



## ILO EVALUATION

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  - **Name of consultant(s):** Ms. Frances Barns, My Ba Nyar and Mr. Ty Morrissey, Morrissey Consulting International (MCI)
  - **ILO Administrative Office:** ILO Liaison Office, Yangon, Myanmar
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  - **Evaluation Manager:** Ms. Margaret Reade Rounds

*This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office*

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## Table of Acronyms

<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisations
<b>CDD</b>	Community Driven Development
<b>CCPDS</b>	Cross Cutting Policy Drivers
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisations
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DWCP</b>	Decent Work Country Program
<b>EAO</b>	Ethnic Armed Organisation
<b>EIIP</b>	Employment Intensive Investment Programme
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>GOM</b>	Government of Myanmar
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IEC</b>	Information Education and Communication
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>LO</b>	Liaison Office (ILO)
<b>JPR</b>	Jobs for Peace and Resilience
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interviews
<b>LIFT</b>	Livelihoods and Food Security Project
<b>LRB</b>	Local Resource Based
<b>MCI</b>	Morrissey Consulting International
<b>MOLIP</b>	Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population
<b>MRD</b>	Ministry of Rural Development
<b>NCA</b>	National Ceasefire Agreement
<b>NLD</b>	National League for Democracy
<b>NMSP</b>	New Mon State Party
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>O&amp;M</b>	Operation & Maintenance
<b>PDO</b>	Project Development Objective
<b>PIT</b>	Project Implementation Team
<b>PSC</b>	Project Steering Committee
<b>RBSA</b>	Regular Budget Supplementary Account
<b>TOC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>TVET</b>	Technical Vocational Education and Training
<b>VDC</b>	Village Development Committee

## Executive Summary

Myanmar has recently emerged from a long period of isolation, authoritarian rule and economic sanctions. Recent transformations have focused primarily on establishing democratic governance and rule of law; fostering peace and reconciliation; promoting market orientated economic adjustments; and implementing key policies centred on decentralisation, poverty alleviation and economic growth.

The rapid changes are not without challenges including: (i) the challenge to foster a culture of democratic governance, (ii) rule of law and awareness of rights and responsibilities among the population; and (iii) defining a vision of diversity, the aspirations of ethnic minorities and long-standing inequality and discrimination.

Along with economic benefits, national stakeholders recognise the critical role that job creation and tackling forced labour can have to peace efforts in Myanmar. However, unfortunately the Government policy statement on job creation and employment does not currently include the wishes and rights of EAOs and their ethnic communities. The Government policy statement therefore does not necessarily reflect their commitment to take into account the demands from the EAOs side. This makes it more challenging to achieve the policy objectives.

External job creating support strategies and initiatives in conflict-affected areas can contribute to the achievement of this desired outcome. However, they can cause harm if they are not based on well-informed, conflict-sensitive approaches to job creation and tackling forced labour. At present, several gaps remain in the evidence on which to base strategies that are economically viable and conflict sensitive and options for job creation in areas affected by conflict in Myanmar. There is an opportunity – and pressing need - to respond constructively to these gaps, and to combine this with the need for continued efforts in the promotion of decent work and action against forced labour.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) managed “*More and quality jobs are created through better policies and frameworks and strengthened labour market information systems*” sought to address the issues of economic growth and job creation by demonstrating and supporting the scale up of the Local Resource Based (LRB) approach to infrastructure development in three conflict affected areas of Mon State, Shan State and Rakhine State. The project is anchored within the ILO global JPR Flagship Programme. The strategic intent was to assist the Government and associated parties involved in the peace process to develop effective and conflict sensitive models and strategies for decent job creation with a focus on vulnerable ethnic groups and youth in rural areas.

Funded through the ILO’s Regular Budgetary Supplementary Account (RBSA) the project included three defined End-of-Activity-Outcomes (EoAO). The identification of priorities and outcomes was facilitated through a consultative process of engagement between tripartite constituents under the Decent Work Country Program (DWCP) Technical Working Group (TWG).

The project was originally designed to be implemented in close collaboration with key Government agencies such as Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population (MOLIP) and Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), with Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) operating in the targeted areas, and with the targeted local communities. During the inception phase, the following project outcomes were agreed upon:

- **Outcome 1:** State-level Government support in Shan, Mon and Rakhine States for the development of conflict-sensitive and economically viable decent job creation policies through employment intensive public investments
- **Outcome 2:** Demonstrated effective and conflict-sensitive operational models for decent job creation through employment-intensive investments in rural infrastructure in selected areas in Mon State
- **Outcome 3:** Increased support in Mon, Shan and Rakhine States for the adoption of decent work standards and practices among duty bearers in lieu of forced labour.

This JPR project is a strong example of an Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) investment which generates pro-poor economic growth, capacity and networking at the local level. The project had a specific focus on the Bee Rae area of Mon State in terms of the development and implementation of an EIIP model on the ground.

## **Key Findings**

The following sections provide a quick summary of key findings against the evaluation criteria.

### **Relevance**

The project fits within relevant policy frameworks including the Government of Myanmar (GoM) Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018 – 2030) with its focus on quality jobs and the private sector as the engine of environmentally conscious and socially responsible economic growth. The project also aligns well with the ILO Myanmar Decent Work Country Programme and the 2016 Bali Declaration.

In terms of its fit in the ILO Flagship Programme on Jobs for Peace and Resilience (JPR), the content of the project activities is relevant but could be expanded to focus on value chain development, Small Medium Enterprises (SME) development, technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training in line with the JPR modality.

The project *Theory of Change* (ToC) states “along with economic benefits, national stakeholders recognise the critical role that job creation and tackling forced labour can have to peace efforts in Myanmar. There is an opportunity – and pressing need - to respond constructively to these gaps, and to combine this with the need for continued efforts in the promotion of decent work and action against forced labour.”

While the interventions produced good results for beneficiaries and the modelling in the case study was sound, the assumption that demonstrating the Local Resource Based (LRB) approach could provide social and economic benefits to the community would lead to take up of the approach by authorities proved problematic upon implementation. While the GoM has put job creation for peacebuilding at the top of its formal policy agenda in the Myanmar context, the political economy context impedes the potential for roll out of this agenda evenly across Government controlled and Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) controlled areas.

Formally, the military has conceded control to civilian political parties through the institutions of a parliamentary democracy system and negotiated a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and power sharing agreements with EAOs. However, the military and the governing National League for Democracy (NLD) administration led by Aung Sang Su Kyi have often demonstrated reluctance to follow through on negotiated concessions and power sharing. While the NLD initially championed democracy by winning government at the first genuine parliamentary election in 2015, since this time the NLD has often taken actions that downplay the priorities of the ethnic groups and elevate the needs of the majority Burmese.

Progress has been made on the signing of the NCA but implementation has been lagging. There has been an unclear structure regarding interim arrangements for implementing the NCA. According to the formal agreement, following the signing of the ceasefire, parties to ceasefire will develop a joint implementation plan relating to the provision of service delivery in areas such as livelihoods, education and health care, etc. The NCA required this to be discussed quickly after signing among parties. However, the Government did not move forward with discussions, but rather appeared to make assumptions that areas of ceasefire were under the control of the Government, and that EAOs had seceded control to the Government through signing the NCA.

This had implications for the relevance of the TOC and the subsequent ability of the project to reach its objective of supporting uptake of the LRB model demonstrated through the project including:

- The Government’s reluctance to roll out service delivery, infrastructure and job creation programs evenly across Government and EAO controlled areas and therefore unlikelihood to take up approaches demonstrated by the project to be effective in employment creation
- EAOs lack resources to scale up job creation programs within areas under their control
- EAOs potential suspicion of development partners operating within their areas of control who they may perceive as working in the interests of the government
- ILO staff were not permitted to enter rural areas outside townships in the EAO areas, forcing ILO staff to implement the project remotely in collaboration with Mon Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Rahmonnya Peace Foundation (RPF) and its partners.

A further challenge is that, since 2013, the World Bank has provided a \$500 million loan to the GoM for the Myanmar National Community Driven Development (CDD) Project. The CDD project, implemented by the GoM, is also providing community level infrastructure and employment for community members. The existence of this project has led the Government to have less interest in engaging with the ILO about their promotion of the model demonstrated through the RBSA project which is small in comparison at \$1 million.

Despite its small size, the ILO RBSA project does have lessons learned that complement the CDD project. First, the ILO project is community managed as well as local employment generating with community contractors employing local people whereas the CDD project is managed by external subcontractors. Second, the CDD project is only implemented in Government controlled areas. The CDD project design intended to work in EAO areas but due to their dissatisfaction with the NCA the EAOs refused to be involved. The RBSA project and previous ILO projects on the other hand have made important contributions to development in EAO areas. Conflict has continued to disadvantage communities over decades in these areas so development urgently needs to take place, despite the lack of enduring conflict resolution. Lessons regarding how to go about this are very important for the country.

The two-year timeframe was too short to allow the ILO to develop strategies and carry out negotiations that would be required to influence the development strategies of the GoM in EAO areas and building capacity among the NMSP and governing bodies in other EAO areas. For the ILO to play a role in supporting leaders with the right agency to take up opportunities requires a long-term commitment. Such opportunities cannot be scheduled within a short implementation schedule. Moreover, the ILO has only demonstrated their model in limited areas in Mon and Shan state, there is a need to broaden application of the approach to many more areas.

The project was funded through the Regular Budgetary Supplementary Account (RBSA) which was established in 2008 to increase the funding of its Decent Work Agenda through flexible and un-earmarked voluntary contributions to relevant technical cooperation programmes. The RBSA helps the ILO to overcome constraints of its existing funding arrangements and respond strategically to relevant development issues and challenges.

The RBSA project appears to be a highly ambitious approach to the use of RBSA funds, given that an attempt was made to achieve both infrastructure works and challenging policy advocacy with a budget of \$1 million. Moreover, extensions are not usually possible to RBSA projects which has implications for sustainability. However, as a UN Agency, the ILO must source funding independently and work within the parameters of the funding envelopes available. The project represented a continuation of previous achievements in Mon State, Shan State and Rakhine State around local employment, economic development and skills development. The ILO Liaison office drew on the RBSA funding to continue this work. While the funding envelope and the project design were not a perfect match, it allowed the ILO to make progress on its longer-term agenda around LRB employment and economic development in EAO areas.

### ***Effectiveness***

Key achievements derived through the project were as follows:

#### **Achievements on Component 1**

Component 1 focused on contributing to the adoption and implementation of evidence-based policy by making a case for economically viable and conflict sensitive job strategies (to be funded by RBSA with co-funding from the EU supported Livelihoods and Food Security (LIFT) Skills development project in Rakhine State).

For Component 1, the main result was the completion of a business case for the application of the labour-intensive approach to infrastructure development and consulting on and sharing the study with government and EAO stakeholders. The report is comprehensive and detailed and makes a strong economic and poverty reduction case for EIIP across Myanmar, building on several years of demonstrated achievements in EIIP. The report highlights the benefits of the approach in promoting poverty reduction, its suitability for the Myanmar context and potential impacts upon labour migration and livelihoods. The project held discussion on decent job creation through EIIP investments with several Union and Regional Government Departments.

While the business case was a quality output and several high-level meetings were held at union and regional level, the project was not successful in gaining traction on its approach with the GoM for reasons explained in the section on Relevance. In Shan State the RBSA project aimed to building on previous work funded by the LIFT project to promote the LRB approach to a broader audience with a view to the EAO taking the lead in upscaling the approach. However, the ILO found that the Shan State National Army (SSNA) was focused on

fighting with the Tatmadaw and other EAOs. While the ILO had an opportunity to explain to the Chief Minister and Parliamentarians about the approach they remained insufficiently engaged in the task of strengthening rural development.

In Rhakine state, the RBSA project was intended to support the LIFT TVET project by promoting the uptake of lessons learned from the project at the policy level. This was conducted to a limited degree, but similar to Shan State, there was a lack of interest from policy makers due to their preoccupation with conflict and political matters. The ILO provided skills training based on a survey on labour needs. Moving forward, the LIFT project will finance two skills training activities, one partnering with the Myanmar construction federation and one with the Ministry of Labour (MoL).

