



# ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title:** Final independent cluster evaluation report of four ILO projects on employment and sustainable enterprise development for peace and resilience in Africa
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- **Name of consultant(s):** Dr Achim Engelhardt, (Team leader) , Dr Boniface Nzonikoua (Central African Republic), Mr Abdoul Anziz Said Attoumane (Comoros), Mr. Pious Sesay (Sierra Leone)
- **ILO Administrative Office:** Country Offices Abuja, Addis Ababa, Antananarivo and Kinshasa
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- **Evaluation Manager:** Mr Ricardo Furman

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**This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office**

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## List of acronyms and abbreviations

ACTEMP	ILO Bureau for Employers' Activities
ACTRAV	ILO Bureau for Workers' Activities
CAF	Central African Republic
CO	Country Office
COM	Comoros
COVID-19	Corona virus disease
CSPR	ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DWT	Decent Work Country Teams
EILD	Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GET	Gender and Entrepreneurship Together
HQ	Headquarters
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Government service Delivery
KfW	Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau
m	Million
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
P&B	Programme and Budget
PARDEV	ILO Partnerships and Field Support department
PNEFP	Politique Nationale de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle
RBSA	Regular Budget Supplementary Account
SCA2D	Strategie de croissance acceleree et de developpement durable
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SOM	Somalia
SLE	Sierra Leone
SLLCA	Sierra Leone Labour Congress
SMART	Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound
SME	Small and medium enterprises
SMEDA	Small and Medium Size Enterprise Development Agency (Sierra Leone)
TC	Technical Cooperation

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ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEG	United National Evaluation Group
UN-Habitat	The United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United National Industrial Development Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
US\$	United States dollar
US\$	United States dollar
%	Percentage

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## Executive summary

**Introduction:** This document constitutes the final independent cluster evaluation report of four International Labour Organization (ILO) projects on employment and sustainable enterprise development in Africa. The evaluation covered the following four projects funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA):

Title	Country	Timeframe	Budget (US\$)
Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD) <b>(COM102 - P&amp;B 2018-19)</b>	Comoros	01/2018 – 12/2020	1,000,000
Access to productive employment, decent work, and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated in Somalia <b>(SOM 101 – P&amp;B 2018-19)</b>	Somalia	12/2017 – 12/2019	864,160
Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments <b>(SLE 107 –P&amp;B 2018-19)</b>	Sierra Leone	11/2017 – 12/2019	1,000,000
Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic <b>(CAF106 P&amp;B 2018-19)</b>	Central African Republic	10/2017 – 12/2020	1,000,000

**Projects’ background:** The ILO Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018-and 2019 and P&B 2020-21 documents stressed the importance of “creating productive and decent employment for young women and men, as well as the promotion of an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and sustainable enterprises, in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in fragile states contexts. Those are important work areas for ILO in Africa.

ILO have implemented several projects towards results in these areas since 2018, funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA). The RBSA funding is an account established based on the voluntary contributions of Member States, in addition to their contributions to the regular budget. It is directed to implementing decent work priorities selected in dialogue with tripartite constituents in Member States.

The projects are focused on the Programme and Budget (P&B) Outcomes on employment promotion and enterprise development. For P&B 2018-19 Outcome 1: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects and Outcome 4: Promoting sustainable enterprises; and for P&B 2020-21 Outcome 3: Economic, social and environmental transitions for full productive and freely chosen employment and decent work for all, and Outcome 4: Sustainable enterprises as generators of employment and promoters of innovation and decent work.”<sup>1</sup>.

In the Central African Republic, the project with its resilience focus aimed to contribute to the creation of opportunities for young people by addressing the root causes of economic, social and environmental vulnerability, in order to enable the country to break out of the vicious

<sup>1</sup> ILO, 2020: Terms of Reference for Independent Final Evaluation of four projects on employment and sustainable enterprises development in Africa

circle of conflicts and disasters by creating decent jobs for vulnerable groups. The project was implemented close to the capital city Bangui due to security considerations.

In Comoros, the ILO implemented the project in the three most vulnerable communes, the islands of Mohéli, Anjouan, and Ngazidza. The ultimate beneficiaries of the project were vulnerable women and men, particularly poor and unemployed young women and men.

In Sierra Leone, the support to the government and social partners was multi-pronged, associating small and medium enterprises (SME) interventions with a focus on fragility and resilience.

In Somalia, the ILO targeted the government and social partners to strengthen their legal, policy, and institutional capacities.

**Evaluation background:** The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)<sup>2</sup> outline the **evaluation purpose** as follows:

- Assess the extent to which the projects have achieved the stated objectives and expected results while identifying the supporting factors and constraints;
- Identify unexpected positive and negative results of the projects;
- Assess the extent to which the outcomes of the projects will be sustainable;
- Establish the relevance of the project design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO, United Nations (UN), and the national development frameworks;
- Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further;
- Provide recommendations to project stakeholders to promote sustainability and support further development of the project outcomes.

The **scope of the evaluation** is of the four projects as representing ways of working in employment and sustainable enterprises in ILO (vis-à-vis ILO approach expressed in P&Bs 2018-19 and 2020-21)<sup>3</sup>. The evaluation covers the entire period from the start of the implementation to the end of all four projects and all projects objectives and results, focusing not only on what has been achieved but how and why.

**Evaluation clients:** The evaluation clients are the ILO constituents and ILO Country Offices and relevant Decent Work Country Teams (DWT) and headquarters (HQ) Departments in Geneva.

**Management and implementation:** The evaluation manager for this evaluation is Mr. Ricardo Fuhrman, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Officer for the ILO Regional Office for Africa. Dr. Achim Engelhardt, an independent evaluation consultant, lead the evaluation, with no prior engagement neither in the design nor implementation of the projects.<sup>4</sup> National evaluators supported him in Comoros, Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone. In total, the evaluators interviewed 208 stakeholders through telephone interviews. 48,7% of interviewees were women and 51,3% men<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> ILO, 2020: Terms of Reference for Independent Final Evaluation of four projects on employment and sustainable enterprises development in Africa, pages 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> Two projects were still formulated during the P&B 2016-17) even though they started end of 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Geneva-based Monitoring and Evaluation specialist with expertise in supporting the ILO in M&E-related work since 2006. [www-lotus-group.org](http://www-lotus-group.org)

<sup>5</sup> Breakdown by sex by country: Central African Republic 36% women (51 out of 142), 64% men (91 out of 142); Comoros: 11 persons without specification of sex; Sierra Leone: 88% women (15 out of 17), 12% men (2 out of 17), 8 persons without specification of sex; Somalia: 100% men (4 out of 4).



**Evaluation methodology and approach:** The team leader used a theory-based evaluation approach for this final cluster evaluation. The cluster evaluation corresponds to a thematic cluster evaluation under an RBSA funding arrangement. According to the ILO's guidance note on Clustered Evaluations (2020), this cluster evaluation type strongly focuses on learning about innovative project implementation approaches.

While the four projects lack a common results-based framework or explicit common theory of change<sup>6</sup>, three of the projects benefit from a common outcome, "More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects." Those are the employment-oriented projects in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Somalia. Only the sustainable enterprise project in Sierra Leone seems less connected to the main cluster, with its outcome concerning "Reforms of business environment that contribute to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises."<sup>7</sup> The evaluation addressed this issue by considering sustainable enterprises also as a way of generating employment.

**Main evaluation findings:** The main evaluation findings are aligned to the evaluation criteria suggested in the Terms of Reference: relevance, validity of project design, effectiveness, efficiency, effectiveness of management arrangements, and the sustainability of results.

**Relevance: The evaluation finds that the cluster was highly relevant in post-conflict countries where the ILO is less present and, particularly rural youth and women lacking development opportunities**

*National priorities and beneficiary needs:* The document review shows that the cluster is closely aligned to national strategies and policies concerning employment and, where applicable, entrepreneurship in the four countries.

RBSA-funded projects are particularly relevant in meeting cluster beneficiaries' needs. This finding is particularly evident, given the limited comprehensiveness of ILO project portfolios in the respective countries amidst desolate post-conflict environments with very few employment opportunities. RBSA provides opportunities in countries where the ILO has little or no presence.

*United Nations frameworks:* The cluster is aligned to United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) or related UN frameworks. The strongest contribution to the Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) shows for SDG 4, target 4.4 (skills) and SDG 8, targets 8.5 (employment) and 8.6 (youth unemployment).

*Relevance for the ILO:* The cluster contributed to the DWCPs, its drafts, or previous versions in all countries, including priorities such as employment-intensive works (Comoros), employment for youth and vulnerable groups and social dialogue (Central African Republic), enabling environment (Somalia) and public and private investment (Sierra Leone).

The cluster is closely aligned to the ILO's Strategic Objectives: P&B 2018 – 2019 (outcomes 1 and 4)<sup>8</sup> and P&B 2020-2021 (outcomes 3 and 4).

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<sup>6</sup> Critical enabling conditions for good cluster evaluation in the ILO according to the Guidance Note 3.3 on Clustered Evaluations.

<sup>7</sup> With the objective "To increase employment creation and opportunities through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour-intensive infrastructure development".

<sup>8</sup> Additional contribution shows for Sierra Leone to outcome 4 on promoting sustainable enterprises.

The cluster built on partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees, failing to systematically include ACTEMP and ACTRAV during the RBSA project design.

**Validity of project designs: The project designs are patchy, lack key elements such as M&E or an exit strategy, while gender and international labour standards were well-reflected. Tripartism and social dialogue were unevenly addressed while fair transition to environment was absent. The reconstructed theory of change for the cluster reveals significant shortcomings in the realism of project designs.**

*Intervention logic:* The cluster did not have a common theory of change. The reconstructed theory shows shortcomings in the results chain, and many critical assumptions are not holding. The validity and realism of implementation approaches were uneven across the cluster.

*Quality and comprehensiveness of project designs:* The project designs of the RBSA projects were "M&E blind," and the cluster lacked an explicit exit strategy. The cluster comprehensively considered gender in the project design and implementation and upheld the International Labour Standards such as Occupational Health and Safety, while disability was practically absent.

Concerning the ILO's *peace and resilience programming*, RBSA is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on this topic. Donors tend to have other geographic priorities for their earmarked development cooperation funding to the ILO and many conflict affected countries lack funding opportunities for ILO projects.

During implementation, two projects diverged from original peace and resilience programming objectives. Reasons were a change of government priorities in the case of Comoros when selecting project sites (which indeed is not the best way to address root causes of conflict) and the project team's preference for a more "traditional" project implementation approach in Sierra Leone<sup>9</sup>.

The role of *tripartite constituents* in the design and implementation of the cluster was uneven.

**Cluster results and effectiveness: results at outcome level across the projects are moderately satisfactory in the context of very fragile post-conflict settings**

The evaluation shows that the projects' contribution to the cluster outcomes was overall uneven:

- Results are satisfactory for the RBSA projects in Somalia due to successful project delivery at policy and programming level contribution to the enabling environment for the creation of more and better jobs and providing the required programming elements;
- Results in Comoros seem moderately satisfactory for the RBSA project due to a patchy project performance lacking follow-up of trainees and sustainable institutional capacities which belittles the contribution to job creation;

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<sup>9</sup> The ILO in Sierra Leone commented that that during the implementation of RBSA SLE 107 in Sierra Leone resources were mobilized by ILO in collaboration with FAO and a USD1.5 million project from the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) to cater for peace and resilience objectives which project was implemented by the two agencies. The PBF project run concurrently with RBSA project in the same target areas as RBSA and beyond but was targeting vulnerable women who were supported in agribusiness, access to markets and BDS. ILO's portion in the PBF project was USD500,000 used on BDS, market linkages, cooperatives, OSH and access to finance which complemented FAO whose role in the PBF project was issues of conflict mapping, land mapping, management, sensitization on conflict resolution and agribusiness development.

- For the Central African Republic, institutional strengthening was less successful than expected while the availability of short-term employment and training for highly vulnerable youth was highly appreciated. A contribution to more and better jobs showed, even if only of short duration;
- In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project's contribution to the cluster outcome was moderately unsatisfactory. While progress was made at the policy level, programming related to the support to trainees and entrepreneurs seem unsatisfactory with insufficient project delivery in a weak institutional context. The project's contribution to more and better jobs is uncertain and depends on the effectiveness of a EURO 8m follow-up project with EU funding. The evaluation finds a diametrical difference in the perception of project benefits between project beneficiaries and the ILO project team.

The evaluation *identified factors affecting the projects' implementation*. Positive factors comprised strong internal ILO support, for example, from DWCTs, the ILO's leading role in the UN Country Team (UNCT), the eagerness of communities to engage in the projects and the traction of the labour-intensive approach for immediate job creation, even if short-term. As for most fragile setting, negative factors included institutional instabilities, slow-moving or stagnating social dialogue, social partners with varying capacities, and diverging understanding of their mandates aggravated further by the effects of COVID-19.

*Gender and vulnerability*: The cluster satisfactorily promoted gender in the projects. Issues of vulnerability figured in the projects mainly concerning unskilled youth.

*Replicability of models*: Evidence emerges for the suitability of replicating the intervention model in similar crisis responses, for example, the employment-intensive approach.

**Efficiency: overall, the cluster used resources appropriately**

*Human resources*: The cluster was appropriately staffed in each of the countries, experiencing, however at times, significant delays in recruiting project teams due to internal ILO procedures. For example, in Sierra Leone, one-third of the project implementation time passed without a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) in post, and half of the project implementation passed before a national expert joined.

*Internal ILO support*: Responsible country offices in the region, DWTs and where applicable ILO HQ provided relevant project implementation and administrative support.

The *financial resources* for the RBSA cluster are well above (71%) the average RBSA project funding.

The compliance with expenditure plans was very high, reaching 91,2% in Somalia, 94% in the Central African Republic, 96,1% in Sierra Leone, and 97,4% in Comoros.

The contribution of the ILO's RBSA project in Somalia to *funding leveraged* amounts to about US\$ 14.45m and the RBSA project in Sierra Leone to approximately US\$ 10.15m amortising the cluster investment of US\$ 3.864.160.

**The effectiveness of management arrangements is mixed across the cluster, affected by highly complex project environments and internal lacunae.**

*Financial management:* The implementation of the cluster's management and governance arrangements suffered in the context of political volatility and fragile security situations. While the human resources were broadly appropriate across the cluster, not having an ILO office with a bank account significantly affected the projects' management arrangements, for example, for making timely payments for the delivery of core components such as employment-intensive works. As such, considering the highly challenging context of post-conflict and fragility across the cluster, the internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs was overall satisfactory, except for financial management.

Due to the absence of a cluster M&E strategy or related strategies in the project documents, the evaluation could not detect any use of such strategies.

The cluster developed partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees.

**Orientation towards impact and sustainability: The evaluation finds that the cluster is truly struggling to sustain RBSA project results**

The sustainability of the projects results is heavily jeopardized by multiple dimensions: Central African Republic and Comoros: lack of success in leveraging donor funding for follow-up; Sierra Leone: institutional challenges in the leading project partner; Somalia, Head of ILO Office currently unable to return to the country among growing political tensions in the country.

*Upscaling and replication:* While RBSA projects served to replicate existing ILO approaches in the projects countries, evidence lacks about replicating RBSA project approaches within the cluster countries or beyond, except Somalia. The evaluation identified highly significant evidence of the upscaling of the RBSA seed funding results in Sierra Leone and Somalia.

Based on those key findings, the evaluation drew the following main conclusions:

**The cluster of RBSA projects on employment and sustainable enterprises addressed the short-term employment needs of mostly vulnerable communities, despite significant project design shortcomings. While the sustainability of the projects failed in the Central African Republic and Comoros, the ILO's risk taking to engage in post-conflict environment was worthwhile, with the RBSA project in Somalia alone contributing to leveraging significant follow-up funding, which amortized the entire investment in the four projects.**

The following recommendations emerge:

Relevance

**Recommendation 1. The ILO Department responsible for the allocation of RBSA resources should keep allocating budgets of about US\$ 1 m per RBSA project to maintain the projects' relevance in complex post-conflict settings.** Less projects with higher funding are preferable to more projects with reduced budgets to ensure the relevance of investments.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** About US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

Validity of project design

**Recommendation 2.** When RBSA projects are designed with alignment to the same ILO P&B outcomes or an ILO programming approach such as peace and resilience programming, projects should aim to operate as a cluster. Based on a peace and conflict analysis, the latter would include using a common Theory of Change, planning framework, monitoring, results reporting and evaluation, while having the flexibility of have activities and outputs tailored to specific country contexts.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** For coordination issues only.

**Recommendation 3.** RBSA projects should strengthen quality assurance during project design, including a systematic analysis of project assumptions and the quality of M&E such as SMART indicators, baselines, and targets.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** For enhanced quality assurance only.

Effectiveness

**Recommendation 4.** The Country Director should engage the Small and Medium Size Enterprise Development Agency (SMEDA), prior to the launch of an EU-funded follow up project to ensure that SMEDA systems are in place to act as a better organized and reliable partner for future project implementation.

**Responsible:** ILO Country Office (CO) Abuja and SMEDA.

**Priority:** Very high.

**Timing:** Next 3 to 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** Travel expenses for visits to Sierra Leone.

**Recommendation 5.** Despite the challenges characterizing fragile settings, the ILO is encouraged to keep funding RBSA project in post-conflict settings, using a cluster approach under the peace and resilience programming or a common P&B outcome, regardless the very high risks of short-term results only (for example, through the employment-intensive approach) in such extremely volatile environments. Genuine engagement for “leaving no one behind” requires risk-taking.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** Up to US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

Effectiveness of management arrangements

**Recommendation 6.** Whilst in some cases RBSA can play a major role as entry point in countries where ILO has no permanent presence nor major initiatives on going, **to effectively implement RBSA projects in the peace and resilience context, countries should be prioritised where established office structures are available, complemented by an active ILO engagement in the UNCT in the conflict affected countries.**

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing:** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** Up to US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

Orientation towards impact and sustainability

**Recommendation 7.** The Head of the Office should return to the country as soon as possible to represent the ILO in the UNCT and give a strong signal to tripartite constituents that the ILO takes leadership in facilitating social dialogue and aims to remain an accessible partner in the country.

**Responsible:** ILO Somalia.

**Priority:** Very high.

**Timing:** Next 3 to 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** No additional HR expenses.

**Recommendation 8.** The Country Directors in their role as non-resident members of the UNCTs in the Central African Republic and Comoros, respectively, should aim to catalyse the participation of the ILO in joint UN programmes. The latter could address shortcomings in institutional capacities and follow-up engagement with trained cooperatives in both countries.

**Responsible:** ILO Country Office Kinshasa and ILO Country Office Antananarivo.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing:** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** Travel expenses for additional visits to the Central African Republic and Comoros or time for virtual engagement.

In this evaluation, the following lessons learned and good practices emerged:

**Lessons learned:**

**Lesson learned 1: Use of the employment-intensive approach in RBSA projects in fragile state countries**

**The employment-intensive approach is suited for short-term employment creation where income sources are urgently needed, for example, for the reconciliation of ethnic or religious groups in volatile post-conflict settings.**

**However, expectations need to be carefully managed, as the promotion of the approach through RBSA projects faces a tight time limit of two years, in real terms even several months less until the project team is recruited. The uptake of the employment-intensive approach by (local) government heavily depends on political will and the availability of financial resources.**

The uptake by donors or UN agencies also depends on UNDAF priorities and their approaches to peace and reconciliation.

Hence, uncertainty prevails for the assumption that the promotion of employment-intensive approaches in short-term RBSA projects contributes to longer-term economic recovery.

#### **Lesson learned 2: RBSA projects in countries with ILO residency vs. non-resident status**

DWTs and ILO country offices can significantly support RBSA projects where the ILO is a “non-resident” agency, as experienced in the Central African Republic. While this support proved essential for enhancing the project implementation’s effectiveness, it faces its limitations. **The remote support cannot replace ILO’s resident status with in-country representation in the UNCT and vis-à-vis the tripartite constituents.** Learning from Somalia shows that physical presence in the UNCT facilitates access of the ILO to joint UN programming, which is proofed as an emerging funding source for ILO programming. Ultimately, the likelihood of RBSA seed funding contributing to a growing ILO project portfolio where approaches of RBSA projects can be replicated or upscaled seem higher where the ILO is a resident agency that is active in the UNCT.

#### **Lesson learned 3: Role of the ILO HQ Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in RBSA projects in post-conflict settings**

The ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in HQ benefits from a Theory of Change for its programming and a dedicated technical support team. **RBSA projects and other ILO programming in post-conflict settings focusing on employment creation would benefit from aligning to that Theory of Change to strengthen RBSA project design, given the design shortcomings in the evaluated RBSA projects. Besides, technical CSRP support can complement other internal ILO support.** This conceptual alignment would strengthen project design and facilitate evaluation given a robust CSRP programming framework.

As RBSA funding is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on peace and resilience, the quality of monitoring data and evaluation opportunities are vital to establish evidence how the peace and resilience programming is working best and why.

#### **Lesson learned 4: Disability in RBSA projects**

Disability issues seem insufficiently mainstreamed among ILO staff with responsibility for project design. ILO staff showed a lack of awareness. **RBSA project would be benefit from a systematic inclusion of the disability dimension in needs assessments, stakeholder analysis and the project implementation.**

#### **Good practices: cluster evaluation**

Without a cluster evaluation, RBSA projects below a threshold of US\$ 800.000 would not benefit individually from a final evaluation due to their budget size below the threshold for mandatory evaluation. **The use of a cluster evaluation allows the ILO to exercise evaluability and enable learning even for smaller-sized projects.** Even though this cluster did not benefit from a common planning, monitoring, and reporting framework, the engagement of staff, tripartite constituents, and, where possible, beneficiaries during the evaluation process allowed for an analysis of projects’ processes and results. As such, the cluster evaluation contributes to learning for future RBSA projects in post-conflict settings.

# 1: Introduction

This document constitutes the final independent cluster evaluation report of four ILO projects on employment and sustainable enterprise development in Africa.

The evaluation covered the following four projects funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA):

- Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD) [SEP]
- Access to productive employment, decent work, and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated in Somalia [SEP]
- Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour-intensive investments [SEP]
- Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic [SEP]

All four projects started in the Biennium 2018-19 (two completed in 2019 and two in 2020).

Following the inception report outlining mainly the evaluation approach and methodology, including data collection tools, this report is the second main deliverable of the evaluation. Part 2 of this evaluation report contains annexes and graphics.

## 1.1 Project background

The table below summarizes the cluster's implementation timeframe, respective countries, and budgets.

**Figure 1: Overview of RBSA projects evaluation as part of the cluster evaluation**

Title	Country	Timeframe	Budget (US\$)
Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD) (COM 102 - P&B 2018-19)	Comoros	01/2018 – 12/2020	1,000,000
Access to productive employment, decent work, and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated in Somalia (SOM 101 – P&B 2018-19)	Somalia	12/2017 – 12/2019	864,160
Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments (SLE 107 –P&B 2018-19)	Sierra Leone	11/2017 – 12/2019	1,000,000
Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic (CAF 106 P&B 2018-19)	Central African Republic	10/2017 – 12/2020	1,000,000

The Terms of Reference summarizes the objective of the projects as follows<sup>10</sup>:

The ILO Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018-and 2019 and P&B 2020-21 documents stressed the importance of “creating productive and decent employment for young women and men,

<sup>10</sup> ILO, 2020: Terms of Reference for Independent Final Evaluation of four projects on employment and sustainable enterprises development in Africa, page 5



as well as the promotion of an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and sustainable enterprises, in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in fragile states contexts." Those are important work areas for ILO in Africa.

"ILO have implemented several projects towards results in these areas since 2018, funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA).

The RBSA funding is an account established based on the voluntary contributions of Member States, in addition to their contributions to the regular budget. It is directed to implementing decent work priorities selected in dialogue with tripartite constituents in Member States.

The projects are focused on the P&B Outcomes on employment promotion and enterprise development. For P&B 2018-19 Outcome 1: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects and Outcome 4: Promoting sustainable enterprises; and for P&B 2020-21 Outcome 3: Economic, social and environmental transitions for full productive and freely chosen employment and decent work for all, specifically Output 3.4. Increased capacity of the ILO constituents to promote peaceful, stable and resilient societies through decent work and Outcome 4: Sustainable enterprises as generators of employment and promoters of innovation and decent work".


The projects had the following characteristics. In the Central African Republic, the project aimed to contribute to the creation of opportunities for young people by addressing the root causes of economic, social and environmental vulnerability, in order to enable the country to break out of the vicious circle of conflicts and disasters by creating decent jobs for vulnerable groups. The project was implemented close to the capital city Bangui due to security considerations.

In Comoros, the ILO implemented the project in the three most vulnerable communes, the islands of Mohéli, Anjouan, and Ngazidza. The ultimate beneficiaries of the project were vulnerable women and men, particularly poor and unemployed young women and men.

In Sierra Leone, the support to the government and social partners was multi-pronged, associating SME interventions with those addressing fragility and building resilience in fragile situations through decent work.

In Somalia, the ILO targeted the government and social partners to strengthen their legal, policy, and institutional capacities. The map below shows the project countries in Africa.

**Figure 2: Project countries in Africa forming part of the cluster evaluation**



Design: A. Engelhardt 02/2021

The following paragraphs describe the projects in more detail.

## **1. Project Employment and integrated local development in Comoros (EILDC (COM102 - P&B 2018-19)**

### **Project results and planned products**

Outcome 1: Institutional capacity building of local institutions, including tripartite constituents, to assess, design and implement employment programs for peace and resilience.

- Output 1.1: Increased awareness of local institutions, tripartite constituents and other key actors on the importance of youth employment for peace and resilience
- Output 1.2: Local institutions and tripartite constituents have improved knowledge and capacities to design, implement and evaluate employment programs.

Outcome 2: Increased decent employment opportunities through investments and entrepreneurship of young vulnerable women and men: Civil society organizations are strengthened to support the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises through business start-up kits for young people and women, and agricultural cooperatives to support to strengthen production capacity, in order to support the national economy and strengthen peace and resilience in the Comoros

- Output 2.1: Development of micro, small and medium-sized cooperatives that create decent jobs and benefit from non-financial and financial support services
- Output 2.2: Launch of new youth and women businesses in social and environmental services

### **Period and target groups**

The project was implemented from January 2018 to December 2020 in three communes of the Comoros (in the islands of Mohéli, Anjouan and Ngazidza). The ultimate beneficiaries of the project are vulnerable women and men, in particular poor and unemployed young women and men.

The government institutions at central and local level, workers and employers organizations as well as civil society organizations are also the direct beneficiaries of the project.

### **Management arrangements**

The project was implemented by a technical management team composed of a National Project Administrator s; and a National Engineer based in Moroni, Comoro.

The project budget is US\$ 1,000,000.

## **2. Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia (SOM 101 – P&B 2018-19)**

### **Objectives and outputs**

Objective 1 To develop policies and programmes to enhance employment generation with particular focus on youth employment

- Output 1.1: Employment policy and strategy for Somalia developed
- Output 1.2: Programs designed and implemented to address youth employment challenges

Objective 2:- To enhance the capacity of Government and social partners in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes

- Output 2.1: Capacity of government and social partners improved to design and implement disaster risk reduction and recovery programs

### **Timeframe and target groups**

The project was implemented from December 2017 to December 2019. The target group included the Government of Somalia and social partners in terms of strengthening their capacities in legal, policy and institutional areas.

### **Project management**

The project was conducted by an international programme manager supported by an international Security Officer and a national Admin/Finance Assistant. .

The project budget was USD 864,160.

## **3. Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour intensive investments (SLE 107 –P&B 2018-19)**

### **Objectives and outputs**

Outcome 1: Enabled environment for sustainable enterprises

- Product 1.1: Assessment report on the state of the environment for sustainable MSMEs in Sierra Leone is available
- Product 1.2: Complementary reforms towards a more conducive environment for sustainable and resilient enterprises are identified and agreed upon in consultation with tripartite partners
- Product 1.3: Embedded technical assistance to the SME Development Agency on the development of a strategy and roadmap for its operationalization

Outcome 2: Improved high quality and continuous non-financial services

- Product 2.1: SMEDA has established hands-on mechanisms to sustain non-financial service provision for women and men-owned MSMEs
- Product 2.2: Sierra Leone has introduced high quality, affordable and suitable entrepreneurship training and business support services including basic in green economy for men and women entrepreneurs
- Product 2.3: MSMEs have received entrepreneurship and skills training as well as post-service delivery support to access finance, markets, sustain their services and promote the Made in Sierra Leone initiative through environmental-friendly practices

Outcome 3: Enhanced access to financial services for MSMEs

- Product 3.1: Financial services providers offer responsible and client centric financial services
- Product 3.2: Entrepreneurs make informed and effective financial decisions and know, understand and use effectively the financial services that are available to them
- Product 3.3: Coordination among financial and non-financial services providers, industry association and regulator is improved through a stringer Sierra Leone Association of Microfinance Institutions (SLAMFI)

Outcome 4: Increased employment opportunities for local enterprises and youth through EIIP

- Product 4.1: Implementing agencies improve their capacity for better contracting with national and local enterprises in employment-intensive approach
- Product 4.2: Enterprises and potential entrepreneurs improves capacity to actively participate in contracting for employment intensive public works
- Product 4.3: Decent working conditions are ensured in the public workers with enhanced awareness
- Product 4.4: Youth contractors are established and capacitated to carry out small infrastructure development and maintenance projects to improve local assets and social and economic services

### **Timeframe and target groups**

The project was implemented from November 2017 to December 2019.

