International Labour Organization

iTrack Evaluation

ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title:** Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry.
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  - **Evaluation Manager:** Nathalie Bavitch
  - **Key Words:** Syrian refugees, EIIP, agriculture, forestry, Jordan,

This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office

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Acronyms

DW	Decent Work
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
EIIP	Employment Intensive Investment Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GoJ	Government of Jordan
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JBV	Joint Business Venture
Jd	Jordanian dinar (equivalent to 1.4 USD)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoL	Ministry of Labour
prodoc	Project document
PPE	Personal protection equipment
PWD	Person/s with Disability
ROAS	Regional Office for Arab States
3RP	Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNCHR	United Nations Commission for Refugees
USD	United States Dollar
wkdy	workdays
WP	Work Permit

EXECTUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Background

According to the latest census, the total number of Syrians residing in the Kingdom of Jordan is around 1.3 million, 637,000 of whom are *refugees* registered with UNHCR, equivalent to about 10 per cent of the total population. This is putting pressure on Jordanian society, its natural resource base, infrastructure, and economy, including the labor market. The Jordanian government envisages that the bulk of these refugees will remain in the country for some time, that they should be enabled to participate in the formal economy and become self-reliant in securing their own employment.

The current project "Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry. (JOR/16/01NOR)" was funded by Norway, with a budget of 1,771,323.79 USD (01 Dec 2016 – 31 Mar 2018). It is thus highly relevant to the current crisis and the longer-term intentions of the Jordanian government. The ILO used an Employment Intensive Investment Program (EIIP) approach, with the Ministry of Agriculture and its Directorates in five Governorates (Tafila, Karak, Albalqa, Jaresh and Aljoun) as the project Implementing Partner (IP). This represented a novel application for EIIP and new IP for ILO in Jordan.

While its contribution of the project is small compared to the crisis, the EIIP and Decent Work approaches proved to be highly effective in achieving technical outputs. The project thus provides new models that could be applied widely to address the country's underlying issues of climate change, weak economy and labour markets.

The project strategy was straightforward, to generate temporary work for **700 workers for 10000 workdays** through creating work opportunities within the agriculture sector; (a) reforestation; (b) water-harvesting (construction of cisterns and tanks), and (c) establishment of Joint Business Ventures (JBVs). These would provide a vehicle for the development objective of 'improved living conditions' for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians through; introduction of Decent Work; improved social cohesion between Jordanians and Syrian refugees and, entitle the refugees to work- permits so they could access to the formal economy. During the Evaluation is was clear that the application of the EIIP and Decent Work protocols were what led these relatively straightforward activities to deliver better living conditions for the beneficiaries. One specific weakness of the project design was that there was no explicit provision for 2 years watering and protection of seedlings for the reforestation. This weakness persists into Phase II.

The project exceeded its immediate objectives with generating employment **for 1,199 workers for a total of 31,519 workdays**. A further 2,100 workdays are still expected to be generated through project extension activities. Just 172 of the 501 Syrian refugees gained work permits. This was primarily due to many who work contracts were less than the min. 16 days required to obtain a WP Longer term contracts enabled workers to begin to plan family life and budget accordingly. However, **none of the refugees** were found to have continued to more regular work, except for the relatively small number (46) who had formed JBVs and thus responsible for their own work. Ultimately the lack of longer term work is due to the weak Jordanian economy and labour market. The overall ratio of **Jdn/Syr workers employed was 58/42**, somewhat short of the 50/50 target. This however suffered from a high number of short-term Jordanians employed in Karak due to multiple relocation of its reforestation site. Other development outputs were substantially achieved but with final figures similarly reduced inclusion of special groups women (7.4 %), and persons with disabilities (2.4%) in the work teams.

The project achieved its target output for reforested area**, 1010 dunum (101%)** but slightly underachieved for the units of cisterns/tanks constructed, **140 units (93%).** The EIIP approaches and Decent Work approaches were not initially been embraced by the Directorates. Through ILO insistence on their application, each Directorate noted that these approaches resulted in reforestation work being conducted **x2 normal efficiency**. This was due to workers performing better due to higher wage rates (15 Jd cf normal 7.5 Jd/d) and improved supervision put in place by EIIP. Increased output was achieved in two sites where supervising engineers used existing directorate equipment for construction of roads and terraces, so that the EIIP labour could be devoted to tree planting, **achieving almost x2 the area**. Thus, the EIIP and Decent Work approaches provides a new model with greater efficiency and outputs, that could be applied nationally.

Cistern/tank constriction delivered increased crop outputs to farmers carrying from 50% (northern provinces), to 2-3x in southern provinces. This variation corresponded to the larger reduction in rainfall in southern provinces due possibly to climate change effects. Where farmers achieve larger yields increases (3-4x), neighbouring farmers had begun to construct cisterns themselves. Application of extension activities could enable such dynamic expansion on a more general basis. Such expansion could thus begin to impact on the local economies, with implications for labour demand (cistern/tank construction and more).

There are opportunities to refine project operation to maximise impacts. The greater impact of cisterns/tanks in the south where climate change has had a bigger effect, and the better rainfall in the north facilitating reforestation, suggests that the balance between these two activities might be reconsidered. Examination of the cost/workdays generated showed that reforestation was more than twice as efficient as cistern/tank construction. However, if dynamic expansion of the later can be achieved through extension activity, cistern/tank construction would be a more efficient intervention than reforestation which has no flow-on effect once completed. The cistern/tank construction activity might be restructured into JBV activities that would provide longer term work and respond to a demand for construction.

The project start-up was delayed until 06 Aug 2017, leaving only 4 months to implement. The bulk of activities were conducted in this time, requiring an impressive concentrated effort of the Directorates. The project responded to these delays by (a) while still waiting for approval reallocating funds to a parallel project in Irbid and Mafraq enabling JVBs, and (b) obtaining a project extension of 4 months, to 30 Mar 2018 and reallocation of unused funds $260,000 (15% of operational budget) to construction two greenhouses.

Several technical issues were evident in the implementation of the project. The sites for reforestation were generally exposed and subject to erosion. Three of the five sites rely on tanker delivered water. These would not survive without a Phase II, which if not approved soon may be too late. Far clearer assignment of responsibility for maintenance of reforested areas needs to be made in the project design and Implementation Agreements. It was clear also that technical advice would play a very constructive role for both reforestation; improved crop production, and extension planning. This needs to be ensured for Phase II.

The effective EIIP and Decent Work models are noted by MoA and Directorate staff but remain as ‘project memories’ and not as lessons for general application. The basic EIIP operating guidelines are good but some small areas could be refined (criteria for selection of needy farmers for cistern/tank grants, preferential use of long term contract for workers, etc.). An early activity of Phase II then should be to bring all parties together to assess the lessons of the current project, adjust criteria as required, and refine the outputs to gain the maximum benefits.

The Syrian refugee crisis is the immediate issue. Jordan as a nation faces existing problems of a denuded landscape, water deficits acerbated by climate change and the weak economy and its labor market. Affecting these will determine how well the refugees can be accommodated in the formal economy. The project has shown that its working approaches, the use of EIIP and Decent Work has the potential to address these effectively. The ILO then should work in two directions:

(a) use the pending Phase II to produce enhanced outcomes[1], through applying the lessons of the current project more effectively and documenting this more rigorous and articulate manner. This can then be used to demonstrate the efficacy of these approaches in impacting on the Jordanian issues and provide a more compelling rationale for funding;

(b) explore mechanisms and partners that ILO could operate with in national level initiatives to both leverage funding for these (given more effective approaches are now demonstrated), and to add to or cooperate with existing or pending initiatives. This would apply firstly to reforestation programs. New EU markets will begin to function soon. Value-chains should be examined to ensure smallholder farmers will have access to them.

Evaluation Background

The final evaluation was conducted to examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, and potential impact of the project and provide recommendations for future similar projects. This evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned.

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Jordan, the partner UN agencies, government entities, and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation, particularly in the operation of Phase II due to begin shortly.

Methodology

The evaluation included three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the inception phase; (b) Field visits for interview with beneficiaries and stakeholders, combined with direct observation of the activities completed; (c) feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings.

Data collection was carried out in Jordan by the evaluator, with assistance from an insightful interpreter over the period 01-15 April. During the field trip, the evaluator travelled to all 5 Governorates included in Greenworks activities. The process used at each site was: meetings with the technical committee, inspection of documentation, individual interviews with direct beneficiaries: workers for reforestation (2 Jordanians, 2 women, and 2 Syrian refugees), followed by site inspection of the reforestation areas and farmers with water cisterns. A field trip was also made to Irbid and Mafraq where a portion of project funds were used for Joint Business Ventures. (See summary of data collection methods in Table 1 below).

Main Findings & Conclusion

Relevance and Strategic fit

The evaluation found the project to be highly relevant in directly addressing the need for greater work opportunities (for both Jordanians and Syrian refuges), as well as ILOs commitment to the

[1] High rates of reforestation to funding inputs through using EIIP and Decent Work approaches, and high production rates from water-harvesting, that stimulate dynamic expansion from limited inputs.

SDGs, the donors priorities (refugees crisis and effective water management), and the Jordanian Government's plans to incorporate Syrian refugees into their society and mainstream economy.

Validity of design
The ILO's choice of the agriculture sector as a vehicle to provide labor intensive activities proved to be effective, demonstrating how this might be employed on a wider scale, although this did not lead to more permanent employment.

Effectiveness
The project exceeded its immediate objectives (700 workers employed for 10,000 workdays), and its establishment of new asset (reforestation 101% and cisterns constructed 93%). The application of EIIS methods and Decent Work protocols were found to at least twice as efficient as approaches normally used by the Directorates for this type of work.

The project made substantial progress towards providing better living conditions and improved social cohesion for those employed (decent work standards used, access to work permit and social security), although it was slightly below its targets for specific groups employed (Syrians refugees, 42%; women 9.1 % and persons with disabilities 2.4%).

Efficiency
Despite a long delay the project (ILO team, MoA and Directorate staff) managed to implement the project interventions achieving with a high degree of quality and redirect the un-expended funds to other effective activities (JBVs and greenhouse construction) thereby creating additional work.

Of the interventions, reforestation had the lowest direct cost per workday generated, but with additional extension activities to generate spontaneous uptake, constriction of water cisterns could well prove to be most cost effective in the long run.

The efficiencies (x2) in output for reforestation compared to the common management of this work were gained through application of Decent Work (higher pay rates and shorter working hours leading to more effective workers) and through application of the EIIP protocols which ensured improved management and oversight of the work by directorate staff in the field.

Sustainability
The reforestation sites were well constructed but require two years of watering to be fully established. Whether this would be provided beyond the project life was not clear. Cisterns were well constructed and individual farmers would clearly use and maintain.

Impacts
The reforestation areas will play a role in rehabilitating the dry and eroded areas they have been located, although far larger areas are needed to impact on local hydrology and weather.

The water cisterns were expected to have a dramatic effect on farmers crops, increasing yields by 50% in the north and 100% in the south, which appears to correspond to reduced rainfall due to suspected early climate change effects.

Lessons Learnt

1# EIIP approaches are effective in integrating Syrian refugees into mainstream labor force.

2# The EIIP and Decent Work provide effective mechanisms to achieve greater outcomes, in particular for reforestation work, thus providing an economic justification for their application.

3# Technical advice has a contribution to make in achieving desired outcomes of the agriculture interventions
4# enhanced partnership models: greater outcomes can be achieved from the activities if the Directorates provide additional resources.

Recommendations

- **Refine project protocols to enhance work opportunities and work security**
- **Refine EIIP approaches for work generation within the agriculture sector in Jordan.**
- **Provide technical advice to enhance outcomes for reforestation and water-harvesting activities.**
- **Refine project design and implementation arrangements, to gain greater clarity, effectiveness and sustainability**
- **Formulate EIIP and Decent Work approaches as strategic innovations that can impact on the agriculture sector at a national level.**

2.0 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1 Background

According to the latest census, the total number of Syrians residing in the Kingdom of Jordan is around 1.3 million, 637,000 of whom are *refugees*[2] registered with UNHCR, equivalent to about 10 per cent of the total population. This is putting pressure on Jordanian society, its natural resource base, infrastructure, and economy, including its labor market. Pre-existing labor market weaknesses, including high levels of unemployment and labor market segmentation, have been exacerbated and raised social tensions with Jordanian host communities.

A 2015 ILO labor market assessment[3] showed that 50 per cent of Jordanians and 99 per cent of Syrians were working in the informal economy. These jobs are outside the scope of any form of governance and lack basic social protection coverage. They are characterized by sub-standard wages, hazardous working conditions and exploitative practices, including forced labor and child labor.

Jordan through its Compact (London 2017) agreed to provide up to 200,000 WPs and associated SS benefits to Syrian refugees. This will enable the refugees' greater security and mobility to find work and function independently.

The ILO has instituted a major Employment-Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) to secure decent livelihoods for both Jordanians and Syrian refugees. The current project extends this, using a **Green Works and Local Resource base (LRB)** approach to focus on the agriculture sector. The agriculture sector is regarded as the most efficient in generating employment for a given capitol flow. Greenworks refers to infrastructure and agricultural works that have direct production or environmental benefits, or are in response to specific environmental contexts, such as climate change and extreme weather events.