## **Achievements on Component 2**

Component 2 involved demonstrating viable, effective and replicable employment intensive and conflict-sensitive strategies for decent job creation and social and economic empowerment for vulnerable people – particularly youth in conflict affected rural areas in Mon State, with the aim of these being taken up by the Government and EAOs. At the operational level, the project results were achieved despite the project being subject to a substantial delay in commencement of up to one year. The delay was due to restrictions on international agencies travelling to rural locations which affected the ability of ILO project staff to access project implementation locations. Prior to the start of implementation, the project team attempted – unsuccessfully – to get an exemption before deciding on remote monitoring. The delay in commencement and the remote monitoring caused delays and extra costs throughout implementation. Nevertheless, project achievements included:

- Completion of 17 infrastructure facilities including - 4 water supply facilities, 3 new clinics, 2 bridges, 3 pre-schools, 3 schools, 1 training centre and 1 dormitory totalling USD 173, 843.<sup>1</sup>
- Employment of 791 workers including 454 (57%) males and 337 (43%) females. Of the workers selected, 42% were youth.
- Creation of a total of 8,022 worker days which included 36% of worker days for women and 39% of worker days for youth.
- Supporting 10 major local CSOs to deliver training for 1,015 girls/women and 702 men/boys in key topics.<sup>2</sup>
- Training and mentoring support for 13 local community members to manage construction contracts.
- Establishing Village Development Committees (VDC) to oversee physical works development and to manage operations and maintenance.
- Developing relationships with the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the political stream of a local EAO.<sup>3</sup>
- Creating a platform for key stakeholders in a conflict environment to develop relationships and work together including the NMSP, CSOs, village level authorities and village members (notably the Government has not been involved).
- Collaborating with 10 CSOs in Mon State and to bring them together with the NMSP and vice versa.

Due to the GoM's restrictions on movement, the review team were not able to visit the infrastructure sites but the information provided to the review team including video images, designs indicate that the works are structurally sound. ILO building codes are of a high standard.

Participants expressed strong appreciation for the benefits brought to them from the process and result of the infrastructure construction. However, because of the delays in commencement of the project and the lack of flexibility to allow for a no-cost extension, the project team was forced to carry out construction activities during the wet season with many consequent challenges. Also, flooding occurred during the 2019 wet season in the Bee Rae area, which resulted in supplies being lost and some community contractors being out of pocket.

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<sup>1</sup> Some photographs of the infrastructure completed is attached in Annex 5.

<sup>2</sup> (youth and drugs literacy; penal discussion; soap making, democracy and federalism, human rights, gender based violence and legal awareness, ecological farming, community development theory and leadership, Peacebuilding)

<sup>3</sup> that has recently signed on to the National Ceasefire Agreement but has not yet cemented the peace with development dividends such as job creation, infrastructure and services in its area.

The findings of the review suggest that the **training** met a high level of need due to the fact beneficiaries had minimal previous access to training. Data from the baseline and end-line studies<sup>4</sup> shows that prior to the project implementation, 94.5% of respondents had no access to training courses in the previous 12 months. During the review, stakeholders expressed that they appreciated the content of the training including soft skills training such as leadership training and practical skills training such as natural fertiliser making, soap making and sewing training.

### **Achievements on Component 3**

Component 3 focused on increased engagement and evidence-based buy-in of duty bearers on promotion and adoption of decent work practice, employment for peace in lieu of forced labour (to be funded with co-funding support from the USAID project on the Forced Labour complaints mechanism). For this component, the work of the RBSA project included production and distribution of Information Education and Communication (IEC) materials and workshops on human rights and workers' rights. This represented a continuation of ILOs previous flagship work in Myanmar around eliminating forced labour. Ending forced labour is an area where successive Myanmar governments both military and NDC led have been cooperative with development agencies due to their interest in being compliant with the demands of the international community in lieu of their investment goals.<sup>5</sup> Since a liaison office was established in 2002, the ILO has played a leadership role in the campaign to end forced labour and child labour in Myanmar.<sup>678</sup>

From this component, the most tangible result has been reports from stakeholders that the military are reluctant to carry out forced labour practices in the ILO's presence. The project has also provided a basis for the ILO to develop a relationship with the NMSP around reducing forced labour. However, as with other project results, results for this outcome have been limited in scope and size. Notably the NMSP has not yet signed any agreements on forced labour. Moving forward, the ILO should continue to encourage the NMSP to sign and action agreements on eliminating forced labour.

### **Efficiency**

The evaluation team found that there were aspects of the approach that were efficient, i.e. drawing on community level human resources for delivery of outputs but the delay in implementation and restrictions on the movement of ILO staff caused inefficiencies. Inefficiencies pertained to many project activities being required to be held in townships resulting in extra accommodation costs, difficulties in securing the attendance of participants because it required them to be away from livelihood activities. The necessity to conduct construction activities during the wet season resulted in some materials being lost due to flooding and some contractors incurring extra costs for supplies as they were cut off from local township suppliers and had to obtain supplies from Thailand. Another aspect of implementation that could potentially be seen as inefficient is the fact that there were a large number of stakeholders involved in implementation: up to 10 CSOs, RPF, PIT, PSC and VDC. The MNSP were also invited to participate in project events. However, the benefits of enhancing collaboration between stakeholders in a context where collaboration and communication are lacking means that the extra costs of this approach are seen to be worthwhile.

The total funds contributed to infrastructure were MMK 252,130,981 (USD 173, 843), approximately 19 percent, to paying local labourers were MMK 72,448,800 (USD 49,953), approximately 5.4 percent of total expenditure and to maintenance Funds was MMK 18,060,296 (USD 12,423), 1.3 percent of total funds spent. This implies that total funds spent at the community level was about 25% which is somewhat low. The need for remote monitoring may have contributed to high support costs.

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<sup>4</sup> The Baseline study was conducted over December 2018 to February 2019. The endline study was held in October – November 2019. 109 household representatives were asked a range of livelihood questions in a questionnaire.

<sup>5</sup> Standing up for workers, promoting labour rights through trade" found at [https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research\\_file\\_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf](https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research_file_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf), retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>6</sup> ILO in Myanmar, About Us" found at <https://www.ilo.org/yangon/country/lang-en/index.htm> retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>7</sup> Forced labour brochure released", Myanmar Times, found at <https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/5278-forced-labour-brochure-released.html> retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>8</sup> Standing up for workers, promoting labour rights through trade" found at [https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research\\_file\\_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf](https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research_file_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf), retrieved on 27/02/2020



More flexibility is required in relation to budget management in a project operating in a highly charged political environment such as Myanmar. Also, contingency funds should be included in the sub-contracts to ensure community contractors are not out of pocket.

**Impact and Sustainability**

Data collected by the project is preliminary but initial findings from baseline and end-line data showed positive economic changes from before to after project implementation. For example, after the intervention 32% more participants reported that they had received any form of income compared to before the intervention. In addition to showing the financial benefit of the project, the data showed the low level of integration of the villagers into the monetary economy prior to the project. In the baseline study 46% of respondents said they received no income in the last 12 months. This suggests that the project is operating in an area of high need where the income provided makes a big difference.

In regard to the sustainability of infrastructure, the project has put systems in place for the maintenance of infrastructure and resource sharing for water systems. For this purpose, the Village Development Committees (VDCs) were designed to transform into Operation and Maintenance (O&M) committees after construction had been completed.

Sustainability also pertains to scaling up the EIP model across Mon state and around the country based on uptake of the model by local national and local stakeholders and other multilateral, bilateral and CSO development partners. Promoting the merits of the approach and gaining traction will be a long-term project. Lessons learned from the RBSA funded activity can be passed on to future projects.

Unfortunately due to the diversion of resources towards the Covid 19 response as of April 2020 donor funding is not currently available to the ILO Myanmar Liaison office for a follow on project. Moreover, there is a no further follow on funding available from the ILO through the RBSA envelope. Should funding become available, priorities would include:

- Activities to support beneficiaries to link more lucratively to markets such as TVET training in key sectors, SME training and value chain development. This could include a continuation of work in the Bee Rae area as these activities were not extensively explored during the RBSA project as well as expanding into other areas.
- Activities to support income generation for women (although women are involved in farming also) such as soap making and sewing.
- Expanding the LRB approach to other areas in Mon State and neighbouring states such as Karen State.

It would be useful to involve CBOs and their staff from the RBSA project in future projects given the capacity building they have received. The need for local level employment strategies has been increased by the Corona virus because migrant workers have returned from Thailand and the Myanmar garment industry is suffering a downturn. The ILO could advocate for access to social protection/income support related funding directed towards tackling Coronavirus to support its work around increasing local employment and income generating opportunities.

**Lessons Learned**

Lesson Learned	Guidance for Addressing
A project budget should be commensurate with the activity type. Infrastructure projects can absorb sizeable budgets and should be provided with them to maximise economies of scale and gain attention of counterparts with whom the agency is attempting to engage in policy discussions.	In future programming, seek to match infrastructure projects with larger funding envelopes
In complex political contexts, the pathway for demonstrating and scaling up suitable models for implementation by national stakeholders is not straightforward. It is not realistic to expect this to occur in a timeframe of two years	Ensure a political economy analysis is conducted prior to design of projects involving demonstrating models for scaling up and incorporate such analysis into the design and ensure enough time is available for implementation.

Signing the NCA does not necessarily lead to the NSMP taking a strong leadership role on strategies for job creation and development in the local region.	Future programming should build on the trust that has been built with the NMSP to support institutional strengthening. This should focus on enhancing their capacity in service provision while recognising that there are limitations to what the NMSP can achieve in the current political context.
To promote conflict sensitive economic development strategies supporting inter-EAO collaboration may be an effective approach.	Seek to involve more than one EAO area in future proposals
On the basis of comparisons with previous projects where the ILO worked with EAOs and community members only and the RBSA project where the project team collaborated with CSOs to deliver project implementation, it was more effective to include CSOs in the project management mix as they were more enthusiastic and active participants when it came to attending meetings, actioning tasks etc.	Building on the positive experience of the RBSA project, seek to involve CSOs in project management in future projects in EAO areas.
Practical training that leads to cost savings and income opportunities for beneficiaries is highly valued by community members. Training of more than a few days duration may be needed to provide sufficient benefit to trainees.	Incorporate this lesson learned into future programming
The design of “soft” skill training courses should be specific in the outcomes it is trying to achieve in order to ascertain how much time and what strategies are needed to achieve outcomes.	Incorporate this lesson learned into future programming
The ILO should consider carefully the amount of contingency funds that to be included in the sub-contracts for community contractors to ensure community contractors are not out of pocket.	Incorporate this lesson into future programming
More support and discussion around gender issues is required for gender equality to be fully absorbed by the communities. Gender equality goes against some of the local cultural practices and progress in this area thus may take some time.	Conduct further contextual analysis to develop strategies for the promotion of gender equality in future programs

### **Looking forward**

Moving forward the ILO should build on its historically strong positioning as a brokering partner of parties to conflict to support peace and development in Myanmar. This should occur through the on-going implementation and promotion to policy makers of the EIIP model and advocacy for equal and fair treatment in striving towards the SDGs in EAO, Government, as well as joint EAOs- Government controlled areas. Toward this end, the following recommendations have been identified by the evaluation team:

**Recommendation 1:** The ILO should seek ongoing funding for its LRB infrastructure and local economic development work. Priorities for future funding should include:

- Activities to support beneficiaries to link more lucratively to markets such as TVET training in key sectors, SME training and value chain development. This could be a continuation in the Bee Rae area as these activities were not extensively explored during the RBSA project as well as expanding into other areas.
- Activities to support income generation for women (although women are involved in farming also) such as soap making and sewing
- Expanding the LRB approach to other areas in Mon State and neighbouring states such as Karen State

**Recommendation 2:** The ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar have a context specific strategy around employment and local economic development that cuts across different projects but currently it is rather informal. It may

be helpful for the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar to support projects with different funding sources operating concurrently and sequentially with:

- Good quality integrated formal analysis covering institutions, systems and processes, political economy, human resource capacity, economic conditions and an identification of opportunities for supporting agents of change that supports their project development.
- An articulated longer term strategy of the ILO's objectives for EAO areas within the framework of the JPR (conflict sensitive LRB infrastructure development, TVET training, value chain development etc)
- An articulated proactive strategy to coordinating with other development partners to work collectively to support national level leaders who possess "agency" to take up opportunities for change.

**Recommendation 3:** The project team has already produced an excellent video on the project achievements including a long and short version. These materials should be disseminated as widely and actively as possible through various media forms and social media. The business case study is another informative output. The study has robust findings, but it is long and technical. It would be useful to produce a shorter version with key findings and recommendations for dissemination. Among the development partner community, it is useful to disseminate lessons through the Development Partners Forum and stakeholders to the LIFT project.

**Recommendation 4:** While EAO areas have been disadvantaged in terms of service delivery, if ILO focuses their operational activity solely on EAO areas then there may be a perception by the Government and Military that they are siding with the EAOs. This may reduce the willingness of the Government to collaborate with the ILO in learning lessons and striving towards development outcomes. In the future, EIIP interventions should be balanced between EAO and Government areas. The ILO should also focus on inter-EAO collaboration as this is a current source of conflict in the country.