The direct recipient were the government (i.e. those national and local institutions working on SMEs development), employers' and workers' organizations, financial and non-financial service providers, women and men associations from the informal economy, and industry associations academic and other relevant organization. The ultimate beneficiaries were the women and men currently operating or intending to operate MSMEs (i.e. young women and men in the informal economy, rural and .or disaster prone areas.

### **Project management**

The project was conducted by an international programme manager and national program officer.

The project budget was USD 1,000,000.

## **4. Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic (CAF106 P&B 2018-19)**

### **Project results and planned products**

Objective 1 Communities improving their resilience through better access to employment through skills development and employability at the local level.

- Output 1.1. Access to employment information is improved
- Output 1.2. The technical capacities of institutions and members of targeted communities are strengthened

Objective 2 Labour market institutions are strengthened to support the creation of micro-enterprises and youth cooperatives,

- Output 2.1 Micro, small and medium-sized cooperative enterprises that create decent jobs and benefit from non-financial and financial support services are created
- Output 2.2: The institutional and legal framework for the establishment of the health insurance system is defined
- Output 2.3: A social dialogue pact is put in place and operational

Objective 3. The capacities of communities are strengthened to rehabilitate and build infrastructures through labour-based approaches.

- Output 3.1 Public institutions integrate labour-based approaches in the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of their investment programs
- Output 3.2. Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and rural development are carried out

### Period and target groups

The project started in October 2017 and ended in December 2020. The target groups are the constituents of the ILO (governance and employers 'and workers' organizations) and three youth cooperatives from Pk5 and Bimbo3 around Bangui (Coopérative des Artisans Fabriquant de Bricks and Pavers SARA-MBI-GA-ZO, Cooperative of Road Maintenance Building Together, and Cooperative of Building Technicians Union Makes the Strength of Bimbo3 and Pk5).

### Management arrangements

The project was conducted by an international program manager and national program officer.

The project budget was USD 1,000,000.

## 1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope

The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)<sup>11</sup> outline the **evaluation purpose** as follows:

- Assess the extent to which the projects have achieved the stated objectives and expected results while identifying the supporting factors and constraints that have led to them;
- Identify unexpected positive and unexpected results of the projects [SEP]
- Assess the extent to which the projects' outcomes will be sustainable; [SEP]
- Establish the relevance of the project design and implementation strategy in relation to [SEP] the ILO, UN, and the national development frameworks [SEP]
- Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of [SEP] interventions that can be applied further; [SEP]
- Provide recommendations to project stakeholders to promote sustainability and support [SEP] further development of the project outcomes [SEP]

The **scope of the evaluation** is of the four projects as representing ways of working in employment and sustainable enterprises in ILO (vis-à-vis ILO approach expressed in P&Bs 2018-19 and 2020-21)<sup>12</sup>. The evaluation covers the entire period from the start of the

<sup>11</sup> ILO, 2020: Terms of Reference for Independent Final Evaluation of four projects on employment and sustainable enterprises development in Africa, pages 9-10.

<sup>12</sup> Two projects were still formulated during the P&B 2016-17) even though they started end of 2017.

implementation to the end of all four projects and all projects objectives and results, focusing not only on what has been achieved but how and why.

The evaluation has been carried out in adherence with the relevant parts of the ILO Evaluation Framework and Strategy; ILO Policy Guidelines for Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning and Managing for Evaluations and United National Evaluation Group (UNEG) Principles. For all practical purposes, this ToR and ILO Evaluation policies and guidelines define the overall scope of this evaluation. Recommendations emerging from the evaluation should be strongly linked to the evaluation findings and should provide clear guidance to stakeholders on how they can address them.

The evaluation integrates gender equality and non-discrimination as a crosscutting concern throughout its deliverables and process, with particular attention to women workers. It should be addressed in line with EVAL guidance note n° 4 and Guidance Note n° 7 to ensure stakeholder participation. Furthermore, it pays attention to issues related to social dialogue, international labour standards, and fair environmental transition. Moreover, the impact of the COVID19 on the completion of the project is taken into account.

**Evaluation clients:**

The primary clients of the evaluation are the ILO constituents and ILO Country Offices and relevant Decent Work Country Teams (DWT) and headquarters (HQ) Departments in Geneva.

**Management and implementation:**

The evaluation manager for this evaluation is Mr. Ricardo Fuhrman, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for the ILO Regional Office for Africa.

Dr. Achim Engelhardt, an independent evaluation consultant, lead the evaluation, with no prior engagement neither in the design nor implementation of the projects.<sup>13</sup> National evaluators supported him in Comoros, Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone.

The evaluation started on 1 February 2021 with a scoping meeting between the evaluation manager and the team leader and the contract was signed on 5 February 2021. On 12 February, the team leader delivered the inception report, followed by a detailed document review. In March, April and early May, data collection took place in challenging circumstances. Following the data analysis throughout the month of May, the draft report was delivered by the 29 May 2021. After a longer feedback period, the final report is due on 6 August 2021.

### 1.3 Evaluation criteria

According to the ToR for this evaluation, the team leader used the following evaluation criteria: i) relevance and strategic fit, ii) validity of design, iii) project results and effectiveness, iv) efficiency of resource use, v) effectiveness of management arrangements, vi) Impact orientation and vii) progress towards sustainability.

### 1.4 Evaluation questions

The evaluation answered the following 28 evaluation questions:

**Relevance and strategic fit**

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<sup>13</sup> Geneva-based Monitoring and evaluation specialist with expertise in supporting the ILO in M&E-related work since 2006. [www-lotus-group.org](http://www-lotus-group.org)

1. Are the projects relevant to the achievements of the government's strategy, policy and plan, the DWCPs as well as other relevant regional and global commitments such as the UNDAF, SDGs targets and ILOs strategic Objectives (Programme & Budget 2018-19 and 2020-21 as applicable)?
2. Are the projects relevant to the felt needs of the beneficiaries regarding, among others, on a conducive employment environment (including job creation and self-employment and sustainable enterprises)?
3. How well the projects complement and fit with other ongoing or forthcoming ILO programmes and projects in the country.
4. What links are established so far with other activities of the UN or non-UN international development aid organizations at local level and/ or Government partners?

#### **Validity of design**

5. Do the projects have a clear theory of change that outlines the causality?
6. Have the projects design clearly defined achievable outcomes and outputs?
7. Have the projects planning included a useful monitoring and evaluation framework including outcomes indicators with baselines and targets?
8. Did the projects design include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?
9. Were the implementation approaches valid and realistic? Have the projects adequately taken into account the risks of blockage?
10. Have the projects addressed gender and disability inclusion, and of other vulnerable groups, related issues in the project document?
11. Have the projects integrate the International labour standards application?
12. Were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design and implementation of the projects, including working through social dialogue?

#### **Project results and effectiveness**

13. To what extent have the projects achieved their results at outcome and output levels, with particular attention to the project objectives?
14. What, if any, unintended results of the projects have been identified or perceived?
15. What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects' success in attaining their targets?
16. Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the project's result areas?
17. To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness and how the projects have addressed this influence?
18. Do the (adapted) intervention models used in the projects suggest an intervention model for similar crisis response?

#### **Efficiency of resource use**

19. How efficiently have resources (human resources, time, expertise, funds etc.) been allocated and used to provide the necessary support and to achieve the broader projects objectives?
20. To what extent have the disbursements and projects expenditures been in line with expected budgetary plans? Why?

#### **Effectiveness of management arrangements**

21. Have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all

- parties involved into implementation and monitoring?
22. Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?
  23. Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the project?
  24. Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?

#### **Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability**

25. To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries?
26. To what extent are planned results of the project likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?
27. What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?
28. Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO projects support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic

This evaluation complied with UN norms and standards for evaluation<sup>14</sup> and ensured that ethical safeguards concerning the independence of the evaluation were followed<sup>15</sup>.

### **1.5 Evaluation methodology and approach**

The evaluation team used a **theory-based evaluation approach** for this final cluster evaluation.

The cluster evaluation corresponds to a thematic cluster evaluation under an RBSA funding arrangement. According to the ILO's guidance note on Clustered Evaluations, this cluster evaluation type has a strong focus on learning about innovative project implementation approaches (2020).

The four projects were independently designed and implemented and the cluster approach was taken for the ex-post evaluation. As such, the four projects lack a common results-based framework or explicit common theory of change<sup>16</sup>. However, three of the projects benefit from a common outcome, "More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects." Those are the employment-oriented projects in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Somalia. Only the sustainable enterprise project in Sierra Leone seems less connected to the main cluster, with its outcome concerning "Reforms of business environment that contribute to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises."<sup>17</sup> The evaluation addressed this issue by considering sustainable enterprises also as a way of generating employment.

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<sup>14</sup> UN Evaluation Group Norms and Standards (2016): <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914>

<sup>15</sup> UN Evaluation Group code of conduct (2008): <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100>

<sup>16</sup> Critical enabling conditions for good cluster evaluation in the ILO according to the Guidance Note 3.3 on Clustered Evaluations

<sup>17</sup> With the objective "To increase employment creation and opportunities through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour-intensive infrastructure development".



As such, the three employment projects correspond well to the ILO's definition of a cluster evaluation due to the common thematic and results focus: *"An envelope of evaluations of projects combined into a single evaluation based on results or strategic, thematic or geographical area or scope."*<sup>18</sup>. The evaluation uses similar evaluation questions in the evaluation questionnaires for the four projects to allow for comparability. As expected, the main differences show when enquiring about the results of specific project outputs.

Given the large number of evaluation questions listed in the ToR, the team leader abstained from adding further questions specific to the cluster approach. As the projects were not designed under an overarching common programmatic framework, any cluster-specific evaluation questions concerning the project design or implementation seem less relevant. However, the analysis assessed to what extent the projects responded to the ILO P&B outcomes as the umbrella. This assessment contributed to the reflection about how to align better the work with common P&B outcomes through RBSA projects.

The comparability of evaluation questions in the primary data collection tools is crucial for the data analysis of the cluster. The evaluation assessed the projects in the four countries concerning the environment for employment in all forms (from youth to women and men, and from self-employment to government and private sector with a role for sustainable enterprises in the four countries).

The suggested approach addressed the expected time-lag of the projects' activities contributing to employment and sustainable enterprise development in Africa. This approach was particularly important, given that the projects in the Central African Republic and Comoros have ended on 31 December 2020 and the project in Somalia on 31 December 2019.

#### **Added value**

The added value of theory-based evaluation was that it further elaborated on the assumptions behind the cluster and linkages between outputs, outcomes, and impact, including indicators. The situation analysis also identified barriers to achieving change in employment and sustainable enterprise development. The approach included analyzing the clusters' response (activities and outputs) to the problem followed by a results analysis."<sup>19</sup>

#### **Data collection and analysis**

Figure 3 summarizes the evaluation process, including the use of data collection tools. The team leader could not use an online survey for beneficiaries, which had been designed for this evaluation, due to challenges in accessing beneficiaries and the limited literacy of many trainees. Gender was included in the data collection by targeting women groups through focus group discussions and by encouraging the participation of women during the evaluation process.

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<sup>18</sup> ILO, 2020: Guidance Note 3.3. Clustered Evaluations

<sup>19</sup> Ibid pages 16-17.

Figure 3: Evaluation process and tools used



Design: A. Engelhardt 04/2021

In total, the team leader and national evaluators interviewed 208 stakeholders through telephone interviews, personal interviews, and, in two countries, focus group discussions (Sierra Leone, Central African Republic). 48,7% of interviewees were women and 51,3% men<sup>20</sup>.

For Somalia, the team leader undertook telephone interviews with tripartite constituents. For all four countries, the team leader was responsible for all interviews with ILO staff, including the CTAs.

In the Central African Republic, the locally based evaluator undertook telephone interviews with key national stakeholders. For the outreach to the communities, travel restrictions applied, and the locally based evaluator identified and engaged resource persons close to the communities to undertake the primary data collection in the course of one week.

In Sierra Leone, the locally based evaluator undertook telephone interviews with key national stakeholders, actively supported by the ILO CTA who continuously had to facilitate contacts in the country, given the limited interest of many stakeholders to participate in the evaluation. He undertook two half-day site visits for primary data collection in the norther part of the country.

In Comoros, the locally based evaluator was refrained from site visits. Hence all interviews took place remotely, including the ones in project sites.

### Sampling

The evaluation covered all four countries benefitting from the evaluated projects.

The evaluation aimed to sample project sites based on the "most significant" change approach, i.e., where the ILO left the most profound footprint, which was operationalized in Sierra Leone only due to COVID-19 related travel restrictions for national evaluations in the other countries. The sampling was accomplished through engaging former projects CTAs. This approach was particularly relevant, as the project in Sierra Leone ended 18 months ago (December 2019). Memory recall was strongest where the project results were most significant. The evaluation also captured less successful project components to the extent

<sup>20</sup> The breakdown pr country is as follows: Central African Republic 36% women (51 out of 142), 64% men (91 out of 142); Comoros: 11 persons without specification of sex, Sierra Leone: 88% women (15 out of 17), 12% men (2 out of 17), 8 persons without specification of sex; Somalia: 100% men (4 out of 4).

possible under the memory recall approach ("least significant change"). This allowed learning also from challenges and how to do things differently in the future (Sierra Leone). In the Central African Republic, all three cooperatives were covered through focus group meetings and key informant interviews. In Sierra Leone two communities were sampled in the north of the country based on the most significant change approach. In Comoros, beneficiaries were selected based on stratified random sampling. For Somalia, all tripartite constituents were interviewed.

## 1.6 Limitations

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, travel and meeting restrictions applied in Switzerland and across the globe, consequently, the team leader undertook this evaluation remotely, without field visits.

Locally based evaluators in Comoros, the Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone formed part of the evaluation team to undertake primary data collection in the project countries. Their deployment for face-to-face interviews in capital cities and project site visits was only possible in Sierra Leone due to the local ILO offices' COVID-19 restrictions. Telephone interviews mitigated this shortcoming in capital cities. In field locations in the Central African Republic national evaluators identified community facilitators for primary data collection, while for Comoros, the national evaluator used telephone interviews for the outreach to stakeholders and beneficiaries.

For Somalia, the evaluation ToR foresaw remote primary data collection due to practical reasons, as the evaluation focuses on the policy level with stakeholders in Mogadishu.

The evaluation faced the limitation that three out of the four project managers were not in post any longer at the beginning of the evaluation, with the fourth one finishing his assignment for the ILO in the course of the evaluation. This fact challenged the direct access to the projects' institutional memory, including stakeholder lists and project documentation. The team leader mitigated this limitation through engagement with previous project managers while still in position in late December 2020, before starting the contract and through contacting ILO officers in charge for the countries included.

Overall, the evaluation approach taken in the COVID-19 context affected the reach of projects' beneficiaries in Comoros and the quality of data collection through enumerators in the Central African Republic. In an ideal scenario, the team leader would have travelled to the project countries to brief the locally based evaluators in person, undertake pilot interviews to test the questionnaires and train enumerators for community-based data collection.

However, the use of national evaluators' networks supported the data collection and mitigated the challenges listed above. As such, the validity of evaluation findings is given.

## Findings and conclusions

### 2. Reconstructed project Theory of Change

The evaluation used the available projects' documentation and reconstructed the cluster's intervention logic, the "theory of change," as presented in **Error! Reference source not found.** 9

The reconstructed Theory of Change of the cluster contains the following elements:

- Formulation of the main problems
- Outputs (short-term results) and related assumptions
- Barriers to moving from outputs to outcomes (medium-term results), which are beyond the control of the cluster
- Outcomes and related assumptions
- Impact statement (long-term results)
- Linkages to external drivers of change catalyzing the achievement of the impact

The cluster addressed the following underlying shortcomings concerning: i) employment opportunities, especially for youth; ii) economic marginalization of vulnerable groups; iii) perspectives especially for at-risk youth; iv) Mismatch between the education system and labour market's skills needs; v) access to vocational training.

The Theory of Change analysis shows that at the goal level, the cluster contributes to the promotion of social justice through the Decent Work Agenda, which constitutes the ILO's mission. At the outcome level, the cluster is aligned to the ILO's Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018 – 2019, outcome 1 and P&B 2020-2021, outcome 4, as expressed in section 2.4.

For the cluster to achieve the outcome of creating more and better jobs, two main assumptions need to hold. A favourable security situation in the fragile implementation countries and the leveraging of additional funding to catalyse the results achieved through RBSA seed funding. This process comprises the transition of short-term job creation through employment-intensive employment to longer-term employment opportunities. The latter requires careful management of stakeholder expectations.

The cluster faced barriers that were outside the remit of the RBSA projects but which required consideration for the implementation. The main barriers were the chronic political and institutional instability in the cluster countries, the fragile security situation, and social norms marginalizing women from participation in the labour market in specific sectors.

Section 4.1 analysis the validity of the clusters' Theory of Change.

### 3. Relevance: were the projects doing the right thing to achieve ILO objectives for employment and sustainable enterprises?

This section assesses the relevance using the following sub-criteria: i) alignment to governments' strategies, policies, and plans; ii) UNDAF/UNSDCF and SDG targets; iii) Decent Work Country Programmes; iv) ILO strategic objectives; v) beneficiary needs; vi) complementing ILO country portfolio, and vii) partnerships. The document review and interviews were the main sources of evidence.

**Key findings: The cluster evaluation finds that the cluster was highly relevant in post-conflict countries where the ILO is less present and lacking employment opportunities, particularly for rural youth and women**

- The document review shows that the cluster is closely aligned with national strategies and policies.
- The cluster is aligned to UNDAF's or related UN frameworks. The strongest contribution to the Agenda 2030 and its SDGs shows for SDG 4, target 4.4 (skills) and SDG 8, targets 8.5 (employment) and 8.6 (youth unemployment).
- The cluster contributed to the DWCPs, its drafts, or previous versions in all countries, including priorities such as employment-intensive works (Comoros), employment for youth and vulnerable groups and social dialogue (Central African Republic), enabling environment (Somalia), and public and private investment (Sierra Leone).
- The cluster is closely aligned to the ILO's Strategic Objectives: P&B 2018 – 2019 (outcomes 1 and 4) and P&B 2020-2021 (outcomes 3 and 4).
- RBSA-funded projects are particularly relevant in meeting cluster beneficiaries' needs. This finding is particularly evident, given the limited comprehensiveness of ILO project portfolios in the respective countries admit desolate post-conflict environments with very few employment opportunities.
- The cluster built on partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees, failing to systematically include ACTRAV and ACTEMP during the RBSA project design.

#### 3.1 Alignment to governments' strategies, policies, and plans

The document review shows that the projects are largely aligned to national strategies and policies. All four project documents refer to respective national planning documentation, with comprehensive details showing for most countries<sup>21</sup>. In Somalia, where “state building” was still on-going when the RBSA project was designed, available national planning documentation was scarcer and subsequently references less ample. In Comoros, the absence of a minimum salary challenged the alignment of the RBSA project with the implementation of government

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<sup>21</sup> République Centrafricaine, 2016 : Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix 2017 -2021  
République Centrafricaine, 2016 : Politique Nationale de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle (PNEFP)  
Union des Comores, 2014 : Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable (SCA2D) 2015-2019  
Union des Comores, 2015 : Stratégie de développement de la Formation Technique et Professionnelle aux Comores 2014 – 2019  
Government of Sierra Leone, 2015: National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone  
Government of Sierra Leone, 2012: Agenda for Prosperity 2013-2018

plans. Figure 4 summarizes the alignment of the RBSA cluster with them main national planning priorities.

**Figure 4: Alignment of RBSA cluster to national priorities**

RBSA project country	Sources of National strategies/policies and alignment	Assessment
Central African Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Khartoum peace agreement (signed 02/ 2019) signed by the President of the Central African Republic and armed groups and guaranteed by the African Union</li> <li>• National Peace Recovery and Consolidation Plan 2017-2021, pillars II (renewing social contract between state and society) and III (recovery of economy and productive sectors)</li> <li>• National Employment and Vocational Training Policy, Annexes 1 and 2 (human resource development and employment)</li> </ul>	☑
Comoros	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National strategy for accelerated growth and sustainable development (2015-2019), pillar 3, employment promotion</li> <li>• Emergency Plan for youth employment</li> <li>• Strategy for the development of Technical and Vocational Training in the Comoros 2014-2019, pillar 1: access and equity</li> </ul>	☑
Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Ebola Recovery Strategy 2015-2017, labour, youth employment, and SME focus</li> <li>• Agenda for Prosperity 2013-2018, pillar 5: labour and employment</li> <li>• Vision 2035</li> </ul>	☑
Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Development Plan, Chapter 7.6 Labor and employment sector</li> </ul>	☑

### 3.2 UNDAF and SDG targets

The evaluation’s document review also provides evidence that the cluster is aligned to UNDAF’s or related UN frameworks of the respective countries<sup>22</sup>, as presented in Figure 5

**Figure 5: Alignment of RBSA cluster to national priorities**

RBSA project country	Sources and UNDAF alignment	Assessment
Central African Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDAF+ (2018-2021) : <i>(i) Consolidation of Peace, Security and Social Cohesion, (ii) Social Welfare and Equity, (iii) Sustainable Economic Recovery.</i></li> </ul>	☑
Comoros	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDAF 2015-2021 Acceleration of structural economic transformation</li> </ul>	☑
Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDAF 2015-2018 Pillar 5: Labour and employment</li> </ul>	☑
Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Strategic Framework 2017-2020: <i>STRATEGIC PRIORITY 5: Supporting socio-economic opportunities for Somalis, leading to meaningful poverty reduction, access to basic social services, and sustainable, inclusive, and equitable development.</i></li> </ul>	☑

The alignment to SDGs is also given. The cluster's strongest contribution to the Agenda 2030 and its SDGs shows for SDG 4, target 4.4, and SDG 8, targets 8.5 and 8.6. The box below provides further details.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, 2017: UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020

Nations Unies, 2014: Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l’Aide au Développement en Union des Comores 2015-2021

**SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.**

**Indicator**

4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs, and entrepreneurship.

**SDG 8 Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all.**

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value.

8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education, or training.

### 3.3 Decent Work Country Programmes

Only two of the four countries had a DWCP in place at the time of project implementation. Comoros 2015-19 DWCP and Central African Republic 2017-2021. In Sierra Leone, the post-2012 DWCP was under development, and the 2017-2019 DWCP in Somalia was still in draft form. However, the document review showed that the cluster contributed to the DWCPs, its drafts, or previous versions in all countries.

The RBSA-funded project in Comoros directly contributes to one out of the two thematic DWCP priorities: Employment governance and promotion,<sup>23</sup> particularly to address youth and women unemployment with specific reference to the employment-intensive works, which formed part of the RBSA-funded project design.

In the Central African Republic, the RBSA-funded project contributed to two DWCP priorities<sup>24</sup>, namely: (i) Promoting decent work for men and women, particularly young people and vulnerable groups, and (ii) Strengthening the institutions of social dialogue to improve the practice of tripartism and application of international labor standards.

In Somalia, the draft DWCP<sup>25</sup> contained the promotion of employment creation through enabling environment, inclusive and job-rich growth, and competitive enterprises as a priority.

In Sierra Leone, the RBSA-funded project contributed to the 2010-2012 DWCP under priority 1, "Public and private investment generate substantial and growth demand for labour and income."<sup>26</sup>

Also, the cluster is aligned to the ILO's Jobs for Peace and Resilience (JPR) Flagship programme, implemented since 2016, by providing "direct and immediate job creation and income security through employment intensive investments", one out of the programme's four key objectives.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> BIT/Gouvernement de la Union des Comores: Programme Pays pour le Travail Décent 2015 – 2019 – Union des Comores

<sup>24</sup> BIT/ Gouvernement de Programme pays pour la promotion du Travail Décent en République Centrafricaine 2017 – 2021

<sup>25</sup> ILO/Government of Somalia, 2016: Decent Work Country Programme Somalia 2017 - 2019

<sup>26</sup> ILO/Government of Sierra Leone, 2009: Decent Work Country Programme Sierra Leone (2010-2012)

<sup>27</sup> ILO, 2020: Jobs for Peace and Resilience. An ILO flagship programme. Key facts and figures.

### 3.4 ILO Strategic Objectives (P&B 2018-2019 and 2020-2021)

The cluster is closely aligned to the ILO's Strategic Objectives. For the ILO's Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018 – 2019, the cluster contributes to outcome 1, "More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects."<sup>28</sup> . In fact, the three employment projects share this outcome as their project goal. The business environment project in Sierra Leone contributes to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises, as also stated under P&B's outcome 1<sup>29</sup>.

The contribution shows to indicator 1.4: "Number of member States in which constituents have strengthened capacities on pre-employment macroeconomic policies, or have developed and implemented sectoral, industrial, trade, infrastructure investment or environmental policies for structural transformation and promoting more and better jobs and tackling inequalities."

The link to the following additional indicator is given: Indicator 1.4: 'Number of member States in which constituents have strengthened capacities on pro-employment macroeconomic policies, or have developed and implemented sectoral, industrial, trade, infrastructure investment or environmental policies for structural transformation and for promoting more and better jobs and tackling inequalities'

For the RBSA project in Sierra Leone, the relevant P&B indicator 4.1 applies: "Number of member States that have formulated or adopted reforms of the business environment that contribute to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises"

The additional link to Indicator 4.2 shows: "Number of member States in which effective interventions to directly assist sustainable enterprises as well as potential entrepreneurs have been designed and implemented".

Concerning the 2020-2021 P&B, the cluster contributes to outcome 3, "[Economic, social and environmental transitions for full, productive and freely chosen employment and decent work for all](#)". The cluster contributes to the output indicator 3.2.1. "Number of member States with measures for decent work in rural areas".

The evaluation also finds a contribution to outcome 4, "Sustainable enterprises as generators of employment and promoters of innovation and decent work."<sup>30</sup>. The evaluation finds a contribution to the following two indicators: 4.1.1 "Number of member States with a strategy and/or action plan to improve the enabling environment for sustainable enterprises' creation and growth".

4.2.1. "Number of member States with effective interventions to support productivity, entrepreneurship, innovation and enterprise sustainability".

### 3.5 Beneficiary needs

The evaluation finds that the RBSA-funded projects are particularly relevant in meeting cluster beneficiaries' needs, given the limited comprehensiveness of ILO project portfolios in the respective countries. The latter is further specified in the following section (2.6).

For example, in the Central African Republic and Comoros, the respective governments had negotiated RBSA-funded projects with the ILO for many years to meet the dire needs of

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<sup>28</sup> ILO, 2017: Programme and Budget for the biennium 2018-19

<sup>29</sup> Additional contribution shows for Sierra Leone to outcome 4 on promoting sustainable enterprises.

<sup>30</sup> ILO, 2019: Programme and Budget for the biennium 2020-21



vulnerable populations, particularly rural youth and women. The same applies to the war-torn populations of Somalia and Sierra Leone. Employment opportunities were scarce across the cluster, and vulnerable populations in desperate need of ILO support.

In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project benefitted from a needs assessment of the government's SME development agency (SMEDA) and the signature of an MoU before the RBSA funding opportunity.

The following paragraph provides insights into beneficiary needs. In Somalia, unemployment rates reached at the time of project design 59%<sup>31</sup>. In Comoros, 40% of children drop out of primary education and 40% out of secondary education<sup>32</sup>, seriously jeopardizing employment prospects. In Sierra Leone, the informal sector comprised 70% of the economy<sup>33</sup>, stripping employees of any sort of social protection in a fragile overall employment situation following the devastating Ebola outbreak. In the Central African Republic<sup>34</sup>, 60% of persons without formal education are women. The weak education levels among women further challenge their access to formal employment in a country where 25% of the population was internally displaced at the time of the project design.

The evaluation reiterates that in desolate post-conflict environments with very few opportunities, the beneficiaries' needs to access employment was very high.

### 3.6 Complementing ILO country portfolio

At the time of the design of the clustered projects, the ILO managed only a small active project portfolio in Somalia (2 projects) and Sierra Leone (1 project). One of those projects showed a direct relevance for the RBSA funded project cluster.<sup>35</sup>, the Youth Employment Program for Somalia.

As such, the RBSA projects aimed to develop a country portfolio in the respective countries, using the investments as seed funding. Depending on the realism of project design, the validity of RBSA funding as seed funds varied, as shown in the quotes below and section 3 of this report.

"After many years of absence from the country, the RBSA project in Somalia aimed to create the groundwork for an ILO country portfolio, catching up with other UN agencies which were already back on the ground."

"The RBSA project was central to set the stage for the ILO's work in the country [Somalia]. This would never have been possible without RBSA funding".

"The RBSA project in the Central African Republic served as a pilot project. However, funding was insufficient to create a wider project portfolio, and more seed funding would be required".

**Sources: project stakeholders**

In Somalia, the RBSA project document constituted the strategic reference for re-establishing the ILO's country presence, including its role in the UN Country Team (UNCT).

<sup>31</sup> ILO, 2016 VF Prodoc RBSA EDLIC Comoros. Proposal

<sup>32</sup> ILO, 2017: SOM101 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

<sup>33</sup> ILO, 2017: SLE 107 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

<sup>34</sup> ILO, 2017: CAF 106 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

<sup>35</sup> A less direct link sows for the project in Sierra Leone (Global Programme Employment Injury Insurance and Protection (Enterprises) and the Joint Programme on Local Government service Delivery (JPLG) in Somalia.

### 3.7 Partnerships

The projects worked with existing or new developed partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees.

