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iTrack
Evaluation

ILO EVALUATION

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This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO’s evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office

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Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
CO	Country Office
CfW	Cash for Work
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
EA	Evaluability Assessment
EIIP	Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme
EO	Employer Organisation
ESS	Environmental and Social Safeguards
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoJ	Government of Jordan
IA	Implementation Agreements
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ILS	International Labour Standards
JORISS	Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis
JRP	Jordan Response Plan
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LIIP	Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Programme
LRBT	Local Resource Based Technology
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOL	Ministry of Labour
MoPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing
MoLA	Ministry of Local Administration
PSU	Project Support Unit
PwD	People with Disabilities
ROAS ¹	Regional Office of Arab States
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TNA	Training Needs Analysis
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNSDf	United Nations Sustainable Development Framework
WO	Workers Organisations

Executive Summary

This report details the results and findings of a cluster evaluation of Phase III, IV and V of the *Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme (EIIP), Jordan*. The programme's three phases covering varying implementation periods. The programme is supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank (KfW) to assist the Jordanian government in ensuring that Syrian refugees and Jordanians can access better living conditions through increased employment and improved infrastructure.

The purpose of the evaluation was two-fold:

- To assess programme progress towards the achievement of key results (outputs and outcomes) and to identify the main difficulties/constraints,
- To document key lessons learned and provide practical guidance and recommendations to improve programme implementation for the remainder of the implantation period and into a possible new phase (Phase VI).

The evaluation undertook a summative assessment of the following criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The approach sought to assess the level of progress and overall achievement of key outputs and outcomes. The evaluation also applied a formative/forward looking approach to recommend possible corrections in the implementation strategy and associated M&E framework and plan. It also identified good practices and lessons learned to inform a possible Phase VI.

The evaluation addressed the questions contained in the ToR (Annex 1). To simplify the process, questions were disaggregated into primary and secondary. The focus was on addressing primary questions, but secondary questions were used to inform and guide questioning and overall analysis. Key findings incorporated a mix of primary and secondary questions. Primary and secondary questions are detailed in Annex 2

The evaluation was primarily qualitative in nature. Key steps included: (i) a desk review of available documents; (ii) an initial briefing with the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme team; (iii) key informant interviews (KIIs) with key stakeholders; (iv) focus group discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries and contractors; (v) data analysis and synthesis. The evaluation also had a number of limitations including time and resources; (ii) remote working; (iii) language related challenges; (iv) judgements; and (v) attribution.

Summary of Key Findings

Relevance

The programme remains relevant to address the needs of supporting Syrian refugees. Relevance has also been heightened with the outbreak of COVID-19 which affects not only Syrian refugees but the broader Jordanian population as well. Lockdowns and subsequent economic contraction have left both Jordanian and Syrian populations vulnerable and the importance of Cash for Work (CfW) and other employment initiatives (e.g. Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme) are more relevant than ever.

The programme aligns to BMZ/KFWs support in Jordan. This support can be traced back to the London Conference and there is strong alignment between the rationale and strategic intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and German government policy. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic risked undermining many of the gains made to support Syrian refugee livelihoods. The pandemic has affected both Syrians and Jordanians in similar ways. Poverty, vulnerability and unemployment have risen in the past 18-months.

The programme aligns to the ILO Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) for 2018-2022. Principles identified in the DWCP include (i) employment creation; (ii) decent working conditions; and (iii) the promotion of decent work. Through the DWCP, the ILO seeks to work in close partnership with the government and social partners to address the challenges of low growth and high unemployment, particularly among women and youth.

While the impacts of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme through the asset creation or maintenance activities on incomes and decent work are short-term, they have the potential to extend the impact through the benefits of the improved assets and influencing the policies and approaches of national and international development partners. The programme's objectives and outcomes do remain relevant to the context. However the short-term nature of work and short phases of implementation to date to make it difficult to focus on longer-term outcomes.

Validity of the Design

Coherence between the development objective, outcomes and outputs is a key condition of overall programme design. The overall objective of the programme is *Syrian refugees and Jordanians have better living conditions because of increased employment and improved Infrastructure*, remains relevant and appropriate¹. The degree to which outcomes and other associated outputs have been delivered or are in the process of being delivered are dependent on design and implementation arrangements. These are in turn highly influenced and determined by the operating context both within institutions and also in the broader national context. This is particularly apparent during the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Results frameworks across implementation phases maintain some similarities but also contain new outputs and indicators for each phase. However, it is evident that similarities remain. This is evidenced by references to "improved access to infrastructure", "jobs created", and "increased income". There does not appear to be a Theory of Change (ToC) to guide implementation and management. A recent Evaluability Assessment (EA) was completed and makes reference to a ToC, but it is unclear if one exists, and the EA did not propose one.

The selection of workers to participate in the programme has always been a contentious issue. In earlier phases the programme, under the direction of KfW, the focus was on having all works completed by Syrian refugees. Over time this was relaxed towards a 50-50 split with equal representation between Syrian and Jordanian workers. In Phase IV and V there has been increased pressure from the GoJ to transition to 70-30 split favouring Jordanian workers. It is a challenging context when the programme operates under the laws of Jordan. Merit can be seen in favouring Jordanian workers, particularly in light of COVID-19 restrictions and the associated economic slowdown. However it is important to recognise the strategic intent of the programme from the outset which was to support Syrian workers. The report recommends that the 50-50 split is maintained but in cases where Jordanian workers are more apparent, then a case can be made to have a higher proportion of Jordanian workers in these circumstances. In effect, decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis based on opportunity and context.

The implementation of a phased programme approach benefits the donor in terms of its reporting obligations to the German Government, however it is problematic from an implementation and management perspective. The short-term nature of implementation creates a degree of uncertainty, particularly among workers and municipal authorities.

With the focus on job creation, it is clear why the BMZ methodology for the definition of a "job created" is applied. In theory the concept makes sense but in practice it is difficult and not ultimately focused on longer-term outcomes of job creation and employment. The use of labour-intensive methods is a core

¹ As indicated in the Evaluation Scope section...there has been limited evaluation or assessment of "better living conditions."

foundation of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and ILO's overall approach. In light of the commentary above, it is still possible to strike a balance between skilling-up workers and promoting labour-based approaches.

Effectiveness

At face value, it is clear that the programme has reached and, in some cases, exceeded targets. This is a significant achievement as demonstrates sound progress in terms of implementation and management. However, the lack of formal outcome statements and associated methodology to assess higher level impacts and change is an area that requires attention.

The work permit issues continue to hamper implementation efforts. The issue has been raised in progress reports and a previous evaluation of Phase I and II. The problem does appear entrenched and is linked to a variety of factors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that delays are due to the breakdown of engagement between Syrian and Jordanian workers (i.e. the 50-50 worker split when a 70-30 model is preferred), institutional inefficiencies, and also due to the type of employment being offered. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific reason for the delays. The programme has sought to engage with the MoL and MoLA to address the issue but it appears far from settled. The introduction of a Project Support Unit (PSU) is an important step to help facilitate the process. In light of previous evidence it is suggested that a different approach be taken. This would involve maintaining the minimum split of 50-50 Syrian and Jordanian workers but also look to prioritise Jordanian workers in selected sites

Training provision for both government officials and contractors has been welcomed and is appreciated. Evidence from progress reports indicate the numbers of participants and the results frameworks indicate proportions of participants with increased knowledge. However it is unclear as to how this training is leading to better practices for contractors, improved institutional systems and better policy and regulatory frameworks. Vocational Training for workers (and contractors) is the way forward if it opens up opportunities for long-term employment. Asset creation is important but unemployment does remain a major issue.

Moving forward it is encouraged to maintain the competitive selection process for municipalities and also the open ballot process for workers as it does reduce the potential for interference and the allocation of jobs based on municipal government preferences and social networks. However it is important in this light to ensure all populations have access to participate. Programme management has been consultative and participatory. The programme maintains strong working relations with MPWH, MoL and MoLA. Strong engagement and participation has underpinned implementation and has been a strong contributor to the achievement of results to date across the three Phases of implementation.

Sustainability

There is evidence of the programme contributing positively to sustainability. Relationships with municipal authorities are robust and all have expressed strong appropriation and gratitude with regards to the support received to date. COVID-19 has severely hampered national and municipal budgets and funds are scarce for on-going service-delivery type programs. The programme has filled an important gap in supporting the CfW program that help maintain employment and income distribution.

In terms of work with MoL, MoLA and MOPWH, relationships remain strong. The proposal of establishing PSU is positive and proactive and leads to a whole range of support and new areas of work to underpin work. The programme have contributed to establishing a foundation for sustainable road maintenance by working with national partners. Engagement with social partners (EO and WOs) is generally weak. The focus to date has been on supporting government and municipal partners and relationships are strong.

At this stage of analysis, there is scope and justification to continuing the programme, however, there does need to be a shift in mindset in a number of key areas. Further analysis is provided in a later section, but the key considerations include:

- A reduced reliance upon short-term employment contracts and a focus on developing a “hybrid “ approach that involves some on-going short-term work coupled with longer-term employment underpinned by in-depth training and vocational training support.
- A shift away from simple municipal works towards work that has higher economic returns and that involve constructing assets. This ideally will be in road maintenance works which can absorb higher levels of labour but also in agroforestry and tree planting exercises.
- A renewed focus on institutional support to MoL and MOLA to support enhanced capacity in project management and oversight, including financial management and reporting.
- Working with municipalities that demonstrate a commitment to infrastructure enhancement and asset creation.

Efficiency

Overall, the programme has achieved a relatively high degree of efficiency. The number and scope of contracts across the three phases have provided opportunities to improve livelihoods on an on-going manner. Also, the focus on core areas of work (i.e. work sectors) enables to programme to achieve a degree of economies of scale in that work is replicated and systems and processes are in place and can be built upon during subsequent phases.

In terms of the delivery of milestones and results, the programme has been able to make significant progress towards to the achievement of planned targets and results. The programme has leveraged opportunities through the CfW working group to harmonise efforts to ensure programmes remain aligned to remove duplication and overlap.

The programme has done well to promote the involvement and engagement of women. The programme has learned from previous experience in earlier phases around the engagement of women and to a lesser degree PwDs. Solid participation rates have been realised through culturally and context specific publicising and influencing activities through community leaders and the promotion of strategies such as women-only work teams, direct payments to women and training of contractors on gender- specific recruitment and retention.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements

Overall management functions appear to function well within the team. There has been a recent turnover of CTAs due to retirements and the donor did express concern at not being informed about the changes. However since 2019, there has been a consistent presence.

Technical backstopping and support are present but not entirely effective. Given the long duration of implementation, coupled with the level of expertise on the team, there is limited need to have technical support. COVID-19 travel restrictions also meant that relevant HQ support has not be able the travel to the project sites, however as part of a decentralisation of responsibility, technical support is provided from the region. There is a need to strengthen the technical backstopping support as all ILO projects require some form of technical and specialist support, particularly for quality assurance and ensuring work is aligned to specific DWCP outcomes.

Monitoring and evaluation systems are relevant and appropriate. When combined with technical supervision and oversight, there is a good coordination and progress to collect and present data against agreed targets. In terms of evaluation, there is scope to strengthen this element of work.

Impact

The programme has made a tangible contribution to improvements in job creation and broader capacity development support with contractors and government officials. The programme has been constrained somewhat by the work permit issues however the establishment of the Project Support Unit (PSU) in the MOL is a positive and proactive step. The short-term nature of work and contracts makes it difficult to influence long-term changes. The promotion of longer-term work arrangements would contribute positively to possible changes in work permit arrangements and would potentially facilitate more timely approvals and awards.

The programme has made a strong contribution to social cohesion and peace and conflict prevention. Feedback from interviews and focus group discussions reveal that the programme contributes in a positive manner. Workers view each other as “brothers and sisters” in working together. However some tensions are evident in some pockets, particularly with the selection of workers which is not always seen as transparent and fair.

Response to COVID-19

Despite the challenges of COVID-19 and associated restrictions, the programme has continued to meet and serve the needs of workers. A key achievement has been the development and approval of a COVID-19 safety plan. This plan is now applied across the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and has also been recognised and picked-up by other donors and NGOs working in the CfW space.

The programme is committed to supporting safe work environments and safe work practices. The programme has ensured workers are protected while working, this not only includes safety equipment but also COVID-19 responsive approaches including, social distancing, maintenance of hygiene practices and the use of masks and other personal protection equipment (PPE). Funding has been repurposed in an appropriate manner to support this.

Good Practices, Challenges and Lessons Learned

The programme has implemented a series of good practices and has also identified key lessons learned. Good practices include: (i) Institutional capacity and support are integral to effective CfW and LBT; (ii) a focus on asset creation and associated maintenance is critical for longer-term success; (iii) support to facilitate work permits is important; and (iv) application of social safeguards and associated monitoring and follow-up is a good practice that is well embedded. Key lessons include:

- **Key Lesson 1:** Programme phases should be extended to allow time for planning, implementation and longer-term engagement. Longer durations also support opportunities to address new and emerging needs and trends. The strategy also allows for better review and evaluative assessments, particularly as they relate to longer-term outcomes.
- **Key Lesson 2:** To promote active engagement it is important to work within existing municipal plans and to align activities to priority areas of work. It is also important to engage with local partners (WOs and EOs) as part of the process to facilitate employment and to maintain the tripartite model.
- **Key Lesson 3:** To promote longer term sustainability, there is a need to move way from CfW type approaches to adopt a mix of short-term assistance along with longer-term employment efforts aimed at promoting infrastructure enhancements and asset creation potentially in collaboration with EO's and WO's.

- Key Lesson 4: To promote the concept of CfW and Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, more in-depth monitoring and evaluation should occur (rather than simply counting jobs) to provide an evidence-base to support future planning at municipal and donor levels

The programme has also experienced challenges across the three phases. Key challenges have been identified following a document review of progress reports and reconfirmed during interviews. Significant challenges include: (i) approval and granting of work permits; (ii) short overlapping phases; (iii) the definition of “job creation”; (iv) payment processes particularly with short-term employment, is complex and requires significant investment of time and resources; (v) distinction between basic and more complex works; and (vi) the impact of COVID-19 and associated restrictions.

Guidance for Potential Phase VI

From the outset, the evaluation recommends an extension phase (Phase VI) of up to three years. This finding is based on the evidence presented regarding the complexity of short and overlapping phases presented above and also the benefits of allowing longer implementation periods for planning and implementation.

The first consideration is to consider the overall strategic intent of the program. The ideal situation is to transition the programme towards the overall intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and to gradually shift away from CfW. To achieve this end the following steps are proposed:

- The programme to liaise with all programme partners regarding an extension into Phase VI. This will include a review of the overall development objective, associated outcomes and the scope of work.
- As part of the consultation process, the programme should develop a detailed ToC which maps out the strategic intent of the programme and provides a more detailed narrative of the rationale and link between longer-term employment prospects and infrastructure enhancements.
- The extended phase should contain a six-month transition/inception period which will enable current work to be completed while planning for the next phase. Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme will need to complete all activities and expenditure under Phase V before transitioning.
- The scope of work should focus on longer-term employment arrangements involving infrastructure provision/asset creation and maintenance. Work with contractors should be prioritised. However there is a need to transition from the current CfW arrangements. The programme should ideally remove all CfW arrangements over time, however this can occur in a gradual manner. Municipality participation should be contingent upon a willingness to transition to these new arrangements, underpinned by longer-term contract arrangements.
- Training to focus more on detailed vocational training. To achieve this end the programme should undertake a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) of needs and priorities. A comprehensive TNA is required to map out longer-term job opportunities aligned to the strategic intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme. This also includes an assessment of national service providers. The focus group discussions highlighted a number of priority areas for support.

Key Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The programme should commence immediate planning for an extension into Phase VI. This will involve coordination with KfW and government authorities at the central and municipal level to discuss and agree on the strategic intent and focus and overall mix of work priorities going forward.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme (EIIP)/ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank (KfW) / Government of Jordan (GoJ)	High	Short	High

Recommendation 2: The Phase VI should focus on asset creation and infrastructure enhancements in line with the strategic intent of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme while reducing the focus on CfW in a staged and coordinated manner in close consultation with municipal authorities.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoLA	High	Short	High

Recommendation 3: As part of Phase VI, the programme should review the development objective and set clear outcomes with associated outputs. This will also involve developing a detailed ToC that will underpin implementation and management arrangements going forward. Complementing this revised approach should be a review of evaluation studies, particularly on institutional reforms and change as a result of training and advisory support and the impacts of work on household income.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW	High	Short	High

Recommendation 4: Options should be considered to lengthen employment contracts beyond the current 40-days. The 50-50 split between Jordanian and Syrian workers should be maintained but reviewed over time to ensure on-going relevance and appropriateness. However, where possible and appropriate, Jordanian workers can be prioritised, particularly for more skilled labour requirements with contractors.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/GoJ	High	Short	High

Recommendation 5: The current geographical scope of work and engagement should be maintained. Municipalities should continue to competitively bid for work and for worker selection, open ballots maintained with set criteria to target and support vulnerable workers. Contractor arrangements to remain the same and the focus should be on using skilled workers.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoLA	High	Short	High

Recommendation 6: In light of a focus towards more longer-term employment, the programme should explore further opportunities to support more in-depth vocational training and job placement strategies with external training service providers. This work should be underpinned by a detailed TNA completed in the first six-months of Phase VI.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoL	High	Short	High

Recommendation 7: The current training programme for government officials and contractors should be maintained but targeted to focus on areas of support that address the changes proposed in earlier recommendations. To complement the training programme, a “fit-for purpose” evaluation strategy should be developed and applied to assess longer-term impacts and changes as a result of support.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/GoJ	High	Short	High

Recommendation 8: Trial a new approach to the worker permits which builds upon the support to be provided by the PSU. The focus should be on raising awareness of the potential strategic shift in structure of work arrangement and the focus on longer term employment involving Jordanian workers. The trial should last for appropriately 12-months during the first year of Phase VI.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoL	High	Short	High

Recommendation 9: Promote the Jordan CO to a fully-fledged country office so as to minimise dependency upon the RAS office. This will support more streamlined, efficient and effective decision-making and overall financial and administrative management.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/ROAS	High	Short	High

Recommendation 10: Promote an existing staff member to a deputy CTA/operations manager to remove the intensive obligations of the CTA. This will help share roles and responsibilities and promote an opportunity for a team member to develop relevant and appropriate management and leadership skills.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/ROAS/KfW	High	Short	High

Introduction

This report details the results and findings of a cluster evaluation of Phase III, IV and V of the *Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme (EIIP), Jordan*. The programme's three phases covering varying implementation periods.²The clustering of the phases into one evaluation is an effective approach given the overlapping nature of the phases. It also promotes an opportunity to develop a more detailed narrative and derive lessons that can inform a possible future phase.

