seems insufficient for an intervention engaging the policy level. (EQ 3.2 and EQ 3.4)

Unforeseeable results: At the request of the Government of Eswatini, the ILO had expanded support to maternity and sickness benefits, now being part of the UBS, as practised in South Africa. (EQ 3.3)

Risk management: The TWG and its seamless operation beyond the intervention's duration in Eswatini ensured that the intervention coordinator stayed in close contact with the tripartite + constituents even after the secondment. In DRC, the Piloting Committee oversaw the intervention implementation, but risk management largely excluded workers' and employers' representatives due to their insufficient participation in the intervention's government structure. (EQ 3.5)

Efficiency: Both interventions managed to leverage significant resources during implementation or for a follow-up intervention. Intervention management structures showed differences, resulting in varying efficiencies for intervention implementation.

The **intervention management structure** in Eswatini was particularly cost-effective, with the intervention coordinator seconded from the national main counterpart, MOLSS, and housed in the ministry. The DWT in Pretoria provided technical backup with the support of a national and one international consultant.

The evaluation found that the strategic allocation of resources of the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC was suboptimal. No intervention coordinator was recruited despite plans to do so. Two specialists from the Yaoundé DWT shared the responsibility for the intervention management without an intervention presence on the ground, despite support from the Kinshasa CO. (EQ 4.1)

Leveraging resources: The ILO intervention leveraged Swaziland Lilangeni 5 m (US\$ 296.000) in government funding for establishing the UBS in Eswatini, a matching ratio of 1: 0,69 for each US\$ the ILO invested in the intervention.

ILO successfully used the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC to attract new donor funding for advancing the social protection agenda in the country through a US\$ 945.000 Belgium-funded intervention. (EQ 4.2)

The likelihood of sustainability of intervention results and related impacts is too early to assess. However, the ILO still has a role to play in facilitating the extent of the intervention's systemic change in Eswatini.

It is too early to assess any **changes in the lives of intervention beneficiaries**, workers who lost their jobs and are transitioning into another employment or becoming entrepreneurs, as the UBS is not yet operational. The same applies to ultimate intervention beneficiaries in DRC, persons benefitting from a comprehensive social security system, including OHS. (EQ 5.1)

Likelihood of sustaining results: The UBS in Eswatini, when implemented, will have national coverage of the formal sector. The employment centres linked to the UBS concept require establishment across the national territory for sustaining intervention results. While the intervention results are due to be sustained with initial national funding in Eswatini, donor funding from the Belgium Development Cooperation is expected to maintain intervention results in DRC and expand them to the central, provincial, and local levels. (EQ 5.2)

Steps to ensure the sustainability of intervention results: For the immediate future, the ILO can still play an essential role in supporting the finalization of the legal process and enacting the UBS bill by the Cabinet and Parliament in Eswatini. While in Eswatini, the ILO country director and DWT specialists are still engaged in the follow-up of the RBSA-funded intervention to unfold the intervention's impact, in DRC, the Belgium-funded follow-up intervention constitutes external funding to sustain intervention results and to scale its reach. (EQ 5.3)

Exit strategy: Once the UBS is established, MOLSS and the entity housing the UBS would benefit from ILO experiences in setting up and operating Employment Centers, which are part of the UBS for training, skilling and the placement of job seekers. In DRC, the intervention's sustainability strategy consisted of investing RBSA resources to provide seed funding to use the existing national social protection policy and strategy and start creating a national social protection floor. At the same time, the intervention team successfully searched for a donor to scale the intervention results. (EQ 5.4)

General conclusion: The evaluation draws the following conclusions based on the main findings listed above:

Relevance:

Both RBSA-funded interventions met social protection needs in Eswatini and DRC, being clearly linked to social protection and COVID-19 measures. The interventions were also aligned to ILO P&B outputs, Country Programme Outcomes, The interventions were also aligned to ILO P&B outputs, Country Programme Outcomes, Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, the Abidjan Declaration and SDGs.

The two RBSA-funded interventions played a catalytic role in the respective national contexts, aligning with and fulfilling their RBSA objectives.

Coherence:

The intervention duration in the original intervention proposals timeframes was too short to achieve policy change. Both countries successfully used tripartite structures to design and

implement the interventions. Also, both interventions used successful sustainability strategies.

Efficiency:

RBSA implementation through consultants and remote support by DWCT in the absence of an intervention coordinator proved suboptimal, as in the case of DRC. Instead, an intervention coordinator seconded from a ministry and housed there, as practised in Eswatini, which seems a good intervention management practice. Both interventions successfully leveraged resources for either implementing the intervention or follow-up action.

Effectiveness:

The degree of realism of intervention design combined with the suitability of the intervention management arrangements, government ownership and tripartite engagement determined, to a large extent, the achievement of both interventions.

Progress towards impact and sustainability:

The likelihood of sustaining intervention results appears promising. Still, it requires national or donor funding and targeted ILO support on demand (e.g., for technical advice at the remaining main decision-making points to pass the UBS bill in Eswatini).

Recommendations. Following the logic from key findings to conclusions, the following recommendations emerge:

Coherence

R1: ILO: RBSA interventions targeting policy change should have a duration of at least 24 months, and RBSA guidelines should be amended accordingly.

Priority: *medium, next 18 to 24 months*

Efficiency

R2: ILO: All RBSA-funded intervention proposals should contain a budget line for an intervention coordinator to ensure that a dedicated person undertakes intervention coordination. Secondments from government counterparts should be considered as one favoured coordination mechanism.

Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.

R3: ILO: Intervention coordination using consultants should be discouraged, given the time required for recruitment and the need for a dedicated intervention coordinator.

Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.

Effectiveness

R4: ILO: Facilitate the finalization of discussions about the Attorney General's Office on the UBS bill, for example, through the leadership of the ILO Country Director Eswatini with support from the Pretoria DWT Specialists as required.

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

R5: Country Director DRC: *Assess to what extent the Belgium-funded social protection intervention can build on and incorporate the work on social protection results 2 and 3 of the RBSA intervention.*

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

See also R2 on intervention coordination.

Progress towards impact and sustainability

R 6: Country Director Eswatini: *It is recommended for the country director to keep engaging with the Labour Advisory Board and the TWG for light-touch monitoring and to assess any technical support needs. While no more RBSA funds are available for this purpose, the regular budget should be used for specific tasks. Those tasks include, among others:*

- i) Share lessons from setting up and running a national employment centre network, for example, from South Africa, with the Labour Advisory Board, the TWG and the service provider selected for running the UBS.*
- ii) Reach out to Parliamentarians and Senators through the Assembly House and Senate House portfolio committees on labour issues*
- iii) Facilitating workshops for raising new Parliamentarians' and, separately, new Senator's awareness about the UBS and building their capacities.*

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

Goods practices and lessons learned.

The following good practise and lessons learned emerge from this evaluation.

While the secondment of a very motivated MOLSS staff as ILO intervention coordinator clearly contributed to the success of the intervention, the ILO committed two errors towards the imminent end of the secondment.

- i) The intervention coordinator was not informed that no more access to intervention data would be available once the secondment ends. This oversight resulted in an avoidable loss of intervention-related documentation. The ILO should have informed the intervention coordinator accordingly to trigger a process of copying all intervention-related deliverables on an external drive of the benefiting ministry.*
- ii) According to ILO rules and regulations, the intervention laptop had to be returned to the ILO after the end of the intervention. In the context of a resource-scarce operation environment, the previously seconded intervention coordinator reincorporated into the ministry, lacking essential work equipment. This also limited her participation in online meetings after the intervention, where she had to use her personal mobile phone, as witnessed during the evaluation.*

Good practice

Use of existing tripartite structures

The intervention in Eswatini used the existing Labour Advisor Committee as an entry point to set up a TWG comprised of tripartite+ constituents. This approach saved time and resources, allowing existing structures to prove their utility. The ongoing activities of the TWG on UBS matters, even after the end of the intervention, show the sustainability of such an approach.

Introduction

This document constitutes the final report of the independent final cluster evaluation of two ILO interventions on social protection in Africa.

The evaluation covers the following two interventions funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA):

- Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all (SWZ/20/01/RBS)
- Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19/ Support to DRC tripartite constituents in addressing the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic (COD/20/01/RBS)

The two interventions started in the Biennium 2020-21.

The table below summarizes the implementation timeframe of the two interventions, respective countries and budgets.

Title	Country	Timeframe	Budget (US\$)
Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all (SWZ/20/01/RBS)	Eswatini	08/2020 – 10/2021, extended to 12/2021	430,000
Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19/ Support to DRC tripartite constituents in addressing the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic (COD/20/01/RBS)	Democratic Republic of Congo	09/2020 – 11/2021, extended to 07/2022	460,000

1. Intervention background

The Terms of Reference summarizes the objective of the interventions as follows⁴:

The ILO's Global Flagship Programme on Building Social Protection Floors for All, launched in early 2016, supports implementing social protection systems, including floors, guided by ILO's social security standards. In addition, the extension of social protection for all is one of the prioritized areas of work of the Abidjan Declaration, adopted at the ILO 14th African Regional Meeting, held in Abidjan in December 2019. To provide constituents with enhanced support to achieve the priorities identified in the Abidjan Declaration, an Implementation Plan⁵ was adopted in the 338th Session (March 2020) of the Governing Body.

Only 18 per cent of the African population receive at least one social protection benefit. Most of those excluded work in the informal economy, and many are locked in a vicious cycle of vulnerability, poverty, and social exclusion. According to the Implementation Plan, to provide universal access to comprehensive, adequate, and sustainable social protection, it is necessary to:

⁴ ILO, 2022: Terms of Reference. Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo)

⁵ [Implementation of Abidjan Declaration.pdf](#)

- develop national social protection strategies that are underpinned by political and budgetary commitments and based on effective social dialogue,
- implement both contributory and non-contributory, gender and HIV-sensitive schemes that protect people from life-cycle risks and prevent poverty and vulnerability, and
- build and improve national social protection systems' financial and administrative governance to ensure long-term sustainability.

Due to the impact of COVID-19, social protection systems have been put under enormous strain. This includes the apparent impact on health systems and health insurance, as well as the need to pay unemployment benefits or provide social assistance to a rapidly growing number of jobless persons.

The [Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025](#), addresses the root causes of coverage deficits on the continent, establishes principles that should guide the extension of social protection, and identifies three action areas necessary to bring about tangible change. To increase social protection coverage in Africa to at least 40 per cent, African countries need to prioritize social protection and go beyond small and piecemeal interventions to pursue ambitious interventions and programmes with sufficient scale to bring about effective change. The strategy aims to build on the ongoing COVID-19 response by building back better with more inclusive, comprehensive and sustainable social protection systems. To that end, and in order to achieve the goals set out in the UN 2030 Agenda and the AU Agenda 2063, the ILO will continue to build strategic partnerships with the UN, the private sector and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and pursue bilateral and other forms of cooperation. The strategy is based on a coherent and adaptable approach that supports the three steps in the development of national Social Protection Floors (SPFs) in African countries: support the adoption of social protection policies and strategies in countries where there is no comprehensive social protection framework; design and reform social protection schemes; and improve operations.


Most African countries have enacted social protection strategies and policies as part of their social and poverty reduction frameworks. The ILO supports these countries in moving from policy design to implementing and operationalising social protection schemes and programmes that extend coverage to previously non-covered categories such as self-employed, rural, urban and migrant workers. The strategy identifies three areas in which action is necessary to bring about tangible change:

1. enhance coverage and adequacy through stronger social protection strategies, legal frameworks and programmes and by scaling up existing and new initiatives.
2. close financing gaps by ensuring adequate and sustainable financing.
3. develop strategic partnerships.

As part of the support of implementing the Abidjan Declaration (December 2019) and the Africa Regional Strategy on Social Protection 2021-2025, ILO worked in 2020-22 in two countries with the ILO constituents to increase social protection coverage: Eswatini and DRC. The RBSA interventions in the biennium 2020-2021 are ILO allocations targeted to finance catalytic actions that leverage other resources across the outcomes found in the ILO Programme and budget for the biennium to intensify support to tripartite constituents' efforts for a human-centred recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, guided by the Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work and consolidating the ILO's leading role in delivering the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The intervention budget should be, in principle, between US\$ 150,000- \$600,000, and the overall implementation period should not exceed 18 months.

Intervention countries:

The map below shows the intervention countries.



Design: A. Engelhardt 03/2023

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) intervention

DRC has ratified Convention N° 102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards) in 1987. However, informal and rural sector workers are primarily excluded from the legal social security schemes. This was clearly observed during the pandemic as employers struggled to ensure unemployment indemnities because of the absence of an unemployment insurance system. At the same time, OSH systems are insufficient, as OSH Committees at the workplace are quite non-existent. The mining sector is rather alarming in artisanal mining, one of the country's most significant sources of income and employment. Despite its importance, Convention N° 176 on OSH in mines have not yet been ratified.

To extend social protection for all (men and women), a national policy and strategy on social protection were validated in 2017, with the support of the ILO, including an extension of social security to workers from the informal economy and the setup of a Universal Health Coverage system as principal strategic axes.

The intervention « **Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'épidémie COVID19** » aimed to

- Strengthen the social protection systems, with a focus on the extension to workers from the informal and rural economy in response to COVID-19, but also with the objective of building sustainable systems.
- Operationalize progressively the Universal Health Coverage system.
- Promote OSH at the workplace, including the ratification of the Convention N° 176.

Strengthening social resilience through adequate social protection mechanisms is one of the strategic axes of the DRC Response Plan against COVID-19. The intervention fits under the output 2.2 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2020-2024 and contributes to SDG targets 1.3, 3.8, and 8.8.

The intervention didn't recruit a full-time staff to implement the intervention activities. Instead, it was closely managed by the Programme Unit of the Kinshasa Country Office with the support of external collaborators (consultants).

Kingdom of Eswatini intervention

Eswatini, although classified as a lower middle-income country, has high poverty rates; the unemployment rate is 23 %, and youth unemployment stands at 47.4% (15-24 years) and 32.4% (15-35 years). There is no unemployment protection scheme in place.

The impact of COVID-19 on economic activity and employment has compounded the problem and heightened the need for unemployment protection. In 2020, information from the Ministry of Labour shows that one hundred and fifty (150) companies have filed applications to lay-off employees, resulting in about 9000 unpaid lay-offs. The government has announced plans to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crises or pandemics. The plan also includes a temporary COVID unemployment relief fund to provide income support for an initial period of two months for unpaid layoffs.

Through ILO support, the government has developed a National Social Security Policy 2019 (and its Implementation Action Plan and Strategy), along with a draft Employment Bill (2017). These documents have already been validated by tripartite constituents and approved by the Cabinet.

The Government has recently developed a Social Assistance Policy and a National Health Insurance Scheme Policy. The Kingdom of Eswatini Strategic Road Map (2019-2023) promotes inclusive growth through effective social safety nets. Together, these policies ensure coordination between contributory and non-contributory measures and reinforce actions towards a national social protection floor.

The intervention **“Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards comprehensive social protection for all”** builds on the government’s recent financial commitment of E5 Million (\$ 296,000) to establish a UBF (with a long term/sustainable system-building perspective) and E 25 million (\$ 1.48 million) Covid unemployment relief fund, as part of the national Covid-19 response measures.

The intervention strategy focused on:

- Supporting the implementation of the National Social Security Implementation Action Plan and Strategy (2019) and, the Government COVID-19 Unemployment Relief Fund, and the UN Multisector COVID-19 Response Plan.
- Conducting feasibility studies and setting establishment and implementation arrangements for a gender inclusive UBF.
- Building capacities of Government, social partners, and stakeholders to enhance social dialogue and good governance of social security.
- Linking unemployment protection with measures to facilitate access to employment services, including job matching, skills development and active labour market policies.

Given the scope of work in establishing a UBF and the need to bolster government capacity, a full-time National Intervention Coordinator supported effective and timely implementation. Technical Working Group from Pretoria and Geneva also supported with needed actuarial analysis and legal and technical feasibility studies. The budget also includes Service Contracts for data and related systems development – crucial in establishing new benefits.

The intervention contributes to achieving the 2016-2020 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF): Priority Area 1: Output 1.1.2: Vulnerable groups have improved access to social protection services, and SDG 1.3, 5.4, 8.5 and 10.4.

2. Evaluation background

ILO considers project evaluations as an integral part of the implementation of technical cooperation activities. The purposes of evaluations are accountability, learning and planning and building knowledge. It should be conducted in the context of criteria and approaches for international development assistance as established by the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standard; and the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

This evaluation will evaluate two interventions as part of a thematic clustered evaluation⁶ on social protection. It will follow the ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluations; and the ILO EVAL Policy Guidelines Note 4.4 “Preparing the inception report⁷”; Checklist 4.1 “Validating methodologies⁸”; and Checklist 4.2 “Preparing the evaluation report⁹”. The evaluation will follow the OECD-DAC framework and principles for evaluation. For all practical purposes, this ToR and ILO Evaluation policies and guidelines define the overall scope of this evaluation. Recommendations, emerging from the evaluation, should be strongly linked to the findings of the evaluation and should provide clear guidance to stakeholders on how they can address them.

