



ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title: Phase II Ending Worst Forms of Child Labour (WFCL) amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities**
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- **Name of consultant(s):** **Dr. Laurie Zivetz; Nour Nasr**
- **ILO Administrative Office:** **Regional Office for the Arab States(ROAS)**
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- **Evaluation Manager:** **Nathalie Bavitch**
- **Key Words:** **Child labor, refugees, education and training, Arab countries**

This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office

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Acronyms

CL	Child Labor
CLMRS	Child labor monitoring and reporting system
DAA	Dar Al Amal
FU	Farmers Union
GoL	Government of Lebanon
GS	General Security
HoH	Home of Hope
ILO	International Labor Organization
LI	Labor Inspector
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoL	Ministry of Labor
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-government organization
SDC	Social Development Center
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPCR	Progress Report
USDOL	United States Department of Labor
WFCL	Worst Forms of Child Labor

Executive Summary

Quick Facts

Countries: Lebanon
Final Evaluation: February-April, 2019
Evaluation Mode: Independent
Administrative Office: Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
Technical Office: ROAS
Evaluation Manager: Nathalie Bavitch
Evaluation Consultant(s): Laurie Zivetz, Nour Nasr
Project Code: LBN/17/02/NOR
Donor(s) & Budget: Norway (US \$1,005,136)
Keywords: child labor, refugees, education and training, Arab countries

Background & Context

Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure

Phases I and II of the Norway-funded project were designed to combat growing rates of the worst forms of child labor in Lebanon. The situation has been compounded by the influx of over a million Syrian refugees in a short period of time.

This final evaluation covered Phase II (May, 2018-March, 2019). Design documents include the following objectives (planned objectives that were removed during the project are noted as Removed).

Outcome 1: Policy and legislative amendments and sensitization of relevant institutions.

Output 1.1: *Capacities of members of Farmers Union, Agricultural Unions and Employers Associations strengthened to implement GS memo to prohibit WFCL in agriculture under 16 yrs.*

Outcome 2: Capacity Building

Output 2.1 *Labour Inspectorate at MOL strengthened to carry out inspection visits to selected industrial areas.*

Output 2.2: *Capacities of Internal Security Forces from Beirut, Tripoli, and Saida strengthened to attend to working street children effectively based on UNCRC principles. [REMOVED]*

Outcome 3 Direct Support

Output 3.1 *Children involved or at risk of being involved in the WFCL, provided with initial integrated support against child labour through community centres in Nabatieh, Ouzai, Kahale, Beqaa and Tripoli.*

Output 3.2: *Tripoli Community Centre against Child Labour Operative. [REMOVED]*

Output 3.3: *Vulnerable households have access to livelihood opportunities through Ouzai, Nabatieh, and Tripoli community centres.*

Output 3.4: *Two CLMS committees established and operational in Nabatieh and North Lebanon areas to coordinate services in vicinities of centres.*

Output 3.5 : *National Choir against child labour established*

The project was implemented in a complex and unpredictable political environment. A hiatus in government functioning (May, 2018-January, 2019) and changes in ministerial appointments (including at the Ministry of Labor) are partially responsible for delays in a number of the anticipated activities during the period of implementation. An investigation into irregularities in the early months of Phase II associated with work of an external contractor under Phase I also contributed to a lull in project activities.

Present Situation of the Project

The project was completed on March 31, 2019 on schedule (this including a 6 month no cost extension).

Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

Per the initial ToR, the final evaluation examined the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, and potential impact of the project and offered recommendations for future similar projects. The report reflects on strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned.

The primary clients of this evaluation are the ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Lebanon, and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation. Implementing partners also attended debriefs and were interested in learning from the evaluation.

Methodology of evaluation

The evaluation relied on two main sources of information: project documents and interviews with key informants. Documentation on the project was shared in waves, and key data related to a number of logframe targets was obtained during the evaluation directly from implementing partners.

Interviews were carried out with key project team members, the Ministry of Labor, General Security Department, NGO partners and the Farmers Union, as well as advisers from the ILO's CLEAR project who had provided input into the project.

A number of key informants had left the project or the country and not all were available to speak with the evaluators. The ILO Project Officer who managed both

Phases I and II retired during the evaluation fieldwork, though she was available for multiple interviews. The external technical consultant had resigned from the project in month 6 of Phase II, and was interviewed on the last day of the fieldwork via Skype.

Separate validation meetings were held with the ROAS Deputy Regional Director, and with implementing NGO partners and the Project Officer from the Norwegian Embassy. The in-coming ROAS Chief of Programming and ROAS M&E Officer attended both meetings. Notably, there was no government representative at the validation meeting.

The evaluation team was comprised of an international and Lebanese evaluator.

Main Findings & Conclusions

Relevance: The need in Lebanon for this type of programming is indisputable, and builds on the ILOs successful work with the Government of Lebanon in drafting a National Plan of Action to combat the worst forms of child labor (WFCL). Direct services to children and families at risk is an urgent need. In its design, the proposal reflects overconfidence in government capacity and commitment, suggesting some of the approaches required further consideration of the context.

Effectiveness: In its execution, the project leaned towards an emphasis on targets at the expense of learning. Weak feedback loops prevented learning and agility, and the project fell back on traditional and sometimes top down approaches to effect systems change. Resources for launching a child labor (CL) monitoring and reporting system were invested in localized efforts that were not carried forward and did not contribute to a national monitoring and reporting system. Opportunities to boost capacity, catalyze

strategic action and improve collaboration with government and non-government bodies was called for but implemented in ad hoc ways. A series of awareness raising workshops for members of the Farmers Union and other multi-stakeholder events were held but follow up is not event. Labor Inspector training--important for capacitating expertise for identification and monitoring of WFCL within the government—experienced multiple delays and was carried out only in the last two weeks of the project.

Downstream activities got good traction in the last five months of the project and exceeded targets for children and families reached with education, training and social support services. While participating NGOs were seen to be effective in providing services to individual children and families at risk, the strategy was short lived, and did little to promote broader learning or inform national policy or action.

The ILO missed an opportunity to broker action on a national action plan which it had helped to shape.

Efficiency: Insufficient work planning and prioritization, lack of documentation, and some concerning recruitment procedures characterized project management. The project team invested a lot of time in the first six months of the project planning for the children’s choir—which benefited fewer than 300 at risk children--while a number of other planned activities were delayed.

The project suffered from a lack of shared vision internally throughout Phase II. This served as an impediment to implementation and advancing partnership with government and private sector partnerships.

Sustainability: Collaboration with government ministries was challenging in the complex political environment in Lebanon during the life of the project. Nonetheless, partnerships with key government and private sector agencies seem diminished at the end of the project, and engagement with other key agencies—such as Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education—still need attention.

The core of the project consisted of trainings and workshops that showed little evidence of advancing sustainable coordination, embedding referral networks, public awareness or forward action. Sustainable results from investments in the children’s choir, Farmers’ Union training, and localized CLMS development appear to have been short lived.

At the end of the project, continuity of vital education and social support services to those children and families who were reached, now defaults to the fundraising initiative of the implementing NGOs.

Recommendations

National policy and sensitization

1. The ILO to leverage its position and mandate to re-energize its partnership with the MoL and other government partners on realizing the goals of the NAP. With a new Minister in place, opportunities to revisit the NAP and strengthen linkages with other relevant ministries and civil society to agree a realistic roadmap for achieving the goals laid out in the National Action Plan to address the WFCL should be a priority.

Priority: high

Resource implications: low to convene, high to implement

2. As a multi-lateral agency with expertise in national-level CL monitoring systems, the ILO to provide technical support to the development of a national CLMRS. based at the MoL.

Priority: Medium

Resource implications: medium

3. The ILO and GoL to promote public awareness of the risks and prevalence of the WFCL through mass and social media and reinvigoration of the CL hotline.

Priority: Low

Resource implications: medium

Capacity building

4. The MoL to continue to recruit and train Labor Inspectors and other law enforcement agents on WFCL, linking them into the CLMRS. Technical and training support from the ILO should be offered.

Priority: medium

Resource implications: low to medium

Direct service delivery

5. The ILO to identify and pilot promising best practices to rehabilitate and protect children withdrawn from WFCL, prevention for children at risk of the WFCL, and vocational training for families with children who have been

withdrawn or at risk of being withdrawn from WFCL.

Priority: medium

Resource implications: medium to high

6. The ILO to continue to fundraise for the issue of child labor, particularly in support of Recommendation 1, matchmaking funders interested in CL and good implementing partners.

Priority: medium

Cost: low

7. In future projects, the ILO to include work planning and check ins with partners as routine elements of the project cycle. Monitoring data should be gathered and shared back to make decision making more robust.

Priority: high

Cost: low

8. In future projects the ILO to clarify roles and responsibilities of project staff and consultants in contractual and planning documents, ideally before projects launch and include milestone check in's by Senior Management with project teams to ensure harmonious team functioning and adherence to project commitments and ILO regulations.

Priority: High

Cost: Minimal

I. Background and Project Description

Lebanon is suffering a humanitarian crisis. Some 1.5 million Lebanese are currently living below the poverty line, a third of whom are children. There are 1.5 million displaced Syrians (including Palestinian Syrians) in the country, with a poverty rate of 76% (LCRP, 2018). Half of all refugees are children. The large influx of Syrian refugees has put a strain on already vulnerable national infrastructure and services, trickling down to the household level (UNHCR, 2014). Low-income families, both Lebanese and Syrian, are at an elevated risk of poverty due to increased labor competition (World Bank, 2013). While the labor market was already characterized by high rates of youth and women unemployment (World Bank, 2016), the entry of Syrian refugees contributed to more challenging market conditions, increasing competition for lower paying jobs, and contributing to socio-economic vulnerability for host and displaced communities alike. As a result, a surge in illegal and exploitative and work conditions is notable, with a particular rise of child labor in the country (LCRP, 2018).

The poverty and extreme poverty levels of Syrian refugees in the country has risen sharply in the last four years. The situation has contributed to a significant uptick in child labor. Amongst refugee populations, disruptions in family structure due to war and displacement have given rise to more women as heads of households, and in turn, more children working to support their families (UNHCR, 2014). Some 73% of Syrian refugees under the age of 18 in Lebanon do not have access to education (ILO, 2015). Low levels of education have pushed children into menial income earning activities (World Bank, 2016).

The number of Lebanese working children has tripled from 2009 to 2016, with a percentage increase from 1.9% to 6% (UNICEF, 2016). Table 1 provides a snapshot of the situation of child labor amongst key strata of the populations in 2017.

Table 1. Percentage of children 17-5 engaged in child labor, 2017

Lebanese	6%
Displaced Syrians	7%
Palestinian Refugees from Syria	4%
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon	5%

Data presented in the UN's Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

While Syrians have traditionally been an important source of migrant labor in the agriculture sector in Lebanon, the farming sector today has become a major employer of child labor. In an FAO study in 2016, 26% of farmers reported employing children under the age of 18, almost all of them Syrian. Children are also employed (or self-employed) in the informal sector, such as street vending, shoe shining, portering or car windshield cleaning (ILO, UNICEF, SCI, & MOL, 2015), or in small shops and businesses, at half the minimum wage or less (UNFPA, 2014). Typically, these types of labor do not include protection from exploitation, harassment, or hazards (UNHCR, 2014).

Lebanon is a signatory to a number of international conventions on child rights and child labor. As noted in the UN's Crisis Response Strategy (2017-2020), Lebanon *has shown exceptional commitment and solidarity to the people displaced by the war in Syria*. These factors predispose

the Government of Lebanon to take action on the issue of child labor. With support from the ILO, a National Action Plan on the elimination of child labor, was promulgated in 2013 by the President of Lebanon. A number of civil society actors as well as other donors are also active in this space. The enabling environment and the urgent need precipitated by the Syrian crisis made the rationale for a project devoted to addressing the worst forms of child labor of high priority.

The International Labor Organization is the pre-eminent multi-lateral agency devoted to issues of worker rights and decent employment globally. The ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) supports the capacity of UN member states to implement ILO Conventions No. 138 on Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (WFCL). One of the pillars of the ILO's Decent Work Country Program for Lebanon 2017-2020 is *the creation of an enabling environment for the elimination of child labour in cooperation with social partners* (Priority 1. Outcome 2 of 3).

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported two phases of programming (LBN/17/02/NOR) to enable ILO Lebanon to contribute to the realization of the National Action Plan. The first phase of the project covered the period September, 2016 - August, 2017 with a budget of \$715,732.60. The second phase continued the activities launched in the first phase and began implementation in October, 2017. It will end in March, 2019. The budget for the second phase was \$1,005,136. This evaluation focuses on the second phase (Phase II).

The Project. Per the initial submission to the Norwegian MFA, the goal of the project was conceived as *The Elimination of the Worst Forms of child Labour amongst Syrian Refugees and Host Lebanese Communities*. Original documents described the project as aiming to...*tackle the WFCL with focus on agriculture and street based work, including prevention, withdrawal and programmes for children involved in WFCL, through a multi-sectoral approach involving policy makers, communities, children and families.*

Measurable outcomes and outputs included in the initial proposal are presented below. Two outputs (2.2 and 3.2) were removed in September, 2018 when a no-cost extension was requested, adding six months to the original 12 month project for Phase II.

Outcome 1: Policy and legislative amendments and sensitization of relevant institutions.

Output 1.1: Capacities of members of Farmers' Union (FU), Agricultural Unions and Employers Associations strengthened to implement GS memo to prohibit WFCL in agriculture under 16 yrs.

Outcome 2: Capacity Building

Output 2.1 Labour Inspectorate at MOL strengthened to carry out inspection visits to selected industrial areas

Output 2.2: Internal Security Forces from Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, capacities, strengthened to attend to working street children effectively based on UNCRC principles (Removed)

Outcome 3 Direct Support:

Output 3.1 Children involved or at risk of being involved in the WFCL, provided with initial integrated support against child labour through community centres in Nabatieh, Ouzai, Kahale, Beqaa and Tripoli.

Output 3.2: Tripoli Community Centre against Child Labour Operative (Removed)


Output 3.3: Vulnerable households have access to livelihood opportunities through Ouzai, Nabatieh, and Tripoli community centres

Output 3.4: Two CLMS committees established and operational in Nabatieh and North Lebanon areas to coordinate services in vicinities of centres

Output 3.5 : National Choir against child labour established

As part of the inception work, the evaluators prepared a **Theory of Change** graphic to provide a visual framework for understanding the interconnected elements of the project design.

Figure 1. Theory of Change



The validity of this ToC to programming in Lebanon is considered in section IV.1 of this report.

The project was based in the ILO's Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS). It was largely designed and managed by a technical consultant who had also managed Phase I and continues to consult for the ILO. This consultant¹ resigned six months into Phase II (March, 2018), and the ILO's Project Officer managed the project for the duration. Four local NGO partners were engaged in two stages in the direct delivery of services to children and families. They include BEYOND, Home of Hope in the first six months, and Dar Al Amal and Borderless in the last five months of the project. The main government partner was the Child Labor Unit at the Ministry of Labor. Links with the Ministry of Social Affairs (through DAA) and the Ministry of Interior (General Security (Immigration)) also played a role. Collaboration with the FU was also important in the early part of Phase II.