The programme is supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank (KfW) to assist the Jordanian government in ensuring that Syrian refugees and Jordanians can access better living conditions through increased employment and improved infrastructure.

The main purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress towards the results, identify the main difficulties/constraints, and to formulate lessons learned and provide practical recommendations to improve the programme implementation for on-going phase V and a potential new phase VI to commence in early 2022. A copy of the evaluation's Terms of Reference (ToR) is included as Annex 1 and a copy of primary and secondary questions is included as Annex 2.

Background the Programme

Jordan's geographical location made it a neighbouring country to host refugees from Syria. From the most recent data, Jordan hosts around 700,000 registered Syrian refugees, although a more realistic total is estimated at around 1.3 million when considering those refugees that remain unregistered³. Jordan's population of approximately 11 million makes the proportion of refugees account for 12% of the total population. This places considerable pressure on the social, economic and infrastructure landscape within the country.

A combined study by the ILO and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 2015 reported that the Jordanian labour market prior to the Syrian conflict had a participation rate of 67% among men and 18% among women. Unemployment rates were approximately 14% for Jordanians with a higher average for female and young Jordanians at around 30% for both groups. The study reported that the unemployment rates among Jordanians at the time of the study marked the 22.1%. This rate has increased since and currently hit 23%⁴.

The demographics of Syrian refugees residing in Jordan has its own reflections on the labour market. A vast majority lived in rural areas in Syria prior to the conflict, they are younger when compared to Jordanian host communities and generally have lower education levels and qualifications⁵. The informal sector is the most likely source of employment where 99% of Syrians work in the informal sector in comparison to 50% of Jordanians⁶.

Work in the informal sector is usually characterised by sub-standard wages, poor working conditions, and exploitive practices such as child labour. At the same time, competition for jobs has led to social tensions. This is of particular concern in the northern governorates, Zarqa, Irbid and Mafraq, and in Amman where

² JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III): 1 November 2018 – 31 May 2021; JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV): 12 December 2018 – 9 August 2021; JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) 1 November 2019 – 30 November 2021

³ [Syrian refugees | ACAPS](#)

⁴ Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS) [Department of Statistics \(dos.gov.jo\)](#), unemployment rate for Q2 of 2020.

⁵ 60 per cent of the Syrian refugees above the age of 15 have never completed basic schooling, and only about 15 per cent of the refugees have completed secondary education, compared to 42 per cent of Jordanians above the age of 15. (Reference ILO and FAO study).

⁶ Stave and Hillesund: Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market (ILO and FAO 2015).

the share of Syrian refugees is higher. The southern Governorate of Karak on the other hand is an area dominated by tribes, requiring a greater understanding of sensitivities of tribal relations.

In 2015, the ILO commenced implementation of a Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Programme (LIIP) to support the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in creating immediate jobs through employment intensive programmes. The programme started in Irbid and Mafraq and has since expanded to cover locations in other parts of the country (central and southern Governorates). Phases I, II and III (2016-2020) were in Irbid and Mafraq. Phase IV (2018-2021) extended southwards to Amman, Jerash, Ajloun and Zarqa. Phase V (2020-2021) continues southwards to Karak. Phases III and IV focus on the creations of jobs within local municipalities and public works such as environmental clearing, maintenance and minor works in public areas and alongside national roads. Typical activities are waste collection and disposal, grass cutting, kerb and footpath construction, fence painting and drain clearing. Phase V has sought to build upon the focus of Phase III and IV and open opportunities for the participation of workers in labour market oriented vocational training (from Phase IV) for longer-term employment, in partnership with accredited training providers. This represents a shift in the focus from municipal works towards more longer-term employment initiatives. It is also important to note that the programme has maintained a strong focus on capacity building and training for government officials, contractors and workers during the three phases of implementation

Main GoJ partners for the programme include, the Ministries of Labour (MoL), Public Works and Housing (MPWH), and Local Administration (MoLA). The programme has been supported and funded across the three phases by BMZ through KfW. The support has assisted the GoJ in ensuring that Syrian refugees and Jordanians can access better living conditions through increased employment and improved infrastructure. The programme is headed by the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), and receives technical and programmatic backstopping from the ILO Regional Office of Arab States (ROAS) and the ILO's DEVINVEST Branch

Evaluation Scope and Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was two-fold:

- To assess programme progress towards the achievement of key results (outputs and outcomes) and to identify the main difficulties/constraints,
- To document key lessons learned and provide practical guidance and recommendations to improve programme implementation for the remainder of the implementation period and into a possible new phase (Phase VI).

The primary clients of this evaluation were Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme staff, ILO ROAS and HQ, ILO constituents in Jordan, government entities, and the BMZ/KfW. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation. A list of people interviewed during the evaluation is included as Annex 3.

The scope of the evaluation was a: (i) final evaluation for Phase III in completed sites; (ii) final evaluation for Phase IV in completed sites; and (iii) mid-term evaluation for Phase V in on-going sites. This cluster evaluation has a thematic as well as a geographic dimension and focus. The theme is the application of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach to provide livelihood support through work in asset creation and preservation for refugees and host communities. There is further elaboration of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme theme and its relevance in the crisis context later in this section.

Some fundamentals of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach of the ILO, which distinguishes it from other initiatives to support the poor and vulnerable through a cash transfer in return

for work as a condition (commonly known as Cash for Work – CfW), are briefly described before examining the objectives of the programme being evaluated. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach is often described as employment intensive investments which “link infrastructure development with employment creation, poverty reduction and local economic and social development”. In practice it encompasses maintenance of existing or development of new and improved assets to protect their value and maintain overall quality.

The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach is complemented by the decent work agenda and while the infrastructure investment provides short-term employment, there is a focus on sustainability of the assets and livelihoods through: (i) the contribution of improved assets to better livelihoods; (ii) generating longer term employment in maintaining created or improved assets, and (iii) influencing policy and institutionalising the employment intensive approach to contribute to a pro-employment development strategy

The number of jobs is an indicator required by the donor. The programmes use three indicators of employment generated, the total number of worker days, the total number worker days created and the number of job opportunities generated (i.e. number of persons employed for a minimum of 40 days in a year). The number of worker days is the most widely accepted and flexible measure of the amount of employment created. The definition provides some flexibility on the part of workers and employers. Some workers may leave after a short duration either because the work does not suit them, they have not performed as expected or they have found other preferred work, while others may prefer to work longer if the project offers such an opportunity. Employers can release workers who are not suited or unwilling to work or retain good workers for longer periods.

The programme also has indicators related to access to infrastructure and income. It has the advantage of estimating the number of persons and their households who benefit from a minimum of 40 days of employment. The targets for access to infrastructure are quite broad and are just based on the population of the municipality. This is quite general, particularly for those municipal works which relate to simple jobs such as rubbish removal. This cannot be classified as improved infrastructure. However if the work is on asset creation or road maintenance, justification could be made. The target and result should ideally be differentiated against each type of work.

Table 1 below summaries the results hierarchy along with definitions and a summary of key targets along the results chain.

Table 1: Summary of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme Jordan Results Framework Hierarchy

Results Hierarchy	Definition	Summarised from Results Framework
Inputs	Human and financial resources.	Finance, expertise (including technical, management and administration).
Activities	Processes and actions which convert inputs into outputs.	Programme and project planning, tendering and procurement, implementation, monitoring, supervision and management.
Outputs	The products, assets or services resulting from the activities.	(i) Number of jobs created; (ii) Short-term decent inclusive employment (minimum % participation of women and PwD); (iii) new or improved assets; (iv) strengthened institutional and technical capacities, and (v) employability for participants beyond short-term programme employment.
Outcomes	Expected effects of the outputs.	Contribution to the improvement of the livelihoods of Syrian refugees and members of the host communities through increased employment and improved assets.
Impacts	Long-term or higher level likely or actual effects.	Improved household income, new businesses and improved economic activity. Contribution to improving the resilience of host communities and reduction of tensions between the refugees and host communities.

It is important to note that the results frameworks for the programme have evolved over time. Access to infrastructure and increased income remain consistent. Improvement in living conditions is stated as a common goal but there is little evidence through evaluation efforts to assess this. Long-term employment and improved livelihoods is severely impacted by the work permit issue. The issue mainly affects Syrians as they are unable to improve livelihoods and longer-term employment. It is an issue that affects all CfW programs in the country.

The key point is that the variances in the results framework do make it difficult to assess similar variables. The desk review of the results framework identified some similarities and core areas that will underpin the completion of the evaluation. Overall assessment of the programme's success will be viewed through the following objectives: (i) short-term employment for Jordanians and Syrians (including women and people with disabilities -PWD); (ii) improvements in the preservation or development of infrastructure assets; (iii) strengthened technical capacity of both government officials and contractors; and (iv) employability and livelihood improvements for the longer-term.

Evaluation Criteria, Key Evaluation Questions and Methodology

In line with the United Nations' good practices for evaluations, as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation (2020)⁷, the evaluation undertook a summative assessment of the following OECD/DAC criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The approach sought to assess the level of progress and overall achievement of key outputs and outcomes.

The evaluation also applied a formative/forward looking approach to recommend possible corrections in the implementation strategy and associated M&E framework and plan. It also identified good practices and lessons learned to inform a possible Phase VI.

To the extent possible, data collection and analysis was disaggregated by sex as described in the ILO Evaluation Policy Guidelines and relevant Guidance Notes (refer to footnote 7). The evaluation sought to actively promote gender equity approaches to ensure women's views were included. Strategies involved, a careful selection of interviewees to ensure women were well represented from within the ILO, government and workers. Two FGDs were held with female workers and beneficiaries. Questions for FGDs were targeted to specifically identify issues related to women and their perceptions and future needs. The analysis also included a review of disaggregated data collected through the project for reporting purposes.

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, this evaluation applied the protocol on collecting evaluative evidence on the ILO's COVID-19 response measures through project and programme evaluations⁸ and followed tips on adapting to the COVID-19 situation in the ILO⁹. As it has been mentioned earlier, three separate evaluations have been clustered into one. A set of specific questions were asked to evaluate effects of COVID-19 and concerned adjustments to the programme and its achievements. After carefully reviewing scenarios, the primary data collection took hybrid approaches where individual interviews were conducted remotely to minimise the risk of COVID-19 transmission, while a national translator was deployed to be on site for focus group discussions.

The evaluation addressed the questions contained in the ToR (Annex 1). To simplify the process, questions were disaggregated into primary and secondary (see Annex 2 for the detailed list of questions). The focus

⁷ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_571339.pdf

⁸ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_757541.pdf

⁹ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_744068.pdf

was on addressing primary questions, but secondary questions were used to inform and guide questioning and overall analysis. Key findings incorporated a mix of primary and secondary questions. Primary and secondary questions are detailed in Annex 2.

A summary of key tables and events for the evaluation are included in the following table.

Table 2: Summary of Key Tasks


Task	Responsible Person	Time Frame
Inception report submission	Ty Morrissey	7 June 2021
Desk Review of Documents	Ty Morrissey	1-7 June 2021
Planning, identification, and scheduling of virtual interviews	EIIP Team/ROAS	1-7 June 2021
Online interview with constituents/stakeholder/ILO staff members	Ty Morrissey	7-30 June 2021
Drafting of Evaluation Report	Ty Morrissey	1-14 July 2021
Submit Draft Evaluation Report	Ty Morrissey	14 July 2021
Sharing the draft report to key stakeholders	EIIP Team	14-21 July 2021
Response to initial comments and feedback	Ty Morrissey	26-31 July 2021
Stakeholder /Lessons Learned Workshop	Ty Morrissey	4 August 2021
Submit Final Report based on comments	Ty Morrissey	6 August 2021
Approval of the final evaluation report	ILO EVAL	Mid-August 2021

The evaluation was primarily qualitative in nature. Key steps included: (i) a desk review of available documents; (ii) an initial briefing with the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme team; (iii) key informant interviews (KIIs) with key stakeholders; (iv) focus group discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries and contractors; (v) data analysis and synthesis. The criteria to select participants for KII’s involved a “purposeful sample” which identified those stakeholders that would offer the most effective insights based on their overall engagement and involvement the programme. FGD participants were selected on a random basis based on the geographic spread of work and which had a solid participation rate for women.

Desk Review: The desk review was an important component of the evaluation as it provided insights into the structure, design and progress of the phases to date. Document reviewed are included as Annex 4. A master “results framework” has been prepared and is included as Annex 5. The desk review helped shape some of the evaluation questions presented above and has supported the identification of possible areas of enquiries through the KIIs and FGDs. The evaluator also developed a short Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme summary to detail the various components and objectives of each phase. The programme had also recently completed an Evaluability Assessment (EA). The document was also considered in discussing elements related to the results framework and overall approach to M&E.

Initial Briefing: The initial briefing (26 May 2021) was a useful exercise which helped shape the scope of the evaluation, seek clarification on key terms and also to understand the structure of the phases. It also helped prioritise the evaluation questions into primary and secondary priorities. As part of the briefing and inception phase, the evaluation applied a conceptual framework to help shape the direction and to ground the process. Figure 1 below summarises the various dimensions and areas of inquiry.

Figure 1: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework



In supporting the application of evaluation questions, the conceptual framework outlined above evaluation sought to link questions to the local socio-economic context, the capacity and willingness of institutions to engage and support and overall capacity of technical advice and associate government counterparts. This structuring and positioning of the evaluation enabled broad dimensions to be considered which identifying areas of overlap and possible areas of improvement as the program progresses towards a new phase. The interlinking of the spheres allows for the investigation of cross-cutting themes and issues that arise at the intersections of the spheres.

The evaluation adhered to the ILO’s Code of Conduct for the completion of evaluations. It also aligned to relevant ILO norms and standards outlined in the ToR. The evaluation also maintained a high degree of ethical standards with regards to data collection with regards to interviews and data collection. The evaluation fully informed interview and group discussion participants of the purpose of the evaluation and how the information will be used and to seek their approval to participate. Findings and key points were carefully reviewed and synthesised into this report and also into the final stakeholder presentation.

Evaluation Limitations

All evaluations and reviews have limitations in terms of time and resources. Some limitations pertaining to this evaluation were:

Time and Resources: the rigour of the data gathering analysis was constrained to some degree by the time available. The evaluator was not able to meet with all key stakeholders, particularly for follow-up meetings and discussions. However, the evaluator has worked closely with the CTA to identify and select key stakeholders to meet with during the interview process.

Remote Working: Due to the COVID-19 situation it was difficult to conduct face to face meetings and interviews. The evaluator was unable to travel to programme sites.

Language related challenges: Not all stakeholders were able to speak English (and the evaluator does not speak Arabic). Effort was made to have translators available to support the process which was greatly appreciated.

Judgements: the time limitations mean that professional judgements were be employed to interpret stakeholder perspectives.

Attribution: The programme operates in a fluid and dynamic environment and many factors influence performance and operational efficiency. Defining and identifying specific areas of attribution remained challenging, particularly for broader outcome results and impacts.

Key Findings


The following sections provide key findings and analysis against the ToR and evaluation questions (Annex 1 and 2). The findings also lead to key learnings and good practices and a series of practical recommendations and guidance for consideration by stakeholders. Guidance is also provided on the possible extension into Phase VI.

Relevance and Strategic Fit

The programme remains relevant to address the needs of supporting Syrian refugees. Relevance has also been heightened with the outbreak of COVID-19 which affects not only Syrian refugees but the broader Jordanian population as well. Lockdowns and subsequent economic contraction have left both Jordanian and Syrian populations vulnerable and the importance of Cash for Work (CfW) and other employment initiatives (e.g. Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme) are more relevant than ever.

According to the UNCHR (2020) the number of refugees¹⁰ in Jordan remained stable at 702,506. An additional 4,870 people were classified as asylum seekers. Out of the total registered population, 82% (575,108 refugees) lived in urban settings. Of the 127,373 refugees living in camps, 78,679 were registered in Zaatari camp, 42,174 Azraq camp and 6,520 in the Emirati Jordanian camp. Most Syrians registered in Jordan originated from southern Dara's (39.9%), Homs (16.2%), Aleppo (11.4%) and Rural Damascus (11.3%). On a positive note, there has been a 5% decrease in the number of refugees.¹¹

Graph 1: Number of Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan 2018-2020.



The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) reports that 34% of the population in Jordan are refugees.¹²

¹⁰ UNHCR (2020)). In Jordan, refugees are referred to as “population of concern” because they are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However the

¹¹ <https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2549?v=2021#year>

¹² <https://mop.gov.jo/En>

The initial Jordan Response Plan (JRP)¹³ was initiated following the London Conference, “*Supporting Syria and the Region*” at which the JRP was signed in February 2016.¹⁴ The approach of the JRP was: (i) a sector by sector plan in collaboration with multilateral and bilateral agencies to deal with the immediate pressures on social amenities and livelihoods of refugees and host communities; (ii) seeking external financial support to implement the plan, and (iii) an inclusive growth strategy based on more open access for exports to the European Union (EU). The priority for 2020-2022 is to *empower the systems to protect the dignity and welfare of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syria crisis*.

The programme also aligns to the *Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy* which seeks to establish a path for the future to promote an integrated economic and social framework that will govern relevant policies that benefit all citizens.¹⁵ The strategy prioritises social aspects of poverty unemployment and social protection.

The programme aligns to BMZ/KfWs support in Jordan. This support can be traced back to the London Conference and there is strong alignment between the rationale and strategic intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and German government policy. BMZ has identified displacement and migration as a key global challenge.¹⁶ BMZ and KfW consider CfW to be an important mechanism for providing short-term support for displaced persons globally. BMZ has been supporting the GoJ in its response to host refugees, implementing projects in line with the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis and the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP), covering areas such as WASH, energy, education, vocational training and employment, and psychosocial support. All BMZ projects follow an integrative and inclusive approach that targets both refugees and host communities and promotes social cohesion. Moreover, the BMZ integrated approach also applies to the way its support is delivered, building on and strengthening national frameworks and systems, and avoiding parallel structures.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic risked undermining many of the gains made to support Syrian refugee livelihoods. The pandemic has affected both Syrians and Jordanians in similar ways. Poverty, vulnerability and unemployment have risen in the past 18-months. A World Bank/UNHCR study released in December 2020 found that poverty has increased by 38% among Jordanians and by 18% among Syrian refugees compared to before the pandemic. The change for refugees was smaller as a higher portion were already living beneath the poverty line.

The programme aligns to the ILO Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) for 2018-2022. Principles identified in the DWCP include (i) employment creation; (ii) decent working conditions; and (iii) the promotion of decent work. Through the DWCP, the ILO seeks to work in close partnership with the government and social partners to address the challenges of low growth and high unemployment, particularly among women and youth. In addition to the DWCP, the programme aligns to the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF) 2018–2022¹⁷, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the outcomes of the ILO’s Programme and Budget 2020-2021 (Outcome 4 and 5). The programme also aligns to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) -Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth.