3. Evaluation purpose

The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)¹⁰ outline the **evaluation purpose** as follows:

- Assess the extent to which the interventions have achieved the stated objectives and expected results while identifying the supporting factors and constraints that have led to them.
- Identify unexpected positive and negative results of the interventions.
- Assess the extent to which the interventions’ outcomes will be sustainable.
- Establish the relevance of the intervention design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO, UN and national development frameworks
- Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further.
- Provide recommendations to intervention stakeholders to promote sustainability and support further development of the intervention outcomes and to ILO towards similar initiatives

4. Scope of the evaluation

The final evaluation covers the period from the start of the interventions (September 2020 for DRC and August 2020 for Eswatini interventions) until February 2023 (taking into consideration the results of the interventions ex-post). The evaluation covers all the planned outputs and outcomes under the intervention, with particular attention to synergies between the components and contribution to the ILO Abidjan Declaration and its implementation plan¹¹, as well as the ILO Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy 2021-2025 and Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs at the ILO P&B).

⁶ Guidance Note 3.3: Strategic clustered evaluations to gather evaluative information more effectively. ILO EVAL, 2020.

⁷ [wcms_746722.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

⁸ [wcms_746807.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

⁹ [wcms_746808.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

¹⁰ ILO, 2022: Terms of Reference. Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo), page 6.

¹¹ https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/africa/arm-14/reports-and-documents/WCMS_768623/lang--en/index.htm

The evaluation discusses how the intervention is addressing the main issues, which include the extension of social protection schemes to the informal economy (universal health coverage, social security for independent workers, and unemployment benefits); COVID-19 response and recovery measures; weak occupational safety and health at work institutional frameworks and operational strategies; lack of employment services; gender inequality and cultural dynamics.

Crosscutting themes will be assessed, including social dialogue and tripartism, international labour standards, gender inequality and non-discrimination (i.e., people with disabilities), and a fair environmental transition¹².

5. Evaluation clients

Clients of the evaluation are ILO's constituents, and national and international partners, including the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Protection, Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the findings of this final evaluation are destined for ILO's management (Kinshasa and Pretoria Country Offices, ILO DWT/CO Yaoundé and Pretoria), Social Protection Department (SOCPRO), International Labour Standards Department (NORMS), Employment Policy Department (EMPLOYMENT), Gender, Social Dialogue, and the Regional Office for Africa. The knowledge generated by this evaluation will also benefit other stakeholders that may not be directly targeted by the intervention's intervention, such as key government institutions, civil society organizations, donors, UN agencies, international organizations that work in relevant fields, and other units within the ILO. The evaluation report will be made publicly available on the ILO website¹³.

6. Evaluation criteria and questions

As defined in the ILO policy guidelines for evaluation (2017), the interventions will be evaluated against the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) international evaluation criteria, adapted to the ILO context. Those criteria and related evaluation questions are presented below. Given the large number of evaluation questions, the evaluator added only two additional questions (EQ 2.4 and 2.5).

1. Relevance and strategic fit

- 1.1. Are the interventions coherent with the Governments' objectives, National Development Frameworks, County Development Frameworks, and beneficiaries' needs, and do they support the outcomes outlined in ILO's P&B 2020-2021, CPOs, as well as the UNSDCF and SDGs?
- 1.2. What links have been established so far with other activities of the ILO, UN or other cooperating partners operating in the country in the areas of social protection (universal health coverage, unemployment benefits) and COVID-19 response and recovery measures at the country level?

¹² ILO, 2022: Terms of Reference. Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo), page 6.

¹³ Ibid, pages 6-7.

- 1.3. To what extent have the interventions played a catalytic role for ILO work in the selected countries through their comparative advantages (including tripartism, social dialogue, international labour standards, etc.)?¹⁴

2. Coherence and validity of design

- 2.1. Are the interventions realistic (regarding expected outputs, outcome, and impact) given the time and resources available and the social, political, etc. environment, including performance and its M&E system, knowledge sharing and communication strategy, and resource mobilization?
- 2.2. To what extent have the interventions integrated the ILO tripartite and normative mandate, gender equality and non-discrimination, just transition to environmental sustainability, and COVID-19 response measures as cross-cutting themes in the design?
- 2.3. Are the interventions' Theories of Change (ToC), if existent, comprehensive, integrating external factors, and are they based on a systemic analysis?
- 2.4. To what extent were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design of the interventions, including working through social dialogue? (new)
- 2.5. Did the intervention designs include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability? (new)

3. Intervention results and effectiveness

- 3.1. To what extent have both interventions achieved their expected results in line with ILO's cross-cutting issues?
- 3.2. Which have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards intervention's success in attaining its targets and implementing the ILO Abidjan Declaration and other COVID-19 response and recovery measures?
- 3.3. Have unintended results of the intervention been identified?
- 3.4. To what extent have the intervention management and governance structures put in place worked strategically with tripartite constituents, stakeholders and partners in the interventions and ILO - to achieve intervention goals and objectives?
- 3.5. What is the assessment regarding how the intervention managements have managed the contextual and institutional risks and assumptions (external factors to the intervention)?

4. Efficiency of resource use

- 4.1. Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the intervention outputs and especially outcomes? If not, why and which measures were taken to achieve intervention outcomes and impact?
- 4.2. To what extent did the interventions leverage resources to go beyond interventions' targets and promote gender equality and non-discrimination?

¹⁴ In the inception phase, it was agreed to delete the following EQs, as it is alike the EQ 1.3: "Have the interventions fulfilled its role as an RBSA funded intervention?" and "Have the interventions been able to leverage the ILO and other contributions, through its comparative advantages (including tripartism, social dialogue, international labour standards, etc.)? Have they played a catalytic role for ILO work in the selected countries?"

5. Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability

- 5.1. To what extent is there evidence of positive changes in the lives of the ultimate intervention beneficiaries?
- 5.2. To what extent are the planned results of the intervention likely to be sustained and/or scaled up and replicated by stakeholders?
- 5.3. What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?
- 5.4. Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO intervention support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

7. Evaluation methodology and approach

The evaluator used a **theory-based evaluation approach** for this final cluster evaluation. The cluster evaluation corresponds to a thematic cluster evaluation under a RBSA funding arrangement. This cluster evaluation type has a strong focus on learning about innovative intervention implementation approaches, according to the ILO's guidance note on Clustered Evaluations (2020).

While the two interventions lack a common results-based framework or explicit common theory of change¹⁵, they benefit from one common output under the 2020-2021 P&B, "Output 8.1: Increased capacity of member States to develop new or reformed sustainable national social protection strategies, policies or legal frameworks to extend coverage and enhance benefit adequacy".

As such, the two social security interventions seemed to correspond well to the ILO's definition of a cluster evaluation due to the common thematic and results focus: "*An envelope of evaluations of interventions combined into a single evaluation based on results or strategic, thematic or geographical area or scope*"¹⁶. The evaluation uses similar evaluation questions in the evaluation questionnaires for the two interventions to allow for comparability.

The comparability of evaluation questions in the primary data collection tools is crucial for the data analysis of the cluster.

The suggested approach addresses the expected time lag of the interventions' activities contributing to social protection in Eswatini and DRC. This is particularly important, given that the intervention in Eswatini ended on 31 December 2021 and the intervention in DRC on 31 September 2022.

Added value.

The added value of theory-based evaluation is that it further elaborates on the assumptions behind the intervention and links between outputs, outcomes, and impact, including indicators. Besides, the approach highlights stakeholder needs as part of the situation analysis and baseline. The situation analysis also identifies barriers to achieving change in employment

¹⁵ Critical enabling conditions for good cluster evaluation in the ILO according to the Guidance Note 3.3 on Clustered Evaluations

¹⁶ ILO, 2020: Guidance Note 3.3. Clustered Evaluations

and sustainable enterprise development. The approach includes analysing the interventions' response (activities and outputs) to the problem followed by a results analysis¹⁷.

Data collection and analysis

For primary data collection, the evaluator used semi-structured interviews, including during the field visit to Eswatini. The secondary data was derived from the intervention documentation, including workplans and progress reports. This approach allowed for a robust data triangulation, as summarized in the box below.

The evaluator interviewed 31 stakeholders of the RBSA-funded intervention in Eswatini, and 11 stakeholders related to the intervention in DRC.

- **Inception phase: Remote engagement with intervention managers, ILO country offices and DWTs about:**
 - Intervention background
 - Intervention stakeholders and beneficiaries
 - Key documentation.
- **Desk review** of intervention documentation and relevant materials such as i) the intervention document, ii) work plans, iii) intervention monitoring plans, iv) progress reports, v) any previous intervention reviews.
- **Inception report**
- **Field data collection: Telephone interviews** with primary stakeholders: the intervention managers, ILO country offices, DWCTs and other relevant ILO staff (e.g., intervention and technical backstopping staff), and key stakeholders in intervention countries.
 - **Field visit to Eswatini for primary data collection.**
- **Stakeholder workshop** for feedback: **Presentation of emerging evaluation findings** to the evaluation manager and the intervention teams following data analysis.
- **Reporting Draft report** shared with evaluation manager for factual and substantive comments, as well as for feedback to the ILO country offices, DWCTs, and other related stakeholders (factual validation/correction & substantive comments).
 - **Finalization of evaluation report and presentation** to the evaluation manager, the intervention team, and other stakeholders for finalisation, focusing on conclusions, recommendations, lessons learned, and good practices.

During the **inception phase**, the evaluator had a chance to undertake remote briefings with the evaluation manager and relevant intervention staff in Kinshasa, Pretoria, and the former intervention team in Mbabane, Eswatini. This process resulted in providing the full intervention documentation to the evaluator, updating, and completing stakeholder lists and planning for the data collection. Combined with the results of the document review, those steps provided the content for the inception report.

For the **field data collection**, the evaluator used the “most significant” change approach, explained below for sampling. The semi-structured questionnaire developed during the

¹⁷ Ibid, pages 16-17.

inception phase served as the primary data collection tool for both countries targeting primary intervention stakeholders such as intervention Tripartite Steering Committee members.

Immediately after the field visit to Eswatini, a **stakeholder workshop** was envisaged to brief the intervention stakeholders about the emerging evaluation results. While the evaluator managed to brief the ILO Country Director in writing while still in the country, TWG stakeholders' agendas did not allow for a workshop prior to the International Labour Conference in Geneva. It is envisaged to present the draft report to the main stakeholders of both interventions as part of the validation of the draft report.

Reporting: Following the draft report, its quality assurance through the Evaluation Manager and validation by main intervention stakeholders, the final report will be prepared.

Annex 5 contains the evaluation matrix.

Sampling

The evaluation covered both countries benefitting from the evaluated interventions. The evaluation sampled intervention sites based on the "most significant" change approach, i.e. where the ILO left the most profound footprint. However, this was limited to cities¹⁸, given the time and budget available for the evaluation. This seems particularly relevant, as the intervention in Eswatini ended 15 months ago (December 2021). Memory recall was strongest where the intervention results were most significant. To the extent possible under the memory recall approach, the evaluation captured less successful intervention components ("least significant change"). This also allowed learning from challenges and how to do things differently in the future.

The evaluator interviewed 31 persons related to the intervention in Eswatini and 11 related to the intervention in DRC.

Limitations to the evaluation

The evaluation encountered two main limitations:

i) The evaluation ToR foresaw visits to both intervention countries. Following the field visit to Eswatini, the visa application process for DRC was delayed. The official invitation letter for the visa application from Kinshasa did not arrive in time to obtain a visa to undertake the field visit, as envisaged. Hence, the evaluator mitigated this shortcoming through virtual interviews, following close consultation with the evaluation manager.

ii) This evaluation was designed as a cluster evaluation, given the social protection focus of both interventions. However, the interventions do not share a common planning framework or monitoring using similar indicators. Hence, the evaluation found that the evaluability as a cluster was not given. As a mitigation measure, the evaluation results of the two interventions are presented often separately but in one document.

¹⁸ In the case of Eswatini, the evaluation interviews took place in three urban locations: Mbabane, Manzini and Ezuwlini.

Findings

8. Relevance

Key findings: The RBSA-funded ILO interventions were highly relevant to both countries in their efforts to establish comprehensive social protection after COVID-19 exposed significant gaps in social protection coverage.

- In both countries the interventions were highly relevant for government objectives and beneficiary needs. In Eswatini, the government planned to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crisis or pandemics. In DRC, a reform of the general social security system was carried out by the Government in 2019, with the support of the ILO.
- The interventions contributed to P&B 2020-2021 outputs 8.1 (Eswatini, DRC), 8.2 and 7.2 (DRC) and at Country Programme Outcome level to CPO SWZ 151 (Eswatini) and CPO 201 (DRC).
- Concerning SDGs, the interventions contributed to SDG 1.3, 8.5 and 10.4 (Eswatini, DRC), SDG 5.4 (Eswatini) and SDG 8.8. (DRC). Both RBSA-funded interventions contribute to the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, Action area 1: “Enhance coverage and adequacy through strong social protection strategies, legal frameworks and programmes”. The interventions also align with priority b (iii) of the Abidjan Declaration, to “progressively extending sustainable social protection coverage”.
- Links to other activities in social protection and COVID-19 measures:
 - Eswatini: The intervention was part of a wider reform process that aims to streamline the fragmented unemployment benefit schemes.
 - DRC: Support the country’s COVID-19 response plan, e.g. to mitigate the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular by strengthening the social protection system.
- Catalytic role of interventions:
 - Eswatini: World Bank used Parliament’s approval of the UBS as a trigger for negotiating a loan with the government of Eswatini, later replaced by the approval of the Social Security Policy.
 - DRC: RBSA intervention as steppingstone to mobilize a new US\$ 945.000 intervention funded by the Belgium Development Cooperation on social protection extension to Great Lakes region addressing universal health coverage.

8.1 Relevance for national planning, ILO frameworks and beneficiary needs

8.1.1 Relevance for government objectives, National Development Frameworks and County Development Frameworks

Eswatini

The government had announced plans to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crises or pandemics. The plan also included a temporary Covid unemployment relief fund to provide income support for an initial period of two months for unpaid layoffs.

The intervention built on the ongoing efforts of ILO constituents towards a comprehensive social protection system in Eswatini. Through ILO support, the government has developed a National Social Security Policy 2019, its Implementation Action Plan and Strategy, and a draft Employment Bill (2017). These documents have already been validated by tripartite constituents and approved by the Cabinet.

The intervention also built on the government's recent financial commitment of E5 Million (\$ 296,000) to establish a UBF (with a long-term/sustainable system-building perspective) and E 25 million (\$ 1.48 million) Covid unemployment relief fund, as part of the national Covid-19 response measures.

The Government has recently developed a Social Assistance Policy and a National Health Insurance Scheme Policy. The Kingdom of Eswatini Strategic Road Map (2019-2023) promotes inclusive growth through effective social safety nets. Together, these policies ensure coordination between contributory and non-contributory measures and reinforce actions towards a national social protection floor.

DRC

The relevance of the intervention in DRC was based on the following national processes:

In order to progressively build a national social protection floor for all (women and men), a national social protection policy and strategy were validated by the DRC in 2017, with the support of the ILO in particular, in which the extension of social security to workers in the informal economy and the introduction of a system of universal health cover are a priority.

The organic law no. The Government adopted 17/002 of 08 February 2017 and extends the scope of intervention of social mutuels to health care, family and maternity allowances and old age and death allowances. Besides, the government reformed the general social security system in 2019 with the support of the ILO.

Finally, the Congolese tripartite constituents were able to review the unratified OSH Conventions and complete the process of ratifying Convention No. 176.

8.1.2 Relevance for beneficiary needs

Eswatini

The Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) and the Eswatini National Providence Fund (ENPF), through exposure to international fora such as the ILO's International Labour Conference (ILC), brought the topic of an Unemployment Benefit Scheme (UBS) to the attention of policymakers in the kingdom before the COVID-19 pandemic.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Eswatini, the country's social security mechanisms proved not shock-responsive.

The government created a Swaziland Lilangeni 25m relief fund (about US\$ 1.48m) from ENPF reserves to mitigate the hardship of the large number of workers losing their jobs during COVID-19 lockdowns. However, the need to find a standardized solution transpired. Hence, Swaziland Lilangeni 5 m was allocated to establishing a UBS, matching the US\$ 430.000 of the ILO for the RBSA intervention. The urgent need for the UBS transpired in interviews with stakeholders in Eswatini, including employers' and workers' representatives, with all 31 interviewees stating a very high relevance for their needs.

DRC

The relevance of the intervention is based on three main arguments.

The DRC ratified the Social Security Convention, 1952 (No. 102) in 1987, but workers in the informal and rural economy are still excluded from statutory social security schemes. Furthermore, the direct management of employer redundancy payments has shown its limitations, particularly in the context of COVID-19, in the absence of an unemployment insurance scheme.


The occupational health and safety system in the DRC has several shortcomings, notably the weakness of the institutional framework and the poor promotion of health and safety committees in the workplace. The situation is much more worrying in the mining sector, particularly the artisanal sector, one of the major providers of employment and wealth.

Despite the mining sector's importance in DR Congo, the 1995 Convention on Safety and Health in Mines (No. 176) has not yet been promoted with a view to ratification.

8.1.3 Relevance for ILO

Figure 1 summarizes the contribution of the two RBSA-funded interventions to the ILO Programme and Budget (P&B). 2020-2021 and Country Programme Outcomes.

Figure 1: Contribution of the interventions to ILO P&B 2020-2021 and Country Programme Outcomes



Source: Final evaluation, 2023. Design. A. Engelhardt, 08/2023

Eswatini

The intervention contributed to the ILO's Programme and Budget (P&B) 2020-2021, **Output 8.1: Increased capacity of member States to develop new or reformed sustainable national social protection strategies, policies or legal frameworks to extend coverage and enhance benefit adequacy.**

The intervention contributed to CPO SWZ 151 at the Country Programme Outcome level: More people have access to better managed and more equitable social security benefits.