¹ The evaluation team interviewed the consultant by Skype on the last day of the fieldwork based on a suggestion from ROAS Deputy Regional Director. Before that, the team was told this interview was not advisable.

There were a number of other projects in Lebanon contributing to the achievement of these outcomes including:

1. *Tackling child labour among Syrian refugees and their host communities in Jordan and Lebanon* (RAB/15/01/DAN), that ended December, 2017
2. Country level engagement and assistance to reduce child labor (CLEAR) project, under by the US Department of Labor, which also finished before the end of Phase II.

A regional cluster evaluation of ILO projects related to child labor--including all of these project--was undertaken in June, 2018 and has helped to inform the findings of this evaluation.

II. Evaluation background

The purpose, scope and intended audience for this evaluation are clearly presented in the evaluation Terms of Reference, included in Annex 1. **Purposes** of this final evaluation include to:

1. *Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;*
2. *Determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;*
3. *Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements and the possible avenues/intended objectives and results of a second phase of the project*
4. *Document lessons learned, success stories, and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained.*

The ToR includes a number of specific foci which were to be investigated in this evaluation. They include:

1. **Changes in context and review of assumptions (relevance):** *Is the project's design adequate to address the problem(s) at hand? What internal and external factors have influenced the targeted groups and [implementing partners] to meet projected outcomes? Were the project objectives and design relevant given the political, economic and financial context? The consultants should present a brief overview of the policy environment and the economic and business conditions.*
2. **Results in terms of outputs achieved (effectiveness):** *Did the programme reach the expected number of targeted groups? Are the beneficiaries satisfied with the quality and delivery of services? If not, in what way did the services not meet with expectations and why? What concrete improvements and changes have taken place as a direct result of the program?*
3. **Assessment of outcome/ impact (effectiveness):** *How has the project contributed towards project's goal? To what extent has the project contributed the capacity of the constituents? How could the project impact have been improved?*
4. **Achievement of projected performance indicators and targets (efficiency):** *What has been the project performance with respect to indicators and agreed responsibilities with respect to program implementation? Cost, time and management staff?*
5. **Sustainability:** *The report should assess the level of the project's sustainability. Will the project's effects remain over time? Will the project's activities/services continue to be provided after the funds have completely been expended?*
6. **Lessons learned:** *The consultant should provide information on the economic/political/financial conditions that should exist, qualifications of the implementation*

partners, required stakeholder participation, and other factors that should be in place to inform the design of future operations. What are the derived lessons learned from the project's second phase implementation?

The **Scope** of the evaluation is framed along the DAC evaluation criteria and include a consideration of development effectiveness, resource efficiencies, impact (including intended and unintended outcomes), relevance, impact of training, sustainability, partnerships and lessons learned/good practices. Gender is highlighted as an important cross cutting issue.

The primary **audience** for this evaluation are the ILO office in Lebanon, ILO Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS) and a number of constituents in Lebanon—government partners, and particularly the Ministry of Labor, implementing NGOs, and the funder, the Norwegian Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Assistance (MFA). With the exception of government partners, all of these stakeholders attended a debrief meeting at the end of the fieldwork for this evaluation (March 6, 2019). Secondary users are other project stakeholders, other government and NGO agencies concerned with child labor, and others within the ILO who may benefit from what is learned in the evaluation.

The evaluation was conducted between January-April, 2019 with fieldwork taking place between February 25-March 6, 2019.

III. Evaluation Methodology and Evaluation Questions

The evaluation relied on two main **sources of information**: project documents and interviews with key informants. This section outlines the methodology including limitations faced.

Documentation about the project turned out to be less than comprehensive and provided sporadically. The initial set of documents that were shared included largely generic strategy materials. Additional project-specific materials (the proposal, logframe revisions, and budget revision documents) were shared only after an interview with the Project Officer (February 19, 2019), just days before the fieldwork began. These included the only progress report for the project, covering the period October, 2017-March, 2018 and a cluster evaluation of ILO projects in the region addressing child labor which had been conducted in the April/May, 2018 period. Minutes and reports of key events were shared after the fieldwork, and only at the evaluators' request². Many lacked information on participants and outcomes. No events included participant feedback. Documentation related to the NGO partnerships forged at the end of the project were forthcoming only when the team was in the field. These documents and one midterm report are comparatively detailed and informative. Reports on one of the key series of workshops were shared only after the fieldwork was completed. A final budget was also shared at that point, on request.

As noted above, at the end of the 18-month project, a report on the first 6 months was available at the time of the evaluation. Key output statistics were lacking, even for many of the log frame indicators. Many of the indicators reported on in Section IV were gathered in the course of the evaluation based on information provided by partners. Inconsistencies exist, for instance in terms of the number of participants at meetings, the number of children who were included in the choir, and even the number of Labor Inspectors working in the Ministry of Labor. Poor knowledge

² As noted elsewhere, the Project Officer 's retirement coincided with this evaluation so some of these delays have been attributed to the many close out activities she was juggling. Nonetheless, it is concerning that documentation was not readily available and regularly updated.

management in this project affected both the achievements of individual strategies and good management and learning. A focus on strengthening M&E is a major finding of this evaluation and was also a recommendation of the cluster evaluation.

The TPCR (Oct, 2017-march, 2018) mentions a study on child labor in the Arab countries supported by the FAO. It is unclear whether this report was available before or during the life of Phase II, and if it was, whether it informed design decisions is unknown.

The **evaluation was carried out by a team** comprised of an international and Lebanese evaluator. The evaluation adopted a qualitative approach to primary data gathering. Report review and a briefing with the ILO Project Officer informed the preparation of an Inception Report. This included suggestions for stakeholders to be interviewed, a proposed timeline, and question protocols. The fieldwork was undertaken in the period February 25-March 6, 2019.

Logistics support was provided by the ILO project team. In addition to national-level interviews, focus groups and interviews with implementing partners and beneficiaries were carried out at project activity sites in Akkar, Tripoli and a number of suburbs of Beirut.

Stakeholders interviewed in the course of the evaluation include:

1. ILO ROAS Project Officer
2. Regional M&E Officer, ILO
3. Technical consultant project manager, ILO*
4. ILO HQ Geneva (CLEAR project)*
5. Norwegian Embassy (International Development Officer)
6. Ministry of Labor (CL Department)
7. Cluster evaluator, former ILO consultant*
8. Dar Al Amal (staff, heads of SDCs, children, parents, teachers in Tripoli, Akkar, Beirut)
9. Borderless (staff, children, parents, teachers in Ouzai)
10. Home of Hope (Directors)
11. Lebanese General Security
12. Farmers Association (one representative)*
13. CL workshop attendees (Rural Women's Association*)
14. Chief of Regional Programming Unit (in debriefs)
15. Deputy Regional Director, ROAS (in individual debrief)

*By phone or Skype

Names of all key informants are provided in Annex 2.

Question protocols were developed as part of the inception report, and provided an initial framework for the evaluation (Refer Annex 4). Children, parents and social workers were interviewed in group settings, while other key informants were interviewed individually. Skype calls were held with a number of key informants not based in Lebanon. Multiple interviews were held with the ILO Project Officer who managed both phases of this project, in order to get greater clarity on activities and decisions that were not documented. The Chief Regional Programming Unit who had been involved in the design and broad oversight of the project was no longer in the ROAS mission and unavailable during the fieldwork period. A short interview was conducted by phone at a late stage of data gathering with the technical consultant —based in Cairo—who provided substantive technical input to implement the project in the first Phase, and the first 6 months of the second phase. Given her departure, the technical consultant did not appear on the original list of key informants. However, as fieldwork progressed, several informants cited the technical consultant as the central source to provide key information, and she was interviewed by Skype

on the last day of the fieldwork. Members of the FU were difficult to access and it was only after much perseverance that two members agreed to be interviewed.

At the end of the fieldwork period, a series of **debriefs** were helpful in validating findings. These were held with 1) the ROAS Deputy Regional Director; 2) Senior Development Program Officer from the Embassy of Norway who managed the program from the donor side; and 3) with three of the four implementing partners. The M&E Officer and new Chief of Regional Programming attended all three debriefs. Neither the technical consultant (who had resigned), nor the ILO project officer (who had retired), nor the representative of the CL Unit at the MoL attended the debriefs.

Every effort was made to triangulate amongst sources in order to get as clear and objective picture of the project as possible. Insofar as possible, findings in this report reflect at least two sources. In the end, the limitations described here left some conclusions to the evaluators' reasonable judgement. For this we take responsibility.

Some 42 **evaluation questions** from the ILO are included in the evaluation ToR in Annex 1. These are all interesting and relevant questions. However, given the limited documentation provided about the project, the relative brevity of the evaluation fieldwork, and the fact that not all stakeholders were available to speak with the evaluation team, the rigor and accuracy of the answers may be uneven. The absence of a progress report for the last part of the Phase II of the project in particular, is a significant limitation and placed more importance on primary data collection.

A hiatus in government functioning lasting 9 months until January 31, 2019³, and subsequent changes in ministerial appointments (including at the Ministry of Labor) are partially responsible for delays in a number of the anticipated activities during the period of implementation. In addition, an investigation into irregularities by an external contractor associated with work under Phase I and the early months of Phase II was on-going at the time of this evaluation. This delayed project activities and was, inevitably, in the background of some of the interviews. It also meant that the main partner from the early part of the project had to be excluded from the evaluation. We have focused our attention on drawing findings and making recommendations on activities under Phase II based on reports and informants that were available to us.

IV. Key Evaluation Findings

1. Relevance and Strategic Fit

The project design adopted a tiered approach to addressing child labor. It included a focus at the policy and national sensitization level, building capacity within government and NGO sectors, and direct service delivery. The Theory of Change, presented in Section I, assumes strategic linkages between each of these dimensions with benefits to the ultimate beneficiaries—children in child labor or at risk of falling into child labor and their families. It is a framework adopted by the ILO in other contexts and broadly speaking the ILO found ways of adapting each level to prevailing situation in Lebanon.

The project was designed during a period of rapid transition in Lebanon, with an influx of refugees into the country that significantly impacted on the situation of child labor, and political transitions

³ <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/middleeast/lebanon-new-government-hezbollah.html>

(May 2018 – Jan 2019) that stalled government leadership and decision making to address the issue. As noted above, the ILO had successfully supported a national policy on child labor. The National Action Plan includes an itemized budget for its implementation, and as the primary partner, the ILO was expected to bring substantial resources as well as technical assistance forward to achieve it. At the end of Phase I, the ILO enjoyed good relations with the MoL, the donor and civil society when the project started. This has changed over time for a complex set of reasons some of which are directly implicated by events in both Phases of this project.

2. Effectiveness

This section considers achievements against targets and objectives from the original project proposal.

Outcome 1: Policy and legislative amendments and sensitization of relevant institutions. Output 1.1: Capacities of members of FU, Agricultural Unions and Employers Associations strengthened to implement GS memo to prohibit WFCL in agriculture under 16 yrs.

Syrians have been involved in the agricultural sector in Lebanon for decades. Starting in 1982, Syrian refugees were given land in return for labor, which essentially bond children to the middleman—the *Shawish*--for life. Syrians also migrated seasonally to work on farms in Lebanon, and children were known to work alongside parents as well. With more than a million refugees in the country today, many of them in precarious economic situations, children are being exploited in this sector. In the first Phase of this project discussions held between the General Security, the Ministry of Labor and the ILO resulted in a memo issued by the GS raising the working age for agricultural labor to 16 years old. The memo went out to all GS field units and inspectors across the country.

A series of workshops sponsored through the Farmers Union were designed to raise understanding of the hazards of child labor in the agriculture sector, promote awareness of this new regulation, and motivate key stakeholders to comply. Two workshops were held in Phase I and three in Phase II (in Nabatiyeh, Akkar and Bekaa). The minutes of the three meetings suggest a wide cross-section of attendees. In addition to members of the FUs, heads of local municipalities, local NGOs, representatives of the General Security forces, and local farmers were also in attendance. Although the ILO was involved in planning for these workshops, controversies arose between the Project Coordinator and the Farmers Union after the completion of the workshops about the content and invited attendees. The signed attendance sheet appears to include what was later deemed irrelevant attendees such as housewives and employees of businesses that had nothing to do with the agriculture sector. A review of the minutes of the workshops by the evaluation team suggests the meetings were comprehensive and participatory. Forward action steps or commitments are not indicated, however and no other documents offer insights into flow on benefits of the workshops. The project technical consultant shared verbally that Fantasia Chips, a major manufacturer, said that it harvested 40,000 tons of potatoes without child labor, as a result of the sensitization workshops. This was not verified.

In preparation for the final evaluation, the ILO project team sought to reach out to attendees of the workshops held in Phase II. Many of those contacted by the ILO reportedly said they were not willing to be interviewed or could not remember the workshop. The two attendees that the evaluators did manage to contact had only a very general recollection of the content of the workshop they had attended. One remembered submitting a detailed evaluation after the event, but the ILO was not able to confirm that a post-workshop evaluation had taken place.

The stated goals of the workshops and the convening agency seems valid given the context, and appropriate within the ILO's tripartite mandate. However, the lack of follow up after the workshops makes it impossible to determine whether they contributed to a more robust enabling environment, promoted reporting networks, or compliance with the GS memo. It is also worth noting that the General Security maintained that their staff on the ground had provided referrals of children in WFCL to the Ministry of Labor, but was unable to provide any further information or documentation.

Outcome 2: Capacity Building

Output 2.1 Labour Inspectorate at MOL strengthened to carry out inspection visits to selected industrial areas

Labor Inspectors (LIs) have a government mandate to inspect formal and informal places of work and report irregularities⁴. LIs are thus, key to the identification and removal of children from the WFCL. In Phase I, Labor Inspectors were provided training related to this specific task, and the design of Phase II included a refresher for veteran LI's and training for new recruits. Numbers of existing and additional anticipated recruitment seemed rather fluid though there was broad consensus that the small numbers were insufficient to cover all of the country. The proposal indicated that 15 LIs would be trained in Phase II. This target doubled in September, 2018 when the logframe was revised.

Training for LI's were delayed multiple times throughout the period of Phase II and at the time of the evaluation were anticipated to be held in the last two weeks of the project cycle to be carried out by a local NGO. The TPCR report (Oct, 2017-March, 2018) offers various reasons for the delays such as the uncertainty about the number of labor inspectors, and the need for the MoL to recruit additional LIs. In the course of the evaluation, tensions between the Child Labor Unit and Labor Inspectorate Departments within the MoL, and the health of a LI trainer from Geneva were also cited as reasons. This information could have been known and taken into consideration in the design of the project, or at least at the time of project extension.