¹³ The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022. <http://www.jrp.gov.jo/>

¹⁴ The compact brought together international humanitarian and development actors to support Jordan through multi-year development funding and trade concessions in return for Jordan’s commitment to improving Syrian refugees’ access to education and legal employment.

¹⁵ <http://jordanembassyus.org/sites/default/files/jo2025part1.pdf>

¹⁶ <https://www.bmz.de/en/development-policy>

¹⁷ The UNSDF has identified three focus areas for the period 2018–2022, namely (i) strengthening public institutions and services, (ii) empowering people, particularly vulnerable populations, to “claim their rights and fulfil their duties for improved human security and resilience”, and (iii) expanding opportunities for inclusive participation in the political, economic and social spheres, with a focus on expanding the opportunities of the poor and vulnerable, youth, women, persons with disabilities, migrant workers and refugees.

The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme in Jordan is part of the portfolio of projects delivered through ILO's Employment Intensive Investment Programme globally. Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme globally links *"infrastructure development with employment creation, poverty reduction and local economic and social development."* One of offerings of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme is to support governments to generate job opportunities in response to crises.¹⁸ This offering is well suited to address the circumstances created by the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. A complementary feature of the programme is for the employment generated to be decent. Given that Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme provides short-term employment, the applicable aspects of decent work are delivery of a fair income, equal opportunities and treatment for all, adequate health and safety measures and insurance in the workplace and freedom to express concerns.

While the impacts of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme through the asset creation or maintenance activities on incomes and decent work are short-term, they have the potential to extend the impact through the benefits of the improved assets and influencing the policies and approaches of national and international development partners. The programme's objectives and outcomes do remain relevant to the context. However the short-term nature of work and short phases of implementation to date to make it difficult to focus on longer-term outcomes. Results frameworks tend to focus on specific periods of time rather than taking a longer-term focus on the benefit of "short-term employment" and "employment creation" generally.

Overall the programme is very relevant, however the onset of COVID-19 has broadened the vulnerability of both Syrians and Jordanians which has direct impacts upon the validity of design and effectiveness and ultimately, sustainability. The short-term nature of work and the focus on CfW tends to run "against the grain" of the intent of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme which focuses more on infrastructure development and longer-term employment creation. These issues are picked up in the following sections.

Validity of the Design

Coherence between the development objective, outcomes and outputs is a key condition of overall programme design. The overall objective of the programme is *Syrian refugees and Jordanians have better living conditions because of increased employment and improved Infrastructure*, remains relevant and appropriate¹⁹. The degree to which outcomes and other associated outputs have been delivered or are in the process of being delivered are dependent on design and implementation arrangements. These are in turn highly influenced and determined by the operating context both within institutions and also in the broader national context. This is particularly apparent during the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Results frameworks across implementation phases maintain some similarities but also contain new outputs and indicators for each phase. From one perspective this is positive as the programme evolves and responds to new priorities and work, but it is also problematic as it does not allow of comparison between phases or to provide a body of evidence over an extended period of time. Phase V is the only results framework that contains outcome statements which are linked to outputs. Earlier Phases (III and IV) have objective statement and then outputs (Phase III) and then simply a list of indicators (Phase IV).

However, it is evident that similarities remain. This is evidenced by references to "improved access to infrastructure", "jobs created", and "increased income". Outcome 1 of Phase 5 focuses on job creation and labour market access, while Phase 4 Outcome 1 is focused on increased employment of a specific type. Outcome 2 of Phase IV is focused on improved employability and improved access to the labour market by both Syrian refugees and Jordanians with Output 2.2 referencing both theoretical and practical

¹⁸ <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-intensive-investment/themes/emergency-employment/lang--en/index.htm>

¹⁹ As indicated in the Evaluation Scope section...there has been limited evaluation or assessment of "better living conditions."

training. Outcome 2 of Phase V differs and has a focus on improved infrastructure as a result of the workers' labour. Reference is made among its related outputs to improved roads, improved municipal structure, and improved capacity of public and private partners to implement the project.

There does not appear to be a Theory of Change (ToC) to guide implementation and management. A recent Evaluability Assessment (EA) was completed and makes reference to a ToC, but it is unclear if one exists, and the EA did not propose one. This is an area for improvement and the programme would benefit from having a ToC, particularly in the definition and articulation of outcome statements and the direct causal pathways required to achieve results. It is strongly recommended that a ToC is developed as the programme prepares for a possible Phase VI.

The programme is implemented in the governorates of Irbid, Mafraq, Amman, and Zarqa, and through Phase V a road maintenance and community works programme in selected municipalities in the governorate of Karak was initiated. The selection of municipalities to participate in respective phases is based on key criteria agreed with the MoL and MoLA. Criteria include: (i) number of Syrian refugees living in the municipality; (ii) willingness to adopt and support the strategy of Phase V to *"bring more work to women & more women to work"*, to increase women participation; and (iii) municipalities in which there are no other active projects implemented by other NGOs or the donor, GIZ.

Based on these criteria, MoLA provides a list of potential municipalities for inclusion that is then submitted to KfW for approval and sign-off. Once non-objection is confirmed, the programme proceeds with subsequent steps regarding the discussion of activities, procedures for the recruitment and rotation of workers, implementation procedures, and monitoring and reporting.

The selection of workers to participate in the programme has always been a contentious issue. In earlier phases the programme, under the direction of KfW, the focus was on having all works completed by Syrian refugees. However a 50-50 split with equal representation between Syrian and Jordanian workers has been agreed and applied. In Phase IV and V there has been increased pressure from the GoJ to transition to 70-30 split favouring Jordanian workers. It is a challenging context when the programme operates under the laws of Jordan. Merit can be seen in favouring Jordanian workers, particularly in light of COVID-19 restrictions and the associated economic slowdown. However it is important to recognise the strategic intent of the programme from the outset which was to support Syrian workers. The report recommends that the 50-50 split is maintained but in cases where Jordanian workers are more apparent, then a case can be made to have a higher proportion of Jordanian workers in these circumstances. In effect, decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis based on opportunity and context.

The implementation of a phased programme approach benefits the donor in terms of its reporting obligations to the German Government as the shorter periods align with the donor's finance and reporting cycles on an annual basis. However it is problematic from an implementation and management perspective. The short-term nature of implementation creates a degree of uncertainty, particularly among workers and municipal authorities. It also works against longer-term planning and engagement. The current operating context is challenging which makes the challenges more apparent. Often there are delays with government procurement, subsequent approvals and seasonal events. This often means that work is packed into a shortened timeframe which leads solely to a focus on job numbers and targets which has the potential to substitute quality in the short-term. The programme continues to provide finance and administration support to municipalities. It is important to focus efforts on supporting municipalities to expedite procurement processes. By facilitating a faster procurement process, municipalities are able to realise job creation and mobilise more work opportunities for both Syrian and Jordanian workers.

The short phases also work against the mandate of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme which is to promote longer-term employment, asset creation and infrastructure enhancements. A longer

duration of at least 2-3 years would be preferred which would also allow for more detailed planning and flexibility to respond to emerging priorities and needs.

It is also noted that flexibility needs to be maintained on the duration as experience suggests that large budgets in short-timeframes often leads to “no-cost extensions” which are no efficient or effective. Depending on the size of the budget, the duration needs to reflect the level of investment. It is also very much dependent on the ILO’s ability to handle and disburse funds as well. Therefore longer timeframes would suit both the programme and associated financial and administrative arrangements.

The timeframes of phases also do not allow for effective programme design (or revisions to the design). Tender processes can be delayed, therefore implementation periods that are short do not provide the necessary flexibility to accommodate these delays. Implementation as a result suffers and recent feedback indicates that there is an on-going focus on “jobs created” in each phase. This is problematic and longer-term planning and implementation is required.

With the focus on job creation, it is clear why the BMZ methodology for the definition of a “job created” is applied. In theory the concept makes sense but in practice it is difficult and not ultimately focused on longer-term outcomes of job creation and employment. The short-term working period is useful in times of emergency or humanitarian crisis when employment is scarce and there is a need to mobilise quick resources and income to provide some form of social safety net or floor. However for longer-term development, the focus on short-term work creates a sense of dependency as workers are not being skilled up, trained or supported to progress into higher skilled areas of work. Feedback from municipalities, contractors and workers all indicated a common demand for longer-term employment contracts. Durations of 6-12 months were raised. This needs to be recognised and responded to. Simply counting jobs, based on a defined methodology, is counter-productive and shifts the focus away from long-term development to focus on short-term measures for the simple purpose of counting.

The use of labour-intensive methods is a core foundation of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and ILO’s overall approach. In light of the commentary above, it is still possible to strike a balance between skilling-up workers and promoting labour-based approaches. It is about identifying work sectors and areas that allow for higher productivity and an opportunity for employment. For example, a focus on road maintenance, tree planting and other agro-forestry approaches allow for skilling up of work and the use of labour. Simple rubbish cleaning, painting and grass-cutting are helping short-term measures but are more inefficient in terms of desired outcomes. It is important in this instance to clarify the differences between the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model and CfW. Initiating higher labour intensity maintenance activities for the preservation of assets is a legitimate part of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes but for sustainability a commitment is required from the national or local partner to continue the maintenance beyond the programme intervention. This is an important consideration and requires more detailed briefings with MoL, MPWH and MoLA to clarify the focus on Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme.

The training (of contractors and their staff and the staff of national partners) and supervision, monitoring and support for project implementation built into the design of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes, are essential for the efficient engagement of labour to fulfil the employment creation objective, the decent employment conditions and quality of the works. The programme has invested considerable resources in the provision of training. Feedback from interviews and focus group discussions highlight appreciation of the training in terms of scope and duration. Training has been delivered to MoLA, MPWH and municipality staff primarily in tendering and planning processes. Topics to date have included: (i) Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approaches, (ii) pricing and preparation for bids; (iii) road conditions and inventory; (iv) employment condition and worker recruitment; (v) payment arrangements; and (vi) reporting and finances.

Training of engineers has been provided through an external service provider – the Jordanian Engineers Association. To date, the association has trained 150 engineers in Ministries across 5 modules. Topics include (i) preparing local resource-based work; (ii) preparing local resource-based contracts and tenders' (iii) bidding for local resource-based work; (iv) supervising local resource-based works' (v) executing local resource-based contracts. To date a total of 8 training events have been facilitated.

In terms of institutional capacity development and support there is some ambiguity about the institutional strengthening and capacity building outputs. The output indicators include provision of training to contractors and government officials. To the extent that training is required for the effective implementation of projects, it is better categorised as an activity. Training and other activities such as influencing policy have the potential to extend the application of the employment intensive approach to other projects and to sustain it beyond the programmes. The role of training is not clearly distinguished from its contribution to the effective implementation of project activities in the results matrix or project documents, and such a distinction is difficult to make. The related aspect of influencing policy and other agencies is not specifically mentioned in the results frameworks across phases.

For the possible Phase VI, there are a number of key learnings to take away from the experiences of implementation under Phase III, IV and V. Key learnings include: (i) adequacy of design and a renewed focus on the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model; (ii) longer implementation and management periods; (iii) a focus on outcomes and quality of results; and (iv) extension of employment contracts and work underpinned by training and support. These issues are discussed in the section *Suggested Guidance of Phase VI*.

Effectiveness

The main focus of effectiveness is centred on the extent to which the programme has contributed to the development objective, associated outcomes by producing the planned outputs. Annex 5 provides a summary of respective phases and the achievement of results and targets. The development objective has remained consistent from Phase III ad Phase IV but has shifted in Phase V towards *Programme Impact*. The current objective is to *Improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanians through increased employment and improved infrastructure*. This is a slight shift in structure but does focus efforts on employment and infrastructure.

The programme operates through Implementation Agreements (IA) and contracts with contractors with MPWH, and with selected municipalities under the MoLA. MPWH is responsible for all roads and highways in Jordan. Under MPWH in all governorates that are responsible for the maintenance of the secondary and rural/tertiary roads in the respective area. In addition, under the Directorates there are also Offices of Public Works in all districts that are responsible for the roads in each district. MoLA in turn supervises the functions of the municipal councils and joint services councils to ensure compliance with the laws, regulations and instructions, and their work related with the implementation of local development projects. MoLA is a key institution to reduce the development differences among areas and governorates. MoLA implements a concept of local development as a participatory effort directed towards mobilising community efforts in all its activities with the participation of all partners from public and private sectors and community institutions.

At face value, it is clear that the programme has reached and, in some cases, exceeded targets. This is a significant achievement as demonstrates sound progress in terms of implementation and management. However, the lack of formal outcome statements and associated methodology to assess higher level impacts and change is an area that requires attention. The evaluation acknowledges worker surveys have been completed but there is limited evidence provided as to the “quality” of work and the “transition to other forms of employment” as a result of participation. The same applies to the goal statement and

“better living conditions.” A simple and continued focus on “jobs created” has taken the focus away from longer-term outcomes. It is important that this is addressed and catered for as part of Phase IV. There should be ample evidence over the five phases of implementation to date to collect a significant amount of data for workers and government.

The work permit issues continue to hamper implementation efforts. The issue has been raised in progress reports and a previous evaluation of Phase I and II. The problem does appear entrenched and is linked to a variety of factors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that delays are due to the breakdown of engagement between Syrian and Jordanian workers (i.e. the 50-50 worker split when a 70-30 model is preferred), institutional inefficiencies, and also due to the type of employment being offered. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific reason for the delays. The programme has sought to engage with the MoL and MoLA to address the issue but it appears far from settled. The introduction of a Project Support Unit (PSU) is an important step to help facilitate the process.

In light of previous evidence it is suggested that a different approach be taken. This would involve maintaining the minimum split of 50-50 Syrian and Jordanian workers but also look to prioritise Jordanian workers in selected sites. There should also be a shift away from municipal works as a proportion of total effort to focus support on longer-term employment generation. One option to consider is to prioritise Jordanian workers into the longer-term opportunities along with vocational training while maintaining a focus on municipal works for Syrians. This could be a trial of sorts and combined with an awareness campaign within MoL and MoLA, see if there is an improvement in approvals. The possible trade-offs may be worth trying as a means to secure permits while at the same time satisfying the leadership of MoL and MoLA.

Despite the challenges with worker permits, the programme continues to meet and exceed worker targets. Table 3 below summaries key results.

Table 3: Summary of Access, Income and Worker Day Results by Phase

Key Result Area	Phase III	Phase IV (January 2021)	Phase V (April 2021)
Number of men and women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefited from improved access to infrastructure and services.	225,902	9,175,600	TBC ²⁰
Number of men and Women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefitted from increased income beneficiaries.	17,525	32,515	4,185
Number of worker days created (disaggregated by type of intervention, sex and nationality)	197,996 (27% Women, 5% PWD and 49% Syrian)	419,541 (26% Women, 4% PwD, and 50% Syrian).	26,227 (30% women, 1% PWD, and 41% Syrian)

In terms of the achievement of results across works involving contracts and municipal works, Table 4 provides a quick snapshot.

Table 4: Summary of Results by Work Sector Phase III and IV²¹

Phase III and IV	Total Cost (JOD)	Planned Worker Days	Actual Worker Days	Planned Jobs	Actual Jobs	Labour Intensity


²⁰ In reviewing the Phase V results framework, a target of 350,000 has been set but unclear if any reporting has commenced. No further information in progress reports.

²¹ At the time of preparing report, Phase V data was unavailable.


Highways	1246721	57337	56632	979	938	63%
Performance Based Management Contracts	4264129	188700	188182	2516	2460	62%
New Roads	3100330	86812	85800	580	608	39%
Municipal Works	5878244	384933	383219	6246	6580	78%
Total	14489424	717782	713833	10321	10586	63%

Most work opportunities have been provided through municipal works which is not surprising. However it is pleasing to see increased work on highways, new roads and maintenance works. Labour intensity is highest on municipal works however it is also pleasing to see highways and maintenance works maintain a high degree of labour intensity as well. Graphs 2 and 3 summarise the results graphically.

Graph 2: Planned V Actual Worker Days



Graph 3: Labour Based Intensity



As the programme has evolved, it has started to focus more on longer-term employment in line with the intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model. Phase IV has opened opportunities for the participation of workers in labour market oriented vocational training for longer-term employment.

Training provision for both government officials and contractors has been welcomed and is appreciated. Evidence from progress reports indicate the numbers of participants and the results frameworks indicate proportions of participants with increased knowledge. However it is unclear as to how this training is

leading to better practices for contractors, improved institutional systems and better policy and regulatory frameworks.

Vocational Training for workers (and contractors) is the way forward if it opens up opportunities for long-term employment. Asset creation is important but unemployment does remain a major issue. Therefore a combination of both short-term employment along with ways of improving long-term employability is ideal. For this to occur, there needs to be ownership and buy-in of the models and arrangements to be proposed and for these to be shared with the donor. KfW have indicated that if these measures are in place, then there is greater opportunity for the idea to be promoted to the German Government.

A positive outcome of work to date has been the use and application of electronic payments for workers. Since September 2018, all workers have been issued ATM cards and have been informed via SMS to collect wages. It is acknowledged that setting the system up and seeking the approval for MPWH took considerable time and effort. Prior to 2018, there were some differences applied to Jordanian and Syrian workers which caused some tension. Payments are now coordinated by the programme which relieves contractors of the administrative burden and ensures correct and timely payments. The approach also removes the possibility of withheld payments or misappropriation of funds.

The selection of workers continues to be a source of tension across the three phases of implementation. Transparency and accountability in recruitment is important particularly since there is more demand (by both Syrian and Jordanian workers) to the number of jobs on offer. The current procedure is to advertise widely and then conduct an open ballot to select workers. The 40-day limit for municipal works does allow a broader number to participate and benefit from the programme.

Under Phase V, a process for municipalities to bid for work has been introduced. This has proven to be a proactive step and introduces a level of competitiveness. One level it may appear to favour those municipalities with larger populations and broader scopes of work, however if carefully managed (with clear guidance provided as to selection criteria and expectations), it can serve to strengthen implementation overall.

Moving forward it is encouraged to maintain the competitive selection process for municipalities and also the open ballot process for workers as it does reduce the potential for interference and the allocation of jobs based on municipal government preferences and social networks. However it is important in this light to ensure all populations have access to participate. Therefore the open ballot system does require some criteria to ensure that vulnerable populations are included. For those works with contractors, it is unlikely that such a system would apply. Therefore a ballot for contractors would not include vulnerable workers but focus on those with the capacity and skill to participate.

One issue related to recruitment of workers, working conditions and decent work is the presence and nature of grievance mechanisms to give “voice” to workers and those who feel excluded (for example because they have not been selected to participate). The short-term nature of work does not always allow for appropriate levels of social dialogue. For the programme, grievance mechanisms do not currently exist. Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining along with “voice” at work are aspects of decent work. For short term employment, collective bargaining and freedom of association, though not excluded, are of limited relevance, though voice is important both for those who are employed and those who were seeking work on a project under Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme but were not selected. However to address the issue, there is opportunity to strengthen national WOs and EOs to better represent and engage with workers.