DRC

In the case of the DRC, the intervention contributed to three ILO's Programme and Budget (P&B) 2020-2021 outputs:

Output 8.1: Increased capacity of member States to develop new or reformed sustainable national social protection strategies, policies or legal frameworks to extend coverage and enhance benefit adequacy.

Output 8.2: Increased capacity of the member States to improve the governance and sustainability of social protection systems.

Output 7.2: Increased capacity of member States to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.

The intervention also contributed to the country programme outcome CPO 201: Strengthened institutional and legislative frameworks for developing a national social protection floor.

Concerning the alignment to the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025¹⁹, both RBSA-funded interventions contribute to Action area 1: "Enhance coverage and adequacy through strong social protection strategies, legal frameworks and programmes". This relates more specifically to the intervention objective of creating a UBS in Eswatini, addressing the target of "designing and implementing effective and sustainable social assistance programmes" mentioned in the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025 and to achieving universal health coverage, as one of the two intervention components in DRC.

Both interventions align with the Abidjan Declaration's priority b (iii)²⁰, to "progressively extending sustainable social protection coverage".






8.1.4 Relevance for UNSDCF and SDGs

The ILO interventions in Eswatini and DRC contributed to four SDGs with their respective indicators, as depicted in the figure below.

¹⁹ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/documents/publication/wcms_828423.pdf

²⁰ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_731646.pdf

Figure 2: Contribution of ILO intervention in Eswatini and DRC to SDGs and SDG indicators

	SDG target	Indicator	Eswatini	DRC
	1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030, achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	1.3.1 Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, by sex, distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, newborns, work-injury victims and the poor and the vulnerable	X	X
	5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate	5.4.1 Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic and care work, by sex, age and location.	X	
	8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	8.5.2 Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	X	X
	8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment	8.8.1 Fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers, by sex and migrant status		x
	10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	10.4.1 Labour share of GDP	X	X

Eswatini: The intervention documentation showed that the intervention team provided technical support and advisory services towards ensuring that Eswatini's United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDCF) Joint Work Plan integrates an output on strengthening institutions and capacities for delivery of an effective and responsive Social Protection system in Eswatini.

Participating Agencies, Institutions and groups include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund, (UNICEF), ILO, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Statistics Office, Business Eswatini, Federation Employers of Business Community, Federation of Eswatini Trade Unions, National Disaster Management Agency, Trade Union Congress of Swaziland.

In fact, in the 2021-2025 UNSDCF, strengthening capacities in the national social protection system to deliver inclusive, shock resilient and financially sustainable programmes on page 26 as a focal area²¹.

DRC: In the case of DRC, the intervention contributed to the UN's weekly meetings on social protection, where other agencies like UNICEF were present.

²¹ Eswatini United Nations Sustainable Development Framework 2021-2025, page 26
https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Eswatini_UNSDCF_2021%20to%202025_1.pdf

The intervention contributed to four SDGs: i) SDG 1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of people experiencing poverty and the vulnerable; ii) SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value; iii) SDG 8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment and iv) SDG 10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.

The intervention is part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2020-2024 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, contributing to objective 2.2: "By 2024, people living in the DRC will benefit from inclusive social protection and a demographic dividend driven by population control and the empowerment of young people and women"²².

8.2 Links with other development activities in social protection and COVID-19 measures

Eswatini

The ILO intervention was part of a broader reform process that aimed to streamline the fragmented unemployment benefit schemes.

UBS contributed to enhancing the social protection safety net and complement measures such as elderly grants, disability grants, child fostering, and orphan and vulnerable children grants. The latter were facilitated through an EU social protection programme in the kingdom.

DRC

The country's COVID-19 response plan focused on two areas: (i) the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening the health system's resilience to various epidemics, and (ii) the response to mitigate the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular by strengthening the social protection system.

8.3 Catalytic role of the interventions

Eswatini

The World Bank used Parliament's approval of the UBS as a trigger for negotiating a loan with the government of Eswatini. This decision further increased policymakers' attention on the UBS. Eventually, the World Bank used the approval of the Social Security Policy as a trigger, replacing the UBS for that purpose due to the need to duly follow a process to decide about the housing of the UBS. The World Bank's focus on the policy enabled its swift approval after lengthy previous delays. Today, the Social Security Policy serves as a broader policy framework for the prospective UBS.

DRC

The RBSA-funded intervention was conceived as a steppingstone to facilitate the ILO's rollout of follow-up interventions. With support from the ILO headquarters in Geneva, the Kinshasa

²² Nations Unis, 2020: Plan Cadre De Coopération Des Nations Unies Pour Le Développement Durable (UNSDCF) 2020-2024 pour la République Démocratique du Congo.

Country Office (CO) mobilized a new intervention funded by the Belgium Development Cooperation on social protection extension to the Great Lakes region addressing universal health coverage.

9. Coherence and validity of intervention design: Did interventions fit strategically, and were the designs realistic?

Key findings: The evaluation finds the validity of the intervention design uneven, with unrealistic intervention duration for both interventions while sustainability was strategically addressed. Tripartite structures were overall well used for intervention design and implementation.

- The original intervention duration of 15 months (DRC) and 17 months (Eswatini) was unrealistic to achieve intervention results, taking into account up to six months required for recruiting the intervention manager (Eswatini) and setting up the intervention.
- Tripartite structures served to engage stakeholders in the intervention design of both interventions.
- Both interventions did not contain a Theory of Change, as this was not foreseen in the RBSA funding proposal template for 2020-2021.
- A Technical Working Group (TWG, Eswatini) or a Steering Committee (DRC), respectively, using tripartite structures successfully oversaw the intervention implementation in both countries.
 - Eswatini: The comprehensiveness of the TWG with its tripartite + structure, the good representation of constituents, the high motivation and continuous engagement of TWG members are one of the main positive factors driving the intervention.
 - DRC: The government was very active in the Steering Committee, while the interaction with workers and employers' representatives was at times uneven (OHS component)
- Sustainability strategy: The ILO intervention matched government funding to establish a UBS in Eswatini. In DRC, RBSA-funded intervention enabled the sustainability of previous ILO intervention results and the targeted RBSA funding provided the steppingstone to fill and existing gap to further upscale the results of this and previous ILO interventions, serving as a catalyser.

9.1 Realism of intervention design

Eswatini

The eleven months available to implement the intervention (six months were lost to set up the intervention, the overall intervention period being 17 months) were clearly insufficient to establish the UBS and get it approved in Parliament due to the lengthy nature of institutional reform and policy change.

DRC

The 15-month intervention implementation required a seven-month non-cost extension to reach a delivery rate of 89,37%. As such, the timeline for intervention implementation lacked realism.

9.2 Tripartite and normative mandate in intervention design

Eswatini

Given the government's lead in establishing the UBS intervention and its complementary funding, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS), which operates using a tripartite structure for its interventions, involved tripartite constituents in the intervention design through the early establishment of a TWG.

DRC

The intervention created a piloting committee with a tripartite structure to prepare for its full rollout.

Building on the contacts with tripartite stakeholders created during previous ILO interventions facilitated this process.

9.3 Comprehensiveness of Theories of Change

Both interventions did not contain a Theory of Change, as this was not foreseen in the RBSA funding proposal template for 2020-2021.

9.4 Involvement of tripartite constituents

Eswatini

All 31 stakeholders interviewed in the kingdom confirmed the systematic involvement of a tripartite + structure in the intervention implementation (government, employers, workers and parastatals such as a financial regulator and a providence fund). Only after the end of the intervention, one workers' federation was temporarily unrepresented in the TWG (but participated in the Labour Advisory Board).

The comprehensiveness of the TWG, the good representation of constituents, and the high motivation and continuous engagement of TWG members are one of the main positive factors driving the intervention.

DRC

The government was very active in the Steering Committee. The evaluations found that the interaction with workers and employers' representatives was sometimes uneven, for example, in the OHS component.

All intervention components used a tripartite structure involving the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Security as the main counterpart. On the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) agenda, for example, the intervention had two full weeks of bilateral meetings with relevant stakeholders in DRC.

The ILO played a crucial role in facilitating a process for awareness raising among 14 ministries and the cooperation to move forward the UHC agenda.

9.5 Exit and sustainability strategies.

Eswatini

The ILO intervention matched government funding to establish a UBS in the kingdom. Given the available government funds, the endeavours to create the scheme go beyond the short timeframe of the ILO intervention of 11 months. In fact, the evaluator witnessed that 17 months after the end of the ILO intervention, the TWG is still in communication, and the MOLSS keeps leading the legal process for establishing the UBS. The interventions did not

contain an exit strategy per se in the intervention proposal but an assessment about leveraging partners' funds.

DRC

The RBSA-funded intervention enabled the sustainability of previous ILO intervention results. The targeted RBSA funding provided the steppingstone to fill an existing gap to further upscale the results of this and previous ILO interventions, serving as a catalyser.

As stated in the relevance section, the DRC validated a national social protection policy and strategy with ILO support in 2017. This included extending social security to informal economy workers and introducing universal health coverage. Organic law no. 17/002 was adopted, extending social insurance intervention to healthcare, family, maternity, and old age allowances. A 2019 general social security system reform was also carried out with ILO support. The RBSA-funded intervention built on those results and contacts created with relevant tripartite stakeholders and facilitated funding a new intervention funded by the Belgium Development Cooperation on social protection extension concerning universal health coverage.

10. Effectiveness: Were intervention results achieved, and how?

This section reviews the extent to which intervention results were achieved based on the intervention proposals. The document review and interviews were used as data sources.

Key findings: the results achievement was uneven across the two interventions, with the more complex intervention in DRC showing result in the OSH component, while the intervention in Eswatini showed good delivery across its two results.

- In Eswatini, good progress was made with both results (policy, legal and institutional framework and establishing the UBS) and nine out of eleven planned activities were fully delivered and two partly. The UBS is likely to be established after the new Parliament gathers in early 2024.
- In DRC, the two results under the social protection components were delayed and the other three results under the OSH component showed progress, which was particularly good under result 4, *The institutional framework for health and safety at work has been strengthened.*
- Factors affecting the intervention performance positively: the government's strong commitment drove the interventions in both countries, including government's funding of US\$ 1.48m in the case of Eswatini. Tripartite committees were instrumental for the intervention implementation in both countries. Finally, the COVID-19 context accelerated the need for the interventions.
- Eswatini: The decision to second the intervention coordinator from MOLSS contributed to a swift start of the intervention after administrative delays on the ILO's side. The secondment also contributed to internal capacity building in MOLSS.
- Factors affecting the intervention performance negatively: Overlapping mandates, turf battles and vested interests of existing institutions concerning OHS in the case of DRC and regarding the UBS housing in Eswatini wasted valuable time. The intervention lacked an intervention manager on the ground in DRC and an intervention duration of 15 months seems insufficient for an intervention engaging the policy level.
- Unforeseeable results: at the request of the Government of Eswatini, the ILO had expanded support to maternity and sickness benefits, now being part of the UBS, as practiced in South Africa.
- Risk management: The TWG and its seamless operation beyond the duration of the intervention in Eswatini served as an assurance that the intervention coordinator stayed in close contact with the tripartite + constituents even after the secondment. In DRC, the Piloting Committee oversaw the intervention implementation, but risk management excluded largely workers' and employers' representatives due to their insufficient participation in the intervention's government structure.

10.1 Degree of activities implemented, and outputs produced as planned and according to programmatic standards of quality and achievement of planned targets to date

Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the achievement of intervention results and activities, showing a high to very high percentage of accomplishment.

In Eswatini, good progress was made with both results and nine out of eleven planned activities were fully delivered and two partly. In DRC, the two results under the social protection components were delayed, and the other three results under the OSH component showed progress, which was particularly good under result 4, titled *The Institutional Framework for Health and Safety at Work, has been strengthened*.

The evaluator noted that both interventions lacked a results framework with SMART performance indicators, which somewhat limited a more detailed evaluation of intervention results.

Figure 3: Intervention results and activities accomplished – Eswatini.

	Results
Result 1: Policy, legal and institutional frameworks for comprehensive social protection in Eswatini are in place	✓
1.1: Actuarial assessments finalized, and consensus reached on the design, including core sets of benefits and financing.	✓
1.2: Draft Gender inclusive policy, legal and institutional frameworks for comprehensive social security in Eswatini developed.	✓
1.3: Actuarial models and management information systems developed and transferred to the government	Partly
1.4: Ministry of Labour and Social Security technical officers trained on the actuarial models, social security data systems and statistics.	✓
1.5: Tripartite constituents and Labour Advisory Board trained jointly on institutional governance mechanisms and overall policy oversight of social security.	✓
Result 2: Gender inclusive unemployment benefit fund established	At the earliest in 2024
2.1: Government provided with technical advice on the implementation of the COVID-19 Unemployment Relief Fund.	✓
2.2: Feasibility studies for an Unemployment Benefit Fund completed (informed by technical analysis, international good practice and social dialogue)	✓
2.3: Draft Legal, institutional and start-up /implementation frameworks for UBF in place.	✓
2.4: Draft national policy framework for linking unemployment protection with employment, macroeconomic and active labour market policies completed.	✓
2.5: Tripartite constituents and Labour Advisory Board trained jointly on institutional governance mechanisms and overall policy oversight of the UBF.	✓

Result 1

Policy, legal and institutional frameworks for comprehensive social protection in Eswatini are in place.

- The Government of Eswatini, in consultation with the Social Partners, has developed a National Social Security Policy (NSSP) and its accompanying Action Plan. Further to its endorsement by the Labour Advisory Board, the National Social Security Policy and its accompanying National Social Security Policy Action Plan was adopted by the Cabinet in November 2021. NSSP seeks to establish, over time, a comprehensive and inclusive social security framework in the Kingdom of Eswatini to expand coverage,

introduce additional social security benefits (maternity, employment injury, unemployment and health), and improve survivors and disability benefits and the conversion of provident into a pension scheme. The Implementation Action Plan and Strategy of the NSSP outlines milestones for adopting policy and legal frameworks, governance and institutional arrangements and the rollout of benefits, including unemployment. The NSSP includes clear linkages to complementary policy documents, including the Social Assistance Policy, the National Health Insurance Scheme Policy, the Employment Act, and The Kingdom of Eswatini Strategic Road Map (2019-2023).

- The ILO team has provided technical support and advisory services towards ensuring that Eswatini's United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDCF). The Joint Work Plan integrates an output on strengthening institutions and capacities to deliver an effective and responsive Social Protection system in Eswatini. Participating Agencies, Institutions and groups include UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Statistics Office, Business Eswatini, Federation Employers of Business Community, Federation of Eswatini Trade Unions, National Disaster Management Agency, Trade Union Congress of Swaziland.
- ILO supported a study to examine the fiscal space for a national social protection floor. This exercise entailed an assessment of the inventory of existing social protection schemes in Eswatini, including data on key social protection indicators. To this end, the Eswatini Government has made good progress towards social protection data, including data linked to SDG target 1.3 towards the ILO social security inquiry web tool.
- The Intervention collaborated with the International Training Centre (ITC-ILO) to facilitate training held on 27th- 30th April 2021 and 14th -17th June 2021. The programme provided capacity building to Constituents on Social Protection Governance and Building employment protection - design, technical assessment and policy options with a particular focus on those relevant to the Eswatini context. Government and Social Partners trained included policy makers drawn from the Ministries of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Commerce Industry and Trade, the Public Policy Coordinating Unit and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Sports, Youth and Culture Affairs, Human Rights Secretariat, Tinkhundla Administration, Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Education and Training and National Fund Administrators for both the Public and Private Sectors. The trained participants comprised a group of 65 constituents, 30 Males and 35 Females.

Result 2:

Gender inclusive unemployment benefit fund established.

- The Government of Eswatini (Ministry of Labour & Social Security) approved and adopted the findings of the Actuarial Valuation commissioned to propose design options and costing for an Unemployment Benefit Scheme (UBS). The Actuarial Valuation was completed in June 2021 and approved by Government and the Social Partners in July 2021.
- Draft Legal, institutional and start-up /implementation frameworks for UBS have been completed and submitted to government and social partners for adoption. Equally, at the request of the Government of Eswatini, the ILO has expanded support to the actuarial work by focusing on additional benefits pertaining to Maternity and Sickness benefits.

- To strengthen the capacity of the Government, Social Partners, the Labour Advisory Board and the National Tripartite Working Group to engage effectively in the social protection policy reform processes (including the Unemployment Benefit Scheme), the ILO collaborated with the ITC-ILO in delivering several courses including extension of social protection, leadership in social protection, governance of social protection, public finance, investment of social security funds, actuarial practice in social security and unemployment protection. Tripartite constituents and the Labour Advisory Board trained jointly on institutional governance mechanisms and overall policy oversight of the UBS.
- To facilitate the operationalization of the Unemployment Benefit Scheme, a study was undertaken on a comprehensive review of the existing governance and institutional arrangements for social security in Eswatini. This involves setting up institutional checks and balances that ensure proper accountability of the Social Security Administration to contributors to the Social Security Schemes. Recommendations for appropriate governance and administrative considerations for ancillary institutions to be established, including existing institutions, were submitted for adoption by the government and the social partners.
- A feasibility study on operational labour market information systems and labour centres to register workers was completed and submitted for adoption by the government and social partners.
- Awareness raising and capacity building for members of the National Technical Working Group, comprised of constituents from the government and social partners, were taken through an induction workshop facilitated by the ITC-ILO on social protection and relevant ILO conventions and standards, gender mainstreaming. The workshop was part of the launch of the work on establishing the Unemployment Benefit Scheme, held from the 3rd to the 4th of September 2020.