2.2 Project description

The project was funded by Norway with a budget of $1,771,323.70 USD with a start date of 01 Dec. 2016 and finish date of 30 Nov 2017, extended to 31 Mar 2018. With the focus on the agriculture sector the implementing partner was the Ministry of Agriculture with its Directorates in each of the target Governorates. The target Governorates were; Irbid, Ajloun, Jarash, Karak, AlAlbalqa and Tafila, which host a significant number of Syrian refugees located within the general communities (i.e. not the camps). The development objective was:

> **"promote better living conditions for Syrian refugees and Jordanians as a result of increased agricultural employment and an improved environment, with** an immediate objective: 700 Syrian refugees and Jordanians (with total of 10,000 working days)". Where

[2] Or more specifically "Person of Concern to UNHCR", as Jordan has not ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees.
[3] The impact of Syrian refugee crisis on the labour market in Jordan, ILO and FAFO, 2015. Retrieved from UNHCR's website (14 March 2018): http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 Based on the figures from UNHCR's website, Registered Syrian refugees make up approximately 4% of the total population in each of the target governorates, which does not take into account the unregistered Syrian refugees. Based on the national level experience, the Jordanian population is double the number of registered Syrian refugees, therefore it is assumed that the Syrian refugees make up approximately 8% of the total population.

ever possible the contracts for work gained by the Syrian refugee workers will be used to secure WPs and social security.

This was to be achieved through the following outputs:

Output 1: Expanded agricultural infrastructure of local farmers and local communities.

1.1 Building water catchments to collect rainwater

1.2 Soil protection arrangements through terracing and planting

1.3 Installing greenhouses

1.4 Installing irrigation systems

Output 2: Increased vegetation cover through tree planting

2.1 Tree planting in public areas (including recreational areas and parks)

2.2 Tree planting on roadsides

Output 3: Capacity of Ministry of Agriculture and local cooperatives is built to implement local resource-based approaches for men and women (including development, rehabilitation and maintenance)

3.1 Classroom and on-the-job training delivered on local resource-based methods for private sector, for cooperatives and government employees

The project aimed that the direct beneficiaries would be 700 Jordanian (50%) and Syrian (50%) men and women, with 10% of the total being women, and 3% persons with disabilities. Direct beneficiaries also include the Jordanian farmers whose land and production capacity has been improved. Indirect beneficiaries were to be 30 staff of public institutions who benefited from training and experience from delivery of the project.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Evaluation Purpose

The final evaluation was conducted to examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, and potential impact of the project and provide recommendations for future similar projects. This evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned.

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Jordan, the partner UN agencies, government entities, and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation, particularly in the operation of Phase II due to begin shortly.

The application of EIIP, applied with Green Works for agriculture and forestry interventions, is novel aspect of this project in the context of Jordan. It thus offers the opportunities for lessons to be gained for ILO and the Implementing Partner (IP), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and its Directorates. Their areas of interest are thus;(a) whether this approach generated new work opportunities and at what cost; (b) are the assets generated of good quality and have an impact on agriculture; and (c) whether this type of work is within the capacity of the implementing partners and whether they gained adequate support.

The evaluation complied with the ILO evaluation policy, which is based on the United Nations Evaluation Norms and Standards and the UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed. It will examine all the activities that have been implemented, including the extension period (01 Dec – 30 Mar).

3.2 Evaluation Principles

The TOR describes the conditions for compliance of evaluation exercise with the evaluation norms, standards and ethical safeguards specified in ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the United Nations system evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

To enhance the usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation was adopted. A combination of tools and methods were used to collect relevant evidences.

3.3 Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation utilizes the standard ILO framework and follows its major criteria:

- **Relevance and strategic fit** – the extent to which the objectives are aligned with sub-regional, national and local priorities and needs, the constituents' priorities and needs, and the donor's priorities for the project countries;
- **Validity of design** – the extent to which the project design, logic, strategy and elements are/ remain valid vis-à-vis problems and needs;
- **Efficiency** - the productivity of the project implementation process taken as a measure of the extent to which the outputs achieved are derived from an efficient use of financial, material and human resources;
- **Effectiveness** - the extent to which the project can be said to have contributed to the development objectives and the immediate objectives, and more concretely whether the stated outputs have been produced satisfactorily;
- **Impact** - positive and negative changes and effects caused by the project at the sub-regional and national levels, i.e. the impact with social partners, implementing partner organisations, government entities, and beneficiaries;

- **Effectiveness of management arrangements**; and
- **Sustainability** – the extent to which adequate capacity building of social partners has taken place to ensure mechanisms are in place to sustain activities and whether the existing results are likely to be maintained beyond project completion; the extent to which the knowledge developed throughout the project (research papers, progress reports, manuals and other tools) can still be utilised after the end of the project to inform policies and practitioners.

The detailed evaluation questions are specified in the TOR (Annex 1) and are as follows;

Relevance and strategic fit:

- How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donor?
- To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?
- How does the project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region, particularly in the Arab countries?
- Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?

Validity of design:

- Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are the logical correlations between objective, outcomes, and outputs)? Do any changes need to be made to the design of the project?
- overall, are project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?
- Does the project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing the project's progress? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?
- What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established?

Effectiveness:

- What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the development objective, outcomes and outputs? Did the EIIP project create jobs and workdays, and what is the cost per job? Are they in line with Decent Work conditions? In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes?
- How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives?
- To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects in Jordan?
- How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- How could the effectiveness of the project be improved?

Efficiency:

- To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? Is the quality and cost of the assets acceptable and in line with minimum standards?
- To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?

- What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
- How could the efficiency of the project be improved?

Sustainability:

- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes, how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?
- Are the results achieved by the project so far likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project?

Effectiveness of management arrangements:

- What was the division of work tasks within the project team and has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between project staff?
- How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?
- How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to PROGRAM and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?
- How effective was the coordination with the implementing partner (MoA), since most of the project was implemented by them?

Impact orientation:

- What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention thus far? Do the project assets result in improved farmers' productivity and are they sustainable (in terms of forestry)?
- What positive or negative unintended outcomes can be identified?

Lessons learned:

- What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied in similar future projects?
- If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

These are repeated at the head of the criteria in Section 4, "Key Findings".

3.4 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation included three main steps (a) desk study of relevant documents during the inception phase; (b) Field visits for interview with beneficiaries and stakeholders, combined with direct observation of the activities completed; (c) feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm and reflect on findings.

Data collection was carried out in Jordan by the evaluator, with assistance from an insightful interpreter over the period 01-15 April. During the field trip, the evaluator travelled to all 5 Governorates included in Greenworks activities. The process used at each site was: meetings with the technical committee, inspection of documentation, individual interviews with direct beneficiaries: workers for reforestation (2 Jordanians, 2 women, and 2 Syrian refugees), followed by site inspection of the reforestation areas and farmers with water cisterns. A field trip was also made to Irbid and Mafraq where a portion of project funds were used for Joint Business Ventures. (See summary of data collection methods in Table 1 below).

Method	Comments/Issues
Desk Review Review of all relevant project documents.	The desk study familiarized the evaluator with (a) the project design, (b) background issues related to the Syrian refugee crisis. This assisted to identify the field data collection program, sites and personal, and documents. Documents included, viz: (a) formal docs, project document, implementation agreement, etc.; (b) Technical products (technical guidelines, training programs, etc.) and other publications used or developed by the project; (c) Relevant background documents: EIIP Overview, Jordan Compact: supporting Syria and the Region, Jordan compact progress report, Prodoc for EIIP Phase 2, Decent Work Country Program; etc. (d) field documents; Mid-Term Report (MOA), samples of project record keeping and monitoring (technical committee reports).
Field visits (01-15 April) 1. ILO staff 2. Officials of MoA, MoL, SSC 3. Implementing partner staff form the Directorates 4. Beneficiaries, workers, farmers	ILO staff were interviewed by skype prior to the field mission, and during the mission in the Jordan Country Office In each Governorate: - Group interviews with directorate staff/technical committees - Key informant or individual interviews with workers (reforestation) according to special groups, nationality, gender, disabilities - Farmers (on site)
Direct Observation (site visits)	Field trips were made to (a) Reforestation sites, to assess site selection, extent of work, type of work (terracing etc) and quality of establishment and likelihood of sustainability (b) Farmer sites, to assess completion of cistern/tanks; quality of work; use and impacts on production (outcomes). These sites were selected by Directorate staff and widely disbursed.
Data Analysis and Verification	All records for work were inspected at the Governorate and central (MoA) levels. These included worker registration; daily work attendance; payment sheets. Farmer applications for cistern/tank construction. These were used to check (a) validity of workers interviewed as key informants, and sites visited as linked to project, and b) compliance with EIIP criteria. Official documents included the implementation agreements, funds dispersal monthly etc were viewed. These were used to assess project design issues, comparative efficiency of payments for work generated, etc. De-briefing workshops were held in both Jordan and Beirut, attended by ILO and MoA staff.

Table 1 Data Collection methods

Over the evaluation, the evaluator conducted a total of 89 interviews, of which 8 were with ILO staff, 33 with Jordanian officials, and 48 with direct beneficiaries. Of the direct beneficiaries met, 17 were farmers and 31 were workers, of which 11 women and one person with a disability. These are listed in Annex 2.

4.0 KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Relevance and strategic fit:

How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donor?

Norway has developed a focus on the Middle East in recent years, increasing its aid for the region to reach 3.3 B NOK in 2016. This has been driven by the Syrian refugee crisis, so that over half of this aid is now humanitarian assistance. Climate change is a specific thematic area Norway's development aid, with 'management of water and water resources' one of the four components.

While Jordan has not been a major focus of Norway's aid in the past, it now plays a key role in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis, and so is in now included in the program. The ILO's focus on the agriculture sector as a means of work generation; reforestation and construction of cisterns, directly responds to climate change. The project thus addresses both the geographic and thematic objectives of Norway's development aid.

To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?

The global commitments of the ILO are; (a) set and promote standards and fundamental principles and rights at work; (b) create opportunities for women and men to decent employment; (c) enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social protection; (d) strengthen tripartism and social dialogue. The project directly supports the second and third of these, although not in a sustainable way. Through using the EIIP approach it succeeds in applying Decent Work standards and creating awareness of these within the MoA and its directorates. The project's three interventions; reforestation; cistern construction and JBVs also contribute to six of the ten outcomes in ILOs biennial Programme and Budget for 2016-2017[4].

Within the SDGs, Decent Work is included as a specific objective (GOAL 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth). Through the work generated, the project also contributes to achieving other SDG objectives of GOAL 1: No Poverty; GOAL 2: Zero Hunger; GOAL 3: Good Health and Well-being; GOAL 5: Gender Equality; GOAL 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth; GOAL 10: Reduced Inequality; GOAL 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities; GOAL 13: Climate Action; GOAL 16: Peace and Justice Strong Institutions; GOAL 17: Partnerships to achieve the Goal.

How does the project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region, particularly in the Arab countries?

Tripartism, in terms of dialogue between the three actors in the labor market; governments, employers and workers, is not common in the Middle East. The ILO since its engagement in the region has tried to promote and enable this, but until now the agricultural sector lay outside the

[4] #2: Ratification and application of international labour standards;
#3 Creating and extending social protection floors;
#4: Promoting sustainable enterprises;
#5: Decent work in the rural economy; #6: Formalization of the informal economy;
#6: Formalization of the informal economy
#10: Strong and representative employers' and workers' organizations.

'Decent Work' net. ILO chose the MoA and its directorates as Implementing Partners (IP), thus opening the opportunity to engage with this sector.

The focus of MoA and the Directorates is understandably technical and output orientated. At the outset of the project ILO held a workshop (26 August 2017) to highlight the humanitarian/refugee aspects of the project and mechanism to enable this. The workshop articulated the need for 'inclusion' in the workforce; (special groups; Jordanian/Syrian; men/women and persons with disabilities), and the role of the Directorates to facilitate WPs and SS cover for refugee workers. Project operating criteria further instituted Decent Work practices; basic wage (15 Jd/d) and good work conditions (8 hr./d) and safe working practices. This falls short of a dialogue between tripartism, but has come to create a positive attitude towards Decent Work attributes within the Directorates and the MoA, who now see these as having had a positive effect on work output.

The support for the Joint Business Venture (JBV) activities conducted in Irbid and Mafraq worked through cooperatives there, thus affirming them and strengthening their operations.

Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?

The project target areas are Governorates along the western side of Jordan, away from the main concentration of Syrian refugees based in camps along the Syrian border. These are not expected to willingly return to Syria for some time, at least until the present regime has passed. Thus, while the project Governorates have a smaller number of refugees (~ 4%, cf. national average of 10%), these live within the Jordanian community. In this respect these Governorates represent the future status quo and foreshadows the challenges and adjustments this will require on a larger scale.

It is very much the view of Ministry of Labor (MoL) that the refugees should become part of the country's formal economy, and for the refugees to become self-reliant. As such they appreciate ILOs work with the project as a means to understand the issues and various structural changes and mechanisms that are needed. Thus, the project does appear to be addressing both immediate issues of improved labor opportunities, and at the same time developing models that could address underlying issues.

4.2 Validity of design:

Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are the logical correlations between objective, outcomes, and outputs)? Does design of the project need to change?

The agriculture sector provides a suitable sector for employment generation as many activities are inherently labor intensive. The project outputs; reforestation and construction of water cisterns, address two key challenges within the sector; denuded landscapes and soil erosion, and low crop production, due to reduced rainfall, possibly due to climate change effects, (e.g. Karak Directorate staff reported olive oil production was down by 30% due to both lower rainfall and pest damage).

The Jordanian economy in general is currently weak with a low labor demand. Improved agricultural production, particularly in the more isolated Governorates will contribute to stronger local economies, and with this increased labor demand.

Employment generated provides the means to achieve the secondary objectives of; access to WPs and social security, entry to the formal economy, and improved social cohesion through joint work

of Jordanians and Syrians. If the EIIP approach proved to be effective in achieving production outputs, this would encourage local authorities to use this approach in existing government programs, thus again strengthening the labor market.