**Recommendation 5:** An important achievement of the project has been the relationship established between the NMSP and the ILO. To achieve effective leadership, the NMSP needs capacity building to strengthen its systems and processes. However, there are sensitivities around external involvement in its internal affairs. The ILO should build on its relationship with the NMSP to influence and support capacity building within the NMSPs internal systems and processes. In the long term, the ILO should encourage the NMSP and other EAO administrations to take an active leadership role in promoting development outcomes such as jobs, services and infrastructure, for communities in areas controlled by them. Improvements in planning and management systems may help to achieve better outcomes.

**Recommendation 6:** The project has also provided a basis for the ILO to develop a relationship with the NMSP around reducing forced labour. However, as with other project results, results for this outcome have been limited in scope and size. Notably the NMSP has not yet signed any agreements on forced labour. Moving forward, the ILO should continue to encourage the NMSP to sign agreements on eliminating forced labour.

**Recommendation 7:** While the planned works were completed by the project team and operation and O&M committees were established, implementation was rushed and there was not much time to ensure the O&M committees were up and running and operating effectively and sustainably. The extent to which maintenance systems established will remain operational and effective is unpredictable. Activities relating to oversight of village infrastructure maintenance from facilities built on the RBSA project should be included in proposals for future funding.

**Recommendation 8:** A key result of the project at the operational level has been support for community members to become commercial contractors with the capability to manage construction projects. To build on the skills and business linkages that have been developed through this, the ILO should look for opportunities to further strengthen the skills and business acumen of the community contractors that have been trained. Support for launching community contractors as sustainably functioning business operations should be built into future community led infrastructure projects.

**Recommendation 9:** Several recommendations emerged from the evaluation pertaining to training which are as follows:

- Trainees found courses that were particularly useful to them to be ecological farming, soap making, and dressmaking. In future projects, it would be useful to deliver training content in these areas. Trainees also noted that the duration of courses was quite short and they would have benefited from more content delivery. In future, consideration should be given to increasing the duration of training to cover participants needs.

- Participants also appreciated “soft skills” training courses such as leadership and human rights but training evaluations did not clearly ascertain the extent of benefits or what additional support is needed. The design of the “soft” skill training courses should be specific in the outcomes it is trying to achieve to ascertain how much time and what strategies are needed to achieve outcomes. Training evaluations should be more rigorous with a focus on building the capacity of trainers to **observe, analyse** and **communicate** outcomes.

A complete assignment of responsibilities, assessment of recommendation risk and timeframe for action is included in Section 5.

# 1 Introduction

This report details the findings of the final evaluation of the “*More and quality jobs are created through better policies and frameworks and strengthened labour market information systems*” project initiated by the ILO. Funded through the Regular Budgetary Supplementary Allocation (RBSA) and part of the global Jobs for Peace and Resilience (JPR) program the project represents an allocation of USD1 million over two-years.

The project focused on scaling up activities in three ethnic conflict affected areas to assist the Government of Myanmar (GoM) in developing effective models and strategies for decent job creation and national reconciliation through employment-intensive investment approaches and models, with a focus on vulnerable ethnic groups and youth in rural areas.

The main purposes of this independent final evaluation was to demonstrate accountability<sup>9</sup> to the ILO member states and key national stakeholders and development partners on key results and achievements. It also sought to promote key learnings based on the experience of implementation and management.

The evaluation covered all interventions implemented under the project as they link to the Myanmar DWCP (2018-21). It addressed the following ILO evaluation criteria: (a) *relevance*, (b) *intervention progress and effectiveness, including of management arrangements*, (c) *efficiency of resource use*; and (d) *impact orientation and sustainability of the interventions as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2017*. A copy of the Terms of Reference (ToR) is included as Annex 1.

Data collection and analysis was completed during February 2019 with one-week field work in Myanmar including a field visit to Mon State. Key results and findings were then analysed and consolidated into an initial Aide Memoire and subsequent report. The following sections highlight the key findings, results and recommendations and guidance moving forward.

## 1.1 Country context

Myanmar has recently emerged from a long period of isolation, authoritarian rule and economic sanctions. Recent transformations have focused primarily on establishing democratic governance and rule of law; fostering peace and reconciliation; promoting market orientated economic adjustments; and implementing key policies centred on decentralisation, poverty alleviation and economic growth.

The rapid changes are not without challenges including: (i) the challenge to foster a culture of democratic governance, (ii) rule of law and awareness of rights and responsibilities among the population; and (iii) defining a vision of diversity, the aspirations of ethnic minorities and long-standing inequality and discrimination.

Poverty alleviation is a key national priority and development objective. World Bank data from 2015 placed the national poverty rate at 26.1%. In 2015, the Human Development Index ranked Myanmar at 145 out of 188 countries.<sup>10</sup> Poverty has been exacerbated by ethnic conflicts, discrimination, economic mismanagement and stagnation under authoritarian rule as well as frequent natural disasters.

Myanmar has been scarred by conflict for over 70 years. Major break throughs in the peace process included a nationwide ceasefire agreement and several bilateral ceasefires, the holding of three major Union peace conferences in 2016, 2017 and 2018 and on-going political dialogues. Fostering peace, however, has proven to be complex and difficult with clashes continuing in various locations around the country.

The Government has recognised in its development assistance policy that “*where communities are materially secure and have access to economic opportunities, peace will be more durable*”. Gender responsive, local development and job creation can therefore play an important role in fostering harmony, reconciliation and nation building thus ensuring sustainable development and stability.

The Union Government of Myanmar has placed on top of its development agenda the promotion of job creation and national reconciliation. Whilst these broad policy priorities have been formulated at Union level, there has been little experience with the development and implementation of effective conflict-sensitive

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<sup>9</sup> According to (OECD/DAC, 2002), accountability is the “*obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards or to report fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and/or plans. This may require a careful, even legally defensible, demonstration that the work is consistent with the contract terms.*”

<sup>10</sup> ILO Decent Work Country Programme (2018 – 2021)

regional and sectoral strategies and models that operationalise these policy priorities at State level and that contribute to peace and reconciliation.

One of the important issues to be addressed by the Government in implementing its job creation and national reconciliation agenda, as well as a priority for ILO's Governing Bodies, is the continued elimination of forced labour. Despite significant progress in the action against forced labour much work remains to be done as forced labour persists in ethnic areas across the country. It is a long-standing problem and increases the level of social and economic vulnerability of the affected population. It also creates distrust towards the Government in its peace reconciliation initiatives.

## 1.2 Project Background and Context

The project was funded through the RBSA which was established in 2008 to increase the funding of its Decent Work Agenda through flexible and unearmarked voluntary contributions to relevant technical cooperation programmes. The RBSA helps the ILO to overcome constraints of its existing funding arrangements and respond strategically to relevant development issues and challenges. The *"more and current jobs"* project fits within the strategic context and qualifies for RBSA support.

The project is part of the first Myanmar Decent Work Country (DWCP) Programme (2018-2021) fitting under Outcome 2 of the DWCP.

In addition, the project is also part of the *ILO Flagship Programme on Jobs for Peace and Resilience* and is based on the *Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205)*. It builds on consultations between ILO tripartite constituents and conclusions of the ILO's Governing Body to continue the efforts for the elimination of forced labour. The Jobs for Peace and Resilience flagship programme (JPR) adopts a strategic approach that aims to contribute to more peaceful and resilient societies through employment, decent work and social dialogue. The JPR supports employment and decent work link as a means to peace and disaster resilience. By enhancing economic prospects and increasing contact between parties to conflict and by addressing grievances of the most vulnerable communities, JPR projects aim to reinforce social cohesion and build resilience to future shocks. Guided by ILO's [Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation \(No. 205\)](#), the JPR combines employment-intensive investments, technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, employment services and private sector and local economic development approaches in a coherent and context-specific manner.

The project was focused on scaling up activities in three ethnic conflict affected areas to assist the Government in developing effective models and strategies for decent job creation and national reconciliation through employment-intensive investment approaches and models, with a focus on vulnerable ethnic groups and youth in rural areas. A summary of key initiatives in participating states is included below:

**Shan State:** From 2015 - 2019 the ILO implemented, together with consortium partners (Save the Children, EPRP, ASG and MDCG), a four-year EU-funded project on Peace, Development and Reconciliation in Shan State. This project's overall objective was to contribute to peace, reconciliation and development through the empowerment of conflict affected communities in Myanmar. One of its components is to facilitate participatory development in conflict affected communities based on community empowerment. This included employment-intensive small infrastructure projects in some parts of Shan.

The RBSA project has contributed to the current implementation of the employment-intensive infrastructure development component of the on-going project through the establishment of linkages with the policy level. Evidence-based advocacy at policy level is an important upstream activity to make the case for economically viable but conflict sensitive job creation strategies. Specifically, it will focus on the elaboration of market-led strategies for job creation

**Rakhine State:** With support from the Livelihoods and Food Security Project (LIFT) multi-donor trust fund, the ILO undertook a project in Rakhine State aimed at supporting the Rakhine State Government in developing a comprehensive Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) strategy in line with the socioeconomic development plan and Rakhine Advisory Commission's recommendations; build the capacity of at least three (3) Government-run non-partisan TVET schools to design and deliver inclusive and labour-market responsive TVET trainings to young women and men; and to develop approaches for better outreach of TVET programmes to vulnerable populations in the State.

The RBSA project aimed to enhance the current implementation of the TVET project by strengthening linkages with the policy level. Upstream activities were designed to contribute to evidence-based policy; making the

case for economically viable but conflict sensitive job creation strategies. Specifically, it focused on the elaboration of market-led strategies for job creation.

**Mon State:** In the period 2013 – 2017 the ILO implemented a Norway-funded project that focused on social and economic empowerment of local populations (mostly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)) in selected clusters, on the back of employment-intensive investments in key rural infrastructure and with a special emphasis on skills development for young people. The project worked with close involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Government of Tanyintharyi Region, and Mon People living in the conflict affected areas. The RBSA project expanded on the recently completed project, adding over 2,500 additional beneficiaries and expanding the coverage to Mon State. It established upstream linkages with the policy level, making the case for economically viable but conflict sensitive job creation strategies.

### 1.3 Overall Project Design

**The Project Development Objective (PDO)** is to support “*vulnerable women and men – in particular youth – in conflict affected ethnic areas of rural Myanmar [to] derive social and economic benefits and increased resilience in fragile situations from employment-intensive investments in key infrastructure and demand-driven Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)*”.

The project included three defined End of Activity Outcomes. The identification of priorities and outcomes was done through a consultative process with engagement of the tripartite constituents through the DWCP-technical working group. The project team partnered with the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population and Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) and at the community level with EAOs operating in the targeted areas, and with the targeted local communities. During the inception phase, the following project outcomes were agreed on:

- Outcome 1: State-level Government support in Shan, Mon and Rakhine States for the development of conflict-sensitive and economically viable decent job creation policies through employment intensive public investments
- Outcome 2: Demonstrated effective and conflict-sensitive operational models for decent job creation through employment-intensive investments in rural infrastructure in selected areas in Mon State
- Outcome 3: Increased support in Mon, Shan and Rakhine States for the adoption of decent work standards and practices among duty bearers in lieu of forced labour.

A summary of key outcomes and components of the project are outlined at Annex 2

## 2 Evaluation Background

### 2.1 Evaluation Purpose

The main purpose of this independent final evaluation was to demonstrate accountability<sup>11</sup> to the ILO member states and key national stakeholders and development partners on key results and achievements. The evaluation also sought to promote key learnings based on the experience of implementation and management. Specifically, the evaluation sought to:

- Assess the extent to which the project has achieved its stated objectives and expected results as reflected in the project document and modifications while identifying the support factors and constraints that have led to them;
- Identify unexpected positive and negative results;
- Assess the extent to which the project outcomes will be scalable;
- Identify lessons learned and good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further;

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<sup>11</sup> According to (OECD/DAC, 2002), accountability is the “*obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards or to report fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and/or plans. This may require a careful, even legally defensible, demonstration that the work is consistent with the contract terms.*”

- Establish the validity and the relevance of the project design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO (i.e. Flagship Programme of Jobs for Peace and Resilience), UN, and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),
- Provide recommendations to project stakeholders to promote sustainability and support the completion, expansion or further development of initiatives that were supported by the project.

## 2.2 Evaluation Scope

The evaluation covered all interventions implemented under the project as they link to the Myanmar DWCP (2018-21). The evaluation covered the entire duration of the project (January 2018-December 2019). The evaluation considered the ILO's global strategic planning cycles, and programmes and budgets, from 2018 to 2019<sup>12</sup>. Finally, the evaluation also considered the four cross-cutting policy drivers – international labour standards, social dialogue and tripartism, gender equality and non-discrimination, and just transition and decent work.