Programme management has been consultative and participatory. The programme maintains strong working relations with MPWH, MoL and MoLA. Strong engagement and participation has underpinned implementation and has been a strong contributor to the achievement of results to date across the three

Phases of implementation. Feedback from municipal authorities indicates that the programme is responsive and supports broader mandates in municipalities.

The programme, particularly under Phase V, has made a concerted effort to increase both female employment and participation as well as those of people with disabilities (PWDs). The programme has targeted a minimum of 20% for women and a 3% target for PWDs which aligns to the ILO's inclusive approach to decent work. This is appropriate at this stage and the programme has achieved positive results in promoting active engagement and participation.

Local Resource Based Technology (LRBT) is important and relevant to the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model. However there is a need to upskill workers. LRBT technology has worked well on municipal works (which often requires less skills sets). The problem is with MPWH where labour intensity is not preferred. Contractors also want to work with smaller qualified teams.

In terms of geographical coverage, the programme is widely spread. It is not advisable to expand geographical coverage any further but to rather consolidate work and scope and to focus on those regions and municipalities where work has been most effective and efficient to date. If there is to be a greater focus on long-term employment then there is going to need to be a rationalisation of short-term work and other training opportunities.

Sustainability

Two elements of sustainability are considered in this report, the extent to which national partners are able and willing to continue with the programme and if the programme is sustainable in terms of financial sustainability and sustainability of livelihood sources.

There is evidence of the programme contributing positively to sustainability. Relationships with municipal authorities are robust and all have expressed strong appropriation and gratitude with regards to the support received to date. COVID-19 has severely hampered national and municipal budgets and funds are scarce for on-going service-delivery type programs. The programme has filled an important gap in supporting the CfW program that help maintain employment and income distribution. However this should be viewed as a short-term gap filling measure as the risk is that the programme can be used as a substitute for on-going government investment and expenditure. Careful consultation and engagement is required to ensure that the programme remains external to government budget mechanisms and is seen as a complementary function as opposed to a substitute.

In terms of work with MoL, MoLA and MOPWH, relationships remain strong. The proposal of establishing PSU is positive and proactive and leads to a whole range of support and new areas of work to underpin work. The programme has contributed to establishing a foundation for sustainable road maintenance by working with national partners. With respect to road maintenance, MPWH has adopted performance-based management contracts introduced by Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme Jordan (under Phase II) for maintenance and has established routine maintenance teams for highways. It is important that this continues to be monitored and supported as it is a critical long-term outcome that will sustain work into the future.

Engagement with social partners (EO and WOs) is generally weak. The focus to date has been on supporting government and municipal partners with when relationships are strong. There has been a concerted effort to work with MPWH and MoLA to strengthen institutional capacity and service delivery. There has also been significant investment into the training of contractors and staff related to maintenance. Interviews, municipal and MoLA officials indicated that they have insufficient resources for continuing maintenance at the required level. More needs to be done to strengthen worker and employer organisations. The WO and EOs will provide useful linkages to transition workers to the private sector.

In terms of worker benefits in light of income received, it is well received but it is difficult to see short-term employment as being sustainable into the longer-term. Under current definitions, workers still need to find employment elsewhere following the completion of their two-month contract.

Programme results to date are likely to be sustained as they tend to be output focused. Resources have been provided and products have been delivered. Long-term changes such as income and institutional capacity require a more concerted effort with regards to evaluation to ascertain whether or not changes are to be sustained. There also needs to be an assessment of the willingness of municipal governments and contractors to want to continue with the programme. For government, there needs to be a commitment of both human personnel and financial resources to demonstrate long-term involvement.

At this stage of analysis, there is scope and justification to continuing the programme, however, there does need to be a shift in mindset in a number of key areas. Further analysis is provided in a later section, but the key considerations include:

- A reduced reliance upon short-term employment contracts and a focus on developing a “hybrid “ approach that involves some on-going short-term work coupled with longer-term employment underpinned by in-depth training and vocational training support.
- A shift away from simple municipal works towards work that has higher economic returns and that involve constructing assets. This ideally will be in road maintenance works which can absorb higher levels of labour but also in agroforestry and tree planting exercises.
- A renewed focus on institutional support to MoL and MoLA to support enhanced capacity in project management and oversight, including financial management and reporting.
- Working with municipalities that demonstrate a commitment to infrastructure enhancement and asset creation.


Efficiency

Efficiency in the context of this programme is a measure of the extent to which the outputs achieved are derived from an efficient use of resources (financial, human and technical). The focus of this section is to assess the cost-effectiveness of the programme in supporting livelihoods and in creating/maintaining assets. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach across the ILO portfolio does seek to balance livelihood support and asset creation/maintenance by two main points of focus: (i) selecting projects where labour-based approaches are efficient; and (ii) by applying the approach efficiently.

Overall, the programme has achieved a relatively high degree of efficiency. The number and scope of contracts across the three phases have provided opportunities to improve livelihoods on an on-going manner. Also, the focus on core areas of work (i.e. work sectors) enables the programme to achieve a degree of economies of scale in that work is replicated and systems and processes are in place and can be built upon during subsequent phases.

The programme over Phase III, IV and V has maintained partnership arrangements with the MPWH, MoA, and MoLA. There is a wide range of sectors and work across these partnership arrangements. Graph 4 summarises the number of contracts that have been implemented across the three phases, grouped by work sector.

Graph 4: Breakdown of Work Sectors and Tasks – Phase III-V




The proportion of worker days in road maintenance tends to incur less expense as it is less labour-intensive when compared to other maintenance areas (tree planting and grass cutting). Tree planting and trimming combined with the greening effects of rehabilitating and developing public spaces has a strong future potential and is a relatively cost-effective means of providing employment and promoting better social outcomes. While the labour intensity of municipal community activities is high (as noted in earlier sections), some of these activities do not fit well into the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model as longer-term initiatives.

More time and analysis are required to determine the efficiency of individual contracts and independent work sectors. However some general observations include:

- The programme works across a wide variety of sectors involving multiple contracts. This can lead to inefficiencies due to the sheer number of contracts.
- A significant amount of work is involved in tree planting and tree trimming.
- Cleaning (culverts, streets, drains and cemeteries) is the most significant area of work.

Graph 5 below summarises the number of contracts implemented across the three phases. At the time of reporting all contracts under Phase III (12) are now closed. In Phase IV, a total of 33 contracts remains open with 5 closed. Under Phase V, 14 contracts are open, 1 closed and 1 yet to commence.

Graph 5: Summary of Contracts – Phase III-V




In terms of the delivery of milestones and results, the programme has been able to make significant progress towards the achievement of planned targets and results. The results frameworks contained in Annex 5 provide an outline of achievements to date. However the donor’s requirement to have targets for the number of jobs created is defined as a minimum of 40 days of employment per person per year. This structure definition is somewhat constraining as some workers do not want to work for 40-days and others wish to have extended contracts. This leads to inefficiencies in terms of worker allocation and may be a contributing factor to some aspects of worker absenteeism.

The programme has leveraged opportunities through the CfW working group to harmonise efforts to ensure programmes remain somewhat aligned to remove duplication and overlap. The ILO in past phases tended to pay higher wages, which caused some concern amongst partners. However in recent phases, the ILO pays consistent rates. CfW is now recognised as a formalised sector and the programme’s support to the PSU is critical to ensure greater representation and to maintain direct contact with relevant government authorities.

In terms of budgets and expenditures, the programme has maintained consistent expenditure. Graph 6 summarises expenditure over the three phases of implementation.

Graph 6: Summary of Income and Expenditure – Phase III - V



Phase III is fully expended, and Phase IV is progressing. Phase V has limited actuals but has a significant number of encumbrances which indicate that expenditure is occurring, and budget amounts are likely to be expended in time.

The application of finance forms (ILO tools for municipalities to complete) which are often not understood or utilised, exacerbates delays and requires a significant amount of time to follow up.

The programme has done well to promote the involvement and engagement of women. The programme has learned from previous experience in earlier phases around the engagement of women and to a lesser degree PwDs. Solid participation rates have been realised through culturally and context specific publicising and influencing activities through community leaders and the promotion of strategies such as women-only work teams, direct payments to women and training of contractors on gender-specific recruitment and retention.

Interviews with women workers groups indicate a high level of satisfaction with regards to perception and involvement. For many women, engagement on the programme is often their first formal paid employment. Women feel included and ultimately feel safe in engaging in work. A core concern consistent with all women surveyed was the availability of transportation and the combination of work and home duties. While women are encouraged to work, home based roles and responsibilities tend to remain somewhat inflexible, with many women having to take on home duties. The workers surveys for Phase III and Phase IV also provide very useful insights with regards to female participation and satisfaction.²²

The programme has sought to seek active engagement and promotion of women through the finalisation of the Environmental and Social Safeguards (ESS) strategy and plan. Part of this process is to address the concerns raised by women and have them work on sites close to residences and also to consider possible transportation options.

The short duration of phases coupled with overlaps has caused significant challenges for finance and administration. This is primarily due to the fact the expenditures are often not realised in a linear fashion and work is generally realised towards the end of implementation phases. When coupled with a need to acquit budgets and expenditures by different Phase, this places significant pressure on the finance and administration teams.

Overall, the overlapping nature of phases increases the complexity of programming. Previous phases have revealed that the ILO faces delays with projects selection and preparation. Once a project document for a phase has been signed, it is mandatory to register it with the Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS) for approval. Without JORISS approval no progress could be made because no implementation agreement could be signed with any government ministries or administrations to initiate the process of project selection and preparation.

Other factors that influence delays and exacerbate problems are the time required to complete some projects, contractors not mobilising in time or unsuitable weather conditions. In 2020 and 2021 the onset of COVID-19 and subsequent economic lockdowns have had a significant impact on timeframes. KfW has to a degree exhibited flexibility to allow “no cost extensions” however these lead to more overlapping and administrative challenges.

Consultations with KfW do indicate a willingness to consider longer term phases, however it is noted from the 2019 cluster evaluation that the same issue was discussed and raised. However it has not translated in any change in Phase IV and Phase V. Longer phases with a longer transition and transfer period would have significant benefit. In all phases to date, there have been delays with the need for preparatory activities and engagements with MOLA and municipal staff. By spreading work out over a longer duration, programme staff are better able to plan and structure engagements and there is also flexibility to address an unforeseen delays or challenges that emerge. It also increases efficiencies, particularly for finance as better planning and scheduling of activities can occur and time is provided for better data collection and reporting. Further analysis and guidance on Phase VI is provided in a later section.


²² NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions (2019).

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements

The focus on management effectiveness arrangements centres primarily on the division of work tasks with the programme and how the programme has communicated and also been supported from a technical and administrative perspective.

Overall management functions appear to function well within the team. There has been some turnover of CTAs across the phases due to retirements and the donor did express concern at not being informed about the changes. However since 2019, there has been a consistent presence. Tasks are generally well divided across the team, but a significant amount of work is dependent upon the CTA who tends to be involved in all aspects of implementation and management

Figure 2: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme Jordan Organigram



The organogram of the Jordan Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme team in Figure 2 shows the structure of the team for the projects implemented by the ILO. The CTA is responsible for the planning and management of this part of the programme as well as the overall Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme which is a collaboration between the ILO and government and social partners.

Under the CTA Senior Technical Officers and four national labour-based engineers are responsible for assessing the suitability of projects for LRBT treatment, design of projects, and oversight and support for projects implemented by contractors. The team of engineers also contributes to the technical aspects of the process of preparing the tender documents for contractors and appraising the bids. It is noted that both Senior Technical Officers have left the programme (in April/May 2021). This leaves a significant gap in implementation arrangements. While the national engineers of high quality and experience, it would be good practice to have some high-level coordination and management experience to reduce workloads on the CTA. The vacant technical officer positions need to be filled with at least one officer to provide supervision to the field and also to support technical arrangements with the CTA.

The large-scale nature of the programme with more concurrent phases and the larger geographical spread of work explains the larger number of engineers. The appointment of an Environment and Social Safeguards (ESS) officer is an important step. The officer is supported by three inspectors who coordinate and monitor works. The community development, communications and monitoring officer is responsible

for the employment database, reporting and monitoring the employment targets and the commissioning of labour surveys and project impact reports.

A recent appointment has been programme and training officer. This is a strategic position and is also responsible for coordinating the relationship with the donor. Ideally it may be appropriate to elevate this position to a deputy type role to reduce some of the technical and administrative burdens placed on the CTA.

Communication mechanism amongst the team appear to function well and there is good camaraderie and respect amongst team members. There does appear to be challenges in engaging with the regional office with regards to approvals and requests. This appears to be an on-going issue. The lack of a Country Office (CO) means that the programme needs to rely on the regional office for finance and administrative issues which could be better implemented and managed if the CO had formal recognition.

Technical backstopping and support are present but not entirely effective. Given the long duration of implementation, coupled with the level of expertise on the team, there appears to be limited need to have technical support. COVID-19 travel restrictions also meant that relevant HQ support has not been able to travel to the project sites. However, despite the expertise of the team, there is a need to strengthen the technical backstopping support as all ILO projects require some form of technical and specialist support, particularly for quality assurance and ensuring work is aligned to specific DWCP outcomes.

Monitoring and evaluation systems are relevant and appropriate. When combined with technical supervision and oversight, there is a good coordination and progress to collect and present data against agreed targets. In general, effective systems are in place to produce monitoring information in a timely and efficient manner. M&E systems are MS Office excel bases which is appropriate in terms of cost and functionality. Six-monthly reports are prepared for the donor and for the ROAS.

In terms of evaluation, there is scope to strengthen this element of work. There is scope, given the programme is at Phase V, to consider more evaluative an impact study effort. The report acknowledges the work on worker surveys (Phase III and Phase IV). However there is scope to undertake other studies such as cost-benefit analysis of short-term employment and also economic analysis of the multiplier effects of worker income and how this is supporting not only households but broader communities and municipalities as well. Ideally these studies would be completed by external providers but would provide a significant evidence base to both municipal governments as well and the donor.

Another useful study would be a qualitative case study approach to capture the experiences of women and PWD's. These case studies (or performance stories) would be a useful and powerful means by which the programme could promote the involvement and impact to women. At present information is collected in worker surveys but it overlooks the often powerful "stories" that women have, and the impact and benefit derived for employment and skills development.

Impact Orientation

At this stage of implementation it would be expected that impacts would be evident. A workers survey completed in 2019 highlighted a number of improvements in income and social conditions as a result of the programme. However it is noted that most Syrian and Jordanian workers held jobs prior to their engagement in the programme. Text Box 1 summarises a key finding.

The study identified a trend that workers are earning more than they did before. While 7% of those who had a job before the program earned 3-5 JOD per day, that percentage dropped to 1.8% for those who received employment post in Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme.

Similarly, for the 23.9% that earned 6-8 JOD in their employment before the programme, the percentage dropped to 15.8%.

More importantly, 3.9% earned 18-20 JOD daily before the program, compared to a substantial increase to 17.6%.

The evidence suggests that the programme has had two main impacts: (i) it has maintained people in some form of work; and (ii) it has enabled people to maintain current or higher levels of income. This is also due to the fact that the ILO pays generally higher wages than market averages. This may “artificially” increase the salary levels, particularly if workers were to be involved in other donor or government-sponsored programs. Another positive result of the study was that more women are now involved in work. Prior to the survey, only 29% were employed previously. This presents opportunities for women to enter the workforce improve skills. People with disabilities indicated that they were either very satisfied or satisfied to some extent (94.5%) with the job opportunity offered by Jordan Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme with less than 4% expressing otherwise.

Aside from money, levels of job satisfaction are very high. A total of 92.1% of respondents were very satisfied or satisfied with the employment. As for satisfaction with working conditions provided by the contractor/municipality, 91.7% of Jordanian and 89.6% of Syrian respondents stated they were very satisfied or satisfied.

The programme has made a tangible contribution to improvements in job creation and broader capacity development support with contractors and government officials. The programme has been constrained somewhat by the work permit issues however the establishment of the Project Support Unit (PSU) in the MOL is a positive and proactive step. The short-term nature of work and contracts makes it difficult to influence long-term changes. The promotion of longer-term work arrangements would contribute positively to possible changes in work permit arrangements and would potentially facilitate more timely approvals and awards.

Work through the CFW working group is a possible strategy to strengthen engagement with government, particularly with regards to work permit approvals. The ILO has been a proactive member of the group and contributed to on-going dialogue amongst partners and in shared representation to government on issues consistent to all members.

The programme has made a strong contribution to social cohesion and peace and conflict prevention. Feedback from interviews and focus group discussions reveal that the programme contributes in a positive manner. Workers view each other as “brothers and sisters” in working together. However some tensions are evident in some pockets, particularly with the selection of workers which is not always seen as transparent and fair. Economic restrictions associated with COVID-19 have also increased general tension and pressure as jobs have become scarce. The programme needs to maintain close dialogue and coordination with MOLA and municipal authorities to ensure systems remain in place and guidance on selection and participation is followed.

To strengthen impact more generally, the programme should seek to work more closely with WOs and EOs in countries. Work and support with government authorities is highly visible and appropriate, however broader social engagement is required to ensure that other national partners are adequately capacitated and supported so as to be able to respond to worker needs in the longer-term.

Good Practices, Lessons Learned and Main challenges faced by the programme

The programme has implemented a series of good practices and has also identified key lessons learned. A summary of good practices and lessons are provided in this section. A more detailed assessment is included in Annex 6 in accordance with ILO standards. Good practices include:

- Institutional capacity and support are integral to effective CfW and LBT. It promotes sustainability and supports government mechanisms to be more resilient and responsive to emergency situations (refugees and COVID-19).
- A focus on asset creation and associated maintenance is critical for longer-term success. This approach aligns to the expectations of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and promotes a sense of longer-term development rather than responsive and short-term mechanisms.
- Support to facilitate work permits is important. It builds relationships, supports institutional arrangements and when coupled with longer-term planning for jobs, enhances relationships and the likelihood of success.
- Application of social safeguards and associated monitoring and follow-up is a good practice that is well embedded. A commitment to equal representation, involvement of women and people with disabilities is encouraged through the programme and well-grounded in implementation efforts.