The immediate project objective was for short term employment of Jordanian and Syrian workers for 700 workers for a total of 10,000 workdays. This amounted to just 14.3 days per worker, insufficient to entitle them to WPs. Once a detailed 'bill of quantities' was calculated for each activity, the 'Implementation Agreement' with MoA increased the output **27,800 workdays**, and later with the project extension, to **29,900 workdays**, or 42.7 days per worker. (note: as there are separate activities with different workers, each of the 700 could not individually achieve this 42.7).

The design did not consider ongoing management to ensure sustainability of the reforested areas. Irrigation is needed for at least two years to ensure the seedlings are well established. This noted in the implementation agreement, but without assigning responsibility. If it is intended that MoA would provide this, then it should be clearly stated under 'management arrangements' in the prodoc (sections 3.4 and 4.1). Had this project been a 'stand-alone' the reforested areas in three Governorates (Tafila, Karak, Albalqa) would not survive. As it is, ongoing maintenance is an explicit activity for Phase II. Despite maintenance of reforested areas having a budget allocation in Phase II, the full issue of sustainability for the reforested areas is not fully addressed. **Maintenance for the Phase I reforested areas will be required not just for 2018, but also through the 2019 summer. Any new reforested areas established in Phase II, will need maintenance through both the 2019 and 2020 summers**.

Overall the project design was coherent and effective. Some points could be made for clarification.

- The secondary objectives, (i.e. Decent Work; facilitating social cohesion; and building capacity of the Syrian refugees to obtain work within the formal economy), could be stated more prominently. As it is they appear as 'indicators' for the immediate objectives, and then in later sections of the prodoc (e.g. 3.3 implementation).
- The sub-outputs grouped under Output 1 (greenhouses, and irrigation systems) suggest that they might be applied with smallholder farms. This persists into the implementation agreement. Sub-outputs 1.3 and 1.4[5] could be elaborated to make it clear that these are intended to support reforestation only. Thee have not affected the work of the current project but are worth noting for future designs.

Some adjustment might be considered to the operational details in the Implementation Agreement

- Min. rainfall of 200 mm per year should be reduced for agriculture as the cisterns can compensate for low rainfall, as long as crop production already exists in the site.
- min. farm area of 3400 m2 could be reduced, to allow more flexibility in selection of farmers for cistern construction.
- the requirement for farmers building cisterns to employ workers from special groups, not practical, and was not applied. This could be dropped.
- Processes for selection of farmers for cistern construction should be rationalised so they are consistent with the project objectives
- Longer employment periods for contracting workers should be used preferentially (see 4.3, "towards better living conditions)

These should not be changed unilaterally, but through a process of consultation with the MoA and its Directorates, accepting that different criteria might apply in different areas.

[5] Output 1.3: Installing greenhouses
Output 1.4: Installing irrigation system

On the whole, are project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?

The project design is simple. Its execution though is dependent on the commitment of staff in each Directorate. The technical procedures for each output; reforestation and cistern construction, are well established and so this aspect was not an issue. However, the EIIP focus on labor engagement, compliance with rigorous documentation, accessing WPs and social security, and inclusion of target groups (refugees, women and persons with disabilities), were not core concerns of directorate staff. The rationale and commitment to apply these was achieved progressively, first articulated in training and workshops provided by ILO and Social Security Corporation for Directorate staff, (26 Aug), but then instilled largely through the monitoring and guidance of the ILO staff

The Project design underwent two significant adjustments due to the delays in approval and start-up time. In June/July 2017, while still waiting for project approval, funds were reallocated to extend an ongoing program, the **Joint Business Venture (JBV) for Syrians and Jordanians**, in Irbid and Mafraq. Funds were provided for 6 sub-projects, at 3000 Jd/sub-projects or $25,423 in total. The delay to start-up immediately meant there would be challenges to complete all activities, and that there would be significant under-expenditure. The second adjustment thus began to be formulated immediately after starting up; to extend the project and reallocate funds not used. The project was extended until **30 Mar 2018, and $260,000** was re-allocated to the construction of two nurseries in Tafila and Albalqa. Agreement with the donor was secured for both these adjustments.

Does project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing project's progress? How should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?

The project instituted a rigorous system of documentation for **project implementation** which included; description and approval of activities; registration of persons working and their status (male/female, Syrian/Jordanian, etc.); daily work rosters and payment records. These systems were administered by Directorate staff in each Governorate, with copies sent back to ILO and to MoA in Amman on a monthly basis. These records were all viewed during the evaluation and considered sufficient for Directorates to manage their activities; for the Project to monitor progress and to capture relevant data for project records. The records were used by the evaluation to confirm the validity of the work and the workers and their links to the project.

A central collation of raw data from all Governorates did not appear to have been made during project implementation. This was understandable given the short time for implementation from formal approval (08 Aug), to the designed close (30 Nov). On the other hand, the time during the start-up delay might have been used to construct an M&E system.

The project did collate the raw data in excel spread-sheet but it appears this was done only in the last month of the project. Such a format would have been adequate for management and reporting, had it been in place at the outset. It provided the key indicators; persons employed, workdays completed and who gained SS, but missed who gained WPs. Relevant characteristics of the beneficiaries, i.e. nationality and gender were included. This range of data, should be adequate.

Data on the **assets completed** was available for the cistern/tank construction by units, (30m2 by volume). Reforestation includes a more complex mix of work; clearing, contour line and terrace construction, digging holes, planting trees, and installation of irrigation systems. Bill of Quantity (BOQ) forms for this were part of the project documentation. MoA had made a mid-term assessment of all work in Nov 2017, but details didn't quite match field check, e.g. it stated all

cisterns completed, whereas the Directorates themselves reported shortfalls (see table 3), something easily checked. This apparent lack of ground checking reduced confidence in this data. If ground checking were done it could be used to refine the BoQ calculations and affect future planning. Such ground-checking should be seen as a means for constructive engagement of MoA with their Directorate staff. This should be taken up in Phase 2.

Altogether the data collection at the field level was comprehensive. This was in a hard copy form necessary due to their working function, i.e. collection of signatures, stamps etc. Again, data collection depended to a high degree on the Directorates. This was directly monitored by the ILO project coordinator who performed this function very effectively evidenced by the completed outputs. However, the lack of progressive collation is somewhat risky in the event such a key staff would leave the project or any reason.

Management and reporting would be facilitated by data entry from the hard-copy into excel forms by the Directorate staff themselves. This would include both the labor inputs and the BoQ for the assets created. It could be easily uploaded to a central 'cloud' system and be accessible to all. This would further enhance the ownership of the staff and enable transparency and better monitoring.

The above discussion focuses on M&E as a project tool. The detailed record keeping, instituted as part of the EIIP approach, in itself contributed to greater outcomes, particularly in reforestation. The M&E processes resulted in more effective task management and supervision, and in turn resulted in more effective work outputs. This is described further in section 4.3.

What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established?

The project has a simple structure delivering well described outputs. Monitoring and reporting required a record of the outputs delivered and so a baseline is not essential.

Baseline data might have played a role in illustrating transformational change or outcomes from the outputs. Collection of data on a comprehensive basis of the workers livelihoods would however be somewhat intrusive, (such queries were carefully made during the evaluation during the individual interviews). Similarly, for comprehensive collection of farmers' production data. This could play a useful role to indicate economic impacts. The individual farmer interviews conducted during the evaluation were suitable and did show impact that helps to justify the outputs.

4.3 Effectiveness:

What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the development objective, outcomes and outputs? Did the EIIP project create jobs and workdays, and what is the cost per job? Are they in line with Decent Work conditions? In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes?

Workers and Workdays

The project enabled a total of **1,199 Jordanian and Syrian workers** to be employed for a total (estimated) of **31,519 workdays**[6]. Both these far exceed the project's immediate objective of 700 worker to be employed for 10,000 workdays. Once a detailed BoQ was made, the Implementation Agreement (ILO and MOA), revised this to 27,900 workdays, which was later increased to 29,100

[6] The days worked for forestry and cistern construction are detailed. However the Joint Business Venture output lists only positions created, 46. As generally these would be on-going ventures, these would in fact create ongoing work, though not necessarily full time. A very rough estimate of workdays created might be; 5days per month for the last 9 months since formation, or 2070 workdays.

workdays with the project extension. These targets have already been exceeded at the time of the evaluation. The construction of two greenhouses under project extension has been contracted but still to be done. This is estimated to generate a further 2,100 workdays, for additional workers.

Three project activities contributed to these figures; (a) reforestation;(b) construction of cisterns, and (c) new jobs created within the Joint Business Venture program in Irbid and Mafraq. The details of these are provided in the tables below.

Governorate	Outputs achieved (to 30 Mar.)							
	Re-forestation area (dunum)	No workers		Workers per target group			workdays	
		total	>16 days	Men/women (persons)	Jdn/Syr (persons)	PWD (psns)	total	Jdn/Syr
Tafila	200	186	175	166/20	105/81	0	5412	2849/2584
Karak	120	285	140	272/13	215/70	6	5453	3137/2372
Albalqa	300	92	84	77/15	45/47	5	4917	2368/2506
Jerash	210	175	143	158/17	88/87	8	5433	2727/2672
Aljoun	200 (+)	155	125	131/24	92/63	3	4996	2931/2065
Total	**1010**	**893**	**667**	**804/89 (90%/10%)**	**545/348 (61%/39%)**	**22**	**26,211**	**14012/12199 (53%/47%)**

Table 2. Work outputs from reforestation

Governorate	Outputs achieved (to 30 Mar.)						
	No Farmers (cisterns built)	No. Workers		Work-days (25 m/d per unit)	No. workers per target groups		
		total	> 16 days		Men/women (persons)	Jdn/Syrn (persons)	PWD (persons)
Tafila	30	44	0	750	44/0	22/22	0
Karak	27	56	0	675	56/0	28/28	0
Albalqa	29	60	0	725	60/0	30/30	0
Jerash	28	42	0	700	42/0	21/21	0
Aljoun	27	58	0	675	58/0	29/29	0
Total	**141**	**260**	**0**	**3525**	**255/0**	**130/130**	**0**

Table 3. Work outputs from cistern construction

Governorate	Project	Jordanian Partner	Syrian Partner	Jobs created
Irbid	Seedlings production in greenhouse	Ein Slekhat Association	Tareq Alahmad	10
Irbid	Cultivation of summer vegetables	Ahmed Ababneh	Samir Knawi	10
Irbid	Greenhouse	Abd Alklareem Ababneh	Tayseer Sadaqa	3
Mafraq	Tomato cultivation & Drying	Badia Hands Association	Bassam Ahmed Hassoun	15
Mafraq	Livestock breeding	Burqaa Cooperative Association	Khalid Abd AlRahman Kokash	2
Mafraq	French roses cultivation	Black Jewel Cooperative Association.	Mari Muhaired	6
TOTAL				**46**

Table 4# Work outputs from Joint Business ventures, Irbid and Mafraq

Towards better living conditions

To achieve the development objective, "better living conditions for Syrian refugees and Jordanians", the project aimed to (a) introduced Decent Work criteria; (b) enable Syria workers to access WP and so join the formal economy; and (c) create social cohesion.

The project applied **Decent Work** in quite concrete terms. Workers were paid 15 Jd/d, compared with the more common 7.5 Jd/d used even by the Directorates in their own projects. Hours worked were 8 hrs./d compared with the 12 hrs./d that unskilled workers frequently had to endure. Application of these Decent Work conditions were appreciated by both workers, and the Directorates. Across all Governorates, Directorate staff who supervised reforestation work, noted the workers worked more quickly and with greater work quality. They attributed this to the higher day rates, but increased supervision from the EIIP procedures probably played an equal role (see 4.3, "reforestation outputs").

Other aspects Decent Work; work safety and use of PPE, were applied inconsistently and made little impression. This is perhaps not so much of concern for reforestation work in open fields. However, the work of cistern construction where workers operate underground may need special consideration, (ventilation, collapse of walls etc.).

A key component of achieving better **living conditions** for the Syrian refugees was **securing WPs and accessing SS coverage**. To do this, workers must have work contracts for at least 16 days. Cistern construction generated only 12-13 days for each worker, so that **none of these (130)** were eligible. Of the 348 Syrian reforestation workers, 292 had work contracts over 16 days. Of these 172 gained WPs, a little under half. This was partly due to the fact that some already had WPs and others did not submit their documents in time. Still this seems a relatively low figure.

Inclusion of persons from the various groups depended on Directorate staff who engaged staff directly for forestry, and, ensured compliance of farmers to employ workers for their cistern construction. For the cistern construction, the ratio was 50/50 Jordanian/Syrian workers, a very clear target as only two workers were employed for each unit. Within the forestry work there is a great variation in the ratio, with only two Goverantes managing to be close to the 50/50 target, i.e. Balqa and Jerash. Overall, for all three activities, the ratio of **Jordanian/Syrians was 58/42,** a significant favoring of Jordanians. (This was distorted by Karak where the Jdn/Syr ratio was 3/1, due in part to relocation of the site two times). When 'workdays' are considered a more balanced ratio of 55/45 was achieved. This is somewhat below the target 50/50.

Employment of women and PWD is also diluted by the high number of very short-term workers a few days. Furthermore, recruitment of women and PWD is not practical for activities of cistern construction and JBVs, where very small teams exist. Thus the percentage of these was assessed **for reforestation work only**. Employment of **women was 9.1%,** below the target of 10%, but with their workdays higher at 12.7%. The employment of **persons with disabilities was 22 persons, or 2.4%.** This would have been 3.1% for the project target of 700 workers. It is in effect diminished by the project's overachievement in total workers.