The RBSA-funded intervention in DRC required a non-cost extension because the ILO office had not recruited full-time staff as an intervention coordinator and preferred to work with external collaborators. This made procedures more cumbersome, and the intervention lost valuable time. Besides, the social protection component, with results 2 and 3, was delayed because the implementation period coincided with the departure of the social protection specialist. His replacement came late, which affected the intervention's implementation.

Figure 4: Intervention results and activities accomplished – DRC.

	Results
Result 1: The institutional and technical architecture of the universal health coverage system, taking gender considerations into account, has been made operational.	
1.1: Supporting the definition of an appropriate institutional architecture for the implementation of Universal Health Coverage	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1.2: Support the definition of a healthcare and services package for the universal health coverage system	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1.3: Determining the options for creating the fiscal space for financing the Universal Health Coverage	
1.4: Strengthen the institutional framework for the implementation of mutual societies in the context of the universal health coverage system	
Result 2: The technical and financial parameters and management mechanisms of the social security scheme for self-employed workers are developed.	Delayed
2.1: Designing a package of services tailored to the needs of self-employed workers, particularly in the context of COVID-19	
2.2: Drawing up a financing model for the social security scheme for self-employed workers	

2.3: Drawing up implementing regulations for the self-employed workers' scheme	
2.4: Draw up a manual of procedures for the administrative and technical management of the scheme for self-employed workers, including the procedures for collecting contributions and issuing benefits	
2.5: Building the capacity of the players involved in implementation	
Result 3: Social protection institutions and other stakeholders, including workers' organisations, have the capacity and knowledge to contribute more effectively to implementing social protection programmes, particularly in the context of COVID-19.	Delayed
3.1: Carry out a rapid assessment of the cost of adjusting social protection programmes in response to COVID-19	
3.2: Develop tools for socio-professional organisations (cooperatives, socio-professional associations, etc.) to implement their role as intermediaries for their members' access to social protection.	
3.3: Establish links between cooperatives and other target group organisations and social protection institutions, particularly the CNSS, to facilitate targeting, affiliation and the granting of benefits.	
3.4: Support workers' organizations in setting up mechanisms to promote social protection for their members	
3.5: Produce statistics on the beneficiaries of social protection programmes, disaggregated by gender, age and other specific characteristics of the population	
3.6: Develop a system for monitoring progress in the social security coverage of the population	
3.7: Build capacity to implement the fee waiver programme, in particular, to provide care for women and other vulnerable people affected by COVID-19	
3.8: Develop and promote a strategy for incorporating the gender aspect into the design and implementation of social protection programmes	
Result 4: The institutional framework for health and safety at work has been strengthened.	
4.1. Diagnose the institutional framework for OHS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.2 Drawing up an occupational health and safety profile for the mining sector, including an in-depth analysis of the regulatory framework and the impact of COVID-19.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.3 Drawing up a sectoral programme for the prevention of occupational risks in the mining sector	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.4. Support the adoption of the ILO's approach to strategic planning for labour inspection compliance, with a focus on the mining sector	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.5. Strengthen the capacity of members of the National Tripartite OSH Council to diagnose, set up, monitor and evaluate national and sectoral OSH systems	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.6. Carry out a study of the feasibility of ratifying OHS agreements, particularly C 176.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Result 5: Social protection institutions and other stakeholders, including workers' organisations, have the capacity and knowledge to contribute more effectively to implementing social protection programmes, particularly in the context of COVID-19.	
5.1 The capacity to implement occupational health and safety measures and programmes, particularly in the mining sector, has been strengthened, especially during COVID-19.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.2 Organising OHS awareness-raising sessions in artisanal mining companies	
5.3. Organising training sessions for members of health and safety committees in artisanal mining companies	
5.4. Strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Mines' Labour Inspectorate and OHS Department to promote OHS, particularly in the mining sector	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.5. Draw up an Occupational Health and Safety Guide for constructing infrastructure in the mining sector.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.6 Draw up and make available to workers' organisations a guide to raise workers' awareness of health and safety measures and their rights and responsibilities when returning to work.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.7 Develop a methodology for assessing OHS risks in companies during post-COVID-19 recovery.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.8 Publicise the employers' guide to workplace management during COVID-19, including aspects relating to Health and Safety Committees	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5.9 Disseminate ILO tools and guides on Safe Return to Office and OSH for workers in the informal economy	

5.10 Organise training using the labour-based approach to installing light WASH infrastructure in the mining sector.	
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The intervention accomplished the following key results:

Result 1:

The institutional and technical architecture of the universal health coverage system, taking gender considerations into account, has been made operational.

The intervention conducted a participatory and inclusive national dialogue that led to a national consensus on the architecture for introducing universal health coverage (UHC). This dialogue facilitated the creation of the Steering Committee of the National Council for Universal Health Coverage, which approved the Strategic Plan for Universal Health Coverage (PSN CSU) on 7 December. Another achievement comprised the popularisation and appropriation of the PSN CSU at the provincial level through harmonisation of the understanding of basic concepts, harmonisation of the methodological approach, and adoption of a common approach to popularisation among stakeholders. Finally, the intervention developed draft legislation and tools for monitoring the work of mutual societies, which will make it possible to strengthen the institutional, regulatory and operational framework for implementing insurance agents with a view to implementing the PSN CSU.

Results 2 and 3 concerning the social protection component suffered delays, as previously stated.

Result 4:

The institutional framework for health and safety at work has been strengthened.

The main achievements of this result comprise establishing a social dialogue on occupational health and safety issues and creating a tripartite monitoring committee. Also, the intervention drew up a national occupational health and safety profile and strategy, validated by the tripartite steering committee, as well as a diagnosis and strategy for preventing occupational risks in the mining sector.

Insight: Result 4 - National Occupational Health and Safety Profile document

On 20 October 2021, the "National Occupational Health and Safety Profile document" was validated. The document was prefaced by Her Excellency the Minister for Employment, Labour and Social Security, who emphasised the importance of protecting the health of the population in general, and of workers in particular, as one of the country's fundamental values (article 53 of the Constitution).

The analysis undertook an analysis from both an international and a national perspective. From the international point of view, it is the objectives of the SDGs that need to be promoted and certain International Labour Standards and Conventions, in particular those relating to medical care or in the event of accidents at work and occupational diseases. Convention 155 refers to the Safety and Health of Workers, while Convention 176 on Safety in Mines and 187 relates to the framework for promoting occupational safety and health (OSH). -From the point of view of the National Legislative and Regulatory Framework, the purpose of the review of the national legislative and regulatory framework was to highlight the legal instruments relating to OSH, to identify the gaps in relation to the international conventions and to formulate recommendations with a view to improving the handling of OSH at national level: the Constitution; Law No. 11/009 of 09 July 2011 laying down the fundamental principles relating to environmental protection; Decree No. 13/015 of 29 May 2013 regulating classified installations; Law No. 18/035 of 13 December 2018 laying down the fundamental principles relating to the organisation of public health; Law laying down the status of career civil servants in the State's public services; Decree no. 12/002 of 19 January 2012 creating and organising a public service called the General Labour Inspectorate, "IGT" in acronym and Law no. 16/009 of 15 July 2016 laying down the rules relating to the general social security scheme.

An analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of occupational health and safety systems was carried out. It should be noted that the status of public service employees requires the State to guarantee the rights and obligations relating to health and safety at work, by providing employees with decent living and working conditions.

"The State is obliged to ensure that health and safety conditions in the workplace are such as to protect the physical and mental health of its employees". "The State is obliged, in the context of health protection, to provide periodic medical check-ups for employees exposed to the risk of illnesses related to their work".

The informal and small-scale sectors, on the other hand, do not apply the laws on health and safety at work. Although there is a culture of tripartite social dialogue, there is a multiplicity of special statutes, at least 8 special social security schemes.

The analysis of the existing occupational safety and health situation calls for the following guidelines to be suggested to the Government and the social partners: to ratify Conventions 155 on the safety and health of workers and 187 on the promotional framework for OSH, and then to put in place a national policy on occupational safety and health. The review of the occupational safety and health (OSH) situation made it possible to draw up an inventory of the OSH situation, which shows:

- The existence of a disjointed occupational safety and health system with no coordination between the various social security schemes.
- The weakness of prevention structures, especially in State institutions and public services.
- A lack of qualified human resources in occupational health and safety management.
- A lack of resources and working tools for the Labour Inspectorate.

To remedy this state of affairs, it is suggested that the Government and the social partners take the following actions:

- Put in place a plan to strengthen the national OHS system by adopting a national occupational safety and health policy,
- Update the existing legal arsenal,
- Set up a national coordination structure, and build the capacity of appropriate human resources, particularly the Labour Inspectorate.

The setting up of a tripartite intervention monitoring committee for the Occupational Health and Safety component and the capacity building of its members has enabled a constructive and effective dialogue to be established around occupational risk prevention issues. In a short time, this has enabled a consensus on national priorities, the national occupational safety and health policy and strategy, and to move beyond the inter-institutional divisions that had blocked the process for years. The DRC currently meets many of the requirements of the two new fundamental conventions: Convention 155 and Convention 187.

Result 5

Social protection institutions and other stakeholders, including workers' organisations, have the capacity and knowledge to contribute more effectively to the implementation of social protection programmes, particularly in the context of COVID-19.

The intervention implemented a training module for workers' representatives on preventing occupational risks in artisanal mines, intended for all West, Central and Southern African countries.

The problem of work-related accidents, particularly serious and fatal ones, in the mining sector is common in several African countries. With the support of the ILO's international training centre in Turin, the intervention has produced a training guide for workers' representatives on assessing and preventing occupational risks in the artisanal mining sector (in English and French). The guide was tested at a training workshop with workers' representatives, which enabled it to be adapted to their actual needs and turned into a practical tool that meets the real needs of the end users. The Turin training centre will use the guide as a training reference for occupational risk prevention in small-scale mines.

10.2 Factors affecting intervention performance.

The evaluation identified positive and negative factors affecting the interventions' performance.

Positive - Eswatini

The intervention benefitted from high-level political commitment. In 2019, His Majesty addressed the ILO centenary celebrations, highlighting social protection needs in Eswatini. Besides, the Cabinet approved the social security policy where UBS figures as a critical component, as a matter of urgency.

The political commitment was combined with the government's financial commitment. The government set aside its own funds worth Swaziland Lilangeni 25m (US\$ 1.48m approx./01/2021 conversion rate) through the ENPF.

At the technical level, the TWG functioned smoothly, and TWG members commented on the common and ongoing commitment to the UBS. When bottlenecks appeared, the LAB took a facilitation role.

Stakeholders also lauded ILO expertise provided through consultants and technical backup from DWT in Pretoria, facilitating the intervention implementation. The decision to second the intervention coordinator from MOLSS contributed to a swift start of the intervention after administrative delays on the ILO's side. The secondment also contributed to internal capacity building in MOLSS.

Finally, the COVID-19 context accelerated the need for the UBS intervention as a matter of urgency.

Positive - DRC

As in the case of Eswatini, the government's strong commitment drove the intervention. The alignment of the intervention's activities with the country's priorities enabled work to proceed smoothly under the government's leadership and full ownership of the intervention by the national side.

The COVID-19 pandemic increased the urgency to work on social protection and implement the national social protection policy and strategy. Those pre-existing structures were also valuable in the case of OHS, where a related legal culture had already existed in the country.

The importance of inclusive and participatory social dialogue was crucial for the results. This dialogue was a trigger for various results in the implementation of the UHC in the DRC (in particular, the setting up of the Steering Committee of the National Council for Universal Health Coverage; the approval of the Strategic Plan for Universal Health Coverage; the Technical Coordination Committee for UHC had set up seven commissions involving more than 12 ministries; the publication and adoption of 5 decrees for the creation of the institutions that will implement the UHC) in less than nine months.

The DWT specialists in Yaoundé were instrumental in the implementation of the intervention, with invaluable support from the ILO office in Kinshasa despite limited human resources.

Negative- Eswatini

On the negative side, the political level sometimes showed reluctance to follow the quick speed of the TWG in a context where the UBS intervention advanced at a pace unknown to other policy reform processes in the kingdom.

The evaluation found that turf battles and vested interests of existing institutions concerning the UBS housing wasted valuable time. This was particularly unfortunate, as those delays blocked the MOLSS and tripartite partners from using the political momentum for a sensitized Cabinet and informed Parliament to pass the bill before the elections in 2023.

For TWG members, reaching its membership across the country was challenging. Meetings restrictions during the pandemic and the cost involved to meet members once free movement was re-established constituted bottlenecks.

Negative- DRC

The intervention lacked an intervention manager on the ground, unlike in Eswatini. Managing the intervention remotely from Yaoundé was suboptimal, especially given the existing workload of the specialists involved. Administrative processes, such as the recruitment of consultants, seemed relatively slow, as witnessed by interviewees.

The intervention duration of 15 months seems insufficient for an intervention engaging the policy level, and 24 months would have been a more realistic intervention timeframe. Also, the evaluation noted that while the government was driving the intervention, the availability of social partners was somewhat limited, and their engagement was largely marginal.

On the government's side, the intervention was confronted with two ministries of unclear competencies concerning OHS, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Labour and Employment. Access to mines was hindered, affecting the intervention's implementation of its OHS component and for the task force to follow up.

10.3 Unforeseeable results

Eswatini

At the request of the Government of Eswatini, the ILO had expanded support to additional benefits. Maternity and Sickness benefits are now part of the UBS, as practised in South Africa and being part of the ILO Standards, which was initially not foreseen for the UBS in Eswatini.

For the employers' representatives, the contribution-based nature of the UBS was initially an unwelcome surprise, which had to be carefully communicated and explained to their membership.

On the workers' side, public sector workers were less inclined to sustain private sector workers through the UBS due to the satisfactory social security benefits public sector workers receive. In this challenging context, the Labour Advisory Board took action. The Board addressed the Public Service Workers Federation to get their buy-in, explaining the government's approach to reducing the number of parastatal bodies and possible unemployment for public sector workers, as well as the increasing number of temporary contracts in the public sector which do not entitle access to social security benefits.

DRC

The evaluation found that in the course of the intervention, all ministries were tasked to create solidary funds, operating like banks and addressing social security issues. It remained unclear to what extent this result was linked to the RBSA-funded intervention.

10.4 Tripartite approach as part of intervention governance structure

Eswatini

The tripartite approach was part and parcel of the UBS intervention governance structure. The intervention institutionalized the tripartite + approach by establishing a TWG at the intervention's outset. Despite competing priorities, TWG members actively and consistently participated in TWG meetings. Providing a Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) for TWG meeting participation was a required incentive.

DRC

As stated above, establishing a piloting committee facilitated the intervention implementation. At the same time, the evaluation noted robust government engagement, driving the intervention, which contrasted with a more marginal engagement of social partners.

10.5 Risk management

Eswatini

The TWG and its seamless operation beyond the intervention's duration served as an assurance that the intervention coordinator stayed in close contact with the tripartite + constituents even after the secondment. The intervention coordinators' full dedication to the intervention and the Labour Advisory Board's support, combined with technical and political support from the ILO DWT in Pretoria, served as effective risk mitigation mechanisms. Some of the risks that were successfully mitigated are listed under the unforeseen intervention

results above.

DRC

The Piloting Committee oversaw the intervention implementation, but risk management largely excluded workers' and employers' representatives due to their insufficient participation in the intervention's government structure. The intervention team focused on leveraging new intervention funding through the RBSA seed funding, as envisaged under the RBSA concept. This approach ensured to manage the risk of not sustaining intervention results.

10.6 Results concerning gender equality and non-discrimination, ILO's normative mandate, just transition to environmental sustainability, and COVID-19 response measures.

Both interventions advanced with implementing social protection policies, developed with ILO support in previous projects. Hence, a contribution to ILO's normative mandate is given. Besides, the intervention in DRC advanced OHS coverage focusing on the mining sector.

The implementation of social protection policies benefits both men and women, though for the time being the ones being employed in the formal sector in Eswatini. Given that 65% of business owners in the informal economy are women in Eswatini²³, the likely exclusion of the informal economy from the UBS due to funding issues would disproportionately affect women.

Both interventions were not designed for a direct contribution to just transition to environmental sustainability, given their social protection focus.

As previously stated, both interventions were a direct response to COVID-19 measures, mitigating the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic by strengthening the social protection system. As such, both interventions advanced in the institutionalization of supporting unemployed workers, which were initially instigated as governments' ad-hoc responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

²³ <https://eswatini.un.org/en/92442-business-growth-and-policy-development-eswatini's-informal-sector>

11. Efficiency: Were resources used appropriately to achieve intervention results?

Key findings: Both interventions managed to leverage significant resources, either during the intervention implementation or for a follow-up intervention. Intervention management structures showed differences, resulting in varying efficiencies for intervention implementation.

- The intervention management structure in Eswatini was particularly cost-effective, with intervention coordinator seconded from the national main counterpart, MOLSS, and housed in the ministry. The DWT in Pretoria provided technical backup with support of a national and one international consultant.
- The strategic allocation of resources of the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC was suboptimal. No intervention coordinator was recruited for the intervention, despite plans for doing so. Two specialists from the Yaoundé DWT shared the responsibility for the intervention management without an intervention presence on the ground, despite support from the Kinshasa CO.
- Leveraging resources: The ILO intervention leveraged Swaziland Lilangeni 5 m (US\$ 296.000) in government funding for establishing the UBS in Eswatini, a matching ratio of 1: 0,69 for each US\$ the ILO invested in the intervention.
- ILO successfully used the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC to attract new donor funding for advancing the social protection agenda in the country through a US\$ 945.000 Belgium-funded intervention.