#### **Internal ILO cooperation**

This cluster constituted by government demand-driven projects involved tripartite constituents in the project design, for example, through ILO ACTEMP and ACTRAV in the project design phase. Interviews with ACTEMP and ACTRAV staff revealed that the involvement mainly was procedural as part of the project design rather than genuinely engaging. Comments were either disregarded or the involvement used to “tick boxes” for the approval of the project design. The reasons for this omission are multilayered and include time pressures to get the RBSA project approved, project designs that put uneven emphasis on either ACTEMP and ACTRAV issues and a lack of fully appreciating the benefits of an in-depth consultation process during project design.

The lack of involvement of ACTRAV in Comoros or ACTEMP in the Central African Republic are examples of missed opportunities for engaging the ILO’s main link with the constituents (workers and employers organizations).

An exception emerges in Somalia, where the RBSA Project worked closely with ACTRAV and ACTEMP Specialists. The ACTRAV Specialist was fully engaged in designing a standalone project for the capacity development of Trade Unions in Somalia. The ACTRAV Specialist visited Mogadishu several times to conduct training courses and meetings with Trade Union leadership. The ACTEMP Specialist also visited Mogadishu to help identify the most representative Employers’ Organization in Somalia. The RBSA Project continued to work with ACTEMP Specialist to design a capacity development framework for Employers’ Organization (Somali Chamber of Commerce & Industries – SCCI). However, due to the closure of the RBSA project, time did not allow to implement any significant, meaningful capacity development activity for Employers.

The cluster also showed weaknesses in engaging ILO regional gender specialists, as evidenced in at least two countries. The reasons for the better involvement of gender specialists at least in Somalia were due to project designers’ professional interest in the topic, which, however, should always be given.

#### **Constituents’ involvement**

Concerning constituents’ involvement in the project design at the country level, a good practice showed in Sierra Leone where constituents were engaged in designing employment-related activities before the RBSA project, including a needs assessment. Based on this joint engagement, the partners contributed to the subsequent RBSA project design.

In Somalia, the RBSA project had to identify workers and employers representatives as part of starting the project implementation, following the ILO’s reengagement in the country.

In Comoros, the association of employees and the Ministry of Employment complained that they were not consulted enough in the decision making of some activities, despite the set-up of a joint project committee.

The evaluation found that in the Central African Republic, tripartite constituents participated in the project launch. Tripartite representatives also participated in the project steering committee, with employers benefitting less due to internal capacity issues.

### Partnerships with UN sister agencies

The evaluation found strong partnerships with other UN sister agencies, for example, in the Central African Republic. The RBSA project cooperated with an Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) project on rural youth capacity building to the extent that the FAO shared office space with the ILO and provided transportation to ILO project staff through a cost-sharing arrangement.

In Sierra Leone the project had a strong partnership with other UN agencies such as FAO. In fact, the RBSA project was housed in FAO Offices also in Sierra Leone. The inter agency collaboration was found to be the most useful way forward in Sierra Leone where there is not country office. The agencies (ILO, FAO and IOM) benefited from each other specialized competencies and also complemented each other. This engagement set the stage for more future inter agency collaboration.

“RBSA projects do not allow for the purchase of vehicles. We were lucky [in the Central African Republic] to have access to the FAO project vehicle to visit communities. The only downside was our lack of visibility, as communities thought we came from the FAO rather than ILO”.

**Source: project stakeholder**

In Somalia, the following partnerships were forged with UN sister agencies:

1. ILO-UNICEF-WFP jointly supported Social Protection Policy for Somalia (adopted by Federal Cabinet in early 2019). They jointly applied for a Funding Opportunity from the UN's 'Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF)' through a global competitive process and successfully mobilized funding for a joint project.
2. ILO-UNIDO-FAO jointly developed a 'Private Sector Development Project (PSDP)' and were able to mobilize funding from Italian Cooperation.
3. ILO-UN Women jointly worked on Women Economic Empowerment and designed joint activities for promoting women's entrepreneurship.

In addition, RBSA Project strengthened previously existing partnerships with UN Agencies around the 'Youth Employment Programme' and 'Local Governance' Projects.

Other partnerships identified in the evaluation concern the World Bank, German Development Bank (KfW), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the European Union (EU) in Sierra Leone.

In Somalia, among major development partners, the RBSA project strengthened the collaboration with KfW, the German International Cooperation (GIZ) on skills development, the World Bank and EU on social protection and the Italian Cooperation on trade unions, cooperatives, and private sector development.

In the Central African Republic, the project cooperated with the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and the Central African Agency for Professional Formation. The above-mentioned cooperation took place in terms of information exchange or, in the case of the Central African Agency for Professional Formation, due to active engagement in the project implementation process.

The evaluation found that the engagement with partners did not always fulfill the expectations of ILO. While in the Central African Republic, for example, the cooperation with FAO was successful due to shared facilities and project sites, the RBSA project struggled to

influence the French Agency for Development Cooperation and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to integrate the labour intense approach into their development programming. The same applies to the government, despite the significant appreciation of the labour intense approach, as shown in the quote below. Reasons for those shortcomings are related to the limited visibility of the project in the donor community.<sup>36</sup> Besides, the lack of in country ILO presence, with inadequate representation in the UNCT influenced the ILO's leverage in the country.

“When fencing work of Bangui airport was due, there was a real opportunity to upscale the labour intense approach, even to engage some of the project’s newly created cooperatives. However, soon we saw very few workers with heavy equipment doing the job”.

**Source: project stakeholder**

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<sup>36</sup> due to its moderate budget size, short duration and use of FAO premises and FAO transportation.

## 4. Validity of project designs: is the cluster's theory of change holding?

The purpose of this section is to assess the validity of the projects' design and the cluster's theory of change. Following the ToR, the evaluation used the following sub-criteria: i) clarity and quality of the theory of change; ii) M&E frameworks; iii) exit strategy; iv) validity and realism of implementation approaches; v) gender, disability, and ethical groups; vi) International Labour Standards; vii) Tripartite constituents' role. The primary data sources were the document review and interviews.

**Key findings: The project designs are patchy, lack key elements (M&E, exit strategy), while gender and international labour standards were well-reflected. The reconstructed theory of change for the cluster reveals significant shortcomings in the realism of project designs.**

- The cluster did not have a solid intervention logic . The reconstructed theory shows shortcomings in the results chain and many assumptions not holding;
- The cluster omitted an M&E framework. The project designs of the RBSA projects were “M&E blind”;
- The evaluation finds that the cluster lacked an explicit exit strategy;
- The validity and realism of implementation approaches were uneven across the cluster;
- Concerning the ILO's peace and resilience programming, RBSA is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on this topic. During implementation, two projects (in Comoros and Sierra Leone) diverged from original peace and resilience programming objectives;
- The cluster comprehensively considered gender in the project design and implementation, while disability was practically absent;
- The cluster upheld the International Labour Standards such as Occupational Health and Safety;
- The role of tripartite constituents in the design and implementation of the cluster was uneven while fair transition to environment was absent

### 4.1 Clarity and quality of theory of change, including results chain

The evaluation found that the projects did not have a solid intervention logic. In fact, the project documents were relatively generic and linked activities and outputs to the respective ILO P&Bs (2018-2019 and 2020-2021) with high-level results. As such, the projects did not show a robust results chain with a “missing middle” where the transfer of activities and outputs to the impact level remains unclear. Linking two-year projects with modest budgets to those high-level outcomes and requiring partnership creation and at times institution building seem rather unrealistic and most of the project's key assumptions did not hold. The reasons for the suboptimal project design seem to be related to insufficient quality control in the design and approval process, which should have put particular emphasis on assessing the project assumptions.

The evaluator reconstructed the Theory of Change for the cluster below, trying to accommodate commonalities across the four projects.

**Problem analysis:** The project documents analysis showed that the cluster addressed the following underlying shortcomings concerning: i) employment opportunities, especially for youth; ii) economic marginalization of vulnerable groups; iii) perspectives especially for at-risk youth; iv) Mismatch between the education system and labour market's skills needs; v) access to vocational training.

**Results path:** The Theory of Change analysis shows that at the goal level, the cluster contributes to the promotion of social justice through the Decent Work Agenda, which constitutes the ILO's mission. At the outcome level, the cluster is aligned to the ILO's Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018 – 2019, outcomes 1 and 4 and P&B 2020-2021, outcomes 3 and 4, as expressed in section 2.4.

At the output level, the cluster contributes to the cluster outcome considering country contexts, with projects in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Sierra Leone taking an employment-intensive approach. In Somalia, work on the enabling environment, youth employment programming, and disaster risk reduction capacities aimed to contribute to employment creation.

Peace and conciliation were the entry points of the RBSA project in the Central African Republic. As in the case of Sierra Leone, a very comprehensive and overly ambitious project design shows. The outputs included access to information, capacity building, the creation of MSMEs and cooperatives, access to business development, including access to finance, work at the policy level (social protection policy), the institutionalization of the employment-intensive approach, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. The letter included the Workers Federation's Job Centre (Bourse du travail) in the capital city Bangui. The reasons for the overambitious project design lacking realisms for a US\$ 1m project with a two-year timeframe could be found in the many years the government of the Central African Republic demanded ILO support without success while support needs exponentially increased in the civil war-torn country. As soon as the opportunity for a project arrived, the government aimed to address as many issues with one project as possible. The ILO failed in the challenging task to manage government expectations during the project design.

In Comoros, the project benefitted from a focused design on youth awareness-raising, the creation of youth-led business, strengthening constituent's capacities in employment for peace and reconciliation, and employment-intensive programming, for example, in the agriculture sector.

In Comoros and Sierra Leone, the original peace and conciliation approach of the two RBSA projects was diluted during project implementation. This development was due to governments' preference in selecting project sites in Comoros and the project team's approach to project implementation in Sierra Leone.

In Sierra Leone, a comprehensive approach was taken to support the SME sector, including situation analysis, policy reforms, institutional strengthening, business development support, including access to finance and post-service delivery support. This approach initially counted on government co-financing, which did not materialize while the project design remained unchanged. This fact is impotent to underline, as the RBSA funding modality would have granted the flexibility to adapt the project design accordingly.

The evaluation finds that the projects' outputs contributed to employment creation. However, the project design did not match the budget and timeframe of the RBSA projects in three of the clustered projects (Central African Republic, Comoros and Sierra Leone). As such, the comprehensiveness of outputs' contribution to employment creation suffered. The reasons for the better performance in Somalia was due the circumstances of a "fresh start" in a country where nation building was still nascent and the RBSA project team had a chance to influence government while identifying the relevant employers and workers representatives. In the other countries, the RBSA projects operated in existing but at times very weak institutional structures with overlapping mandates which challenged project implementation.

## Assumptions

**Output to outcome level:** For the cluster to contribute to the outcome of creating more and better jobs, two main assumptions need to hold. A favourable security situation in the fragile implementation countries and the leveraging of additional funding to catalyse the results achieved through RBSA seed funding. This process comprises the transition of short-term job creation through employment-intensive employment to longer-term employment opportunities. The latter requires careful management of stakeholder expectations.

The evaluation finds that the security situation remained stable in Sierra Leone<sup>37</sup> and Comoros<sup>38</sup>. However, it remained very volatile in the Central African Republic during the evaluation process, according to the UN peacekeeping chief and as discussed in the UN Security Council in February 2021.<sup>39</sup> Also, the security situation in Somalia caused concern again, as reported by the United Nations in April 2021, with the country experiencing a political stalemate, "impacting negatively on peace, security, stability, and prosperity in Somalia and beyond."<sup>40</sup> As such, the security situation did not substantially change since the project implementation in the Central African Republic and Somalia.

**Activity to output level:** The main assumptions to achieve cluster outputs are listed by project country, given the country-specific particularities and the individual project designs.

In the **Central African Republic**, the reconstructed theory of change indicates that the security situation is a precondition for the project implementation, as endorsed in stakeholder interviews. Also, national institutions need to have the required capacities and resources to engage in the project, including the follow-up and replication of project results. Finally, youth need to be ready for reconciliation across faiths.

The evaluation showed that youth's readiness for reconciliation was given, despite the previous bitter armed conflict between faith groups. However, in hindsight, the other assumptions did not hold. Due to the challenging security situation, project sites had to be kept close to the capital Bangui. The sustainability of the project results will be strongly determined by the development of the security situation, as stakeholders indicated. Also, the national institutions involved in the project lacked resources to sustain project results, for example, in following-up project-funded training and accompanying trainees.

In **Comoros**, all three main assumptions seem to fail. The government did not follow the ILO's original peace and resilience approach to select project sites and preferred a change of

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<sup>37</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/sierra-leone/safety-and-security>

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/comoros/safety-and-security>

<sup>39</sup> <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085602>

<sup>40</sup> <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1089482>

benefitting communities. Also, the attraction of youth to work in the agriculture sector proved challenging due to the remoteness of cultivable land. Finally, the enabling environment proved to be less mature than expected. Relevant government institutions are struggling to sustain capacity building or to accompany the trainees.

For **Sierra Leone**, the evaluation finds that the main assumptions also seem to fail. First, the government did not provide the required co-financing to implement the ambitious and comprehensively designed RBSA project to address the SME sector holistically. Besides, the election cycle did affect the start of the project, resulting in delays in the project implementation and effectively reducing the implementation time from 24 months to 19 months. Finally, at the time of the final evaluation, it seems uncertain whether the implementation of the revised SME policy can catalyse complementary reforms supporting the SME sector.

In **Somalia**, two out of the three assumptions hold. The RBSA project managed to facilitate re-establishing the ILO office in Mogadishu thanks to very good project management and a hard-working project team. The government eventually welcomed the dialogue with workers' and employers' representatives, following the project team's interventions to facilitate the process. Finally, the project was confronted with workers' and employers' representatives who did not have affiliates and were not physically based in Somalia. As such, the project had to identify alternative interlocutors in the country.

**Barriers:** The cluster faced barriers that were outside the remit of the RBSA projects but which required consideration for the implementation. The main barriers were the chronic political and institutional instability in the cluster countries, the fragile security situation, and social norms marginalizing women from participation in the labour market in specific sectors.

Other barriers concerned low levels of alphabetization, informal employment dominating many locations without social protection, the brain drain or internal displacement, and environmental threats. In the Central African Republic, for example, the drop out rate during primary education is 40%, following by a 40% drop out rate during secondary education<sup>41</sup>. Also, a general mismatch shows between the education systems and labour market's skills needs.

**Drivers of Change:** Factors catalyzing the achievement of cluster results are the availability of an enabling policy environment in most countries (for example, national employment policies) and SDG 4 and SDG 8 calling for skills development and employment, including youth employment.

To summarize, the evaluation finds the following clarity and quality of the project logic per country:

Central African Republic: An overly ambitious project logic shows, where key assumptions did not hold and with the ILO struggling to manage government's expectations when designing the project.

Comoros: The original peace and conciliation approach of the project was diluted during project implementation due to governments' preference in selecting less vulnerable project

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<sup>41</sup> Rapport d'enquête 1-2-3, INSEED/AFDB, 2013



sites with supposedly higher economic prospects. The weak project logic shows, for example, in all main assumptions failing.

Sierra Leone: The comprehensive project approach initially counted on government co-financing, which failed to materialize. However, the project design remained unchanged despite the flexibility in RBSA projects in doing so. The project team's approach to project implementation in Sierra Leone weakened the project's original peace and conciliation approach. The project logic is weak with the main assumptions not holding.

Somalia: The project logic was strong in the RBSA project, with most assumptions holding in a context where the ILO re-engaged in the country, establishing a country office amid a nascent tripartite structure that was still moldable to fully benefit from the ILO's expertise.

## 4.2 M&E frameworks

The cluster did not contain a common M&E framework, as projects were not designed as a cluster. The individual project documents also fail to include specific references to M&E, given the generic nature of the RBSA project document template. This finding coincides with a recent review of RBSA projects in the ILO, which described monitoring and reporting as "inappropriate."<sup>42</sup> References to evaluations did not figure in the project documents. Besides, the project logframes did not systematically contain performance indicators. Where available, the quality of indicators is inadequate, lacking SMART<sup>43</sup> quality criteria, with baselines, or targets missing.

Each project took a different approach to results reporting. In the Central African Republic, the RBSA project undertook systematic activity indicator-based semester reporting using the project's results framework. A complete set of annual activity reports shows in Comoros complemented by an official end of project review. The RBSA project in Sierra Leone reported on main activities, complemented by a final project report, and the project in Somalia produced a final report. The final RBSA project review acknowledged shortcomings in project monitoring, including clarifying roles and responsibilities in Comoros.<sup>44</sup>

The evaluation coincides with views in the ILO stakeholder interviews that overall, RBSA projects have too little results orientation.

## 4.3 Exit strategy

The evaluation finds that the cluster did not benefit from an explicit exit strategy. Implicitly, some, but not all, ILO project managers referred to the logic that RBSA-funded projects would enable, directly or indirectly, seed funding for replicating or upscaling the projects. This was

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<sup>42</sup> ILO/Egger, P., 2020: Review of the RBSA funding modality, page 20.

<sup>43</sup> Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound

<sup>44</sup> Union de Comores/BIT, 2020: Emploi et développement local intégré aux Comores. Revue du Project EDLIC 2018-2020.

accomplished in Sierra Leone (donor interest) and Somalia (strong UNCT engagement by country office and donor interest) but failed in the other two countries of the cluster.

In Comoros, the RBSA established local committees to maintain labour intense works and a network of young entrepreneurs as part of its sustainability strategy. Without appropriate government follow-up, particularly local government, the feasibility of this strategy is challenged.

In the Central African Republic, the project strengthened local institutions. However, those institutions lack the financial means to effectively apply the knowledge transferred through the project.

Overall, the evaluation finds that the concept of the RBSA projects as seed funding instruments is only partly valid and most likely to succeed in countries where the ILO has a country presence with a leadership role in the UNCT or with a strong donor presence<sup>45</sup>.

#### 4.4 Validity and realism of implementation approaches across the cluster

The evaluation assessed the validity of implementation approaches across the cluster-based from two perspectives: a) The RBSA perspective and 2) the human development-peace nexus of the ILO's peace and resilience programming.

From the RBSA perspective, the rules and regulations concerning, for example, the project timeframe were clear across the cluster. However, the realism of project design suffered. In Sierra Leone since the government failed to mobilize co-funding. Also, the project design was rather vague in Comoros, allowing the project manager to define the project further, allowing the government to interfere in the project implementation. Stakeholders indicated that the risk analysis of RBSA project implementation in Comoros was somewhat incomplete.

In the Central African Republic, the risk assessment guided the project to locations where certain UN agencies intervene. However, the ownership of project activities among tripartite constituents was uneven due to institutional instability and capacity issues, which affected the realism of project implementation.

In Somalia, the RBSA project engaged in a context with the absence of most institutional structures.

The size of RBSA funding facilitated implementation approaches. Compared to other RBSA projects of around US\$ 200.000, the budget sizes of these projects between US\$ 900.000 and US\$ 1.000.000 created momentum for ILO initiatives.

Concerning the ILO's peace and resilience programming, RBSA is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on this topic. The suitability of RBSA as a funding source seems to show for countries in protracted crises such as Chad, parts of DRC or Mozambique, Liberia, or South Sudan, as stated by senior ILO stakeholders.

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<sup>45</sup> In 2017, for example, overseas development aid to Comoros was US\$ 66 million, compared to US\$ 1743 million for Somalia. The ODA share in Sierra Leone was 1.2 % between 2010 and 2017 for Africa, compared to 0.7% for the Central African Republic, showing a stronger donor interest in Sierra Leone (Source: OECD, 2019: Development Aid at a glance. Statistics by region. 2. Africa)

Initially, the cluster design fitted strategically with the programming objectives till projects diverged during the implementation in Sierra Leone and Comoros.

#### **4.5 Gender, disability, ethnic groups, and fair transition to environment**

The cluster comprehensively considered gender in the project design and implementation, while disability was practically absent. When enquiring more in-depth about the lack of disability inclusion, ILO stakeholders struggled to find explanations. It seems that this topic was not sufficiently mainstreamed in the ILO at the time of the projects' design, with staff lacking the required awareness.

Issues of vulnerability figured in the projects, focusing on ethnicity in the Central African Republic due to the faith-related nature of the civil unrest.

The cluster addressed gender through gender-specific sector analysis for employment generation when working on policy documents such as the labour code (Somalia) or targeting specifically women for project-related events (all countries). In the Central African Republic, the project envisaged a participation rate of women of at least 30% in project-related events. Besides, project sites were selected considering the participation of women. In Comoros, two women cooperatives were included in the project implementation, with a total of 45% of the workforce for employment-intensive works being women. However, for the training of trainers' activities, only very few women applied.

In Sierra Leone, some project activities were specifically targeted at women in communities.

While regional gender specialists were engaged in the design of the project to varying degrees, the evaluation finds that their involvement was less systematic and suboptimal.

Fair transition to environment was absent from project designs.

#### **4.6 International Labour Standards**

The evaluation finds that the projects upheld International Labour Standards across the cluster, with specific examples showing. In the Central African Republic, the employment-intensive works considered labor standards, putting the young beneficiaries in optimal working conditions (equipment required).

In addition, health and safety in the workplace was a principle fully observed in implementing the project.

In Comoros, the project steering committee followed the tripartite structure to enable social dialogue. Occupational Health and Safety was complied with for the employment-intensive works, like in Sierra Leone, while the project struggled with the lack of a minimum salary in Comoros.

In Somalia, the ILO ensured that the new Labour Code firmly builds on international labour standards. Related activities included i) the first tripartite training course on 'International Labour Standards' and Reporting requirements; ii) support to the Government of Somalia to produce first-ever reports on three ratified ILO Conventions; and iii) support to the Somali National Tripartite Consultative Committee (SNTCC) to review Somalia's 'ratification portfolio'. Subsequently, the Federal Government decided to consider three new ILO Conventions for ratification.

## 4.7 Tripartite constituents' role

**Design:** The role of tripartite constituents in the design of the cluster was uneven. To start with, in Somalia, the RBSA-funded project had to identify the constituents, as both the official workers and employers' organizations turned out to be fictitious. At the same time, the project took time to engage the government to fully appreciate the value of the tripartite approach, given the ILO's longer-term absence from the country. Once the representative organizations for Employers and Workers were identified in Somalia, the RBSA project supported these organizations to "have a place on table" in all relevant policy dialogues and consultations.

In the Central African Republic and Comoros, the respective governments strongly demanded the RBSA-funded projects to address urgent employment needs. While workers and employers' representatives were eventually invited for project activities, the involvement in the project design was less systematic, as stated by ILO sector specialists in DWTs. The reason for involving specific tripartite partners to different degrees is manifold. It includes the perceived strengths of those partners and their capacity to contribute to the project design. Other reasons comprise the professional preferences of the ILO staff designing projects, their network of contacts or previous experiences. The need transpires to systematically involve tripartite constituents in RBSA project design.

The evaluation found that in Sierra Leone, the Employers Federation with its small membership and limited capacities was not involved in the project design. Also, little demand showed from the employers' side, for example, for project components such as the assessment of the business environment.

**Implementation:** The constituents' involvement in project implementation was also patchy, as explained for each country in the paragraphs below. While across the cluster, social partners constituted the project steering committees, their active involvement was intermittent.

In the Central African Republic, the social partners were involved in the implementation, particularly in the component on institutional support (for example, diagnostics of the labor market and specifications of the employment observatory).

In Somalia, the RBSA project revived tripartism and involved social partners, for example, in drafting the Labour Code and established collective bargaining agreements, Mogadishu airport being one example.

However, in Comoros, social partners were engaged in turf battles about their respective mandates, and social dialogue was largely absent. The project's location in government offices caused significant skepticism from other social partners.

In Sierra Leone, the project was strongly government-focused, including for capacity building. Secondary private sector components included involvement in labour-based feeder road maintenance with SME contractors and trainings of the financial institutions and insurance companies in financial inclusion and micro insurance. The weak employer federation was not involved in the project, and to some extent, the project missed the opportunity to

systematically strengthen the social partners still affected by the country's post-conflict situation<sup>46</sup>.

Overall, positive factors affecting the involvement of constituents were clear roles and responsibilities, which were agreed from the onset. Negative factors were a stagnant social dialogue due to distrust between tripartite constituents or weak social partners, which projects failed to strengthen as part of the project.

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<sup>46</sup> This finding is not shared with part of the ILO in Sierra Leone, stressing the strengths of the Federation and its active project engagement, contrary to stakeholder views in the country captured during the evaluation.

## 5. Cluster results and effectiveness: were results achieved, and how?

This section reviews the extent to which cluster results were achieved based on outcomes and outputs. The primary data sources are the document review and interviews.

### **Key findings: results at outcome level across the projects are moderately satisfactory in the context of very fragile post-conflict settings**

The evaluation shows that the projects' contribution to the cluster outcomes was overall uneven:

- Results are satisfactory for the RBSA projects in Somalia due to successful project delivery at policy and programming level contribution to the enabling environment for the creation of more and better jobs and providing the required programming elements;
- Results in Comoros seem moderately satisfactory for the RBSA project due to a patchy project performance lacking follow-up of trainees and sustainable institutional capacities which belittles the contribution to job creation;
- For the Central African Republic, institutional strengthening was less successful than expected while the availability of short-term employment and training for highly vulnerable youth was highly appreciated. A contribution to more and better jobs showed, even if only of short duration;
- In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project's contribution to the cluster outcome was moderately unsatisfactory. While progress was made at the policy level, programming related to the support to trainees and entrepreneurs, including access to finance, seem unsatisfactory with insufficient project delivery in a weak institutional context. The project's contribution to more and better jobs is uncertain and relies on a new EURO 8m EU-funded project, building on weak implementation partners, struggling already with moderate tasks in the RBSA project.
- The evaluation identified factors affecting the project implementation. Most of those factors were negative, such as institutional instabilities, slow-moving or stagnating social dialogue, social partners with varying capacities, and diverging understanding of their mandates aggravated further by the effects of COVID-19.
- The cluster satisfactorily promoted gender in the projects. Issues of vulnerability figured in the projects mainly concerning unskilled youth.
- Evidence emerges for the suitability of replicating the intervention model in similar crisis responses, for example, the employment-intensive approach.

### 5.1 Cluster and project level outcome results

**Outcomes:** The evaluation shows that the projects' contribution to the cluster outcome "More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects" was overall uneven. Results are satisfactory for the RBSA projects in Somalia due to the excellent delivery of project outputs at the policy and programming level. Results in Comoros seem satisfactory to moderately satisfactory for the RBSA project due to a patchy delivery of outputs lacking follow-up of trainees and sustainable institutional capacities. For the Central African Republic, two distinctive perspectives emerged. For institutional stakeholders in the

capital city Bangui, the RBSA project's contribution to the cluster outcome was unsatisfactory, given that institutional strengthening was less successful than expected and the rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and rural developments advanced rather slowly.

However, project beneficiaries in the project sites were moderately satisfactory given the availability of short-term employment and training for highly vulnerable youth in a precarious economic situation with very few employment opportunities.

In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project's contribution to the cluster outcome "Reforms of business environment that contribute to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises" was moderately unsatisfactory. While progress was made at the policy level, the project outputs related to the support to trainees and entrepreneurs seem unsatisfactory with little project delivery<sup>47</sup>.

The following section explains the rationale of outcome level results when analysing in more detail the underlying outputs and their relationship with the outcomes for each of the projects.

## 5.2 Project level output results

**Outputs:** Differences for the achievement of projects' outputs show across the cluster, as explained in detail in sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4. While for Somalia, the achievements of the three outputs were satisfactory to highly satisfactory, the performance in the other countries was more uneven. In Comoros, the RBSA project's achievement of the four outputs was moderately satisfactory to moderately unsatisfactory. The RBSA project in the Central African Republic again, a significant split in the perception of the project's outputs achievement emerges. For institutional stakeholders, the achievement of five out of the six outputs was unsatisfactory, while beneficiaries found that three out of the six outputs were satisfactorily achieved. As such, the results for the RBSA project in the Central African Republic are presented cautiously in this report.

In Sierra Leone, where the government's co-funding of the RBSA project did not materialize, the fully-fledged development project struggled to deliver on its 13 outputs, with nine outputs, mostly related to the support of entrepreneurs, showing moderately unsatisfactory results.

Regarding the projects outcomes and outputs, sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 provide insights by country<sup>48</sup>.

## 5.3 Factors affecting positively and negatively cluster performance, including COVID-19

The evaluation identified factors affecting the project implementation. While there were positive ones, negative factors prevailed, aggravated further by the effects of COVID-19.

On the positive side, the good availability of dedicated ILO technical specialists showed in the Central African Republic. The support from the DWT based in Yaoundé and the Kinshasa office was essential for the project implementation in a very challenging and fragile country context where the selection of project sites had to be accommodated according to the changing security situation.

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<sup>47</sup> One comment from the ILO in Sierra Leone disagrees with this finding and states many of the project components that were delivered, stressing activity delivery. However, stakeholders and beneficiaries in the country strongly questioned the effectiveness of delivery and its tangible results.

<sup>48</sup> See footnote above for further explanations.

In Somalia, the ILO’s response to the government’s demand for returning to the country was very timely, probably overdue. A powerful project team was in the right place at the right time to re-establish the ILO’s country presence through the RBSA project.