The TPCR offers a number of action steps related to labor inspection. These include the need for more data on inspections and children identified in WFCL, the need for LI's to be more proactive (not just responding to complaints) and more staff. By the end of the project, there is no evidence that any of these quite reasonable recommendations has been taken.

Given the pivotal role of Labor Inspectors in finding and withdrawing children from WFCL, limited engagement with the Labor Inspectorate Unit also impacted the development a national monitoring and reporting system.

Output 2.2: Internal Security Forces from Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, capacities, strengthened to attend to working street children effectively based on UNCRC principles (Removed)

This Output was removed in August, 2018 with the revisions to the log frame associated with a request for a no cost extension. The reasons given in the 6 monthly report:

⁴ According to a report by the US Department of Labor: Inspections of child labor are generally a result of a complaint, particularly in the formal sector. However, based on available information, child labor is nearly non-existent in the formal sector.(16; 70) The number of labor inspectors is insufficient for the size of Lebanon's workforce, which includes over 2.1 million workers.(71) According to the ILO's technical advice of a ratio approaching 1 inspector for every 15,000 workers in developing economies, Lebanon would employ about 144 inspectors."

<https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/lebanon>

The Internal Security Forces representatives informed during the evaluation interview with him of Phase I, of his dis-satisfaction on the quality and type of solutions needed; that the design of the project should have been discussed with them, larger project and more funds – not a piece meal approach-, given that the political situation and the government policies in what relates to the problems the ISF are facing with regard to the Syrian Refugees presence in Lebanon.

No further information was available or offered to clarify this discontinuation of collaboration or to expand on the reasons for the ISF dissatisfaction cited above.

Outcome 3 Direct Support:

Output 3.1 Children involved or at risk of being involved in the WFCL, provided with initial integrated support against child labour through community centres in Beirut ,Nabatieh, Ouzai, Kahale, Beqaa and Tripoli.

Given the magnitude of the problem at the time of the project, it is understandable that the donor and the ILO chose to make direct services to children involved in or at risk of WFCL a priority. In the end, it consumed approximately a third of the budget and was the only Output that exceeded the log frame targets. In all, four NGOs were contracted over the life of the project to deliver direct support to children and parents (Output 3.3) in two waves. More details on services delivered are presented in the following sections. However, it is worthwhile noting that the type of agencies selected to deliver these services was somewhat heterogeneous. Home of Hope, one of the two agencies contracted in the first round, provides residential services to high risk street children all of whom are referred through the justice system⁵, whereas the other three: Dar Al Amal, Borderless and BEYOND offer a range of academic, social, vocational training and in the case of DAA, other medical and dental services (through the Ministry of Social Affairs) as well as psychosocial support and case management.

In considering the relevance of this initiative, the evaluation found that the project missed a strategic opportunity to document and validate best practices in context. Delivery of services ended up being target-driven, while the evaluation identified a number of innovations that could have offered potential models for mainstreaming (outlined in Section IV.8). While field level operations are important to the ILO's credibility and can inform advocacy and policy dialogue—which are the agency's mainstay—they were not conceived in this way in this project.

Output 3.2: Tripoli Community Centre against Child Labour Operative (Removed)

This Output was removed based on the transition out of the project of the original service delivery partner, BEYOND. In the end, however, the new partner, Dar Al Amal, was able to deliver services to vulnerable children and families in one of the neediest communities in Tripoli, a major hub for refugees and child labor in the informal sector.

Output 3.3: Vulnerable households have access to livelihood opportunities through Ouzai, Nabatieh, and Tripoli community centres

Livelihood and vocational training opportunities for families is a typical pillar of a national child labor initiative. Children are often pushed into work because adult family members lack sufficient income earning options. The original design anticipated that 20 families would receive livelihood

⁵ The project consultant indicated that Home of Hope also had a drop in center for street children, which is why they were selected. It is possible that the agency's scope changed over the course of the project. The current director indicated that the center only accepts children referred to them through the Ministry of Justice.

support under this project. Given the scale of the problem in Lebanon, this target seems tokenistic at best, and it is puzzling why the activity was included at all at that level. Ultimately, the NGOs participating in the second wave of implementation (November, 2018-March, 2019) were able to provide vocational training to significantly more mothers (217 at the time of the evaluation), as described in Section V. However, as with Output 3.1, although innovations appear to have been included to boost efficiencies and impact, documentation and learning were not integral to this part of the project design. This will be described in more detail later in the report.

Output 3.4: Two CLMS committees established and operational in Nabatieh and North Lebanon areas to coordinate services in vicinities of centres

A functioning monitoring and referral system is a mainstay of a national-level strategy to address the WFCL. Children who are removed from dangerous work often need multiple types of services and need to be tracked to ensure they get those services and don't fall back into dangerous work. Agencies often do not provide all services under one roof, and rely on partners. In Lebanon, the Ministry of Labour issued Resolution 401/01/ of 16.12.2016 to establish a national CLMRS. A number of government agencies including the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the General Security, police, and the Judicial system all have a role in addressing child labor. Civil society and humanitarian agencies are active in providing psychosocial, rehabilitation, vocational, academic, medical and other critical forms of support. It is widely recognized that knitting these all together in a common monitoring and referral system promotes efficiencies. This is consistent with Activity 2.4.2 *build capacity to monitor child labour and their referral systems*, in the ILO's Decent Work Country Program for Lebanon (2017-2020). The NAP highlights this amongst the priority activities in the section on legislation and law enforcement: *5. Compile information on a computer database about children working, within a child labour monitoring and referral system. (NAP, Pg 26)*, and a national system is also recommended in the TPCR (March, 2018) and the cluster evaluation (June, 2018). A CLMRS was thus highly relevant to achieving the overall goal of this project.

Two NGOs were selected as the base for developing local level CLMRS. The NGO in North Lebanon (BEYOND) was removed from the project in the first six months and no record of any activity related to a CLMS committee was made available to the evaluators. A long term consultant was based in Home of Hope, the partner NGO in Kahale, Mount Lebanon. She brought little expertise in developing this kind of specialized database, and struggled without technical support, or a felt need on the part of the hosting agency (who had their own system) to create a referral system for the 68 children in residence at Home of Hope. She developed a detailed inventory of agencies active in providing a range of services in the Mt. Lebanon vicinity, and helped to convene a committee at least once during the 18 months of the project. At the end of the project, no one seems to be using the database.

Given the ILO's expertise in developing these types of databases, the alignment of mandates within the ILO's DWCP and the GoL's NAP to move a monitoring and referral system forward, this may be the most significant missed opportunity in this project.

There seems to be a number of views about the capacity and willingness of the MoL to undertake this effort centrally. A representative of ILO's CLEAR project (which supported the HoH consultant in Phase I of the project) notes that there was resistance at the MoL and the difficulties of achieving an inclusive system given political affiliations with some NGOs. The lack of access to IT support was also cited. CLEAR informants appear to have been quite hands off with respect to these initiatives inside of the Phase II Norwegian project, reporting only that they visited the HoH on one occasion.

Output 3.5 : National Choir against child labour established. The most time consuming and high profile activity in the first six months of the project was the establishment of a national choir against child labor. 1200 children, including Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian children auditioned, and the choir included between 100-300 children (reports differ). A maestro was brought from Egypt where such a choir on WFCL has been successful and is still functioning several years after its establishment.

Stakeholders who had been involved in the choir preparation or attended the event at the presidential palace commented on the positive impact of the experience on the children themselves as they engaged in something creative, gained recognition, rehearsed together, and had fun.

Anecdotally, the evaluators learned that the number of children who actually performed at the Presidential Palace were fewer than anticipated.⁶ Some informants suggested that the space ended up being too small to accommodate all of the children, and another that some undocumented members of the choir (all refugees) were turned away at the last minute. As a result, the composition of the choir was majority Lebanese children—not reflective of the distribution of children in CL or at risk of CL in the country. Cost over-runs related to transportation (including for parents), food, lodging, and costumes⁷ were widely reported.

The TPCR suggests the performance at the presidential palace was well covered in the media and helped highlight the issue nationally. The one-off nature of the event is concerning, given the insignificant investment and also in terms of any efforts to keep the issue in the public's eye. Although the original proposal for Phase II anticipated a number of choir performances, and this was reported verbally, no documentation about other performances was available at the time of the evaluation. Importing this strategy from a country in a different situation vis a vis WFCL was perhaps not the best use of scarce resources.

A number of the Outputs that have been included under Outcome 3. Direct Support, seem more appropriately related to the national, policy level. Positioning activities in support of a Child Labor Monitoring System (3.4) and the National Choir against Child Labor (3.5) as Direct Support suggest missed opportunities to advance networking, reporting and sensitization activities in strategic and potentially more sustainable ways. Positioning the choir under Output 3. Direct services in the logframe seems to favor the experiential element (for the children) and de-emphasize the broader awareness-raising significance of the initiative, for instance

Overall, it appears that the design of the project fell short in some areas in terms of adaptation of a generic model to address WFCL to the Lebanese context. Opportunities to strategically advance elements of the NAP were missed. Weak feedback loops prevented learning and agility, and the project fell back on traditional, and sometimes top down approaches to systems change. These and other management issues compromised effective implementation. At the end of the day, it is not possible to completely validate the Theory of Change (or not), given the weak evidence base.

3. Validity of the design

As depicted in the Theory of Change, the design of the project adopts a tiered approach. To addressing child labor. The proposal for Phase II approached the goal of *eliminating the WFCL*

⁶ This rather important fact was discovered in the course of conversations with one of the partners, and verified in the interview with the technical consultant.

⁷ Leftover costumes are still sitting at the MoL

amongst Syrian Refugee and Host Lebanese Communities through a three tiered strategy designed to:

- 1) increase awareness and responsiveness amongst key targeted populations consistent with the ILO’s tripartite focus. In this project, these included government ministries and employer associations in a position to identify and remove children in WFCL (General Security), ISF, Famers’ Union;
- 2) boost capacity amongst key actors responsible for identifying and removing children from WFCL—Labor Inspectors and ISF officers;
- 3) Provide direct support to children and families, including at risk families. The establishment of CLMRS committees in four locations (reduced to two in the revisions to the logframe at month 6) and national choir against child labor were both included under 3). (See Norway Child Labor Lebanon Phase II - Proposal, undated)

These objectives and associated activities in Phase II built broadly on the activities in Phase I and sought to consolidate impact and sustainability by continuing many of them. This turned out to be appropriate in some cases, but flawed in others. The proposal for Phase II and funding award (October, 2017) occurred before the cluster evaluation results were delivered (June, 2018). Given the limitations on monitoring or other data from Phase I (a finding of the cluster evaluation), the ILO essentially took the validity of the original design on faith and extended the design into Phase II. It is also not clear to what extent the ILO consulted with partners or other stakeholders about Phase I before drafting the plan/proposal for Phase II.

Additional adjustments to the log frame in August, 2018 mostly proposed changes in partnership arrangements made necessary by the departure of the main implementing agency, and amended the targets (see Section V). Assumptions which appear to have informed the original design, and carried over into Phase II are grouped broadly into appropriate and questionable, given the context in the Table below. These are reflections in hindsight, of course and also based on very limited project-related data, so should be read with these caveats in mind. Some will be explained in more depth in the following sections.

Table 2. Design assumptions that turned out to be....	
Appropriate	Questionable
1. National level sensitization	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership with MoL, CL Unit and MoL Labor Inspectorate important to gain government buy in, sustainability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outreach to Labor Inspectorate Division, MoSA and municipalities through local NGOs would engender cooperation • ILO consultancy with MoL staff would promote project implementation, government commitment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration with Farmers’ Union reaches members and other agri sector stakeholders with information, encouragement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GS would follow up on memo regarding children in agriculture launched in Phase I
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National level choir model (from Egypt) would be sustainable, inclusive, cost effective approach to awareness raising/youth engagement
2. Capacity building	

- Training and engagement with Labor Inspectors key to identifying WFCL cases

3. Direct services

- Local NGOs are best positioned to deliver education, psychosocial services to children, and vocational training and psychosocial support to youth and parents
- Launching CLMRS through the formation of committees based at non-government org's would be sustainable, scalable
- Outsourcing direct service provision to NGOs to reach a small number of children a sustainable, cost-effective solution on its own.
- NGOs would be able to engage with hard to reach families and children in a short timeframe.

The **risks** listed in the proposal focused on contextual issues including the security and political situation and the ambiguities related to further immigration of refugees from Syria. No risks associated with design decisions are indicated in the proposal.

Gender and inclusion considerations in the design

The differential drivers and impacts of child labor on girls and boys is not explored in the proposal. **Gender** is not mentioned in the situation analysis, although the negative effects of the Syrian crisis on the refugee population appears to be greater for women and girls (who make up 51% of refugees)—in terms of vulnerability to poverty, gender based violence, and barriers to access to services (LCRP, 2018). Lebanese and Palestinian women from lower economic strata share these vulnerabilities. The proposal inexplicably commits a target of 30% of opportunities to females—a target which translates into some of the log frame indicators. The proposal also commits to encouraging recruitment of female staff. In its execution, the project likely exceeded these commitments, though data is not universally available. Vocational training to youth was predominantly for girls. Vocational training for families was provided exclusively to mothers. Endemic issues related to gender based violence at home and in places of work, and the impact on children's' development were recognized by implementing partners, and reportedly addressed in workshop settings. NGOs for this evaluation were directed, managed and staffed almost exclusively by women, and the ILO team and primary consultants were almost all female as well.

The proposal committed to recruitment of **people with disabilities**. This was not checked or evident, though a number of children with disabilities were participating in classrooms in the NGOs visited.

Progress and effectiveness

The ILO supported a significant achievement in the enabling environment in helping the government of Lebanon draft a National Action Plan on Child Labor in 2013. Unique in the region (and unusual in the world), this set the stage for addressing the growing problem of child labor amongst refugee families which coincided with the NAP's release. The timing of funding from the Norwegian Embassy for the first phase of this project was propitious. Implementation in Phase II met with a number of challenges both in the political environment and internal to the project. In the end, because of limited data and documentation, a definitive conclusion about how responsive, flexible and ultimately effective the ILO was in adapting to these challenges must rely

largely on impressions. This section seeks to answer the questions put forward in the ToR in this regard.

Progress towards outcomes. As discussed in the prior sections, and enumerated in Section V below, while the project met or exceeded many of its revised targets, in its focus on meeting short term targets (and grappling with compliance issues), the ILO lost sight of the needs and opportunities to enhance sustainable and scalable systems change. The children's choir event encountered numerous unanticipated demands, overwhelmed the team, and delayed other activities. One-off sensitization events were not evaluated or followed up on to consolidate learning or promote motivation within key Ministries, Associations and amongst thought leaders. Resources for launching a CL monitoring and reporting system were invested in localized efforts that were poorly conceived and delinked from the MoL. Collaboration with other projects, and particularly CLEAR, failed to create technical synergies. While services provided to children and families undoubtedly benefited individual recipients (a tiny fraction of those in need), they did little to promote broader learning or inform national policy or action—a role that the ILO sees for itself.