Key lessons include:

- Key Lesson 1: Programme phases should be extended to allow time for planning, implementation and longer-term engagement. Longer durations also support opportunities to address new and emerging needs and trends. The strategy also allows for better review and evaluative assessments, particularly as they relate to longer-term outcomes.
- Key Lesson 2: To promote active engagement it is important to work within existing municipal plans and to align activities to priority areas of work. It is also important to engage with local partners (WOs and EOs) as part of the process to facilitate employment and to maintain the tripartite model.
- Key Lesson 3: To promote longer term sustainability, there is a need to move way from CfW type approaches to adopt a mix of short-term assistance along with longer-term employment efforts aimed at promoting infrastructure enhancements and asset creation potentially in collaboration with EO's and WO's.
- Key Lesson 4: To promote the concept of CfW and Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, more in-depth monitoring and evaluation should occur (rather than simply counting jobs) to provide an evidence-base to support future planning at municipal and donor levels

The programme has also experienced challenges across the three phases. Key challenges have been identified following a document review of progress reports and reconfirmed during interviews. Significant challenges include:

- The approval and granting of work permits is perhaps the most significant challenge faced by the programme across Phase III, IV and V. Work permit delays mean that workers cannot commence work and often leads to delays in works and the “bunching” of works towards the end of each Phase. This places significant pressure on the implementation team and management. Longer durations combined with the expediting of permits would reduce backlogs and allow for a more routine and targeted work programme.
- Short-overlapping phases present numerous challenges, particularly to finance, administration and procurement. This in turn impacts implementation and management. Compounding the situation is the relatively slow ILO processes for approvals and associated system controls.
- The definition of “job creation” and the short duration of employment contracts is also a challenge.

- Payment processes particularly with short-term employment, is complex and requires significant investment of time and resources from a finance and administrative perspective.
- The distinction between basic maintenance work (cleaning etc) and more complex contracting works administered between IAs and MPWH contracts meant that some workers are being pushed beyond normal working limits and contractors unable or unwilling to follow agreed contracts and safety standards. The programme has done a good job in training contractors and raising awareness to date. The point is raised as a reminder to continue reinforcing the safety and priorities of workers and supporting contractors ensure relevant and appropriate standards are maintained.
- COVID-19 has also been a significant challenge and has had a direct impact upon management. The key impact has been “stay-at-home” orders and economic shutdowns which has led to worker absences and limited engagement with government staff. This is discussed further in the next section.

Response to COVID-19

As indicated in the relevance section, COVID-19 has had a significant impact upon Jordan. According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted research²³ into the impacts of COVID-19 as a result of economic lockdowns. Key findings included:

- National GDP is estimated to have fallen by 23% during the lockdown period. The services sector was hardest hit, seeing an estimated drop in output of almost 30%
- Food systems in Jordan experienced a reduction in output by almost 40%
- Employment losses during the lockdown were estimated at over 20%, mainly driven by job losses in services.
- Household income fell on average by around 20% due to the lockdown, mainly driven by contraction in service sector activities, by slowdown in manufacturing activity, and by lower remittances from abroad.

Despite the challenges of COVID-19 and associated restrictions, the programme has continued to meet and serve the needs of workers. A key achievement has been the development and approval of a COVID-19 safety plan. This plan is now applied across the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and has also been recognised and picked-up by other donors and NGOs working in the CfW space.

The programme is committed to supporting safe work environments and safe work practices. The programme has ensured workers are protected while working, this not only includes safety equipment but also COVID-19 responsive approaches including, social distancing, maintenance of hygiene practices and the use of masks and other personal protection equipment (PPE). Funding has been repurposed in an appropriate manner to support this.

Despite efforts, the programme has been affected by worker absences and an inability to engage with key government counterparts due to reduced staffing levels in MOL, MOPW and municipal offices. This has exacerbated the issues already raised with regards to workers permits and associated approvals.

Partnership arrangements with other donors and stakeholders involved with CfW remain strong. The programme takes a leading role of the CfW Working Group and leads discussions on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), work permits, activity planning and sector coordination. The programme has also established a good relationship with the UNHCR and has supported the organisation in the following ways:

²³ <https://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-covid-19-jordanian-economy-economic-sectors-food-systems-and-households>

(i) supporting the clearance and verification of Syrian workers before they can be employed; (ii) publishing eligibility criteria for project work; (iii) discussing methodologies for worker payments and (iv) sending recruitment announcements through UNCHR networks.

In terms of government engagement during COVID19, there is little the programme can do. The proposed implementation of the PSU is a positive response to support the programme. The programme cannot influence or dictate the working arrangements of government itself, however it can continue to maintain a presence and offer opportunities for support and engagement. The programme can also continue to use its leading influence as part of the CfW working group to lobby a sector response to maintain engagement with government.

The achievement of results, particularly in Phase V is likely to be impacted by COVID-19. Lockdowns, restrictions and worker absence are expected to affect “job creation” results overall but flexibility should be maintained with regards to expectations and targets. In addition, the removal of face-to-face training events will reduce the number of people reached. External events and “shocks” like COVID-19 do require programmes to maintain flexible responses and also an ability to adjust targets. This should be discussed and considered with KfW and agreed as part of the remaining implementation period for Phase V and perhaps have targets and numbers transition over into Phase VI. The programme cannot be expected to achieve results agreed and set prior to COVID-19 impacts and associated restrictions.

Overall, the programme has provided timely and relevant responses to support workers and government respond to COVID-19. While some anticipated targets may not be reached, the programme as adapted and applied new ways of working and pivoted support to maintain on-going engagement and work.

Guidance for Potential Phase VI

The following section provides some suggested guidance based on the results of the evaluation to inform a possible Phase VI. The guidance is preliminary in nature but provides a base for dialogue between the programme, KfW, government (central and municipal) and other social partners.

From the outset, the evaluation recommends an extension phase (Phase VI) of up to three years. This finding is based on the evidence presented regarding the complexity of short and overlapping phases presented above and also the benefits of allowing longer implementation periods for planning and implementation.

The first consideration is to consider the overall strategic intent of the program. The ideal situation is to transition the programme towards the overall intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and to gradually shift away from CfW. To achieve this end the following steps are proposed:

- The programme to liaise with all programme partners regarding an extension into Phase VI. This will include a review of the overall development objective, associated outcomes and the scope of work.
- As part of the consultation process, the programme should develop a detailed ToC which maps out the strategic intent of the programme and provides a more detailed narrative of the rationale and link between longer-term employment prospects and infrastructure enhancements.
- The extended phase should contain a six-month transition/inception period which will enable current work to be completed while planning for the next phase. Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme will need to complete all activities and expenditure under Phase V before transitioning.
- The scope of work should focus on longer-term employment arrangements involving infrastructure provision/asset creation and maintenance. Work with contractors should be

prioritised. However there is a need to transition from the current CfW arrangements. The programme should ideally remove all CfW arrangements over time, however this can occur in a gradual manner. Municipality participation should be contingent upon a willingness to transition to these new arrangements, underpinned by longer-term contract arrangements.

- Training to focus more on detailed vocational training. To achieve this end the programme should undertake a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) of needs and priorities. A comprehensive TNA is required to map out longer-term job opportunities aligned to the strategic intent of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme. This also includes an assessment of national service providers. The focus group discussions highlighted a number of priority areas for support.

Overall, the evaluation recommends that the programme adopt a mix of employment opportunities. This includes on-going CfW work with municipalities along with contractors. Priority sectors should be roads and agroforestry as this provides a useful mix of gainful employment and opportunity for longer term employment (and potentially higher wages).

A risk associated with higher quality jobs is that the number of jobs created will fall, however the number of workdays may remain the same. This is a key consideration that needs to be discussed with the donor. In keeping with a strategic focus on Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, it is feasible and appropriate to reduce the number of “jobs created” but to focus on developing and promoting better quality work and jobs.

Conclusions

In drawing some key conclusions, the evaluation returns to the initial objectives detailed earlier in the report: (i) short-term employment for Jordanians and Syrians (including women and people with disabilities -PwD); (ii) improvements in the preservation or development of infrastructure assets; (iii) strengthened technical capacity of both government officials and contractors; and (iv) employability and livelihood improvements for the longer-term. The conclusions are a quick summary to avoid overtly repeating key findings and analysis.

Overall, the programme is highlight relevant and has provide direct and tangible assistance to both Jordanian and Syrian workers. In most cases targets have been reached and, in some cases, exceeded. The programme has been subject to delays in the approvals of some projects and the worker permit issues continues to hamper implementation efforts. Specific mention is made of the increased participation of women and PWDs.

The programme has supported on-going employment through a mix of contractor-based works and municipal works. While the numbers are impressive and participation rates are high, the quality of work and sustainability of the approach is questioned. However the work is well received by municipal governments and it does have a positive contribution of social cohesion and peace initiatives. In summing up, the programme does provide employment, does maintain a high degrees of labour intensity and works within the plans and structures of municipalities.

The programme has also made positive contributions to asset creation and maintenance of assets. A renewed focus on asset creation and infrastructure provision is promoted as a priority as part of the possible Phase VI. Training of contractors and officials has been useful but tends to focus on work directly related to contracts and municipal works rather than longer-term institutional change. The establishment of the PMU is a positive step towards providing more on-the-job support and guidance while at the same time trying to resolve the delay in work permits.

Long-term employment prospects still require further work. The focus on short-term employment does not always contribute to long-term employment. The report has highlighted a number of strategies to transition away from short-term prospects using a mix of technical and vocational training and a realignment of work priorities (contracting v municipal works). There is definitely a need to maintain a mix of opportunities but preference should be placed on long-term asset creation and the skilling up of labour.

Overall the programme is at important cross-roads of implementation and management. The work across Phase I to Phase V has realised a number of key achievements, improvements and results. Ultimately the long-term objective would be a sustainable system that is funded and supported by municipal governments through existing budget mechanisms which is underpinned by a robust private sector that provides skilled workers opportunities to work in asset creation indicators or to start own individual businesses. However that degree of sustainability is some way off and additional assistance is required to continue the transition and development process.

Recommendations

This section details key recommendations for the evaluation. Key recommendations include:

Recommendation 1: The programme should commence immediate planning for an extension into Phase VI. This will involve coordination with KfW and government authorities at the central and municipal level to discuss and agree on the strategic intent and focus and overall mix of work priorities going forward.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme (EIIP)/ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank (KfW) / Government of Jordan (GoJ)	High	Short	High

Recommendation 2: The Phase VI should focus on asset creation and infrastructure enhancements in line with the strategic intent of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme while reducing the focus on CfW in a staged and coordinated manner in close consultation with municipal authorities.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoLA	High	Short	High

Recommendation 3: As part of Phase VI, the programme should review the development objective and set clear outcomes with associated outputs. This will also involve developing a detailed ToC that will underpin implementation and management arrangements going forward. Complementing this revised approach should be a review of evaluation studies, particularly on institutional reforms and change as a result of training and advisory support and the impacts of work on household income.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW	High	Short	High

Recommendation 4: Options should be considered to lengthen employment contracts beyond the current 40-days. The 50-50 split between Jordanian and Syrian workers should be maintained but reviewed over time to ensure on-going relevance and appropriateness. However, where possible and appropriate, Jordanian workers can be prioritised, particularly for more skilled labour requirements with contractors.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/GoJ	High	Short	High

Recommendation 5: The current geographical scope of work and engagement should be maintained. Municipalities should continue to competitively bid for work and for worker selection, open ballots maintained with set criteria to target and support vulnerable workers. Contractor arrangements to remain the same and the focus should be on using skilled workers.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoLA	High	Short	High

Recommendation 6: In light of a focus towards more longer-term employment, the programme should explore further opportunities to support more in-depth vocational training and job placement strategies with external training service providers. This work should be underpinned by a detailed TNA completed in the first six-months of Phase VI.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoL	High	Short	High

Recommendation 7: The current training programme for government officials and contractors should be maintained but targeted to focus on areas of support that address the changes proposed in earlier recommendations. To complement the training programme, a “fit-for purpose” evaluation strategy should be developed and applied to assess longer-term impacts and changes as a result of support.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/GoJ	High	Short	High

Recommendation 8: Trial a new approach to the worker permits which builds upon the support to be provided by the PSU. The focus should be on raising awareness of the potential strategic shift in structure of work arrangement and the focus on longer term employment involving Jordanian workers. The trial should last for appropriately 12-months during the first year of Phase VI.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/KfW/MoL	High	Short	High

Recommendation 9: Promote the Jordan CO to a fully-fledged country office so as to minimise dependency upon the RAS office. This will support more streamlined, efficient and effective decision-making and overall financial and administrative management.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/ROAS	High	Short	High

Recommendation 10: Promote an existing staff member to a deputy CTA/operations manager to remove the intensive obligations of the CTA. This will help share roles and responsibilities and promote an opportunity for a team member to develop relevant and appropriate management and leadership skills.

Responsible Unit(s)	Priority	Time Implications	Resource Implications
EIIP/ROAS/KfW	High	Short	High

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (ToR) for Cluster Independent Project Evaluation of “Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme” in Jordan

I. Key Facts	
DC Symbol:	JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III) JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)
Country:	Jordan
Project titles:	Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan: (Phase III, IV and V)
Duration:	JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III) 31 months including no cost extensions (final) JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) 32 months including no cost extensions (final) JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) 25 months including no cost extensions (mid-term)
Start Date:	01 November 2018 JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III) 12 December 2018 JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) 01 November 2019 JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)
End Date:	31 May , 2021 JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III) 09 August, 2021 JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) 30 November, 2021 JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)
Administrative unit:	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
Technical Backstopping Unit:	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS), DEVINVEST
Collaborating ILO Units:	SKILLS, DEVINVEST
Evaluation requirements:	Independent Midterm (Phase V) and Final Evaluation (Phase III and IV)
Donor:	Germany, KfW Development Bank
Budget:	JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III) (USD 5,685,050; 5,000,000 EUR) JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) (USD 22,753,128; 20,000,000 EUR) JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) (USD 7,700,770; 6,930,693 EUR)

II. Background

Jordan’s geographical location made it the third country in the Region in terms of hosting Syria refugee influx since 2011. From most recent data, Jordan hosts around 658,000 registered Syrian refugees, although the real total of Syrians is estimated at around 1.3 million when taking the unregistered Syrians into account²⁴. Jordan’s population - to date - amounts to approximately 10,836,849 making the percentage of Syrian refugees residing in Jordan around 12%, a rate that has its weight on the social, economic and infrastructure landscape.

²⁴ [Syrian refugees | ACAPS](#)

A combined study by the ILO and FAO in 2015 reported that the Jordanian labour market prior to the Syrian conflict had a participation rate of 67% among men and 18% among women. Unemployment rates were above 14% for Jordanians with a higher average for female and young Jordanians aged 15-25 years respectively at around 30% for both groups. The study reported that the unemployment rates among Jordanians at the time of the study marked the 22.1%. This rate has increased since and currently hit 23% mark²⁵.

The demographics of the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan has its own reflections on the labour market. The vast majority lived in rural areas in Syria prior to the conflict, they are younger when compared to the Jordanian host communities and have lower education²⁶. The former makes it evident that the informal sector would be more appealing to them where 99% of Syrians work in the informal sector in comparison to 50% of Jordanians²⁷.

Work in the informal sector is usually characterised by sub-standard wages, poor working conditions, and exploitive practices such as child labour. At the same time, the competition for jobs has led to social tensions. This is of particular concern in the northern governorates, Zarqa, Irbid and Mafraq, and in Amman where the share of Syrian refugees is greater. The southern Governorate of Karak on the other hand is an area dominated by tribes, requiring a greater understanding of sensitivities of tribal relations.

The ILO is collaborating with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank (KfW) to assist the Jordanian government in ensuring that Syrian refugees and Jordanians can access better living conditions through increased employment and improved infrastructure. In 2015, the ILO has started the implementation of a Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Programme in Jordan to support the Government of Jordan in creating immediate jobs through employment intensive programmes which has now reached its fifth phase. The programme which started in Irbid and Mafraq and has since expanded to cover locations in the Centre and some parts of the South Governorates, targets Jordanian and Syrian women and men in host communities. Phases III and IV focus on the creations of jobs within local municipalities and public works such as environmental clearing, maintenance and minor works in public areas and alongside national roads. Typical activities are waste collection and disposal, grass cutting, kerb and footpath construction, fence painting and drain clearing. The main Government partners are the Ministries of Labour (MoL), Public Works and Housing (MPWH), and Local Administration (MoLA). Other partners include GIZ and other CFW agencies, and training providers. Phases I, II and III (2016-2020) were located in Irbid and Mafraq. Phase IV (2018-2021) extended southwards to Amman, Jerash, Ajloun and Zarqa. Phase V (2020-2021) continues southwards to Karak.

The Programme is headed by the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) and receives technical and programmatic backstopping from the ILO Regional Office of Arab States and the DEVINVEST Branch of the ILO.

III. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

III Evaluation Background

ILO considers evaluation as an integral part of the implementation of technical cooperation projects. Provisions are made in all projects in accordance with ILO evaluation policy and based on the nature of the project and the specific requirements agreed upon at the time of the project design and during the project as per established

²⁵ Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS) [Department of Statistics \(dos.gov.jo\)](http://dos.gov.jo), unemployment rate for Q2 of 2020.

²⁶ 60 per cent of the Syrian refugees above the age of 15 have never completed basic schooling, and only about 15 per cent of the refugees have completed secondary education, compared to 42 per cent of Jordanians above the age of 15. (Reference ILO and FAO study).

²⁷ Stave and Hillesund: Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market (ILO and FAO 2015).

procedures. The Regional M&E and Knowledge Management Officer at the ILO ROAS supports the evaluation function for all ILO projects.

As several phases overlap, and as discussed with KfW, the evaluation is clustered, and covers the current overlapping Phase III, Phase IV and Phase V, as described in the table below.

Project Code	Project Name	Phase	Start Date	End Date	Funds in USD
JOR/17/08/DEU	Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan, Phase III	Phase III	01 November 2018	31 May 2021	5,685,050
JOR/18/05/DEU	Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan - Phase IV	Phase IV	12 December 2018	09 August 2021	22,753,128
JOR/19/03/DEU	Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan - Phase V	Phase V	01 November 2019	30 November 2021	7,700,770

In line with the new ILO evaluation policy which promotes clustering as a means to more strategic learning, the scope of the current evaluation is a clustered evaluation for the three projects in Jordan, which would serve to evaluate all overlapping phases. This would be the second cluster evaluation of the Programme, the first one being conducted in 2019 and covered Phases II, III and IV along with the Lebanon Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme project funded by KfW.

The clustered approach is the most efficient and strategic for several reasons, the first being that the three phases are implemented in parallel as a single unit (but managed as different projects administratively and financially). They cover the same theme (Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme) and to an extent similar outcome areas which correspond to the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach such as infrastructure development and maintenance, capital investment creation, institutional capacity building, and job creation through labour intensive works.

The evaluation will serve not only to provide analysis according to OECD criteria at country level, but also make comparisons as and when possible. This will foster mutual drawing of lessons and identify good practices that would potentially benefit current implementation and lessons learnt for a future phase.

Purpose

The cluster independent evaluation will be conducted to assess the progress towards the results, identify the main difficulties/constraints, and formulate lessons learned and practical recommendations to improve the programme implementation for ongoing phase V and a potential new Phase VI (which will be planned in mid-2021), including in the COVID-19 context.