The main negative factors affecting projects’ performance comprised the following:

- Slow-moving or stagnating social dialogue, social partners with uneven capacities and diverging understanding of their mandates (entire cluster)
- Institutional instability (entire cluster),
- Challenges of not being a resident agency (Central African Republic, Comoros, and Sierra Leone)
- Unpredictable security situation (Central African Republic and Somalia),

### COVID-19

When the Corona virus pandemic hit Africa, two of the four projects were already closed (in Sierra Leone and Somalia).

In the Central African Republic and Comoros, the pandemic has had effects in terms of travel restrictions for project teams and specialists in charge of monitoring implementation to support constituents in the field. This introduced delays in the completion of certain activities, such as field studies.

In both countries, COVID-19 affected communication due to generally weak telephone and internet connections. The latter affected the efficiency of remote engagement in project activities towards the end of project implementation.

### 5.3.1 Somalia

The table below summarizes the performance by outputs and the underlying reasons influencing the results. Section 4.3 above provides a more in-depth analysis of the overarching factors influencing cluster performance, and those factors are not repeated in the country-specific sections below. The project synthesis sheets in Annex 7 provides further country insights.

Figure 6: Results against logframe – Somalia

RBSA project results	Achievements
Outcome: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects	The RBSA project provided data to the government as a basis for strategy development and programming. However, one data source, the National Labour Force Survey undertaken in 2019 with ILO support, is still with the ILO for validation and cannot be used by tripartite constituents.
Output 1.1: Developing employment policy and strategy for Somalia	Since the first National Tripartite Steering Committee meeting in November 2018, social partners were included in developing the National Employment Policy. Cabinet approved the National Employment Policy. The launch is imminent, with 5000 copied already printed.
Output 1.2: programmes designed and implemented to address the youth employment challenges	The Joint UN programme on youth employment changed leadership from UNDP to the ILO once the RBSA projects re-established the ILO country presence and proved its capacities to the UNCT.
Output 2.1: enhance the capacity of government and social partners in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes	The National Tripartite Consultative Committee discussed disaster risk reduction programming, aiming to align programmes under disaster lens concerning political instability. However, the last meeting took place in 2019, towards the end of the RBSA project.

The main factors affecting the project performance in Somalia were as follows:



### Positive factors

- Support from Addis Ababa CO, Cairo DWT
- Clear roadmap for ILO Somalia with new DWCP (still in draft form, though)
- Tripartite structure and culture
- Mobilized many resources longer term
- Place in UNCT for employment and decent work

### Negative factors:

- Challenges: project office, no access to ILO security arrangements, no access to ILO IRIS; team in Kenya, Puntland, Mogadishu, Addis Ababa: at time communication gaps; but had two weekly review meetings to mitigate issues
- COVID-19: office not restarted activities

For more details on the overarching factors affecting the cluster performance are presented in section 5.3.

## 5.3.2 Central African Republic

Figure 7: Results against logframe – Central African Republic

RBSA project results	Achievements
Outcome: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects	During project implementation, the project created short-term jobs, for example, in three cooperatives of Boeing and Pk5. Youth employment prospects seem uncertain due to the lack of donor funding or the prioritization of national budgets to follow-up employment-intensive works.
Output 1.1: Access to employment-related information is improved	Access to information on employment is improved but not to the extent that young people desire. The National Employment Observatory should have been operational for information sharing and real-time information for the employment market. However, even after the 12 months non-cost extension, the Observatory was not operational.
Output 1.2: The technical capacities of institutions and members of targeted communities are strengthened	Technical capacities of institutions and members of targeted communities are strengthened but not adequately.
Output 2.1: Micro, small and medium enterprises/cooperatives creating decent jobs and benefiting from non-financial and financial support services are established.	Micro, small and medium enterprises/cooperatives have been established, for example, the three cooperatives in Boeing and Pk5 in the Bangui region. However, they do not benefit from financial support services, and the national institutions are financially unable to accompany the new enterprises and cooperatives. Short-term employment was created during project-funded public works.
Output 2.2: The national social protection policy and its implementation plan are validated.	The national social protection policy and its validated implementation plan remain a crucial challenge, which does not satisfy the stakeholders.
Output 3.1.: Public institutions integrate labour-based approaches in the planning, implementation, and monitoring-evaluation of their investment programs	Public institutions integrate labour-based approaches into planning, the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of their investment programs to some extent. However, progress made is below expectations for institutional stakeholders.
Output 3.2.: Rehabilitation works of agricultural infrastructure and rural development are carried out.	The rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and rural developments were carried out to varying degrees.

The main factors affecting the project performance in the Central African Republic were as follows:

**Positive factors**

- The openness of communities with different religious backgrounds for dialogue;
- Availability of ILO expertise with three technical specialists from Yaoundé DWT and Kinshasa CO directly involved to mitigate the project implementation in a highly volatile context.

**Negative factors:**

- The project did not make enough use of existing opportunities to promote gender equality, including disability issues and the inclusion of other vulnerable groups due to the unstable security situation;
- The COVID-19 pandemic negatively influenced the results and the effectiveness of the project because it disrupted the planning of the implementation of activities and the training schedule;
- The intervention model that was used in this project responds to projects to respond to a similar crisis, but unfortunately, good practices were insufficiently documented and disseminated to project implementation partners;
- Project coordination and monitoring were suboptimal due to lack of transportation for the project team;
- Challenging project implementation hand-over to the national expert after CTA left.

### 5.3.3 Comoros

Figure 8: Results against logframe – Comoros

RBSA project results	Achievements
Outcome: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects	The project created short-term jobs in employment-intensive works for 300 persons and supported entrepreneurship, including the establishment of seven cooperatives. Four out of twelve randomly selected trainees managed to find a job, showing enhanced employment prospects, while eight trainees were still unemployed twelve months after the training.
Output 1.1: More awareness of the situation of vulnerable young people in the targeted areas	The 12 trainees which the evaluation randomly selected for interviews stated an increased awareness about employment opportunities. While to project trained over 250 youth and 6 young people received business start-up kits, it failed to ensure appropriate follow-up of the trainings due to the projects focus on awareness raising rather than job creation.
Output 1.2: The capacities of the tripartite constituents in the development of employment programs for peace and resilience are strengthened, in accordance with the national employment policy	Despite receiving capacity building as SIYB trainer, tripartite constituents stated that they did not receive enough capacity building from the project as far as their ability to conceive job programmes for peace. As a result, constituents do not have the expertise to accompany present and future entrepreneurs. The Ministry of Employment identified the lack of "training of trainers" in the ministry as a crucial shortcoming for its capacities in the follow-up of entrepreneurs after project completion.
Output 2.1: Investment models based on local resources and employment-intensive sector programs are designed	The project designed and implemented employment-intensive activities in the agriculture sector, for example, in isolated locations to enhance accessibility to 600 ha of land through the construction of rural roads.

Output 2.2: New youth businesses in social and environmental services are launched	The project supported six new businesses, two businesses in each of the three project sites. The support amounted to approximately US\$ 1500 for each of the businesses. However, after the follow up three months before the end of the project no further follow-up was ensured after the end of the project implementation.
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The main factors affecting the project performance in Comoros were as follows:

**Positive factors**

- Strong female participation
- Good access to youth for training

**Negative factors:**

- Weak project design: quality of risk assessment for the project suboptimal, lack of sustainability strategy; vague project document allowing for external interferences;
- Change of the project sites, which made the project less relevant from the peace and resilience perspective;
- Change in the project team as CTA left the position after seven months;
- Change of ILO Country Director in Madagascar with responsibility for Comoros, which created a temporary void in the ILO’s institutional support to the project;
- Weak social dialogue in the country.

### 5.3.4 Sierra Leone

Figure 9: Results against logframe – Sierra Leone

RBSA project results	Achievements
Outcome: Reforms of business environment that contribute to an enabling environment for sustainable enterprises	Some indications of enhanced ease of doing business seem to show according to the project’s leading implementation partner, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency (SMEDA).
Output 1.1: Assessment report on the state of the environment for sustainable MSMEs in Sierra Leone	The assessment report was delivered, which informed the design of an EU-funded project following up on some of the RBSA project components.
Output 1.2: Complementary reforms towards a more conducive environment for sustainable and resilient enterprises are identified and agreed upon in consultations with the tripartite partners	Some national constituents contributed to the National Cooperative Policy, which was validated while the evaluation process took place. The Ministry of Trade and industry championed the policy, and the evaluation found that the employers federation was less involved in the process.
Output 1.3: Constituents have adopted strategies towards strengthening institutions and creating a more conducive environment for sustainable and resilient enterprises	The project supported SMEDA to develop a strategic plan on how to deliver on its mandate of facilitating SME development. It is unclear to what extent SMEDA adopted the plan.
Output 2.1: SMEDA has established hands-on mechanisms to sustain non-financial service provision for MSMEs in the country	The leading implementation partner SMEDA benefits from four local offices at the district level, but most activities are centralised, given the country’s centralized governance system. 51 SMEDA staff were trained as trainers in Improve Your Exhibition Skills, GET Ahead. However, the evaluation found challenges in SMEDA to access information about trainees.
Output 2.2: Sierra Leone has introduced high-quality, affordable, and suitable entrepreneurship training	Training of Trainers conducted for SMEDA, Sierra Leone Labour Congress (SLLCA) and the National Youth Commission, and other partners in entrepreneurship packages (Gender and

and other business support services to men and women entrepreneurs	Entrepreneurship Together) GET Ahead and Improve Your Exhibition Skills. They have subsequently trained 345 entrepreneurs. However, the entrepreneurship training and other business support services lack coordination, and follow-up implementation remains unclear.
Output 2.3: MSMEs have received entrepreneurship and skills training as well as post-service delivery support to access finance, markets, sustain their businesses, and promote the "Made in Sierra Leone" initiative	Complementary to training, the project facilitated market access through two regional trade fairs co-hosted by SMEDA and SLLCA in Bo and Makeni Cities. However, beneficiaries experienced the post-service delivery support as unsatisfactory, not meeting their expectations. The evaluation finds that the "Made in Sierra Leone" initiative has not taken root.
Output 3.1: Financial services providers offer responsible and client-centric financial services	The document review showed that financial institutions and their networks were trained in financial inclusion. However, training benefitted urban institutions, and rural clients did not detect any changes in access to finance.
Output 3.2: Entrepreneurs make informed and effective financial decisions and know, understand, and use effectively the financial services that are available to them	The project supported institutions to financial literacy. However, the evaluation was unable to find evidence that entrepreneurs make informed financial decisions, given the persistent lack of access to finance.
Output 3.3: Coordination among financial and non-financial service providers, industry associations, and the regulator is improved through a stronger Sierra Leone Association of Microfinance Institutions (SLAMFI)	The document review shows information about engagements between Financial service providers and Non-financial service providers. However, the level of progress made seems uncertain.
Output 4.1: Implementing agencies improve their capacity for better contracting with national and local enterprises in employment-intensive approach	The project worked on a demonstration site and hired a consultant for the output, but he did not complete the work due to ill health.
Output 4.2: Enterprises and potential entrepreneurs improve capacity to actively participate in contracting for employment-intensive public works	The project hired a consultant to study procurement laws and recommend revisions that could enable SMEs to compete for public works projects. However, the work was not completed due to ill health. The evaluation found that the trainees had no opportunities to apply their capacities beyond project-funded interventions.
Output 4.3: Decent working conditions are ensured in the public work with enhanced awareness	Demonstration roadworks in project sites were undertaken under the strict ILO supervision of contractors. The project trained 24 participants, mainly SME contractors and Ministry of Labour staff on Occupational Health and Safety for construction projects. The SME contractors applied the knowledge learned by ensuring decent working conditions, such as workers being given protective clothing on the SME feeder road construction projects.
Output 4.4: Youth contractors are established and capacitated to carry out small infrastructure development and maintenance projects to improve local assets and social and economic services	Contractors and government engineers were trained in rural feeder road construction. 150 youth were trained by SME contractors on the job on feeder road maintenance on 1 Km of rural feeder road in each of the four selected districts. However, the ownership and use of capacities will only show once opportunities arise.

The main factors affecting the project performance in Sierra Leone were as follows:

### Positive factors

- Quality of the project team
- Successful resource mobilization to complement to RBSA project. USD150,000 from IOM and Euro 8 million from the European Union (EU)
- Public works interventions as a demonstration site (4 km in 4 districts work with SME contractors)

### Negative factors: <sup>49</sup>

- The RBSA project design assumed government co-funding. After the co-funding did not materialize, the project design remained unchanged, proving far too ambitious for the budget and timeframe available.
- COVID-19 related interruptions affected the full project implementations

## 5.4 Unintended results

The evaluation did not detect any major unintended cluster results, neither positive nor negative ones.

## 5.5 Promoting gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion

As stated in section 3.5, the cluster satisfactorily promoted gender in the projects' design and implementation. However, stakeholders failed to recall addressing the topic of disability, coinciding with the document review results. Issues of vulnerability figured in the projects mainly concerning unskilled youth, which was most attracted through labour-intense works as often the only employment opportunity.

## 5.6 Suitability of intervention models for similar crisis response

The evaluation found evidence for the suitability of replicating the intervention model in similar crisis responses. The employment-intensive approach seems generally suited to creating social cohesion and immediately creating employment in fragile settings such as post-conflict countries, particularly youth. Opportunities emerge in countries like Liberia or South Sudan, according to ILO stakeholders in the region.

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<sup>49</sup> One comment from the ILO in Sierra Leone disagrees with the practically all assessments made in Figure 9. Those independent evaluation assessments are made based in the internal final RBSA project report, triangulated with views from stakeholders and beneficiaries in Sierra Leone. The evaluation invited all relevant project stakeholders contained in the project's contact list for interviews. The response rate was disappointingly low despite active ILO facilitation on the ground, showing both a lack of interest and capacity of stakeholders to engage in the evaluation process.

## 6. Efficiency: were resources used appropriately to achieve cluster results?

Section 5 analyses the appropriateness of resource use based on the sub-criteria of i) human and financial resources and ii) compliance with expenditure plans. The evaluation used the document review and telephone interviews as the primary data sources.

### **Key findings: Overall, the cluster used resources appropriately**

- The cluster was appropriately staffed in each of the countries, experiencing, however, at times, significant delays in recruiting project teams. In Sierra Leone, for example, one-third of the project implementation time passed without a CTA in post, and half of the project implementation passed before a national expert joined;
- Regional offices and DWTs provided relevant project implementation and administrative support;
- Financial resources for the RBSA cluster are well above (71%) the average RBSA project funding;
- The funding leveraged through contribution of the ILO's RBSA project in Somalia alone (about US\$ 14.45m) amortises the cluster investment of US\$ 3.864.160. The contribution of the ILO's RBSA project in Sierra Leone leveraged US\$ 10.15m;
- The compliance with expenditure plans was high to very high, reaching 91,2% in Somalia, 94% in the Central African Republic, 96,1% in Sierra Leone, and 97,4% in Comoros.

### 6.1 Human and financial resources

#### **Human resources**

The cluster benefitted from a CTA and national staff in each of the countries, complemented by administrative support. Even though the projects operated in environments without an ILO country office, Regional Offices in Abuja, Addis Ababa, Antananarivo, and Kinshasa, as well as Decent Work Teams in Cairo, Dakar and Yaoundé, supported the RBSA projects.

The evaluation found that particularly the RBSA project in the Central African Republic benefitted from a larger group of proactive technical experts based in the Kinshasa office and the Yaoundé Decent Work Team. Similarly, the RBSA project Somalia benefitted from a larger group of technical specialists from Addis Ababa and DWT-Cairo. With one technical specialist on EIIP permanently based in Mogadishu, specialists from Employment, ILS, Enterprise, STATISTICS, ACTRAV, and ACTEMP, provided useful support to RBSA project for various joint interventions.

However, the evaluation detected delays in contracting project staff, which reduced the project implementation time across the cluster. For example, in Sierra Leone, the CTA came on board eight months after the project start, with the national officer joining after 12 months. Those delays are significant, considering the 24-months implementation timeframe.

## Financial resources

The evaluation finds that the financial resources for the RBSA cluster are well above the average RBSA project funding (71%). Analysis of ILO Partnerships and Field Support department (PARDEV) data shows that the average RBSA budget for projects implemented between 2018 and 2021 is USD 565.309<sup>50</sup>. This average compares to the budget of US\$ 1 million for each of the RBSA projects in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Sierra Leone, and US\$ 864,160 for the RBA project in Somalia.

As stated in previous sections, the project budgets might have been insufficient to implement the over ambitiously designed RBSA projects in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic.

In Somalia, follow-up projects to the RBSA projects include the trade union capacity building project funded by Italy (SOM/18/02/ITA<sup>51</sup> US\$ 700.000) and support for the Chamber of Commerce and Industries through an International Monetary Fund (IMF) project (US\$ 200.000). The ILO also works with four other UN agencies (UNDP, FAO, United National Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)) on an 11m joint multi-donor funded project on youth employment, with the ILO implementing a project component of US\$ 3m). The German Development Bank KfW funds a EURO 10m employment-intensive works investment in one region, which the RBSA team facilitated. In the US\$ 1m joint UN programme private sector development programme, the ILO leads one component with a budget of US\$ 200.000. Finally, the ILO manages a social protection component worth approximately US\$ 350.000 of a US\$ 1.2m UN SDG Fund, partnering with UNICEF and WFP. The overall funding leveraged amount to approximately US\$ 14.45m.

From the cluster perspective, the funding leveraged through the ILO's RBSA project in Somalia alone seems to amortise the cluster investment of US\$ 3.864.160, even though not all funding leveraged can be directly attributed to the RBSA project. According to evaluation interviews, the RBSA's key contribution to establish a larger project portfolio in Somalia was the presence of a project office which tripartite constituents considered like a country office. The ILO's presence also enabled the ILO to "have a seat at the table" of the UN Country Team and to engage in dialogue and joint programming. Those factors were not given prior to the RBSA project with a minimal ILO project portfolio in the country.

The contribution of the ILO's RBSA project in Sierra Leone leveraged US\$ 10.15m. More specifically, in Sierra Leone ILO mobilized resources in collaboration with FAO and a US\$ 1.5 million project from the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) to cater for peace and resilience objectives. The two agencies implemented the project. The PBF project run concurrently with RBSA project in the same target areas as RBSA and beyond but was targeting vulnerable women who were supported in agribusiness, access to markets and BDS. ILO's portion in the PBF project was US\$ 500,000 used on business development services, market linkages, cooperatives, operations health and safety and access to finance which complemented FAO. The latter's role in the PBF project was issues of conflict mapping, land mapping, management, sensitization on conflict resolution and agribusiness development.

The RBSA project in Sierra Leone also started the mobilization of Euro 8 million from the EU that is for a new four-year programme that will scale up the interventions started by the RBSA project to create over 4,000 jobs in employment intensive investment feeder road

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<sup>50</sup> 81 projects funded with a total of US\$45.790.000 in 2018-2019 and 2020-2021. Source: ILO, 2021: Core Voluntary Funding (RBSA) for ILO development cooperation.

<sup>51</sup> Occupation and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience in Somalia


maintenance works and another 3,000 jobs in enterprises from 2021 to 2025 which is a significant contribution to job creation initiated by the RBSA project. The new programme is scaling up interventions that the RBSA project started in the same districts of Sierra Leone.

The RBSA project's contribution to leveraging the above funding was based on piloting some components which the new projects aim to scale up such as the labour-intensive work approach.

## 6.2 Compliance with expenditure plans

The compliance with expenditure plans was very high, reaching 91,2% in Somalia, 94% in the Central African Republic, 96,1% in Sierra Leone, and 97,4% in Comoros, as shown in Figure 10.

**Figure 10: compliance with expenditure plans**



Sources: ILO, 2021



## 7. Effectiveness of management arrangements

This section analyzes the *effectiveness of management arrangements* for the cluster. The principal data sources used in this section are evaluation interviews. The evaluation used the following sub-criteria: i) management and governance arrangements: ii) use of M&E strategies, iii) partnerships, and iv) internal ILO support.

### **Key findings: The effectiveness of management arrangements is mixed across the cluster, affected by highly complex project environments and internal lacunae**

- The implementation of the cluster's management and governance arrangements suffered in the context of political volatility and fragile security situations.
- While the human resources were broadly appropriate across the cluster, not having an ILO office with a bank account significantly affected the projects management arrangements, for example, for making timely payments for the delivery of core components such as employment-intensive works
- Due to the absence of a cluster M&E strategy or related strategies in the project documents, the evaluation was unable to detect any use of such strategies.
- The cluster developed partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees
- Considering the highly challenging post-conflict context and fragility across the cluster, the internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs was overall satisfactory, except for financial management.

### 7.1 Management and governance arrangements

The implementation of the cluster's management and governance arrangements suffered in the context of political volatility, fragile security situations, and the fact that none of the projects benefitted from being part of an ILO country office in the respective project countries.

The evaluation revealed that not having an ILO office with a bank account significantly affected the projects' management arrangements, as highlighted in the box below.

"The project did not have a bank account to receive the funds and be able to pay contractors in project sites on short notice, as stipulated on the Purchase Orders. This was the biggest flaw of the project".

"Financial management most certainly did not facilitate the achievement of project results as the project did not have any bank accounts in the country. I was alone in the capital city and experienced up to 4 months of delays in paying contractors. This heavily delayed public works".

Source: project stakeholders

While the human resources were broadly appropriate across the cluster, as stated in the previous section, the accessibility of the projects to technical specialists from DWTs or Regional Offices depended on the prevailing security situations. From March 2020 onwards,

the Corona virus-related travel restrictions further inhibited the practical implementation of management arrangements. Even project staff experienced challenges in reaching project sites, with local travel restrictions still being in place at the time of the evaluation in the Central African Republic and Somalia.

In the fragile cluster context, the projects also suffered from communication challenges due to weak telephone and internet connections and intermittent power supply (the latter particularly in Comoros). The distance to reach project beneficiaries affected project implementation, also when only virtual support was possible. During the evaluation, the evaluation team confirms those challenges in physically reaching project beneficiaries.

The evaluation found indications that the cooperation between international CTAs and national experts was at times suboptimal. Reasons were personality issues or little coordination in timing the contracting, including for hand-over.

## **7.2 Use of M&E strategies and disaggregation of data**

Due to the absence of a projects M&E strategy or related strategies in the project documents, the evaluation was unable to detect any use of such strategies. Project teams undertook activity-based reporting, without taking a wider RBM approach which could have been available in the respective country offices.

Project reporting showed some level of disaggregating data by sex, for example, in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Sierra Leone.

## **7.3 Partnerships**

As stated in section 2.7, the cluster developed partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees. The cooperation with the FAO was particularly successful, where the RBSA project and the FAO shared project facilities and transportation in the Central African Republic. In Somalia, the set-up of the ILO country office and the ILO's presence in the UN Country Team (UNCT) established partnerships with other UN agencies, which eventually developed into joint projects.

RBSA Sierra Leone collaborated with FAO who hosted ILO in their offices, collaborated on the UN peace building fund project. ILO also collaborated with IOM on the youth entrepreneurship project. They also collaborated with other UN agencies such as UNCDF, UNIDO, UN women and WFP.

## **7.4 Internal ILO support**

The internal ILO support needs to be considered in a context where no resident ILO offices were available at the time of RBSA project implementation. Only in Somalia, the project eventually contributed in its implementation cycle to set up an ILO project office (which was beyond its original scope).

Given the highly challenging post-conflict context and fragility across the cluster, the internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs were satisfactory, in some cases like the Central African Republic highly satisfactory. The evaluation finds that the project teams at times did not explicitly request inputs from technical specialists, for example, concerning

issues of ACTEMP, ACTRAV, or gender. However, those support structures are in place, as verified by the evaluation. Project teams should be sensitized about the available support structures and how to use them.

Section 7.1 outlines the financial projects management challenges across the cluster, which affected the efficiency of internal ILO support and the effectiveness of cluster delivery.

## 8. Orientation to impact and sustainability

The analysis of the sustainability of cluster results used evaluation interviews and the document review as principal data sources. This section summarized the results for the following sub-criteria: i) lasting cluster results, ii) replication of results and approaches, iii) upscaling; iv) changes to the lives of beneficiaries v) gaps in the sustainability strategy and vi) steps to ensure sustainability.

### **Key findings: The evaluation finds that the cluster is genuinely struggling to sustain RBSA project results**

- The sustainability of cluster results is heavily jeopardized by multiple dimensions (Central African Republic and Comoros: lack of success in leveraging donor funding for follow-up; Sierra Leone: institutional challenges in the leading project partner; and Somalia, Head of ILO Office currently unable to return to the country among growing political tensions in the country);
- While RBSA projects served to replicate existing ILO approaches in the cluster countries, evidence lacks about replicating RBSA project approaches within the cluster countries or beyond except for Somalia;
- The evaluation identified highly significant evidence of the upscaling of the RBSA seed funding results in Sierra Leone and Somalia.

The evaluation finds that sustaining cluster results is moderately unsatisfactory. The replication of cluster results is unsatisfactory, but for Somalia, while the upscaling of RBSA project results is satisfactory in Sierra Leone and Somalia. In the Central African Republic and Comoros, the latter sub-criterion is unsatisfactory.

### 8.1 Sustaining cluster results

The evaluation finds that the cluster is struggling to sustain RBSA project results. Even the most successful RBSA project among the cluster, implemented in Somalia, faces challenges in sustaining its extraordinary results.

In Somalia, the ILO office is fully established as a direct contribution of the RBSA funding with a growing project portfolio. The RBSA's seed funding approach succeeded exceptionally well, and the RBSA project in Somalia serves as a good practice RBSA model.

However, the Head of Office had to leave the country because of the Corona pandemic, and the challenging political situation hampers his return to the country. As a result, there is a perception that the ILO is no longer present on the ground, despite ILO staff deputizing in the absence of the Head of Office. To some extent, this could affect the sustainability of the ILO country portfolio, the ILO's role in the UNCT, and the perception of the ILO as a partner for national constituents.

In the Central African Republic, the RBSA project's sustainability did fail from a business perspective, as the project did not manage to leverage other donor funding. Besides, the national counterpart is underfunded to apply the newly acquired skills and sustain especially labour-intensive activities. Also, trained youth of newly established enterprises and cooperatives do not have the means to apply their newly acquired skills.

"We have trained the youth, but there is no ongoing mentoring of young men and women. The cooperatives have building materials. They are trained. They know how to participate in public procurement contracts. But municipalities and others do not allocate budgets for labour intense works. We see that there is a lack of political will".

"We have helped to create the youth cooperatives, but now they are not operational."

Source: Project stakeholders, Central African Republic

The mention of lacking political will seems surprising, given the project's close engagement with government institutions. The latter comprised, for example, institutional support, information sharing about employment-intensive approaches in relevant ministries, contributions to the National Skills Training Policy, and better access to employment-related information.

However, the project showed that in two project sites, the project contributed to a climate of confidence and peaceful cooperation among youth antagonists during the armed conflict. As long as the security situation allows, this climate of reconciliation could serve as a stepping stone for peace and development.

"They [youth from both religions] rehabilitated infrastructure together. The Job Centre in Bangui is one example. Yes, the environment is ready for the youth of both confessions to peacefully work together in their cooperatives – if they could only find work.

Source: Project stakeholders, Central African Republic

The evaluation finds that the lack of a sustainability strategy in Comoros jeopardized the sustainability of RBSA project results. The project focused on delivering outputs without prioritizing leveraging additional funding to exploit the potential of the RBSA seed funding fully. References to insufficient project funding in the internal project review<sup>52</sup> to fully exploit project results and the omission of any reference to sustainability seem to indicate a project implementation approach which was "sustainability blind."

"We absolutely see gaps in the RBSA project's sustainability. While 20 new trainers were trained in "Start and Improve Your Business" in Comoros and they have trained more than 100 young people, we do not know what has become of them, knowing the difficulties to launch businesses here. A specific platform to follow, encourage and even support these young people could have been set up by the ILO. It has already been observed that those who have embarked on the poultry sector have fallen into bankruptcy".

Source: Project stakeholder, Comoros

In Sierra Leone, the evaluation found that the RBSA project undertook a systematic training of trainers approach involving the leading project implementation partner SMEDA, which, however, shows institutional challenges. Turf battles with IFAD and the German Development Bank (KfW) challenge a broader adoption of the employment-intensive approach promoted through the RBSA project.

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<sup>52</sup> Union des Comoros/BIT, 2020: Revue du Project EDLIC 2018-2020

The ILO in Sierra Leone expects that a new EU-funded program is going to consolidate and scale up the entrepreneurship and value chain development and feeder road maintenance work that was initiated by RBSA in the same four districts.

In both the Central African Republic and Comoros, stakeholders missed ILO post-project follow-up through a specialist, for example, for employment-intensive works or SME development. However, in the absence of any follow-on projects leveraged through the RBSA project, this kind of support seems unrealistic.

## 8.2 Replication

The RBSA projects served to replicate successful ILO approaches from other countries. For example, lessons from the employment-intensive approach from Madagascar were incorporated in the RBSA project in Comoros. Also, the ILO's "Start and Improve Your Business" and "Generate your business" approaches served to train trainers and entrepreneurs in Comoros.

The evaluation did not manage to identify examples of replicating RBSA project approaches within the cluster countries or beyond but for Somalia (constituents capacity building, youth employment, private sector development, employment-intensive works, and social protection) and Sierra Leone (entrepreneurship value chain development and rural feeder roads maintenance started by the RBSA project). In the latter case, a new four-year programme will scale up the interventions started by the RBSA project to create over 4,000 jobs in employment intensive investment feeder road maintenance works and another 3,000 jobs in enterprises from 2021.