In the first six months of the twelve month project, the project achieved only two of the seven activities originally planned. This led to a request for a six month no cost extension. While it appears that the sensitization activity with the FU managed to exceed the number of participants, the extent to which these were the right participants remains a concern of the ILO, as noted above. By the end of Phase II, disputes with the FU over invoicing and attendance led to strained relations. While there is no doubt that participation in the choir touched the lives of individual children, the evidence points to the need for better management of attendance, child expectations, visibility strategy, and budgeting for essential things like transportation. Lack of follow up was also notable, as this was the only event that media was reported to have been engaged with.

Relations with and **participation of other government agencies** and opportunities for strategic engagement in promoting the goals of the project deserved further consideration in the design and implementation of Phase II. In Phase I, as noted above, the ILO was successful in encouraging General Security to produce a memo about revisions to age restrictions on children in agriculture. This was a good achievement. The GS also participated in Farmers' Union workshops but seemed disconnected from referral networks, saying they had advised their field workers to refer cases to the MoL. However, with one person in the Child Labor Unit, the MoL is clearly not equipped to handle referrals. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which has a network of social development centers (SDCs) throughout the country, was not mentioned in the proposal for Phase II. They came into the project via Dar Al Amal which has close ties to MoSA and based project activities in four MoSA SDCs⁸. Finally, the planned training for Labor Inspectors was dependent upon the coordination between MoL's CL unit and Labor Inspectorate units, which contributed to multiple delays, as noted above. Given the ILO's strong partnership with the MoL and the CL unit in particular, more strategic initiatives designed with such challenges in mind may have been helped avoid some of these outcomes.

Inclusion of Associations and civil society. Although the service delivery agencies benefited from grants received and the three who were reviewed under this project appear to have provided good services and met their targets, broader engagement with the NGO community was piecemeal and the lasting effect uncertain. The original proposal anticipated engaging with Farmers, Agricultural and Employers' Associations in order to raise awareness and action amongst

⁸ No representatives from MoSA were interviewed for this evaluation

as broad a spectrum of stakeholders as possible. In the end, only the FU was included. The cluster evaluation had confirmed the need to engage with employers in the formal sector, and it is not known why this was not picked up. Civil society actors who were providing advocacy and direct services were included in the roster for Mt Lebanon. The CLEAR project also supported training for informal CL “monitors”. Service delivery contracts to four agencies were supported under the Phase II Norwegian project.

CLMRS. The project hired a local consultant to develop a **referral roster** of local NGOs for the children based at Home of Hope, where she was situated. Home of Hope did not have a felt need for such a referral system (they had their own referral system), and with only 68 children in residence at its height, it is hard to understand this choice of venue. The CLMRS consultant received little support from the project, or from CLEAR which had a mandate to work on CLMRS systems. The consultancy consumed 11 months of project resources (December, 2017-September, 2018) for developing an automated system that no one is likely to use. It appears that the Nabetieh CLMS committee met once during the consultancy period, but there is no indication as to whether or not this increased referrals or collaboration.

The consultant was required to submit monthly reports to the ILO, reports that appear to have garnered no comment from the concerned project officer. It was only at the end of her consultancy, and after the technical consultant had resigned, that the ILO recognized the error in this investment, offering strident criticism of the consultant, rather than reflecting what went wrong with the approach. The project officer reflected that “We were unable to institutionalize a structure for the CLMRS”. The MoL/CL representative confirmed that the originally intended national scope of the CLMRS was not met.

The most helpful output of her consultancy is a detailed list of services provided by agencies in the Mt. Lebanon vicinity—of interest mostly in that it suggests the breadth of expertise and service availability in the country.

Under the CLEAR project, a number of multi-stakeholder CLMRS committee convening’s and **trainings of local “monitors”** were held across the country. Phase II resources did not contribute to these meetings, but the strategies and stakeholders overlap. Participants reportedly included NGOs, labor inspectors, representatives of local municipalities and, inexplicably, children. The ILO recognized these gatherings as strategic networking and awareness raising opportunities. No information is available about whether they led to increased identification, removal or referrals of children in WFCL and whether local committees continued to meet. Neither are the documents or sources clear about links between this activity and the establishment of a more formal CLMRS. One observer who attended a training noted the ambition of the networking task, and thought it was probably unrealistic.


Meanwhile, in April, 2018 at the initiative of the project technical consultant, the MoL held a meeting to discuss a way forward for a national CLMRS. Minutes of the meeting outline a number of broad steps without providing commitments of resources from the MoL or other agencies to achieving them. Most notable about these minutes is the absence of a participant list. Neither could the MoL/CL representative remember who was present.

The three direct services NGOs visited by this evaluation were providing important services to children and in two cases, to families. All had submitted proposals asking for specific types of support consistent with the overall requirements of the project. Alignment with the project was clearer for the two NGOs selected in the second round (Dar **AI** Amal and Borderless). Home of

Hope, which received support from November 2017-September 2018, provides residential services to a small number of children, all of whom are referred through the justice system. While these services appear to be powerful and filling an important gap in government support (Home of Hope is the only residential service provider for street children in the country), the direct link with child labor is not completely apparent and the numbers quite small. Concerns about the evangelical nature of the services provided by Home of Hope also surfaced. More details on the services provided by DAA and Borderless are presented in the following sections.

4. Efficiency of resource use

Figure 2. presents a broad breakdown of budget expenditures per activity, reported as at March 2019.



The project expenditures more or less matched budgeted projections for the FU training, children’s choir. There was an underspend for Labor Inspector and ISF trainings—activities which were not carried out. The CLMS committee component spent only 57% of the projected budget, because activities were only carried out in only one of the two targeted centers. Only 34% of small budget for advocacy (\$38,899) was spent. Some of the underspend was reallocated to direct service vocational training for vulnerable households. Approximately \$100,000 was unspent as at March, 2019.

Most striking about this graphic is the proportion of project funds spent on project management. When combined with project support costs (more or less overhead for the ILO), this accounts for

just over half of the expenditures for the project.⁹ In a technical assistance-heavy project this kind of allocation is appropriate. However, in light of the light touch of the ILO to many of the activities, and the number of consultants used to execute and support activities (most of whom are costed under specific activities), the allocation to project management seems disproportionate.

A number of other observations.

1. Direct services constitute just over a third of the budget, much of it spent in the last five months of the project (Oct, 2018-March, 2019).
2. The choir expenditure under this project went entirely for the Egyptian Maestro. This decision seems questionable given the cost and availability of local talent which of course would have built capacity and relationships in Lebanon. According to the MoL, they managed to get donated t-shirts for the children and paid for pants and shoes through the ministry. Other costs associated with travel, lodging and food for participating children and their families came from core budget of the ILO and donations from businesses.
3. Whether the use of a consultant resident in another country to manage this program was cost effective is an outstanding question. She is Lebanese with a specialization in child labor, so presumably this was felt to outweigh her being off-site.

As highlighted in prior chapters, investments were made per the original design and log frame, and while many achieved stated targets, efficiencies in terms of investments in sustainability or scalable models are difficult to see. In terms of short term cost efficiencies, project resources through the three NGOs appear to be high value added for the individual children and families who benefited. The extent to which these investments leveraged additional years of schooling, income generated for individuals, or families at risk of child labor is undoubtedly there, but the level is unknown.

5. Effectiveness

The ILO outsourced much of the design and management for this project to a **technical consultant**¹⁰. She was given a free hand in selecting partners, negotiating contracts, and making key decisions on the course of the project. During both phases of the project, she was based in Cairo, and on the ground in Lebanon intermittently.¹¹ The consultant resigned in March, 2018, leaving a number of the key partners (including the MoL/CL Unit) disgruntled.

Project management suffered from discord from the outset of Phase II, which served as an impediment to implementation. Staff working on the project did not have a shared a vision for the project, and the technical consultant maintained exclusive relationships with government and NGO partners. Internal disagreements came to define the management of the project, promoting inefficiencies and lack of a strategic vision which persisted throughout. After the technical consultant resigned, the ILO Project Coordinator took full control of the project. An investigation into irregularities with an implementing partner led to a hiatus in many activities. Towards the end

⁹ The original budget included the consultancy of the technical project manager under Direct Services. This amount has been shifted to project management in the graphic, for clarity.

¹⁰ As noted above, she was a child labor expert who had worked for the ILO in the past, and was consulting on other ILO projects in Lebanon and in the MENA region during her tenure with the project, and since.

¹¹ ILO project staff were unable to estimate what percentage of project time she was in country.

of 2018/early 2019, new NGOs were contracted to pick up the direct services component. Relations with MoL and Farmers' Association partners were characterized by poor communications.

The **chief of the Child Labor Unit at the Ministry of Labor** (the only staff in that unit) was put on a contract to provide support to project activities for the period January-June, 2018.¹² A letter from the Minister approving this consultancy covering the period October-December, 2017 suggests there were two separate consultancies. The Minister's letter indicates that work would be carried out during administrative leave and off hours. The practice was questioned by the donor and so funding for the consultancy shifted into general budget of the ILO.

Nevertheless, the ToRs describe the consultancy as providing technical and logistical support to the achievement of objectives *of the ILO*. It is difficult to see how this advanced ownership inside of the MoL, though it is obvious that achievement of project objectives were enabled by her participation. Many of the tasks carried out under this consultancy are representational, which effectively leveraged the consultant's role as the CL representative of the government in support of project activities. While it appears from her report that much was accomplished related to the two major activities in the period of the consultancy (FU briefings on the GS memo on child labor and the Children's Choir against CL), it is not clear why the sole representative on the issue of CL needed to be paid outside of her government salary to support them.

Aside from being flagged as questionable by the donor, this practice also seems counterproductive. The TPCR report lays out a number of shortfalls in the MoL's ability to advance key elements of the NAP—including reconvening the National Steering Committee on Child Labor and supporting a national CLMRS. It is not clear why adding a consultancy to the one already stretched individual responsible for moving these initiatives forward was considered a good choice. If a consultancy was desirable, a second set of hands might have been better.

Selection of NGO partners to deliver direct services appears to have been undertaken based on direct outreach from the project officer (in the first instance via the technical consultant; in the second instance the ILO project officer)¹³. There were two cycles of selection and two agencies were engaged in each Phase. Contracts with agencies in the second Phase (DAA and Borderless) were for projects that included delivery of numerous activities. Contracts with Home of Hope in the first Phase were executed between the ILO and four teachers employed to deliver services to

¹² In Phase I of the project, the donor had agreed that the MOL focal point could undertake additional tasks above and beyond her job (and working hours). In the second phase this decision was reversed, and the ILO assumed the contract under a separate budget.

¹³ Per IGDS Number 270 14. B) *Any implementing partner, which is an organization carrying out non-profit-oriented work as defined in paragraph 8(b), shall be selected following a documented comparison of proposals/concept notes submitted by potential implementing partners. The selection shall take into account their: (i) technical expertise; (ii) institutional and financial capacity to carry out the programme/project activities and/or produce the outputs, and manage the funds entrusted to them; and (iii) the financial proposal. This comparison is not required when the implementing partner has been approved by the donor in writing.* While two of the four NGOs and two of the consultants (including the key technical consultant), carried over from Phase I, and were named in the Phase II proposal, the evaluators were told that they were selected through a sole source process. The two NGOs that participated in the final part of Phase II were not selected through competitive processes.

children at that center¹⁴. The donor was informed in writing of the involvement of DAA and HoH. The arrangement with BEYOND is unknown. Borderless was contracted after another NGO could not take on the work. The basis for the choice of Borderless and not another implementing partner was unclear.

Legitimate criteria for selection were put forward verbally when the concerned persons were asked. These included expertise in CL; existing relationships with target communities; on-going programming to allow rapid start up; and association with the MoSA in the case of DAA and HoH. The technical consultant explained the selection process for the first two NGOs on the basis of the brevity of the original agreement, saying that for a one year grant it would have taken 3-4 months to go through a bidding process.

One of the agencies selected in the second phase, Borderless, was contracted after the agency from the first phase—BEYOND—came under investigation at the end of Phase I. Borderless, which registered in December, 2017, inherited much of the equipment provided to BEYOND in Phase I. Some of the Borderless staff had been engaged with BEYOND's work in the first Phase. These observations should not detract from the work that the agency is doing, which seems cost effective and consistent with the goals of the project, but more transparency about the handover procedure is warranted.

Processes for selection of consultants needed further transparency. ILO regulations state that *External collaborators should be selected from among highly qualified candidates in a specific field of expertise, on the basis of a reasoned and documented process.*

The evaluation was informed that the identification of the technical consultant was based on her “longstanding working relationship with the ILO in the field of child labour”. Her contract had ended and it was decided to extend it based on need of her services. The hiring of other consultants was based on technical judgment put forward in internal minutes from the ILO Project Officer to the Deputy Head of Mission. The minutes for the CLMS consultant based in the Home of Hope notes that she had some NGO background, but she also turned out to be related to the MoL CL chief. Whether there were others with more expertise who could have been contracted to do the work is possible, but not known. The contract with the MoL/CL chief was clearly based on her role at the Ministry, but was covered through other sources of funding at the ILO and not from the funds of this project. None of the minutes mention consideration of other candidates for these consultancy positions.

Basic **management tools** like a workplan, team meetings and regular meetings with stakeholders were not evident in this project, elements that might have alleviated some of the communication issues and improved effectiveness.

On the other hand, when two major partners failed to show up at the inception meeting, this should have been a red flag that something was amiss. From the TPCR:

An inception meeting took place on 10th November 2017 in the presence of a representative of the donor, ISF, GS, and Home of Hope. The two major partners: BEYOND and the Ministry of Labour were absent. The inception meeting did not discuss any workplan, challenges, or necessities to change in the overall design and or the

¹⁴ Three teachers and one animator were contracted from Nov, 2017-Sept, 2018; an educator and company to provide a course on coding and robotics was contracted from July-Sept, 2018

implementation workplan of the project. It also did not bring any clarity on the role of each entity and the coordination among them, or any issues relating to future interventions. The representative of the donor was uncomfortable, raised the point of the absence of the two main partners, and wished their presence in next consultative meetings of the project's implementation. ILO first TPCR (Oct, 2017-March, 2018)

As noted elsewhere, the absence of monitoring data, and a robust **M&E framework** for evidencing lessons learned represent missed opportunities for the project, and achievement of its goals. Better M&E could have enabled the ILO and implementing partners to reflect more effectively on strategy limitations, and make course corrections during the life of the project. The ROAS M&E officer was not engaged in the original design or invited to input into revisions to the log frame. It is not clear why this type of input was not routine.¹⁵ On the other hand the two NGO partners had adopted some effective ways of tracking academic progress of children, and keeping records about participants in various trainings. DAA was recruited in part because they already had families in their filing system as well as on-going demand from new children and families.