Generation of greater **social cohesion** was to be achieved through the dynamic of joint work of Syrians and Jordanians. While the Syrians employed was less than the targeted 50/50, none the less, during face-to-face interviews, both groups appreciated working together, noting they had developed a sense of fellowship across these national lines they had not previously gained through casual meetings within their communities. (Many of the forestry sites were tough areas, such that any group enduring work there would develop a sense of fellowship). The project did provide new

models of employment. In the southern Governorates (Tafila and Karak) the female workers had not previously worked alongside men. This experience broke that barrier for them. Similarly, it provided an example of employing persons with disabilities. Where the default position of the Directorates would have been to hire robust men, the project has now shown that the employment net can be spread wider to include a range of groups, and so achieve worthwhile social impacts.

The work generated by the project had not lead to any of those workers interviewed to move into more regular employment. The skills gained were limited to the agriculture sector, and with the overall labor market still weak this had not increased their opportunities for employment. This applied to all groups, men/women, Syrian/Jordanian. Most had returned to seeking day labor as before, although some groups (women and young Jordanians) were now more disposed to find similar labor-based employment. This was somewhat different for the JBV which do appear to have created new enterprises with ongoing employment.

The Syrian refugees noted that the WPs did provide sense of security and enable them to move more freely, and thus be more mobile in seeking work. Several workers made the point that where employment was for a short time, this simply provided quick funds, whereas with **2-3 months employment,** they were able to budget and use the money more constructively. This suggests the longer-term employment would generate a greater self-worth and determination to seek work.

Thus, the design outputs did contribute to the development objective in a profound way. This was not inherent in the outputs themselves but achieved through the 'Decent Work' criteria and ILO's support and insistence that these be applied, particularly in the early part of the project.

Reforestation outputs

Overall the reforested area **1010 dunum (101%)**, was slightly above the target of 1000 dunum. This was not achieved evenly across the five Governorates, and the quality of establishment varied.

Site selection was made by directorate staff. In two Governorates (Karak and Jaresh), the sites had to be relocated due to traditional ownership issues. With delayed start-up there was no time for protracted negotiations and eventually all sites were on land under control of the Directorates. All sites are located in exposed and highly eroded areas, except for Jaresh, located at the rear of forestry station. As such they should play a role in reduction of soil erosion. Two sites, Karak and Jerash were close to the towns and could have community recreational functions (picnics etc.). Two of the areas (Jaresh and Aljoun) have access to existing water sources, and so should not have sustainability issues.

Each site had made considerable work efforts for the reforestation. The establishment from visual observation varied, with two sites (Tafila and Karak) appearing to suffer from technical and/or maintenance issues, (see Fig 1 below). The direct field supervision of these sites was by staff not with specific forestry backgrounds, although forestry section head engineer were members of the technical committees] It appeared that both these sites would have benefited from specific technical advice or supervision[7].

[7] This observation was by the evaluation team, not foresters themselves, but cross-checked with other staff who were experienced foresters. This is an area where exchange of experiences between sites would provide fertile inputs.



Fig. 1. Site characteristics and establishment of reforested areas

The total reforestation area in Karak was just over half its target due to twice relocating the site. Jerash had established a reduced area of new reforestation due to the labor input applied for rehabilitating existing areas. Two other sites, Albalqa and Aljoun, had achieved reforested areas greater than planned. This was achieved through use of local resources (machinery) to build the access roads and construct terraces. As a result, the labor component of EIIP was devoted to tree planting, and thus larger areas were achieved.

Staff in all Governorates stated that the reforestation work carried under the project **was more efficient and effective than they normally achieved.** This was stated in various ways; that the teams achieved greater areas, or the reforested was achieved in a much shorter time than normal. This higher rate of work is still important as reforestation is constrained to short window of time ahead of winter rains. Directorate staff output was **x2 the typical output** for this work, even though under Decent Work criteria work hours are 8 and not the usual 12 hrs. This was due to two factors: (a) the decent-work higher wages resulted in more motivated workers; and (b) the improved management, required under the EIIP procedures resulted in better supervision. This is an important outcome from the application of EIP and Decent Work for reforestation. There is a growing focus on reforestation in Jordan. This experience offers the possibility that significantly more substantial reforested areas can be established, per budget allocation, and per time. It permits more substantial targets to be made, than the odd 200 dunum here and there.

Water harvesting / cistern and tank construction

The project achieved **141 cisterns/tanks (93%)**, just under the 150 unit target. Only one Governorate achieved its full 30 unit quota. The reasons for this are mostly procedural. In some Governorates farmers withdrew from the program at a late date, and in several others, farmers had not provided full paper work required. With the late start to the project it was not possible for the Directorates to relaunch the program.

Selection processes varied, with dissemination of the funding opportunity left to the directorates; some using word of mouth (a rather narrow net), others using social media and or traditional media

(newspapers, radio). Submissions could be substantial (150 expressions of interest in Karak for the 30 units) requiring effort to vet, particularly field inspections of sites widely disperse (up to an hour's drive in different directions). Selection criteria used then varied, from 'first come first served', to favoring more needy farmers.



Fig 2 Cistern and Tank construction for water harvesting

Of the farmers visited during the evaluation, perhaps 20% would not be considered 'needy', 25% obviously needy and others could access funds but would have entailed prioritizing this against other household needs. The project supplied 1200 Jd, and in most cases the expenditure was higher, 1500-1800 Jd. The value of the construction (1500-1800) represents a typical salary for 5-6 months, so construction of cisterns/tanks would compete with many other household needs. At the same time, in most cases the increased yields would repay the total cost within 3 seasons.

The Implementation Agreement described forward payments to farmers once agreements were signed. In practice these were not made for fear farmers might delay construction or use funds for other purposes. As such, farmers relied on credit to obtain material inputs etc. and this may have skewed selection to farmers better able to deal with this.

The units themselves were well constructed and effective (see Fig 2). Many were located close to the house with the roof as the catchment area. Only those far from a residence relied on the catchment pan. The cistern itself can't store enough water for all needs through the summer. Where additional water is purchased, significant savings are still gained for the farmer from lower water costs for water being delivered to cisterns/tanks, rather than water-tankers parking to directly irrigate the land. The impact of these on farmers production was assessed to be very significant, from 50% to 300% increase in yields (mainly olive oil). This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.6.

How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives?

The MoA and the Directorates in each Governorate has been critical in the implementation of the project. The MoA assigned its own coordinator who monitored and facilitated the project, particularly in the early stage when systems were being put into place. Within the framework of the intensive work approach, the Directorates in each Governorate performed independently, selecting sites for reforestation, workers, and the farmers for construction of cisterns. This has meant that some of the approaches and outputs have varied between Governorates. Examples of this have been the forestry outputs; balance between Jordanian and Syrian workers and so on (see table 2).

To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects in Jordan?

As noted the Jordanian government accepts the Syrian refugees as a new reality that it must adjust to. In this regard is has seen that conditions for Syrian refugees to enter the formal workforce relaxed; 16 day minimum contract, flexible WPs that are no longer linked to a single employer, designation of unions (construction) and cooperatives (agriculture) to act as agents for the issue of WP, and so on. The project is among the first to apply these in a substantial way within the Agriculture sector, and thus make them a reality.

There are a large number of projects working with the refugees using various approaches. 'cash-4-work' has been a common intervention which focuses just on payment for work. The ILO introduced the EIIP approach as a vehicle to bring additional attributes and sustainability of these: enabling worker to enter the formal labor markets through access to WP and SS; application of 'Decent Work' conditions (pay, hours, safety); training and skills development and so on. The shift to EIIP has been accepted by a number of other major agencies; World Food Program; UNDP, GiZ and Oxfam who now apply them in their programs.

The reforestation and cistern construction outputs reinforce existing GoJdn programs. There are several ongoing reforestation programs, such as "Desert Road Program' to have trees to line this major highway (Tafila). These are all budget constrained. In addition to adding funds to these, the ILO applied the EIIP approach to managing this work have proven to be more efficient than the old ways used by the Directorates by 50-100%. This could have a major impact on the outputs of such programs in the future. This contribution is recognized by technicians at the Governorate level. Final lessons learnt workshops were <u>not</u> held, thus missing the opportunity to articulate these, and ensure they are appreciated at national level. However, these points were emphasized during the evaluation and were noted by the MOA representative.

How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labor standards?

The project activities directly contributed to all these strategies. While the direct effects have been transient, they have demonstrated the efficacy of these, and hopefully developed some institutional memory. Each of these has shown the feasibility and social benefits to be derived from application of these, i.e. inclusion of women and persons with disabilities, improved work efficiency through applying EIIP and Decent Work approaches, greater familiarity between Jordanians and Syrians and so on. This has not perhaps generated social dialogue on a tripartite level, but now provides experiences that can be part of such a dialogue in the future.

How could the effectiveness of the project be improved?

The project suffered difficulties in the both **selection of sites** for reforestation and **farmers** for cistern/tanks construction. It is a pity that some of the 'dead time' waiting for project approval could not have been used in prepatory work for these. Once following phases of the project are approved, attention will need to be given to effective use of the pre-season time for planning and negotiation with local communities, prior to field work.

The project has already overachieved in its primary objectives of persons employed and workdays. The outputs could be further increased through leveraging resources from within the Directorates. This applies firstly to use of machinery to allow the labor inputs to be devoted to 'tree planting' and so a greater area of reforestation could be achieved. It also applies to technical inputs.

Both the project interventions would have benefited from **technical advice**; (a) reforestation: specific advice particularly in the southern Governorates would have improved the practices there, and (b) water from the cisterns could have gained higher production outcomes; advice could include both production practices and 'economic' advice. Regarding the later, farmers were willing to spend large sums to capture more water (e.g. spending + 1000 Jd for additional 5m2), where a far smaller investment in drip-irrigation would gain a 3x efficiency in water consumption (giving in effect a virtual 90 m2 cistern/tank with conventional open-channel irrigation).

Technical inputs for forestry were part of the project design. With the late start this was not mobilized. It will be worth ensuring that this is not missed with Phase II. Technical advice does not all need to come from outside but can and should include mobilizing local knowledge through **networking mechanisms.** For example, well established reforestation areas were achieved in Governorates where the engineers had substantial forestry backgrounds. These results could be mainstreamed through networking activities that enabled engineers of all Governorates to cross-visits to sites, consult and share experiences.

For the agriculture activities, good production practices need to be applied so that the cisterns/tanks generate high production results. Improved practices for the common crops should already be available within the Directorates and communities. What is needed is for these to be disseminated, along with simple cost-benefit analysis and impacts from use of good practices. External support might be needed for development of effective extension plans.

4.4 Efficiency:

To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? Is the quality and cost of the assets acceptable and in line with minimum standards?

Overall ILO has managed the project very efficiently, with one-part time project manager, and a full-time field coordinator. Work that was designed to span 5 months of field work (Implementation Agreement budget) was mostly completed within 3 months. This efficiency is not just due to the ILO team, but also due to commitment of Directorate staff in each Governorate. The delayed field work resulted in underspending, and these were reinvested in additional labor generating activities (a) JBVs and (b) greenhouse construction.

Each workday was allocated $21.1/workday in the Implementation Agreement budget, although the labor intensity for each activity would inherently vary according to the materials required along with the labor (see Table 5).

Activity	Total cost of activity	Total cost of Labor	Labor intensity (%)	Cost /workday ($/wkdy)	
				budgeted	achieved
Reforestation (terracing, irrigation, forestry)	657,195	510211	77	27.2	25.1
Cistern construction	254,237	79,225	31	67.0	78.5
Pad + Greenhouse	260,000	60,000	15	123.8	-
Joint Business Ventures	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
TOTAL	**1,171,432**	**649,436**			

Table 5. Intensity of labor and costs for generation of workday achieved

The actual costs of the **reforestation** workdays were calculated from the workdays generated (now complete for reforestation and cistern construction). These show that costs for all forestry activities is **$25.1/wkdy,** or 1.7% of the day-wage paid. This would increase once on-going maintenance costs beyond the 'establishment year' are included.

Cost for **cistern/tank construction, $78.4/wkdy**, are over twice that for reforestation. This might suggest that reforestation should be favored in future EIIP budget. However, reforestation work once completed has no further flow on effect. Cistern/tank construction has the potential for dynamic effects. When the cisterns result in significantly increased production, this can stimulate other farmers to construct cisterns. Such dynamic expansion can generate 3-5 farmers to invest in cistern construction themselves, so generating more work opportunities, (see 4.7). If such dynamic expansion can be facilitated, then 'cistern construction' would in fact have a lower investment cost for labor generated.

The cost of generating labor through **greenhouse construction** is extremely high, **$123.9/wkdy**. This activity is not normally applied within an EIIP project due to its low labor intensity (15%). In this case the funds thus allocated came from under-expenditure due to delayed approval ($260,000). This was accepted by all parties as the most expedient means to use these funds. Once completed, the greenhouses will be used in the Phase II to produce fruit tree seedlings, thus having a flow-on effect of enabling additional activities to generate more workdays with an estimated 7450 workdays. However, this additional labor will have its own funds for mobilization and cannot be attributed to greenhouse construction in this phase.

To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?

Employment through labor intensive infrastructure in Jordan (JOR/16/01/DEU) is an ongoing project running in parallel, but with a focus on the construction sector. The current project built on processes for granting WPs developed in JOR/16/01/DEU, (Unions in construction and Cooperatives in agriculture) as well as record keeping of work inputs. An M+E system based on these parallel projects could have been done, but once approval was gained, the focus was in the field work.

With project start-up delays, funds were diverted to JBV for Syrians and Jordanians being implemented in Irbid and Mafraq. This added 46 new positions with high prospects they will be sustained. This approach to building small enterprise groups could be applied to cistern construction crews.