11.1 Strategic allocation of resources

Eswatini

The intervention's governance structure benefitted from an intervention coordinator seconded by MOLSS and housed in the ministry. The DWT in Pretoria provided technical backup with the support of a national and one international consultant.

The evaluation found that this choice was particularly cost-effective. The seconded intervention coordinator was thoroughly acquainted with the institutional set-up of tripartite stakeholders and the kingdom's evolving social security system.

An international consultant or ILO staff filling this temporary intervention management position would have been more expensive, and the short intervention implementation time would have hindered that external person to quickly "hit the ground running".

The evaluation finds that technical expertise was sufficiently provided through the ILO backup in Pretoria, which stakeholders positively commented on and the consultants. Most stakeholders were satisfied with the technical knowledge of the consultants.

The leadership of the ILO country director and his convening power also benefitted the intervention.

However, applying ILO rules unknown to the secondee resulted in the partial loss of intervention documentation, which was stored on the intervention laptop but had to be returned to the ILO. The lack of an office laptop clearly affects the efficiency of the former intervention coordinator in her role back in MOLSS, as the shortage of hardware in MOLSS excludes her, for example, from participating in virtual meetings such as Teams calls.

DRC

The evaluation found that the strategic allocation of resources of the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC was suboptimal. Two specialists from the Yaoundé DWT shared the responsibility for the intervention management in cooperation with the ILO office in Kinshasa, as no intervention coordinator was recruited for the intervention despite plans for doing so. After the original 15 months of intervention implementation, one of the specialists responsible for the intervention implementation changed, and another specialist shared the intervention implementation responsibilities for the remaining seven months.

The DWT specialists undertook those tasks in addition to serving nine countries in the region and being intervention managers for several other interventions.

Without an intervention coordinator, the intervention was principally managed from Yaoundé, without an intervention presence on the ground on an ongoing basis to meet stakeholder needs as and when needed.

In hindsight, this intervention implementation arrangement appears less efficient than those chosen for the RBSA-funded intervention in Eswatini.

11.2 Leveraging resources.

Eswatini

The ILO intervention leveraged Swaziland Lilangeni 5 m (US\$ 296.000) in government funding for establishing the UBS. Over Swaziland Lilangeni 3 m of this government budget is still available to implement the scheme.

In monetary terms, this is a matching ratio of 1: 0,69 for each US\$ the ILO invested in the intervention, i.e. the government invested US\$ 0.69 for every dollar the ILO invested through its RBSA funding.

Besides, the intervention leveraged non-financial resources from the World Bank. The World Bank's interest in supporting Eswatini in creating a comprehensive social security system resulted in the UBS being used as a reform trigger for negotiating a loan. As reported earlier, this further increased the traction and interest of policymakers in the UBS.

DRC

The ILO successfully used the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC to attract new donor funding for advancing the social protection agenda in the country. A new Belgium-funded intervention will focus on building universal health coverage, focusing on institutions and creating a much-needed management information system at the national, regional and local levels in DRC.

12. Progress towards impact and sustainability: Are results likely to lead to systemic change and lasting?

This section analyses the likelihood of the impact of intervention results. Principal data sources used in this section are evaluation interviews and observations during the field visit to Eswatini.

Key findings: The likelihood of sustainability of intervention results and related impacts is too early to assess. However, the ILO still has a role to play in facilitating the extent of the intervention's systemic change in Eswatini.

- It is too early to assess any **changes in the lives of intervention beneficiaries**, workers who lost their jobs and are transitioning into another employment or becoming entrepreneurs, as the UBS is not yet operational. The same applies to ultimate intervention beneficiaries in DRC, persons benefitting from a comprehensive social security system, including OHS.
- **Likelihood of sustaining results:** The UBS in Eswatini, when implemented, will have national coverage of the formal sector. The employment centres linked to the UBS concept require establishment across the national territory for sustaining intervention results. While the intervention results are due to be sustained with initial national funding in Eswatini, donor funding from the Belgium Development Cooperation is due to sustain intervention results in DRC and expand them to the central, provincial, and local levels.
- **Steps to ensure sustainability of intervention results:** For the immediate future, the ILO can still play an important role in supporting the finalization of the legal process, and the enacting of the UBS bill by Cabinet and Parliament in Eswatini. While in Eswatini, the ILO country director and DWT specialists are still engaged in the follow-up of the RBSA-funded intervention to unfold the intervention's impact, in DRC the Belgium-funded follow-up intervention constitutes external funding to sustain intervention results and to scale its reach.
- **Exit strategy:** Once the UBS is established, MOLSS and the entity housing the UBS would benefit from ILO experiences in setting up and operating Employment Centers, which are part of the UBS for training, skilling and the placement of job seekers. In DRC, the intervention's sustainability strategy consisted of investing RBSA resources to provide seed funding to use the existing national social protection policy and strategy and start creating a national social protection floor. At the same time, the intervention team successfully searched for a donor to scale the intervention results.

12.1 Evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate interventions' beneficiaries?

Eswatini

It is too early to assess any changes in the lives of intervention beneficiaries, workers who lost their jobs and are transitioning into another employment or becoming entrepreneurs, as the UBS is not yet operational.

The bill has been drafted, the Attorney General's office provided comments on the draft bill, and the Labour Advisory Committee had a first meeting to discuss comments. At the same time, the evaluator undertook his field visit to the kingdom. The window of opportunity for

the bill to reach the Cabinet before the country moves into elections was lost. It will no longer be possible for Parliament to pass the bill due to the recent elections. This will delay the next window of opportunity for the Parliament to pass the bill to early 2024, delaying the benefits for the ultimate intervention beneficiaries.

DRC

As in the case of Eswatini, it is too early to tell the effects of the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC on the life of the ultimate intervention beneficiaries, persons benefitting from a comprehensive social security system, including OHS. The Belgium-funded US\$ 945.000 follow-up social protection (SOCPRO) intervention aims at institutional strengthening at central, departmental and local levels, but evaluative evidence about its likely impact is unavailable.

12.2 Likelihood of sustaining or scaling results

Eswatini

The UBS in Eswatini, when implemented, will have national coverage of the formal sector. Scaling the UBS to the large informal sector in the country raises budgeting questions, which seem unsolved at the time of the evaluation. Opening the UBS to the informal sector would currently put the sustainability of the UBS at risk.

The employment centres linked to the UBS concept require establishment for sustaining intervention results. Those employment centres should provide training, skilling, and placement of persons out of work and benefitting temporarily from the UBS. At the same time, the new UBS service provider is required to have a presence across the country to offer employment centre services to urban and rural populations. For sustainability reasons, this national network of service points should already exist.

DRC

While the intervention results are due to be sustained with initial national funding in Eswatini, donor funding from the Belgium Development Cooperation is expected to maintain intervention results in DRC and expand them to the central, provincial, and local levels.

12.3 Steps to ensure sustaining intervention results.

Eswatini

In the immediate future, the ILO can still play an essential role in supporting finalising the legal process of enacting the UBS bill by the Cabinet and Parliament. During the field visit to Eswatini, the evaluator contacted the ILO Country Director to encourage the Labour Advisory Board to accelerate the finalization of discussions about the Attorney General's Office on the bill. The ILO Country Director immediately took this vital step to enable the Labour Advisory Board to submit the revised bill to the Cabinet before the beginning of the election period in July, when no more Cabinet decisions seem feasible. However, this turned out to be unfeasible.

This ILO action seemed crucial to mitigate the risk of engaging with the new Cabinet after the election and having to restart raising awareness and capacitating the Cabinet's new members on the UBS issue. Stakeholders commented that this process could take several years. Hence, the swift ILO action in addressing a bottleneck in the legal process was priceless for fast-tracking the eventual UBS implementation despite the lack of progress that was eventually made.

Delays in the legal process concerning the housing of the fund blocked any possibility for discussion and approval of the bill in the current Parliament. This final step in the legal process is no longer feasible under the current Parliament, given the election process, which is highly unfortunate. The ILO's support will be crucial for supporting the TWG, MOLSS and the Labour Advisory Board in creating new Parliamentarians' and Senator's awareness about the UBS and building their capacities. A swift action when Parliament and Senate reconvene after the elections in early 2024 would be required to keep the UBS high on the political agenda. The ILO could invite Parliamentarians and Senators for one or two one-day workshops in early 2024.

The assembly house and senate house portfolio committees on labour issues could serve as valuable entry points for ILO's action.

DRC

While in Eswatini, the ILO country director and DWT specialists are still engaged in the follow-up of the RBSA-funded intervention to unfold the intervention's impact, the situation is different in DRC. The Belgium-funded follow-up intervention constitutes external funding to sustain intervention results and to scale its reach.

12.4 Exit strategy and possible gaps.

Eswatini

The COVID-19 pandemic raised the urgency of the UBS in Eswatini and accelerated the drafting of the required bill, one of the two expected intervention results.

The implementation of the UBS and its sustainable performance due to the contribution from workers and employers are beyond the scope of the ILO intervention. Hence, the evaluation would not identify the abovementioned issues as a gap in the intervention's sustainability strategy.

Nevertheless, ILO technical advice for UBS implementation, for periodically monitoring the scheme's performance, and evaluation after several years of implementation would be appreciated steps for the ILO's contribution to the UBS' sustainability.

Once the UBS is established, MOLSS and the entity housing the UBS would benefit from ILO experiences in setting up and operating Employment Centers, which are part of the UBS for training, skilling and the placement of job seekers.

DRC

The intervention's sustainability strategy consisted of investing RBSA resources to provide seed funding to use the existing national social protection policy and strategy and start creating a national social protection floor. At the same time, the intervention team searched for a donor to scale the intervention results, which it accomplished successfully.

Conclusions, recommendations, lessons learned and good practices.

13. Conclusions

The following conclusions emerge based on the main findings summarized in the boxes at the beginning of the findings' sections. The conclusions are grouped according to the evaluation criterion. **Annex 1: Overview of key findings, conclusions and recommendations**

The figure below presents the key evaluation findings grouped by evaluation criteria, followed by conclusions and recommendations using a matrix to underscore the logical flow.

Figure 5 presents the logical flow between the main evaluation findings and conclusions.

Relevance:

Both RBSA-funded interventions met social protection needs in Eswatini and DRC, being clearly linked to social protection and COVID-19 measures. The interventions were also aligned to ILO P&B outputs, Country Programme Outcomes, Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, the Abidjan Declaration and SDGs.

The two RBSA-funded interventions played a catalytic role in the national contexts, aligning with and fulfilling their RBSA objectives.

Coherence:

The intervention duration in the original intervention proposals timeframes was too short to achieve policy change. Both countries successfully used tripartite structures to design and implement the interventions. Also, both interventions used successful sustainability strategies.

Efficiency:

RBSA implementation through consultants and remote support by DWCT in the absence of an intervention coordinator proved suboptimal, as in the case of DRC. Instead, an intervention coordinator seconded from a ministry and based there, as practised in Eswatini, which seems a good intervention management practice. Both interventions successfully leveraged resources for either implementing the intervention or follow-up action.

Effectiveness:

The degree of realism of intervention design combined with the suitability of the intervention management arrangements, government ownership and tripartite engagement determined, to a large extent, the achievement of both interventions.

Progress towards impact and sustainability:

The likelihood of sustaining intervention results appears promising. Still, it requires national or donor funding and targeted ILO support on demand (e.g., for technical advice at the remaining main decision-making points to pass the UBS bill in Eswatini).

14. Recommendations

Based on the above key findings and conclusions, the following recommendations emerge.
Annex 1: Overview of key findings, conclusions and recommendations

The figure below presents the key evaluation findings grouped by evaluation criteria, followed by conclusions and recommendations using a matrix to underscore the logical flow.

Figure 5 presents the logical flow between those key findings, conclusions, and recommendations after the final section on lessons learned.

Coherence

R1: ILO: RBSA interventions targeting policy change should have a duration of at least 24 months, and RBSA guidelines should be amended accordingly.

Priority: medium, next 18 to 24 months

Efficiency

R2: ILO: All RBSA-funded intervention proposals should contain a budget line for an intervention coordinator to ensure that a dedicated person undertakes intervention coordination. Secondments from government counterparts should be considered as one favoured coordination mechanism.

Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.

R3: ILO: Intervention coordination using consultants should be discouraged, given the time required for recruitment and the need for a dedicated intervention coordinator.

Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.

Effectiveness

R4: ILO: Facilitate the finalization of discussions about the Attorney General's Office on the UBS bill, for example, through the leadership of the ILO Country Director Eswatini with support from the Pretoria DWT Specialists as required.

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

R5: Country Director DRC: Assess to what extent the Belgium-funded social protection intervention can build on and incorporate the work on social protection results 2 and 3 of the RBSA intervention.

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

See also R2 on intervention coordination.

Progress towards impact and sustainability

R 6: Country Director Eswatini: It is recommended for the country director to keep engaging with the Labour Advisory Board and the TWG for light-touch monitoring and to assess any technical support needs. While no more RBSA funds are available for this purpose, the regular budget should be used for specific tasks. Those tasks include, among others:

- i) Share lessons from setting up and running a national employment centre network, for example, from South Africa, with the Labour Advisory Board, the TWG and the service provider selected for running the UBS.*
- ii) Reach out to Parliamentarians and Senators through the Assembly House and Senate House portfolio committees on labour issues*
- iii) Facilitating workshops for raising new Parliamentarians' and, separately, new Senator's awareness about the UBS and building their capacities.*

Priority: very high, next 3 months.

15. Lessons learned and good practices

This mid-term evaluation identifies one main lesson learned and one good practice based on a set of criteria used as good practices²⁴. As such, the lesson learned below includes i) context, ii) challenges; iii) causal factors; iv) target users; v) success; and vi) the fact that a lesson is not a recommendation or a conclusion.

Lessons learned.

While the secondment of a very motivated MOLSS staff as ILO intervention coordinator clearly contributed to the success of the intervention, the ILO committed two errors towards the imminent end of the secondment.

- i) The intervention coordinator was not informed that no more access to intervention data would be available once the secondment ends. This oversight resulted in an avoidable loss of intervention-related documentation. The ILO should have informed the intervention coordinator accordingly to trigger a process of transferring all intervention products such as reports, studies and analyses to the MOLSS information technology system.*
- ii) According to ILO rules and regulations, the intervention laptop had to be returned to the ILO after the end of the intervention. In the context of a resource-scarce operation environment, the previously seconded intervention coordinator reincorporated into the ministry, lacking essential work equipment. This also limited her participation in online meetings after the intervention, where she had to use her personal mobile phone, as witnessed during the evaluation.*

Good practice

Use of existing tripartite structures

The intervention in Eswatini used the existing Labour Advisor Committee as an entry point to set up a TWG comprised of tripartite+ constituents. This approach saved time and resources, allowing existing structures to prove their utility. The ongoing activities of the TWG on UBS matters, even after the end of the intervention, show the sustainability of such an approach.

²⁴ ILO and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

Annex 1: Overview of key findings, conclusions and recommendations

The figure below presents the key evaluation findings grouped by evaluation criteria, followed by conclusions and recommendations using a matrix to underscore the logical flow.