6. Impact orientation

The project may have raised the issue of Child Labor in the eyes of the public and officials in a position to take action, though follow up is not evident. The project fell short in terms of capacitating key actors (labor inspectors). Although the Ministry of Labor was active in most of Phase II, at the time of this evaluation there are rifts that require attention. Networks amongst key partners moved forward in the context of a number of workshops and trainings but tensions within and between key government agencies responsible for addressing WFCL remain—realities that are largely beyond the ILOs purview. Design and implementation shortcomings missed opportunities for the ILO to establish a foundation for a national CLMRS and to offer evidence-based lessons learned on effective strategies for preventing children from entering the WFCL and rehabilitating children withdrawn from WFCL. Indeed, initiatives under this project were not framed in terms of learning for scale. Other UN and civil society agencies have mandates and expertise in service delivery for vulnerable populations. The ILO missed the opportunity to leverage its particular niche and expertise related to child labor (and resources under this project) to contribute evidence behind best practices for monitoring, referral and service delivery for children in WFCL and prevention, particularly amongst refugee populations.

The issue of **targeting** also needs some attention in this project. As noted elsewhere, the very abbreviated funding cycle imposed on partners recruited in the last five months of the project imposed numerous constraints on inclusion of hard to reach children and families. To reach their targets, NGOs offered services to those who were already in their respective orbits. They had no dearth of takers. The cluster evaluation pointed to the need for greater rigor in setting eligibility criteria, which the evaluation also suggests would offer a baseline for measuring impact. These remain relevant observations.

The participating agencies are not a position to sustain project activities as a result of their participation in this project. The CL Unit at the MoL remains under resourced, and Associations and NGOs continue to rely on the ebb and flow of external funding. To a large extent, this is well beyond the project's responsibility. A refugee crisis of the magnitude of Syria draws in and requires external support, and agencies that can respond quickly will do so. Short term, humanitarian funding has its own set of constraints for the agencies and the beneficiaries—cutting short the

¹⁵ The cluster evaluator found weak M&E systems across all of the projects in the region.

pathway to education, a vocation, or healing on many levels. For this evaluation, what may also be interesting is whether these agencies are now more efficient or effective at responding to children caught in child labor? And whether participating agencies have refined more cost-effective strategies as a result of their participation in the project—including strategies that can be shared and scaled? Based on the evaluators' observations, the answer to the question about the refinement of strategies appears to be “yes”. However, this needs further validation.

7. Sustainability

Sustainability does not appear to have been a consideration in the broader design of this project. In its discussion of project sustainability, the proposal for Phase II focuses on the role of the Ministry in achieving the goal of the National Action Plan to eliminate child labor in Lebanon by 2020. Commitment of the GS is also mentioned. Both agencies, and others participated in the activities of the project. As noted above, the GS did not systematically follow up with its field units to assess whether instances of children in WFCL were identified, referred, and what happened after that. There was an oral account of referrals having been made, yet no documentation was shared.



Borderless's slogan: "Freedom to Dream"

More than 1000 children and mothers benefited from services¹⁶ under this project. For some families, there is undoubtedly less risk of children reverting to WCFL. It is also likely that as a result of the project, many will continue to work, but side by side they will get an education and some mothers will be able to earn something to support these children and their siblings. Without any longitudinal data, the magnitude, nature and duration of these benefits is unknown.

The situation in Lebanon remains challenging, with services stretched and many other critical issues drowning out attention on the suffering of children in child labor. It is not clear that the project promoted longer term commitment to the issue or systems development—both indications of sustainability. The ILO appears to be able to continue to identify additional resources to channel to local partners to address the issue. Perhaps this is a sign of sustainability, or just a continuation of its role as an intermediary.

8. Potential good practices related to direct services

A number of **potential good practices** emerged from conversations and observations during field visits to implementing NGOs. These are innovations adopted by two NGOs that had between 5-2.5 months to reach targets (DAA and Borderless), and one that had more time but offered a different model of rehabilitation (Home of Hope). Innovations seem particularly relevant for the Syrian refugee population which was an important target group for this project.¹⁷ They are put

¹⁶ An exact number of individuals is difficult to estimate since some people received more than one service.

¹⁷ It is entirely possible that some of these strategies have already been adopted, or even studied in the Lebanese or other populations. Without a broader scan of the humanitarian

forward here as examples of practices identified in this final evaluation that could have merited more rigorous piloting, with an eye to sharing with other implementation agencies for scale. Since they are based on only a small number of interviews, and brief observations they are included in this report but not in the more formal lessons learned briefs for wider circulation. ROAS may wish to investigate some of these with greater rigor and add them to the ILO lessons learned database if they indeed prove promising.

Approaches to mainstreaming Syrian children into education in Lebanon. Although the Lebanese government has provided an afternoon shift to allow Syrian children to enter school, refugee children face multiple barriers to education. Many had never been to school when they fled with their families to Lebanon (for instance in one DAA center an estimated 70% of the 93 children under 14 had never been to school). For those who had, the language of instruction is not the same. Discipline and basic learning and life skills are often limitations to academic achievement. These are tackled through social worker support and other classroom-based approaches with the goal of helping children pass the entrance exams so they can be mainstreamed into public education.

Integration of psychosocial and life skills into academic and vocational training.

All of the agencies providing direct services to children, youth and parents noted that the provision of trauma counseling, life coaching and other forms of psychosocial support were most effective when integrated into other types of training. Social workers are part of teams of professionals offering services. The residential services offered through Home of Hope address developmental issues amongst children with a tough love approach, with the potential to turn a life of extremism or criminal activity around. DAA and Borderless, with more limited time with participants look to instilling children with academic and life skills that are the building blocks for a productive life. An effort to weigh the benefits of these inputs in terms of transformational impacts on the trajectory of the children's lives may be challenging and even imprecise, but could offer a powerful argument for greater investment in such holistic services to the benefit of positive societal outcomes in the longer term. Similarly, **integrating psychosocial counseling and group sharing into vocational training for women** (an approach both DAA and Borderless adopt) may prove beneficial for decision making related to child rearing and child labor.



Children at Borderless during language class

assistance environment at present, this is unknown. For the purposes of the ILO the impact on mitigating WFCL would need to be a major outcome of any study.

Gender focus. Child labor is not gender neutral. Girls experience different push factors and different vulnerabilities than boys at home and at work. Although this issue had limited profile in the design of the project, it was addressed by implementing partners in ways that merit further investigation. Specifically, psychosocial support addressed issues related to gender based violence in sessions for mothers (and possibly for girls, not known). Vocational training was reserved exclusively for female parents, and one agency tried to focus on home-based income generating activities, recognizing that many Syrian mothers would find it difficult to work outside of the home.



Children at Borderless during a computer-facilitated educational session

While participation in much of the vocational training for women and youth sorted along gender lines—with courses on makeup, hair, sewing, and flower arranging exclusively for women and girls, and plumbing, electrical and cell phone repair engaging mostly boys--some girls elected to join the less traditional classes and were encouraged by the NGOs to do so. Computer classes at Borderless are attended by boys and girls equally. A longitudinal look at life choice and remunerative outcomes for these participants could shine light on their efficacy in promoting alternatives to dangerous and early child labor.

Integration, inclusion. Although Lebanon has been welcoming to the million plus refugees who have poured into the country from Syria, tensions between the communities are inevitable as resources and systems are strained. Refugee access to resources and services that are not readily available to poorer Lebanese citizens can also take its toll. The second shift opened at schools nationwide to accommodate refugee children has served to segregate children somewhat. While this is certainly an issue beyond the ILO's scope, the integration of children in training and activities offered by DAA and Borderless was noted as an opportunity to build understanding across communities. The long term dividends of such exposure during childhood cannot be underestimated and may bear further investigation.



Vocational training session on cell phone repair by Dar Al Amal

Rapid start up assistance for micro entrepreneurs. To help mothers and girls launch their businesses, Dar el Amal provided kits to vocational training graduates. For instance, trainees in hairdressing received a hair dryer and scissors; trainees in makeup received a make-up kit; trainees in mobile phone repair received tools. This low cost, in-kind starter kit seems like an effective complement to training. Trainees also receive a certificate from the Ministry of Social Affairs, potentially adding to the legitimacy of their businesses. It would be useful to know more about whether these practices add value in terms of income generated, family stability, even gender based violence.

V. Key Results

The following table has been compiled from documents made available by the ILO and provided via email by partner NGOs. Since some shifted from the original proposal for Phase II and the revised log frame prepared in August, 2018 as part of the no cost extension, both sets of targets are provided. Anomalies and outstanding ambiguities related to this data are noted in the table.

Table 3. Targets and Achievements, Phase II Ending WFCL amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities (October, 2017-March, 2019)

Output	Proposal targets (9/2017)	Revised logframe targets (9/2018)	Achievement (2/2019)	Notes
1.1 Farmers Union/Employers Association members sensitized/trained	30 members x 3 activates = 90 members	3 sensitization activities for 90 famers and employers	150	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •TPCR reports 150 attendees •Minutes suggest b/w 165-170 attendees •Minutes and attendee lists available •No post workshop evaluation
2.1 Labor Inspectors trained	15	15	0	Still pending at the time of the evaluation
2.2 ISF trained	60	60	0	Activity removed from project
3.1 Children withdraw from WFCL provided with educational, social, protection, nutritional and/or recreational activities	500 children (30% girls)	500 children (30% girls)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •738 children receive academic support (57%+ female) •210 youth receive vocational skills (60% female) •27 recreational activities in 7 centers reach 1100 children 	Outcome data gathered directly from partners

Children at risk of WFCL prevented from entering WFCL through provision of awareness raising	1000 children (30% girls)	1000 children 15 social workers trained on CL law	30 Social workers trained on auto protection	No specific data available on awareness raising for children. As above?
3.2 Tripoli community center operational	1 center	1 center	1 center	DAA providing services in Tripoli
3.3 Vulnerable households receive livelihood support	20 families+	20 families	175 women receive voc skills training 42 women get business skills 130 parents in awareness raising about WFCL	Outcome data gathered directly from partners
3.4 CLMS committees established and operational	Two committees: Nabatieh and N. Lebanon	Two committees: Nabatieh and N. Lebanon	?	Status and functioning of committees unknown
3.5 National Choir against child labor established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 100 children selected (at least 30% girls) • 1 performance in N. Lebanon 	1 Nat'l Choir established; 1 musical performance	60 children perform once	

As the table shows, most of the targets were achieved or exceeded over the life of the project. Several key activities were removed midway through the project, and a major activity—training of Labor Inspectors—is pending.

VI. Conclusions

Working in a complex, politicized and fluid environment, the ILO had the opportunity to leverage its expertise, role as a UN agency, and resources through this project to move the needle on the issue of WFCL. The proposal reflects a superficial analysis of the problem, and in its execution the project leaned towards an over emphasis on targets at the expense of learning. It represents a wasted opportunity to broker action on a national action plan which it had helped to shape.

Opportunities to boost capacity, advance strategic action and improve collaboration with government and non-government bodies on child labor was called for, but addressed only through trainings and workshops that show little evidence of sustainable coordination, embedded referral networks, awareness or forward action, or at least there is no documented evidence to offer reassurance of these outcomes. Collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs and municipalities were outsourced to NGO partners, and only at the end of the project. Engagement with Labor Inspectors—key actors in addressing WFCL in the formal sector and any CLMRS—became mired in inexplicable delays. Management practices were weak and the project team got distracted with planning for an event in the first half of the project which ran into cost and time over runs and ended up being less than inclusive even for the very small number of children who had been selected to participate. The ILO could have piloted and advanced evidence based models for addressing the particular challenges of dealing with WFCL in the context of the refugee situation in Lebanon. The project took steps towards building on traction achieved in Phase I in the memo from the General Security raising the legal age of CL in agriculture by holding informational trainings for key stakeholders in the agricultural sector. But follow up was not evident.

Several initiatives to progress monitoring and referral networks at local and Ministerial levels floundered because of a lack of appropriate expertise, follow up, and practical, strategic vision. In this area in particular, the ILO could have leveraged its partnerships and resources to build a national electronic framework, or at least test what was possible.

The ILO recruited a number of effective partners to deliver services to children who had been withdrawn from or were at risk of child labor. Downstream activities got some traction in the last five months of the project, and exceeded targets for children and families reached with services. Lebanon appears to have no dearth of talent and even infrastructure through the MoSA and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) are responding to the need. Opportunities to investigate the particular needs of working children, children being abused at work, and children at risk of missing an education because of poverty or family situations in collaboration with these government agencies and with the very active civil society sector were not identified.

Disruption in key partnerships will need attention and repair going forward. Indeed strong indications of what was to come were apparent as early as the inception meeting.

Though the first TPCR cites the need for a workplan, none was forthcoming. Some contracting procedures may have also contributed to poor outcomes in the project. Contracting a government official to support project activities distorted the partnership relationship, and may have reinforced rather than enabled divisions within the MoL and weak cooperation between the MoL and the MoSA. Best practice in the selection of service delivery partners would have been possible through a competitive bid and further transparency.

Many of these outcomes could have been addressed early on in the project with better management and M&E feedback loops. Some are a byproduct of working in a complicated environment without the advantage of hindsight which this evaluation enjoys. Recommendations put forward in the next section offer reflections on a way forward.

VII. Recommendations

Based on the findings from this final evaluation of Phase II of the project *Phase II Ending Worst Forms of Child Labor amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities*, a number of recommendations are put forward for consideration. These are organized broadly around the Final evaluation, Phase II Ending the WFCL amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities

three tiers of the project: national policy and sensitization, capacity building and direct services. A cross cutting recommendation related to project management and M&E is also included. These recommendations assume resources to focus on WFCL will be forthcoming, though a number could be carried out by technical staff in ROAS without project funding.

Resource implications are presented in relative terms (low, medium, high) as it is impossible to offer budget amounts with the information available. Broadly, low could be in the \$10-50k range; medium in the \$100-300k range; and high anything above that.

National policy and sensitization

1. The ILO to leverage its position and mandate to re-energize its partnership with the MoL and other government partners on realizing the goals of the NAP.

With a new Minister in place, opportunities to revisit the NAP and create a realistic roadmap for achieving the goals laid out in the NAP should be a priority. The NAP cannot be achieved through the Child Labor unit alone, even if the staff capacity were to be enhanced. The planning process should bring together other key government players, including from within the MoL, the MoSA, MEHE and GS in the first instance (and civil society actors and donors later on). Reconvening the Committee originally formed to move the NAP forward may be an appropriate forum to do this. Inclusion of stakeholder representatives—children who have been withdrawn from WFCL--on the committee could be considered.

Given resource limitations, it will be necessary to triage the activities anticipated in the Plan, to agree on contributions from different Ministries, and mechanisms for cooperation and communication. The ILO can play an important brokering role, and follow up to bring resources to the process.

To act: The ROAS senior management team; relevant government ministries and agencies

Priority: High

Resource Implications: low to convene, high to implement

2. As a multi-lateral with expertise in national-level CL monitoring systems, the ILO to provide technical support to the development of a national CLMRS.