What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?

There did not appear to be any additional cost to the work output through the inclusion of woman, although at 9.1% this could better be termed gender inclusion rather than gender equality. In most cases women were employed as a group in lighter work, though still in a mixed gender setting.

The direct benefits to the women so employed were clear, through the income earned. Attitudes to inclusion women for manual work in a mixed setting for directorate staff and the women changed, with both willing to repeat this.

How could the efficiency of the project be improved?

A higher labor output over design was achieved. This is not in terms of the number of workers (as many were employed for short periods), but in the total workdays generated, 31,519, (potentially 33,619 once greenhouses are constructed). This was achieved with the existing budget allocation, which means the Directorates would have cut back in some areas so funds could be provided to pay extra workdays. How they did this was not probed during the evaluation but should be assessed so that such efficiencies could be achieved across the board.

The project completed all work in a shorter period than designed, effectively 7 months instead of the designed 12 months, with the bulk of the field work completed in close to 4 months. In this respect it was highly efficient. The reallocation of un-used funds, $260,000 (15% of total budget) for greenhouse resulted a low labor-intensive activity. Given the time of the year (approaching summer) and with limited time, this was accepted as an expedient decision.

Concentration of field work in specific periods is the nature of agricultural work. Project activities must be determined by the seasons, both to allow work to be carried out efficiently (avoiding extreme periods of heat), and to be timely to take advantage of the rains. This is not to suggest that the project timeframes should be shortened, as project staffing continuity is required, and preparatory work must be carried out (planning use of all resources, selection of farmers for cistern construction, negotiation with traditional land owners for reforestation, etc.). Selected staffing could be tailored for peak periods, rather than the full duration of the project (e.g. data entry staff for M+E, technical advisors etc.) to allow a higher proportion of the budget to be allocated to labor generation.

Increased results of secondary objectives, in particular achievement of WPs for Syrian refuges might have been achieved through better planning. Additional work inputs for this activity could have been specified through construction of contour barriers in farmers' fields to reduce erosion and increase water retention. This would be beneficial even field of low slope. All cistern sites inspected could have benefited from this. This extra labor would have taken these workers above the <16 day threshold for accessing WPs.

What was the division of work tasks within the project team and has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labor between project staff?

The Directorates staff are on-site, and thus the key units for effective implementation. Funds were allocated to them engendering a sense of ownership. The ILO's EIIP procedures provided an operational framework. Aspects of EIIP and Decent Work were not foremost in normal working approaches of the Directorates. Early in the project on several occasions ILO withheld approvals until they were applied. The project team itself was lean, with part-time project manager and full-time field coordinator. MOA provided a full-time coordinator. Together this team were effective in mobilizing Directorate staff to deliver the outputs. Such mobilization across all five Governorates is no small accomplishment and should be noted.

Additional technical advisors were planned, but with the delays and final short period for implementation, these were not engaged. With hindsight, technical inputs for forestry and M+E might have been used in preliminary work with partners while waiting for official start.

Such a tight team for the project can have advantages for coordination, as all information is concentrated with one or two people. This places something of a load on the individuals and combined with the absence of M+E system, poses a risk for the project in the event a key staff is not available for project work for any reason.

How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?

The ILO Headquarter Geneva EIIP office produced the original prodoc with an initially conservative objectives of 700 workers and just 10,000 workdays. They later prepared the EIIP guidelines for the agriculture interventions, reforestation and cistern construction. These were specific, pertinent, and appropriate for conditions in Jordan. As such the Implementation Agreement had the more ambitious target of 27,800 workdays.

As project implementation at first stalled and then proceeded with a rush, ROAS appeared to have been left out of the loop or somehow lacked a clear idea of its operation. The project's focus on agriculture also made it somewhat different from other projects. The lack of an effective M+E system meant reporting tended to be descriptive, which makes it vulnerable to being 'lost in translation'. As a result, despite the impressive actual progress in the field, the project began to develop a reputation as being problematic.

How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to PROGRAM and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?

The project design specified establishment of an M&E plan, with both quantitative and qualitative indicators. As specified in the prodoc this did appear to be somewhat more elaborate than required for such a simple project. Budget allocation was made for design of an M&E system, but this was not carried out, most likely due to the focus on work in the field once approvals were gained.

An effective system to monitor progress is essential in a project where many separate activities are being conducted. As noted earlier, data was collected by the Directorates responsible, but then remained essentially in a raw form and unconsolidated across the Governorates. This makes it difficult for the MoA and ILO to assess progress overall, instead having to rely on their field coordinators observations.

The under-achievement for the development outputs, i.e. employment special target groups; Syrians, women, and PWD, is partly a function of this, where targets are achieved across sites and then aggregated. This allows each site to assume any slack in their achievements will be made up in another site. Such aggregation needs to occur in 'real-time' so that the Directorates can adjust their processes to achieve the overall goal. Here the use of a cloud system for data entry could be considered as a means to achieve this.

A mid-term report was made by the MoA coordinator detailing the outputs for both reforestation and cistern construction (m. of terraces built, areas irrigated etc.). While this report does break down each component of the activities (length of terraces, etc.) it did not seem to be reliable. During the evaluation, the Directorates themselves reported and displayed documentation showing outputs that differed from this mid-term report, (cisterns completed as less than reports, reforested areas did not match, etc.). Simple ground checks could resolve this.

How effective was the coordination with the implementing partner (MoA), since most of the project was implemented by them?

The performance of MoA staff in the Directorates was impressive. They responded to the project and implemented all the activities in an intensive manner once start-up was possible.

There were some initial start-up issues with disbursement of funds, MOA to the Directorates. These were quickly sorted out. Some of the criteria for EIIP and Decent Work were not applied, and the ILO office noted these and requested full compliance. Specific problems were dealt with through negotiation and adjustments were made, (e.g. minimum area of farm to qualify for cistern construction reduced in Jerash to 2000 m2).

Directorates made operational decision within the EIIP (selection of farmers, length of worker contracts etc.), which varied across Governorate. These do not need to be standardized, but some effort to ensure common objectives drive them, e.g. status of farmers for cistern/tank construction; length of contracts for workers to enable access to WPs).

The Directorates conducted the day to day monitoring of work inputs rigorously with the records available for inspection both at the Governorate level and MoA in Amman. The Governorates did make an effort to select workers according to the specific groups, although the number of Syrian refugees was far lower than it should have been.

4.5 Sustainability:

Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes, how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?

Measures were in place to increase sustainability through staff capacity building. Training was provided to Directorate staff in EIIP and BoQ. Only one case was encountered where this occurred, i.e. Balqa forestry staff continue to apply BoQ procedures in normal work. Final 'lessons learnt' workshops were planned to articulate lessons and instill them, but these were not held. As it is, while the EIIP and Decent Work approaches were recognized as effective, this remained as a 'project memory' and not as general lessons that could be reapplied.

The project recognized the short-term nature of the work generated for the workers. It expected that by acquiring skills, and the experience of working constructively, would result in the workers

continuing to find work. In the case of Syrian refugees this was reinforced through the requirement they gain WPs. As noted earlier, within the weak labor market, ongoing work has not eventuated.

The sustainability of the cistern construction was not an issue. Ongoing management of the reforestation areas is required; watering, weeding and protection from interference (animals and human) for a minimum of 2 yrs. This was not articulated in the prodoc. It was stated in the Implementation Agreement with MoA but without assigning responsibility. Clear and specific statement of ongoing management requirements and responsibilities need to be made.

Are the results achieved by the project so far likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project?

As noted above, ongoing securing of work by the workers is not occurring, and is unlikely in a weak labor market, particularly in the agriculture sector.

As noted above, ongoing maintenance is needed for the reforestation areas. Without clear assignment of responsibility for this, this does not appear to be occurring, with the directorates waiting for the forthcoming Phase II. If this is not forthcoming the sustainability in Tafila, Karak and Albalqa will be very doubtful. (Jaresh and Aljoun reforestation areas have access to existing water sources and should survive).

4.6 Impact:

What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention thus far? Do the project assets result in improved farmers' productivity and are they sustainable (in terms of forestry)?

<u>Forestry Intervention</u>
Each Directorate has expended quite some effort to establish these areas, but now risk losing them if inputs are not provided in a timely manner. All require ongoing management to survive. Those in Tafila, Karak and Albalqa will require irrigation. Such ongoing maintenance it to be provided by Phase II, if it is implemented in a timely manner. Other means should be made to explore how this might be achieved in the short term (re-allocation of some funds from greenhouse construction, allocation of directorate resources, etc.).

All sites are in highly eroded and exposed areas, (except in Jaresh). In this respect they contribute to regeneration of desolate areas, albeit on a small way (just 200 dunum) compared to the extensive nature of the sites. More extensive reforestation initiatives are needed on a national level for both environmental and climate change mitigation. A national forestry strategy is in the process of development with the support of GiZ. The more productive approach to conducting reforestation through use of EIIP and Decent Work attributes, offers ways for such program to have increased outputs. These need to be assessed more rigorously and the lessons understood at national levels.

<u>Water harvesting: cistern/tank construction</u>
Farmers production has not been affected at the time of the evaluation. However, farmers made estimates based on their own and neighbors experience.

In the **Southern Governorates** (Tafila and Karak) farmers here estimated they would **double their yields of olive oil** with the water now available from the cisterns. In some cases, the addition of the

cistern made it possible for farmer to shift from field crops (wheat) to horticulture, which will provide **treble the returns**, and with **more stability** (field crops will not be irrigated in a drought but allowed to fail, whereas horticulture crops will benefit from supplementary irrigation). For poor farmers this is a transformative effect.

The **Northern Governorates** the benefits projected from the cisterns was lower, **about 50% yield increase in olive oil**. One farmer in Jaresh, through intercropping with his olive trees, and sale of secondary products (cuttings as planting material for other farmers, and olive leaves for restaurants) was achieving 3-4 x income.

The variation in production increases appear to be due to **climate change effects**. Farmers reported significant decreases in annual rainfall over the last ten to twenty years. In the **South rainfall was reduced by 1/2**, and in the **North, it had declined by about 1/3.** Rainfall was also reported to be more intense with more severe soil erosion effects, with implications for management of this in farmers' fields. This change in rainfall has not only affected HHs crop yield and income but is also felt on a macro level with the local economies.

There is potential for a dynamic scaling out of cistern/tank construction. In the community where the farmers had achieved 3-4 x increases in productivity, **another six farmers** have taken note and begun to construct similar cisterns. Thus, the single unit funded by the project, has had a flow on effect of another six cisterns, thereby providing additional work.

Such suspected climate change effects are being noted now. Directorate staff in Jaresh reported that olive oil export had reduced by 30% in recent years, due to combined effect of reduced rainfall and pest damage. Thus, there is an increasing interest of farmers to obtain means for water harvesting. Dynamic expansion could be enabled thorough (a) technical advice to ensure high returns, (b) advice on ways to use water effectively; (c) cost-benefit analysis to encourage investment; and (c) establishing local networks between farmers to disseminate results. If such dynamics were mobilized, to recover the 30% reduction in production, along with multiplier effects, would have a macro effect on local economies and so in turn strengthen labor markets.

What positive or negative unintended outcomes can be identified?

Higher outcomes have been achieved than designed, and these suggest that these could be further enhanced or consolidated with deliberate action. Larger areas of reforestation have been achieved where the Directorates provided additional resources, i.e. machines for access road and terrace construction (see 4.3, reforestation outputs).

Similarly, farmers' crop yields from cistern installation were higher than expected. A climate change effect had not been considered and this emerged gradually over the course of the evaluation. The effects of climate change – reduced rainfall - in effect magnified the effect of cisterns, or conversely, the cisterns are now countering the climate change effects.

No negative outcomes were encountered.

4.7 Conclusions:

Relevance and Strategic fit
The evaluation found the project to be highly relevant in directly addressing the need for greater work opportunities (for both Jordanians and Syrian refuges), as well as ILOs commitment to the SDGs, the donors priorities (refugees crisis and effective water management), and the Jordanian Government's plans to incorporate Syrian refugees into their society and mainstream economy.

Validity of design
The ILO's choice of the agriculture sector as a vehicle to provide labor intensive activities proved to be effective, demonstrating how this might be employed on a wider scale, although this did not lead to more permanent employment.

Effectiveness
The project exceeded its immediate objectives (700 workers employed for 10,000 workdays), and its establishment of new asset (reforestation 101% and cisterns constructed 93%). The application of EIIS methods and Decent Work protocols were found to at least twice as efficient as approaches normally used by the Directorates for this type of work.

The project made substantial progress towards providing better living conditions and improved social cohesion for those employed (decent work standards used, access to work permit and social security), although it was slightly below its targets for specific groups employed (Syrians refugees, 42%; women 9.1 % and persons with disabilities 2.4%).

Efficiency
Despite a long delay the project (ILO team, MoA and Directorate staff) managed to implement the project interventions achieving with a high degree of quality and redirect the un-expended funds to other effective activities (JBVs and greenhouse construction) thereby creating additional work.

Of the interventions, reforestation had the lowest direct cost per workday generated, but with additional extension activities to generate spontaneous uptake, constriction of water cisterns could well prove to be most cost effective in the long run.

The efficiencies (x2) in output for reforestation compared to the common management of this work were gained through application of Decent Work (higher pay rates and shorter working hours leading to more effective workers) and through application of the EIIP protocols which ensured improved management and oversight of the work by directorate staff in the field.

Sustainability
The reforestation sites were well constructed but require two years of watering to be fully established. Whether this would be provided beyond the project life was not clear. Cisterns were well constructed and individual farmers would clearly use and maintain.