## 2.3 Evaluation Client(s)

The primary end users of the evaluation findings are the project management team and the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, ILO technical departments and the Union Government of Myanmar. Secondary parties utilising the results of the evaluation include the tripartite constituents and other interested stakeholders directly and indirectly involved in supporting the implementation of the Myanmar DWCP.

## 2.4 Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation addressed the following ILO evaluation criteria: *(a) relevance, (b) intervention progress and effectiveness, including of management arrangements, (c) efficiency of resource use; and (d) impact orientation and sustainability of the interventions as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2017*. In order to address the standard ILO evaluation framework, the evaluation focused on the primary and secondary sub-questions which were as follows.

Evaluation Criteria	Primary Questions	Secondary Question
<b>Relevance and Strategic Fit</b>	Is the project relevant to the ILO, GoM and other stakeholders?	Does the ToC for the project remain relevant to the Myanmar DWCP and ILO's regional priorities as outlined in the 2016 Bali Declaration?
		Was the strategy and approach of the project relevant for the project objectives? Were there any changes in strategies, and were they been effective?
		Was the time frame for project implementation and the sequencing of project activities planned logical and realistic?
		What is the perception of project stakeholders with regard to the relationship of the activity to peacebuilding? How has the project concept been perceived by parties to conflict? Was it well received, and were there any obstacles to adopting and implementing it?
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Has the project been effective in implementation?	To what extent were project results achieved? Were these the intended results? Have there been any unintended results, positive or negative?
		To what extent has the management structure, arrangements, capacities, and consistency and continuity at all levels and in all locations influenced the results achieved?
		To what extent have the stakeholders, and in particular the ILO's tripartite constituents been involved in project oversight and/or implementation? Are project partners able to fulfil the roles expected in the project strategy? Are there any capacity challenges (human resources, funding, etc.)? What has been the impact of their involvement?

<sup>12</sup> 2018-21 Strategic Plan and 2018-19 P&B



		To what extent were the project's intended outcomes around institutional capacity building achieved?
		To what extent were the CCPDs, particularly gender equality and non-discrimination, as well as climate resilient solutions integrated into the approach? To what effect? What strategies did the project employ to benefit youth and were they effective?
<b>Efficiency of resource use (including funds, time, technical and support personnel)</b>	Has the project been implemented efficiently and represented good value for money?	To what extent has the project delivered results commensurate with the resources provided, i.e. value for money? Could they have been allocated more efficiently, and if so how?
		How effectively has the project leveraged resources (e.g., by collaborating with other ILO initiatives and other projects)?
		How effective was monitoring, evaluation, reporting and processes supporting learning on the Project? How could these have been improved?
<b>Impact orientation and sustainability</b>	What is the likely impact of the project	What strategies and/or plans have been put in place to ensure continuation of actions initiated after the project ends? To what extent are these likely to be effective?
		How effective has the project been in establishing and fostering national/local ownership and to what extent has this influenced internal networking and cooperation?
		How far did the programme link and coordinate with other initiatives and activities in order to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability in relation to the peacebuilding objectives, the employment objectives or both?
		What are the risks to the sustainability and impact of project outcomes?
<b>Challenges, Lessons Learned and Recommendations</b>	What lessons learned emerged from the project and what recommendations do these imply for project stakeholders?	What lessons learned emerged from the intervention for the ILO in Myanmar and in the broader region and the GoM and other development partners in Myanmar? What recommendations are there to promote sustainability and support the completion, expansion and further development of initiatives supported by the project?

## 2.5 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

The evaluation complied with evaluation norms and standards and was carried out in adherence with the relevant parts of the ILO evaluation policy and ILO evaluation strategy. The evaluation followed ethical safeguards, as specified in the ILO's evaluation procedures. The evaluation adheres to the UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards and ethical safeguards and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

MCI's approach to the evaluation involved a qualitative led mixed methodology, combining a range of methods to answer the key evaluation questions and sub-questions. The key data collection methods included a desk review of program and other relevant secondary documents and an analysis of baseline and end-line data to identify changes over the implementation period. More details on the evaluation methodology are outlined below.

Method	Comments/Issues
<b>Desk Review of relevant documents</b>	The desk review Identified initial issues and provided guidance to the type, nature and focus of key evaluation questions and highlighted pertinent issues raised in earlier reports that needed to be verified. This provided a basis for assessment of key achievements with regards to targets and outputs. Baseline and endline data collected by the project team was analysed to identify outcomes achieved by the project.

<b>Briefing</b>	The evaluator had an initial consultation with the ILO Country Office team. The consultation enabled the Country Office and the Evaluator to reach a common understanding regarding the state of progress of the project, the priority questions for the main evaluation users, available data sources and data collection instruments and the structure of the final report.
<b>Key informants' interviews (face-to-face and remote) and Focus Group Discussions</b>	<p>The evaluation utilized a qualitative approach to data collection which included KIIs and FGDs. The evaluation team employ stratified purposeful sampling among sub-groups to ensure that the review captured the perspective of all groups.</p> <p>Key Informant Interviews were held with the project steering committee, project implementation team, project partners, village development committees and government representatives in Yee and Mawlamyine townships, Mon State. The KII and FGDs applied a semi structured approach to questioning.</p> <p>The review team met with 29 men, 13 women and 1 trans. The evaluation schedule and list of stakeholders met is attached at Annex 4.</p>
<b>Data Analysis and Verification</b>	<p>A final debrief presentation of the Aide Memoire was presented to ILO country office staff. This provided an opportunity for stakeholders involved in the key informant interviews such as project steering committee, project implementation team, project partners, village development committees and government representatives in Yee and Mawlamyine townships as well as ILO project staff to provide feedback on the initial findings of the report.</p> <p>Based on secondary data sources gained through review of existing documents as well as consultations and interviews with key stakeholders, the evaluation team undertook data analysis.</p> <p>The evaluation team conducted content analysis, coding and tallying of qualitative and quantitative data to provide evidence-based responses to the evaluation questions. This data was triangulated with quantitative data from the baseline and endline study.</p> <p>Inferences made were analytical rather than statistical and sampling for fieldwork was purposive and not representative. Baseline and end-line data was analysed using frequency analysis and qualitative data was tallied, analysed based on the stratified samples and trend analysis applied to the data.</p>
<b>Utilisation of key findings and results</b>	The entire review was grounded in a utilisation focused evaluation in that results and findings have been presented in a way to maximize the ability of stakeholders to process, apply and learn from key findings and results.

## 2.6 Evaluation Limitations and Constraints

All evaluations and reviews have limitations in terms of time and resources. Some limitations pertaining to this evaluation are outlined below:

**Time and Resources:** the rigour of the data gathering analysis was constrained to some degree by the time available. The final evaluation team could not meet with all key stakeholders, particularly for follow-up meetings and discussions. However, the evaluation team worked closely with the ILO to identify and select key stakeholders to meet with during the in-country mission.

**Timeframe:** Field work on the evaluation was limited to one week restricting the range of stakeholders who can be interviewed and provide input into the findings and analysis.

**Access to work sites:** Due to travel restrictions to rural areas the evaluation team were not able to visit project sites, rather, project stakeholders were required to visit the review team in urban locations. This limited the capacity of the review team to verify project achievements.

**Judgements:** the time limitations meant that professional judgements needed to be employed to interpret stakeholder perspectives.

**Attribution:** ILO works in a fluid and dynamic environment (particularly for skills development and institutional strengthening) and many factors influence performance and operational efficiency. Defining and identifying specific areas of attribution remain challenging at best.

### 3 Key Findings and Analysis

The following section summarises key findings against the following ILO evaluation criteria: (a) *relevance*, (b) *intervention progress and effectiveness, including of management arrangements*, (c) *efficiency of resource use*; and (d) *impact orientation and sustainability*. The findings are based on the direct observations and interviews from the field, relevant secondary data and consultation between the evaluation team.

#### 3.1 Relevance and Strategic Fit

The evaluation team found the project approach was relevant in some ways and less so in others. The project was relevant to GoM and ILO policy frameworks. Globally, job creation has been shown to be an important lever for peace. The *Case Study, Benefits of Employment-Intensive and Local Resource-Based Investments in Basic Rural Infrastructure in the Context of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018 -2030* makes a robust case for the benefits of rolling out the EIIP approach across the country. However, the assumption that demonstrating a strong model for job creation could lead to scale up at the national level proved problematic in the country context due to the ongoing environment of conflict and mistrust that prevails.

##### **Relevance to policy frameworks**

With its focus on building community level infrastructure and creating local jobs, the project fits within the policy priorities of GoM. In the GoM Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018 – 2030), Goal 3 focuses on the creation of quality jobs, together with the expansion of the private sector as the engine of environmentally conscious and socially responsible economic growth. Also, strategy 3.6 focused on building a priority infrastructure base that facilitates sustainable growth and economic diversification.<sup>13</sup>

The project aligns well with the ILO Myanmar Decent Work Country Programme. The project contributed towards Priority 2: *By 2021, employment and decent work and sustainable entrepreneurship opportunities are available and accessible to all, including for vulnerable populations affected by conflict and disasters*. Notably the project contributed towards:

- Outcome 2.1: More women and men of working age have decent jobs or are engaged in entrepreneurship, especially those in vulnerable employment conditions – by providing employment and injecting funds into the local economy with flow on effects for local investment and established business functionality and networks (e.g. local contractors)
- Outcome 2.2: Strengthened protection against vulnerable forms of work, in particular forced labour and child labour, through the production and distribution of IEC materials and workshops.<sup>14</sup>

The project also aligns well with the 2016 Bali Declaration<sup>15</sup> as outlined including:

- *Paragraph 1: Realising fundamental principles and rights at work* -by providing and modelling safe and fair working conditions and equal pay for equal work and provided training on decent and safe work conditions.
- *Paragraph 2: Development of policies for decent work* – by developing a model for scale up of labour-intensive infrastructure investment involving decent work and promoting it to the Government and EAOs.
- *Paragraph 4: Accelerating action for eliminating child labour and forced labour* - by producing and distributing IEC materials on forced labour and child labour as well as workshops on human rights.
- *Paragraph 7: Closing gender gaps in opportunities and outcomes* – by modelling quotas for participation of females in work and training and providing gender awareness training.

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<sup>13</sup> The Government of Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018 – 2030) found at [https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core\\_Doc\\_Myanmar\\_Sustainable\\_Development\\_Plan\\_2018\\_-\\_2030\\_Aug2018.pdf](https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core_Doc_Myanmar_Sustainable_Development_Plan_2018_-_2030_Aug2018.pdf) retrieved on 27/2/2020

<sup>14</sup> ILO Myanmar Decent Work Country Programme

<sup>15</sup> The declaration adopted at the 16th Asia and Pacific Regional Meeting of the ILO in Bali on 9 December 2016 served as a call to action for governments, workers' and employers' organizations in the region to do more to promote inclusive growth, social justice and decent work. (found at

- Paragraph 6: Building resilience in situations of crisis arising from conflict and natural disasters – from Increased agricultural production capacity due to increased employment income.<sup>16</sup>

As part of the *ILO Flagship Programme on Jobs for Peace and Resilience* the content of the project activities is relevant having developed conflict-sensitive employment strategies. However, there is room to build on the contribution to local economic development of the LRB infrastructure with value chain development, SME development, technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training in line with the JPR modality. This aspect of the JPR approach fits with the views of respondents who, during review consultations, identified that they wished for support in obtaining a greater proportion of the value in the agricultural activities such as rubber and betel nut as well as more practical skills training for their business activities. Such an approach would be more comprehensive and beneficial to local community members. In future project activities, it would be worthwhile taking a more holistic approach to local economic development in programming.

### **Relevance of project implementation strategies to project objectives**

In the project document the Theory of Change is described:

“Along with economic benefits, national stakeholders recognise the critical role that job creation and tackling forced labour can have to peace efforts in Myanmar but there remain gaps in the evidence on which to base economically viable strategies and options for job creation in areas affected by conflict in Myanmar. There is an opportunity – and pressing need - to respond constructively to these gaps, and to combine this with the need for continued efforts in the promotion of decent work and action against forced labour.” But the ToC also states that these strategies need to be conflict sensitive and address forced labour.

With this underpinning ToC, the project implemented a strategy of Local Resource Based (LRB) and community managed infrastructure construction and skills training including practical and soft skills in collaboration with local CBOs (Outcome 2). This Outcome was implemented both for its immediate economic benefits to the communities involved and the demonstration (as per the ToC) of the efficacy of the LRB approach for wider application throughout the country.