There is support for this objective amongst key stakeholders. The CLMRS development and the systems should be based in the MoL¹⁸, and link as many monitoring and service delivery agencies together, providing a tracking system for children who have been withdrawn from WFCL, the services they receive and their status through to adulthood. It should also include employers who have been implicated in the exploitation of children. The CLMRS should enable networking and referral amongst the various actors by providing information about available resources and appropriate ways of communicating and requesting support.

A user friendly app or secure online database with a user-friendly interface should be developed which can be used on a smartphone. This will encourage use by the range of monitors and service providers. The app should be tested before being rolled out nationally. Security, access and confidentiality concerns need to be preminent in the development.

¹⁸ If capacity in MoL appears too stretched or if other concerns make this an unviable home at the moment, the MoSA may be in a position to host the CLMRS in the short run, as it has the infrastructure and reach.

This activity has four stages parts: 1) development of the architecture and IT system/app; populate the referral component; 2) beta testing; 3) roll out and training; 4) systems management—continuously updating and oversight of confidentiality. The third component is part of capacity building.

To act: ILO HQ Technical Unit; ROAS technical unit; IT consultant (local); MoL and other stakeholders

Priority: Medium

Resource Implications: Medium

3. The ILO and GoL to promote public awareness of the risks and prevalence of the WFCL

Mass and social media may be the most cost effective way to keep the issue of child labor in the public eye. The ILO could consider hiring a small team to design a campaign that profiles current day issues related to child labor (human interest stories), raises awareness about the law, and gives the public information about what to do if they become aware of a child in the WFCL. There is a helpline which has languished and could be reinstated through this campaign. Members of the children's choir could be engaged in the campaign, ideally informally and in smaller groups.

The ILO could also develop video materials that could serve many purposes, including 1) to be used in public awareness campaigns; 2) to be used during trainings and workshops with key stakeholders such as GS, FU, and others partners; and 3) to contribute to M&E qualitative documentation of impact (using the Most Significant Change framework, or Outcome Harvesting).

To act: ROAS technical unit (including M&E); MoL

Priority: Low

Resource Implications: Medium

Capacity building

4. The MoL to continue to recruit and train Labor Inspectors and other law enforcement agents on WFCL

It is widely agreed that while identifying children in dangerous work environments should be part of the Labor Inspectors' remit, the number of LI's is small and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Training for LIs (old and new recruits) as well as others who may be positioned to legally withdraw children from dangerous work environments would ensure wider coverage. This might include police, members of the GS, and the ISF. Training should include both identifying children in WFCL (including for undocumented children); sensitive withdrawal practices; confidentiality; and referral networks and procedures. This activity is directly linked to Recommendation 2 above. There could be reciprocal benefits of initiating the CLMRS and training of LIs and other monitors in tandem.

To act: ILO HQ Technical Unit, ROAS technical unit, MoL and other law enforcement agencies

Priority: Medium

Resource Implications: Medium to low

Direct service delivery

On the basis of the findings of this evaluation, it is not recommended that the ILO undertake major service delivery initiatives going forward. Other UN Agencies are in a better position to do so. It is understood that the ILO cannot abandon links with the front line entirely, as this informs national level work and maintains ILO's profile in the CL space. The ILO could:

5. The ILO to and pilot promising best practices to rehabilitate and protect children withdrawn from WFCL, prevention for children at risk of the WFCL, and vocational training for families with children who have been withdrawn or at risk of being withdrawn from WFCL.

The ILO is best placed to provide evidence behind cost effective approaches to address the particular needs of these populations. Rapid assessment approaches should be applied, including retrospective studies of children and parents who have received the services being studied in order to understand longer term outcomes. Many of the practices that would be profiled to mainstream children into education, youth into vocational training and mothers into income earning activities may also be of interest (or underway) with agencies involved in poverty alleviation activities, including for refugees. Coordination with these agencies will be key.

The ILO should also focus on the particular psychosocial needs of children who have been exposed to or are at risk of the WFCL and test scalable models in the Lebanese context. Again, this may involve an investigation of what has worked in a particular agency, and should be coupled with an assessment of capacity to deliver within government agencies and the broader NGO community—in order to make it relevant.

Results should be presented in a way that is easily accessible to potential users, including policy makers, civil society organizations and potential funders. Evidence needs to be rigorous enough to be credible internationally.

To act: ROAS and ILO M&E technical Units; ROAS technical unit; implementing partners

Priority: Medium

Cost: Medium to high

6. The ILO to continue to fundraise for the issue of child labor

The ILO is well placed to identify international donors interested in child labor. Resources generated to implement activities related to 1.-5. And the realization of the NAP more broadly could be used by the ILO directly. Resources for direct service delivery might be best channeled directly to the implementing agency, with the ILO simply playing a recommending or matchmaking role. This is linked with many of the other Recommendations, and particularly Recommendation 1.

To act: ROAS technical unit and ILO HQ

Priority: Medium

Cost: Low

7. In future projects, the ILO to include work planning and check ins with partners as routine elements of the project cycle.

At the outset of the project, a joint work planning effort with key partners builds a shared vision and commitment. The TPCR rightly pointed to the need for a workplan to guide the project. It should include a timeline, agreed roles and responsibilities, and indicate measurable milestones and feedback loops. It should also anticipate additional check in opportunities to ensure all partners are updated on progress and included in decisions on course corrections. M&E expertise should be represented at such meetings to ensure data collection is planned and is being used for decision making throughout the project cycle.

Strengthened knowledge management and more robust M&E frameworks are essential to ensure efficiencies and advance learning.

To act: ROAS technical and administrative units and M&E; implementing partners

Priority: High

Cost: Minimal

8. In future projects the ILO to clarify roles and responsibilities of project staff and consultants in contractual and planning documents.

This should be done before projects launch, and include milestone check in's by Senior Management with project teams to ensure harmonious team functioning and adherence to project commitments and ILO regulations.

To act: ROAS technical and management units and M&E

Priority: High

Cost: Minimal

Annexes

Annex 1. ToRs



INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
TECHNICAL COOPERATION

**Terms of Reference (ToR) for Final Independent Project Evaluation
“PHASE II Ending Worst Forms of Child Labour (WFCL) amongst Syrian Refugees and
Lebanese Host Communities”**

1. KEY FACTS	
TC Symbol:	LBN/17/02/NOR
Countries:	Lebanon
Project title:	Ending Worst Forms of Child Labour (WFCL) amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities PHASE II
Duration:	17 months
Start Date:	1 st October 2017
End Date:	31 st March 2019
Administrative unit:	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
Technical Backstopping Unit:	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
Collaborating ILO Units:	FUNDAMENTALS
Evaluation requirements:	Final Independent Evaluation
Donor:	Norway
Budget:	US\$ 1,005,136

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Project Background

The situation of child labour in Lebanon has worsened over the past few years for both Lebanese and non-Lebanese children including Syrians, Palestinians and other refugees. The immense pressure on Lebanon's economy, already limited services and infrastructure, and the rising unemployment among adults and youth have led families to resort to child labour as a means of survival. Children are dropping out of school. They are forced into unacceptable forms of work in order to have access to basic needs such as food and shelter. This is especially the case among Syrian Refugees. Child Labour, including the worst forms of exploitation, is seen everywhere, but especially in particular sectors of work such as agriculture. They are also apparent on the streets (where children are at risk of being lured into commercial sexual exploitation, drug trafficking and armed conflicts) and in small service establishments and construction.

The project had 2 phases: the first phase which was implemented from September 2019 until August 2017, and Phase 2 which was a continuation of activities and was implemented from October 2017 and is ending in March 2019.

Together, the two phases responded to and contributed to the objectives of the revised National Action Plan (NAP) for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour by 2020 in Lebanon, which was launched by the President of the Republic in December 2013. They also support the implementation of Decree 8987, which prohibits a number of forms of work by children under the age of 18 in Lebanon, and the recent Memo issued at the end of 2016 by the General Security (GS) Directorate, prohibiting work in the agriculture sector by both Lebanese and non-Lebanese children under 16 years of age. Of importance to note is that this memo was the result of advocacy, awareness raising, and capacity building work done by the ILO with the General Director of the General Security during the first phase of the project.

The two phases of the project contribute to the implementation of the following components of the NAP:

- Legislation and Law Enforcement
- Integration into the educational systems, Economic opportunities for parents and youth of working age;
- Capacity building and development;
- Prevention
- Withdrawal
- Rehabilitation.

Key Components of Phase II:

1) Awareness Raising: Phase II of the project continued working on raising awareness of children on the dangers of the WFCL, its effect on their health, and means for them to protect themselves from hazards and exploitation. Awareness raising included their families, employers, policy makers, and the public at large. This was initiated in Phase I of the project through the establishment of children's podiums (Choir is an extension of the Podium emphasizing use of music to reach a larger audience in the country), where they can express their needs, challenges, obstacles, aspirations, and dreams. During Phase II, a National Choir Against Child Labour was established from Lebanese and non-Lebanese, including Syrian refugees at risk and working children from different areas in Lebanon (Beqaa, North, South, and Mount-Lebanon). Around

1200 children were planned to be auditioned by Maestro Selim Sahab, to select 100 children (boys and girls), to establish a choir.

2) Capacity Building: This component was maintained from phase I, given the important role of the inspectors in controlling the use and exploitation of the children and withdrawing them from WFCL and streets. Under phase II the plan was to reinforce the capacity of Internal Security Forces (ISF) who serve in urban areas of Lebanon such as Beirut, Tripoli, Saida and Nabatieh, noting that capacities of the ISF.

3) Direct Services for Children: Direct support to children continues to be a top priority for ILO's work in the area of child labour in Lebanon. Phase II provided social, educational, protection and recreational services to at risk and children engaged in WFCL, including street children and those who work in the agriculture sector. BEYOND Nabatieh Centre (currently under construction, funded by Phase I), BEYOND Ouzai day care centre, and the 24-hour facility Centre "Home of Hope" which receive working street children, continued to be supported by the project. Fully-fledged services were provided to identify sectors of children involved in WFCL during phase II. A focal point was appointed in Kahale Centre under the ILO "Country Level Engagement and Assistance to reduce CL" (CLEAR) project, funded by USDOL to work on establishing the Child Labour Monitoring and Referral System (CLMRS). Phase II continued supporting the CLMRS considering its importance in terms of keeping records and maintaining a database on the children, including personal information (identity, place of birth, country, gender Male or Female, etc.), number, cases as most of these are either referred to by various governmental institutions (Police, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labour, etc..), or were abandoned by their mothers, or the parents are divorced, or for any other reason.

Phase II also supported the BEYOND Community Centre Against Child Labour in North Lebanon which was originally established with funds from Save the Children International in 2016. This is a center located in a very poor area concentrated with a big number of children including Syrian Refugee children. The majority of those children work on the streets. The existence of the center is a crucial and necessary, as its location is perfect for the local community and identifying children working on streets. A package of services, including direct educational, recreational and socio-economic services for working children and their families in that area.

4) Livelihood Programmes: Livelihood interventions was designed and implemented during this phase. It included life skills, vocational training and small income generating projects to be provided to the adult head of household, on condition that his/her child remains out of the WFCL. The targeted number of the families would be 20, to be selected across the governorates.

5) Child Labour Monitoring System: Two committees were planned to be established in Nabatieh, and if possible, another one in Tripoli. These required capacity building and operational support. The CLMRS committees are extremely important for the identification of children engaged in WFCL within the vicinities and regions of all supported centres. These committees will refer the children to appropriate services provided by the relevant Ministries.

Immediate Objectives and Outputs

Outcome 1: Policy and legislative amendments and sensitization of relevant institutions.

Output 1.1: Capacities of members of FU, Agricultural Unions and Employers Associations strengthened to implement GS memo to prohibit WFCL in agriculture under 16 yrs.

Outcome 2: Capacity Building

Output 2.1 Labour Inspectorate at MOL strengthened to carry out inspection visits to selected industrial areas

Output 2.2: Internal Security Forces from Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, capacities, strengthened to attend to working street children effectively based on UNCRC principles

Outcome 3 Direct Support:

Output 3.1 Children involved or at risk of being involved in the WFCL, provided with initial integrated support against child labour through community centres in Nabatieh, Ouzai, Kahale, Beqaa and Tripoli.

Output 3.2: Tripoli Community Centre against Child Labour Operative

Output 3.3: Vulnerable households have access to livelihood opportunities through Ouzai, Nabatieh, and Tripoli community centres

Output 3.4: Two CLMS committees established and operational in Nabatieh and North Lebanon areas to coordinate services in vicinities of centres

Output 3.5: National Choir against child labour established

Geographical Coverage of the Project

As described above, the project covers national level interventions in Lebanon.

Beneficiaries

The target group of the project includes the following:

- Labour Inspectors at the Ministry of Labour;
- Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (Directorate of the General Security, and Internal Security Forces);
- BEYOND centres in Ouzai, Tripoli and Nabattiye;
- Kahale Home of Hope Centre;
- Members of FU, Agricultural Unions and Employers Associations;
- Children working in very exploitative forms of agricultural work as well as those facing all forms of exploitation on the streets. These include sometimes children at-risk of or involved in prostitution, drug trafficking and armed conflicts. Moreover, the project targets children working in construction and small services establishments; and,
- Families of children involved in WFCL will also be directly targeted in order to relief their children of social and economic burdens.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Evaluation Background

ILO considers evaluation as an integral part of the implementation of development cooperation activities. Provisions are made in all projects in accordance with ILO evaluation policy and based on the nature of the project and the specific requirements agreed upon at the time of the project design and during the project as per established procedures.

The project document states that an independent final evaluation will be conducted, which will be used to assess the progress towards the results, identify the main difficulties/constraints, assess the impact of the programme for the targeted populations, and formulate lessons learned and practical recommendations to improve future similar programmes.

ILO's established procedures for development cooperation projects are followed for monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the project throughout the project cycle and at different stages of project execution. Specific

components of ILO's M&E plan include a multi-layered logical framework and work plan to measure the timely achievement of results at the activity and output level as well as change at the objective level.

Monitoring of individual objectives and activities based on indicators in the logical framework feed into the progress reports.

Purpose

The final evaluation will be conducted to examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, and potential impact of the project and provide recommendations for future similar projects. This evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned.

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- Determine the impact of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- Provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements and the possible avenues/intended objectives and results of a second phase of the project
- Document lessons learned, success stories, and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained.