Impacts
The reforestation areas will play a role in rehabilitating the dry and eroded areas they have been located, although far larger areas are needed to impact on local hydrology and weather.

The water cisterns were expected to have a dramatic effect on farmers crops, increasing yields by 50% in the north and 100% in the south, which appears to correspond to reduced rainfall due to suspected early climate change effects.

5.0 LESSONS LEARNT

What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied in similar future projects?

1# EIIP approaches are effective in integrating Syrian refugees into mainstream labor force.

The Ministry of Labor aims for Syrian refugees to enter the formal economy and to be self-reliant in obtaining work. The EIIP focusses on establishing enabling conditions for refugees to do this. Temporary work provides a means for the refugees to obtain WPs and so to present as legitimate workers. While a 16-day contract entitles the refugees to a WP, short term contracts however are not sufficient to achieve attitudinal change. Where work contracts are 3 months or longer, the workers begin to budget, and plan use of funds, in effect become accustomed to work and income routine, which they then try to continue.

2# The EIIP and Decent Work provide effective mechanisms to achieve greater outcomes, in particular for reforestation work, thus providing an economic justification for their application.

Decent Work, through providing higher wages (15 Jd/d) recognizes the value of labor and so incentivize workers to perform better, with higher outputs and better quality of work. The EIIP procedures result in more direct supervision by Directorate staff. These combined have resulted in an estimated doubling of output for reforestation. Recognition of this and application by national programs could have a major impact on reforestation in Jordan, and at the same time generate significant labor opportunities.

3# Technical advice has a contribution to make in achieving desired outcomes of the agriculture interventions.

Considerable efforts are made in reforestation work. This effort may be put at risk if basic good practices are not applied; appropriate or strategic site selection; practices in layout (contour and terrace alignment); plot protection strategies and maintenance. All these will contribute to sustainability of the areas. A balance between external advice and mobilizing existing capacities is needed through networking between staff across Governorates.

Cistern/tank construction makes water available, which must then be used efficiently. There are gaps in farmers knowledge and practices particularly in vegetable production. Sources of good practices should be available within the directorates and communities. Additional knowledge or technical assistance may be needed to develop extension strategies and plans to mobilize this effectively.

4# enhanced partnership models: greater outcomes can be achieved from the activities if the Directorates provide additional resources.

Where the directorates provided machinery for reforestation, the labor component provided through EIIP achieved considerably more area. This does not change the labor generated, simply how it is applied. Increasing the output by 50-100% provides a compelling justification to the Directorates to continue to apply EIIP and Decent Work. Similarly, in the agriculture interventions, where technical knowhow is available, productivity is gained, which then motivates other farmers to follow suite. Again, increased productivity will provide a more compelling rationale to those making budget allocation decisions.

If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

The project relevance and effectiveness are already high. The projet exceeded its objectives of workers and workdays. Looking beyond these numbers, it could have given greater preference to employing workers for longer contract periods to they (a) were entitled to WPs and (b) developed a greater sense of employment to continue to seek more work.

Greater sustainability could have been gained through allocating a portion of the unused funds from the late start-up, to maintenance of the reforestation areas.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Refine project protocols to enhance work opportunities and work security

6.1.1 Where possible, work contracts for Syrian refugees should be greater than 16 days in order that they will be eligible for WPs and SS. Contracts for both Jordanian and Syrian refugees should be longer term (3 months), so that workers adjust their work/life patterns, plan family progress and budget accordingly. To reinforce this, it should be made clear that workers with long term contract (min 2 months continuous employment) will not be eligible for a new contracts within the next 12 months. As such they should not expect employment with a new ILO project but rather seek further work themselves.

6.1.2 The period of time allocated for water cistern/tank construction should be increased to above the 16 day threshold (currently 12 days). The additional time designated for cistern/tank construction could usefully be achieved through allocating days for various land-improvements so that the water is used more effectively; i.e. construction of contour barriers or bunds across fields or around specific crops. These would reduce soil erosion due to the more intense rain-storms being experienced, as well as increasing infiltration of the water into the soil.

6.1.3 Increase work stability through applying a JBV approach to the cistern/tank construction activity. Support for formation of JBVs could be made available to teams with joint experience (at least 2 units each of both cistern and tanks successfully constructed) for groups of 2-6 persons. These new JBVs could then respond to, and promote the growing demand for more units, thereby stimulating the local economy and extending their own employment

6.1.4 Facilitate access to WPs and SS. The process for accessing to WPs is unfamiliar to farmers. The responsibility for facilitating this should retained by the Directorates directly, or through Cooperatives with this function.

The above recommendations are all of high importance to enable work opportunities generated to have a sustainable impact. These would all be applied by Directorate staff, with support from the ILO field officer. Additional training inputs for Directorate staff would be needed to apply the JBV mechanism. There would be a small budgetary implication for recommendations linked to cistern construction, as noted in 7.1.2 and 7.1.3.

6.2 Refine EIIP approaches for work generation within the agriculture sector in Jordan.

The EIIP approach has been shown to be effective in achieving work outputs as well as generating work opportunities and should be retained, including the rigorous record keeping procedures.

Some of the criteria (expressed in the Implementing Agreement) could be refined. These should not be changed unilaterally but through a process of dialogue with Directorates of all Governorates. This could be achieved through conducting a Workshop to review the experiences of Phase I and then refine the guidelines. There should be room for these to vary according to the conditions in each Governorate. The issues that could be considered for refinement (but necessarily exclusively) are;

- The selection of sites for reforestation, currently min. of 200 mm

- Selection of farmers for grants to build cisterns/tanks, to favour needy farmers. This might be achieved through adjusting the size of land, or ensuring agriculture is the primary occupation of the applicants, etc.
- Achieving the right balance of reforestation and water harvesting (cistern/tanks construction), which might favour cistern/tank construction more in the Southern Governorates where these have greater production impact where climate changes has had greatest effect, and reforestation in the North where rainfall is higher. But both are needed in all areas.
- Establishing work plans and strategies that provide time for (a) prepatory work (negotiating reforestation areas with traditional owners, selection of farmers for water harvesting grants) and then (b) timely field work to fit the seasons.

The above reccomendations are all of moderate importance to achieve a balanced result from the project overal. The recommendations would be applied by Directorate staff, with the MoA and ILO responsible for facilitating the consultation workshop. There should be no budgetry implication for the adjusted guidelines and a small budgtry requirement for the workshop.

6.3 Provide technical advice to enhance outcomes for reforestation and water-harvesting activities.

Achieving increased production outcomes for the current activities both has direct benefits, but also provides more compelling reasons for funding to those who make budgeting decisions

Reforestation: achieve better establishment and maintenance strategies through ensuring suitable technical advice is available. This can be through both external experts, combined with local expertise. To enable ongoing mentoring, opportunities for networking of relevant Directorate staff across all Governorates should be made. Such a networking should begin early in the season, with one later to build communication networks.

Water-harvesting and agriculture production: provide technical advice for improved production with a focus on intercropping and farmers entering vegetable production. Technical knowledge in crop production should be supported by (a) efficient water-use, through drip-irrigation and/or use of hydroponics), and (b) cost and benefits of investment in agriculture. Dissemination of good results should be carried out to achieve dynamic expansion. Technical advice in crop production should already be available in the Directorates and with experienced local farmers. Support it needed not for technical advice but rather development of extension strategies/plans. This should be done before construction begins.

The above reccomendations are of high importance to achieve greater outcomes from the project interventions. These would be applied by Directorate staff, with the MoA and ILO responsible for enabling technical advice to be made available to the Directorates. There would be budgetry implication to mobilise external techncial advisors for both reforesttion and extension, and to enable internal networking study trips and workshops.

6.4 Refine project design and implementation arrangements, to gain greater clarity, effectiveness and sustainability

6.4.1 Reforestation requires watering and site protection for two years to ensure establishment. The responsibility for this two year activity should be stated in the prodoc and specific inputs and responsibilities then assigned in the Implementation Agreement between ILO and MoA. Given the

short active life of the project, it is only the implementing partners that are in a position to provide maintenance inputs.

6.4.2 With the experience of the current project, project objectives should be more ambitious and secondary objectives such as facilitation of WPs should be made more specific with indicators assigned.

6.4.3 Project targets which are to be achieved across different sites should (a) have site specific targets so each site appreciates its responsibility, and , establish a cloud-based system where achievements at each sites can be uploaded and aggregated in real time to monitor progress.

6.4.4 Several of the development targets (percentage of women, refuges, and PWD) cannot be applied for activities which employ small groups and/or managed by non-partners (i.e. such as farmers contracting workers for cistern construction or the two partners of JBVs when they hire other workers). Such targets are feasible only where large numbers of workers are employed (i.e. reforestation). The assignment of indicators for these needs to take this into account if still expressed as an overall percentage of the target, or to be expressed as specific numbers for each activity.

6.4.5 Work safety and use of PPE are not a high priority for most agricultural work. However, cistern construction with workers underground could face risk if walls collapsed in soft soils, or poor ventilation. This should be examined by ILO and a recommendation and means made available to contracting farmers.

The above recomendations are of moderate <u>importance</u> to ensure effective project management and achievement of project outcomes. These are primarlily the responsiblity of the ILO country office to established in the Implemenetaiton Agrement with MoA. The first of these has a significant budgetry implication, which should be shared with the MoA and its Directorates.

6.5 Formulate EIIP and Decent Work approaches as strategic innovations that can impact on the agriculture sector at a national level.

Jordan as a nation faces existing problems of a denuded landscape, water deficits acerbated by climate change and weak economy and labor markets. The project has shown that its working approaches, the use of EIIP and Decent Work has the potential to address these effectively. The ILO then should work in two directions.

6.5.1 Use the pending Phase II to produce enhanced outcomes[8], through applying the lessons of the current project more effectively and documenting this more rigorous and articulate manner. This can then be used to demonstrate the efficacy of these approaches in impacting on the Jordanian issues above.

6.5.2 Explore mechanisms and partners that ILO could operate with in national level initiatives to both leverage funding for these (given more effective approaches are now demonstrated), and to add to or cooperate with existing or pending initiatives.

[8] High rates of reforestation to funding inputs through using EIIP and Decent Work approaches, and high production rates from water-harvesting, that stimulate dynamic expansion from limited inputs.

- In the area of reforestation, there are a range of initiatives where EIIP and Decent Work could be mainstreamed. These include Royally sponsored programs, new efforts to establish a national forestry strategy and other donor supported activities (e.g. GiZ).
- Agriculture production and investment in materials and improved practices will be driven by market demand, right to the farmer level. Initiatives are already in train to make EU markets more accessible to Jordan. These will take time to function. At the same time, examination of the value chain should be made at local level to ensure that smallholder farmers will be able to respond, such as (a) good access to pertinent information, (b) formation of marketing groups, etc.

The above recommendations are of high importance. The first requires the application of the previous recommendations and in particular 7.5.1.). Effective dissemination and dialogue with donors is the responsibility of ILO (head office, ROAS and country Office) and of MoA in dialogue with various donors. Most of this would be achieved within existing functions and budgets.

7.0 ANNEXES

Annex 7.1 : Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (ToR) for Final Evaluation

"Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry"

1. KEY FACTS	
TC Symbol:	JOR/16/10/NOR
Country:	Jordan
Project titles:	Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry
Duration:	16 months
Start Date:	1 December 2016
End Date:	31 March 2018
Administrative unit:	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
Technical Backstopping Unit:	EMP/INVEST
Collaborating ILO Units:	SKILLS SECTOR, GED, GREEN JOBS, COOP
Evaluation requirements:	Final Evaluation
Budget:	USD 1,771,323.70

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Project Background

According to the latest census, the total number of Syrians residing in the Kingdom of Jordan is around 1.3 million, 637,000 of whom are *refugees*[9] registered with UNHCR. The registered Syrian refugee population in Jordan is equivalent to about 10 per cent of the total population, which is putting additional pressure on Jordanian society, its natural resource base, infrastructure and economy, including the labour market. Pre-existing labour market weaknesses, including high levels of unemployment and labour market segmentation, have been exasperated and raised social tension with host community members.

A 2015 ILO labour market assessment[10] showed that 50 per cent of Jordanians and 99 per cent of Syrians were working in the informal economy. These jobs are completely outside the scope of any form of governance and lack basic social protection coverage. They are characterized by sub-standard wages, hazardous working conditions and exploitative practices, including forced labour and child labour. At the same time, the competition for jobs has led to social tensions.

The ILO seeks to secure decent work for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians in the short term. To this end, it launched a major Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) in the Governorates of Mafraq and Irbid, with the support of the German Development Bank (KFW). The programme links decent work with asset creation and maintenance in the communities and builds on more than three years of work that the ILO has been doing in those two Governorates to support local economic development (LED), as part of ILO's LED approach. Thus, the Norway funded project is an extension of the EIIP with a focus on labour-intensive agriculture development in Governorates hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees.

Geographical Coverage of the Project

Governorates of Ajloun, Jarash, Karak, Albalqa and Tafila, which hosts a significant number of Syrian refugees as per the below figures[3]:

Ajloun: REGSITERED Syrians (7,166), Jordanians (176,080)
Jarash: REGISTERED Syrians (9,385), Jordanians (237,059)
Karak: REGISTERED Syrians (8,635), Jordanians (316,629)
Albalqa: REGISTERED Syrians (18,658), Jordanians (491,709)
Tafila: REGISTERED Syrians (1,608), Jordanians (96,291)

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[9] Or more specifically "Person of Concern to UNHCR", as Jordan has not ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees.

[10] The impact of Syrian refugee crisis on the labour market in Jordan, ILO and FAFO, 2015.