## 8.3 Upscaling

In two of the cluster countries, the evaluation identified highly significant evidence of the upscaling of the RBSA seed funding results.

In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project contributed to the upcoming European Union's (EU) EURO 8m "Opportunity Salone" programme in the country, incorporating the employment-intensive approach, which is currently under negotiation. Besides, the RBSA project successfully advocated for the World Bank and German Development Bank (KfW) to take social protection approach to infrastructure development. Besides, the ILO undertook business development opportunities activities for the IOM for 12 months, till November 2020.

In Somalia, the US\$ 864,160 RBSA funding contributed to creating a project portfolio of five new projects worth over US\$ 14.45 m. As such, the ILO country office's set-up in Mogadishu resulted in significantly upscaling the ILO's engagement in the country.

## 8.4 Evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries

The RBSA project created expectations in communities in the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Sierra Leone where the projects engaged at the local level. The evaluation finds

that the projects created capacities and left behind work materials or appliances for cooperatives and small enterprises.

Also, during the project implementation, the community members in the three countries benefited from short term employment in employment intensive works such as feeder road construction (Comoros and Sierra Leone) and the rehabilitation of buildings (Central African Republic).

The evaluation interviews showed that the project has a significant physiological effect on communities which previously felt left behind, forgotten, or worthless. While the evaluation is rather critical about the lack of follow-up at local level to accompany the cooperatives and small enterprises, based on disappointing longer-term employment effects, community members cherish the project results. Many members have not lost hope for change in the future based on the newly acquired skills and their reinforced confidence.

### **8.5 Gaps in the sustainability strategy across the cluster**

The assumption *across the cluster* that after the project end, trainees' capacities for creating enterprises would remain, and the network of trainers continue to function seems highly dependent on opportunities to put learning and networks into practice.

The project team in the Central African Republic considered the Central African Agency for Professional Development and Employment (ACFPE) as the backup option to accompany trained entrepreneurs and cooperatives in case seed funding would not attract additional donors. However, the agency's financial capacities seem less suited to accomplish this task. The same limitations seem to apply to ministries' resources to fund the National Health Insurance (Caisse Nationale de la Maladie), the Observatory for employment and professional training, or implementing the National Employment Policy.

### **8.6 Steps to ensure sustainability**

As stated in section 3.3, the projects did not benefit from explicit exit strategies and unevenly used the RBSA as seed funding aiming to leverage additional financial resources.

The most promising approaches included the use or creating of local institutional structures such as local committees to maintain labour intense works in Comoros. Those endeavors build however mainly on weak foundations with insufficient national funding.

As such, the cluster took to some extent steps to ensure sustainability but with uneven results, showing most success in Somalia and Sierra Leone due to follow-up donor funding and joint UN projects.

Figure 11: Summary of key findings, conclusions, and recommendations

	Key findings of the cluster evaluation	Conclusions	Recommendations
Relevance	The cluster is closely aligned to national strategies and policies.	The cluster was highly relevant for then ILO and the benefitting Member Countries.	<i>No recommendation.</i>
	The cluster is aligned to UNDAF's or related UN frameworks.		
	The cluster contributed to the DWCPs, DWCP drafts, or previous versions in all countries.		
	The cluster is closely aligned to the ILO's Strategic Objectives: P&B 2018 – 2019 (outcome 1) and P&B 2020-2021 (outcome 4)		
	RBSA-funded projects are particularly relevant in meeting cluster beneficiaries' needs, given the limited comprehensiveness of ILO project portfolios in the respective countries admit desolate post-conflict environments with very few employment opportunities.	RBSA-funded projects filled a gap in the ILO's development cooperation portfolios and reached countries left behind.	<b>R1. ILO:</b> The ILO Department responsible for the allocation of RBSA resources should keep allocating budgets of about US\$ 1 m per RBSA project to maintain the projects' relevance in complex post-conflict settings. Less projects with higher funding are preferable to more projects with reduced budgets to ensure the relevance of investments. <b>Priority:</b> Medium: Next 12 months.
The cluster built on partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees, failing to systematically include ACTRAV and ACTEMP during the RBSA project design.	The cluster could have included workers' and employers' representatives in the ILO more systematically.	<i>No recommendation.</i>	
Validity of project designs	The projects did not have a solid intervention logic. The reconstructed theory shows shortcomings in the results chain and many assumptions not holding.	The design of individual projects was activity-driven rather than results-based, lacking a robust design.	<b>R2. ILO:</b> When RBSA projects are designed with alignment to the same ILO P&B outcomes or an ILO programming approach such as peace and resilience programming, projects should aim to operate as a cluster. Based on a peace and conflict analysis, the latter would include using a common Theory of Change, using a common planning framework, monitoring, results reporting and evaluation, while having the flexibility of have activities and outputs tailored to specific country contexts. <b>Priority:</b> High: Next 6 months.
	The cluster omitted a common M&E framework. The project design of the RBSA projects was "M&E blind."		
	The evaluation finds that the cluster lacked from an explicit exit strategy.		
	The validity and realism of implementation approaches were uneven across the cluster.	RBSA is a critical funding source for ILO's peace and resilience programming, but the alignment to programming objectives suffered during implementation in two projects.	<b>R3: ILO:</b> RBSA projects should strengthen quality assurance during project design, including a systematic analysis of project assumptions and the quality of M&E such as SMART indicators, baselines, and targets. <b>Priority:</b> High: Next 6 months.
	Concerning the ILO's peace and resilience programming, RBSA is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on this topic. During implementation, two projects diverged from original peace and resilience programming objectives.		



	The cluster comprehensively considered gender in the project design and implementation, while disability was practically absent.	The cross-cutting issue of gender was fully mainstreamed across the cluster and international labour standards complied with, while disability did not figure across the cluster.	<i>No recommendation.</i>
	The cluster upheld the International Labour Standards such as Occupational Health and Safety.		
	The role of tripartite constituents in the design and implementation of the cluster was uneven.	Tripartite constituents could have been involved more systematically across the cluster at the national level.	<i>No recommendation.</i>
Effectiveness	Projects' contribution to the cluster outcomes: Results are satisfactory for the RBSA projects in Somalia due to the excellent delivery of project outputs at the policy and programming level. Results in Comoros seem satisfactory to moderately satisfactory for the RBSA project due to a patchy delivery of outputs lacking follow-up of trainees and sustainable institutional capacities. For the Central African Republic, institutional strengthening was less successful than expected, while the availability of short-term employment and training for highly vulnerable youth was appreciated. In Sierra Leone, the RBSA project's contribution to the cluster outcome was moderately unsatisfactory. While progress was made at the policy level, the project outputs related to the support to trainees and entrepreneurs seem unsatisfactory with insufficient project delivery particularly from SMEDA, the main project implementation partner.	The evaluation shows that the projects' contribution to the cluster outcomes was overall uneven.	<b>R4: ILO Country Office Abuja and SMEDA:</b> The Country Director should engage SMEDA, prior to the launch of an EU-funded follow up project to ensure that SMEDA systems are in place to act as a better organized and reliable partner for future project implementation. <b>Priority:</b> Very high: Next 3 to 6 months
	The evaluation identified factors affecting the project implementation. Most of those factors were negative, such as institutional instabilities, slow-moving or stagnating social dialogue, social partners with varying capacities, and diverging understanding of their mandates aggravated further by the effects of COVID-19.	The seed-funding approach of RBSA-funded projects with a short duration and budgets up to US\$ 1m emerges as a high risk – high return approach in very volatile post-conflict settings where "nation-building" is still required. However, RBSA projects are often the only ILO funding source in post-conflict settings. While the projects encountered very high risks, the returns can also be very high, as shown in Somalia, where the country office was re-established, and a robust project portfolio created.	<b>R5. ILO:</b> Despite the challenges characterizing fragile settings, the ILO is encouraged to keep funding RBSA projects in post-conflict settings, using a cluster approach under the peace and resilience programming or a common P&B outcome, despite the very high risks of short-term results only (e.g., through the employment-intensive approach) in such extremely volatile environments. Genuine engagement for "leaving no one behind" requires risk-taking. <b>Priority:</b> High: Next 6 months.
	The cluster satisfactorily promoted gender in the projects. Issues of vulnerability figured in the projects mainly concerning unskilled youth.		
	Evidence emerges for the suitability of replicating the intervention model in similar crisis responses, for example, the employment-intensive approach in countries like Liberia or South Sudan.		
Efficiency	The cluster was appropriately staffed in each of the countries;	The cluster was comparably well funded in the RBSA context, and internal ILO support worked sufficiently well.	<i>No recommendation.</i>
	Regional offices and DWTs provided relevant project implementation and administrative support.		
	Financial resources for the RBSA cluster are well above (71%) the average RBSA project funding. Financial information to determine the compliance with expenditures plans was not available.		
	The funding leveraged through contributions of the ILO's RBSA project in Somalia alone (about US\$ 14.45m) amortises the cluster investment of US\$ 3.864.160.	RBSA project risk-taking was worth the investment, with investments fully amortised due to additional project funding leveraged in Somalia alone.	See R4.
Effectiveness	The implementation of the cluster's management and governance arrangements suffered in the context of political volatility and fragile security situations.	Not having an ILO country office with its support structure and imprest account for swift financial	<b>R6: ILO:</b> Whilst in some cases RBSA can play a major role as entry point in countries where ILO has no permanent

	While the human resources were broadly appropriate across the cluster, not having an ILO office with a bank account significantly affected the projects management arrangements	transactions further challenged the performance of the RBSA projects in post-conflict settings in three countries, despite satisfactory internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs.	presence nor major initiatives on going, to effectively implement RBSA projects in the peace and resilience context, countries should be prioritised where established office structures are available, complemented by an active ILO engagement in the UNCT in the conflict affected countries.  <b>Priority:</b> Medium: Next 12 months.
	Considering the highly challenging post-conflict context and fragility across the cluster, the internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs was overall satisfactory, except for financial management.		
	Due to the absence of a cluster M&E strategy or related strategies in the project documents, the evaluation was unable to detect any use of such strategies.	As concluded under the validity of project design, the cluster was activity-driven rather than results-based, challenging the use of results-based management.	
	The cluster developed partnerships with tripartite constituents and development partners to varying degrees	Partnerships were strongest where the ILO eventually established a country office (Somalia), with UNCT presence and partnerships being the basis for an expanding project portfolio.	
Orientation towards impact and sustainability	The sustainability of cluster results is heavily jeopardized by multiple dimensions (Central African Republic and Comoros: lack of success in leveraging donor funding for follow-up; Sierra Leone: institutional challenges in the leading project partner; Somalia, Head of ILO Office currently unable to return to the country among growing political tensions in the country ).	Given the fragile security situation in the cluster countries, even the most successful and effective RBSA project implementation does not assure the sustainability of results. However, projects had a significant physiological effect on communities which previously felt left behind, forgotten, or worthless.	<b>R7. ILO Somalia:</b> The Head of the Office should return to the country as soon as possible to represent the ILO in the UNCT and give a strong signal to tripartite constituents that the ILO takes leadership in facilitating social dialogue and aims to remain an accessible partner in the country. <b>Priority:</b> Very high: Next 3 to 6 months.  <b>R8: ILO Country Office Kinshasa and ILO Country Office Antananarivo:</b> The Country Directors in their role as non-resident members of the UNCTs in the Central African Republic and Comoros, respectively, should aim to catalyse the participation of the ILO in joint UN programmes. The latter funding opportunities could address shortcomings in institutional capacities and follow-up engagement with trained cooperatives. <b>Priority:</b> Medium: Next 12 months.
	While RBSA projects served to replicate successful ILO approaches in the cluster countries, evidence lacks about replicating RBSA project approaches within the cluster countries or beyond except Somalia.	The high-risk approach taken in the cluster succeeded in two countries where the RBSA seed funding resulted in replication or upscaling of results.	See R5.
	The evaluation identified highly significant evidence of the upscaling of the RBSA seed funding results in Sierra Leone and Somalia.		

## 9. Conclusions

Based on the main findings summarized at the beginning of the findings sections for each evaluation criteria, the following conclusions emerge. The logic between the main evaluation findings and conclusions is transparently presented in **Error! Reference source not found.** before this section.

**Main conclusion: The cluster of RBSA projects addressing employment and sustainable enterprises addressed the short-term employment needs of mostly vulnerable communities, despite significant project design shortcomings. While the sustainability of the projects failed in the Central African Republic and Comoros, the ILO's risk taking to engage in post-conflict environment was worthwhile, with the RBSA project in Somalia alone contributing to leveraging significant follow-up funding, which amortised the entire investment in the four projects.**

### **Relevance:**

The cluster was highly relevant for then ILO and the benefitting Member Countries. RBSA-funded projects filled a gap in the ILO's development cooperation portfolios and reached countries left behind.

*Inclusiveness:* The cluster could have included workers' and employers' representatives more systematically.

### **Validity of project designs:**

The design of the individual projects was activity-driven rather than results-based, lacking a robust design.

RBSA is a critical funding source for ILO's peace and resilience programming, but the alignment to programming objectives suffered during implementation in two projects.

*Cross-cutting issues and participation:* The cross-cutting issue of gender was fully mainstreamed across the cluster and international labour standards complied with, while disability did not figure across the cluster.

Tripartite constituents could have been involved more systematically across the cluster at the national level.

### **Effectiveness:**

The evaluation shows that the projects' contribution to the cluster outcomes was overall uneven. The seed-funding approach of RBSA-funded projects with a short duration and budgets up to US\$ 1m emerges as a high risk – high return approach in very volatile post-conflict settings where "nation-building" is still required. However, RBSA projects are often the only ILO funding source in post-conflict settings. While the projects encountered very high risks, the returns can also be very high, as shown in Somalia, where the country office was re-established, and a robust project portfolio created.

In the Central African Republic, an overly ambitious project design based on many incorrect assumptions diluted the projects focus and failed to strengthen the institutional structures to strengthen youth employment prospects beyond short-term employment in few communities.

In Comoros, project created short-term jobs in employment-intensive works and supported entrepreneurship, but not in the most conflict-affected communities. The project failed to strengthen national or particularly local support structures for appropriate follow-up of the trainings to sustain cooperatives.

Finally, in Sierra Leone, the over ambitious project design was completely inappropriate for the available project budget and timeframe and diluted the project's implementation focus. The policy

level results justified the RBSA engagement while the results of the programmatic part of the project did not sufficiently fulfil the very high expectations created.

**Efficiency:**

The cluster was comparably well funded in the RBSA context, and internal ILO support worked sufficiently well.

RBSA project risk-taking was worth the investment, with investments fully amortised due to additional project funding leveraged in Somalia alone.

**Effectiveness of management arrangements:**

Not having an ILO country office with its support structure and imprest account for swift financial transactions further challenged the performance of the RBSA projects in post-conflict settings in three countries, despite satisfactory internal ILO support from other country offices and the DWTs.

As concluded under the validity of project design, the cluster was activity-driven rather than results-based, challenging the use of results-based management.

Partnerships were strongest where the ILO eventually established a country office (Somalia), with UNCT presence and partnerships being the basis for an expanding project portfolio.

**Orientation towards impact and sustainability:**

Given the fragile security situation in the cluster countries, even the most successful and effective RBSA project implementation does not assure the sustainability of results. However, projects had a significant physiological effect on communities which previously felt left behind, forgotten, or worthless.

The high-risk approach taken in the cluster succeeded in two countries where the RBSA seed finding resulted in replication or upscaling of results.

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## Recommendations, lessons learned, and good practices

### 10. Recommendations

Following the main findings and the conclusions, the recommendations listed below emerge. The logic between main evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations are transparently presented in **Error! Reference source not found.**, as previously stated. The recommendations are targeted for the design and implementation of future RBSA projects, an approach to clustering, and in one case, for the ILO office in Somalia.

#### Relevance

**Recommendation 1.** The ILO Department responsible for the allocation of RBSA resources should keep allocating budgets of about US\$ 1 m per RBSA project to maintain the projects' relevance in complex post-conflict settings. Less projects with higher funding are preferable to more projects with reduced budgets to ensure the relevance of investments.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing:** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** About US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

#### Validity of project design

**Recommendation 2.** When RBSA projects are designed with alignment to the same ILO P&B outcomes or an ILO programming approach such as peace and resilience programming, projects should aim to operate as a cluster. Based on a peace and conflict analysis, the latter would include using a common Theory of Change, planning framework, monitoring, results reporting and evaluation, while having the flexibility of have activities and outputs tailored to specific country contexts.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** For coordination issues only.

**Recommendation 3.** RBSA projects should strengthen quality assurance during project design, including a systematic analysis of project assumptions and the quality of M&E such as SMART indicators, baselines, and targets.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** For enhanced quality assurance only.

#### Effectiveness

**Recommendation 4.** The Country Director should engage the Small and Medium Size Enterprise Development Agency (SMEDA), prior to the launch of an EU-funded follow up project to ensure that SMEDA systems are in place to act as a better organized and reliable partner for future project implementation.

**Responsible:** ILO Country Office (CO) Abuja and SMEDA.

**Priority:** Very high.

**Timing:** Next 3 to 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** Travel expenses for visits to Sierra Leone.

**Recommendation 5.** Despite the challenges characterizing fragile settings , the ILO is encouraged to keep funding RBSA project in post-conflict settings, using a cluster approach under the peace and resilience programming or a common P&B outcome, regardless the very high risks of short-term results only (for example, through the employment-intensive approach) in such extremely volatile environments. Genuine engagement for “leaving no one behind” requires risk-taking.

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** High.

**Timing:** Next 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** Up to US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

## Effectiveness of management arrangements

**Recommendation 6.** Whilst in some cases RBSA can play a major role as entry point in countries where ILO has no permanent presence nor major initiatives on going, **to effectively implement RBSA projects in the peace and resilience context, countries should be prioritised where established office structures are available, complemented by an active ILO engagement in the UNCT in the conflict affected countries.**

**Responsible:** ILO.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing:** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** Up to US\$ 1 million for each new RBSA project.

## Orientation towards impact and sustainability

**Recommendation 7.** The Head of the Office should return to the country as soon as possible to represent the ILO in the UNCT and give a strong signal to tripartite constituents that the ILO takes leadership in facilitating social dialogue and aims to remain an accessible partner in the country.

**Responsible:** ILO Somalia.

**Priority:** Very high.

**Timing:** Next 3 to 6 months.

**Resource requirement:** No additional HR expenses.

**Recommendation 8.** The Country Directors in their role as non-resident members of the UNCTs in the Central African Republic and Comoros, respectively, should aim to catalyse the participation of the ILO in joint UN programmes. The latter could address shortcomings in institutional capacities and follow-up engagement with trained cooperatives in both countries.

**Responsible:** ILO Country Office Kinshasa and ILO Country Office Antananarivo.

**Priority:** Medium.

**Timing:** Next 12 months.

**Resource requirement:** Travel expenses for additional visits to the Central African Republic and Comoros or time for virtual engagement.

## 11. Lessons learned and good practices

This evaluation identifies lessons learned based on criteria used as good practices in other international organizations.<sup>53</sup> As such, the lessons learned below include i) context; ii) challenges; iii) causal factors; iv) target users; v) success, and vi) the fact that a lesson is not a recommendation or a conclusion.

### Lessons learned:

#### **Lesson learned 1: Use of the employment-intensive approach in RBSA projects in fragile state countries**

The employment-intensive approach is suited for short-term employment creation where income sources are urgently needed, for example, for the reconciliation of ethnic or religious groups in volatile post-conflict settings.

However, expectations need to be carefully managed, as the promotion of the approach through RBSA projects faces a tight time limit of two years, in real terms even several months less until the project team is recruited. The uptake of the employment-intensive approach by (local) government heavily depends on political will and the availability of financial resources. The uptake by donors or UN agencies also depends on UNDAF priorities and their approaches to peace and reconciliation.

Hence, uncertainty prevails for the assumption that the promotion of employment-intensive approaches in short-term RBSA projects contributes to longer-term economic recovery.

#### **Lesson learned 2: RBSA projects in countries with ILO residency vs. non-resident status**

DWTs and ILO country offices can significantly support RBSA projects where the ILO is a “non-resident” agency, as experienced in the Central African Republic. While this support proved essential for enhancing the project implementation’s effectiveness, it faces its limitations. The remote support cannot replace ILO’s resident status with in-country representation in the UNCT and vis-à-vis the tripartite constituents. Learning from Somalia shows that physical presence in the UNCT facilitates access of the ILO to joint UN programming, which is proofed as an emerging funding source for ILO programming. Ultimately, the likelihood of RBSA seed funding contributing to a growing ILO project portfolio where approaches of RBSA projects can be replicated or upscaled seem higher where the ILO is a resident agency that is active in the UNCT.

#### **Lesson learned 3: Role of the ILO HQ Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in RBSA projects in post-conflict settings**

The ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in HQ benefits from a Theory of Change for its programming and a dedicated technical support team. RBSA projects and other ILO programming in post-conflict settings focusing on employment creation would benefit from aligning to that Theory of Change to strengthen RBSA project design, given the design shortcomings in the evaluated RBSA projects. Besides, technical CSRP support can complement other internal ILO support. This conceptual alignment would strengthen project design and facilitate evaluation given a robust CSPR programming framework.

As RBSA funding is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on peace and resilience, the quality of monitoring data and evaluation opportunities are vital to establish evidence how the peace and resilience programming is working best and why.

#### **Lesson learned 4: Disability in RBSA projects**

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<sup>53</sup> The International Labor Organization and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.



Disability issues seem insufficiently mainstreamed among ILO staff with responsibility for project design. ILO staff showed a lack of awareness. RBSA project would benefit from a systematic inclusion of the disability dimension in needs assessments, stakeholder analysis and the project implementation.

**Good practices: cluster evaluation**

Without a cluster evaluation, RBSA projects below a threshold of US\$ 800.000 would not benefit individually from a final evaluation due to their budget size below the threshold for mandatory evaluation. The use of a cluster evaluation allows the ILO to exercise evaluability and enable learning even for smaller-sized projects. Even though this cluster did not benefit from a common planning, monitoring, and reporting framework, the engagement of staff, tripartite constituents, and, where possible, beneficiaries during the evaluation process allowed for an analysis of projects' processes and results. As such, the cluster evaluation contributes to learning for future RBSA projects in post-conflict settings.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

**Terms of Reference**  
**Cluster Final Evaluation of four RBSA projects on employment and entrepreneurship in Africa**  
**(2018-20)**  
**-11 January 2021-**

<b>Project titles</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Employment and integrated local development in Comoros (EILDC)</li> <li>2. Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia</li> <li>3. Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour intensive investments</li> <li>4. Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic</li> </ol>
<b>ILO Outcomes</b>	<p>Outcome 1: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects</p> <p>Outcome 4: Promoting sustainable enterprises</p>
<b>Implementer</b>	ILO Country Offices Abuja, Addis, Antananarivo and Kinshasa
<b>Backstopping units</b>	ILO Decent Work Teams Cairo, Pretoria and Yaoundé
<b>Funding</b>	ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA).
<b>Budget</b>	US\$ 3,846,160
<b>Projects duration</b>	January 2018-December 2020
<b>Type of Evaluation</b>	Independent
<b>Timing of evaluation</b>	Final February-April 2021

### I. Background of the Projects

To creating productive and decent employment for young women and men, as well as the promotion of an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and sustainable enterprises, in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in fragile states contexts are important work areas for ILO in Africa, as indicated in the ILO Programme and Budget (P&B) 2018-and 2019 and P&B 2020-2 documents (2018:52 [here](#) and 2020:49 [here](#)). In this context ILO have implemented several projects towards results in these areas since 2018, funded under the ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA).

The RBSA funding is an account established based on the voluntary contributions of Member States, in addition to their contributions to the regular budget. It is directed to the implementation of decent work priorities selected in dialogue with tripartite constituents in Member States.

These Terms of reference have been developed towards evaluating four projects in Africa, that are RBSA-funded and started in the Biennium 2018-19 (two completed in 2019 and two in 2020). They are focused on the P&B Outcomes on employment promotion and enterprises development. For P&B 2018-19 Outcome 1: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects and Outcome 4: Promoting sustainable enterprises; and for P&B 2020-21 Outcome 3: Economic, social and environmental transitions for full productive and freely chosen employment and decent work for all, and Outcome 4: Sustainable enterprises as generators of employment and promoters of innovation and decent work.

The four projects subjected to this evaluation are presented below:

## **1. Project Employment and integrated local development in Comoros (EILDC (COM102 - P&B 2018-19)**

### **Project results and planned products**

Outcome 1: Institutional capacity building of local institutions, including tripartite constituents, to assess, design and implement employment programs for peace and resilience.

- Output 1.1: Increased awareness of local institutions, tripartite constituents and other key actors on the importance of youth employment for peace and resilience
- Output 1.2: Local institutions and tripartite constituents have improved knowledge and capacities to design, implement and evaluate employment programs.

Outcome 2: Increased decent employment opportunities through investments and entrepreneurship of young vulnerable women and men: Civil society organizations are strengthened to support the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises through business start-up kits for young people and women, and agricultural cooperatives to support to strengthen production capacity, in order to support the national economy and strengthen peace and resilience in the Comoros

- Output 2.1: Development of micro, small and medium-sized cooperatives that create decent jobs and benefit from non-financial and financial support services
- Output 2.2: Launch of new youth and women businesses in social and environmental services

### **Period and target groups**

The project is implemented from January 2018 to December 2020 in the three most vulnerable communes of the Comoros (in the islands of Mohéli, Anjouan and Ngazidza). The ultimate beneficiaries of the project are vulnerable women and men, in particular poor and unemployed young women and men.

The government institutions at central and local level, workers and employers organizations as well as civil society organizations are also the direct beneficiaries of the project.

### **Management arrangements**

The project was implemented by a technical management team composed of a National Project Administrator s; and a National Engineer based in Moroni, Comoro.

The project budget is US\$ 1,000,000.

## **2. Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia (SOM 101 – P&B 2018-19)**

### **Objectives and outputs**

Objective 1 To develop policies and programmes to enhance employment generation with particular focus on youth employment

- Output 1.1: Employment policy and strategy for Somalia developed
- Output 1.2: Programs designed and implemented to address youth employment challenges

Objective 2:- To enhance the capacity of Government and social partners in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes

- Output 2.1: Capacity of government and social partners improved to design and implement disaster risk reduction and recovery programs

### **Timeframe and target groups**

The project was implemented from December 2017 to December 2019. The target group included the Government of Somalia and social partners in terms of strengthening their capacities in legal, policy and institutional areas.

### **Project management**

The project has been conducted by an international programme manager supported by an international Security Officer and a national Admin/Finance Assistant. .

The project budget was USD 864,160.

## **3. Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour intensive investments (SLE 107 –P&B 2018-19)**

### **Objectives and outputs**

Outcome 1: Enabled environment for sustainable enterprises

- Product 1.1: Assessment report on the state of the environment for sustainable MSMEs in Sierra Leone is available
- Product 1.2: Complementary reforms towards a more conducive environment for sustainable and resilient enterprises are identified and agreed upon in consultation with tripartite partners
- Product 1.3: Embedded technical assistance to the SME Development Agency on the development of a strategy and roadmap for its operationalization

Outcome 2: Improved high quality and continuous non-financial services

- Product 2.1: SMEDA has established hands-on mechanisms to sustain non-financial service provision for women and men-owned MSMEs
- Product 2.2: Sierra Leone has introduced high quality, affordable and suitable entrepreneurship training and business support services including basic in green economy for men and women entrepreneurs
- Product 2.3: MSMEs have received entrepreneurship and skills training as well as post-service delivery support to access finance, markets, sustain their services and promote the Made in Sierra Leone initiative through environmental-friendly practices

Outcome 3: Enhanced access to financial services for MSMEs

- Product 3.1: Financial services providers offer responsible and client centric financial services
- Product 3.2: Entrepreneurs make informed and effective financial decisions and know, understand and use effectively the financial services that are available to them
- Product 3.3: Coordination among financial and non-financial services providers, industry association and regulator is improved through a stronger Sierra Leone Association of Microfinance Institutions (SLAMFI)

Outcome 4: Increased employment opportunities for local enterprises and youth through EIIP

- Product 4.1: Implementing agencies improve their capacity for better contracting with national and local enterprises in employment-intensive approach
- Product 4.2: Enterprises and potential entrepreneurs improve capacity to actively participate in contracting for employment intensive public works
- Product 4.3: Decent working conditions are ensured in the public workers with enhanced awareness
- Product 4.4: Youth contractors are established and capacitated to carry out small infrastructure development and maintenance projects to improve local assets and social and economic services

### **Timeframe and target groups**

The project was implemented from November 2017 to December 2019.

The direct recipients were the government (i.e. those national and local institutions working on SMEs development), employers' and workers' organizations, financial and non-financial service providers,

women and men associations form the informal economy, and industry associations academic and other relevant organization. The ultimate beneficiaries were the women and men currently operating or intending to operate MSMEs (i.e. young women and men in the informal economy, rural and .or disaster prone areas.

### **Project management**

The project has been conducted by an international programme manager and national program officer.

The project budget has been USD 1,000,000.

## **4. Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic (CAF106 P&B 2018-19)**

### **Project results and planned products**

Objective 1 Communities improving their resilience through better access to employment through skills development and employability at the local level.