Figure 5: Summary of key findings, conclusions, and recommendations

	Key evaluation findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Relevance and strategic fit	In both countries, the interventions were highly relevant to government objectives and beneficiary needs. In Eswatini, the government planned to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crises or pandemics. In DRC, the government carried out a reform of the general social security system in 2019 with the support of the ILO.	Both RBSA-funded interventions met social protection needs in Eswatini and DRC, being clearly linked to social protection and COVID-19 measures. The interventions were also aligned to ILO P&B outputs, Country Programme Outcomes, the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, the Abidjan Declaration and SDGs.	<i>No recommendation.</i>
	The interventions contributed to P&B 2020-2021 outputs 8.1 (Eswatini, DRC), 8.2 and 7.2 (DRC) and at Country Programme Outcome level to CPO SWZ 151 (Eswatini) and CPO 201 (DRC).		
Coherence	Concerning SDGs, the interventions contributed to SDG 1.3, 8.5 and 10.4 (Eswatini, DRC), SDG 5.4 (Eswatini) and SDG 8.8. (DRC). Both RBSA-funded interventions contribute to the Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025, Action area 1: “Enhance coverage and adequacy through strong social protection strategies, legal frameworks and programmes”. The interventions also align with the Abidjan Declaration's priority b (iii) to “progressively extending sustainable social protection coverage”.	The two RBSA-funded interventions played a catalytic role in the national contexts, aligning with and fulfilling their RBSA objectives.	<i>No recommendation</i>
	Links to other activities in social protection and COVID-19 measures: Eswatini: The intervention was part of a broader reform process that aims to streamline the fragmented unemployment benefit schemes. DRC: Support the country’s COVID-19 response plan, e.g. to mitigate the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly by strengthening the social protection system.		
	Catalytic role of interventions: Eswatini: The World Bank used Parliament’s approval of the UBS as a trigger for negotiating a loan with the government of Eswatini, later replaced by the approval of the Social Security Policy. DRC: RBSA intervention as stepping stone to mobilize a new US\$ 945.000 intervention funded by the Belgium Development Cooperation on social protection extension to the Great Lakes region addressing universal health coverage.		
	The original intervention duration of 15 months (DRC) and 17 months (Eswatini) was unrealistic to achieve intervention results, taking into account up to six months required for recruiting the intervention manager (Eswatini) and setting up the intervention.	The intervention duration in the original intervention proposals timeframes was too	<i>R1: ILO. RBSA interventions targeting policy change should have a duration of at least 24</i>

	<p>Tripartite structures served to engage stakeholders in the intervention design of both interventions.</p> <p>Both interventions did not contain a Theory of Change, as this was not foreseen in the RBSA funding proposal template for 2020-2021.</p> <p>A Technical Working Group (TWG, Eswatini) or a Steering Committee (DRC), respectively, using tripartite structures successfully oversaw the intervention implementation in both countries</p> <p>Sustainability strategy: The ILO intervention matched government funding to establish a UBS in Eswatini. In DRC, the RBSA-funded intervention enabled the sustainability of previous ILO intervention results. The targeted RBSA funding provided the steppingstone to fill an existing gap to further upscale the results of this and previous ILO interventions, serving as a catalyser.</p>	<p>short to achieve policy change. Tripartite structures were successfully used in both countries to design and implement the interventions.</p> <p>Both interventions used successful sustainability strategies.</p>	<p><i>months, and RBSA guidelines should be amended accordingly.</i></p> <p>Priority: medium, next 18 to 24 months</p>
Efficiency	<p>The intervention management structure in Eswatini was particularly cost-effective, with the intervention coordinator seconded from the national main counterpart, MOLSS, and housed in the ministry. The DWT in Pretoria provided technical backup with the support of a national and one international consultant.</p>	<p>RBSA implementation through consultants and remote support by DWCT in the absence of an intervention coordinator proved suboptimal, as in the case of DRC. Instead, an intervention coordinator seconded from a ministry and housed there, as practised in Eswatini, which seems a good intervention management practice.</p>	<p>R2: ILO. All RBSA-funded intervention proposals should contain a budget line for an intervention coordinator to ensure that a dedicated person undertakes intervention coordination. Secondments from government counterparts should be considered as one favoured coordination mechanism.</p> <p>Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.</p> <p>R3: HQ unit tasked with RBSA. Intervention coordination using consultants should be discouraged, given the time required for recruitment and the need for a dedicated intervention coordinator.</p>
	<p>The strategic allocation of resources of the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC was suboptimal. No intervention coordinator was recruited for the intervention despite plans for doing so. Two specialists from the Yaoundé DWT shared the responsibility for the intervention management without an intervention presence on the ground, despite support from the Kinshasa CO.</p>		
	<p>Leveraging resources: The ILO intervention leveraged Swaziland Lilangeni 5 m (US\$ 296.000) in government funding for establishing the UBS in Eswatini, a matching ratio of 1: 0,69 for each USD the ILO invested in the intervention.</p>	<p>Both interventions successfully leveraged resources for either implementing the intervention or follow-up action.</p>	<p>Priority: high, next 3 to 6 months.</p>
	<p>ILO successfully used the RBSA-funded intervention in DRC to attract new donor funding for advancing the social protection agenda in the country through a US\$ 945.000 Belgium-funded intervention.</p>		
Effectiveness	<p>In Eswatini, good progress was made with both results (policy, legal and institutional framework and establishing the UBS), and nine out of eleven planned activities were fully delivered and two partly. The UBS will likely be established after the new Parliament gathers in early 2024. In DRC, the two results under the social protection components were delayed, and the other three results under the OSH component showed progress, which was particularly good under result 4, <i>The institutional framework for health and safety at work has been strengthened.</i></p>	<p>The degree of realism of intervention design combined with the suitability of the intervention management arrangements, government ownership and tripartite engagement determined to a</p>	<p>R4: ILO: Facilitate the finalization of discussions about the Attorney General's Office on the UBS bill, for example, through support from the Pretoria DWT Specialists as required.</p> <p>Priority: very high, next 3 months.</p>
	<p>Factors affecting the intervention performance positively: The government's strong commitment drove the interventions in both countries, including the government's funding of USD 1.48m in the case of Eswatini. Tripartite</p>		

	<p>committees were instrumental in the intervention implementation in both countries. Finally, the COVID-19 context accelerated the need for the interventions.</p> <p>Eswatini: The decision to second the intervention coordinator from MOLSS contributed to a swift start of the intervention after administrative delays on the ILO's side. The secondment also contributed to internal capacity building in MOLSS.</p> <p>Factors affecting the intervention performance negatively: Overlapping mandates, turf battles and vested interests of existing institutions concerning OHS in the case of DRC and regarding the UBS housing in Eswatini wasted valuable time. The intervention lacked an intervention manager on the ground in DRC, and an intervention duration of 15 months seems insufficient for an intervention engaging the policy level</p> <p>Unforeseeable results: At the request of the Government of Eswatini, the ILO had expanded support to maternity and sickness benefits, now being part of the UBS, as practised in South Africa.</p> <p>Risk management: The TWG and its seamless operation beyond the intervention's duration in Eswatini ensured that the intervention coordinator stayed in close contact with the tripartite + constituents even after the secondment. In DRC, the Piloting Committee oversaw the intervention implementation, but risk management largely excluded workers' and employers' representatives due to their insufficient participation in the intervention's government structure.</p>	<p>large extent the results achievement of both interventions.</p>	<p>R5: Country Director DRC: <i>Assess to what extent the Belgium-funded social protection intervention can build on and incorporate the work on social protection results 2 and 3 of the RBSA intervention.</i></p> <p>Priority: very high, next 3 months.</p> <p><i>See also R2 on intervention coordination.</i></p>
<p>Progress towards sustainability and impact</p>	<p>It is too early to assess any changes in the lives of intervention beneficiaries, workers who lost their jobs and are transitioning into another employment or becoming entrepreneurs, as the UBS is not yet operational. The same applies to ultimate intervention beneficiaries in DRC, persons benefitting from a comprehensive social security system, including OHS.</p> <p>Likelihood of sustaining results: The UBS in Eswatini, when implemented, will have national coverage of the formal sector. The employment centres linked to the UBS concept require establishment across the national territory for sustaining intervention results. While the intervention results are due to be sustained with initial national funding in Eswatini, donor funding from the Belgium Development Cooperation is expected to maintain intervention results in DRC and expand them to the central, provincial, and local levels.</p> <p>Steps to ensure the sustainability of intervention results: For the immediate future, the ILO can still play an essential role in supporting the finalization of the legal process and enacting the UBS bill by the Cabinet and Parliament in Eswatini. While in Eswatini, the ILO country director and DWT specialists are still engaged in the follow-up of the RBSA-funded intervention to unfold the intervention's impact, in DRC, the Belgium-funded follow-up intervention constitutes external funding to sustain intervention results and to scale its reach.</p>	<p>The likelihood of sustaining intervention results appears promising. Still, it requires national or donor funding and targeted ILO support on demand (e.g., for technical advice at the remaining main decision-making points to pass the UBS bill in Eswatini).</p>	<p>R 6: Country Director Eswatini: <i>It is recommended for the country director to keep engaging with the Labour Advisory Board and the TWG for light-touch monitoring and to assess any technical support needs. While no more RBSA funds are available for this purpose, the regular budget should be used for specific tasks. Those tasks include, among others:</i></p> <p><i>i) Share lessons from setting up and running a national employment centre network, for example, from South Africa, with the Labour Advisory Board, the TWG and the service provider selected for running the UBS.</i></p>

	<p>Exit strategy: Once the UBS is established, MOLSS and the entity housing the UBS would benefit from ILO experiences in setting up and operating Employment Centers, which are part of the UBS for training, skilling and the placement of job seekers. In DRC, the intervention’s sustainability strategy consisted of investing RBSA resources to provide seed funding to use the existing national social protection policy and strategy and start creating a national social protection floor. At the same time, the intervention team successfully searched for a donor to scale the intervention results.</p>		<p><i>ii) Reach out to Parliamentarians and Senators through the Assembly House and Senate House portfolio committees on labour issues</i></p> <p><i>iii) Facilitating workshops for raising new Parliamentarians’ and, separately, new Senator’s awareness about the UBS and building their capacities.</i></p> <p>Priority: very high, next 3 months.</p>
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference



Terms of Reference

Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo) (Anglophone and Francophone evaluation)

Version 13 October 2022

Title of interventions	Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19 Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all
Intervention DC Code	COD/20/01/RBS SWZ/20/01/RBS
Administrative Unit in the ILO responsible for administrating the intervention	CO-Kinshasa CO-Pretoria
Technical Unit(s) in the ILO responsible for backstopping the intervention	SOCPRO NORMES/OSH/HIMO/EMPLOYMENT/Gender/Social Dialogue ACTRAV/ACTEMP
Interventions duration	COD/20/01/RBS: September 2020 to July 2022 SWZ/20/01/RBS: August 2020 to December 2021
Budget	USD 460,000 (COD/20/01/RBS) USD 430,000 (SWZ/20/01/RBS)
Donor	ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA)
ILO Programme and Budget 2020-21 outcomes under evaluation	8.1 8.2, 7.2
SDG(s) covered	1.3, 3.8, 5.4, 8.5/8.8, 10.4
Type of evaluation	Independent cluster evaluation
Timing of evaluation	Final
Evaluation timeframe	November 2022-February 2023
Evaluation manager	Edgar Aguilar

1. Background information

The [ILO's Global Flagship Programme on Building Social Protection Floors for All](#), launched in early 2016, supports the implementation of social protection systems including floors, guided by ILO's social security standards. In addition, the extension of social protection for all is one of the prioritized areas of work of the [Abidjan Declaration](#), adopted at the ILO 14th African Regional Meeting, held in Abidjan in December 2019. To provide constituents with enhanced support to achieve the priorities identified in the Abidjan Declaration, an Implementation Plan²⁵ was adopted on the 338th Session (March 2020) of the Governing Body.

Only 18 per cent of the African population receive at least one social protection benefit. Most of those excluded work in the informal economy and many are locked in a vicious cycle of vulnerability, poverty, and social exclusion. According to the Implementation Plan, to provide universal access to comprehensive, adequate, and sustainable social protection, it is necessary to:

- develop national social protection strategies that are underpinned by political and budgetary commitments and based on effective social dialogue.
- implement both contributory and non-contributory, gender and HIV-sensitive schemes that protect people from life-cycle risks and prevent poverty and vulnerability; and
- build and improve the financial and administrative governance of national social protection systems to ensure their long-term sustainability.

Due to the impact of COVID 19, social protection systems have been put under enormous strain. This includes the obvious impact on health systems and health insurances, as well as the need to pay unemployment benefits or provide social assistance to a rapidly growing number of jobless persons.

The [Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025](#), addresses the root causes of coverage deficits on the continent, establishes principles that should guide the extension of social protection, and identifies three action areas that are necessary to bring about tangible change. In order to increase social protection coverage in Africa to at least 40 per cent, African countries need to prioritize social protection and go beyond small and piecemeal interventions to pursue ambitious interventions and programmes with sufficient scale to bring about effective change. The strategy aims to build on the ongoing COVID-19 response by building back better with more inclusive, comprehensive and sustainable social protection systems. To that end, and in order to achieve the goals set out in the UN 2030 Agenda and the AU Agenda 2063, the ILO will continue to build strategic partnerships with the UN, the private sector and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and to pursue bilateral and other forms of cooperation. The strategy is based on a coherent and adaptable approach that supports the three steps in the development of national SPFs in African countries: support the adoption of social protection policies and strategies in countries where there is no comprehensive social protection framework; design and reform social protection schemes; improve operations.

²⁵ [Implementation of Abidjan Declaration.pdf](#)

The majority of African countries have enacted social protection strategies and policies as part of their social and poverty reduction frameworks. The ILO supports these countries in their effort to move from policy design to the implementation and operationalization of social protection schemes and programmes that extend coverage to previously non-covered categories such as self-employed, rural, urban and migrant workers. The strategy identifies three areas in which action is necessary in order to bring about tangible change:

- enhance coverage and adequacy through stronger social protection strategies, legal frameworks and programmes and by scaling up existing and new initiatives.
- close financing gaps by ensuring adequate and sustainable financing.
- develop strategic partnerships.

As part of the support of the implementation of the Abidjan Declaration and the Africa Regional Strategy on Social Protection ILO has worked in 2020-22 in two countries with the ILO constituents to increase social protection coverage: Eswatini and DRC. The RBSA interventions in the biennium 2020-2021 are ILO allocations targeted to finance catalytic actions that leverage other resources across the outcomes found in the ILO Programme and budget for the biennium, to intensify support to tripartite constituents' efforts for a human-centred recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, guided by the Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work and consolidating the ILO's leading role in delivering the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The intervention budget should be in principle between US\$ 150,000- \$600,000 and the overall implementation period should not exceed 18 months.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) intervention

DRC has ratified Convention N° 102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards) in 1987. However, workers from the informal economy and rural sector are largely excluded from the legal social security schemes. During the pandemic, this was clearly observed as employers struggled ensuring unemployment indemnities because of the absence of an unemployment insurance system. At the same time, Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) systems are quite insufficient as OSH Committees at the workplace are quite inexistant. The mining sector is quite alarming, in artisanal mining one of the biggest sources of income and employment of the country. Despite its importance, Convention N° 176 on OSH in mines have not yet been ratified.

To extend social protection for all (men and women), a national policy and strategy on social protection were validated in 2017, with support of the ILO, including extension of social security to workers from the informal economy and the setup of a Universal Health Coverage system as major strategic axes.

The intervention « **Appui aux mandants tripartites de la RDC dans la lutte contre l'impact de l'épidémie COVID19** » aimed to :

- Strengthen the social protection systems, with a focus on the extension to workers from informal and rural economy in response to COVID but also with the objective to build sustainable systems.
- Operationalize progressively the Universal Health Coverage system.

- Promote OSH at the workplace, including the ratification of the Convention N° 176.

Strengthening the social resilience through adequate social protection mechanisms is one of the strategic axes of the DRC Response Plan against COVID-19. The intervention fits under the output 2.2 of the UNSDCF 2020-2024 and contributes to SDG targets 1.3; 3.8; and 8.8.

The intervention didn't recruit a full-time staff to implement the activities of the intervention. Instead, it was closely managed by the Programme Unit of Kinshasa Country Office with support of external collaborators (consultants).

Key intervention results as informed by the intervention:

- A tripartite committee overseeing occupational safety and health issues, including in the mining sector, was established.
- The Universal Health Coverage strategic plan (PSN CSU) was approved in December 2021.
- Draft texts and monitoring tools to strengthen the institutional and operational framework of health insurance system were developed.

Kingdom of Eswatini intervention

Eswatini, although classified a lower middle-income country has high rates of poverty, unemployment rate is 23 %, and youth unemployment stands at 47.4% (15-24 years) and 32.4% (15-35 years). There is no unemployment protection scheme in place.

The impact of COVID-19 on economic activity and employment has compounded the problem and heightened the need for unemployment protection. In 2020, information from the Ministry of Labour show that one hundred and fifty (150) companies have filed applications to lay-off employees resulting in about 9000 unpaid lay-offs. The government has announced plans to establish an unemployment benefit fund (UBF) to mitigate the impact of future crisis or pandemics. The plan also includes a temporary Covid unemployment relief fund to provide income support for an initial period of two months for unpaid layoffs.

Through ILO support, government has developed a National Social Security Policy 2019 (and its Implementation Action Plan and Strategy), along with a draft Employment Bill (2017). These documents have been already validated by tripartite constituents and approved by Cabinet.

The Government has recently developed a Social Assistance Policy and a National Health Insurance Scheme Policy. The Kingdom of Eswatini Strategic Road map (2019-2023) promotes inclusive growth through effective social safety nets. Together, these policies ensure coordination between contributory and non-contributory measures and reinforce actions towards a national social protection floor.

The intervention **“Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all”** builds on the government's recent financial commitment of E5 Million (\$ 296,000) to establish a UBF (with a long term/sustainable system building perspective), and E 25 million (\$ 1.48 million) Covid unemployment relief fund, as part of the national Covid-19 response measures.

The intervention strategy focuses on

- Supporting the implementation of the National Social Security Implementation Action Plan and strategy (2019) and the Government COVID-19 Unemployment Relief Fund and the UN Multisector COVID-19 Response Plan
- Conducting feasibility studies and setting establishment and implementation arrangements for a gender inclusive unemployment benefit fund (UBF)
- Building capacities of Government, social partners, and stakeholders to enhance social dialogue and good governance of social security.
- Linking unemployment protection with measures to facilitate access to employment services, including job matching, skills development and active labour market policies.

Given the scope of work in establishing a UBF and the need to bolster government capacity, a full time National Intervention Coordinator supported effective and timely implementation. Technical Working Group from Pretoria and Geneva also supported with needed actuarial analysis, legal and technical feasibility studies. The budget also includes Service Contracts for data and related systems development – crucial in establishing new benefits.

The intervention contributes to the achievement of the 2016-2020 UNDAF: Priority Area 1: Output 1.1.2: Vulnerable groups have improved access to social protection services, and SDG 1.3, 5.4, 8.5 and 10.4.

Key intervention results as informed by the intervention:

- Policy, legal and institutional frameworks for comprehensive social protection in Eswatini are in place.
- Gender inclusive unemployment benefit fund established.

2. Purpose, objectives, and scope of the evaluation

Evaluation background

ILO considers intervention evaluations as an integral part of the implementation of technical cooperation activities. The purposes of evaluations are accountability, learning and planning and building knowledge. It should be conducted in the context of criteria and approaches for international development assistance as established by the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standard; and the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

This evaluation will evaluate two interventions as part of a thematic clustered evaluation²⁶ on social protection. It will follow the ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluations; and the ILO EVAL Policy Guidelines Note 4.4 “Preparing the inception report²⁷”; Checklist 4.1 “Validating methodologies²⁸”; and Checklist 4.2 “Preparing the evaluation report²⁹”. The evaluation will follow the OECD-DAC framework and principles for evaluation. For all practical purposes, this ToR and ILO

²⁶ Guidance Note 3.3: Strategic clustered evaluations to gather evaluative information more effectively. ILO EVAL, 2020.