It will provide analysis according to OECD criteria at country level and will examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, potential impact and sustainability of the projects. The evaluation report shall reflect findings from this evaluation on the extent to which the different phases have achieved their stated objectives, produced the desired

outputs, and realized the proposed outcomes. This evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned with recommendations.

The evaluation will comply with the ILO evaluation policy, which is based on the United Nations Evaluation Norms and Standards and the UNEG ethical guidelines.

Scope

The evaluation will cover the project 'Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme in Jordan' (Phase III, IV, V) in all their outcomes, outputs, and activities realized so far.

Given the COVID-19 situation, the evaluation will be home-based and all field-work will be conducted online.

The independent cluster evaluation will take place from mid-May 2021 to end-July 2021, including 3 weeks of online field work to collect information from different stakeholders. The consultancy shall start with initial briefing with the project team and the Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS).

The evaluation will integrate gender equality and inclusion of people with disabilities as a cross-cutting concern throughout its methodology and all deliverables, including the final report.

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Jordan, government entities, and the BMZ/KfW. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation.

The scope of the evaluation will be as follows:

- Final evaluation for Phase III in completed sites.
- Final evaluation for Phase IV in completed sites.
- Mid-term evaluation for Phase V in ongoing sites.

IV. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation utilises the standard ILO framework and follows its major criteria:

- Relevance and strategic fit – the extent to which the objectives are aligned with sub-regional, national and local priorities and needs, the constituents' priorities and needs, and the donor's priorities for the country;
- Validity of design – the extent to which the programme design, logic, strategy and elements are/remain valid vis-à-vis problems and needs;
- Efficiency - the productivity of the programme implementation process taken as a measure of the extent to which the outputs achieved are derived from an efficient use of financial, material and human resources, including re-purposing in the mitigation of Covid-19 impacts;
- Effectiveness - the extent to which the programme can be said to have contributed to the programme objectives and more concretely whether the stated outputs have been produced satisfactorily, including in the Covid-19 context; in addition to building synergies with national initiatives and with other donor-supported programmes;
- Impact - positive and negative changes and effects caused by the programme at the national level, i.e. the impact with social partners, government entities, beneficiaries, etc.; special attention should be given to secondary job effects, which are expected to occur in economic infrastructure like agricultural roads, markets or irrigation.
- Effectiveness of management arrangements; and
- Sustainability – the extent to which adequate capacity building of social partners has taken place to ensure mechanisms are in place to sustain activities and whether the existing results are likely to be

maintained beyond programme completion, in the case of infrastructure this refers concretely to whether operation and maintenance agreements are actually being implemented; the extent to which the knowledge developed throughout the programme (research papers, progress reports, manuals and other tools) can still be utilised after the end of the programme to inform policies and practitioners,

Relevance and strategic fit:

Primary Questions

- How well does the programme approach fit in context of the on-going crisis in Jordan? To what extent does the programme fit into national development and humanitarian response plans? Does the programme design take into account local efforts addressing the crisis? Are the planned programme's objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analysed?
- How does the programme's objectives respond to the priorities of the donor (BMZ/KfW) in Jordan?

Secondary Questions

- Are the programme's objectives aligned with tripartite constituents' objectives and needs? What measures were taken to ensure alignment?
- To what extent are the programme's activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the Sustainable Development Goals and the agenda 2030?

Validity of design:

Primary Questions

- Are the programme's strategies and structures coherent and logical (the extent of logical correlations between the development objective, module outcomes, and outputs)? Do the different phases (III, IV and V) under programme align and are they coherently designed? Do any changes need to be made to the design of the programme for Phase VI? (Recommendations for future phases taking into account compliance with the BMZ Methodology Note).
- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of the following selection process; 50% Jordanians and 50% Syrian refugees or the Government's request of 70% Jordanians and 30% Syrian refugees.
- Is it appropriate for short duration, overlapping and non-repeating phases to focus on maintenance activities? Do short overlapping phases detract attention from the long term need for maintenance?
- Are programme's phases' timeframes appropriate including (i) programme identification (ii) programme design including approvals (iii) tender process, and (iv) programme implementation?
- What are the impacts of 1) two month working periods (rather than longer periods) and 2) high labour intensity – from a logistical/administrative perspective, and also from a sustainability perspective (the impact on beneficiaries of short two month working periods)?
- Which is more effective: a series of many short phases, or fewer longer phases?
- For upcoming potential Phase VI: Assess the direction the programme design is recommended to follow to increase longer-term impact in terms of:
- A continued and increased focus on employability of workers through vocational training, entrepreneurship training and/or jobs matching.
- Institutional strengthening with government partners to improve maintenance systems.
- Increased asset creation and infrastructure development, and in which sectors?
- How should the project design for future phases be revised to take into account changing contexts for instance, changing government priorities (for instance, ratio of Jordanian and Syrian workers), protracted

nature of the Syrian Crisis, increasing unemployment rate in Jordan and socio-economic impact from Covid-19.

Secondary questions:

- What is the impact of short, overlapping Phases?
- What kind of activities have proven to be especially successful and why? Which activities should rather not be continued?
- Are the programme's identification and selection processes of interventions logical and suitable?
- Were programme's assumptions and targets realistic, and did the programme undergo risk analyses and design readjustments when necessary? What are the advantage and disadvantages of having short term (two months contract) on the workers, on the partners who have to follow up on all administrative details and for the programme staff? To what extent would extending employment periods while reaching less people is recommended?
- Assess the extent of increasing the job duration as a mitigation plan to overcome challenges related to delays in work permit issuance.
- What are the benefits of expanding into other locations in future phases, compared to continuing to work for a longer time in the original locations?
- To what extent did the project design identify and integrate specific targets and indicators on gender and disability inclusion dimensions, and how did the programme remain flexible and responsive to any challenges or changing contexts with regards to these issues ?
- For Phase V specifically: Assess the changes that have been made to Phase V on the programme outcomes.

Effectiveness:

Primary questions:

- How have stakeholders been involved in programme's implementation, including selection of locations and activities?
- How has continuous issues with work permit issuance for Syrian workers affected the operations and timely delivery of the projects?

Secondary Questions

- What progress has the programme made so far towards achieving the development objective and outcomes? Were targets under each phase reached? In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes?
- Effectiveness and appropriateness of Local Resource Based Technology appropriate and effective for different types of infrastructure.
- To what extent has the programme management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the programme objectives?
- How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- What positive or negative unintended outcomes can be identified?
- Assess the efficiency of carrying out Municipality works in Jordan by direct labour and Municipal supervision, compared to the possible use of contractors?
- Assess location and activity and participants' (potential beneficiaries) selection and the involvement of stakeholders in that selection. Assess the method of municipalities bidding competitively for involvement in Phase 5.

- What have been specific strategies in terms of breaking gender stereotypes? Have they been successful? What are the next steps ahead?
- What have been strategies for disability inclusion? Have they been successful? What should be done differently to improve impact?
- There is difficult balance to strike between a large coverage of many areas and a more focused approach on a limited number of sites – has the programme optimised the options they had in this regard?

Sustainability:

Primary questions

- To what extent are national partners able and willing to continue with the programme?
- At this stage, would considering a continuation of the programme be justifiable? In what way could achievements be consolidated? In what way should the next phases differ from the current ones?

Secondary questions

- Are the results achieved by the programme so far likely to be sustainable- in terms of (a) financial sustainability, capabilities, mandate and commitment of stakeholders, (b) sustainable livelihood sources of beneficiaries? What measures have been taken to ensure that the key components of the programme are sustainable beyond the life of the programme? Are they sufficient?
- How effectively has the programme built national ownership?
- Are operation and maintenance (O&M) agreements for infrastructure in place, and are these actually being implemented? Is there adequate and sustainable funding for O&M?
- How could sustainability of the measures be increased (e.g. through design changes in the programme)?

Efficiency:

Primary questions

- How could the efficiency of the programmes be improved?
- How could coordination between the different implementing agencies in the sector be improved?
- To what extent has the programme been on track in terms of timely achieving the assigned milestones? If not, what factors contributed to the delays? How could they be mitigated in the future phases?

Secondary questions

- To what extent has the programme's activities been cost-effective in terms of creating livelihoods, creating / maintaining assets? How can the labour intensity of the programme be optimised with due regards to the quality of assets created? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- To what extent has the programme been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives nationally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies?
- What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
- Comment on efficiency of short phases and overlapping phases.

Effectiveness of management arrangements:

Primary questions

- What was the division of work tasks within the programme's teams? Has the use of local skills been effective? How do the programme's governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery?

- How effective was communication between the programme’s teams, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters?
- Has the programme received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?

Secondary questions

- How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between programme’s staff and government entities?
- How effectively does the programme management team monitor the programme’s performances and results? Does the programme report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to the programme and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been? Do the M&E systems provide for capturing results in terms of women’s and PwDs’ participation?

Impact orientation:

Primary questions

- Is the length of contracts adequate to allow for beneficiaries to graduate to longer term job and sustainable source of livelihood?

Secondary questions

- What is the likely contribution of the programme’s initiatives to the stated development objectives of the intervention?
- To what extent does the programme influence long term changes in policy and approaches at the level of the government? What have been the achievements and shortcomings of the programme in providing formal job opportunities – in particular, in terms of work permits, social protection, and organization / representation? Does the programme influence women’s participation in workforce?
- What is the indirect and induced impact of the programme in terms of business growth and job creation, secondary job effects along the value chain? How can it be improved?
- Assess the impact of the work done through the CFW working group on the sector and with other ILO initiatives.
- Assess the vocational training component and the potential for employment. What can be done in future phases to increase its impact on preparing ex workers of the project in accessing the labour market?
- Has the programme contributed to Peace and conflict prevention?
- Has the programme contributed to social cohesion in the communities between Jordanians and Syrians?
- To what extent has the project contributed to strengthening capacities of its national partners so they can better serve the needs of the public and communities?

Challenges, Lessons learned and Specific Recommendations for the formulation of new Phases:

Primary questions

- What good practices can be learned from the different phases of the programme that can be applied to future phases of this programme or similar future programmes?
- Challenges and lessons learned from implementing the programme in Karak Governorate in Phase V in terms of tribal power balance and its impact on the selection of municipalities and participants (both Jordanians and Syrian refugees).

Secondary questions

- Based on the challenges identified during the implementation of previous phases, how can challenges be addressed in ongoing and new phases?

COVID-19 Context:

- The effect of COVID-19 pandemic on the country, employment, and nature of interventions and progress of implementation within the milestones.
- To what extent has the project leveraged new or repurposed existing financial resources to mitigate COVID-19 effects in a balanced manner?
- To what extent has the intervention leveraged partnerships (with constituents, national institutions, IFIs and UN/development agencies) to support constituents while targeting the COVID-19 response?
- Assess the timeliness of response, relevance of contingency measures, and lessons learnt in relation to the Programme's response to the impact of Covid-19.
- How has the change (decrease) in capacity of government staff due to Covid-19 affected the achievement of some of the project's goals (work permits, etc.), and what should be considered for future planning if the situation persists?
- Assess the impact on the achievement of project goals and objectives with disruptions caused by the Covid-19 national and local lockdowns
- To what extent has the programme provided a timely and relevant response to constituents' needs and priorities in the COVID-19 context?

V. Methodology

The independent evaluator will be hired by the ILO to conduct the evaluation. The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. Any changes to the methodology should be discussed with and approved by the Regional Evaluation Officer (REO).

Desk Review:

The evaluator will review programme's background materials before conducting any interviews.

Internal Briefing by the programme team(s):

The evaluator will have an initial consultation with the REO, relevant ILO specialists and support staff in ROAS. The objective of the consultation is to reach a common understanding regarding the status of the programme, the priority assessment questions, available data sources and data collection instruments and an outline of the final assessment report. The following topics will be covered: status of logistical arrangements, programme's backgrounds and materials, key evaluation questions and priorities, outline of the inception and final report.

Individual Interviews and/or Group Interviews:

Following the initial briefing, the desk review and the inception report, the evaluator will have meetings with constituents/stakeholders together with interpreters supporting the process if needed. Individual or group interviews will be conducted with the following:

- Programme staff/consultants that have been active in ILO (including Chief Technical Advisor, technical, administrative, and finance staff);
- ILO ROAS DWT Director and DWT Specialists, RPU, Employers' and Workers' Organisations;
- ILO Headquarters technical departments;
- KfW representatives;
- Interviews with national counterparts: government/ministries (MOL, MOPW, MOAL); municipalities; public institutions; social partners; implementing partners, etc.); Farmers, Municipality Mayors;
- Interviews with contractors participating in the programme;

- Interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries;
- Other international agencies working in relevant fields (CfW Working Group).

Debriefing

Upon completion of the missions, the evaluator will provide a field debriefing to the stakeholders to validate results, and a separate debriefing to the Project teams, ILO DWT, ILO HQ, and donor on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Evaluation Management

The evaluator will report to the ILO REO in ROAS. The Evaluation Manager will be the first point of contact for the consultants as well as the project team for any technical and methodological matters related to this evaluation. All communications with regard to this evaluation must be marked to the evaluation manager. The ILO ROAS office and the project team will provide administrative and logistical support for the interviews.

VI. Main Deliverables

The main outputs of the evaluation consist of the following:

- Deliverable 1: Inception Report
- Deliverable 2: Draft evaluation report
- Deliverable 3: Stakeholder debrief, PowerPoint Presentation (PPP)
- Deliverable 4: Internal debrief
- Deliverable 5: Draft 2 evaluation report
- Deliverable 6: Final evaluation report with executive summary (report will be considered final after review by EVAL. Comments will have to be integrated).

Inception Report

The evaluator will draft an Inception Report, which should describe, provide reflection and fine-tuning of the following issues:

- Programme background
- Purpose, scope and beneficiaries of the evaluation
- Evaluation criteria and questions (please note that this will need to take into account the result framework of each phase (Phase III, IV and V respectively) of the programme and map them by broad evaluation criteria for a comprehensive evaluation)
- Methodology and instruments
- Main deliverables
- Management arrangements and work plan

Final Report

The final version of the report will follow the below format and:

- Title page
- Table of Contents, including List of Appendices, Tables
- List of Acronyms or Abbreviations
- Executive Summary with methodology, key findings, conclusions and recommendations
- Background and Programme Description
- Purpose of Evaluation
- Evaluation Methodology and Evaluation Questions

- Status of objectives
- Clearly identified findings along OECD/DAC criteria, substantiated with evidence
- Key results (i.e. figures and qualitative results) achieved per objective (expected and unexpected)
- Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations that are linked to findings (identifying which stakeholders are responsible, priority of recommendations, and timeframe)
- Lessons Learned
- Potential good practices
- Annexes (list of interviews, TORs, lessons learned and best practices in ILO EVAL templates, list of documents consulted, etc.) Annex: Different phases' log frames with results status, by phase.

The quality of the report will be assessed against the EVAL Checklists 4, 5, and 6. The deliverables will be submitted in the English language and structured according to the templates provided by the ILO.

VII. Management Arrangements and Workplan

The evaluator(s)/evaluation team should have:

- An advanced degree in social sciences;
- Proven expertise on evaluation methods, labour markets, conflict issues and the ILO approach;
- Extensive experience in the evaluation of development interventions;
- Expertise in the Labour intensive modality, job creation projects, capacity building and skills development and other relevant subject matter;
- An understanding of the ILO's tripartite culture;
- Knowledge of Lebanon, Jordan, and the regional context;
- Full command of the English language (spoken and written) will be required. Command of the national language would be an advantage.
- The final selection of the evaluator will be approved by the Regional Evaluation Focal Point in the ILO ROAS.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The External Evaluator is responsible for conducting the evaluation according to the terms of reference (ToR).

He/she will:

- Review the ToR and provide input, propose any refinements to assessment questions, as necessary;
- Review project background materials (e.g., project document, progress reports, etc.);
- Prepare an inception report including a matrix of evaluation questions, workplan and stakeholders to be covered;
- Develop and implement the evaluation methodology (i.e., conduct interviews, review documents, etc.) to answer the evaluation questions;
- Conduct preparatory consultations with the ILO REO prior to the evaluation mission;
- Conduct online field research, interviews, as appropriate, and collect information according to the suggested format;
- Present preliminary findings to the stakeholders;
- Prepare an initial draft of the evaluation report with input from ILO specialists and constituents/stakeholders;
- Conduct a briefing on the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the evaluation to ILO;
- Prepare the final report based on the ILO, donor and stakeholders' feedback obtained on the draft report.

The ILO Evaluation Manager is responsible for:

- Drafting the ToR;
- Finalizing the ToR with input from colleagues;
- Preparing a short list of candidates for submission to the Regional Evaluation Officer, ILO/ROAS and EVAL for final selection;
- Hiring the consultant;
- Providing the consultant with the project background materials;
- Participating in preparatory consultations (briefing) prior to the assessment mission;
- Assisting in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in meetings, review documents);
- Reviewing the initial draft report, circulating it for comments and providing consolidated feedback to the External Evaluators (for the inception report and the final report);
- Reviewing the final draft of the report;
- Disseminating the final report to all the stakeholders;
- Coordinating follow-up as necessary.
- *The ILO REO²⁸:*
- Providing support to the planning of the evaluation;
- Approving selection of the evaluation consultant and final versions of the TOR;
- Reviewing the draft and final evaluation report and submitting it to EVAL;
- Disseminating the report as appropriate.

The Project Coordinator is responsible for:

- Reviewing the draft TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials, including studies, analytical papers, progress reports, tools, publications produced, and any relevant background notes;
- Providing a list of stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the inception report;
- Participating in the preparatory briefing prior to the evaluation missions;
- Scheduling all meetings and interviews for the missions;
- Ensuring necessary logistical arrangements for the missions;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the initial draft report;
- Participating in the debriefing on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
- Providing translation for any required documents: TOR, PPP, final report, etc.;
- Making sure appropriate follow-up action is taken

Duration of Contract and Timeline for Delivery

The collaboration between ILO and the Consultant is expected to last for a maximum of 10 weeks starting on the 15 of May (or upon signature) until 31 July 2021. The following deadlines are suggested:

Evaluation Timeframe

Deliverables	Week									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Desk review of project documents and phone/skype interviews with Programme Management/Evaluation Manager										

²⁸ The REO is also the Evaluation Manager.

Inception report																				
Interviews																				
Submission of first draft for ILO revision																				
Briefings																				
Incorporation of ILO comments and revisions																				
Second draft report																				
Final report																				

Supervision

The evaluator will work under the direct supervision of Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Manager and in close collaboration with the Project Coordinator on any technical and methodological matters related to this evaluation. The evaluator will be required to provide continuous updates on the progress of work and revert to the ILO with any challenges or bottlenecks for support. Coordination and follow-up with the evaluator will take place through e-mail or skype or any other digital communication mean.