- Output 1.1. Access to employment information is improved
- Output 1.2. The technical capacities of institutions and members of targeted communities are strengthened

Objective 2 Labour market institutions are strengthened to support the creation of micro-enterprises and youth cooperatives,

- Output 2.1 Micro, small and medium-sized cooperative enterprises that create decent jobs and benefit from non-financial and financial support services are created
- Output 2.2: The institutional and legal framework for the establishment of the health insurance system is defined
- Output 2.3: A social dialogue pact is put in place and operational

Objective 3. The capacities of communities are strengthened to rehabilitate and build infrastructures through labour-based approaches.

- Output 3.1 Public institutions integrate labour-based approaches in the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of their investment programs
- Output 3.2. Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and rural development are carried out

### **Period and target groups**

The project started in October 2017 and will end in December 2020. The target groups are the constituents of the ILO (governance and employers 'and workers' organizations) and three youth cooperatives from Pk5 and Bimbo3 around Bangui (Coopérative des Artisans Fabriquant de Bricks and Pavers SARA-MBI-GA-ZO, Cooperative of Road Maintenance Building Together, and Cooperative of Building Technicians Union Makes the Strength of Bimbo3 and Pk5.

### **Management arrangements**

The project has been conducted by an international program manager and national program officer.

The project budget is USD 1,000,000.

## **II. Evaluation background**

As per ILO evaluation policy, the RBSA-funded projects with budget of US\$ 800,000 and over are subjected to an independent final evaluations for accountability, learning, planning, and building knowledge. It should be conducted in the context of criteria and approaches for international development assistance as established by the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standard; and the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

The evaluation is managed by an evaluation manager not linked with the projects or the Countries offices covering the project, and implemented by an evaluation team. The evaluation follows the same standard valid for independent evaluation of Development Cooperation projects.

This evaluation will adopt a “clustered approach” which means that the evaluation will examine a cluster of four projects located in Africa that address employment and enterprises development in context of fragility. This approach will allow a comprehensive coverage of various projects with greater opportunities for feedback on the overall strategy as well as mutual learning across project locations.

In addition, the clustered approach is likely to be more cost and time efficient compared to individual project evaluations. It will apply a scope, purpose and methodology comparable to what would be used for an individual project evaluation.

### **III. Purpose of the Evaluation**

The cluster final independent evaluation has the following objectives:

- Assess the extent to which the projects have achieved the stated objectives and expected results, while identifying the supporting factors and constraints that have led to them;
- Identify unexpected positive and unexpected results of the projects
- Assess the extent to which the projects outcomes will be sustainable;
- Establish the relevance of the project design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO, UN and the national development frameworks
- Identify lessons learned and potential good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further;
- Provide recommendations to project stakeholders to promote sustainability and support further development of the project outcomes

### **IV. Scope of the Evaluation**

The scope of the evaluation covers the entire project period from the start of the implementation to its end and all project objectives and results focusing not only in what has been achieved but how and why.

The evaluation should be carried out in adherence with the relevant parts of the ILO Evaluation Framework and Strategy; ILO Policy Guidelines for Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning and Managing for Evaluations and UNEG Principles. For all practical purposes, this ToR and ILO Evaluation policies and guidelines define the overall scope of this evaluation. Recommendations, emerging from the evaluation, should be strongly linked to the findings of the evaluation and should provide clear guidance to stakeholders on how they can address them.

The evaluation will integrate gender equality and non-discrimination as a crosscutting concern throughout its deliverables and process, with special attention to women workers. It should be addressed in line with EVAL guidance note n° 4 and Guidance Note n° 7 to ensure stakeholder participation. Furthermore, it should pay attention to issues related to social dialogue, international labour standards and fair environmental transition. Moreover, the impact of the COVID19 in the completion of the project will be taken into account.

### **V. Clients**

The primary clients of the evaluation are the ILO constituents and ILO Country Offices and relevant DWT and HQ Departments.

### **VI. Evaluation criteria and questions**

The evaluation will cover the following evaluation criteria

- i) Relevance, coherence and strategic fit,
- ii) validity of design,

- iii) projects effectiveness,
- iv) efficiency,
- v) impact orientation and sustainability as defined in ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation.

Analysis of gender-related concerns will be based on the ILO Guidelines on Considering Gender in Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects (September, 2007). The evaluation will be conducted following UN evaluation standards and norms and the *Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management* developed by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

In line with the results-based approach applied by the ILO, the evaluation will focus on identifying and analysing results through addressing key questions related to the evaluation criteria and the achievement of the outcomes/objectives of the project using the indicators in the logical framework of the project.

The evaluation should address the questions bellow. Other aspects can be added as identified by the evaluator in accordance with the given purpose and in consultation with the evaluation manager. Any fundamental changes to the evaluation criteria and questions should be agreed between the evaluation manager and the evaluator, and reflected in the inception report.

### **Key Evaluation Questions**

The evaluator shall examine the following key issues:

1. Relevance, coherence and strategic fit,
  - Are the projects relevant to the achievements of the government's strategy, policy and plan, the DWCPs as well as other relevant regional and global commitments such as the UNDAF, SDGs targets and ILOs strategic Objectives (Programme & Budget 2018-19 and 2020-21 as applicable)?
  - Are the projects relevant to the felt needs of the beneficiaries?
  - How well the projects complement and fit with other ongoing ILO programmes and projects in the country.
  - What links are established so far with other activities of the UN or non-UN international development aid organizations at local level and/ or Government partners?
2. Validity of design
  - Do the projects have a clear theory of change that outlines the causality?
  - Have the projects design clearly defined achievable outcomes and outputs?
  - Have the projects planning included a useful monitoring and evaluation framework including outcomes indicators with baselines and targets?
  - Did the projects design include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?
  - Were the implementation approaches valid and realistic? Have the projects adequately taken into account the risks of blockage?
  - Have the projects addressed gender and disability inclusion, and of other vulnerable groups, related issues in the project document?
  - Have the projects integrate the International labour standards application?
  - Were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design and implementation of the projects, including working through social dialogue?
3. Project effectiveness
  - To what extent have the projects achieved their results at outcome and output levels, with particular attention to the project objectives?
  - What, if any, unintended results of the projects have been identified or perceived?
  - What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects' success in attaining their targets?
  - Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the project's result areas?
  - To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness and how the projects have addressed this influence?

- Do the (adapted) intervention models used in the projects suggest an intervention model for similar crisis response?
4. Efficiency of resource use
    - How efficiently have resources (human resources, time, expertise, funds etc.) been allocated and used to provide the necessary support and to achieve the broader projects objectives?
    - To what extent have the disbursements and projects expenditures been in line with expected budgetary plans? Why?
  5. Effectiveness of management arrangements
    - Have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties involved into implementation and monitoring?
    - Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?
    - Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the project?
    - Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?
  6. Orientation to impact and sustainability
    - To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries?
    - What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?
    - Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO projects support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic

## VII. Methodology

The evaluation should be carried out in adherence with the relevant parts of the ILO Evaluation Framework and Strategy; ILO Policy Guidelines for Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning and Managing for Evaluations and UNEG Principles.

In particular, this evaluation will follow the ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation; and the ILO EVAL Policy Guidelines Checklist 3 “Preparing the inception report”; Checklist 4 “Validating methodologies”; Checklist 5 “Preparing the evaluation report” and Checklist “6 Rating the quality of evaluation report”.

Recommendations, emerging from the evaluation, should be strongly linked to the findings of the evaluation and should provide clear guidance to all stakeholders on how they can address them, indicating in each one to whom is directed, Priority, Resources required and timeframe (long, medium or short).

Due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the world of work, this evaluation will be conducted in the context of criteria and approaches outlined in the ILO internal guide: Implications of COVID-19 on evaluations in the ILO: An internal Guide on adapting to the situation (version March 25, 2020 [here](#))

A team leader consultant will conduct the evaluation virtually (home-based) with support of national consultants for fieldwork in Comoros, Sierra Leone and CAR. For Somalia he will conduct the full data collection virtually.



The evaluation will be carried out through a desk review and field visits to the project sites in Comoros, Sierra Leone and CAR. Interviews and consultations will take place with implementing partners, beneficiaries, the ILO and other key stakeholders.

The draft evaluation report will be shared with all relevant stakeholders and a request for comments will be asked for 10 working days. The evaluator will seek to apply a variety of evaluation techniques – desk review, meetings with stakeholders, focus group discussions, and observation during the field visits and virtually as applicable. Triangulation of sources and techniques should be central.

### **Desk review**

The Desk review will include the following information sources:

- Projects document
- Work plans
- Progress reports
- Project budget and related financial reports
- Reports from various activities (including trainings, workshops, task force meetings, video conferences etc.)
- Others as required

All documents will be made available by the Evaluation manager in coordination with Country Offices, in a drop-box (or similar) at the start of the evaluation.

In addition, the evaluation team will conduct initial interviews with the COs officers involved closely with the projects. The objective of the consultation is to reach a common understanding regarding expectations and available data sources.

The Inception report will cover status of logistical arrangements, project background and materials, key evaluation questions and evaluation indicators, evaluation matrix, detailed work plan, list of stakeholders to be interviewed, outline of the stakeholders' workshop and of the final report, and all data collection tools following EVAL Checklist 3 (see Annex 1). The Inception report that will operationalize the ToRs and should be approved by the evaluation manager before moving to data collection at field level.

The Evaluation team leader will receive a list of key stakeholders by project by the EM. If the Evaluator requires contacting other stakeholders, beyond the list, this can be discussed during the preparation of the Inception report.

The desk review phase will produce the Inception report that will operationalize the ToRs and should be approved by the evaluation manager.

### **Data collection/field work**

The current COVID-19 pandemic restricts mobility for country and field visits to international consultants. In line with these restrictions, the evaluation data collection methodology will combine remote/virtual (evaluation team leader) and field work data collection (evaluation team member for CAR, Comoros and Sierra Leone). This will require enhanced engagement and collaboration with the project team in terms of organizing the contact with stakeholders.

The Evaluators will undertake group and/or individual discussions. The Country offices will provide all their support in organizing these virtual and face-to-face interviews to the best extent possible. The evaluators will ensure that opinions and perceptions of women are equally reflected in the interviews and that gender-specific questions are included.

The evaluator is encouraged to propose alternative mechanism or techniques for the data collection phase. These will be discussed with the project and the evaluation manager at the Inception phase. Any alternative should be reflected in the Inception report.

### **Interviews with ILO Staff**

A first meeting will be held with the ILO CO Director and the Program unit officer.. The evaluator will also interview project staff of other ILO related projects, and ILO staff responsible for financial, administrative

and technical backstopping of the project. An indicative list of persons to be interviewed will be prepared by the NPO in consultation with the Evaluation Manager.

### **Interviews with Key Stakeholders the project sites**

The evaluator will meet relevant stakeholders including, project beneficiaries and regional and local level government officials and experts to examine the delivery of outcomes and outputs at local level. List of beneficiaries will be provided by the project for selection of appropriate sample respondents by the evaluators. The evaluator will select the field visit locations, based on criteria defined by her/him. The criteria and locations of data collection should be reflected in the inception report mentioned above.

At the end of the data collection, the evaluators will organize, with logistic support from the project, a stakeholders' virtual workshop to present the preliminary findings of the evaluation to key stakeholders

### **Report Writing Phase**

Based on the inputs from discussions and interviews with key stakeholders, the evaluation team leader with inputs for the national consultants will draft the evaluation report. The draft report will be sent to the Evaluation Manager for a methodological review, and then to be shared with key stakeholders for their inputs/comments.

The Evaluation Manager will consolidate all comments including methodological comments and will then share them with the Evaluator for consideration in finalizing the report.

The Evaluator will finalize the report, taking into consideration the stakeholder comments and submit the final version for approval of EVAL.

One evaluation report integrating analysis form the four projects is expected. This means that specificities by project should be considered only to provide enough arguments for the analysis. An annex will present a tale by project to produce a summary of what the project have been achieved and way (brief discussion by objective in each project)

## **VIII. Deliverables**

Then deliverables will be in English, with an Executive summary of the evaluation in French (draft and final version)

1. Inception report (with detailed work plan and data collection instruments following EVAL Checklist 3 – see annex)
2. A concise draft and final Evaluation Reports (maximum 30-40 pages plus annexes and following EVAL Checklists 5 and 6 -see Annex) as per the following proposed structure:
  - Cover page with key project and evaluation data (using ILO EVAL template)
  - Executive Summary
  - Acronyms
  - Description of the project
  - Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation
  - Methodology and limitations
  - Clearly identified findings for each criterion (looking at the four projects in an integrated manner)
  - Conclusions
  - Recommendations
  - Lessons learned and good practices (briefly in the main report and a detailed in ILO EVAL template, annexed to the report)
  - Annexes:
    - TOR
    - Evaluation questions matrix
    - Data Table on Project Progress in achieving its targets by indicators with comments
    - Evaluation schedule
    - Documents reviewed
    - List of people interviewed

- Lessons learned and good practices (using ILO-EVAL template)
- Any other relevant documents

3. Evaluation Summary using the ILO template.

All draft and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided to the evaluation manager in electronic version compatible with Word for Windows.

**. Management arrangements, work plan & time frame**

**Evaluation Manager**

The evaluator will report to the evaluation manager, Ricardo Furman (furman@ilo.org) and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the evaluation manager should issues arise. The evaluation will be carried out with full logistical support of the project staff, with the administrative support of the ILO Offices in Abuja, Addis, Antananarivo, and Kinshasa.

**Work plan & Time Frame**

The total duration of the evaluation process is estimated to 50 working days for the team leader and 11 for the team members.

N.	Activity	Responsible	Team leader No days	Team member <sup>54</sup> No days	Dates
1	Prepare a detailed Evaluation Budget and Draft the TOR a) EM develops b) COs provides feedback EM finalizes	Evaluation manager	0	0	October 2020
2	List of stakeholders (ILO all levels, national and donor) to share the TORs draft for comments (name, position, institution, and email)	Country Offices	0	0	October 2020
3	Share the TORS with stakeholders for comments	NPC	0	0	Oct-Nov 2020
4	Integrate comments from constituents and final TORs	EM	0	0	Oct-Nov 2020
5	Publish Call for expression of interest of evaluators	EM	0	0	Oct-Nov 2020
6	Selection of team leader (int or national) and team members( national)	EM	0	0	Nov. 2020
7	Contract of team leader and national evaluator: IRIS and contract signature	EM and Country Offices	0	0	Dec-Jan. 2021
8	Launch the Evaluation and Briefing to the team leader	CTA/Project	1	0	1 Feb.
9	Desk-review phase and Inception report approval	EM	14	0	2-19 Feb
10	Data collection and field visits	Evaluator with project support	23	11	22 Feb-26 March
11	Draft report development	Evaluator with project sup.	10	0	29 March-9 April

<sup>54</sup> For CAR, Comoros and Sierra Leone

12	Methodological review of the draft before circulation	Evaluator	0	0	12-16 April 2021
13	Circulate the draft report to project team and stakeholders	EM	0	0	20-30 April
14	Consolidate comments from stakeholders and share with the Evaluator	EM	0	0	3-5 May
15	Incorporate comments from project team and stakeholders	EM	0	0	6-7 May
16	Review by EVAL and approval	Evaluator	2	0	10-14 May
17	EVAL send to ROAF-RPU for dissemination and Management response	EM and EVAL	0	0	17-21 May
	Total number of days for evaluators		50	11	

## IX. Evaluation team

### Evaluation team responsibilities

<b>Evaluation team leader responsibilities</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Briefing with ILO/ Evaluation Manager</li> <li>b. Desk review of programme documents</li> <li>c. Preliminary interviews with the CO Director and projects officers</li> <li>d. Development of the Inception report including the evaluation instrument</li> <li>e. Undertake interviews with stakeholders (skype, telephone, or similar means)</li> <li>f. Draft evaluation report</li> <li>g. Finalise evaluation report</li> </ul>

<b>Evaluation team members ( xxx) responsibilities</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Support the desk review of programme documents</li> <li>b. Undertake interviews with stakeholders (skype, telephone, or similar means)</li> <li>c. Field visits</li> <li>d. Provide inputs in the draft and final evaluation report</li> </ul>

### Profile of Evaluation team

The Evaluator team should have the following qualifications:

#### Team leader

- Advanced university degree in social sciences or related graduate qualifications;
- A minimum of 7 years of professional experience in evaluating social development projects initiatives; including role of sole evaluator or team leader, experience in the area of migration will be an added advantage;
- Knowledge of the projects thematic areas and countries will be an advantage
- Proven experience with logical framework approaches and other strategic planning approaches, M&E methods and approaches (including quantitative, qualitative and participatory), information analysis and report writing;
- Fluency in written and spoken English and French required.
- Knowledge and experience of the UN System of ILO's roles and mandate and its tripartite structure as well as UN evaluation norms and its programming is desirable;

- Excellent consultative, communication and interview skills;
- Demonstrated ability to deliver quality results within strict deadlines.
- Not have been involved in the projects.

#### **Team member (national consultant for Central Africa Republic, Comoros and Sierra Leone)**

- University degree in social sciences or related graduate qualifications;
- A minimum of 5 years of professional experience in evaluating social development projects initiatives or related social research as team member (i.e. data collection and analysis), on the areas of the project to be evaluated will be an added advantage;
- Proven experience with logical framework approaches and other strategic planning approaches, M&E methods and approaches (including quantitative, qualitative and participatory), information analysis and report writing;
- Fluency in written and spoken English or French required. Knowledge of local languages will be an asset
- Knowledge and experience of the UN System of ILO's roles and mandate and its tripartite structure as well as UN evaluation norms and its programming is desirable;
- Understanding of the development context of the Project Country is an advantage;
- Excellent communication and interview skills;
- Demonstrated ability to deliver quality results within strict deadlines.
- Not have been involved in the project.
- Based in the country capital (Bangui, Moroni or Freetown)

#### **Management Arrangements**

The evaluator will report to the evaluation manager (Ricardo Furman furman@ilo.org) and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the evaluation manager, should issues arise.

For this evaluation, the final report and submission procedure will be as follows:

- a. The Evaluation Consultant will submit a draft evaluation report to the Evaluation Manager
- b. After reviewing compliance with the TORs and accuracy, the Evaluation Manager will forward to all key stakeholders, including the project and the donor, for comment and factual check;
- c. The Evaluation Manager will consolidate the comments and send these to the Evaluation Consultant;
- d. The Evaluation Consultant will finalize the report, incorporating any comments deemed appropriate and providing a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated. He/she will submit the final report to the Evaluation Manager;
- e. The Evaluation Manager will forward the report to the Regional evaluation officer and then shared, for last review and approval, with EVAL. Feedback from EVAL on corrections is required before approval could take place.
- f. Once approved, EVAL publishes the report in i-eval Discovery and informs PARDEV and/or the ILO responsible official for the submission of the approved report to the key stakeholders, including the donor.

#### **Resources**

The following resources are required:

- a. Consultant fees for team leader 44 and team members in Comoros, Central African Republic and Sierra Leone 14 working days
- b. Field visit support including DSA for national consultants according with ILO travel policies
- c. Communication costs

## **Annex 1 Relevant documents and tools on the ILO Evaluation Policy**

1. Code of conduct form (To be signed by the evaluator)

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206205/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206205/lang--en/index.htm)

2. Checklist No. 3 Writing the inception report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165972/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165972/lang--en/index.htm)

3. Checklist 5 Preparing the evaluation report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165967/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165967/lang--en/index.htm)

4. Checklist 6 Rating the quality of evaluation report

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165968/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165968/lang--en/index.htm)

5. Template for lessons learned and Emerging Good Practices

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206158/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206158/lang--en/index.htm)

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_206159/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_206159/lang--en/index.htm)

6. Guidance note 7 Stakeholders participation in the ILO evaluation

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165982/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165982/lang--en/index.htm)

7. Guidance note 4 Integrating gender equality in M&E of projects

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_165986/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_165986/lang--en/index.htm)

8. Template for evaluation title page

[http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_166357/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_166357/lang--en/index.htm)

9. Template for evaluation summary: <http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/edmas/eval/template-summary-en.doc>

## Annex 2: Documentation reviewed

BIT/ Gouvernemnt de Programme pays pour la promotion du Travail Décent en République Centrafricaine 2017 – 2021

BIT/Gouvernemnt de la Union des Comores: Programme Pays pour le Travail Décent 2015 – 2019 – Union des Comores

Government of Sierra Leone, 2015: National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone

Government of Sierra Leone, 2012: Agenda for Prosperity 2013-2018

ILO, 2021: Core Voluntary Funding (RBSA) for ILO development cooperation.

ILO, 2020: Guidance Note 3.3. Clustered Evaluations

ILO, 2020: Jobs for Peace and Resilience. An ILO flagship programme. Key facts and figures.

LO, 2020: Final Progress Report NOVEMBER 2017 TO DECEMBER 2019. Increasing employment creation and opportunities in sierra leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services and labour intentensive investments

ILO, 2019: Programme and Budget for the biennium 2020-21

ILO, 2017: Programme and Budget for the biennium 2018-19

ILO, 2017: SOM101 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

ILO, 2017: SLE 107 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

ILO, 2017: CAF 106 Minute approval 2016-2017. Project document

ILO, 2016 VF Prodoc RBSA EDLIC Comoros. Proposal

ILO/Egger, P., 2020: Review of the RBSA funding modality,

ILO/Government of Somalia, 2016: Decent Work Country Programme Somalia 2017 - 2019

ILO/Government of Sierra Leone, 2009: Decent Work Country Programme Sierra Leone (2010-2012)

Nations Unis, 2014: Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l’Aide au Développement en Union des Comores 2015-2021

République Centrafricaine, 2016 : Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix 2017 - 2021

République Centrafricaine, 2016 : Politique Nationale de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle (PNEFP)

UNEG, 2008: UN Evaluation Group code of conduct

UNEG, 2016: UN Evaluation Group Norms and Standards

Union des Comores, 2014 : Strategie de croissance acceleree et de developpement durable (SCA2D) 2015-2019

Union des Comores, 2015 : Stratégie de développement de la Formation Technique et Professionnelle aux Comores 2014 – 2019

Union de Comores/BIT, 2020: Emploi et développement local intégré aux Comores. Revue du Project EDLIC 2018-2020.

United Nations, 2017: UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020

**Internet sources:**

United Kingdom government

<https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/sierra-leone/safety-and-security>

<https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/comoros/safety-and-security>

United Nations

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085602>


<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1089482>



# Annex 3: Infographic summarizing the cluster evaluation and results


**Evaluation process**  
208 stakeholders consulted

Central African Republic, Comoros, Sierra Leone and Somalia (48,7% female)  
Telephone interviews: 55 stakeholders  
Field visits: 153 stakeholders



Project period: Comoros: 01/2018 – 12/2020 Budget: US\$ 1m  
Project period: Central African Rep.: 10/2017 – 12/2020 Budget: US\$ 1m

**Evaluation period: February to June 2021**




Desk review, virtual briefing meetings, telephone interviews, field visits (Sierra Leone)


Project period: Somalia: 12/2017 – 12/2019 Budget: US\$ 864,160  
Project period: Sierra Leone: 11/2017 – 12/2019 Budget: US\$ 1m

**Intended evaluation users**

ILO constituents and ILO Country Offices and relevant Decent Work Country Teams (DWT) and headquarters (HQ) Departments in Geneva




**Evaluation purpose**



Learning and accountability of four RBSA funded projects in ILO in post-conflict countries across Africa


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**Evaluation results** **Relevance**




- Highly relevant in post-conflict countries where the ILO is less present and lacking opportunities, particularly for rural youth and women.

**Efficiency**




- Cluster was appropriately staffed in each of the countries, experiencing, however at times, significant delays in recruiting project teams;
- Responsible country offices in the region, DWTs and where applicable ILO HQ provided relevant project implementation and administrative support
- The financial resources for the RBSA cluster are well above (71%) the average RBSA project funding.
- compliance with expenditure plans was high to very high, up to 97,4% in Comoros.

**Validity of project design**




- Patchy project designs. Lack key elements such as M&E or exit strategy. Gender and international labour standards well-reflected.
- Tripartism, and social dialogue unevenly addressed. Fair transition to environment absent.
- Reconstructed theory of change for the cluster reveals significant shortcomings in the realism of project designs.

**Effectiveness of management arrangements**




- Mixed across the cluster, affected by highly complex project environments and internal lacunae;
- Not having an ILO office with a bank account significantly affected the projects' management arrangements.

**Cluster results & effectiveness**



- Outcome level across the projects are moderately satisfactory in the context of very fragile post-conflict settings.

**Sustainability**



- Cluster is truly struggling to sustain RBSA project results;
- Central African Republic and Comoros: lack of success in leveraging donor funding for follow-up; Sierra Leone: institutional challenges in the leading project partner; Somalia: Head of ILO Office currently unable to return to the country among growing political tensions in the country.

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**Learning**

**Use of the employment-intensive approach in RBSA projects in fragile states**

Suited for short-term employment creation where income sources are urgently needed for reconciliation

**RBSA projects in countries with ILO residency vs. non-resident status**

Physical presence in the UNCT facilitates access of the ILO to joint UN programming

**Role of the ILO HQ Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in RBSA projects in post-conflict settings**

Theory of Change in place for programming and a dedicated technical support team

**Disability in RBSA projects**

Insufficiently mainstreamed among ILO staff but entry points showing for needs assessments, stakeholder analysis

Without a cluster evaluation, the four projects would not have benefitted individually from a final evaluation due to their budget sizes

**Recommendations (high to very high priority)**


**1** ILO: RBSA projects to operate as a cluster if design aligned to the same ILO P&B outcomes or an ILO programming approach.

**2** ILO: RBSA project design should strengthen quality assurance, including for M&E.

**3** ILO Country Office (CO) Abuja: The Country Director should engage the Small and Medium Size Enterprise Development Agency (SMEDA) in Sierra Leone & consider institutional systems performance audit prior to EU-funded follow-up project.

**4** ILO: keep funding RBSA projects in post-conflict settings, regardless the very high risks of short-term results only. Genuine engagement for "leaving no one behind" requires risk-taking.

**5** ILO Somalia: The Head of the Office should return to the country as soon as possible to represent the ILO in the UNCT and take leadership in facilitating social dialogue.