Specifically, the evaluation will examine the following aspects:

- Changes in context and review of assumptions (relevance): Is the project's design adequate to address the problem(s) at hand? What internal and external factors have influenced the targeted groups and [implementing partners] to meet projected outcomes? Were the project objectives and design relevant given the political, economic and financial context? The consultants should present a brief overview of the policy environment and the economic and business conditions.
- Results in terms of outputs achieved (effectiveness): Did the programme reach the expected number of targeted groups? Are the beneficiaries satisfied with the quality and delivery of services? If not, in what way did the services not meet with expectations and why? What concrete improvements and changes have taken place as a direct result of the program?
- Assessment of outcome/ impact (effectiveness): How has the project contributed towards project's goal? To what extent has the project contributed the capacity of the constituents? How could the project impact have been improved?
- Achievement of projected performance indicators and targets (efficiency): What has been the project performance with respect to indicators and agreed responsibilities with respect to program implementation? Cost, time and management staff?
- Sustainability: The report should assess the level of the project's sustainability. Will the project's effects remain over time? Will the project's activities/services continue to be provided after the funds have completely been expended?
- Lessons learned: The consultant should provide information on the economic/political/financial conditions that should exist, qualifications of the implementation partners, required stakeholder participation, and other factors that should be in place to inform the design of future operations. What are the derived lessons learned from the project's second phase implementation?

The evaluation will comply with ILO evaluation policy, which is based on the United Nations Evaluation Norms and Standards and the UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed.

Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will look at the project activities, outputs and outcomes to date. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political and environmental constraints. The evaluation
Final evaluation, Phase II Ending the WFCL amongst Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities

will also take specific note of the role of – UN constituents in the implementation and integration of gender mainstreaming in their respective organizations.

In particular, the evaluation will examine the quality and impact of project activities on the target groups, looking at:

- **Development effectiveness:** The extent to which the development intervention’s agreed objectives and intended results were achieved;
- **Resource Efficiency:** The extent to which resources were economically converted into results, including mention of alternative more cost-effective strategies when applicable;
- **Impact:** Positive and negative, intended and unintended long-term effects;
- **Relevance:** The extent to which the development intervention of the project meets the needs of constituents, country needs, global priorities and donor policies;
- **Impact of Training:** The extent to which the training delivered matches the needs of PAM and had an impact on daily work and process improvement.
- **Sustainability:** The continuation of benefits and probability of continued long-term benefits after the project has been completed.
- **Partnerships:** The extent to which the project contributed to capacity development of the involved partners, the effectiveness of partnership development and implications on national ownership and project continuity/sustainability;
- **Lessons learned and good practice:** Good practices identified by the project, key lessons learned from programme implementation, and recommendations for similar programmes/projects.

Clients of Evaluation

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Lebanon, and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation.

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

The evaluation utilizes the standard ILO framework and follows its major criteria:

Relevance and strategic fit

1. How well does the project’s approach fit context of the on-going crisis in Lebanon?
2. How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donors Lebanon and the region?
3. Are the project objectives aligned with tripartite constituents’ objectives and needs? What measures were taken to ensure alignment? How does the Project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region?
4. To what extent does the project fit into national development and humanitarian response plans?
5. To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the Sustainable Development Goals and the agenda 2030?
6. Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
7. How well does the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address the crisis in Lebanon? Does the project’s design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions have failed to address?

Validity of the design

1. Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are logical correlations between the overall objective, outcomes, and outputs)?

2. On the whole, were project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?
3. Does the project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing the project's progress? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate? Are the assumptions for each objective and output realistic?
4. To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring an increase in self-reliance and an enhancement of social cohesion and the improved capacities of the involved institutions? To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring enhancement of capacities of ILO constituents?
5. To what extent did the project design align with the Country Programme Outcome?
6. Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes, how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?
7. To what extent did the project design take into account: Specific gender equality and non-discrimination concerns relevant to the project context? As well as concerns relating to inclusion of people with disabilities?
8. To what extent the project considered relevant SDG targets and indicators (ies)?
9. Are project indicators and milestones/targets gender inclusive? Is data sex disaggregated in the M&E plan?

Project progress and effectiveness

1. What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the overall objective and outcomes? (analysis of achievements and challenges by outcome is required) In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes? Are the project partners using the outputs? Have the project outputs been transformed by the project partners into outcomes?
2. How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives? How effective was the collaboration with the relevant ILO offices, media, and non-governmental organizations working on child labour, and what has been the added value of this collaboration? What systems been put in place to enhance collaboration with government institutions working on this issue and how?
3. To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects?
4. How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
5. To what extent did synergies with and operation through local organizations help to ensure the sustainability of the impact of the project i.e. through building capacity?
6. What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
7. To what extent did the achievement of the indicators lead to the attainment of the outcomes?
8. What unintended outcomes can be identified?

Efficiency of resource use

1. To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? To what extent can the project results justify the time, financial and human resources invested in the project?
2. To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?

3. What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
4. How could the efficiency of the project be improved?

Effectiveness of management arrangements

1. What was the division of work tasks within the project team and between the agencies? Has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? And if not, why not?
2. How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?
3. How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?

Impact orientation

1. What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention?
2. What were the interventions long-term effects on more equitable gender relations or reinforcement of existing inequalities?
3. To what extent are national partners able and willing to continue with the project? How effectively has the project built national ownership? In what ways are results anchored in national institutions and to what extent can the local partners maintain them financially at end of project?
4. Sustainability
5. Are the results achieved by the project likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project? How will activities and/or management structures be financed when the project ends?
6. Did the project put in place measures to ensure the continuity of access to solar energy after the end of the project?
7. To what extent was sustainability of impact taken into account during the design of the project?
8. To what extent have the interventions advanced strategic gender-related needs?
9. What was the role of the project in resource mobilization?

Lessons learned:

1. What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied to similar future projects?
2. If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

5. METHODOLOGY

An independent evaluator will be hired by the ILO to conduct the evaluation, which will be managed by the Regional Evaluation Officer (REO). The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. Any changes to the methodology should be discussed with and approved by the REO and the Project.

- a) Desk Review

The evaluator will review project background materials before conducting any interviews or trips to the country.

- b) Briefing

The evaluator will have an initial consultation with the REO, relevant ILO specialists and support staff in ROAS. The objective of the consultation is to reach a common understanding regarding the status of the project, the priority assessment questions, available data sources and data collection instruments and an outline of the final assessment report. The following topics will be covered: status of logistical arrangements, project background and materials, key evaluation questions and priorities, outline of the inception and final report.

c) Individual Interviews and/or Group Interviews

Following the initial briefing, the desk review and the inception report, the evaluator will have a mission to Lebanon, and have meetings with constituents/stakeholders together with interpreters supporting the process if needed. Individual or group interviews will be conducted with the following:

- a) Project staff/consultants that have been active;
- b) ILO ROAS DWT Director, RPU, and Senior Specialists in Gender, Child labour, etc;
- c) Interviews with national counterparts (government, public institutions, social partners, IPs, etc.);
- d) Interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries;
- d) Debriefing

Upon completion of the missions, the evaluator will provide a debriefing to the Project team, ILO DWT and ROAS on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations in Beirut at ROAS. The evaluator will also debrief stakeholders to validate results.

Evaluation Management

The evaluator will report to the ILO REO in ROAS and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the REO. The ILO ROAS office will provide administrative and logistical support during the evaluation mission.

Evaluation Timeframe

Responsible person	Tasks	Number of Working days	Tentative timeline
Evaluator	Desk review of project documents and phone interview with key informants		
Evaluator	Inception report		
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in respective countries	Evaluation missions to Lebanon		
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in respective countries	Stakeholders Workshop and presenting preliminary findings		
Evaluator	Drafting report		
Evaluator	Submission of the report to the evaluation manager		
Evaluation manager	Circulating the draft report to key stakeholders		
Evaluation manager	Send consolidated comments to evaluator		
Evaluator	Second Draft		
Evaluation Manager	Review of Second Draft		
Evaluation Manager	EVAL approval		
Evaluator	Integration of comments and finalization of the report		

Total days: X Days

6. MAIN DELIVERABLES

The main outputs of the evaluation consist of the following:

- Deliverable 1: Inception Report
- Deliverable 2: Draft evaluation report
- Deliverable 3: Stakeholder debrief and Powerpoint Presentation (PPP)
- Deliverable 4: Final evaluation report with executive summary (as per ILO's standard procedure, the report will be considered final after quality review by EVAL. Comments will have to be integrated)
- Translation of the final report into Arabic (Project team)

Inception Report

The evaluator will draft an Inception Report, which should describe, provide reflection and fine-tuning of the following issues:

- Project background
- Purpose, scope and beneficiaries of the evaluation
- Evaluation criteria and questions
- Methodology and instruments
- Main deliverables
- Management arrangements and work plan.

Final Report

The final version of the report will follow the format below and be in a range of **25-30 pages** in length, excluding the annexes:

1. Title page
2. Table of Contents, including List of Appendices, Tables
3. List of Acronyms or Abbreviations
4. Executive Summary with key findings, conclusions and recommendations
5. Background and Project Description
6. Purpose of Evaluation
7. Evaluation Methodology and Evaluation Questions
8. Key evaluation findings (organized by evaluation criteria)
9. A table presenting the key results (i.e. figures and qualitative results) achieved per objective (expected and unexpected)
10. Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations (identifying which stakeholders are responsible and the time and resource implications of the recommendations)
11. Lessons Learned (in prescribed template)
12. Potential good practices (in prescribed template)
13. Annexes (list of interviews, TORs, list of documents consulted, etc.)

The quality of the report will be assessed against the EVAL Checklists 4, 5, and 6. The deliverables will be submitted in the English language, and structured according to the templates provided by the ILO.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

REQUIREMENTS

The evaluator will have experience in the evaluation of development interventions, expertise in child labour and other relevant subject matter, an understanding of the ILO's tripartite culture, and knowledge of the Lebanese and regional context. He/she will be guided by high professional standards and principles of integrity in accordance with the guiding principles of the international evaluation professionals' associations. The evaluator should have an advanced degree in social sciences, proven expertise on evaluation methods, and the ILO approach. Full command of English will be required. Command of the national language would be an advantage. The consultant should not have any links to project management or any other conflict of interest that would interfere with the independence of the evaluation.

The final selection of the evaluator will be approved by the Regional Evaluation Focal Point in the ILO ROAS based on a short list of candidates.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The External Evaluator is responsible for conducting the evaluation according to the terms of reference (ToR). He/she will:

- Review the ToR and provide input, propose any refinements to assessment questions, as necessary, during the inception phase;
- Review project background materials (e.g., project document, progress reports).
- Prepare an inception report;
- Develop and implement the evaluation methodology (i.e., conduct interviews, review documents) to answer the evaluation questions;
- Conduct preparatory consultations with the ILO REO prior to the evaluation mission.
- Conduct field research, interviews, as appropriate, and collect information according to the suggested format;
- Present preliminary findings to the constituents;
- Prepare an initial draft of the evaluation report with input from ILO specialists and constituents/stakeholders;
- Conduct a briefing on the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the evaluation to ILO ROAS;
- Prepare the final report based on the ILO, donor and constituents' feedback obtained on the draft report.

The ILO Evaluation Manager is responsible for:

- Drafting the ToR;
- Finalizing the ToR with input from colleagues;
- Preparing a short list of candidates for submission to the Regional Evaluation Officer, ILO/ROAS and EVAL for final selection;
- Hiring the consultant;
- Providing the consultant with the project background materials;
- Participating in preparatory consultations (briefing) prior to the assessment mission;
- Assisting in the implementation of the assessment methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in meetings, review documents);
- Reviewing the initial draft report, circulating it for comments and providing consolidated feedback to the External Evaluators (for the inception report and the final report);
- Reviewing the final draft of the report;
- Disseminating the final report to all the stakeholders;
- Coordinating follow-up as necessary.

The ILO REO¹⁹:

- Provides support to the planning of the evaluation;
- Approves selection of the evaluation consultant and final versions of the TOR;
- Reviews the draft and final evaluation report and submits it to EVAL;
- Disseminates the report as appropriate.

The Project Coordinator is responsible for:

- Reviewing the draft TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials, including studies, analytical papers, reports, tools, publications produced, and any relevant background notes;
- Providing a list of stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the inception report;
- Participating in the preparatory briefing prior to the assessment missions;
- Scheduling all meetings and interviews for the missions;
- Ensuring necessary logistical arrangements for the missions;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the initial draft report;
- Participating in the debriefing on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
- Providing translation for any required documents: ToR, PPP, final report, etc.;
- Making sure appropriate follow-up action is taken.

8. LEGAL AND ETHICAL MATTERS

- This evaluation will comply with ILO evaluation guidelines and UN Norms and Standards.
- The ToRs is accompanied by the code of conduct for carrying out the evaluation “Code of conduct for evaluation in the ILO” (See attached documents). The selected consultant will sign the Code of Conduct form along with the contract.
- UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed throughout the evaluation.
- The consultant will not have any links to project management or any other conflict of interest that would interfere with the independence of the evaluation.

9. ATTACHMENTS

- ILO Policy Guidelines for evaluation: Principles, rationale, planning and managing for evaluations, 3rd ed. 2017: https://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationpolicy/WCMS_571339/lang--en/index.htm
- Evaluation Guidelines: https://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_176814/lang--en/index.htm
- Evaluation Policy: https://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationreports/WCMS_603265/lang--en/index.htm
- Code of Conduct form for evaluators: <http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-code-of-conduct.doc> Gender Checklist: http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm
- Stakeholder engagement Checklist: http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165982/lang--en/index.htm

¹⁹ The REO is also the Evaluation Manager.