²⁷ [wcms 746722.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

²⁸ [wcms 746807.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

²⁹ [wcms 746808.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

Evaluation policies and guidelines define the overall scope of this evaluation. Recommendations, emerging from the evaluation, should be strongly linked to the findings of the evaluation and should provide clear guidance to stakeholders on how they can address them.

Purpose and objectives of the clustered final independent evaluation

The main purpose is twofold: first, to provide an independent assessment of the implementation of two intervention interventions and understand how and why the interventions have obtained the specific results from outputs, outcomes, and impact. Second, to analyse learning linkages between both interventions to help identify critical success factors and potential risks, thus providing valuable information for the performance of the future and on-going interventions in similar context and themes. The clustered evaluations serve a dual purpose. They provide learning and accountability for each intervention in the cluster but also the basis for the analysis of thematic trends, ILO's contribution to implementing the Decent Work Agenda in the UN Development Framework and ultimately ILO's contribution to the SDGs. As such, clustered evaluation results serve ILO management and its constituents to support the strategic decision-making processes are based on evidence.

Specific objectives:

1. Assess the extent to which the interventions have achieved the stated objectives and expected results, while identifying the supporting factors and constraints that have led to them.
2. Identify unexpected positive and negative results of the interventions.
3. Assess the extent to which the interventions outcomes will be sustainable.
4. Establish the relevance of the interventions design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO, UN and the national development frameworks.
5. Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further.
6. Provide recommendations to intervention stakeholders to promote sustainability and support further development of the intervention outcomes and to ILO towards similar initiatives.

Scope of the evaluation

The final evaluations will cover the period from the start of the interventions (September 2020 for DRC and August 2020 for Eswatini interventions) until October 2022 (taking into consideration the results of the interventions ex-post). The evaluation will cover all the planned outputs and outcomes under the intervention, with particular attention to synergies between the components and contribution to the ILO Abidjan Declaration and its implementation plan³⁰ as well as the [ILO Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy 2021-2025 and Country Programme Outcomes \(CPOS at the ILO P&B\)](#).

³⁰ https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/africa/arm-14/reports-and-documents/WCMS_768623/lang-en/index.htm

The evaluation will discuss how the intervention is addressing the main issues which include the extension of social protection schemes to informal economy (universal health coverage, social security for independent workers, and unemployment benefits); COVID-19 response and recovery measures; weak occupational safety and health at work institutional frameworks and operational strategies; lack of employment services; gender inequality and cultural dynamics.

Crosscutting themes will be assessed, including social dialogue and tripartism, international labour standards, gender inequality and non-discrimination (i.e people with disabilities), and a fair environmental transition.

Clients of the evaluation

Clients of the evaluation are ILO's constituents, national and international partners, including the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Protection, Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the findings of this final evaluation are destined for ILO's management (Kinshasa and Pretoria Country Offices, ILO DWT/CO Yaoundé and Pretoria), SOCPRO, NORMES, EMPLOYMENT, Gender, Social Dialogue, and the Regional Office for Africa.

The knowledge generated by this evaluation will also benefit other stakeholders that may not be directly targeted by the intervention's intervention such as: key government institutions, civil society organizations, donors, UN agencies, international organizations that work in relevant fields, and other units within the ILO. The evaluation report will be made publicly available at ILO website.

3. Evaluation criteria and questions (including Cross-cutting issues/ issues of special interest to the ILO)

The evaluation should address the overall standard evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2020³¹

- Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention
- Coherence
- Validity of the intervention design
- Intervention effectiveness
- Efficiency of resource use
- Sustainability of intervention outcomes
- Impact orientation

For clustered evaluations, for each evaluation criterion, dual lenses are applied to focus on the individual interventions and their potential interconnectedness learning. The evaluator shall examine the following key issues:

³¹ https://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationpolicy/WCMS_571339/lang--en/index.htm

1. Relevance and strategic fit of the intervention

- Are the interventions coherent with the Governments objectives, National Development Frameworks, County Development Frameworks, beneficiaries' needs, and do they support the outcomes outlined in ILO's P&B 2020-2021, CPOs as well as the UNSDCF and SDGs?
- What links have been established so far with other activities of the ILO, UN or other cooperating partners operating in the country in the areas of social protection (universal health coverage, unemployment benefits) and COVID-19 response and recovery measures at country level?
- Have the interventions been able to leverage the ILO and other contributions, through its comparative advantages (including tripartism, social dialogue, international labour standards, etc.)? Have they played a catalytic role for ILO work in the selected countries?
- Have the interventions fulfilled its role as an RBSA funded intervention?

2. Coherence and validity of intervention design

- Are the interventions realistic (in terms of expected outputs, outcome, and impact) given the time and resources available and the social, political, etc. environment, including performance and its M&E system, knowledge sharing and communication strategy, and resource mobilization?
- To what extent have the interventions integrated the ILO tripartite and normative mandate, gender equality and non-discrimination, just transition to environmental sustainability, COVID-19 response measures as cross-cutting themes in the design?
- Are the interventions' Theory of Change (ToC) comprehensive, integrating external factors, and are they based on a systemic analysis?

3. Effectiveness

- To what extent have both interventions achieved their expected results, in line with ILO's cross-cutting issues?
- Which have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards intervention's success in attaining its targets and implementing ILO Abidjan Declaration and other COVID-19 response and recovery measures?
- Have unintended results of the intervention been identified?
- To what extent have the interventions management and governance structure put in place worked strategically with tripartite constituents, stakeholders and partners in the intervention, and ILO - to achieve intervention goals and objectives?
- What is the assessment regarding how the interventions management have managed the contextual and institutional risks and assumptions (external factors to the intervention)?

4. Efficiency of resource use

- Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the intervention outputs and specially outcomes? If not, why and which measures taken to work towards achievement of intervention outcomes and impact?
- To what extent did the interventions leverage resource to go beyond interventions' targets and promote gender equality and non-discrimination?

5. Impact orientation and sustainability

- To what extent is there evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate intervention beneficiaries and on policies and practices at national and county levels?
- To what extent are the results of the intervention likely to have a long term, sustainable positive contribution to the relevant SDGs and targets (explicitly or implicitly)? Which were the gaps when enhancing the likelihood of outcome sustainability?
- Are the interventions contributing to expansion of the knowledge base and building evidence regarding the intervention outcomes and impacts at county and national levels?
- What assessment is made regarding the sustainability of the interventions outcomes and what steps were made to enhance the likelihood of outcome sustainability? Which were the gaps?
- To what extent have the interventions developed and implemented any exit strategy? If not, why?

4. Methodology

The clustered final independent evaluation will comply with evaluation norms and standards and follow ethical safeguards, all as specified in [the ILO evaluation policy and the following principles of the Policy guidelines for results-based evaluation, 4th edition \(2020\)](#). The ILO adheres to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. The evaluation is an independent evaluation, and the final methodology and evaluation questions will be determined by the consultant in consultation with the Evaluation Manager as part of the inception phase of the evaluation.

The evaluation will apply a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods to be defined and approved as part of the evaluation inception report, including triangulation to increase the validity and rigor of the evaluation findings, engaging with tripartite constituents, stakeholders, and partners of the intervention, as much as feasible, at all levels during the data collection and reporting phases.

In line with ILO's evaluation policy guidelines and related guidance notes³², the evaluation will pay specific attention to ILO's cross-cutting issues, notably the ILO's normative and tripartite mandate, environmental sustainability, and disability inclusion. Contribution of the ILO to the relevant targets set in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the global pandemic response will also be considered by the evaluation. The gender equality and non-discrimination (e.g., people with disabilities, youth, migrants, etc.) dimension will be a cross-cutting concern throughout the methodology, deliverables and final report of the evaluation. This implies involving both men and women, and other identified vulnerable groups, in the consultation, evaluation analysis and evaluation team as possible. Moreover, the evaluators should review data and information that is disaggregated by sex and assess the relevance and effectiveness of gender and disability inclusion related strategies and outcomes within the purview of ILO's work. Specific measures to reflect gender and inclusion concerns should be elaborated in the inception report, in line with the UN GEEW-SWAP guidance in this regard.

The evaluation consultant / team should develop the final evaluation methodology in consultation with the evaluation manager. The methods should be selected for their rigor and their ability to produce empirical evidence to meet the evaluation criteria, answer the evaluation questions and meet the objectives of the evaluation. The desk review at inception phase may suggest a number of preliminary findings that could be useful in reviewing or fine-tuning the evaluation questions. The desk review will include briefing interviews with the intervention teams and/or relevant Country Offices staff. The approval of the inception report by the evaluation manager is a condition to start the data collection.

The evaluation will involve field visits and face-to-face engagements with ILO Country Offices and intervention staff, tripartite constituents, stakeholders, and partners in RDC and Eswatini, as well as the ILO regional office for Africa Regional Programme Unit.

An indicative list of persons to be interviewed will be prepared by the interventions' officers/COs in consultation with the Evaluation Manager. The COs will provide logistical support in the organization of these interviews.

A stakeholders' workshop will be organized toward the end of the data collection phase in each country, with participation from key stakeholders, ILO staff and partners. This is an opportunity to present the preliminary findings and fill in any data gaps. The draft evaluation report will follow (see below deliverables for details). The draft will be subject to a methodological review by the evaluation manager, and upon the necessary adjustments, it will be circulated among the key stakeholders. Subsequently, the evaluation manager will consolidate any written the comments and provide to the evaluator - who will develop the final version of the report, addressing

³² [ILO EVAL, ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation: Principles, rationale, planning and managing for evaluations, 4th ed.](#)
[ILO EVAL, Guidance Note 3.2 Adapting evaluation methods to the ILO's normative and tripartite mandate](#)
[ILO EVAL, Guidance Note 3.1 Integrating gender equality in monitoring and evaluation](#)
[ILO EVAL, Protocol on collective evaluation evidence on ILOs COVID-19 response measures through intervention and programme evaluations](#)

the comments - or explain the reason for not addressing the comments, if that would be the case.

5. Main deliverables

The following products will have to be produced and delivered by the evaluation team:

- **Inception report** in English (incl. methodological note, refer to Checklist 4.8 “Writing the Inception Report”³³). Being a clustered evaluation, particular attention must be paid to validate common frameworks as much as feasible. The latter may include a common Theory of Change across interventions or components, a country framework, thematic framework, or common results framework at strategic and objectives level.
- **A stakeholder workshop** that will have to be facilitated in English or French depending on the country. A virtual or in-person workshop must be conducted with evaluation stakeholders of each country team to present initial findings collected during field work.
- **A first draft of the evaluation report** that will have to be written in English and French, answer the questions related to the evaluation criteria, including the recommendations, lessons learned, good practices. It will follow the structure presented in Checklist 4.2 “Preparing the Evaluation Report”³⁴. The particularity of clustered evaluations is that a set of strategic recommendations are likely to be for the thematic or geographic cluster while other more operational recommendations will focus on its individual interventions or components. Lessons learned and good practices should have a more strategic focus. The report will be sent to the evaluation manager (refer to “Checklist 4.2: Preparing the evaluation report” for guidance on the structure and content and “Checklist 4.9: Rating the quality of evaluation report”³⁵)

The draft and final report outline as follows:

1. Cover page with key intervention and evaluation data (using ILO EVAL template)
2. Executive Summary
3. Acronyms
4. Description of the interventions
5. Purpose, scope, and clients of the evaluation
6. Methodology and limitations
7. Clearly identified findings for each criterion (looking at the three interventions in an integrated manner)

³³ [wcms 746817.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

³⁴ [wcms 746808.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

³⁵ [wcms 746818.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

8. Conclusions
9. Recommendations
10. Lessons learned and good practices (briefly in the main report and a detailed in ILO EVAL template, annexed to the report) (both in English and French)

Annexes:

- TOR of the evaluation
 - Evaluation questions matrix
 - Data Table on Intervention Progress in achieving its targets by indicators with comments.
 - Evaluation schedule
 - List Documents reviewed.
 - List of people interviewed.
 - Lessons learned and good practices (using ILO-EVAL template can be found in the Checklist 4.2)
 - Any other relevant documents
- The **final evaluation report**, which must be written in English and French, must be about 30-40 pages maximum (excluding annexes and executive summary), follow the structure presented in Checklist 4.2 and include a cover page (refer to Checklist 4.3: Filling in the Evaluation Title Page³⁶). Appendices should include the questions matrix, the interview and focus groups guides, field work schedule, a list of interviewees, and a list of documents analysed. The quality of the report in English and in French will be assessed based on the ILO Checklist 4.9 (see above).
 - A **summary of the final evaluation report** (using ILO/EVAL template, refer to Checklist 4.4: Preparing the Evaluation Report Summary³⁷) will be sent, together with the final report, in English and in French to the evaluation manager based on the executive summary of the evaluation report. A PowerPoint presentation of the summary will also be required.

6. Management arrangements and work plan (including timeframe)

The organization and coordination of the evaluation mission will be provided by Mr Edgar AGUILAR PAUCAR (aguilarpaucar@ilo.org), the designated Evaluation Manager at ILO. The evaluation consultant / team will discuss with him all technical and methodological issues when needed. It will be able to coordinate with both Intervention Managers to provide the main documents and any information that they will need to carry out their mission. It will facilitate contacts with the different partners. Meetings will be organized on this occasion with the authorities, partners and beneficiaries concerned by the intervention. The evaluation consultant/team will

³⁶ [wcms 746810.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

³⁷ [wcms 746811.pdf \(ilo.org\)](#)

also receive technical, logistical, and administrative support from the intervention team.

The evaluation manager is responsible for completing the following specific tasks:

- Brief the evaluator on ILO evaluation policies and procedures.
- Initial coordination with the intervention team on the development of the data collection process and the preliminary results workshop.
- Ensure all deliverables meet ILO quality requirements.
- Circulate the first draft of the evaluation report to the key stakeholders requesting written comments within 10 working days.
- Consolidate the received written comments received into a master evaluation report to send the evaluation team.
- Ensure the final version of the evaluation report addresses the stakeholders' comments (or an explanation why any has not been addressed) and meets ILO quality requirements.

The evaluator or evaluation team is responsible for completing the following specific tasks.

- Responsible for conducting the evaluation.
- Coordinate with evaluation manager, intervention team and stakeholders to conduct the entire evaluation process.
- Proceed to a desk review of all relevant documents and conduct a field mission to meet main stakeholders.
- Elaborate the inception report (incl. methodological elaborations), the first version and final report in deadlines and in conformity with ILO and international standards.
- Conduct the field work and stakeholders' workshop at the end of the mission.
- Participate to debriefings with main stakeholders on the main results and recommendations of the evaluation.

The ILO Country Offices will provide logistical support to the evaluator and will assist in organizing the data collection (documents and interviews). The intervention will ensure that all relevant documentation is up to date and easily accessible by evaluator or evaluation team from the first day of the contract (desk review phase).

Finally, the Evaluation Office (EVAL) of the ILO will approve the final report.

The evaluation will be undertaken mostly between November 2022 and January 2023. A detailed timetable will be included in the inception report developed by the evaluator. All logistics costs will be covered by the intervention.

Task	Responsible	Tentative timeline	No of days of work
Development of ToRs (including circulation with stakeholders)	Evaluation manager (EM)	September -October2022	0
Selection of the evaluator/team (Call	EM	31 October – 18 November r 2022	0

for EoI and issue of contract)			
Inception phase: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Briefing with Evaluation Manger and interventions officers • development and submission of the Inception report with approval by the EM 	Evaluator	21-29 November 2022	7 days
Data collection and field work, including stakeholder workshops	Evaluator	December 2022 – Mid January 2023	20 days (10 per country)
First draft of the evaluation report in English and French reviewed by the EM	Evaluator and EM	End January 2023	8 days
Circulation of draft report to collect inputs and comments from evaluation stakeholders	EM	End January-Early February 2023 (two weeks)	0
Final report in English and French	Evaluator	February 2023	2 days
Approval of the evaluation report	EM and EVAL	February 2023	
Total number of days			37 days

7. Profile of the evaluation team

The evaluation will be conducted by **an evaluation team that can be a sole evaluator or an evaluation team leader and 1 or 2 national evaluators.**

Main qualifications of team leader

- Advanced university degree preferably in economics, business management or related qualifications,
- A minimum of 7 years of professional experience in evaluating international programmes and interventions, development initiatives, logical framework and theory of change-based and other strategic approaches, M&E methods and approaches, and information analysis and report writing,
- Understanding and experience of the development context in Africa, preferable in the sub-regions of the two countries of the intervention (RDC and Eswatini), with relevant technical work in social protection will be an asset
- Knowledge and experience of the UN System, ILO's roles and mandate and its tripartite structure, UN evaluation norms, its programming is desirable.
- Excellent communication and interview skills, and writing skills,
- Demonstrated ability to work in group and deliver quality results within strict deadlines,
- Excellent knowledge and excellent drafting skills in English and French

Main qualifications of national team members (RDC and Eswatini) - *Optional*

- Advanced university degree preferably in law, economics, business management or related qualifications,
- A minimum of 5 years of professional experience in evaluating and implementing social protection programmes, preferably supporting Governments, national agencies, or social partners
- Understanding and experience of the development context at country level (RDC or Eswatini), with relevant technical work in social protection
- Excellent communication and interview skills, and experience organizing field visits.
- Demonstrated ability to work in group and deliver quality results within strict deadlines,
- Excellent knowledge and excellent drafting skills in English or French
- Based in the selected country.