The project also produced evidence in the key output of Component 1 the *Case Study, Benefits of Employment-Intensive and Local Resource-Based Investments in Basic Rural Infrastructure in the Context of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018 -2030*<sup>17</sup> on the significant benefits that can be achieved in Myanmar if EIPP’s local resource based approaches are used in delivering investments in basic rural infrastructure in Myanmar, employment, enhanced service delivery and economic growth.

While the interventions produced good results for beneficiaries and the modelling in the case study was sound, the assumption that the demonstration of technical efficacy of the LRB approach in terms of social and economic benefits to the community would lead to take up of the approach by authorities proved problematic upon implementation.

### *Political economy of Myanmar*

While the UGoM has put job creation for peacebuilding at the top of its formal policy agenda in the Myanmar context, the political economy context impedes the potential for roll out of this agenda evenly across Government controlled and EAO controlled areas.

At the national level, the political economy of Myanmar has been dominated by the conflicting interests of the military, the majority ethnic Burmese representative party the National League for Democracy (NLD) and several smaller ethnic groups and army insurgents representing them. Formally, the military has conceded control to civilian political parties through the institutions of a parliamentary democracy system and negotiated ceasefire and power sharing agreements with Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). However, the military and the NLD administration have often demonstrated reluctance to follow through on negotiated concessions and power sharing. While it initially championed democracy by winning government at the first genuine parliamentary election in 2015, since this time the NDL has often taken actions that downplay the priorities of the ethnic groups and elevate the needs of the majority Burmese. Due to the numerical dominance of the Burmese and the constitutional underpinnings of the parliamentary democracy system,

<sup>16</sup> ILO, the Bali Declaration found at [https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/asia/aprm-16/WCMS\\_537445/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/asia/aprm-16/WCMS_537445/lang--en/index.htm) retrieved on 27/2/2020

<sup>17</sup> ILO Myanmar (2020) *Benefits of Employment-Intensive and Local Resource-Based Investments in Basic Rural Infrastructure in the Context of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018 -2030: A Case Study*

the NDL has been able to push legislation through parliament leaving the ethnic groups little recourse. Examples of how the Military and the NDL have discriminated against minority ethnic groups include:

- The expulsion of 700,000 Rohingas from Rahkine state in 2017
- The military retaining veto power on legislation passing through the parliament.
- The fact most remaining Rohingas do not have the vote and have no prospect of gaining it (due to the cancellation of Temporary Registration Certificates in 2015, the only type of registration documents that most Rohingya have).
- In the 2015 election candidates from local parties won in several ethnic minority areas but an NLD government imposed NLD Chief Ministers who have not engaged with local leaders. This has increased the support of ethnic populations for EAOs.
- The NLD has made little progress on development priorities such as job creation and electrification, particularly in ethnic minority areas

#### *The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)*

The NCA was a landmark agreement signed between the Government of Myanmar and eight insurgent groups in 2015 and two other insurgent groups joined in 2018. The eight groups that originally signed the peace agreement were: (i) The All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF); (ii) The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); (iii) The Chin National Front (CNF); (iv) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); (v) The Karen National Union (KNU); (vi) The KNU/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNU/KNLA PC); (vii) The Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and (viii) The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).

On 13 February 2018, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) was signed in the NCA. 7 armed ethnic organisations which have not signed the peace agreement include:

- KIA, Kachin Independence Army
- National United Front of Arakan (AA)
- WNO, Wa National Organization
- PSLF/TNLA, Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta-ang National Liberation Army
- KNPP, Karenni National Progress party

The seven steps of peace process according to the Road map of the NLD Government are: Review “the framework for political dialogue”.

- Amend “the framework for political dialogue”.
- Continue convening Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong based on the framework.
- Sign the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference Agreement based on the outcomes of the 21st Century Panglong Conference.
- Approve the constitutional amendment in accordance with the Union Agreement.
- Hold multi-party democratic elections in accordance with the amended Constitution
- Building of a democratic federal union based on the result of the election.

#### *Progress on implementation of the NCA*

Since the signing of the NCA, progress on implementation has been lagging. There has been an unclear structure regarding interim arrangements for implementing the NCA. According to the formal agreement, following the signing of the ceasefire, parties to ceasefire will develop a joint implementation plan relating to the provision of service delivery in areas such as livelihoods, education and health care, etc. The NCA required this to be discussed quickly after signing among parties. However, the Government did not move forward with discussions, but rather appeared to make assumptions that areas of ceasefire were under the control of the Government, and that EAOs had seceded control to the Government through signing the NCA.

This led to further conflict and unrest and delaying of discussions around implementation arrangements. There was a tighter control of access by the union level government after ceasefire signed and an incoherent interpretation of “ceasefire” between EAOs and the Government. The Government denied access of

development agencies to rural areas inside areas controlled by EAOs.<sup>18</sup> Moreover in this situation there was lack of clarity around who was responsible for development activities in EAO areas. Government ministries responsible for service delivery such as Ministries of Education, Health and Rural Development have no reach into EAO controlled areas. In connection with EAO areas, there is only the Myanmar Peace Centre which is responsible for peace and not development.

This had implications for the relevance of the TOC and the subsequent ability of the project to reach its objective of supporting uptake of the LRB model demonstrated through the project including:

- Lack of clarity about who is responsible for service delivery in the localities where the ILO was working or the EAO areas more generally reducing the potential for the model to be rolled out.
- The Government's reluctance to roll out service delivery, infrastructure and job creation programs evenly across Government and EAO controlled areas and therefore unlikelihood to take up approaches demonstrated by the project to be effective in employment creation
- EAOs lack resources to scale up job creation programs within areas under their control
- EAOs may be suspicious of development partners operating within their areas of control who they may perceive as working in the interests of the government.
- ILO staff were not permitted to enter rural areas outside townships in the EAO areas, forcing ILO staff to implement the project remotely in collaboration with Mon CSO Rahmonnya Peace Foundation (RPF) and its partners.

A further challenge is that, since 2013, the World Bank has provided a \$500 million loan to the GoM for the Myanmar National Community Driven Development (CDD) Project. The CDD project, implemented by the GoM, is also providing community level infrastructure and employment for community members. The existence of this project has led the Government to have less interest in engaging with the ILO about their promotion of the LRB model which is small in comparison at \$1 million.

Despite its small size, the ILO project does have lessons learned that complement the CDD project. First, the ILO project is community managed as well as local employment generation with community contractors employing local people whereas the CDD project is managed by external subcontractors. Second, the CDD project is only implemented in Government controlled areas. The project design intended to work in EAO areas but due to their dissatisfaction with the NCA the EAOs refused to be involved.

The RBSA project and previous ILO projects on the other hand have made important contributions development in EAO areas. Due to long standing conflict that has continued over decades, development – education, health, infrastructure, rural development etc. – in EAO areas has lagged. Conflict has continued to disadvantage communities over decades in these areas so development urgently needs to take place, despite the lack of resolution. Lessons regarding how to go about this are very important for the country.

The ILO has only demonstrated their model in limited areas in Mon and Shan state, there is a need to broaden application of the approach to many more areas.

The two-year timeframe was too short to allow the ILO to develop strategies and carry out negotiations that would be required to influence the development strategies of the GoM in EAO areas and building trust and capacity among the NMSP and governing bodies in other EAO areas. For the ILO to play a role in supporting leaders with the right agency to take up opportunities requires a long-term commitment. Such opportunities cannot be scheduled. A project timeframe of two years is unlikely to be long enough.

The small size of the budget (USD1 million) limited the breadth of the achievements at the operational level or the ability of the project to draw the attention from the GoM and other national stakeholders required to upscale the model. The project was funded through the RBSA which was established in 2008 to increase the funding of its Decent Work Agenda through flexible and un-earmarked voluntary contributions to relevant technical cooperation programmes. The RBSA helps the ILO to overcome constraints of its existing funding arrangements and respond strategically to relevant development issues and challenges. The *RBSA project* appears to be a highly ambitious approach to the use of RBSA funds, given that an attempt was made to achieve both infrastructure works and challenging policy advocacy with a budget of \$1 million.

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<sup>18</sup> This is part of the authorities' ban on the UN and other international agencies from delivering aid to areas controlled by EAOs in light of evidence of atrocities that emerged of atrocities committed by the Military in Rahkine state.

However, as a UN Agency, the ILO must source funding independently and work within the parameters of the funding envelopes available. The project represented a continuation of previous achievements in Mon State, Shan State and Rakhine State around local employment, economic development and skills development. The ILO Liaison office drew on the RBSA funding to continue this work. While the funding envelope and the project design were not a perfect match, it allowed the ILO to make progress on its longer-term agenda around LRB employment and economic development in EAO areas.

It may be helpful for the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar to support projects with different funding sources operating concurrently and sequentially with:

- good quality formal analysis covering institutions, systems and processes, political economy, human resource capacity, economic conditions and an identification of opportunities for supporting agents of change that supports their project development.
- An articulated longer term strategy of the ILO's objectives for EAO areas within the framework of the JPR (conflict sensitive LRB infrastructure development, TVET training, value chain development etc)
- An articulated proactive strategy to coordinating with other development partners to work collectively to support national level leaders with agency to take up opportunities for change.

### **Perception of stakeholders regarding the relationship of the project to peacebuilding**

At the operational level, there were some limited contributions of the project to peace. Project stakeholders such as the NMSP, VDC members, and community contractors highlighted the economic benefits of the project and their own commitment to peace. Several respondents in the Bee Rae area stated that when training and works were ongoing with the oversight of CSOs there was less intimidation by armed personnel.

Baseline and end-line data showed that the project had some effect on the awareness of villagers about the peace process.<sup>19</sup> The project facilitated peace awareness training to 85 participants (40 men and 45 women). The percentage of respondents who had never heard of the peace process decreased from 33 to 17% from the baseline to the end-line study and the percentage of respondents who had heard about the ceasefire process increased from 12 to 19%. The percentage who said they had heard about peacebuilding from CSO increased from 3% to 14%. These preliminary findings suggest that awareness of the peace process, its objectives and progress is low among conflict vulnerable communities in Mon State. This may suggest that there is a need for more information sharing and education among communities about the peace process.

It is notable that the findings of the baseline and end-line survey showed that respondents still perceive conflict as a threat but not as a grave concern for their immediate personal safety. A total of 51% of respondents to the baseline and 76% of respondents to the end-line survey said they felt a threat to themselves and their possessions because of the possibility of a manmade disaster. Figure 1 shows where respondents perceived the threat to be coming from. The perceived threat from the *Tatmadaw* (Military) increased from 14% to 27% while the perceived threat from a non-Mon EAO increased from 25% to 57%. The perceived threat from the Government decreased from 14 to 3%<sup>20</sup> 32% in the baseline and 36% in the end-line saw armed personnel in their locality once a month or less and 68% in the baseline and 62% in the end-line rarely or never saw armed personnel in their area. However, people generally felt safe though, 95% in the baseline and 91% in the end-line felt it was safe or very safe to walk around the streets at night time.

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<sup>19</sup> While project implementation was short, the project team managed to collect baseline and endline data. In 9 villages where the project was implemented 104 households were included in the questionnaire study representing 1198 households.<sup>19</sup> The baseline study was conducted in December 2018 – February 2019 and the endline data was collected in October and November 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Over the project duration fighting had broken out in the Bee Rae area between Mon and Karen EAOs due to a territorial dispute. "Karen, Mon Forces Discuss Fighting on Thai-Myanmar Border", *the Irrawaddy*, found at <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/karen-mon-forces-discuss-fighting-thai-myanmar-border.html> retrieved on 27/02/2020






Figure 1: Perceived sources of threats

## 3.2 Effectiveness

The evaluation team found that the project was effective with some caveats. Under Outcome 2 strong results were achieving including community infrastructure, employment and flow on effects to the local economy, capacity building, local contracting capacity, village management systems, skills development and relationship building between NMSP and local CSOs. However, the project was subject to delays in commencement and without an option for a no cost extension was forced to implement during the wet season causing extra costs and other challenges. The project performed well on promoting gender equality by ensuring at least 35% of employees were women, that women received equal pay for equal work and at least 40% of trainees were women.

### 3.2.1 Achievement of Results

**The project results were achieved despite the project being subject to a substantial delay in commencement of up to one year.** Also, the NMSP took some months to engage with the project due to their pre-occupation with signing of the NCA causing additional delays. In addition to initial delay the remote monitoring also resulted in subsequent delays (and extra costs) throughout implementation. All stakeholder meetings had to be held in townships and villagers accommodated in hotels. Moreover, because of the delays in commencement of the project and the lack of flexibility to allow for a no-cost extension, the project team was forced to carry out construction activities during the wet season with many consequent challenges. Also, flooding occurred during the 2019 wet season in the Bee Rae area, which resulted in supplies being lost and some community contractors being out of pocket (see below).