- Inception report Checklist: http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165972/lang-en/index.htm
- Evaluation title page Template: http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_166363/lang-en/index.htm
- Good practices Template: <http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-goodpractice.doc>
- Lessons learnt Template: <http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-lesson-learned.doc>
- Evaluation summary Template: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_166361.pdf

Annex 2. Key Informants

1. ILO ROAS Project Officer, Mrs. Rabia Jalloul
2. ILO HQ Geneva (CLEAR project), Mr. Ricardo Furman, Mr. Michail Kandarakis (phone interview)
3. ILO ROAS Deputy Regional Director, Mr. Frank Hagemann (participated separately debrief)
4. ILO ROAS Chief of Programming, Mr. Oktavianto Pasaribu (participated in all debriefs)
5. ILO ROAS Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Ms. Nathalie Bavitch (interview and debrief)
6. Norwegian Embassy, Senior Development Program Officer, Ms. Manal Kortam
7. Ministry of Labor (CL Department), Ms. Nazha Shalita
8. ILO former technical consultant, Ms. Hayat Osseiran (short phone interview)
9. CLMRS consultant, Ms. Nidal Hamdan
10. Cluster evaluator, former ILO consultant, Ms. Vera Chiodi (phone interview)
11. Dar el Amal (staff, heads of SDCs, children, parents, teachers in Tripoli, Akkar, Chiyah), headed by director of Dar el Amal, Mrs. Hoda Kara
12. Borderless (staff, children, parents, teachers in Ouzai), headed by Borderless co-founder, Mrs. Randa Ajami
13. Home of Hope, Brady Black, Education Director of HoH, Raghida Assal, Director of HoH
14. Lebanese General Security, Col. Talal Youssef
15. Director of the Farmers Union, Mr. Bahjat Harati (phone interview)
16. CL workshop attendees (2), Ms. Fatat Hajj Diab, Secretary of the National Association for Rural Women and Mr. Hsayn Darwish, Farmers Union (phone interviews)

Annex 3. List of Documents reviewed

1. Background reference reports:
 - a. World Bank (2016): Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
 - b. Lebanon Decent Work Country Programme For Lebanon 2017-2020
 - c. United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) Lebanon 2017-2020
 - d. Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 with 2018 update
 - e. National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Form of Child Labour in Lebanon by 2020

2. ILO:
 - a. Report on Work Achieved for Norwegian, RDPP, CLEAR and other related child labour projects in Lebanon for months of January , February, March, April, May & June 2018
 - b. ILO response to comments of Norwegian Embassy on Child Labour Lebanon Phase II
 - c. ILO Project Financial Status Report by Project Outcome, Output and Activity and Expenditure Category (20-SEP-2017 - 31-MAR-2019)
 - d. Norway Child Labour Lebanon Phase II proposal
 - e. Approval Minute sheet
 - f. Evaluation: Country Level Engagement and Assistance to Reduce (CLEAR) Child Labour: GLO/13/22/USA
 - g. OBB Excel sheets (V01, V02, V03, V04)
 - h. Budget revisions (BRRF V02 and BRRF V03)
 - i. LBN1702NOR 31.12.2017 Financial Statement
 - j. Results framework for project
 - k. CLEAN Norway Child Labour Lebanon Phase II - Logframe 30.08.2018
 - l. Norway Child Labour Lebanon Phase II - Logframe (REVISED 18.09)
 - m. CLEAN TPCR PHASE II, Reporting period: 1st October 2017 to 31st March 2018
 - n. ILO evaluation: SYR1601RBS_Final_CLusterEval_2018, Date of evaluation: April – June 2018

3. Farmers' training reports and attendance sheets:
 - a. Nabatiye Workshop session report – Rana Barazi – 08-01-2018
 - b. Akkar workshop session report – Rana Barazi – 20-12-2017
 - c. Bekaa workshop session report – Rana Barazi – 25-12-2017
 - d. 3 attendance lists for Baalbeck
 - e. 3 attendance sheets for Akkar
 - f. Attendance sheet for Nabbatiyeh

4. MoL
 - a. Minutes of the preparatory meeting to build a follow-up and referral system for Child labor 12 April 2018
 - b. Nazha Shalita new TOR – 15 Jan – 30 June 2018
 - c. Letter to ILO from MoL to confirm Ms. Nazha Shalita's additional responsibilities towards the project

5. Dar El Amal

- a. Roster for children participating in the project, age ranges 6-18 9 (including transportation receipt) – dated November 2018 to March 2019;
- b. 3 lists of participants for Beirut autoprotection workshop, dated 15/2/2019, and one list for the same workshop in Tripoli dated 22/2/2019
- c. Agenda of training for social workers, one in Beirut in SDC center in Chiah, 15 February 2019, and the second in Dar Al Amal center in Tripoli, 22 February 2019
- d. List of recreational activities across all DAA centers and SDCs in Tripoli and Beirut, from Nov 2019 to Feb 2019, including dates of each event and number of participants

Annex 4. Interview Protocols

ILO Team

1. What is your role in the ILO? Was your role in the project?
2. What were the key achievements of this project? What do you attribute these to?
3. What were the biggest disappointments in terms of what was expected? What do you attribute these to?
4. In addition to what you've told me, let's talk about each of the components of the project. Review each of the outcomes and outputs in turn, asking:
 - What was accomplished?
 - How effective were these trainings/activities/partnerships? How did they contribute to the overall goal?
 - How sustainable do you think these investments/efforts were in terms of on-going efforts to address WFCL?
 - What could be done differently or better in future?
 - How did this initiative address gender issues?
 - If this objective or output was not undertaken, why not?
5. What factors contributed to the underspend in the project, and its extension?
6. Why was a second progress report to the end of the project not prepared?
7. How did you monitor results as the project was unfolding? Aside from anecdotal evidence, what evidence do you have now about outcomes and outputs?
8. What factors in the country or local environment were most important helping the project achieve its goal? (This can be anything from good partners to strong policy to supportive donor to a change in the political or economic environment)?
9. How does the project fit into broader work in Lebanon on child labor and related issues? Has the project leveraged other initiatives and partnerships to help achieve its goals? Explain.
10. What were the most important factors in the country or local environment impeding achievement of the project goals?
11. (If this has not already been covered): How effectively do you think this project was managed? Explain. What stands out as good practice? How could it have been better managed? What support did the project receive from the regional office?
12. What do you see as priorities for the ILO in tackling the WFCL going forward? Explain.
13. Are there particular questions you would like this final evaluation to explore?

Specific questions following briefing from the Project Coordinator and receipt of second round of documents received:

1. The tracked changes in the logframe and your responses to the Norwegian Embassy Qs were quite helpful. It looks like the target for number of children reached was reduced based on the issues with Beyond but I don't seem to have access to the original logframe, and the number (500) does not appear to be changed in the doc. Can you clarify what the original target was, and what it was reduced to (i.e. what it is now)?
2. Also, will you be able to confirm achievements to date for this and other targets so we can include them in the evaluation?
3. Under Outcome 3. you have an indicator · 200-250 policy makers and public at large, sensitized on WFCL.
Who are these policy makers?
4. Also, You had indicated that you were not focusing on municipal government actors. The DAA mid term report suggests municipalities have been greatly involved in their work, and cited Tripoli in particular (the municipality has offered space for project activities). It would be good to meet them (Marianne please note). Did I misunderstand?

5. For DAA: Were the proposed activities and budget put forward in their proposal approved as presented?
6. Is there a difference between the SDCs and Dar el-Amal programmatically? Sounds like SDCs are government and Dar is an NGO with close ties (as you explained) to government and the SDCs? Are they independently responsible for project delivery in different places?
7. The Mid Term Report from DAA suggests that a number of types of trainings--for Inspectors and Social Workers-- will occur in Feb, 2019. Just in case, if its happening during the time we are in the field, we would like to attend/observe for an hour or so if possible? (Marianne, pls note)
8. For Borderless: it appears their contract is for 2.5 months only and covers activities that would merit on-going support (e.g. educational support and safe space for children). What is the plan after that? Ditto for DAA.
9. Output 3.1 in the logframe includes ref to 710 children receiving "awareness raising" and then literacy and numeracy through HoH.
Sounds like the Norwegian Embassy was not keen on HoH.
Can you clarify the reason?
It sounds like you discontinued your relationship with them?
Does this target still apply?
10. Your target in the logframe for livelihood support to parents is now 130 (20 from hh's of children working in WFLCL and 110 at risk hh's)? The number of sites is quite extensive. Can you clarify how these hh's were selected? It sounds like each was given different types of "tools" according to their skills to help them engage in remunerative activities. How did this work?
11. In their questions about revisions of the Plan, the Embassy asks about IRC and you note that they are a dissemination agency for information about CL. Can you provide more information about what this? Should we be meeting IRC?
12. It sounds like in your revised budget you asked for salary increases for staff and that there was a discussion with the Embassy about this in terms of a force majeure. Could you explain this please and also confirm whether this increase was ultimately approved?
13. I'm confused about the Ministry of the Interior role. In your interview and in your last email you indicated they declined to participate in the project, and so should be removed from this final evaluation. However, in the (undated) document entitled "Effects of Revision on Project scope-CL project phase II" (which extends the project to March 2019), the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (Directorate of General security) are listed as a target group. Pls advise.
14. Did Beyond submit a proposal for their work in the project? If so, could you share?
15. Is the budget presented in the attached file (31.08.2018) the final agreed budget for the no cost extension for this Phase II project?
16. In this budget there appears to be a new line item (row 13, Output .2. 1.2) for a workshop for 25 "LI's" (Labor Inspectors), which looks like its delivered by someone from Geneva. This also appears in the work of DAA. Can you explain?

Norwegian Embassy/MFA

1. How does this project fit into your overall portfolio in Lebanon? (Explore issues, partnerships)
2. Why did you decide to fund a Phase II?

3. Based on your knowledge, what have been the main achievements of this project? Review the key elements of the project if respondent is aware.
4. What have been the main disappointments?
5. How do you feel about how the project was managed?
6. Do you plan to fund a follow up phase? If yes: what would be your expectations/focus?
7. Did you have any input into the selection of partners for this project? What were your concerns about Home of Hope?
8. Are you familiar with the current partners—Dar el-Amal and Borderless? Do you know why they were chosen?
9. What do you know about the irregularities that were identified by the ILO under this project? Has the emergence of information about altered your views of the implementing partners, and future planning for work in this space? Has it affected your relationship with government agencies?
9. Have you visited this project in the field?

Government of Lebanon: MOL and Ministry of Social Welfare

1. You have signed a number of international agreements and have a national action plan for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor by 2020—next year. What have been the biggest achievements in realizing the goals of this plan in practice? What have been the major challenges? (Explore both political, refugee, as well as capacity and funding issues)
2. We are evaluating the second phase of a three year long effort by the ILO to support achievement of the goals of the national plan. The MoL/MoSW was a key partner. There were a number of components of this project. Looking back, how relevant and effective do you think these were to addressing WFCL in the country? (Go through the components and ask about each).
3. Going forward, what do you consider of highest priority? Would you make changes to current strategies? How?
4. Would you add or remove components from a future program? Explain
5. How would you describe your relationship with the ILO? (Talk about communications, technical advice, resourcing)
6. Have partnerships with any other organizations been important in the implementation of this project? Please explain and also explain your relationship with these partners. For MoSW ask about the SDCs and Dar el_Amal.
7. How does this project fit into other projects addressing child labor in Lebanon?

Farmers' Union, Agricultural Unions and Employers Association representatives

1. What do you know about child labor in Lebanon?
2. Why is the issue of child labor of interest to you and your members?
3. What initiatives have you taken in the past or are you taking now to address child labor?
4. What kind of support did you receive from the ILO over the last 18 months to support your efforts to address child labor? (If training probe on duration, trainers, topics)
5. Who benefited/participated?
6. Did you collect any information about what participants learned or how they felt about trainings? Do you have any other evidence to suggest the trainings or other support made a difference in practice? Probe.
7. Are there other initiatives that might help address the issue of child labor going forward?

Municipal government officials

1. Is child labor a major factor in your area? What contributes to child labor? How has this changed over the last 3-5 years?
2. What is your role in addressing this issue?
3. What kind of staffing, resourcing, policy, administrative support do you get to help you play this role? What are your biggest challenges?
4. Have you received any support from the ILO to help you carry out this role? If yes, what kind of support? Are there other partners working on this in your locality? If yes, what do they do and what is your relationship to them?
5. What were the best things about this support? Probe.

6. What could have been better about this support? Probe.
7. Would you like to receive it again? If so, would you change anything about it? If not, why not?
8. Are there other things that can be done to address child labor? If so, is there a role for your organization in this? What kind of support would allow you to undertake this role?
9. How aware is the public about the laws against child labor? How aware are employers about the law? How do most people learn about this?

Labor Inspectors

1. Is child labor a major factor in your area? What contributes to child labor? How has this changed over the last 3-5 years?
1. What is your role in addressing this issue?
2. How do you receive and record information about incidents of child labor? What actions do you take?
3. What challenges do you face in carrying out this role?
4. Did you receive training from the ILO? What was it about? How beneficial was it? Were there things you would have liked to learn that you didn't?
5. How aware is the public about the laws against child labor? How do most people learn about this?

Social Workers

1. What is your background and training? How long have you been working at this organization? What is your job?
2. What do you think are the key factors contributing to child labor?
3. What does your organization do to address this?
4. What kind of support, training or otherwise, did you receive from the ILO partner (name) over the last year? Did it help you to do your job? How?
5. What other kind of training or support would help you do your job better, particularly in relation to children who have been engaged in child labor or are at risk of child labor?
6. What do you think the effect of this program has been on the children (probe for specifics and examples)?
7. If this program were supported again, what would you change?

National NGO partners and staff

1. Can you give us a history of this NGO/Children's home? Why was it founded? What services does it provide and to whom? What is your job?
2. What do you think are the biggest contributors to child labor in your community? Who else is working on this issue? What is your relationship to them?
3. What kind of support have you received from the ILO, in prior years and in the last 18 months? What has this support allowed you to do?
4. Aside from financial support have you received training, staff, other types of resources or information?
5. Taking these one by one, ask about how many people have benefited and how. Probe.
6. For parents and older children: How were the areas for vocational training selected? How were trainees selected? Do you provide any support in security work? Loan? Do you do any follow up to see if the training resulted in improved remuneration?
7. [For DAA]: who designed the FGD guides and what was their purpose? Who used them? Where is the information? Probe about the emphasis on religion for younger kids; emphasis on testing for older ones. Why?
8. What have been the biggest challenges you've faced in providing these services?
9. How do you measure success?
10. Going forward what kind of support would be most valuable to help children who have been removed from child labor?

CLMRS excol

1. What is your background—experience and education?

2. How did you find out about this consultancy? What were the ToR?
3. Has the CLMRS committee met in Mt. Lebanon? If yes, ask for details.
4. You collected a lot of interesting information in your report. How has it been used? How has it been shared?
5. Do you know about other CLMRS committees in other parts of the country? Have you interacted with them?
6. Do you know about the CLEAR project? Did you get support or have any interaction with this project in your work on the CLMRS?
7. Based on your analysis, what recommendations do you have for the ILO in addressing the need to build national CLMRS going forward?
8. Based on your analysis what do you think are the biggest challenges to addressing the WFCL in Lebanon? What are the most cost effective responses, given the current capacity in country?

Children at community centers

1. Intro's. Name, age, gender, birth order, schooling. How long living in this location.
2. Who lives in your household? Probe about parents status. Who is earning in your household?
3. Q's for use in probing story about child labor: What kind of work were you doing before? How long did you do this work? How many hours a day did you have to work? How much did you earn? Were you mistreated?
4. Why were you working? What were your earnings spent on?
5. Would you be willing to go to work again soon? Why or why not?
6. Could you tell me about a typical day at your job before? How is it different from a typical day for you now?
7. Q's for story about removal from CL: Who brought you to this center? How did you feel when you came here? What was your family's reaction? How long ago was that? How do you feel now? What do you like about this place? What do you dislike?
8. What do you want to be when you grow up?

Parents who have received IGA support

1. Intro's. Name, age, gender, number of children, number of adults in household. How long living in this location.
2. Who lives in your household? Who is earning?
3. How did you hear about support from the ILO/community organization? What did you have to do to be selected?
4. What did you receive? How did you use it? If investment in a business, did you get other types of support (training, networks)? What is happening with your business now?
5. Looking back, if you got this support again, would you use it in the same way? Why? Why not?
6. Has it allowed you to keep your children out of working? What are the children doing now?
7. Up to which age do you feel you can continue to provide for your children?
8. Do you know any other families in your community where the children engage in paid labor? What are the reasons this is happening, in your opinion?
9. What recommendations would you have for programs/services to allow children not to engage in paid labor at a young age? Where is the key area of intervention, in your view?