8. Legal and ethical matters

All data and information received from the ILO or other stakeholders for the purposes of this assignment shall be treated as confidential and shall be used only for the purpose of executing this mandate. All intellectual property rights arising from the execution of this mandate are attributed to the ILO. The contents of the written documents obtained and used in connection with this assignment may not be disclosed to third parties without the prior written consent of the ILO or the relevant stakeholders.

9. Evaluation Budget

Estimated resource requirements at this point will cover:

- **For the evaluation team:**
 - Fees for the consultancy for 37 working days for the team
 - DSA and flights as per ILO travel policy

- **For the ILO Office:**
 - Stakeholders' workshop
 - Logistic support for field visits
 - Any other miscellaneous costs

Annex I

LIST OF RELEVANT EVALUATION GUIDELINES and standard templates

1. ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation: Principles, rationale, planning and managing for evaluations:
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationpolicy/WCMS_168289/lang--en/index.htm
2. Code of conduct form (To be signed by the evaluator)
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206205/lang--en/index.htm
3. Checklist No. 3 Writing the inception report
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165972/lang--en/index.htm
4. Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm
5. Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm
6. Template for lessons learned and Emerging Good Practices
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206158/lang--en/index.htm
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206159/lang--en/index.htm
7. Guidance note 7 Stakeholders participation in the ILO evaluation
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165982/lang--en/index.htm
8. Guidance note 4 Integrating gender equality in M&E of interventions
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm
9. Template for evaluation title page
http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_166357/lang--en/index.htm
10. Template for evaluation summary:
<http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-summary-en.doc>

Annex 3: Documentation reviewed.

Eswatini United Nations Sustainable Development Framework 2021-2025

ILO, 2022: Terms of Reference. Independent cluster final evaluation of two ILO social protection interventions in Africa (Eswatini and Democratic Republic of Congo)

ILO, 2022 : **Coordination et dialogue social autour de la SST**

ILO, 2021: Africa Regional Social Protection Strategy, 2021 - 2025

ILO, 2021: Hand over note. Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all. 28 December 2021

ILO, 2021: Technical Cooperation Progress Report. Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all.

ILO, 2021: Minute sheet. **Request for Intervention Extension – Intervention SWZ/20/01/RBSA 107675 (501758) Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Scheme in Eswatini: towards comprehensive social protection for all**

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Annex 4: List of people interviewed.

Eswatini

	Sex	Name	Job title	Organization
1.	Mr	Makhosini Mndawe	Director	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
2.	Mr	Magwabane Mdlulu	Primary Secretary	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
3.	Ms	Jabulile Dlamini	Officer	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
4.	Mr	Kingdom Mamba	Deputy Commissioner of Labour	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
5.	Ms	Talatona Sacolo	Officer	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
6.	Ms	Tsimlani Dlamini	Officer	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
7.	Mr	Godfrey Mkhwnazi	Officer	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
8.	Ms	Siphelele Mahldela	Officer	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
9.	Ms	Dudu Ndzinisa	Intervention Coordinator	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
10.	Ms	Nunklankla Shongwe	Officer	Ministry of Economic Planning
11.	Ms	Sebontile Hlophe-Dlamini	Officer	Ministry of Economic Planning
12.	Mr	Ncamiso T. Ntshalintshali	Chief Executive Officer	Financial Services Regulatory Authority
13.	Ms	Silindile Matsebula	Manager: Licensing & Inspections	Financial Services Regulatory Authority
14.	Mr	Musa Dlamini	Senior Financial Analyst	Financial Services Regulatory Authority
15.	Mr	Xolani Dlamini	Finance Officer	Ministry of Finance
16.	Ms	Bungumusa Sikhondele	Member	Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions
17.	Ms	Makhosonkte Dlamini	Member	Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions
18.	Mr	Phendulile Zikialala	Member	Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions
19.	Mr	Sabglo Dlamini	Member	Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions
20.	Mr	Mamposa Gawedze	Member	Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions
21.	Ms	Sandile Gumedze	Member	Business Eswatini
22.	Mr	Lungile Motsa	Member	Business Eswatini
23.	Mr	Thoki Vilokati	Officer	MOLSS
24.	Mr	Miccah Mkabinde	General Manager	ENPF
25.	Ms	Sindile Manyo	Manager	ENPF

26	Ms	Khabonina Tsabedke	Member	FESBC
27	Ms	Tania Tyfe	Member	FESBC
28.	Mr	Christiam Siguola	Member	FESBC
29.	Mr	Joni Musabayana	Director	ILO Pretoria Office
30.	Mr	Andrew Allieu	Senior Social Protection Specialist	ILO Pretoria DWT
31	Ms	Sindile Moitse	Programme Officer	ILO Pretoria Programming Unit

DRC

	Sex	Name	Job title	Organization
1.	Ms	Josée Feza Nyamumba	General Secretary	Social Security DRC
2.	Mr	Luyalu Léon	National consultant	Independent
3.	Mr	Marc Atibu Saleh Mwekee	National consultant	Independent
4.	Mr	Benjamin Kwengani Mavard	Deputy National Director	Ministry of Health
5.	Mr	Mukamba Degaul	National consultant	Independent
6.	Ms	Nteba Soumano	Director	ILO Kinshasa Office
7.	Ms	Fatime C. N'diaye	Gender specialist	ILO Dakar DWT
8.	Mr	Joseph Momo	Programme analyst	ILO Regional Office for Africa, Abijan
9.	Ms	Joana Borges	Social Protection Specialist	Former ILO Yaoundé DWT
10.	Mr	Gomez Ntoya Makela	Intervention Officer	ILO Kinshasa Office

Annex 5: Overview: Evaluation object and key evaluation results

Final cluster evaluation: "Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all" and "Support for DRC's tripartite constituents in combating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic"

Evaluation process Project period: Eswatini 08/2020 – 10/2021, extended to 12/2021, budget US\$ 430,000.
DRC: 09/2020 – 11/2021, extended to 07/2022, budget US\$ 460,000.

<p>42 stakeholders consulted</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Eswatini: 31 stakeholders DRC: 11 stakeholders</p>	<p>Evaluation period: March to October 2023</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Virtual briefing meetings, telephone interviews with stakeholders and field visits to Eswatini</p>	<p>Intended evaluation users</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">ILO's constituents, and national and international partners</p>	<p>Evaluation purpose</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact orientation and cross cutting topics of gender and non-discrimination</p>
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Evaluation results

<p>Relevance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In both countries, the interventions were highly relevant to government objectives and beneficiary needs. Contribution to P&B 2020-2021 outputs 8.1 (Eswatini, DRC), 8.2, and 7.2 (DRC) Links to other activities in social protection and COVID-19 measures appeared in both countries. Catalytic role of both interventions 	<p>Efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both interventions leveraged significant resources during implementation or for a follow-up intervention. Intervention management structures showed differences, resulting in varying efficiencies for intervention implementation. Eswatini: intervention coordinator seconded from the national main counterpart, MOLSS DRC: No intervention coordinator recruited
<p>Effectiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The results achievement was uneven across the two interventions The more complex intervention in DRC shows results in the OSH component, less under social protection components The intervention in Eswatini showed good delivery across its two components. 	<p>Coherence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The validity of the design was uneven, with unrealistic intervention duration for both interventions, while sustainability was strategically addressed. Tripartite structures were overall coherently used for intervention design and implementation.

Resources leveraged

<p>Eswatini</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> About US\$ 296,000 in government funding for establishing the UBS Matching ratio of 1: 0,69 for each US\$ the ILO invested in the intervention. 	<p>DRC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> US\$ 945,000 new donor funding for advancing the social protection agenda in the country through a Belgium-funded intervention.
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Sustainability

- The likelihood of sustainability of intervention results and related impacts is too early to assess.
- However, the ILO still has a role to play in facilitating the extent of the intervention's systemic change in Eswatini.
- Funding from the Belgium Development Cooperation is expected to maintain and expand intervention results in DRC.

Factors influencing results

<p style="text-align: center; font-size: x-small;">Internal</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p style="text-align: center;">✓ Secondment of intervention coordinator from main counterpart in Eswatini</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p style="text-align: center;">✗ Lack of an intervention manager on the ground in DRC</p> </div> </div>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: x-small;">External</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p style="text-align: center;">✓ Governments' strong commitment - Instrumental use of Tripartite committees</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p style="text-align: center;">✗ Overlapping mandates, turf battle,s and vested interests of existing institutions</p> </div> </div>
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Unintended results: ILO had expanded support to maternity and sickness benefits, now being part of the UBS, as practised in South Africa.

Recommendations

<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">1</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">ILO: RBSA interventions targeting policy change should have a duration of at least 24 months, and RBSA guidelines should be amended accordingly.</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">2</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">ILO: All RBSA-funded intervention proposals should contain a budget line for a intervention coordinator to ensure that a dedicated person undertakes intervention coordination. Secondments from government counterparts should be considered as one favoured coordination mechanism.</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">3</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">ILO: Intervention coordination using consultants should be discouraged, given the time required for recruitment and the need for a dedicated intervention coordinator.</p>
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">4</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">ILO: Facilitate the finalization of discussions about the Attorney General's Office on the UBS bill, for example, through the leadership of the ILO Country Director Eswatini with support from the Pretoria DWT Specialists as required.</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">5</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Country Director DRC: Assess to what extent the Belgium-funded social protection intervention can build on and incorporate the work on social protection results 2 and 3 of the RBSA intervention.</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">6</p> <p style="font-size: x-small;">Country Director Eswatini: It is recommended for the country director to keep engaging with the Labour Advisory Board and the TWG for light-touch monitoring and to assess any technical support needs.</p>

Source: A. Engelhardt, 2023: Final cluster evaluation
Design: A. Engelhardt, 10/2023


Annex 6: Evaluation matrix

	Evaluation questions/issues	Proposed evaluation tools	Data sources
1. Relevance and strategic fit: Were the Interventions doing the right thing?	1.1 Are the interventions coherent with the Governments objectives, National Development Frameworks, County Development Frameworks, beneficiaries' needs, and do they support the outcomes outlined in ILO's P&B 2020-2021, CPOs as well as the UNSDCF and SDGs?	Document review Interviews with ILO intervention staff (EQ 1.2 to 1.3)	Interventions documentation; interventions stakeholders.
	1.2 What links have been established so far with other activities of the ILO, UN or other cooperating partners operating in the country in the areas of social protection (universal health coverage, unemployment benefits) and COVID-19 response and recovery measures at country level?		
	1.3 To what extent have the interventions played a catalytic role for ILO work in the selected countries through its comparative advantages (including tripartism, social dialogue, international labour standards)?		
2. Coherence and validity of interventions' designs: is the theory of change holding?	2.1 Are the interventions realistic (in terms of expected outputs, outcome, and impact) given the time and resources available and the social, political, etc. environment, including performance and its M&E system, knowledge sharing and communication strategy, and resource mobilization?	Document review Interviews with ILO intervention staff and implementation partners (EQ 2.4)	Interventions documentation; interventions stakeholders.
	2.2 To what extent have the interventions integrated the ILO tripartite and normative mandate, gender equality and non-discrimination, just transition to environmental sustainability, COVID-19 response measures as cross-cutting themes in the design?		
	2.3 Are the interventions' Theories of Change (ToC), if existent, comprehensive, integrating external factors, and are they based on a systemic analysis?		
	2.4 To what extent were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design of the interventions, including working through social dialogue?		
	2.5 Did the intervention designs include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?		

3. Interventions results and effectiveness: were interventions' results achieved, and how?	3.1 To what extent have both interventions achieved their expected results, in line with ILO's cross-cutting issues?	Document review Interviews with ILO intervention staff, implementation partners and beneficiaries (EQ 3.1 to 3.5)	Interventions documentation; interventions stakeholders.
	3.2 Which have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards intervention's success in attaining its targets and implementing ILO Abidjan Declaration and other COVID-19 response and recovery measures?		
	3.3 Have unintended results of the intervention been identified?		
	3.4 To what extent have the interventions management and governance structure put in place worked strategically with tripartite constituents, stakeholders and partners in the intervention, and ILO - to achieve intervention goals and objectives?		
	3.5 What is the assessment regarding how the interventions management have managed the contextual and institutional risks and assumptions (external factors to the intervention)?		
4. Efficiency: Were resources used appropriately to achieve intervention results?	4.1 Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the intervention outputs and specially outcomes? If not, why and which measures were taken to work towards achievement of intervention outcomes and impact?	Document review Interventions budget Interviews with ILO intervention staff	Interventions documentation; interventions stakeholders.
	4.2 To what extent did the interventions leverage resource to go beyond interventions' targets and promote gender equality and non-discrimination?		
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	5.1 To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate interventions' beneficiaries?	Document review Interviews with ILO staff, implementation partners and beneficiaries	Interventions documentation; interventions stakeholders;
	5.2 To what extent are planned results of the interventions likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?		
	5.3 What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?		
	5.4 Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO interventions support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic.		

Annex 7: Lessons learned.



Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all

Project DC/SYMBOL:

SWZ/20/01/RBS

Name of Evaluator:

Achim Engelhardt

Date: 19 October 2023

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LESSON LEARNED ELEMENT	TEXT
Brief description of lessons learned (link to specific action or task)	While the secondment of a very motivated MOLSS staff as ILO intervention coordinator clearly contributed to the success of the intervention, the ILO committed the following error towards the imminent end of the secondment . i) The intervention coordinator was not informed that no more access to intervention data would be available once the secondment ends. This oversight resulted in an avoidable loss of intervention-related documentation. The ILO should have informed the intervention coordinator accordingly to trigger a process of transferring all intervention products such as reports, studies and analyses to the MOLSS information technology system.
Context and any related preconditions	Valuable institutional memory was lost for the main intervention counterpart MOLSS due to a lack of awareness of ILO rules and regulations.
Targeted users /Beneficiaries	Project Managers seconded from an ILO counterpart.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	As the project manager was not ILO staff, she was unaware of ILO rules and regulations and should have been informed by the ILO about the due termination of access to all project related files. As the ILO omitted this information, MOLSS lost access to valuable project deliverables.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	The secondment from the main intervention counterpart contributed to a strong ownership of the RBSA intervention and its results in MOLSS.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The project manager, not being ILO staff, should have been informed by the ILO about the due termination of access to all project related files at the finalization of the intervention. As the ILO omitted this information, MOLSS lost access to valuable project deliverables.



Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all

Project DC/SYMBOL:

SWZ/20/01/RBS

Name of Evaluator:


Achim Engelhardt

Date: 19 October 2023

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LESSON LEARNED ELEMENT	TEXT
Brief description of lessons learned (link to specific action or task)	While the secondment of a very motivated MOLSS staff as ILO intervention coordinator clearly contributed to the success of the intervention, the ILO committed the following error towards the imminent end of the secondment. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i) According to ILO rules and regulations, the intervention laptop had to be returned to the ILO after the end of the intervention. In the context of a resource-scarce operation environment, the previously seconded intervention coordinator reincorporated into the ministry, lacking essential work equipment. This also limited her participation in online meetings after the intervention, where she had to use her personal mobile phone, as witnessed during the evaluation.
Context and any related preconditions	The RBSA provided essential work equipment to the project manager, which the main counterpart (MOLSS) could not replace due to funding issues once the secondment was finalized.
Targeted users /Beneficiaries	Project Managers seconded from an ILO counterpart.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	In the context of a resource-scarce operation environment, a previously seconded intervention coordinator reincorporated into the ministry, remained without a computer, lacking essential work equipment.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	The secondment from the main intervention counterpart contributed to a strong ownership of the RBSA intervention and its results in MOLSS.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	In the context of secondments of project managers from a resource-scarce operation environment, the ILO could consider donating the project computer after the finalization of the project to the employer of the seconded staff to ensure the seamless continuation of work in the ministry. In the case of Eswatini, this would have been MOLSS.

Annex 8: Good practices



Establishment of Unemployment Benefit Fund in Eswatini: Towards Comprehensive Social Protection for all

Project DC/SYMBOL:

SWZ/20/01/RBS

Name of Evaluator:

Achim Engelhardt

Date: 19 October 2023

The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

GOOD PRACTICE ELEMENT	TEXT
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	The intervention in Eswatini used the existing Labour Advisor Committee as an entry point to set up a Technical Working Group (TWG) comprised of tripartite+ constituents. This approach saved time and resources, allowing existing structures to prove their utility. The ongoing activities of the TWG on the Universal Benefits Scheme (UBS) matters, even after the end of the intervention, show the sustainability of such an approach.
Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	This good practice is applicable in countries with existing Labour Advisor Committee or similar institutionalized tripartite structures.
Establish a clear cause- effect relationship	Using an existing tripartite structure helped the intervention to “hit the ground running”. The project manager saved valuable time for establishing the TWG.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	The ongoing activities of the TWG on the UBS matters, even after the end of the intervention, show the sustainability of such an approach and enhance the likelihood of achieving the project goals in establishing the UBS.
Potential for replication and by whom	This good practice is applicable in countries with existing Labour Advisor Committee or similar institutionalized tripartite structures.
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO’s Strategic Programme Framework)	(P&B) 2020-2021, Output 8.1: Increased capacity of member States to develop new or reformed sustainable national social protection strategies, policies, or legal frameworks to extend coverage and enhance benefit adequacy. CPO SWZ 151 at the Country Programme Outcome level: More people have access to better managed and more equitable social security benefits. CPO RDC 201: Strengthened institutional and legislative frameworks for developing a national social protection floor.
Other documents or relevant comments	N/A