Source: A. Engelhardt, 2021: Final independent cluster evaluation report of four International Labour Organization (ILO) projects on employment and sustainable enterprise development in Africa.  
Design: A. Engelhardt, 05/2021

## Annex 4: List of people interviewed

### ILO

Name	Position	Organization
Mr. Ahmadou Tidiane Guisset	Former CTA Central African Republic	ILO Central African Republic
Mr Alexio Musindo	Director- ILO Office for Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, and Special Representative to AU, EAC	ILO Addis Abeba
Mr Ali Abdulkadir	Technical Officer	ILO Somalia
Ms Clara Ramaromanana	Programme Officer	ILO Antananarivo
Mr Cyrano Afidi LEBOGSO OMBOLO	Spécialiste HIMO	ILO Yaounde
Mr David Dorkenoo	Officer -in-Charge	ILO Abuja
Mr Dereje Alemu	Backstopping officer	ILO Addis Ababa
Ms Emeka-Anuna, Chinyere	Senior Programme Officer	ILO Abuja
Ms Fatime Christiane Ndiaye	Senior gender specialist	ILO Dakar
Mr Federcio Negro	Chief, Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR)	ILO Geneva
Ms Julie Kazagui	Regional Specialist, Employers Activities	ILO Pretoria
Mr Lassina Traore	Principal technical specialist for employers activities	ILO Yaounde
Mr MADAÏ BOUKAR ALI	Spécialiste Emploi et développement productif	ILO Yaounde
Ms Marinna Nyamekye	Senior Specialist, Workers 'Activities, Decent Work Team-Country Office-Yaounde	ILO Yaounde
Mr Mban Kabu	Regional Specialist, Workers' Education	ILO Addis Abeba
Mr Mohamed Abdoulhamid	Former CTA Comoros	
Mr Mohammed Mwamadzingo	Regional desk officer for Africa; Focal point for sustainable enterprises	ILO HQ
Mr <u>Munyaradzi Hove</u> ;	Former CTA Sierra Leone	ILO Sierra Leone
Ms. Nieves Thomet	Technical Specialist, Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR)	ILO Geneva
Ms NTOYA MAKELA Gomez	Assistant Principal au Programme Bureau Pays de l'OIT pour l'Angola, Centrafrique, Congo, Gabon, RDC & Tchad	ILO Kinshasa
Mr. Patrick Somse	Former CTA Central African Republic	ILO Central African Republic
Mr Roger Nkambu	Programme Officer	ILO Kinshasa
Mr Saad Gilani	Former CTA Somalia	ILO Pakistan

**RBSA project countries (non-ILO stakeholders)****Central African Republic****Cadres rencontrés individuellement à Bangui**

N°	NOM ET PRENOM	FONCTION	STRUCTURES
	Charles SIANGUE	DirCab Ministère Travail	ministère du travail
1	Jean de Dieu YOGONDOUNGA	DG Protection Sociale	ministère du travail
2	Jean Paulin SANGATA	Ancien cadre ministère de travail	ministère du travail
3	Bienvenu Hervé KOVOUNGBO	Directeur de la coopération multilatérale /Comité Multisectoriel HIMO	ministère du plan et de l'économie
4	Noel RAMADAN	SGA/USTC	organisation des travailleurs
5	Louis Marie KOGRENGBO	ODSTC	organisation des travailleurs
6	Oumarou SANDA BOUBA	SG/FOC	organisation des travailleurs
7	Faustine Théodora	SG/CNTC	organisation des travailleurs
8	Gilles Gilbert GRESENGUET	(UNPC)	organisations des employeurs
9	Laurence NASSIF	(GICA)	organisations des employeurs
10	Gilles POTOLOT NGBANGANDIMBO	Secrétaire Général GICA	organisations des employeurs
11	Ghislaine PSIMHIS	GICA	organisations des employeurs
12	Vincent PINGO	Coopérative des jeunes pour la construction bâtiments	coopératives
13	Sylvain DEMANGHO	Chargé de Mission	Ministère de l'action humanitaire
14	Sylvie MBETIBANGUI	Point Focal	Ministère de l'agriculture
15	Richard GUEREE GBA-GBA	Président commission élection	Autorité Nationale des Élections
16	Béatrice HON EPAYE	Parlementaire (Présidente)	Forum des femmes parlementaires
17	Théodore KOINAM	Directeur jeunesse	Ministère de la jeunesse

**Personnes rencontrées individuellement à Yaloké**

N°	Nom Prénom	Fonction	Sexe
1	Thérèse AZENE	Conseillère (Club Dimitra)	F
2	Marie GOTIANGA	Membre (Club Dimitra)	F
3	Abib KATIDJA	Chargée de matériels	M
4	Idriss OUMAR	SG Dimitra	M
5	Assania SAKAIRA	Présidente Dimitra	F
6	Innocent YAMALET	Enseignant	M
7	KPALAMBATA Jean	Pasteur	M
8	Pierre INGANDO	Directeur regional jeunesse	M
9	Zéphérin KONA	Commissaire police	M

10	LOLA André	Proviseur du Lycée	M
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#### Personnes rencontrées individuellement à Boda 1et II

N°	Nom Prénom	Fonction	Sexe
1	Blaise ZINGUENE	Sous-Préfet	M
2	Marie YASSIGUIA	Enseignante	F
3	Mariam BARNIL	SG Mairie	F
4	Moussa AMADOU	Chef de quartier	M
5	Issa Abdouraman	DR maison des jeunes	M
6	Jean Jacques MATHAMALE	Société civile	M
7	St Jerome SITAMON	Coordonnateur	M
8	Simplice Désiré KOZO	Chef de projet REPALCA	M
9	Simplice KOUARANGA	SG REPALCA	M
10	Philomène BIA	Coordo BATA GBAKO	F
11	Yves OMON	Chef de projet CRAD	M
12	Basile IMANJA	Société civile	M
13	Ulrich LASSIDA	Indépendant	M
14	Chantal SEKOLA	Commerçante	F
15	Waboue	Enseignante	F
16	Marie YANGA	Commercante	M

#### Personnes rencontrées en Focus Groups au sein des différentes associations locales à Yaloké

N°	Nom Prénom	Fonction	Sexe
1	Paul KENGEMBA	President	M
2	Thérèse KADA	CP	F
3	Maurice KOSSI	SG	M
4	André LOMA	Conseiller	M
5	Marie Olive Gloria GBANGBALA	Présidente	F
6	Félicité LAKAI	membre	F
7	Syba KATIDJA	SG	F
8	Hyacinth LONGBA	Chargé de programme	M
9	Sylvain FIOBOY	RAF	M
10	Senoussi GADJI	Membre	M
11	Princia GBADJAKO	Membre	F

12	Birgitte YABE	Membre	F
13	Marie KEREGBA	Présidente	F
14	Aminatou DAOUDA	Membre	M
15	Awa ADAM	Membre	F
16	Inès KORONDO	Membre	F
17	Ache FOTOR		M
18	Jocelyn SENGUEMON	Présidente	M
19	Anicha BABOUE	membre	F
20	Rosalien YAKITE	membre	M
21	Edwige BALEMBI	membre	F
22	Joséph MANDA	membre	M
23	Chantal SALIFOU	membre	F
24	Charles GUIGLAS	Membre	M
25	Marie NGAO	membre	F
26	Célestin SEPOUNEDJI	membre	M
27	Angèle NDAPOTO	Membre CNP	F
28	Félicité KO-NGANAM	Présidente	F
29	Fabrice ADE	Assistant au Programme	M
30	Nicole KOUE	Présidente section femmes	F
31	Crépin AZOUKA	Président	M
32	Marthe TOUAGUENE	Présidente	F
33	KASSAI Max Landry	Coordonnateur	M
34	Fiacre SALABE	Chargé de communication	M
35	Françoise KABRAL	Conseillère	F

### Personnes rencontrées en Focus Groups à Boda 1et II

N°	Nom Prénom	Fonction	Sexe
1	David OUANGANDO	SG	M
2	Edouard ZAMA	Comptable	M
3	Salomon YAMALE	Formateur	M
4	Youssef komobaya	CP	M
5	Bruno NGOUGNOGBIA	Président	M
6	Vermond KAINÉ	Animateur	M
7	Edith ASSANI	Directrice programme	F
8	Léopold KOUANDOGUI	MP	M
9	Anatole NDOMA	SG	F
10	Hélène KOKO	Trésorière	M
11	Ambasso Issa	Président	M

12	Fatime ABDELKARIM	Membre	F
13	Francois KOUBDA	Membre	M
14	Paul ALIOU	Membre	M
15	Alain KPITOUA	Membre	M
16	M SIDIC	Membre	M
17	Amina MOUSSA	Membre	F
18	Innocent ZARA	Membre	M
19	Zanabali AMATE	Membre	M
20	Kadjidjia SAIDOU	Membre	F
21	Awa MOUSSA	Membre	F
22	Boniface YAMALE	Membre	M
23	Rabelais MOUSSA	Membre	M
24	Kaltouma MOUDANI	Membre	F
25	Sogal KALIOUMA	Membre	M
26	NDAMA Moussa	Membre	M
27	ZAROUA Oumar	Membre	F
28	APSITA Amssou	Membre	F
29	MAIMOUNA Abdoulaye	Membre	F
30	NOURASSAME Mamasale	Membre	M
31	KALTOUMA Ibrahime	Membre	M
32	NDAPOU Armelle	Membre	F
33	AZENE Apsatou	Membre	F
34	MARIAME Ousmane	Membre	M
35	SADIA Abouba	Membre	M
37	TADJI Saidou	Membre	M
38	ADJARA Issa	Membre	M
39	RAMATA Saidou	Membre	M
40	BIBATOU Asoubairou	Membre	M
41	ADAMA Issa	Membre	M
42	ALIMA Oumarou	Membre	M
43	ADJIDJA Amadou	Membre	M
44	ZAKARIA Yaouba	Membre	M
45	Rose Wambiti	Présidente	F
46	Claude NDEMABROTO	Membre	M
47	MANDAZOU Julien	Membre	M
48	GONABRIA Hortence	Membre	F
49	TANGBA YASSI Rose	Membre	F
50	MAITRE Jean	Membre	M

51	GBALINDJI Anathasie	Membre	F
52	Fatime MOUSTAFA	Membre	F
53	NDOKOLYSSIO Olga	Membre	F
54	KOTAZO Evelyn	Membre	M
55	YASSIGBABIA Anne	Membre	F
56	LENZANEDE Marie	Membre	F
57	EBEREYO Grace à Dieu	Membre	M
58	KOTAZO Hervé	Membre	F
59	BROUNGBAKOU Arsène	Membre	M
60	MANIOU Florent	Membre	M
61	AHOUZANDJI Eloi	Membre	M
62	OUAMBETI	Membre	M
63	Darata Marie-Christine	Présidente	F
64	Horche Ndoulamo	Membre	M

#### Comoros

Name	Occupation	Location	Sex
Mr Youssoufa Ahamada	Farmer	Mboinkou	n/a
Mr Hassani Hamada	Independent consultant	Moroni	n/a
Ms Faiza Mohamed	Teacher	Moroni	n/a
Ms Mariama Houmadi	Agent	Mutsamudu	n/a
Ms Chadjarati Massoundi	n/a	Anjouan	n/a
Ms Nadjima Mohibacabaco	n/a	Moheli	n/a
Mr Moritoidhoi Soumaya	Employee	Moheli	n/a
Ms Malida Said	Civil Servant	Moheli	n/a
Mr Al Hadi Hirdani Baco	Producer	Moheli	n/a
Ms Nadjati Soilihi	Employee	Moheli	n/a
Ms Djamaldine Abdou	Farmer	Anjouan	n/a

## Sierra Leone

### Mapaki Community, Masabo, Bombali District

Name	Occupation	Role	Sex
Ms Marie Koroma	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Nancy Conteh	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Yeabu Kamara	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Zainab Kalokoh	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Marie Turay 2	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Abie Conteh	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Amie Koroma	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Babic Kargbo	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Sallay Kamara	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Fatmata Turay	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Marie Turay 1	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Susan Conteh	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Aminata Kamara	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Isata Sesay	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Ramatu Sesay	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Ms Mariama Swaray	n/a	Project beneficiary	F
Mr Bailor A. Jalloh	n/a	Trained trainer	M

### Teti-Mange community, Burreh, Kalangba , Porto Loko

Name	Occupation	Role	Sex
Ya-bom Posseh Kamara		Project beneficiary	n/a
Fatmata M. Bangura		Project beneficiary	n/a
Salamatu Bangura		Project beneficiary	n/a
Isata Bangura		Project beneficiary	n/a
Kadiatu Kamara		Project beneficiary	n/a
Kadiatu Bangura		Project beneficiary	n/a
Gibrilla B Kamara		Project beneficiary	n/a
Saidu Drico Kamara		Trained trainer	n/a



Mr Wodie Momodu	National Youth Commission	Project implementation partner	M
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Somalia

Mr Abdinasir Jimale	Director	Somalia Chamber of Commerce and Industry	
Mr Abdullahi M. Ali	Director General	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Somalia	
Mr. Abdul Esak	Senior advisor, former RBSA project focal point	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Somalia	
Mr. Omar Farouk Osman	General Secretary,	Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU)	

## Annex 5: Evaluation matrix

	Evaluation questions/issues	Proposed evaluation tools	Data source
1. Relevance and strategic fit: Were the Projects doing the right thing?	1.1 Are the projects relevant to the achievements of the government's strategy, policy and plan, the DWCPs as well as other relevant regional and global commitments such as the UNDAF, SDGs targets and ILOs strategic Objectives (Programme & Budget 2018-19 and 2020-21 as applicable)?	Document review	Projects documentation; projects stakeholders.
	1.2 Are the projects relevant to the felt needs of the beneficiaries?	Interviews with ILO project staff	
	1.3 How well the projects complement and fit with other ongoing ILO programmes and projects in the country.	On-line survey and interviews (for question 1.2, 1.4; question 1.3 for ILO country office interview)	
	1.4 What links are established so far with other activities of the UN or non-UN international development aid organizations at local level and/ or Government partners?		
2. The validity of projects designs: is the theory of change holding?	2.1 Do the projects have a clear theory of change that outlines the causality?	Document review	Projects documentation; projects stakeholders.
	2.2 <b>To what extent</b> have the project designs clearly defined achievable outcomes and outputs?	Interviews with ILO project staff and implementation partners	
	2.3 <b>To what extent</b> have the project planning processes included a useful monitoring and evaluation framework including outcomes indicators with baselines and targets?	Theory of change validation meeting	
	2.4 Did the project designs include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?		
	2.5 To what extent were the implementation approaches valid and realistic? Have the projects adequately taken into account the risks of blockage?		
	2.6 To what extent have the projects addressed gender and disability inclusion, and of other vulnerable groups, related issues in the project document?		
	2.7 To what extent have the projects integrate the International labour standards application?		
	2.8 To what extent were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design and implementation of the projects, including working through social dialogue?		

<b>3. Projects results and effectiveness: were projects results achieved, and how?</b>	3.1 To what extent have the projects achieved their results at outcome and output levels, with particular attention to the project objectives?	Document review Interviews with ILO project staff, implementation partners and beneficiaries Online-survey	Projects documentation ; projects stakeholders.
	3.2 What, if any, unintended results of the projects have been identified or perceived?		
	3.3 What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects' success in attaining their targets?		
	3.4 Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the projects' result areas?		
	3.5 To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness and how the projects have addressed this influence?		
	3.6 Do the (adapted) intervention models used in the projects suggest an intervention model for similar crisis response?		
<b>4. Efficiency: Were resources used appropriately to achieve project results?</b>	4.1 How efficiently have resources (human resources, time, expertise, funds etc.) been allocated and used to provide the necessary support and to achieve the broader projects objectives?	Document review Projects budget Interviews with ILO project staff	Projects documentation ; projects stakeholders.
	4.2 To what extent have the disbursements and projects expenditures been in line with expected budgetary plans? Why?		

5. Effectiveness of management arrangements	5.1 To what extent have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties involved into implementation and monitoring?	Document review Interviews with ILO staff	Projects documentation ; projects stakeholders;
	5.2 Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?	Online-survey: question 5.3 Telephone interviews with stakeholders: question 5.3	
	5.3 Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the projects?		
	5.4 Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?		
6. Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability: are results likely to last?	6.1 To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate projects beneficiaries?	Document review	Projects documentation ; projects stakeholders;
	6.2 To what extent are planned results of the projects likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?	Interviews with ILO staff Online-survey question	
	6.3 What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?	Telephone interviews with stakeholders	
	6.4 Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO projects support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic		

## Annex 6: Evaluation Interview guide

Name	Position	Type of organization (government, employers, workers, academia, civil society organization, UN)	Organization	Date

### (A) Relevance

1.1. To what extent do the following key components of the project take into account the needs of beneficiaries and stakeholders?

	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory
Need for developing employment policy and strategy for Somalia						
Need for programmes designed and implemented to address the youth employment challenges						
To enhance the capacity of government and social partners in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes						

1.2 Are the project targets and activities sufficiently relevant/strategic as per the national contexts?

1.3 Is the project sufficiently aligned with ILO's broader priorities and objectives in this area of work? (*question for ILO stakeholders only*)

1.4 To what extent is the project aligned to national initiatives and complementing other on-going ILO and wider UN or other stakeholders (e.g., business, civil society)?

1.5 How would you rate the overall relevance of the project?

	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory
Overall relevance						

of the project						
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**(B) Validity of project design**

2.1 To what extent did the projects design include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?

2.2 To what extent were the implementation approaches valid and realistic? Have the projects adequately taken into account the risks of blockage?

2.3 To what extent have the projects addressed gender and disability inclusion, and of other vulnerable groups, related issues in the project document?

2.4 To what extent have the projects integrate the International labour standards application?

2.5 To what extent were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design and implementation of the projects, including working through social dialogue?

**(B) Effectiveness: the achievement of project results (Somalia)**

3.1 To what extent has the project’s strategy been effective in achieving the following:

	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory	No answer/not
Outcome: More and better jobs for inclusive growth and improved youth employment prospects							
Output 1.1: Developing employment policy and strategy for Somalia							
Output 1.2: programmes designed and implemented to address the youth employment challenges							
Output 2.1: enhance the capacity of government and social partners in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes							
Overall, how satisfied are you with the project results?							

3.7 What, if any, unintended results of the projects have been identified or perceived?

3.8 What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects’ success in attaining their targets?

3.9 Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability

and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the project's result areas?

3.10 To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness and how the projects have addressed this influence?

3.11 Do the (adapted) intervention models used in the projects suggest an intervention model for similar crisis response?

**(C) Efficiency of project management**

4.1 How efficiently have resources (human resources, time, expertise, funds etc.) been allocated and used to provide the necessary support and to achieve the broader projects objectives? *(question for ILO stakeholder only)*

4.2 To what extent have the disbursements and projects expenditures been in line with expected budgetary plans? Why? *(question for ILO stakeholder only)*

4.3 How would you rate the overall efficiency of project management

	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory
Overall efficiency of project management						

**(D) Effectiveness of management arrangements**

5.1 Have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties involved into implementation and monitoring?

5.2 Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?

5.3 Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the project?

5.4 Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?

**(E) Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability**

6.1 To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries?

6.2 How would you rate the overall impact of the project

	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory
Overall project impact						

6.3 To what extent are planned results of the project likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?

Overall progress towards sustainability	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Highly unsatisfactory

6.4 What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?

6.5 Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO projects support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic

**6.6 Analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats/risks**

6.6a What are the strengths of the project?

6.6b What are the weaknesses of the project?

6.6c What are the opportunities of the project?

6.6 d What are the risks that might affect the sustainability of its results?



6.7 How could up-scaling or replication be further catalysed?

6.8 How would you rate the overall sustainability of the project?

## Annex 7: Country results sheets

### Comoros

#### Relevance and strategic fit

*Are the projects relevant to the achievements of the government's strategy, policy and plan?*

The EDLIC project is well aligned the major Governmental development strategies, policies and plans including the revised SCA2D (growth acceleration plan), the PCE (emerging plan), the agriculture investment plan, the national industrialization plan, etc. The project reflects in a strong manner the Government concerns of increasing agriculture production for self-sufficiency, youth job creation and economic opportunity expansion, gender equity and women empowerment.

*Are the projects relevant to the felt needs of the beneficiaries regarding, among others, on a conducive employment environment (including job creation and self-employment and sustainable enterprises?*

The project suitably contributed to enhance youth entrepreneurship through provision of required and needed skills on economic analysis, market research, business planning and growth management.

*How well the projects complement and fit with other ongoing or forthcoming ILO programmes and projects in the country?*

The project sited under the authority of the Ministère de l'Emploi which equally implements the Facilité Emploi project financed by the French Agency AFD. The related project also intervenes in the creation of job opportunities in rural areas for self-sufficiency and local development. Some of the project staff and trained beneficiaries on entrepreneurship have been used to support the establishment and broad support to the project Facilité Emploi in matters related to rural entrepreneurship. The Coordinator of the project Facilité Emploi happens to be himself o former trainee on GERME.

*What links are established so far with other activities of the UN or non-UN international development aid organizations at local level and/ or Government partners?*

All projects implemented in Comoros are overseen by the General Secretary of the Government who ensures that implemented project talk to each other and provide a common direction toward achieving national developmental objectives. Though no clear mechanism is set to coordinate the different projects in place, the General Secretary of the Government ensures that projects are well aligned and not competing to each other. The EDLIC staff and stakeholders have been for instanced solicited to input into the PIDC, a World Bank financed project on developing job opportunities in agriculture, transport and tourism, with regard in particular to sector priorities and business plan development process.

#### Validity of design

*Did the projects design include an exit strategy and a strategy for sustainability?*

The EDLIC project was first designed with the view to serve as catalytic project which participates into creating a valuable dynamic of highly demonstrative activities that would

ultimately set a stage for further rollout by the beneficiaries, the Government and other players. Beneficiaries were hence capacitated through training of trainers to keep serving as resource persons in entrepreneurship training. Similarly, the project encouraged the establishment of a joint local committee to keep oversee the maintenance of the off road project implemented in Boinkou.

*Were the implementation approaches valid and realistic? Have the projects adequately taken into account the risks of blockage?*

The major risks of blockage of the project resided into the buy-in of the stakeholders as well as their potential to collaborate. Dialogue and sensitization were used at all levels to avoid potential clashes. The project was for instance delayed for three months to enable dialogue and full buy-in of the project by the Government. Some activities were even swifited to meet Government requirement with regard to the region where the HIMO approach should be implemented. A potential high risky conflict between various communities was removed in relation to the off road construction project before it was implemented.

*Have the projects addressed gender and disability inclusion, and of other vulnerable groups, related issues in the project document?*

The project put upfront the gender equality and social justice theme in its overall communication, sensitization and projects selections. Numerous women ended participating in various forms into the project activities and hopefully benefitted from them. People with disabilities were likewise encouraged and sensitized through their participation were less.

*Have the projects integrate the International labour standards application?*

All service providers were treated against International Labor Standard. This was true with the consultants out of which none complained about the work conditions and salary treatment. This was also true with the employees who worked under the HIMO project. The off road construction was only built with adults, respectful of the work security policies, work standards, etc.

*Were the ILO tripartite constituents involved in the design and implementation of the projects, including working through social dialogue?*

The project foresaw a joint committee that gathered the project stakeholders to interact, exchange and oversee the project activities and results. Some stakeholders including the employers umbrella association, the association of employees and the Ministère de l'Emploi, complained however that they were not consulted enough in the decision making of some activities. In most cases, they were only informed via the project administrator or the media. They believe a strong opportunity for social dialogue in matters of common social and economic gain was lost.

### **Project results and effectiveness**

*To what extent have the projects achieved their results at outcome and output levels, with particular attention to the project objectives?*

Stakeholders and beneficiaries are overall happy with the project results. They believe the project managed to accomplish much with less and against the timeframe.

Only the Ministère de l'Emploi, the MODEC and the CTC disclaimed they did not receive enough capacity building from the project as far as their ability to conceive job programmes for peace and resilience are concerned. The Ministère de l'Emploi insisted they were trained in GERME but were not given the opportunity to implement the training and gain experience. The same was claimed by the MODEC and CTC. They all regret that today they don't have the expertise to accompany present and future entrepreneurs. The Ministère de l'Emploi further indicated that no follow up of the trained entrepreneurs is conducted failing to have set a trained team at the ministry to do so after the completion of the project.

*What, if any, unintended results of the projects have been identified or perceived?*

The interviewees demonstrated that additional youth from the communities were trained on GERME and assisted to create their enterprises out of the project funding and assistance. Few trained youth on GERME established their own companies to provide such training and assistance to the Government, other projects and entrepreneurs. Some like the President of the Youth Entrepreneurship Association are internationally solicited to provide trainings on GERME.

*What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects' success in attaining their targets?*

The project faced several challenges during the short period of implementation. This includes military uprising in Anjouan which prevented the project team to conduct its regular activities in Anjouan and Mohéli. The project was also confronted to the disruption of the Kenneth cyclone and the high impact of the COVID 19. It was however able in every circumstance to adapt, learn and reinvent itself. During the COVID 19 expansion, the project was for instance able to save money and reallocate funding to provide a resurgent response along with the employers' umbrella association, the association of employees and the Government. It was able to rapidly organize further trainings for entrepreneurs on how to manage one enterprise in the context of crisis disruption such as the COVID 19.

*Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the project's result areas?*

The communication released by the project to encourage enrollment was gender equality and disability sensitive.

*To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness*

*and how the projects have addressed this influence?*

The COVID-19 severely hit the fragile entrepreneurs who were supported by the project. Many had to suspend their activities while some were to give up their activities. Hopefully, the project provided the majority of them the training on how to manage their business in period of crisis. This certainly helped the large majority to revisit their activities and targets. Unfortunately, a large number was not able to mobilize external funding to pursue or establish their businesses during the period.

*Do the (adapted) intervention models used in the projects suggest an intervention model for similar crisis response?*

The social dialogue enabled by the tripartite model was fast to provide an opportunity for project stakeholders to sit, reflect and share a spontaneous response to the COVID-19 upsurge.

#### **Effectiveness of management arrangements**

*Have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties involved into implementation and monitoring?*

The tripartite stakeholders merely regretted that they were not associated in the decision making as they should have been. They were to their views considered as external stakeholders and not as project owners. The project team only informed them about the activities to be implemented when they were about to be so. The Steering Committee did not accomplish its work and responsibility as project owner. They claimed they were not able to properly and physically monitor the project achievements and results due to lack of field visit. They pick the project team to have lacked of transparency as most decisions were taken by the Project Administrator without consultation of the Steering Committee.

*Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?*

The monitoring and evaluation strategies visibly fell short. The disaggregated information was produced by the review team. No information on people with disability is provided.

*Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the*

*project?*

The project was much welcome in the villages by the local authorities as well as in the islands. The local authorities in Mboinkou helped the project team to temper the rising conflict between the communities in relation to the construction of the off road. In Anjouan, the local authorities participated into the sensitization of the youth entrepreneurs.

*Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?*

### **Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability**

*To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries?*

Changes are observed at two levels: at HIMO level and entrepreneurship level. At HIMO level, the construction of the OFF road visibly contributed to spur agriculture production. It is reported that five mini buses operate daily between the village and agricultural zone. Women have ease access to the field and do not suffer to harvest. The village people revenue has increased as a matter of fact. With regard to entrepreneurship, several youths report that they increased awareness on business planning and development. Though very few benefitted from the project financial support, a significant part was able to establish or turn around their businesses. The project team faced with a high demand from likely youth entrepreneurs.

*To what extent are planned results of the project likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?*

The implementation of the HIMO approach revealed to be a great success story including the set up of the steering committee to maintain the off road. The concept seemingly seduced the Government that intends to replicate the model in other communities as part of the national investment plan for agriculture development. The set committee is now on board and active at national level. The committee recently participated into a national television broadcast to tell their story and seek for additional support from the Government to expand the project. As for the youth trained on GERME, they are vividly solicited to repeat the training in their communities and beyond. Some have made it a sustainable national and international business.

*What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?*

The main shortfall of the project is the lack of capacity building at the Ministère de l'Emploi

level on monitoring and evaluation which would have allowed the beneficiaries to keep receiving either support, information or guidance with regard to access to financing that the project was not able to address or to linkages with other Government led project such as the WB, IBD or the ONUDI projects.

*Identify and discuss gaps in the sustainability strategy and how the stakeholders, including other ILO projects support, could address these, taking into consideration potential changes in the country due to the COVID 19 pandemic*

The HIMO approach shifts responsibility to the community to sustain the off-road construction. The committee which is in place consists of tree employees and three volunteers (students). The plan of the committee is to increase the number of employees to match the amount of work ahead. The committee receives agreed fees from mini buses operating into the field. The off-road is still in good shape despite the heavy recent rains. Some small wholes have been spotted but the committee is about to fix them. The main question raised as for the sustainability of the project is to do with the hundred of youth who were trained but not in position to start their business due to lack of funding. This is an issue that the Ministère de l'Emploi et le Ministère de l'Agriculture should handle as one agenda item of the Government is to set up a Trust Fund for youth employment. Hopefully, many youth were able to shape their project and even develop their business plan and found themselves stuck because of lack of funding. There should be a mechanism set to inform the beneficiaries about the new opportunities in place for them to apply for funding. A clear mechanism should be develop to monitor and trace progress of the youth who received the training and the financial support.

## Central African Republic

### Méthodologie et déroulement de la mission

- Entretiens individuels.  
- Groupes de discussion (7 à 11 personnes par groupe homogène de discussion : associations de jeunes et jeunes en milieu ouverts, associations de femmes, élus locaux).

- Questionnaires écrits.

La mission d'évaluation s'est déroulée à Bangui dans les deux sous-préfectures (Yaloké et Boda). Dans chaque province, des personnes clés ont été interviewées. Les groupes de discussion ont été animés par les points focaux identifiés, qui disposait d'un canevas d'entretien semi-structuré, dans le but d'homogénéiser les discussions. Les questions et les réponses ont été simultanément traduites en sango et résumées par écrit par un rapporteur. Un nombre de questionnaires non représentatifs traduits en sango ont également été distribués aux membres d'associations de jeunes et de femmes mais le nombre de questionnaires remplis ne nous a pas permis d'ajouter un éclairage pertinent par rapport aux faits qui ressortaient déjà de l'organisation des focus groups.

### Résultats de l'enquête

#### (A) Pertinence

Le projet de Promotion de la paix et création d'emplois décents et durables est un projet pertinent qui répond à un besoin important en matière de la paix et création d'emplois décents et durables en faveur des jeunes en RCA.

1.1. Le diagnostic a permis d'identifier les besoins spécifiques des jeunes en matière de renforcement des capacités en termes de formation et d'accompagnement de proximité vers des modèles d'investissements basés sur les ressources locales et de programmes sectoriels à haute intensité d'emploi, conçus pour des nouvelles entreprises de jeunes sur les services sociaux et environnementaux lancées. Ce diagnostic a permis de préciser le contenu des thèmes à développés au cours des sessions de formation, touchant la sensibilisation à la situation des jeunes vulnérables dans les zones ciblées.

**1.2. Les objectifs et activités du projet** qui permettent de contribuer à la promotion de la paix et à la cohésion sociale par la création d'emplois décents pour les groupes vulnérables **sont pertinents et stratégiques, et cadrent avec le contexte des crises que le pays connaît depuis plus de 10 ans.**

1.3. Ce projet s'aligne bien sur les priorités du gouvernement en matière de création d'emplois pour les jeunes, définies dans le RCPCA (document de relance du contrat social). Le projet intervient au (i) niveau institutionnel par le renforcement des institutions du marché du travail pour faire face aux crises et accompagner la création des PME, et au (ii) niveau opérationnel, par le renforcement des compétences des communautés à générer des opportunités d'emplois malgré les crises.

1.4. Le projet s'intègre dans l'organisation existante de la MINUSCA, PNUD, FAO et collabore avec les réalisations antérieures de l'OIT dans le pays.

1.5. Globalement, le projet est pertinent par ce qu'il a une incidence très positive sur la réduction de la pauvreté et les conditions sociales des jeunes à travers les activités génératrices de revenus.

#### (B) Validité de la conception du projet



2.1 Le projet a permis de doter les jeunes de techniques adaptées et innovantes pour l'amélioration de leurs conditions de vie à travers une mise en place de chaîne de solidarité communautaire. Le projet donne des conditions de viabilité et durabilité des actions en faveur des jeunes.

**2.2 Pour bien de bonnes raisons**, le projet contribue au développement socio-économique et à la réalisation de l'objectif de réduction de la pauvreté, renforcement des capacités, création de l'emploi, amélioration de revenus des jeunes.