#### Achievements on Component 1

Component 1 focused on contributing to the adoption and implementation of evidence-based policy by making a case for economically viable and conflict sensitive job strategies (to be funded by RBSA with co-funding from the LIFT-funded Skills project in Rakhine State)

Key Milestones for the Component were as follows:

- Milestone 1: By end of December 2018: Completed initial assessment of employment and income opportunities in Shan and Rakhine States
- Milestone 2: By end of December 2018: Completed assessment of past and on-going government and donor-assisted initiatives that support(ed) job creation and income generation

Key outputs (December 2017 – October 2019):

- Evidence-based, in depth assessments of employment and income opportunities at State level (December 2017 – October 2019)
- Detailed elaboration of conflict sensitive approaches to implementing strategies and programmes supporting job creation and income

For Component 1, the main result was the completion of a business case for the application of the LRB approach to infrastructure development and consulting on and sharing the study with government and EAO stakeholders. The primary focus was to scope out realistic, workable employment-intensive approaches and models with a focus on rural areas of Mon and Shan States that can inform employment strategies. The report is comprehensive and detailed and makes a strong economic and poverty reduction case for EIIP across Myanmar, building on several years of demonstrated achievements in EIIP in Shan State and Mon State. The



report highlights the benefits of the LRB approach in promoting poverty reduction, its suitability for the Myanmar context and potential impacts for employment, infrastructure development and service delivery as well as upon labour migration and livelihoods. The report also identifies the “enabling environment” needed for EIIP to be effective in bringing about poverty reduction and economic development including maintenance funding, TVET training, crop diversification from paddy, cash for work programs following disasters, access to financial services, improved value chain coordination and governance and watershed management.

The project held discussion on decent job creation through EIIP investments with the several Union and Regional Government Departments including:

- U Khant Zaw - Director General and U Zarni Minn, Director of Department of Rural Development, Nay Pyi Taw on February 04, 2019
- U Win Shein- Director General, Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, Nay Pyi Taw on February 06 February 2019.
- U Maung Maung Win -Director, Heads of Department of Rural Development, Taunggyi, Shan State on February 14, 2019
- U Han Win Aung- Director, Department of Labour, Taunggyi, Shan State on February 15, 2019
- U Win Naing –Deputy Director, Heads of Department of Rural Development, Mawlamyine, Mon State on March 15 13, 2019
- Daw Thuzar Yamin Khime, Officer, Ever Green Project (MSY), Mawlamyine, Mon State on March 15, 2019
- Daw Myant Tar Htwe - Director, Department of Labour, Mawlamyine, Mon State on March 29, 2019

While the business case was a quality output and several high-level meetings were held at union and regional level the project was not successful in gaining traction on its approach with the GoM for reasons explained in the section on Relevance. In Shan State the ILO had been working for four years and had the objective of introducing this approach to a broader audience with a view that the EAO might take the lead in upscaling the approach. However, the ILO found that the Shan State National Army (SSNA) was too focused on fighting with the Tatmadaw and other EAOs and, although the ILO explained to the Chief Minister and Parliamentarians about the approach but they were not sufficiently engaged in rural development.

In Rhakine state the ILO provided skills training based on a survey on labour needs but funding was available through the LIFT project and did not need to be channelled through the RBSA project. The LIFT project will not finance two skills training activities one partnering with the Myanmar construction federation and one with the MoL.

### **Achievements on Component 2**

Component 2 involved demonstrated viable, effective and replicable employment intensive and conflict-sensitive strategies for decent job creation and social and economic empowerment for vulnerable people – particularly youth in conflict affected rural areas in Mon State, which is supported by the Government and EAOs. The milestones for the Component were as follows:

- Milestone 1: By end of December 2018: target communities in Mon State have increased knowledge on the peace process and increased capacities for employability and livelihood engagement
- Milestone 2: By end of December 2018, 30% of the completion of the identified and selected community infrastructure in the target communities in Mon State
- Milestone 3: By end December 2018: Framework for available, effective and replicable EIIP model for decent job creation and social and economic empowerment (which also effectively addresses the forced labour issue) for vulnerable people in conflict affected rural areas prepared and discussion of this framework with constituents and key stakeholders started.

For Outcome 2, the project demonstrated considerable achievements despite the delays in commencement. There were two main areas of project outputs including (i) construction and employment and (ii) skills training.

### ***Construction and employment***

In relation to construction of infrastructure and employment, achievements included:

- Completion of 17 infrastructure facilities including - 4 water supply facilities, 3 new clinics, 2 bridges, 3 pre-schools, 3 schools, 1 training centre and 1 dormitory.
- Employment of 791 workers including 454 (57%) males and 337 (43%) females. Of the workers selected, 42% were youth with jobs offered to the poorest members of the village.
- Creation of a total of 8,022 worker days which included 36% of worker days for women and 39% of worker days for youth.
- Supporting 10 major local CSOs to deliver training for 1,015 girls/women and 702 men/boys in key topics.
- Training and mentoring support for 13 previously inexperienced local businessmen to manage construction contracts.
- A thorough process of community participatory management involving Establishing Village Development Committees (VDC) to oversee physical works development and to manage operations and maintenance.
- Developing relationships with the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the political stream of a local EAO.
- Creating a platform for key stakeholders in a conflict environment to develop relationships and work together.
- Collaborating with all CSOs in Mon State and to bring them together with the NMSP which has been difficult to achieve in the past

Participants expressed strong appreciation for the benefits brought to them from the process and final result of the infrastructure construction. Some of the comments made by beneficiaries were as follows:

*Prior to the project, people in our village didn't villagers didn't have any work so the project provided a big contribution to our households as people got some income and also learned some new skills as well.*

*The works are something that contributes to our village, we would be prepared to do for free but we will also get paid as well so we are happy about this*

*The villagers learned a lot from experience, how to make cement and how to make foundations. They learned from the skilled workers. it was a great experience for them*

However, there were some negative comments from beneficiaries as well:

- The VDCs rotated opportunities between households and some respondents questioned this approach as they felt the better workers should have the opportunity to work for longer
- Some contractors informed the review that they lost money on the project. Originally, every contractor signed contract for 10% of the profit. However, some contractors were artisan and worked as a mason or carpenter. Therefore, the project suggested that options were provided to receive a single payment either as a wage for skilled work or 10% of the profit. Some of them chose to take a percentage but then ended up losing money, due to flooding in the town of Ye, where supplies had been priced and the contractor were required to buy the supplies in Thailand where the prices were higher due to currency exchange rates.

In relation to the first point, the ILO might consider extending the duration of the contracts of strongly performing workers over a longer project duration but for a short project it seems fair to share the work around. The second point highlights that the ILO needs to carefully consider the amount of contingency funds included in sub-contracts with infrastructure contractors. Regular contingency funds are proving to be not adequate to deal with climate change issues. There was record-high flooding and landslides experienced in the project targeted villages in 2019. Operation and maintenance issues are discussed under the Section 3.4 on Impact and Sustainability.

### **Training**


Table 1 shows the training content that was provided on the RBSA project, the organisations that provided training, the training locations and the number of participants. In total there were 998 attendees of training.

Training Course	Trainer Organisation	Locations	Males	Females	Total
Peacebuilding	Mon Youth Progressive Organisation	Gani, Tamoi Kaban, Yuang, Re	40	45	85

Community Development Theory and Leadership	Ramoyana Peace Foundation, Jeepyah Civil Governance Development Organisation	Pana Paing, Jokabya, Kani, Re	32	75	107
Ecological Farming	Mon Relief and Development Centre	Chek Daik, Kani, Banang Baing	30	59	89
Gender Based Violence and Legal Awareness	Mon Women's Organisation	Nji Sar, Palan	28	62	90
Human Rights	RBF	Cheik, Gani, Palan	46	44	90
Democracy and Federalism	MPYO	Pana, Bore, Joe, Kaprout Sawana	32	48	70
Soap making	Mon Cetana Development Foundation	Tamoh Ban, Palan	15	37	53
Health and Hygiene Awareness	Mon National Health Committee	Panan Pong, Joe, Khaprout, Sawonne, Bone	18	126	144
Youth and drugs literacy and penal discussion	RPF	Joe, Kaprout, Gani	not specified	not specified	270
<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>998</b>

**Table 1: Training provided on the RBSA project**

In regard to the outcomes of the training, the findings of the review suggest that the training met a high level of need due to the fact beneficiaries had minimal previous access to training. Data from the baseline and end-line studies<sup>21</sup> shows that prior to the project implementation, 94.5% of respondents had no access to training courses in the previous 12 months (See Figure 2). In remote areas of conflict zones, community members may lack access to support and capacity building from development partners. Participants' lack of opportunity for education and capacity building increased their receptivity and appreciation.



**Figure 2: Have you successfully completed any skills training in the last 12 months?**

During the review meetings, beneficiaries mentioned several benefits they had received from the training:

- There had been an improvement in the incidence of domestic violence and reduced drug use among young people in their communities. Review respondents stated that drug usage among young people was a big problem in their community.
- Trainees were more aware of their rights according to the constitution.
- In regard to domestic violence training participants now believed that they could be protected.
- Participants understood what skills and attributes were involved in being a leader.

<sup>21</sup> The Baseline study was conducted over December 2018 to February 2019. The endline study was held in October – November 2019. 109 household representatives were asked a range of livelihood questions in a questionnaire.

- Participants strongly appreciated the training in soap making and several were making soap for home use and sale. Participants also appreciated the dress making training for similar reasons.
- Participants strongly appreciated the ecological farming training, particularly training in making natural fertiliser. They realised they have a lot of resources on their farms which they could use to enhance the production of their crops which they were applying on their farms.

However, there were also some drawbacks with the training according to review respondents:

- Due to the delays in implementation, the project team were forced to hold the training during the wet season, so it was challenging for trainers to get to the village locations. Flooding and landslide prevented some participants from attending.
- Coordination with village leaders was lacking and the latter were frequently not informed about the training.
- For several of the courses, less males attended due to work commitments.
- The training courses were limited in duration to 2 to 7 days so there was a limit in the extent of behaviour change that could be expected.
- There were literacy and translation challenges pertaining to training delivery. Translation had to be carried out from One report stated that 1/3 of participants could not read in Mon or Burmese.

The evaluations of training courses were not rigorous so it is difficult to exactly understand the outcomes particularly in regard to the “soft skills” training. Trainers and evaluation reports mentioned that given that the time spent was short (of only a few days duration) and the recipients generally had a low level of education, the training was not sufficient to see major shifts in attitudes and behaviour. Respondents are operating in an environment that is not conducive and does not reflect the lessons they learned through the training, particularly for human rights, democratisation and gender equality which makes it harder for trainees to take these lessons on board. In the future it may be beneficial for training courses to be designed to be more specific about what they are trying to achieve. This may help to ascertain how much time training is needed to achieve outcomes.

Also, training evaluation should be more thorough. However, loading up training evaluations with many outcomes and outputs that should be met often only achieves in creating more paperwork. Improving the rigour of training evaluations is better done by building the capacity of trainers to observe, analyse and communicate outcomes. In future, training on practical topics such as ecological farming, soap making and dressmaking should be replicated. Consideration should be given to increasing the duration of training as the depth and breadth of the material covered was limited.

Contractors also received training in construction management and project financial management. Participants stated that this training was quite new to them, they obtained new skills, but they were foundational, and it would be useful if they had another project where they could apply and strengthen these skills, they had acquitted on how to manage, how to calculate etc.

### ***Project location***

The choice of project location of the Bee Rae area in the township of Ye was selected in collaboration with the NMSP and local community members. In the future if more funding were available it would be worthwhile to expand geographically within Mon State but also into neighbouring states.

Conflict in Mon State is not only in relation to disputes between an EAO and the *Tatmawdaw* (Military) but also other EAOs. Over the project duration, conflict broke out between the Karen National Army and the NMSP. Fresh landmines were planted, undermining work in landmine removal led by Norwegian Peace Aid resulting in three accidents involving landmine explosions in March 2020. To promote conflict sensitive economic development strategies supporting inter-EAO collaboration on a project may be an effective approach.