VIII. Legal and Ethical Matters

This independent evaluation will comply with ILO evaluation guidelines and UN Norms and Standards. These ToRs will be accompanied by the code of conduct for carrying out the evaluation “Code of conduct for evaluation in the ILO” (See attached documents). UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed throughout the independent evaluation.

The consultant will not have any links to project management or any other conflict of interest that would interfere with the independence of the evaluation.

Annex 2: Evaluation Primary and Secondary Questions

	Primary Questions	Secondary Questions
Relevance and Strategic Fit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How well does the programme approach fit in context of the on-going crisis in Jordan? To what extent does the programme fit into national development and humanitarian response plans? Does the programme design consider local efforts addressing the crisis? Are the planned programme's objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analysed? How does the programme's objectives respond to the priorities of the donor (BMZ/KfW) in Jordan? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the programme's objectives aligned with tripartite constituents' objectives and needs? What measures were taken to ensure alignment? To what extent are the programme's activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the Sustainable Development Goals and the agenda 2030?
Validity of design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the programme's strategies and structures coherent and logical (the extent of logical correlations between the development objective, module outcomes, and outputs)? Do the different phases (III, IV and V) under programme align and are they coherently designed? Do any changes need to be made to the design of the programme for Phase VI? (Recommendations for future phases considering compliance with the BMZ Methodology Note). Assess the advantages and disadvantages of the following selection process; 50% Jordanians and 50% Syrian refugees or the Government's request of 70% Jordanians and 30% Syrian refugees. Is it appropriate for short duration, overlapping and non-repeating phases to focus on maintenance activities? Do short overlapping phases detract attention from the long-term need for maintenance? Are programme's phases' timeframes appropriate including (i) programme identification (ii) programme design including approvals (iii) tender process, and (iv) programme implementation? What are the impacts of 1) two month working periods (rather than longer periods) and 2) high labour intensity – from a logistical/administrative perspective, and from a sustainability perspective (the impact on beneficiaries of short two month working periods)? Which is more effective: a series of many short phases, or fewer longer phases? For upcoming potential Phase VI: Assess the direction the programme design is recommended to follow to increase longer-term impact in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A continued and increased focus on employability of workers through vocational training, entrepreneurship training and/or jobs matching. Institutional strengthening with government partners to improve maintenance systems. Increased asset creation and infrastructure development, and in which sectors? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What is the impact of short, overlapping Phases? What kind of activities have proven to be especially successful and why? Which activities should rather not be continued? Are the programme's identification and selection processes of interventions logical and suitable? Were programme's assumptions and targets realistic, and did the programme undergo risk analyses and design readjustments when necessary? What are the advantage and disadvantages of having short term (two months contract) on the workers, on the partners who must follow up on all administrative details and for the programme staff? To what extent would extending employment periods while reaching less people is recommended? Assess the extent of increasing the job duration as a mitigation plan to overcome challenges related to delays in work permit issuance. What are the benefits of expanding into other locations in future phases, compared to continuing to work for a longer time in the original locations? To what extent did the project design identify and integrate specific targets and indicators on gender and disability inclusion dimensions, and how did the programme remain flexible and responsive to any challenges or changing contexts with regards to these issues? For Phase V specifically: Assess the changes that have been made to Phase V on the programme outcomes.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How should the project design for future phases be revised to consider changing contexts for instance, changing government priorities (for instance, ratio of Jordanian and Syrian workers), protracted nature of the Syrian Crisis, increasing unemployment rate in Jordan and socio-economic impact from Covid-19. 	
Effectiveness:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How have stakeholders been involved in programme's implementation, including selection of locations and activities? How has continuous issues with work permit issuance for Syrian workers affected the operations and timely delivery of the projects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What progress has the programme made so far towards achieving the development objective and outcomes? Were targets under each phase reached? In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes? Effectiveness and appropriateness of Local Resource Based Technology appropriate and effective for different types of infrastructure. To what extent has the programme management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the programme objectives? How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards? What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives? What positive or negative unintended outcomes can be identified? Assess the efficiency of carrying out Municipality works in Jordan by direct labour and Municipal supervision, compared to the possible use of contractors? Assess location and activity and participants' (potential beneficiaries) selection and the involvement of stakeholders in that selection. Assess the method of municipalities bidding competitively for involvement in Phase 5. What have been specific strategies in terms of breaking gender stereotypes? Have they been successful? What are the next steps ahead? What have been strategies for disability inclusion? Have they been successful? What should be done differently to improve impact? There is difficult balance to strike between a large coverage of many areas and a more focused approach on a limited number of sites – has the programme optimised the options they had in this regard?
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are national partners able and willing to continue with the programme? At this stage, would considering continuation of the programme be justifiable? In what way could achievements be consolidated? In what way should the next phases differ from the current ones? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the results achieved by the programme so far likely to be sustainable- in terms of (a) financial sustainability, capabilities, mandate and commitment of stakeholders, (b) sustainable livelihood sources of beneficiaries? What measures have been taken to ensure that the key components of the programme are sustainable beyond the life of the programme? Are they sufficient? How effectively has the programme built national ownership? Are operation and maintenance (O&M) agreements for infrastructure in place, and are these being implemented? Is there adequate and sustainable funding for O&M? How could sustainability of the measures be increased (e.g. through design changes in the programme)?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How could the efficiency of the programmes be improved? How could coordination between the different implementing agencies in the sector be improved? To what extent has the programme been on track in terms of timely achieving the assigned milestones? If not, what factors contributed to the delays? How could they be mitigated in the future phases? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has the programme's activities been cost-effective in terms of creating livelihoods, creating / maintaining assets? How can the labour intensity of the programme be optimised with due regards to the quality of assets created? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? To what extent has the programme been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives nationally, about the creation of synergies? What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality? Comment on efficiency of short phases and overlapping phases.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the division of work tasks within the programme’s teams? Has the use of local skills been effective? How does the programme’s governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? • How effective was communication between the programme’s teams, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? • Has the programme received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between programme’s staff and government entities? • How effectively does the programme management team monitor the programme’s performances and results? Does the programme report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to the programme and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been? Do the M&E systems provide for capturing results in terms of women’s and PwDs’ participation?
Impact Orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the length of contracts adequate to allow for beneficiaries to graduate to longer term job and sustainable source of livelihood? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the likely contribution of the programme’s initiatives to the stated development objectives of the intervention? • To what extent does the programme influence long term changes in policy and approaches at the level of the government? What have been the achievements and shortcomings of the programme in providing formal job opportunities – in particular, in terms of work permits, social protection, and organization / representation? Does the programme influence women’s participation in workforce? • What is the indirect and induced impact of the programme in terms of business growth and job creation, secondary job effects along the value chain? How can it be improved? • Assess the impact of the work done through the CFW working group on the sector and with other ILO initiatives. • Assess the vocational training component and the potential for employment. What can be done in future phases to increase its impact on preparing ex workers of the project in accessing the labour market? • Has the programme contributed to Peace and conflict prevention? • Has the programme contributed to social cohesion in the communities between Jordanians and Syrians? • To what extent has the project contributed to strengthening capacities of its national partners so they can better serve the needs of the public and communities?
Challenges and Lessons Learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What good practices can be learned from the different phases of the programme that can be applied to future phases of this programme or similar future programmes? • Challenges and lessons learned from implementing the programme in Karak Governorate in Phase V in terms of tribal power balance and its impact on the selection of municipalities and participants (both Jordanians and Syrian refugees). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on the challenges identified during the implementation of previous phases, how can challenges be addressed in ongoing and new phases?
COVID-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The effect of COVID-19 pandemic on the country, employment, and nature of interventions and progress of implementation within the milestones. • To what extent has the project leveraged new or repurposed existing financial resources to mitigate COVID-19 effects in a balanced manner? • To what extent has the intervention leveraged partnerships (with constituents, national institutions, IFIs and UN/development agencies) to support constituents while targeting the COVID-19 response? • Assess the timeliness of response, relevance of contingency measures, and lessons learnt in relation to the Programme’s response to the impact of Covid-19. • How has the change (decrease) in capacity of government staff due to Covid-19 affected the achievement of some of the project’s goals (work permits, etc.), and what should be considered for future planning if the situation persists? • Assess the impact on the achievement of project goals and objectives with disruptions caused by the Covid-19 national and local lockdowns • To what extent has the programme provided a timely and relevant response to constituents’ needs and priorities in the COVID-19 context? 	

Annex 3: List of Document Reviewed

#	Document Name	Source
1	20191001 Jordan Phase V Prodoc with Annexes	EIIP Team
2	Project Document Phase 3	EIIP Team
3	Project Document Phase 4	EIIP Team
4	Annex 1- Semi-Annual Progress Report#1 - Phase III	EIIP Team
5	Annex 2-Semi-Annual Progress Report#2 - Phase III	EIIP Team
6	Annex 3 - Phase 3 Semi-Annual Progress Report3 - Sept 2020	EIIP Team
7	Annex 4 - Results Matrix Phase III_Feb 2021 (Apr2021)	EIIP Team
8	Phase 3 Semi-Annual Progress Report#4 - Feb 2021	EIIP Team
9	20201020 Phase 4 Semi-Annual Progress Report#3 - Sept 2020	EIIP Team
10	Annex 1-20190728 Semi-Annual Progress Report#1 - Phase IV_KfW	EIIP Team
11	Annex 2-20200414 Semi-Annual Progress Report#2 Phase IV	EIIP Team
12	Annex 3- 20201020 Phase 4 Results Matrix - Sept 2020	EIIP Team
13	Phase 4 Semi-Annual Progress Report#4_Final_25 March	EIIP Team
14	20201129 Annex I - Results Matrix Phase V (002)	EIIP Team
15	20201129 Phase 5 Semi-Annual Progress Report#1 - October 2020	EIIP Team
16	Annex_Phase 4 Semi-Annual Progress Report#4_01 March	EIIP Team
17	ILO KfW EIIP_Second Phase V Semi Annual Report (15Mar21)	EIIP Team
18	Executive Summary-Cluster EIIP (1)	ILO ROAS
19	Lebanon Jordan EIIPs Independent Evaluation Report - Final Draft	ILO ROAS

Annex 4: List of People Interviewed and Consulted

Name of Interviewee	Position and Location
ILO Office Jordan	
Ms. Frida Khan,	ILO Country Coordinator for Jordan
EIIP project team	
Mr. Simon Done	EIIP CTA
Ms. Nisha Baruah	EIIP Programme and Training Officer
Suha Hawatmeh	Admin Finance Officer
Mahmoud Odeh	Procurement Officer
Qais Khrais	Environmental & Social Safeguards Officer
Hazim Abu Issa	National Engineer – Irbid
Anas Al Bakhit	National Engineer - Amman
Thair Ziyadneh	National Engineer - Jerash
Ahmad Athamat	National Engineer – Zarqa
Sampson Addo-Teyye,	International Engineer (previous)
ILO ROAS	
Ms. Ruba Jaradat	ILO Regional Director
Mr. Frank Hagemann	Deputy Regional Director
Maha Kattaa,	Resilience and Crisis Response Specialist
Oktavianto Pasaribu,	Chief, Regional Programming Unit
Sarah El Jamal	Programme Officer
Nathalie Bavitch	Senior UN Coherence and Partnership Specialist, OIC Regional M&E Officer
Tomas Stenstrom	CTA of KFW-funded EIIP project in Lebanon
Kishore Kumar Singh	Regional Senior Skills Specialist
Toshi Inoue	Chief, Regional Admin Services
ILO Headquarters, Geneva	
Chris Donges,	Coordinator, Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP)
Peter Rademaker	Head, Development Partner Relations Unit, PARDEV
KfW	
Julia Prigge-Mussial,	KfW Desk Officer
Assia Al Dhabi	KfW Amman
Representatives of other agencies and projects	
Maria Ghauri – van Kruijsdijk,	Team Leader, Protection of Water Dams in Jordan through labour-intensive Activities (Cash for Work), GIZ
Abdullah Lahham,	Project Manager, ILO Municipal Services and Social Resilience Project (MSSRP), World Bank
Aya Kasasbeh,	National Project Coordinator, AICS Italian-funded ILO EIIP project
Sharif Khaled,	Previous National Engineer, National Project Coordinator, UNESCO Italian-funded ILO EIIP project
Government ministries and municipalities	
Engineer Hussein Muhaidat	Secretary General (SG), Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA)
Engineer Jumana	Project Focal Point, Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA)
Engineer Marwan	Secretary General (SG) Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH)
Engineer Dalia Banoura	Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH)

Mr. Hadidi	Secretary General, Ministry of Labour (MOL)
Mr. Hamdan	Project Focal Point, Ministry of Labour (MOL)
Mr. Sayel	Project Focal Point, Ministry of Labour (MOL)
Contractors and Beneficiaries	
Contractors and staff for the road maintenance projects under MPWH (Phase IV and Phase V)	8 contractors to be identified.
Workers and other beneficiaries	26 Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme workers (16 men, 10 women) and 4 site engineers (2 men, 2 women) distributed over 4 Governorates - Mafraq, Irbid, Amman and Karak

Annex 5: Master Results Framework: Phase III-V

Phase III

Results	Indicator	Target	Progress	Comment	Status
Programme objective: Syrian refugees and Jordanians have better living conditions because of increased employment and improved Infrastructure.	Indicator 1: Number of men and women, both Jordanian and Syrian, who benefit from improved access to infrastructure and services	200.000	225.902	The number will be the population in the municipalities, assuming that all population benefited from the services, and including all Syrians	Achieved
	Indicator 2: Number of men and women, both Jordanian and Syrian, who benefited from increased income	16.000	17.525	This number was counted based on 5 average household number. (headcount*5)	Achieved
	Indicator 3: Proportion of residents in the target governorates who perceive tensions between refugees and the host community in the target areas to have reduced or stayed the same	0	0	This will be reported in the Phase III Workers Survey. To date the project helpline has not received any complaint about tensions between Syrians and Jordanians within the project.	Achieved
Module objective: Increased employability in environmental and landscaping activities	Indicator 1: Number of worker days created	193.920	197.996	27% Women, 5% Workers with Disability, 49% Syrians	Achieved (over target)
	Indicator 2: Number of workers involved in municipal Works	3.200	3.505	28% Women, 5% Workers with Disability, 48% Syrians	Achieved (over target)
	Indicator 3: Number of job opportunities generated	3.200	3.417	28% Women, 5% Workers with Disability, 48% Syrians	Achieved (over target)
	Indicator 4: Total investment in improved municipal infrastructure (\$)	4.328.577	3.241.284	total expenditure	Suha to provide
	Indicator 5: Labour Intensity	80%	80%	The exact total labour intensity will be calculated by the end of the phase where all the number of workers and total expenditure is known to be able to calculate it precisely.	Engineers to advise

Output 1: Expand and improved environment services in target municipalities	Indicator 1.01: Number of municipalities benefitted from improved environment	8	9	Due to incompliance two municipalities were terminated and one Municipality from Phase II was added. For the same reasons some municipalities gets extensions to make up the number of working days which were lost.	Achieved
	Indicator 1.02: Number public events organized on environmental sustainability and keeping the municipality clean	8	0	This activity was moved to be conducted under Phase IV budget.	will be conducted under Phase IV. This has been communicated & agreed with KfW
Output 2: Capacity of staff at the municipalities built to manage employment intensive projects	Indicator 2.01: Number of municipal officials who participated in training activities on employment intensive techniques	50	227	Finalized	Achieved
	Indicator 2.02: % of participants with increased knowledge on management of employment intensive techniques	70%	95%	Finalized	Achieved
Output 3: Improved awareness of municipality and MoL officers on labour laws, work permits, and social security rules and regulations	Indicator 3.01: Number of workshops conducted on labour laws, work permits, and social security rules and regulations	1	0	Ministry of Labour staff were busy with work permits rectification grace period and it was difficult to conduct the workshop. It will be rearranged to March 2020	Not Achieved (Qais to advise)
	Indicator 3.02: % of participants with increased knowledge on management of employment intensive techniques	70%	0	To be assessed after workshop is held	Not Achieved
	Indicator 4.01: % of workers benefitted from occupational safety and health	80%	100%	All workers are provided with health and safety equipment and training	Achieved
	Indicator 4.02: % of Jordanian workers benefitting from social security	80%	100%	All workers who work for more than 16 days qualify for social security	Achieved

	Indicator 4.03: % of Syrian workers benefitted from health insurance scheme	80%	0	All the workers are registered for social security so there is no need for health insurance	Achieved
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Phase IV

Result	Success Indicators	Target	Target Progress up to January 2021	Comment	Status
	Indicator 1: Number of men and women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefited from improved access to infrastructure and services.	8.000.000	9.175.600		Achieved
	Indicator 2: Number of men and Women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefitted from increased income beneficiaries.	Target values: 32,000 beneficiaries	32.515,00		Achieved
	Indicator 3: Proportion of resident in the target governorates who perceived tensions between the refugees and the host communities to have reduced or stay the same.	Target values: xxx % Was not set	0		will be conducted. Planned
	Indicator 1.1: Number of worker days created (disaggregated by type of intervention, sex and nationality)	Target values: 488,857 worker days (50% Jordanians, 50% Syrians; of which 15% women, 3% PwD) 307,417 worker days on road sector. 181,440 worker days under municipality works.	419,541 Total Worker Days 50% Jordanians , 50% Syrians, 26% Women, 4% PwD. 237,819 Roads 181,722 Municipalities		On track and achievable

	Indicator 1.2: Number of jobs exceeding 40 days duration created (disaggregated by sex, disability, nationality and type of intervention)	6,439 jobs (50% Jordanians, 50% Syrians; of which 15% women, 3% PwD)	6,188 total jobs 49% Jordanians , 51% Syrians, 28% Women, 4% PwD, 3095 Municipalities 3,093 Roads		On track and achievable
	Indicator 1.3: Number of people employed (disaggregated by sex, disability and nationality and type of intervention)	6,439 workers (15% women, 3% PwD) 3,415 workers employed in road sector and 3,024 workers employed in municipalities)	6,503 Head Count 49% Jordanians, 51% Syrians, 27% Women, 4% PwD 3,166 Municipalities 3,337 Roads		Achieved
	Indicator 1.4: Percentage of workers benefitting from OSH measures and Social Security.	80%	100%		Achieved
	Indicator 1.5: Percentage of workers benefitting from labour contract.	80%	100%		Achieved
	Indicator 1.6: Total Investment in infrastructure works.	EUR 15,275,743	7.986.792,65		Suha to advise
	Indicator 1.7: Labour Intensity of Capital Investments (by type of work)	45% for road works and 85% for municipality works	on completion		Simon to advise
	Indicator 1.1.1: Number of Kilometres of road maintained	2.112	2.173		Achieved
	Indicator 1.2.1: Number of municipalities supported	6	6		Achieved