[3] Retrieved from UNHCR's website (14 March 2018): http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107

Based on the figures from UNHCR's website, Registered Syrian refugees make up approximately 4% of the total population in each of the target governorates, but this does not take into account the unregistered Syrian refugees. Based on the national level experience, the Jordanian population is double the number of registered Syrian refugees, therefore it is assumed that the Syrian refugees make up approximately 8% of the total population.

Beneficiaries

The project's direct beneficiaries are 700 Syrian refugees and Jordanian women and men in Ajloun, Jarash, Karak, Albalqa and Tafila Governorates that will benefit through improved access to decent work and employment opportunities. Direct beneficiaries will also include the farmers whose lands will be improved through drip irrigation systems, water cisterns and soil terraces to decrease water run off, and who will benefit from increased agriculture productivity.

Indirect recipients will be 30 staff of public institutions and private service companies, including the Departments of Public Works, Agriculture, and Labour in Ajloun, Jarash, Albalqa, Karak and Tafila as well as the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). They will benefit from trainings on local resource based methods and contribute to the delivery of services under the Programme.

Objectives and Outputs

Development Goal: The development goal of the project is to promote better living conditions for Syrian refugees and Jordanians as a result of increased agricultural employment and an improved environment.

Immediate Objective: 700 Syrian refugees and Jordanians (with total of 27,900 working days) benefited from access to short-term employment through improved infrastructure and environmental works by using employment intensive methods in the agriculture and forestry sectors.

Output 1: Expanded agricultural infrastructure of local farmers and local communities
Output 1.1: Building water catchments to collect rainwater
Output 1.2: Soil protection arrangements through terracing and planting
Output 1.3: Installing irrigation systems

Output 2: Increased vegetation cover through tree planting
Output 2.1: Tree planting in public areas (including recreational areas and parks)
Output 2.2: Tree planting on roadsides

Output 3: Capacity of Ministry of Agriculture is built to implement local resource-based approaches for men and women (including development, rehabilitation and maintenance)
Output 3.1: Classroom and on-the-job training delivered on local resource-based methods for government employees

Project Management Structure

The project will significantly benefit from the management structure created under ILO response to Syrian refugee crisis.

A partnership was established with the Ministry of Agriculture. Again, technical designs and specifications, and ownership of certain infrastructure (for instance certain waterways and hillside slopes) fall under the MoA. Considering the MoA already has a system for the construction of cisterns and terracing, existing modalities will be used and adopted to include local resource based technology.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Evaluation Background

ILO considers evaluation as an integral part of the implementation of technical cooperation activities. Provisions are made in all projects in accordance with ILO evaluation policy and based on the nature of the project and the specific requirements agreed upon at the time of the project design and during the project as per established procedures. The Regional Evaluation Officer at the ILO ROAS provides the evaluation function for all ILO projects.

The project document states that an independent final evaluation will be conducted, which will be used to assess the progress towards the results, identify the main difficulties/constraints, assess the impact of the programme for the targeted populations, and formulate lessons learned and practical recommendations to improve future similar programmes.

ILO's established procedures for technical cooperation projects are followed for monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the project throughout the project cycle and at different stages of project execution. Specific components of the ILO's M&E plan include a multi-layered logical framework and work plan to measure the timely achievement of results at the activity and output level as well as change at the outcome and development objective level.

Monitoring of individual objectives and activities based on indicators in the logical framework feed into the progress reports.

Purpose

The final evaluation will be conducted to examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, and potential impact of the project and provide recommendations for future similar projects. This evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation as well as lessons learned.

The evaluation will comply with the ILO evaluation policy, which is based on the United Nations Evaluation Norms and Standards and the UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed.

Scope

The evaluation will cover the project 'Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry'. The evaluation should focus on all the activities that have been implemented since the start of the project to the moment of the field visits.

The project is active in Jordan and the travel will be to Jordan for field work where the project team is based. Travel to Lebanon is also necessary where ILO's Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS) is located.

The independent final evaluation will take place during March 2018 with 10 days of field visit to Jordan to collect information from different stakeholders.

The evaluation will integrate gender equality as a cross-cutting concern throughout its methodology and all deliverables, including the final report.

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Jordan, the partner UN agencies, government entities, and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation.

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

The evaluation utilises the standard ILO framework and follows its major criteria:

- ✓ **Relevance and strategic fit** – the extent to which the objectives are aligned with sub-regional, national and local priorities and needs, the constituents' priorities and needs, and the donor's priorities for the project countries;
- ✓ **Validity of design** – the extent to which the project design, logic, strategy and elements are/ remain valid vis-à-vis problems and needs;
- ✓ **Efficiency** - the productivity of the project implementation process taken as a measure of the extent to which the outputs achieved are derived from an efficient use of financial, material and human resources;
- ✓ **Effectiveness** - the extent to which the project can be said to have contributed to the development objectives and the immediate objectives, and more concretely whether the stated outputs have been produced satisfactorily;
- ✓ **Impact** - positive and negative changes and effects caused by the project at the sub-regional and national levels, i.e. the impact with social partners, implementing partner organisations, government entities, and beneficiaries;
- ✓ **Effectiveness of management arrangements**; and
- ✓ **Sustainability** – the extent to which adequate capacity building of social partners has taken place to ensure mechanisms are in place to sustain activities and whether the existing results are likely to be maintained beyond project completion; the extent to which the knowledge developed throughout the project (research papers, progress reports, manuals and other tools) can still be utilised after the end of the project to inform policies and practitioners.

Relevance and strategic fit:

- ❖ How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donor?
- ❖ To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?
- ❖ How does the project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region, particularly in the Arab countries?
- ❖ Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analysed?

Validity of design:

- ❖ Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are the logical correlations between objective, outcomes, and outputs)? Do any changes need to be made to the design of the project?
- ❖ On the whole, are project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?
- ❖ Does the project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing the project's progress? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?
- ❖ What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established?

Effectiveness:

- What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the development objective, outcomes and outputs? Did the EIIP project create jobs and workdays, and what is the cost per job? Are they in line with decent work conditions? In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes?
- How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives?
- To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects in Jordan?
- How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- How could the effectiveness of the project be improved?

Efficiency:

- To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? Is the quality and cost of the assets acceptable and in line with minimum standards?
- To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?
- What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
- How could the efficiency of the project be improved?

Sustainability:

- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes, how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?
- Are the results achieved by the project so far likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project?

Effectiveness of management arrangements:

- What was the division of work tasks within the project team and has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between project staff?
- How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?
- How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to PROGRAM and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?
- How effective was the coordination with the implementing partner (MoA), since most of the project was implemented by them?

Impact orientation:

- What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention thus far? Do the project assets result in improved farmers' productivity and are they sustainable (in terms of forestry)?
- What positive or negative unintended outcomes can be identified?

Lessons learned:

- What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied in similar future projects?
- If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?
-

5. METHODOLOGY

An independent evaluator will be hired by the ILO to conduct the evaluation. The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. Any changes to the methodology should be discussed with and approved by the REO and the Project.

1. Desk Review:

The evaluator will review project background materials before conducting any interviews or trips to the country.

2. Briefing:

The evaluator will have an initial consultation with the REO, relevant ILO specialists and support staff in ROAS. The objective of the consultation is to reach a common understanding regarding the status of the project, the priority assessment questions, available data sources and data collection instruments and an outline of the final assessment report. The following topics will be covered: status of logistical arrangements, project background and materials, key evaluation questions and priorities, outline of the inception and final report.

3. Individual Interviews and/or Group Interviews:

Following the initial briefing, the desk review and the inception report, the evaluator will have a mission to Jordan, and have meetings with constituents/stakeholders together with interpreters supporting the process if needed. Individual or group interviews will be conducted with the following:

a) Project staff/consultants that have been active in ILO in Jordan and Lebanon;
b) ILO ROAS DWT Director, RPU, and Senior Specialists in Gender, Skills and Employability, Employers' and Workers' Organisations, etc.;
c) ILO Headquarters technical departments;
d) Interviews with national counterparts (government/ministries such as the MoL and MoA, social security, public institutions, social partners, IPs, etc.);
e) Interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries;
f) Other international agencies working in relevant fields.

The evaluator may also propose data collection tools to triangulate information, especially for the indicators that can be measured through surveys or similar tools.

4. Debriefing

Upon completion of the missions, the evaluator will provide a debriefing to the Project team in Jordan, and ILO DWT and HQ on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations in Beirut at ROAS. The evaluator will also debrief stakeholders to validate results.

Evaluation Timeframe

Responsible person	Tasks	Number of Working days
Evaluator	Desk review of project documents and phone/skype interviews with key informants in Jordan	5
Evaluator	Inception report	1
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in Jordan and Lebanon	Evaluation mission to Jordan	14
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in Jordan and Lebanon	Stakeholders Workshop and presenting preliminary findings	2
Evaluator	Drafting report	5
Evaluator	Submission of the report to the evaluation manager	
Evaluation manager	Circulating the draft report to key stakeholders	
Evaluation manager	Send consolidated comments to evaluator	5
Evaluator	Second Draft	3
Evaluation Manager	Review of Second Draft	3
Evaluation Manager	EVAL approval	
Evaluator	Integration of comments and finalization of the report	1

Total days for the evaluator: 31 Days

Evaluation Management

The evaluator will report to the ILO REO in ROAS and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the REO, should issues arise. The ILO ROAS office will provide administrative and logistical support during the evaluation mission.

6. MAIN DELIVERABLES

The main outputs of the evaluation consist of the following:

- Deliverable 1: Inception Report
- Deliverable 2: Draft evaluation report
- Deliverable 3: Stakeholder debrief and Powerpoint Presentation (PPP)
- Deliverable 4: Final evaluation report with executive summary (report will be considered final after an additional review by EVAL. Comments will have to be integrated)
- Translation of the final report to Arabic (Project team)

Inception Report

The evaluator will draft an Inception Report, which should describe, provide reflection and fine-tuning of the following issues:

- Project background
- Purpose, scope and beneficiaries of the evaluation
- Evaluation criteria and questions
- Methodology and instruments
- Main deliverables
- Management arrangements and work plan

Final Report

The final version of the report will follow the below format and be in a range of 30-35 pages in length, excluding the annexes:

1. Title page
2. Table of Contents, including List of Appendices, Tables
3. List of Acronyms or Abbreviations
4. Executive Summary with methodology, key findings, conclusions and recommendations
5. Background and Project Description
6. Purpose of Evaluation
7. Evaluation Methodology and Evaluation Questions
8. Status of objectives
9. Clearly identified findings
10. A table presenting the key results (i.e. figures and qualitative results) achieved per objective (expected and unexpected)
11. Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations (identifying which stakeholders are responsible, priority of recommendations, and timeframe)
12. Lessons Learned
13. Potential good practices
14. Annexes (list of interviews, TORs, lessons learned and best practices templates, list of documents consulted, etc.)

The quality of the report will be assessed against the EVAL Checklists 4, 5, and 6.

The deliverables will be submitted in the English language, and structured according to the templates provided by the ILO.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND WORKPLAN

REQUIREMENTS

The evaluator should have:

- An advanced degree in social sciences;
- Proven expertise on evaluation methods, labour markets, conflict issues and the ILO approach;
- Extensive experience in the evaluation of development and humanitarian/emergency interventions;
- Expertise in the Labour intensive modality, agriculture and forestry, job creation projects, capacity building and skills development and other relevant subject matter;

- An understanding of the ILO's tripartite culture;
- Knowledge of Jordan and the regional context;
- Full command of the English language (spoken and written) will be required. Command of the national language would be an advantage.

The final selection of the evaluator will be approved by the Regional Evaluation Focal Point in the ILO ROAS based on a short list of candidates prepared in consultations with the ILO technical specialists, EVAL, ILO HQ technical departments, etc.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The External Evaluator is responsible for conducting the evaluation according to the terms of reference (ToR). He/she will:

- Review the ToR and provide input, propose any refinements to assessment questions, as necessary;
- Review project background materials (e.g., project document, progress reports, etc.);
- Prepare an inception report;
- Develop and implement the evaluation methodology (i.e., conduct interviews, review documents, etc.) to answer the evaluation questions;
- Conduct preparatory consultations with the ILO REO prior to the evaluation mission;
- Conduct field research, interviews, as appropriate, and collect information according to the suggested format;
- Present preliminary findings to the constituents;
- Prepare an initial draft of the evaluation report with input from ILO specialists and constituents/stakeholders;
- Conduct a briefing on the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the evaluation to ILO ROAS;
- Prepare the final report based on the ILO, donor and constituents' feedback obtained on the draft report.

The ILO Evaluation Manager is responsible for:

- Drafting the ToR;
- Finalizing the ToR with input from colleagues;
- Preparing a short list of candidates for submission to the Regional Evaluation Officer, ILO/ROAS and EVAL for final selection;
- Hiring the consultant;
- Providing the consultant with the project background materials;
- Participating in preparatory consultations (briefing) prior to the assessment mission;
- Assisting in the implementation of the evaluation methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in meetings, review documents);
- Reviewing the initial draft report, circulating it for comments and providing consolidated feedback to the External Evaluators (for the inception report and the final report);
- Reviewing the final draft of the report;
- Disseminating the final report to all the stakeholders;
- Coordinating follow-up as necessary.

The ILO REO[11]:

- Providing support to the planning of the evaluation;
- Approving selection of the evaluation consultant and final versions of the TOR;
- Reviewing the draft and final evaluation report and submitting it to EVAL;
- Disseminating the report as appropriate.