### ***Achievements on Component 3***

Component 3 focused on increased engagement and evidence-based buy-in of duty bearers on promotion and adoption of decent work practice, employment for peace in lieu of forced labour (to be funded with co-funding support from the USAID project on the Forced Labour complaints mechanism)

Key milestones were as follows:

- Milestone 1: By end of December 2018, increased awareness at State level in conflict areas on decent work, forced labour and peace through the implementation of advocacy activities<sup>12</sup>
- Milestone 2: By end of December 2018, increased capacity of Government and EAOs to handle and resolve forced labour cases, including for public infrastructure works, in conflict affected areas through the implementation of the planned training activities

Key outputs (December 2017 – September 2019) included:

- 3.1 State level advocacy activities on decent work (with an emphasis on employment-intensive investments), forced labour and peace are implemented at decentralized level with permission from the Government at State level and
- Training programme for Government and EAOs on decent work (with an emphasis on employment-intensive investments), forced labour and peace agreed, adopted and delivered in line with the Action Plan on the elimination of forced labour and the Decent Work Country Programme (December 2017 – September 2019)

For Outcome 3, the work of the RBSA project included production and distribution of IEC materials and workshops on human rights and workers' rights.

This represented a continuation of ILOs previous work in Myanmar around eliminating forced labour. Ending forced labour is an area where successive Myanmar governments both military and NDC led have been cooperative with development agencies due to their interest in being compliant with the demands of the international community in lieu of their investment goals.<sup>22</sup> Since a liaison office was established in 2002, the ILO has played a leadership role in the campaign to end forced labour and child labour in Myanmar.<sup>232425</sup>

In regard to results from the RBSA project, the most tangible result has been reports from stakeholders that the military are reluctant to carry out forced labour practices in the ILOs presence. The project has also provided a basis for the ILO to develop a relationship with the NMSP around reducing force labour. However, as with other project results, results for this outcome have been limited in scope and size. Notably the NMSP has not yet signed any agreements on forced labour. Moving forward, the ILO should continue to encourage the NMSP to sign such agreements.

### 3.2.2 Effectiveness of management arrangements

The management arrangements on the project were well defined and involved the coordination of a range of stakeholders including ILO staff, CSOs, management committees, community contractors and workers. See Box 1 for a summary of the various roles on the RBSA project. The inability of ILO staff to attend to project sites caused delays and inconveniences. However, the local stakeholders, notably the RPF, Project Implementation Team and VDCs, could effectively run the project at the community level. This was enabled by strong management systems, clear and fair procedures and adequate briefing for stakeholders on their roles and responsibilities and sufficient engineering oversight.

The RPF performed well, coordinating up to 10 CSOs. A list of all the CSOs cooperating on the project is attached at Annex 8. The RPF was seen to be the only CSO that could bring together the CSOs and the NSMP together with a development partner, so this was a good choice. involvement of several CSOs was beneficial for improving coordination, collaboration and building consensus between CSOs in the state as well as between the CSOs and the NMSP. The capacity of staff in the CSOs required development so ILO had to carry out capacity building prior to and during project implementation. Several staff progressed extensively in their knowledge and capability over the duration of project implementation. If funding were available in the future some staff from the project could be employed again.

<sup>22</sup>“Standing up for workers, promoting labour rights through trade” found at [https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research\\_file\\_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf](https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research_file_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf), retrieved on 27/02/2020 retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>23</sup> ILO in Myanmar, About Us” found at <https://www.ilo.org/yangon/country/lang--en/index.htm> retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>24</sup> Forced labour brochure released”, Myanmar Times, found at <https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/5278-forced-labour-brochure-released.html> retrieved on 27/02/2020

<sup>25</sup>“Standing up for workers, promoting labour rights through trade” found at [https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research\\_file\\_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf](https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research_file_attachment/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf), retrieved on 27/02/2020

ILO project staff compared the approach to working in Shan State with communities where the ILO partnered with the EAO to support communities compared to Mon State where the ILO collaborated with local CSOs. The ILO found that working with CSOs improved project outcomes as they were more willing to engage in processes through attending meetings etc. The CSOs have been working on development issues in the region for a long time although their resources and capacity are limited. EAOs tend to be focused on conflict and political matters etc and to some extent business. ILO staff expressed a view that they would like to see a change in the mentality of the EAOs to become more focused on development issues. This is likely to take some time.

At community level, the project increased village level coordination and management capacity through the establishment of the VDCs and the procuring of community contractors. The application of procedures to ensure transparency of decisions and fair payment and conditions helped to increase trust and collaboration at community level. However, there is the possibility that establishment of a new committee at village level may have displaced existing village management systems.

### 3.2.3 Tripartite engagement, institutional strengthening and Cross Cutting Policy Drivers (CCPDs)

In regard to **tripartite stakeholders**, the project did not engage with employer organisations. The context is not yet sufficiently stable for investment to take place. Nevertheless, tripartite constituent of the ILO have endorsed the project under the framework of the DWCP, as they see that peace is in their interest to attract investors into Myanmar, stability on the ground post ceasefire will be contributing to the better investment climate.

**Box 1: Key roles and responsibilities on the RBSA project**

**Chief Technical Officer:** overall guidance, direction and oversight and strategic advocacy input.

**P3 Technical Officer:** oversight, management and coordination of three components

**National Project Officer:** day to day internal and external coordination and liaison

**National Engineer:** coordinate planning and implementation of infrastructure works

**Training Coordinator:** coordinate training programs in consultation with CSO training providers

**Key Committees**

**Project Implementation Team:** Establish VDCs and select community contractors, secretariat services for the

**Project Steering Committee:**

- Coordinate project participants, maintain relations with EAOs and security forces to monitor the security situation, contract one senior engineer and two assistant engineer to oversee works
- Oversight of all project activities, review and approve the workplan prepared by the PIT, approve selection of the community contractors, promote dialogue on peace among stakeholders, coordinate with the NMSP, GoM and international agencies.

**Village Development Committee:** After wider community consultation, elect the VDC consists of 1 chairperson, 1 secretary, 1 treasurer and 3-5 members: must have 40% women. The VDCs have the role of nominating community contractors, coordinating with Engineers and the PIT, monitoring the works, taking responsibility for Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

**CSOs:**

**RPF:** Manage the PIT, coordinate CSO training partners and sign and manage contracts with the Community

**CSO partners:** deliver training courses based on contracts with RPF

**Community contractors:**

Sign contracts with RPF, purchase supplies and manage construction in accordance with the Bill of Quantities take a management fee that is a percentage of the contract, recruit workers, pay them on time in accordance with agreed decent work standards, return any excess funds after the construction to the VDC to go into the O&M committee for ongoing infrastructure management

Skilled and unskilled workers: complete works based on decent work standards and an outputs based payment system, at least 35% female workers

NMSP: Strategic oversight of project activities

In terms of **support for institutional strengthening**, the NSMP did not take an active role in guiding project activities and adopting the approaches although it fell within their mandate of service delivery in Mon state. Several project stakeholders stated that the NMSP lacked capacity and a strong drive to lead development activities within their jurisdiction. Further analysis and brainstorming is needed to come up with the best strategy to support the NMSP to take an active leadership role in service delivery and community development. Support for institutional strengthening will be key to this but establishing the level of trust required is not easy in the fraught political environment. The initial support from ILO over a two-year period

should provide an initial basis from which close relationship involving institutional strengthening could be established.

On the other hand, collaborating closely with an EAO runs the risk of alienating the Government. To avoid this, it may be useful to implement programs concurrently in both EAO and government areas.

In regard to **Cross Cutting Policy Drivers**, the project team took several steps to promote gender equality in their approach:

- At least 35% of workers were required to be female, in fact 43% of workers were females. Women received equal pay for equal work to men with payment made on the basis of work outputs rather than time
- 40% of VDC members were required to be female and females were included in key decision-making positions
- Domestic violence and gender legal awareness was included in the training curriculum

In regard to the outcomes of the team’s efforts to promote gender equality, the review team noted:

- Some beneficiaries, including NMSP did not fully agree with the ILO policy of equal pay for women and men (although payment was output not time based and the approach was clearly explained to all stakeholders)
- Trainers reported that younger men were responsive to the messages around equal rights for both sexes and strategies for eliminating domestic violence, but the perspectives were unfamiliar to them.

These findings indicate that more support and discussion around gender issues is required for gender equality to be fully absorbed by the communities. Gender equality goes against some of the local cultural practices and progress in this area and may take some time to achieve.

### 3.3 Efficiency of Resource Use

The evaluation team found that there were aspects of the approach that were efficient, i.e. drawing on community level human resources for delivery of outputs but the delay in implementation and restrictions on the movement of ILO staff caused inefficiencies.

Table 2 shows the project budget and expenditure amount at the end of the project. The project managed to complete planned outputs and expend most of the funds by the end of the project timeframe despite the delays to commencement of the project. There was some reallocation of line items in accordance with implementation requirements.

	Total Budget	Total Expenditure	Percentage of budget spent at end of project
ILO National staff	192,508	193,150	142%
ILO International staff	361,100	301,620	84%
Travel costs ILO Staff	48,200	47,704	99%
Subcontracts	339,120	301,155	89%
Operational expenses	14,195	22,219	157%
Communications	4,300	259	6%
Furniture and equipment	4,677	5,177	111%
Seminars	35,900	40,813	114%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,000,000</b>	<b>912,097</b>	<b>91%</b>

**Table 2: Project Budget and Expenditure (\$USD)**

The total funds contributed to infrastructure were MMK 252,130,981 (USD 173, 843), approximately 19 percent, to paying local labourers were MMK 72,448,800 (USD 49,953), approximately 5.4 percent of total expenditure and to maintenance Funds was MMK 18,060,296 (USD 12,423), 1.3 percent of total funds spent. This implies that total funds spent at the community level was about 25% which is somewhat low. The need for remote monitoring may have contributed to high support costs.



There were some aspects of implementation that were efficient in terms of achieving greater benefit for less cost including:

- The use of community contractors is cheaper than commercial contractors (less cost) and the funds flow into the local economy (more benefit)
- The local community are employed as workers for the infrastructure enabling funds to flow into the local economy (more benefit)
- Trainers, supplied by CSOs, were not expensive (less cost)
- The most senior and expensive ILO staff inputs were limited to less than 10% of the project total duration (less cost)

However, there were also aspects of the project that were inefficient:

- Due to the delay in project commencement, ILO international staff and national staff salaries were paid for several months while project activities, particularly under Component 2, were not yet taking place
- The delay in commencement and lack of flexibility in extending the end date of the project resulted in construction and training activities taking place during the wet season. This caused inefficiencies including loss of supplies (cement), a longer time taken to complete works and the need to purchase supplies from Thailand. Some of these additional costs were born by contractors who received negative profit.
- The fact that ILO staff were not permitted to travel to project sites caused inefficiencies because villagers had to be brought to townships for project events incurring extra costs.

More flexibility in budgetary management is required in relation to the duration of a project operating in a highly charged political environment such as Myanmar. Also, additional contingency funds should be included in the sub-contracts to ensure community contractors are not out of pocket.

Another aspect of implementation that could potentially be seen as inefficient is the fact that there were a large number of stakeholders involved in implementation: up to 10 CSOs, RPF, PIT, PSC and VDC. The MNSP were also invited to participate in project events. While not all of them were paid involving all these people incurred costs in terms of per-diems, transport costs etc. The project could have been implemented with less stakeholders. However, the benefits of enhancing collaboration between stakeholders in a context where collaboration and communication are lacking means that the extra costs of this approach are seen to be worthwhile.


### 3.4 Impact Orientation and sustainability

The evaluation found that preliminary baseline and end-line data showed potentially good impact on the economy including improved production income and increase in land holding size. In terms of sustainability, the project has put in place systems for operation and maintenance of infrastructure, but they will need to be followed up on. Moving forward the ILO should be proactive in promoting the EIIP model among the Government and development partners.

#### 3.4.1 Impact


Data collected by the project is preliminary but initial indications from baseline and end-line data showed positive economic changes before and after project implementation. Figure 3 shows that that *32% more participants reported that they had received any form of income after than before the intervention*. In addition to showing the financial benefit of the project, this shows the low level of integration to the monetary economy of the villagers prior to the project, given that in the baseline study 46% of respondents said they received no income in the last 12 months. The project is operating in an area of high need where the income provided makes a big difference.






**Figure 3: In the last twelve months have you received income as a wage or as profit for goods sold?**

Figure 4 shows the average income for the last 12 months among respondents in the nine villages participating in the project at baseline and end-line. The data shows that the average income increased over the period in eight out of nine villages, in at least three by a considerable margin. The data shows an increase in production income as well as non-production income. Figure 4 shows production income in the last 12 months between baseline and end-line data in all villages. There was an increase in eight out of nine villages in at least three villages by a considerable margin.



**Figure 4: Total income in the last 12 months (village, average, Kyat)**

The study found that the use of loans for food purchases decreased by 18% and the use of loans for the purchase of agricultural inputs increased by 13%.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the proportion of respondents whose households own a rubber plantation increased from 33% to 45%.