2.3. Grâce aux sensibilisations et formations dispensées, le projet a permis à un certain nombre de femmes, des handicapés, surtout au niveau des villages, de prendre conscience de l'importance des formations techniques/AGR et de la force de tout le monde (femme, handicapé...) dans la participation du développement local.

2.4. Le projet a intégré l'application des normes internationales du travail de manière faible ce qui n'a pas permis aux acteurs d'avoir le même niveau de perception et de bien apprécier les résultats du projet.

2.5. Pour les acteurs, il est difficile d'avoir des éléments d'appréciation à ce sujet par ce qu'ils n'ont pas été en contact avec ces documents.

### **(C) Efficacité: l'atteinte des résultats du projet**

Pour une partie des répondants, l'objectif prévu n'est pas entièrement atteint, et ce pour plusieurs raisons :

- L'accès à l'information sur l'emploi n'est pas tellement amélioré comme veulent les jeunes (plutôt insatisfaisant), les capacités techniques des institutions et des membres des communautés ciblées ne sont pas renforcées comme il se doit (insatisfaisant), les micro, petites et moyennes entreprises/coopératives créatrices d'emplois décent et bénéficiant de services d'appui non-financiers et financiers ne sont pas créés (très insatisfaisant), les institutions publiques n'arrivent pas à intégrer les approches HIMO dans la planification, la mise en œuvre et le suivi-évaluation de leurs programmes d'investissement, les travaux de réhabilitation des infrastructures agricoles et des aménagements ruraux ne sont pas réalisés (plutôt insatisfaisant).
- On estime toujours que les résultats identifiés sur le terrain n'apparaissent pas clairs face à la situation sécuritaire sur l'ensemble du territoire qui constitue déjà une menace réelle à la réalisation efficace des activités du projet.
- Du point de vue efficacité, le projet n'a pas assez utilisé les opportunités existantes pour promouvoir l'égalité des sexes y compris les questions de handicap et l'inclusion d'autres groupes vulnérables dans les domaines de résultats du fait de la situation sécuritaire instable
- Aussi, la pandémie COVID-19, pour sa part a influencé négativement les résultats et l'efficacité du projet du fait qu'il a perturbé la programmation de mise en œuvre des activités et l'agenda des formations. Cela a modifié les activités du projet par rapport aux mesures de barrière.
- Pour les acteurs, interrogés, le modèle d'intervention qui a été utilisé dans ce projet répond à des projets de réponse à une crise similaire, mais malheureusement, les bonnes pratiques ne sont pas diffusées et documentées à travers les documents de capitalisation auprès des partenaires.

### **(C) Efficacité de la gestion de projet**

- Globalement, il y'a une satisfaction, par ce que les appuis réalisés ont permis de dresser une liste des personnes qui désirent être accompagnés pour la formalisation de leurs unités économiques.

## **(D) Efficacité des modalités de gestion**

5.1 Les questions touchant les modalités de gestion et de gouvernance des projets relèvent plus des parties prenantes de l'OIT.

5.2 Les questions touchant les stratégies de suivi et d'évaluation, y compris la collecte et l'utilisation de données ventilées par sexe relèvent des parties prenantes de l'OIT.

Les ateliers d'échange et de partage d'expérience ont été de moments forts de coopérations entre les parties prenantes (autorités gouvernementales compétentes aux niveaux national, régional et local et d'autres parties).

5.3 Les questions relatives au soutien administratif, technique et - si nécessaire - politique adéquat de la part du bureau de l'OIT et de spécialistes sur le terrain (bureaux de pays, équipes de travail décent, bureau régional et siège) relèvent des parties prenantes de l'OIT.

## **(E) Orientation d'impact et progrès vers la durabilité**

Il y'a une satisfaction quant à l'impact du projet. L'accompagnement des acteurs et des actrices ayant bénéficié des formations s'est fait à deux niveaux. Un niveau individuel et collectif. Ce qui a permis de suivre le réinvestissement des acquis des formations. Ce fut des moments de formation pour une meilleure appropriation des résultats issus des formations. Cet accompagnement technique et d'appui conseil a permis aux formés de se renforcer et de consolider la plus-value des formations techniques et entrepreneuriales

### **6.3 Les résultats prévus du projet sont peuvent être reproduits par les parties prenantes.**

Grâce aux sensibilisations dispensées, le projet a permis à un certain nombre de femmes, des jeunes surtout au niveau des provinces, de prendre conscience de l'importance des métiers pratiques et de la force de la femme et jeune dans la consolidation de la paix.

6.4 Le ministère de l'Emploi à travers l'Agence Centrafricaine de Formation Professionnelle et de l'Emploi (ACFPE) devrait mettre en place des mécanismes pour assurer la durabilité des activités du projet en partenariat avec d'autres bailleurs.

6.5 L'absence des organisations de la société civile spécialisées dans l'insertion des jeunes pour suivre la suite du projet en partenariat avec les ministères impliqués constitue des lacunes et défis. Dans les jours à venir, il serait souhaitable d'impliquer des organisations nationales spécialisées pour faciliter la mise en œuvre des activités et une bonne durabilité.

## **6.6 Analyse des forces, faiblesses, opportunités et menaces / risques**

6.6a: La mobilisation des acteurs pour la mise en œuvre des activités (forces)

6.6b : L'absence des organisations de la société civile spécialisées dans l'insertion des jeunes pour suivre la suite du projet en partenariat avec les ministères impliqués, la lenteur dans la réalisation des activités (faiblesses)

6.6c : Multiplicité des partenaires techniques et financiers impliqués dans la thématique emploi des jeunes, existence des ONG nationales spécialisées sur la thématique insertion des jeunes (opportunités)

6.6 d: Persistance de l'insécurité dans le pays (risques)

6.7: Trouver d'autres partenaires pour la suite des activités en impliquant des ONG travaillant

sur la thématique insertion des jeunes (réplication).

6.8 : La durabilité du projet serait satisfaisante si les critères d'analyse ci-haut sont mis en exergue.

## Evaluation field survey results Central African republic: Direct recipients of project support

### (A) Pertinence

- 1.1. Les femmes et les jeunes centrafricains, n'ayant pas auparavant bénéficié des formations techniques et professionnelles, l'objectif général de renforcement des capacités des jeunes pour des formations techniques et professionnelles est essentiel et pertinent pour l'avenir de la Centrafrique. A l'échelon provincial, il n'était pas possible pour un jeune d'accéder à technique et professionnelle qui règle les conditions de vie en milieu rural. Aujourd'hui, il est donc impératif de démontrer aux jeunes qu'ils peuvent participer à la création d'entreprise en milieu rural. Plusieurs personnes, au cours des entretiens, nous ont expliqué qu'ils se sentent plus à l'aise outillés, et qu'ils sont en mesure de créer leurs propres entreprises.
- 1.2. Les formations dispensées ont très fortement insisté sur la nécessité de création d'entreprise personnelle, la participation des jeunes dans le processus du développement.
- 1.3. Le projet a dispensé des formations avec un nombre de bénéficiaires très important, mais vu ce ciblage, le projet n'a pas eu le temps de procéder à un choix plus approfondi des bénéficiaires.

Conformément à la politique nationale de lutte contre la pauvreté, le projet s'inscrit dans la dynamique de la politique du gouvernement en matière de la formation technique et professionnelle. La régénération des jeunes a permis aux populations de disposer de ressources pour le développement durable. C'est à ce niveau que l'on voit la relation entre la lutte contre la pauvreté et la satisfaction des besoins socioéconomiques des jeunes. Ce qui est aussi intéressant à ce niveau, est que les jeunes ont eux-mêmes perçu et mentionné, au moment de l'étude que les formations ont permis aux uns et autres de revenir au bon sens. Ces derniers en conséquence se sont multipliés au grand bonheur des populations qui ont vu leur niveau s'améliorer et leurs revenus s'accroître.

### (B) Efficacité

Plusieurs raisons expliquent l'efficacité du projet :

Par ce projet, des nombreux emplois de meilleure qualité pour une croissance inclusive pour les jeunes sont créés, l'accès à l'information sur l'emploi est amélioré, les capacités techniques des institutions et des membres des communautés ciblées sont renforcées. Les répondants sont satisfaits des résultats et pensent que la stratégie du projet est efficace. En outre, la création des micro, petites et moyennes entreprises/coopératives créatrices d'emplois décent et bénéficiant de services d'appui non-financiers et financiers est moyennement satisfaisante parce que influencé par le contexte des crises politiques. Cependant, la politique nationale de protection sociale et son plan de mis en œuvre validés reste un défi crucial, ce qui ne satisfait pas les acteurs.

Malgré que les institutions publiques ont intégré les approches HIMO dans la planification, la mise en œuvre et le suivi-évaluation de leurs programmes d'investissement, des travaux de réhabilitation des infrastructures agricoles et des aménagements ruraux sont réalisés, les acteurs restent plutôt insatisfaisant. De tous ces progrès, on peut retenir que le taux d'atteinte des résultats du projet est de 81,73%. Ce niveau est tiré vers le bas par le contexte socio-politique. Aussi, les plus faibles taux de mise en œuvre observés sont beaucoup plus

le fait de la coordination et de suivi du projet, et se justifient notamment par les difficultés de mise en œuvre du projet

## 2.2 Principales raisons de l'atteinte/non atteinte des résultats du projet

Les succès et les faiblesses enregistrés dans la mise en œuvre et la réalisation du projet invitent à tirer les quelques leçons suivantes :

- Les autorités locales et les populations bénéficiaires ne sont pas pleinement impliquées dans certaines des phases du projet (planification, mise en œuvre et suivi) en raison de la nature du projet en l'occurrence « urgence humanitaire »;
- Le projet est mis en œuvre dans un environnement sociopolitique difficile, notamment marqué par la volatilité de la situation sécuritaire qui a retardé la mise en œuvre des activités sur le terrain ainsi que leur suivi;
- Les actions de communication et d'informations des différentes parties prenantes au projet (populations bénéficiaires, autorités locales et sanitaires, voire certains

### (c) Orientation d'impact et progrès vers la durabilité

La méconnaissance du projet par les bénéficiaires, autorités locales voire certains partenaires de mise en œuvre sont des facteurs qui ne permettent pas l'appropriation du projet par ces parties prenantes, et encore moins la durabilité des acquis du projet. Toutefois, ces parties prenantes sont conscientes de l'intérêt des actions du projet sur elles mêmes, leurs familles respectives et leur communauté, et se sont engagées (autorités locales), voire organisées (populations) à protéger les acquis du projet.

## 2. La durabilité probable

la durabilité des acquis du projet sera certaine dans les domaines de:

- renforcement des capacités institutionnelles. Ces réalisations vont certainement augmenter de façon pérenne l'offre de services aux populations, voire la fréquentation de ces services ;
- renforcement des capacités des jeunes et autres prestataires techniques de la zone d'intervention sur des domaines clés ;
- l'autonomisation des jeunes victimes des crises par la formation, en vue de renforcer leurs capacités techniques/productives ainsi que leur niveau de revenu ;
- la structuration et l'organisation des populations locales en vue du renforcement des acquis du projet, notamment avec la mise en place d'un cadre d'échange, de concertation au sein de la population par l'association ITA MASSEKA pour la sensibilisation des jeunes;
- Implication des services étatiques en charge des questions touchant l'insertion des jeunes..

## 4. Forces, Faiblesses et Opportunités du projet:

- La mobilisation des acteurs pour la mise en œuvre des activités
- L'absence des organisations de la société civile spécialisées dans l'insertion des jeunes pour suivre la suite du projet en partenariat avec les ministères impliqués, la lenteur dans la réalisation des activités (faiblesses)
- Multiplicité des partenaires techniques et financiers impliqués dans la thématique emploi des jeunes, existence des ONG nationales spécialisées

Les risques susceptibles d'affecter la durabilité des résultats du projet sont entre et autres l'insécurité dans le pays et la démotivation des jeunes pour raison de manque de suivi par le gouvernement, le faible nombre des partenaires appuyant le section insertion des jeunes, la mauvaise politique d'encadrement des jeunes, la mauvaise gestion des ressources destinées à la suite des formations des jeunes.

## **Sierra Leone**

### **Relevance and strategic fit**

Are the projects relevant to the felt needs of the beneficiaries regarding, among others, on a conducive employment environment (including job creation and self-employment and sustainable enterprises?

- Most of the beneficiaries (if not all) are businessmen and businesswomen that recognized the need for the development of their business skills. The intervention fits naturally within their socio-economic lives
- Before the training, beneficiaries indicated that they were not clear how to check if their business was making profit or not. They now know how to buy and sell to make some profit margins, they added.
- Given the high level of unemployment in the country, training local people in what they do as a means of livelihood will certainly help them realize more from their daily ventures and become gainfully self-employed.

### **Project results and effectiveness**

To what extent have the projects achieved their results at outcome and output levels, with particular attention to the project objectives?

- Most of the beneficiaries (if not all) are businessmen and businesswomen that recognized the need for the development of their business skills. The intervention fits naturally within their socio-economic lives
- Most of the project beneficiaries are women- promoting gender equality
- Beneficiaries are from deprived and underprivileged communities
- The content of the training was detailed and very precise to local needs

What have been the main contributing and challenging factors towards projects' success in attaining their targets?

Interviews with the ToTs suggest that:

- Most of the beneficiaries trained were illiterate women who could not read, write and count. Some sections of the training modules required numeracy for a good grasp of ideas- needs to be simplified to fit the characteristics of the majority of participants.
- The content of the training was too detailed for the duration of training of the beneficiaries. There was not enough time to deliver in detail the training content to beneficiaries.

Contributing factor is mainly the fact that most of the beneficiaries (if not all) are business men and women that recognized the need for the development of their business skills. They embraced the initiative and cooperated very well.

Did the projects effectively use opportunities to promote gender equality and disability and other vulnerable groups' inclusion within the project's result areas?

During the focus group discussions with beneficiaries and discussions with implementing partners, it was very clear that the trainings benefited more women than men in terms of outreach.

To what extent is the COVID-19 Pandemic have influenced projects results and effectiveness and how the projects have addressed this influence?

All training sessions were conducted the COVID-19 pandemic. Strict adherence to the national COVID-19 precautions, protocols and policies mean limited number of participants could be trained at a given time and location. This in turn affected the overall number of beneficiaries impacted by the project.

However, to minimize the effect of national COVID-19 policies, precautionary measures such as the wearing of masks and conducting several small-small training sessions in different locations and open spaces were used to maximize beneficiary outreach.

## **Effectiveness of management arrangements**

29. Have the management and governance arrangement of the projects facilitated project results? Was there a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties involved into implementation and monitoring?

Some stakeholders, the Ministry of Labour for example, indicated they could not remember or recall their participation and involvement into the project. This does not suggest clarity of the roles and responsibility of stakeholders. Future programmes should set-up a stakeholder management committee to engage and involve the active participation of all relevant stakeholders.

Have the monitoring & evaluation strategies been in place relevant, including collecting and using data disaggregated by sex (and by other relevant characteristics, such as people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups the project might have identified)?

Usually, a very good monitoring and evaluation system should be able to make available the list of all project beneficiaries, with details about their contacts and location for routine monitoring field visits and to support evaluation processes. This is not the case with this project as the evaluation consultants have to struggle to access the beneficiaries. As such comprehensive database of beneficiaries for partners do not exist, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent the project's M&E strategies ensures disaggregated data that takes into consideration gender and social inclusion of all groups.

Have the projects created good relationship and cooperation with relevant national, regional and local level government authorities and other relevant stakeholders to implement the project?

ILO has been implementing projects through relevant national and local stakeholders and they continue to successfully do so, meaning there is good relationship between ILO and these stakeholders.

Nevertheless, the fact that some high level stakeholder could not remember the project interventions calls for improved relationship within stakeholders and between the stakeholders and ILO. There is need for more visibility.

Lastly, the cooperation of and support from stakeholders to this evaluation are unsatisfactory, particularly to elicit response from the implementing partners. Except for the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the implementing partners have not been able to produce their beneficiary list nor return the completed questionnaires to support the evaluation of the project they have implemented. This is not a good sign of corporation.



Have the projects received adequate administrative, technical and - if needed - policy support from the ILO office and specialists in the field (Country Offices, Decent Work Teams, Regional Office and HQ)?

The Sierra Leone Labour Congress for example, were concerned that the budget for the business development and management trainings was too tight, not allowing any room for routine monitoring and follow-up calls after the training.

### **Impact orientation and progress towards sustainability**

30. To what extent there is evidence of positive changes in the life of the ultimate project beneficiaries?

One evidence of positive change in the lives of the project beneficiaries is that they have been able to organize themselves into savings and loan groups. With this, group members can make savings and have ready access to soft loans with very minimal interest. As beneficiaries live in deprived and underprivileged communities, they emphasized on this benefit because they do not have access to loan schemes of formal and semi-formal financial service providers who require collateral and charge very high interest rates. According to the beneficiaries, the flexible saving and loan groups give members access to the monies at any time to attend to emergencies and business opportunities.

Beneficiaries indicated that since they received the training, they have improved on the skills to manage their businesses. They said they are now able to forecast market prices which will guide them on how much to buy and sell to be able to make profit. This learnt skills have not only contributed to increased profit but created good relationship between husbands and wives within the household. The husbands recognize them now as partners that make financial contributions to meeting household needs with the extra profit they now realize from their business ventures.

### **To what extent are planned results of the project likely to be sustained and/or scaled-up and replicated by stakeholders?**

While there is a clear implementation strategy, in terms of delivering structured business training sessions to trainers and beneficiaries, there are doubts over sustainability and replication. The training seems to be a one-off event of activities that do not have a follow-up plan in place. This presents very serious concern about sustainability and replication.

What concrete steps were or should have been taken to ensure sustainability?

Beneficiaries, mostly women engage in micro businesses with very little capital. Almost all of them indicated that they use their profit mainly to meet the day-to-day household needs and not necessarily to re-invest in their business. To ensure sustainability, there is need to provide these beneficiaries with business capital for them to expand on their businesses and realize much more profit than they would use on household needs.

Furthermore, since the training was delivered, no follow-up has been carried out to know how beneficiaries are using the skills learnt. Follow-up mechanism needs to be put in place in future programmes to assess the impact of the training and address any emerging issues.

In addition, the sustainability of business development training should also put in place a coaching and mentoring service for the trainees. This will guide them in translating or applying successfully the skills learnt from theory into practice.

## **Somalia**

### Relevance

Since 1991 Somalia worked without proper governance structures. Today, the country benefits from a properly organized government with policies and normative frameworks. In 2017, demand was very high for the ILO to return with an office presence to Somalia. This processes experienced several delays until the project manager was recruited in September 2018.

At that time, the country lacked an employment policy, labour code and social security policy. Employer and workers were not organized and were not talking to the government and social dialogue was inexistant. Eventually, the project identified organizations that represented workers and employers, in needs of capacity building and institutional strengthening. The project also identified the need for capacity building in the restructuring of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Preparatory work on the DWCP started while a country presence was still not in place but affairs for Somalia were managed from Addis Ababa. To date, the DWCP is still pending.

### Validity of project design

The project design was realistic though the implementation was difficult in the absence of any institutional structures and a short project cycle. The project benefitted from a close engagement with ILO technical specialists.

### Inclusion

The project aimed to employ women and about 40% of the office team was female at the end of the RBSA project.

The project ensured that during discussions of the employment policy, labour code and social security policy women were at the table to participate in discussions. This is important in the context of a clan-based culture which promotes strict male hierarchy and authority. Also, the project delivered an entrepreneurship training to access micro finance, especially for women. On another aspect of inclusion, the project addressed internally displaced people for employment intensive programming.

#### International labour standards

When the project started, the understanding of the tripartite partners about international labour standards was minimal. The project informed about International labour standards in National Tripartite Committee meetings, in seminars and training. Subsequently, the tripartite partners supported conventions 128, 181 and 182 (child labour).

#### Effectiveness

The project established the first ever social dialogue platform, the Somali National Consultative Tripartite Committee.

Besides, the project supported the development of the first ever labour law for Somalia in a fully consultative process, which by now was approved.

Also, the project supported the country's employment policy which subsequently was approved.

With UNICEF and WFP, the project worked on a social protection policy

In the course of the project, the National Statistics Bureau received capacity building and the project supported the first labour force survey in Somalia. However, its publication is still pending.

#### Main contributing and challenging factors

The project significantly benefitted from the ILO Addis Ababa country office and the Cairo decent work country team. Challenges for the project implementation comprised the status of the project office lacking access to ILO security arrangements and ILO IRIS. Also project team implementing projects in Somalia were based in Kenya, Puntland, Mogadishu, and Addis Ababa which at times led to communication gaps. Two-weekly review meetings which the RBSA project facilitated aimed to mitigate that shortcoming.

#### Analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats/risks

##### Strengths

- Established foundations for sustainable programme for ILO in Somalia, clear roadmap outlined in draft DWCP
- Tripartite structure and culture
- Mobilized many resources longer term
- Place in UNCT for employment and decent work

##### Weaknesses

- COVID-19: office has not restarted activities
- Status of office, still project office, limitations to access IRIS and other internal resources , slows down office performance

#### Opportunities

- Employment creation, social protection, social dialogue
- Dedicated head of office for proper representation to talk to UNCT and others

#### Risks/threats

- COVID-19: stopped activities, drastic slow down
- Security situation, access to beneficiaries
- Need to mobilize more resources, otherwise others will take over

## Annex 8: Lessons learned and good practices templates

### ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD): Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments: Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** COM102, SLE 107, CAF106

**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 12 May 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Use of the employment-intensive approach in RBSA projects in fragile state countries</b></p> <p>The employment-intensive approach is suited for short-term employment creation where income sources are urgently needed, for example, for the reconciliation of ethnic or religious groups in volatile post-conflict settings. However, expectations need to be carefully managed, as the promotion of the approach through RBSA projects faces a tight time limit of two years, in real terms even several months less until the project team is recruited. The uptake of the employment-intensive approach by (local) government heavily depends on political will and the availability of financial resources. The uptake by donors or UN agencies also depends on UNDAF priorities and their approaches to peace and reconciliation.</p> <p>Hence, uncertainty prevails for the assumption that the promotion of employment-intensive approaches in short-term RBSA projects contributes to longer-term economic recovery.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<b>RBSA projects in post-conflict settings.</b>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	<b>ILO design teams of RBSA projects</b>
<b>Challenges /negative lessons – Causal factors</b>	<b>The short time frame for RBSA project implementation to promote an employment-intensive approach to (local) government, donors, or UN agencies.</b>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<b>Employment-intensive approach’s short-term employment creation where income sources are urgently needed, for example, for the reconciliation of ethnical or religious groups in volatile post-conflict settings.</b>

<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<b>The short time frame for RBSA project implementation (two years) to promote employment-intensive approach, which is reduced by delays in recruiting the project team (6 months for the CTA and 12 months for the national expert in case of the RBSA project in Sierra Leone).</b>
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## ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Employment and Integrated Local Development in Comoros (EILD): Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments: Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic, Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** COM102, SLE 107, CAF106, SOM 101

**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 12 May 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<b>RBSA projects in countries with ILO residency vs. non-resident status</b>  DWTs and ILO country offices can significantly support RBSA projects where the ILO is a “non-resident” agency, as experienced in the Central African Republic. While this support proved essential for enhancing the project implementation’s effectiveness, it faces its limitations. The remote support cannot replace ILO’s resident status with in-country representation in the UN Country Team (UNCT) and vis-à-vis the tripartite constituents. Learning from Somalia shows that physical presence in the UNCT facilitates access of the ILO to joint UN programming, which is proofed as an emerging funding source for ILO programming. Ultimately, the likelihood of RBSA seed funding contributing to a growing ILO project portfolio where approaches of RBSA projects can be replicated or upscaled seem higher where the ILO is a resident agency that is active in the UNCT.
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<b>The implementation of RBSA projects in countries with ILO residency vs. non-resident status</b>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	ILO design teams of RBSA projects
<b>Challenges /negative lessons – Causal factors</b>	<b>RBSA project implementation where ILO lacks in-country representation in the UN Country Team (UNCT) and vis-à-vis the tripartite constituents</b>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<b>Physical presence in the UNCT facilitates access of the ILO to joint UN programming, which is proofed as an emerging funding source for ILO programming.</b>
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<b>DWCTs and ILO country offices can significantly support RBSA projects where the ILO is a “non-resident” agency, as experienced in the Central African Republic where ILO technical experts supported the project remotely and through project visits.</b>

## ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD): Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments: Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic, Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** COM102, SLE 107, CAF106, SOM 101

**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 12 May 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Role of the ILO HQ Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in RBSA projects in post-conflict settings</b></p> <p>The ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in HQ benefits from a Theory of Change for its programming and a dedicated technical support team. RBSA projects in post-conflict settings focusing on employment creation would benefit from aligning to that Theory of Change to strengthen RBSA project design, given the design shortcomings in the evaluated RBSA projects. Besides, technical CSRP support can complement other internal ILO support. This conceptual alignment would strengthen project design and facilitate evaluation given a robust CSRP programming framework.</p> <p>As RBSA funding is often the only funding opportunity for the ILO to engage on peace and resilience, the quality of monitoring data and evaluation opportunities are vital to establish evidence how the peace and resilience programming is working best and why.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<b>ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) in RBSA projects in post-conflict settings, where RBSA project alignment was suboptimal</b>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	<b>ILO design teams of RBSA projects</b>
<b>Challenges /negative lessons – Causal factors</b>	<b>RBSA project cluster showed shortcomings in the validity of project designs</b>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<b>The ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR) benefits from a Theory of Change for its programming and a dedicated technical support team, also supporting RBSA projects.</b>



<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<b>The ILO Coordination Support unit for Peace and Resilience (CSPR)'s Theory of Change is underused to guide RBSA projects in post-conflict settings.</b>
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## ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD): Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments: Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic, Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** COM102, SLE 107, CAF106, SOM 101

**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 25 May 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Disability in RBSA projects</b></p> <p>Disability issues seem insufficiently mainstreamed among ILO staff with responsibility for project design. ILO staff showed a lack of awareness. RBSA projects would be benefit from a systematic inclusion of the disability dimension in needs assessments, stakeholder analysis and the project implementation.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<b>Disability mainstreaming</b>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	<b>ILO design teams of RBSA projects</b>
<b>Challenges /negative lessons – Causal factors</b>	<b>RBSA project cluster showed shortcomings in the inclusion of disability, with ILO staff lacking awareness</b>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<b>Opportunities for disability mainstreaming, for example, in needs assessments or stakeholder analysis.</b>
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<b>ITC in Turin can systematically strengthen disability awareness raising among ILO staff responsible for project design and implementation.</b>

## ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic,  
**Project TC/SYMBOL:** CAF106

**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 25 May 2021

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Effects of COVID-19 in conflict affected locations</b></p> <p>Particularly in the in the Central African Republic, the pandemic had effects in terms of travel restrictions for the project team and specialists in charge of monitoring implementation to support constituents in the field. This introduced delays in the completion of certain activities, such as field studies.</p> <p>COVID-19 affected communication due to generally weak telephone and internet connections in the field sites. The latter affected the efficiency of remote engagement in project activities towards the end of project implementation in an already highly fragile context.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<b>Need of telecommunication connectivity in post-conflict contexts</b>
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	<b>ILO design teams of RBSA projects</b>
<b>Challenges /negative lessons – Causal factors</b>	<b>Challenges in reaching project sited due to travel restrictions where virtual engagement is highly limited due to weak telephone and internet connections</b>
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	<b>Joint engagement of project team, DWCT and responsible COs</b>
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<b>Weak telecommunication connectivity seems beyond the control of the RBSA project</b>

## ILO Emerging Good Practice Template

**Project Title:** Employment and Integrated Local Development in the Comoros (EILD): Increasing employment creation and opportunities in Sierra Leone through entrepreneurship training, business development services, and labour intensive investments: Promotion of peace and creation of decent and productive jobs in the Central African Republic, Access to productive employment, decent work and economic opportunities for women and men facilitated at Somalia

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** COM102, SLE 107, CAF106, SOM 101


**Name of Evaluator:** Achim Engelhardt

**Date:** 12 May 2021

The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

GP Element	Text
<b>Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)</b>	Without a cluster evaluation, RBSA projects below a threshold of US\$ 800.000 would not benefit individually from a final evaluation due to their budget size below the threshold for mandatory evaluation. The use of a cluster evaluation allows the ILO to exercise evaluability and enable learning even for smaller-sized projects. Even though this cluster did not benefit from a common planning, monitoring, and reporting framework, the engagement of staff, tripartite constituents, and, where possible, beneficiaries during the evaluation process allowed for an analysis of projects' processes and results. As such, the cluster evaluation contributes to learning for future RBSA projects in post-conflict settings.
<b>Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability</b>	<b>Suitability of cluster evaluation approach for ILO projects below the threshold for mandatory evaluation.</b>
<b>Establish a clear cause-effect relationship</b>	<b>Without the cluster evaluation approach, the four RBSA projects would not have benefitted from a final evaluation due to their small budget sizes.</b>
<b>Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>
<b>Potential for replication and by whom</b>	<b>Clustering of RBSA projects for evaluation, which benefited from some kind of alignment under a common P&amp;B outcome or planning framework</b>
<b>Upward links to higher ILO Goals (DWCPs, Country Programme Outcomes, or ILO's Strategic Programme Framework)</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>
<b>Other documents or relevant comments</b>	<b>ILO guidance sheet for clustering evaluations</b>

## Annex 9: Reconstructed Theory of Change for the cluster



Source: A. Engelhardt 04/2021, based on document review and stakeholder interviews