	Indicator 1.2.2: Units of infrastructures constructed, rehabilitated or maintained	Target values: xxx road, xxx parks, xxx schools, xxx mosques, xxx cemeteries, xxx trees planted (to be identified after selecting the 6 municipalities)			Simon to advise
	Indicator 1.3.1: Percentage of public officials who attended trainings with increased knowledge on employment intensive approaches (disaggregated by sex and disability)	80%	96%		Achieved
	Indicator 1.3.2: Number of MPWH engineers and Municipal officials certified in Local Resource Based Technology	100	191		Achieved
	Indicator 1.4.2: Number of Contractors' engineers certified in Local Resource Based Technology (disaggregated by sex and disability)	50	0		Simon to advise
	Indicator 1.5.1: Percentage of participants who attended awareness workshops with increased knowledge on gender equality in the workplace (disaggregated by sex and disability)	80%	95%		Achieved
	Indicator 1.5.2: Number of participants who attended awareness workshops on gender equality in the workplace (disaggregated by sex and disability)	100	110		Achieved
	Indicator 2.1: Percentage of workers who benefit from being granted a one year work permit after completion of the work under the EIP Project	25%	0		Simon to advise

	Indicator 2.2: Share of workers placed who are retained after three months of on-the-job training	50%	0		Simon to advise
	Indicator 2.1.1: Number of Syrian workers who received work permit in agriculture or construction sector (disaggregated by sex and disability)	600	0		Simon to advise
	Indicator 2.2.1: Number of workers placed and certified (disaggregated by sex and disability)	Target values: xxx (to be identified after selecting the courses)	0		Simon to advise

EIIP Phase 5

Result	Indicator(s)		Phase V Actual	Target	Output status	Remarks
Programme Impact: Improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanians through increased employment and improved infrastructure.						
	Indicator 1: Number of men and women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefited from access to improved infrastructure and services.		This can be updated on work starts and cleaning , routine maintenance take place to see how many areas benefited.	350,000 beneficiaries	On schedule	
	Indicator 2: Number of men and women both Jordanian and Syrian who benefited from increased income.		837*5= 4,185 Head count*5 Average Household Number	18,000	On schedule	
	Indicator 3: Change in the percentage of workers willing to interact with other population groups (disaggregated by nationality and governorate)			25%	On schedule	
Outcome 1: Employment Opportunities generated and access to the labour market improved for Syrian Refugees and Jordanians						
	Indicator 1.1: Number of jobs reaching or exceeding 40 days duration created (disaggregated by sex, disability and nationality)		194 M: 136 F: 58 D: 8 S:73 J: 121	3,900 jobs (250 workers employed in road sector and 3,650 workers employed in municipalities) (50% Jordanians, 50% Syrians; of which 20% women, and 3% PwD)	On schedule	Target has been revised to 3,300 jobs, in consultation with KFW

		Indicator 1.2.: Percentage of Jordanians and Syrian refugees graduates from skills training who access employment after one month of completing the training (disaggregated by sex, disability and nationality)			40%	Delay: not yet started	
		Indicator 1.3.: Percentage of Jordanians and Syrian refugees placed who are retained after four months of completing the training (disaggregated by sex, disability and nationality)			Target: 50% (out of target group under indicator 1.2)	Delay: not yet started	
Outcome 1: Employment opportunities generated and access to the labour market improved for Syrian refugees and Jordanians							
Out put 1.1	Employment opportunities generated for Syrian refugees and Jordanians	Indicator 1.1.1.: Number of worker days created (disaggregated by type of intervention, sex, nationality and disability).		26227 M: 18322.5 F: 7904.5 D: 2026.5 S:10851 J:15376	260,000 worker days (26,700 worker days on road sector and 233,300 worker days under municipality works)	On schedule	
		Indicator 1.1.2.: Number of salaries paid to workers (disaggregated by type of intervention, sex and nationality).			€ 4,871,516, of which € 571,925 for salaries, social security and work permits of workers on road works; And € 4,299,591 for salaries, social security and work permits for municipal workers.	On schedule	
Out put 1.2	Strategy for increasing women participation	Indicator 1.2.1: Number of participants who attended awareness workshops with increased knowledge on gender equality in the workplace (disaggregated by sex, disability, and nationality)			200 (among which 80% with increased knowledge)	Delay: not yet started	

	impleme nted	Indicator 1.2.2: Number of participants in all-women road routine maintenance works (disaggregated by nationality and disability)			30	On schedule	
Out put 1.3	Syrian refugees and Jordania ns who complete d their work with the Project accessed to Labour Market Oriented Vocation al Training	1.3.1: Number of Syrian refugees and Jordanian workers placed in labour market oriented vocational training (disaggregated by sex, disability and nationality)			100 (out of which 30% women, 3% PwD, and 50% Syrian refugees)	Delay: not yet started	
Outcome 2: Improved infrastructure through the use of labour intensive methods for men and women							
Out put 2.1	Improve d roads through routine maintena nce works	Indicator 2.1.1: Number of Kilometres of highway road maintained			300 km	On schedule	
Out put 2.2	Improve d municipa l infrastru cture	Indicator 2.2.1: Number of municipalities supported Indicator 2.2.2: Units of infrastructures maintained			9 municipalities 1,000 km of municipality road, 30 parks, 55 cemeteries, 70 mosque compounds, 35	On schedule On schedule	Indicator 2.2.1. After an assessment during the preparation phase, the project target has changed to 11 municipalities

				government office compounds, 20 health centres, 12,000 tree planting, 110 km kerb stone painting and repair, 11,000 sq meter fence painting.		Indicator 2.2.2. After an assessment during the preparation phase, the project target has changed to: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2,000 trees planted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 200 trees trimmed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 10 km of kerb constructed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50 km of kerb stone painted and repaired <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3,000 m2 of fence painted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3,000 m2 of footpath constructed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 600 m3 of gabions constructed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1,000 m of concrete bumpers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4 parks constructed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4 km of road lines marked <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 30 iron benches constructed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6,000 kerb stones manufactured <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1,500 m2 of floor tiled <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2 Town Gates rehabilitated <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 Spring rehabilitated
Output 2.3	Improve capacity of public and private sectors to implement Employment Intensive Approaches	Indicator 2.3.1: Number of municipal and MPWH officials who attended trainings with increased knowledge on employment intensive approaches (disaggregated by sex and disability)	112 trainees - 57 Municipality Staff and 55 Skilled Workers (92 male & 20 female) in 8 municipalities	106 (among which 80%with increased knowledge on employment intensive approaches)	On schedule	Indicator 2.3.1. Planned training for remaining 3 municipalities are 41 trainees, 21 Municipality Staff and 20 Skilled Workers (33 male & 8 female)
		Indicator 2.3.2: Number of private sector contractors / engineers who attended trainings with increased knowledge on employment intensive approaches (disaggregated by sex and disability)		18 (among which 80%with increased knowledge on employment intensive approaches)	On schedule	

Annex 6: Good Practices and Lessons Learned

Good Practices

<p>ILO Emerging Good Practice Template Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V) Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey Date: 12 July 2021</p>	
<p>GP Element: Institutional capacity and support is integral to effective CfW, EIIP and LBT. It promotes sustainability and supports government mechanisms to be more resilient and responsive to emergency situations (refugees and COVID-19).</p>	
<p>Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)</p>	<p>The programme has maintained a strong focus on institutional capacity and support. The support is not just on supporting programme implementation but also introduces systems and processes that support the government to respond to current future crises</p>
<p>Relevant conditions and context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability</p>	<p>Jordan has been heavily impacted by the on-going Syrian crises. COVID-19 has also exposed limitations in national response efforts resulting in significant economic constraints and changes. It is important to maintain institutional systems during these periods</p> <p>There also needs to be a willingness on the part of government administrations to adopt the approach and make the necessary changes and adjustments. The willingness depends on the value of the benefits and continuing external support. For the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes, a consistency of approach and partnerships with other external agencies are required in the face of changes in the political context.</p>
<p>Establish a clear cause-effect relationship</p>	<p>The result of institutional support should ideally be better service delivery and policy frameworks. The capacity and institutional support provided to date has revealed the importance of asset creation and infrastructure enhancements. Importantly it has also highlighted the need for on-going maintenance support.</p>
<p>Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries</p>	<p>The measurable impact is the subsequent change in systems, processes and policies as a result of the support (i.e. work visa process). Another impact is the focus of work to centre on maintenance and assess creations. It is also related to the people who are trained as part of the process.</p>
<p>Potential for replication and by whom</p>	<p>The “cause-effect relationship” and “measurable impact” above refer to the capacity to replicate. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes have replicated the approach with different partners (e.g. the Ministry of Public Works and Housing) and provided training for other providers using the LRBT approach.</p>

Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	The engagement with government (central and municipal) has significant implications for all aspects of the ILO's goals, strategies and operations.
Other documents or relevant comments	The Standard Operating Procedure for cash for work projects in Jordan.

ILO Emerging Good Practice Template Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V) Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey Date: 12 July 2021	
GP Element: A focus on asset creation and associated maintenance is critical for longer-term success. This approach aligns to the expectations of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme and promotes a sense of longer-term development rather than responsive and short-term mechanisms.	
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	Asset creation is core to the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme in Jordan is taking steps to focus on asset creation but this takes time. The good practice is more of an objective at this stage and is strongly recommended for work progressing into Phase VI.
Relevant conditions and context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	There need to be buy-in from government to see the benefit of asset creation, infrastructure enhancements and overall maintenance. The programme has provided evidence of the benefits of such arrangements. However the focus on short-term job creation is a popular mechanism to promote development but does not always correlate into longer-term jobs and change.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	By focusing on asset creation, there is a higher change of longer-term employment which has significant impacts with regards to income and also business development, particularly in the private sector.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	The main beneficiaries are workers. Impacts will be on number of assets created and proportion of assets being used and maintained. Important evaluation studies could be defined around these.
Potential for replication and by whom	The "cause-effect relationship" and "measurable impact" above refer to the capacity to replicate. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes have replicated the approach with different partners (e.g. the Ministry of Public Works and Housing). There are also useful opportunities for the donor to apply similar approaches elsewhere to complement CfW efforts.

Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	The engagement with government (central and municipal) has significant implications for all aspects of the ILO's goals, strategies and operations.
Other documents or relevant comments	

ILO Emerging Good Practice Template Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V) Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey Date: 12 July 2021	
GP Element: Support to facilitate work permits and visas is important. It builds relationships, supports institutional arrangements and when coupled with longer-term planning for jobs, enhances relationships and the likelihood of success.	
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	Work Permits are an ongoing issue for the project. Any support to help facilitate and streamline the process of approvals is welcomed and warranted. The programme's strategic shift to embed advisers within the MoL is important as it builds relationships and helps speed up processes. There is also scope to broaden institutional support from this example.
Relevant conditions and context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	There needs to be a recognition that a core response for the delay in work permits is the type and nature of work as well as the priority shown to Syrian workers. EIPP needs to respond to the context and acknowledge that changing government systems and approvals is not going to occur easily. There needs to be a shift in focus (as discussed in report) to promote better quality jobs, increase employment contracts and seek to use Jordanian workers.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	The impacts are significant as it will allow for more workers to work and will also support institutional changes. By improving processes, there is scope to promote work and also to ensure the economy improves as a result of more income and potential tax benefits.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	The impacts will be more Syrians receiving the opportunity to work and corresponding increase in income.
Potential for replication and by whom	There is scope to replicate this process across all other CfW programs and

Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	The work has significant impact on the DWCP and also to SDG 8: promoting Decent Work.
Other documents or relevant comments	N/A

ILO Emerging Good Practice Template Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V) Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey Date: 12 July 2021	
GP Element: Application of social safeguards and associated monitoring and follow-up is a good practice that is well embedded. A commitment to equal representation, involvement of women and people with disabilities is encouraged through the programme and well-grounded in implementation efforts.	
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	The EIPP has invested considerable effort to promote appropriate social safeguards to guide programme implementation and management. Social Safeguards are a critical component of decent work and also for safety measures. This is also particularly important with regards to work safety on work sites. It is also critical with regards to social distancing measures as a result of COVID-19.
Relevant conditions and context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	There needs to be a willingness and understanding of the importance of social safeguards with regards to infrastructure provision and enhancements. Social and environmental elements of work and infrastructure are critical. It takes time to embed and institutionalise such approaches. The best approach is through practical demonstration and awareness raising and on-going monitoring and support.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	The application of safeguards leads directly to reduced indicators of accidents and/or death. It also fosters a promotion and culture of safety in all aspects of work and to protect individuals and the environment also.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	The direct measurable impacts are around the reduced incidents of accidents and/or death. There is also an assumption that the application of safeguards leads to be quality infrastructure.
Potential for replication and by whom	This could easily be replicated on other sites and on other projects. Evidence suggests that the Safeguards systems for Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme Jordan is well regarded and strategy and tools have been replicated and applied and are also being utilised.

Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	The links to all aspects of the ILO's work. Safeguards has significant implications for all aspects of the ILO's goals, strategies and operations.
Other documents or relevant comments	Social Safeguards Framework

Lessons Learned

Lesson No.1 Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V) Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V) Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey Date: 12 July 2021 The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.	
LL Element: Programme phases should be extended to allow time for planning, implementation and longer-term engagement. Longer durations also support opportunities to address new and emerging needs and trends. The strategy also allows for better review and evaluative assessments, particularly as they relate to longer-term outcomes.	
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	The report has spoken at length about the challenges of short phases. The short duration of phases does not correspond to go development outcomes and focuses efforts on short-term results and simple head counts of jobs linked to a specific methodology. By promoting longer phases, the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme allows time for better implementation and management and also supports better engagement and the promotion of other outcomes. It also fosters a focus on evaluative efforts as time is provided to assess and measure changes in key areas of work.
Context and any related preconditions	The context is primarily dependent upon the wishes of the donor. Demand is there for longer phases (and also for longer-employment contracts). The context has also shifted from a humanitarian issue into a longer-term development context, so there is a need to change strategic focus and programme arrangements to accommodate this new reality and way of working. It is also good practice to focus on better development outcomes and results.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	All stakeholders gain with a broader focus. The donor obtains better results, governments are able to reach more workers and also have enhanced infrastructure assets. Workers benefit as they have better participation rates and can focus work on better outcomes.

Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	If short-term phases are continued there is a risk that existing issues and problems will continue. There is a need to review the current context and respond to demands and priorities.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	By providing a longer timeframe for implementation, there is scope to undertake more detailed planning and allow for delays and challenges. It also provides a higher degree of confidence to government partners and provides a higher degree of certainty.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	There will be an impact upon resources as budgets may be expanded and the longer duration may require changes to staffing levels. This needs to be considered in partnership with KfW.

Lesson No.2

Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V)

Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)

Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey

Date: 12 July 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element: To promote active engagement it is important to work within existing municipal plans and to align activities to priority areas of work. It is also important to engage with local partners (WOs and EOs) as part of the process to facilitate employment and to maintain the tripartite model.

Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	The risk for short-term CfW type programs is that they respond to issues and needs often without careful consideration of current government plans and strategies. The programme has done a good job of ensuring alignment but there is a risk that too much work across too many sectors can dilute efforts and promote a “scatter-gun approach which reduces efficiency and effectiveness. There is also a need to ensure WO’s and EO’s are actively involved to help support transition to more longer-term employment
Context and any related preconditions	The context is heavily influenced by the ability of WO and Eos to engage and the willingness of the programme to work within the plans and priorities of governments.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	

ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	
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Lesson No.3
Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V)
Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)
Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey
Date: 12 July 2021
The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element: To promote longer term sustainability, there is a need to move way from CfW type approaches to adopt a mix of short-term assistance along with longer-term employment efforts aimed at promoting infrastructure enhancements and asset creation.

Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	A key lesson arising from the comparison of projects and activities between phases is the importance of differentiating between the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach (which combines the multiple objectives, short term employment, public asset improvement and potential for making a sustainable contribution to pro-employment development) and other cash for work (CfW) approaches.
Context and any related preconditions	Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programmes will always be less “efficient” if the sole objective is to be cost-effective in delivering cash to target groups with no consideration of whether the work is productive. It is important that the key stakeholders (the donor, the governments and actual and potential partners)
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	The users targeted by this lesson are the key stakeholders, the donor, actual and potential partners and the government. But the ultimate beneficiaries are the workers on projects, those using the improved assets and those who benefit from a pro-employment development approach in the long term.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	A challenge is that the key stakeholders (notably the donor, the governments and other actual or potential partners) do not perceive the rounded benefits of the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme approach to be of sufficient added value in comparison with other CfW approaches. Another challenge is that Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme offers short-term employment only and not a longer term livelihood improvement. To counter these challenges, it is essential to: (a) ensure that there is sufficient sustainable added value from the improved assets, and (b) develop links within the ILO and other partners whose focus is longer term livelihood improvement.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	A conscientious shift away from CfW into more asset creation aligned to the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme model would have significant benefits and support government priorities as well as support the ILO’s comparative advantage. When combined with longer timeframes, there is also a higher chance of key results being achieved and sustained.

ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The ILO need to continue engagement with both the government and donors to shift the thinking and approach. Resourcing may need to change dependent on the type of work being implemented as a result of the shift away from CfW.
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Lesson No.4
Project: Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, Jordan (Phase III, IV and V)
Project TC: JOR/17/08/DEU (Phase III), JOR/18/05/DEU (Phase IV) and JOR/19/03/DEU (Phase V)
Name of Evaluator: Ty Morrissey
Date: 12 July 2021
The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element: To promote the concept of CfW and Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme, more in-depth monitoring and evaluation should occur (rather than simply counting jobs) to provide an evidence-base to support future planning at municipal and donor levels

Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	Decisions to potentially shift away from CfW into more longer-term employment and asset creation, requires an evidence base. If longer phases are introduced, there is an opportunity to plan for more detailed evaluative efforts. There is scope to deepen evaluation studies and consider more detailed assessments (i.e. moving away from simple head counts of jobs created).
Context and any related preconditions	The context is heavily influenced by available resources, technical capacity and also a willingness to develop the evidence base. There is scope to combine efforts with other programmes and donors to undertake more detailed assessments. With five phases of implementation, it would be assumed that there would be significant amounts of data and information that could be used.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	The main users of this work will be the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme team, the donors and government partners. I would also be useful for the ILO as a whole to depend on the evidence base and literature around CfW and Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme work.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	He key challenge will be the time and resources available to complete such studies. Often, a significant amount of time and resources are required to plan, design and implement studies. However this could be minimised through a targeted “fir-for-purpose” approach that works within the context.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	The use of evaluation also promotes learning and supports decision making. Good research and evaluation has a number of significant benefits. Hopefully it will lead to better decision-making and also provides demonstrable evidence of the benefits of the work completed to date.

ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	Significant resources are required, however there is an opportunity to outsource the work to a third-party provider. External support may be required to support the drafting of ToRs and study design. This can be factored into Phase VI planning.
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