The Project Coordinator is responsible for:

- Reviewing the draft TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials, including studies, analytical papers, progress reports, tools, publications produced, and any relevant background notes;
- Providing a list of stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the inception report;
- Participating in the preparatory briefing prior to the evaluation missions;
- Scheduling all meetings and interviews for the missions;
- Ensuring necessary logistical arrangements for the missions;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the initial draft report;
- Participating in the debriefing on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
- Providing translation for any required documents: TOR, PPP, final report, etc.;
- Making sure appropriate follow-up action is taken.

8. LEGAL AND ETHICAL MATTERS

-This independent evaluation will comply with ILO evaluation guidelines and UN Norms and Standards.
-These ToRs will be accompanied by the code of conduct for carrying out the evaluation "Code of conduct for evaluation in the ILO" (See attached documents).
-UNEG ethical guidelines will be followed throughout the independent evaluation.
-The consultant will not have any links to project management or any other conflict of interest that would interfere with the independence of the evaluation.

[11] The REO is also the Evaluation Manager.

Annex 7.2 : Schedule and list of people consulted

DATE	LOCATION	INFORMANT NAME	ORGANISATION/AFFILIATION	POSITION/ROLE IN PROJECT
MAR				
27	**Geneva**	Chris Donnges	ILO Head Office	Specialist, employment intensive investments
27	**Beirut**	Sanaa Abousleiman	ILO ROAS	Program assistant
28	**Beirut**	Lars Johansen	ILO ROAS	Chief, Regional Programme Unit
	Beirut	Nathalie	ILO ROAS	Monitoring/Evaluation Officer
APRL				
01	**AMMAN**	Maha Katta	ILO Country Office, Jordan	Coordinator: Response to Syrian refugee crisis
		Samer Alrawashed	ILO Country Office, Jordan	Project Officer
		Ali Abu Hammour	Ministry of Agriculture	Ass. Secretary General
		Dr. Bashir Yousef Muhammed Alqadri	Ministry of Agriculture	Project coordinator
		Sharif Mohmmad	Ministry of Agriculture	Loan and Grants Dept.
02	**TAFILA**	**Directorate**		
		M. Hussien Al Qatameen	Directorate	Director
		Bayan Ahmad AlDabr	Project Dept.	Head, Technical Committee
		Emud Budorian	Forestry Dept.	Head, Technical Committee
		Thaier Odue Salem Al Ramjth	Water systems	Head, Techncial Committee
		Abdullah Hamad Al Freijat	Forestry Dept.	Engineer, supervision
		Adel Sbehat	Forestry Dept.	Engineer, supervision
		Benficiaries		
		Omar Khader Albaker	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Mahar Jomaa Mojo	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Amneh Mohd Bakar	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary, female
		Ilham Faher Alkhraset	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Abdullah Suliman Al Hjoj	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
		Said Ahmad Frojat	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
03		Not collected	Cistern 1	Farmer
		Not collected	Cistern 1	Worker, Jordanian
		Not collected	Cistern 2	Farmer
		Mahoud Kwastel	Cistern 3	Farmer
		-	Cistern 4	Farmer
04	**KARAK**	**Directorate**		
		E.Manal masarweh	Directorate	Director, Technical Committee
		Yones Traawneh	Forest Dpt.	Head, Technical committee
		Khaled Qudah	District officer	Head, Technical committee
		Waeh Sharofa	Forestry Dept.	Engineer, Technical committee
		Masal Masarweh	Crop production	Engineer, Technical committee
		Reghad Amareen	Project Dept.	Head, Technical Committee
		Benficiaries		
		Fahed Bed Al farwa	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Imad Ahmad Al Riyadi	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary (disabled)
		Amani Muagbeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Fadwa Maubeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Oday NAyel Shakahal	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary

		Mohammad fayee zayadeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
05		Hiyam Ahmad Mostafa	Cistern 1	Farmer
		Ayed mohammad al habashneh	Cistern 2	Farmer, (partially blind)
		Sager Yohnik Abu Amro	Cistern 3	Farmer
		Saheed Mayesh Badi Boyayada	Cistern 4	Farmer
06		free		
	IRBID	Hattam Al Hrob	Marj Ibn Amer Coop Soc.	Director
		Mousa Mohammed aba Zaid	Worker, Syrian	WP recipient
		Forad Majed	Worker, Syrian	WP recipient
		Not collected	JBV Greenhouse, Syrian Partner	Farmer
		Not collected	JBV Greenhouse, Jdn. Partner	Farmer
	MAFRAQ			
		Iada Al Sharfat	Assoc. of Badia - Ag. Coop	Director
		Abdullrahman	JBV Greenhouse, Syrian	Farmer
		Mohamad suleiman allosh	JBV Greenhouse, Syrian	Farmer, (+2 sons)
08	**BALQA**	**Directorate**		
		Yusif suileman al arabiyat	Forestry Dept.	Head, Technical committee
		Awni Alnsour	Project Dept	Head, Technical committee
		Beneficaries		
		Hussam Mohamad Dokeh	Worker, Syrian	beneficiary
		Abdull Kaream Almousa	Worker, Syrian	beneficiary
		Soher Wahbi Ali Althab	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Hejer Abdullafez sadam AlKhawa Ideh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
09		Motasam Al dabbas	Worker, Jordanian	beneficiary
		Sadam Ateed Abuhammour	Worker, Jordanian	beneficiary
		Not collected	Cistern 1	Farmer
		Ahmad Fadel Alawamleh	Cistern 2	Farmer
		Awad Salem Wishah	Cistern 3	Farmer
		Abed Mahmoud Al aqel	Cistern 4	Farmer
1	**JARESH**	**Directorate**		
		Abdalhafez Abu Orabi	Directorate	Technical committee
0		Hani ahmed Bani Bakar	Crop production Dept	Head, Technical committee
		Ahmad Al Shaar	Water systems Dept.	Head, Technical committee
		Wissan Alqadah	Project Dept	Head, Technical committee
		Tayscar Samar	Administration	Head, Technical committee
		Fayez Alharasha	Forestry	Head, Technical committee
		Beneficairies		
		Alia Al rabia	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Sarn Al Atoum	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Samed Mohd Al ali	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Ahmed Mohd Almashraka	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Mohd Taysee Moh-saad Farraj	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
		Mohd Hani samer Al Jagber	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
		Mohammad Al Shaorman	Cistern 1	Farmer
		Ahmad sadam Matalka	Cistern 2	Farmer
		Ahmad Al Staer	Cistern 3	Farmer
11	**ALJOUN**	**Directorate staff**		
		Raed Al Sharman	Directorate	Director
		Mousa Hadda	Project Dept	Head, Technical Dept
		Hatem Ahmed Freihat	Forestry Dept	Head, Technical Dept.

		Beneficiaries		
		Waleed Saleh Mahamoud Marhamond	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Ibriham Mohd Al Haree	Worker, Syrian	Beneficiary
		Samaber Ahmed Mohd Rushaydeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Sharem mohd Hassan Ananbeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Fatmed Hamed Zreqat	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary, female
		Mandouh Mostfa freihat	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
		Abdullah Ahmad Khahatbeh	Worker, Jordanian	Beneficiary
		Abdullah Mohd Hishan Inizat	Cistern 1	Farmer
		Sami ali Mohd Oboid freihat	Cistern 2	Farmer
12	**AMMAN**	Mohammad al Zniemat	Social Security cooperation	Head of Inspection
		Hamdan Yacoub	Ministry of Labour	Head, Syrian Refugee Dept
		Patrick Daru	ILO Jordan	Skills +Employability Specialist, Coordinator Amman DWCP
		Htun Hliang	ILO Jordan	Chief technical assistant
13		Data processing		
14		Preparation De-brief		
15		<u>De-briefing:</u> Maha Katta E. Khalid Hunifat	ILO Jordan	
16	**BEIRUT**	<u>Debriefing:</u> Lars Johansen Nathalie Bavitch Rebecca Samah Sanna Abousleiman Chris Donnges	ILO ROAS	

Annex 7.3 : Lessons Learnt

Project Title: Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry
Project TC/SYMBOL: ILO TC/SYMBOL: JOR/16/10/NOR
Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date: 03/05/2018

Key Lesson 1: The EIIP approaches are effective in integrating Syrian refugees into the mainstream labour force.

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	The EIIP provides direct work opportunities as well as a means for the refugees to obtain WPs, and so to present as legitimate workers. In terms of building personal attributes of the refugees to acquire work, short term contracts are not sufficient to achieve attitudinal change. Work contracts of 3 months provide workers conditions for planning family affairs and budgeting. In effect they become accustomed to work and income routine, which they then try to continue.
Context and any related preconditions	The Ministry of Labor aims for Syrian refugees to enter the formal economy, and to be self-reliance in obtaining work.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	ILO technical advisers, donors, program team and Directorate staff (who manage contracts).
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Labour markets are weak and despite worthwhile attributes conferred by EIIP, obtaining sustainable work is not likely.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	Reforestation work does provide opportunity for longer contracts, whereas cistern/tank construction, which of their nature, are short term (currently 13 days)
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	Criteria and mechanisms for cistern/tank construction could be changed to enable formation of Joint business venture, which offer longer term work and a high degree of self-determination than wage labour.

Project Title: Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry
Project TC/SYMBOL: ILO TC/SYMBOL: JOR/16/10/NOR
Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell

Date: 03/05/2018

Key Lesson 2: **The EIIP and Decent Work can provide effective mechanism to achieve greater technical outcomes, particularly in reforestation work, thus providing an economic justification for their application.**

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	Decent Work although it provides a higher wage (15 Jd/d) and shorter work hours, when combined with better supervision from EIIP procedures, resulted in more effective reforestation, estimated at x2 the normal output. The more general lesson is that providing good work conditions, rather than minimizing inputs/conditions can generate better outputs
Context and any related preconditions	Reforestation work conducted by Directorates has typically paid low wages (7.5 Jd/d) and provided minimal supervision, resulting in unmotivated work force and low outputs. In other words, this is a low base for comparison, but nevertheless the norm.
Targeted users / **Beneficiaries**	Initially this lesson can be applied by directorates in any reforestation work. It provides a case for ILO technical advisors, donors can apply more widely, including in national programs.
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Initially the higher wages and EIIP procedures were not accepted as they go against entrenched practices.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	ILO officers required compliance with criteria agreed for application of the conditions, so that the above results emerged.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	Availability and commitment of ILO officers to the Decent Work criteria must be available to monitor application of criteria and advise, particularly in early stage of the project when these are tested.

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Key Lesson 3: **Technical advice has a contribution to make in achieving desired outcomes for agriculture interventions.**

LL Element	**Text**
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	A significant number or reforestation and cistern/tank construction sites demonstrated poor practices. Where technical knowledge was available good results were obtained: reforestation sites managed by engineers who were forestry specialists, and farmers with technical knowledge or support, who shifted new vegetable production and/or intercropping.
Context and any related preconditions	Engineers supervising at some sites had generalist agriculture backgrounds, not forestry. No programmed technical support was provided to farmers where cisterns/tanks were constructed.
Targeted users / Beneficiaries	ILO technical advisers, donors, program team and Directorate staff (who manage contracts).
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	The activities tended to be viewed as 'work' activities rather than 'agricultural activities, with less attention on the production outcomes.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	At sites where technical expertise existed, or could be requested, excellent results were gained that demonstrate the potential of these activities.
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	Technical expertise was planned for the project. The delayed start up resulted in a focus on achieving the outputs without seeking the technical advice planned. No technical advice was considered for agriculture as this expected to rely on existing practices without innovation .

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Key Lesson 4: **enhanced partnership models: improved outcomes can be achieved when the Directorates provide additional resources.**

LL Element	Text
Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)	Where Directorates provided machinery, reforestation areas achieved were substantial above the target.
Context and any related preconditions	Reforestation includes a mix of activities. Some of these (construction of access roads and terraces) can be more efficiently done by machinery, which allows the labour component of EIIP to plant larger areas of trees. Such machinery needs to already exist within the Directorate, and thus requires operational funds only.
Targeted users / **Beneficiaries**	ILO technical advisers, donors for future design and agreements with IPs, and ILO program team and Directorate staff (who manage implementation).
Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors	Not all directorates have access to equipment. In this first project for reforestation, the expanded effort was the result of individual initiative. Not all staff have the vision, or position to mobilise such resources.
Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors	The results gained were the result of individual initiative, which have now provided enhanced models for EIIP implementation
ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)	The ILO program staff did not have an agricultural focus, and thus less attention was paid on the technical outcomes of the EIIP interventions

Annex 7.4 : Emerging good practices

ILO Emerging Good Practice Template	
Project Title: Job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities through green works in agriculture and forestry Project TC/SYMBOL: ILO TC/SYMBOL: JOR/16/10/NOR Name of Evaluator: John G. Connell Date: 03/05/2018 **The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.**	
GP Element	**Text**
Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)	EIIP provides cash for work which requires intensive monitoring to ensure funds are assigned correctly. As such it is an existing practice, however **new functions** for them can be noted. The process requires local staff to attend work on site, and so more hands-on supervision of the work itself is achieved, contributing to improved work efficiency. These protocols should be seen not simply to record attendance, but to ensure active supervision.
Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability	These should be applied where ever EIIP processes are used.
Establish a clear cause-effect relationship	All directorates reported this effect.
Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries	The Directorates reported that work was carried out in 50% of the time when their normal work management procedures were sued.
Potential for replication and by whom	This should be applied in future EIIP activities. It can be seen not to simply be an EIIP approach, but used by many reforestation projects within Jordan. It should be brought to the attention of MoA and GiZ (which plays a major role in supporting re-forestation work in Jordan).
Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)	Recognition that application of EIIP and DC will generate greater and/or results, provides a strong pragmatic justification to other agencies and donors to recognize the value of EIIP and DC
Other documents or relevant comments	n/a