**Figure 5: production income in the last 12 months (Village average, Kyat)**

<sup>26</sup> At there was no real change in the number of households that took out loans among respondents between baseline and end-line (this dropped from 74 to 73%)




Figure 6: Use of loans taken out in the last 12-months

Baseline and end-line data is preliminary and needs qualitative data to support analysis of correlation and cause. However, the findings are promising that the income from work on the infrastructure works has caused positive flow on effects into the local economy including agriculture production and at least temporarily reduced vulnerability.

### 3.4.2 Strategies for Sustainability

#### **Maintaining infrastructure built**

In ensuring the continuation of actions, the main focus has been on maintenance arrangements and sharing arrangements for water systems. For this purpose, the VDCs were designed to transform into Operation and Maintenance (O&M) committees after construction had been completed. Funds left over from construction costs were to be invested to provide funds for O&M of the infrastructure. About half of the villages have allocated land to grow crops for sale to generate funds for O&M. For water systems, user charging mechanisms were introduced to input into maintenance funds.

Time will tell whether these systems can remain in place, ensuring the successful maintenance of infrastructure works and supporting economic development of the villages. Currently there is no follow-on project so this is an area of risk.

Another potential sustainable outcome is that the O&M committees may also provide the initial basis for village microfinance systems with flow on economic benefits. During review meetings, several VDC member respondents stated that they were lending O&M funds to villagers with interest as a means of generating income.

#### **Looking forward**

In addition to ensuring the maintenance of infrastructure, sustainability also pertains to the focus of Outcome 1, scaling up the EIIP model across Mon state and around the country based on uptake of the model by local national and local stakeholders and other multilateral, bilateral and CSO development partners. Promoting the merits of the approach and gaining traction will be a long-term project. Lessons learned from the RBSA funded activity can be passed on to future projects.

Unfortunately, due to the diversion of resources towards the Covid 19 response the ILO Myanmar Liaison office as of April 2020 donor funding is not currently available for a follow on project. Once this changes, priorities for a follow on project would include:

- Activities to support beneficiaries to link more lucratively to markets such as TVET training in key sectors, SME training and value chain development. This could be a continuation in the Bee Rae area as these activities were not extensively explored during the RBSA project as well as expanding into other areas.
- Activities to support income generation for women (although women are involved in farming also) such as soap making and sewing.

The need for local level employment strategies has been increased by the Coronavirus due to the fact that migrant workers have returned from Thailand and the garment industry suffered a downturn. The ILO should advocate for access to social protection Corona related funding.

## 4 Lessons Learned

From implementation to date, several key lessons have emerged that are important to note. More details on the lessons learned is included in Annex 8.

Lesson Learned	Guidance for Addressing
A project budget should be commensurate with the activity type. Infrastructure projects can absorb sizeable budgets and should be provided with them to maximise economies of scale and gain attention of counterparts with whom the agency is attempting to engage in policy discussions	In future programming, seek to match infrastructure projects with larger funding envelopes
In complex political contexts, the pathway for demonstrating and scaling up suitable models for implementation by national stakeholders is not straightforward. It is not realistic to expect this to occur in a timeframe of two years	Ensure a political economy analysis is conducted prior to design of projects involving demonstrating models for scaling up and incorporate such analysis into the design and ensure enough time is available for implementation.
Signing the NCA does not necessarily lead to the NSMP taking a strong leadership role on strategies for job creation and development in the local region.	Future programming should build on the trust that has been built with the NMSP to support institutional strengthening. This should focus on enhancing their capacity in service provision while recognising that there are limitations to what the NMSP can achieve in the current political context.
To promote conflict sensitive economic development strategies supporting inter-EAO collaboration may be an effective approach.	Seek to involve more than one EAO area in future proposals
On the basis of comparisons with previous projects where the ILO worked with EAOs and community members only and the RBSA project where the project team collaborated with CSOs to deliver project implementation, it was more effective to include CSOs in the project management mix as they were more enthusiastic and active participants when it came to attending meetings, actioning tasks etc.	Building on the positive experience of the RBSA project, seek to involve CSOs in project management in future projects in EAO areas.
Practical training that leads to cost savings and income opportunities for beneficiaries is highly valued by community members. Training of more than a few days duration may be needed to provide sufficient benefit to trainees.	Incorporate this lesson learned into future programming
The design of “soft” skill training courses should be specific in the outcomes it is trying to achieve in order to ascertain how much time and what strategies are needed to achieve outcomes.	Incorporate this lesson learned into future programming
The ILO should consider carefully the amount of contingency funds that to be included in the sub-contracts for community contractors to ensure community contractors are not out of pocket.	Incorporate this lesson into future programming
More support and discussion around gender issues is required for gender equality to be fully absorbed by the communities. Gender equality goes against some of the local cultural practices and progress in this area thus may take some time.	Conduct further contextual analysis to develop strategies for the promotion of gender equality in future programs

## 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The *More and Quality Jobs* project is a strong example of an EIIP investment from the ILO which generates pro-poor economic growth, capacity and networking at the local level in the Bee Rae area of Mon State. The project has achieved a number of key outputs and deliverables and contributed in a positive manner to its three outcomes. The RBSA project also produced and distributed IEC materials and workshops on human rights and workers' rights, representing a continuation of ILOs flagship work in Myanmar around eliminating forced labour.

Project achievements have acted as strong levers for peace. Moreover, the case study on the *Benefits of Employment-Intensive and Local Resource-Based Investments in Basic Rural Infrastructure in the Context of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018 -2030* provides a compelling case for scaling up EIIP across the country. However, ongoing conflict between the Government, the Military and the EAOs limited the potential of the project to use the lessons learned at the grassroots to develop models that can be scaled up. Most importantly, following the Rohingya crisis the Government denied access of development agencies to rural areas inside areas controlled by EAOs citing security concerns. This caused a delay of up to 12-months on the project leaving a short time for project implementation and the necessity of carrying out works during the wet season.

For efficiency, the review team found that there were aspects of the approach that were efficient, i.e. relying on human resources at the community level but the delay in implementation and restrictions on the movement of ILO staff caused inefficiencies.

Regarding impact, the evaluation found that preliminary baseline and end-line data showed potentially good impact on the economy including improved production income and increase in land holding size. In terms of sustainability, the project has put in place systems for operation and maintenance of infrastructure, but they will need to be followed up on.

Over the course of the project ILO had several mid-level and high-level meetings with Government officials to promote the EIIP model. However, for political reasons the GoM may be reticent in actively pursuing options for enhancing service delivery in EAO areas and EAOs may lack resources and capacity. To ensure sustainability and scale up, the ILO should promote the EIIP model among development partners and advocate for a balanced approach to working in government and EAO controlled areas. The following recommendations have been identified by the evaluation team:

**Recommendation 1:** The ILO should seek ongoing funding for its LRB infrastructure and local economic development work. Priorities for future funding should include:

- Activities to support beneficiaries to link more lucratively to markets such as TVET training in key sectors, SME training and value chain development. This could be a continuation in the Bee Rae area as these activities were not extensively explored during the RBSA project as well as expanding into other areas.
- Activities to support income generation for women (although women are involved in farming also) such as soap making and sewing
- Expanding the LRB approach to other areas in Mon State and neighbouring states such as Karen State

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	High	Within 1 year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 2:** The ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar have a context specific strategy around employment and local economic development that cuts across different projects but currently it is rather informal. It may be helpful for the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar to support projects with different funding sources operating concurrently and sequentially with:

- Good quality integrated formal analysis covering institutions, systems and processes, political economy, human resource capacity, economic conditions and an identification of opportunities for supporting agents of change that supports their project development.
- An articulated longer term strategy of the ILO's objectives for EAO areas within the framework of the JPR (conflict sensitive LRB infrastructure development, TVET training, value chain development etc)

An articulated proactive strategy to coordinating with other development partners to work collectively to support national level leaders who possess “agency” to take up opportunities for change.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO	Medium	Within 6 month	Can be completed within current budget of LO

**Recommendation 3:** The project team has already produced an excellent video on the project achievements including a long and short version. These materials should be disseminated as widely and actively as possible through various media forms and social media. The business case study is another informative output. The study has robust findings, but it is long and technical. It would be useful to produce a shorter version with key findings and recommendations for dissemination. Among the development partner community, it is useful to disseminate lessons through the Development Partners Forum and stakeholders to the LIFT project.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO	Medium	Within 6 months	Can be completed within current budget of LO

**Recommendation 4:** While EAO areas have been disadvantaged in terms of service delivery, if ILO focuses their operational activity solely on EAO areas then there may be a perception by the Government and Military that they are siding with the EAOs. This may reduce the willingness of the Government to collaborate with the ILO in learning lessons and striving towards development outcomes. In the future, EIIP interventions should be balanced between EAO and Government areas. The ILO should also focus on inter-EAO collaboration as this is a current source of conflict in the country.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	Medium	Within one year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 5:** An important achievement of the project has been the relationship established between the NMSP and the ILO. To achieve effective leadership, the NMSP needs capacity building to strengthen its systems and processes. However, there are sensitivities around external involvement in its internal affairs. The ILO should build on its relationship with the NMSP to influence and support capacity building within the NMSPs internal systems and processes. In the long term, the ILO should encourage the NMSP and other EAO administrations to take an active leadership role in promoting development outcomes such as jobs, services and infrastructure, for communities in areas controlled by them. Improvements in planning and management systems may help to achieve better outcomes.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	Medium	Within one year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 6:** The project has also provided a basis for the ILO to develop a relationship with the NMSP around reducing forced labour. However, as with other project results, results for this outcome have been limited in scope and size. Notably the NMSP has not yet signed any agreements on forced labour. Moving forward, the ILO should continue to encourage the NMSP to sign agreements on eliminating forced labour.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	Medium	Within one year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 7:** While the planned works were completed by the project team and operation and O&M committees were established, implementation was rushed and there was not much time to ensure the O&M committees were up and running and operating effectively and sustainably. The extent to which maintenance

systems established will remain operational and effective is unpredictable. Activities relating to oversight of village infrastructure maintenance from facilities built on the RBSA project should be included in proposals for future funding.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, DWT, ILO-HQ, Donor(s)	Medium	From 6 months to one year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 8:** A key result of the project at the operational level has been support for community members to become commercial contractors with the capability to manage construction projects. To build on the skills and business linkages that have been developed through this, the ILO should look for opportunities to further strengthen the skills and business acumen of the community contractors that have been trained. Support for launching community contractors as sustainably functioning business operations should be built into future community led infrastructure projects.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	Medium	From 6 months to one year	Part of future investments.

**Recommendation 9:** Several recommendations emerged from the evaluation pertaining to training which are as follows:

- Trainees found courses that were particularly useful to them to be ecological farming, soap making, and dressmaking. In future projects, it would be useful to deliver training content in these areas. Trainees also noted that the duration of courses was quite short and they would have benefited from more content delivery. In future, consideration should be given to increasing the duration of training to cover participants needs.
- Participants also appreciated “soft skills” training courses such as leadership and human rights but training evaluations did not clearly ascertain the extent of benefits or what additional support is needed. The design of the “soft” skill training courses should be specific in the outcomes it is trying to achieve to ascertain how much time and what strategies are needed to achieve outcomes. Training evaluations should be more rigorous with a focus on building the capacity of trainers to **observe, analyse and communicate** outcomes.

Responsible Unit	Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
LO, Donor(s)	Medium	Within one year	Part of future investments.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Project title and geographical coverage	More and quality jobs are created through better policies and frameworks and strengthened labour market information systems Myanmar
ILO Project codes/IRIS codes	MMR/16/03/RBS
Duration, start and end dates	26 months - 1 November 2017 to 31 December 2019
Project language	English
Executing unit	ILO Liaison Office for Myanmar
Development partner/funding agency	Core voluntary funds (RBSA)
Development partner contribution	US\$1,000,000

### INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR EVALUATION

The Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) is available to support a limited number of prioritized Country Programme Outcomes (CPOs) in Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs). CPOs identified as targets for the biennium are prioritised.

**This Terms of Reference (ToR) covers the FINAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATION of the last round of 2016-17 RBSA funding of US\$1,000,000, contributing to the delivery of the Myanmar DWCP (2018-21)<sup>27</sup>.**

The ILO considers evaluation to be an integral part of the implementation of development cooperation activities. The aim of evaluation in the ILO is to support improvements in projects, programmes, and policies, and to promote accountability and learning. This is consistent with the *UNEG<sup>28</sup> Norms for the UN System*.

As per the ILO's evaluation policy, this project is subject to a FINAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATION.

This independent final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and organisational learning. The evaluation aims to assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and to identify lessons learned and best practices. As per ILO evaluation guidelines, the evaluation will assess the project against the evaluation criteria of *relevance, the validity of design, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability*.

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent evaluator and will be managed<sup>29</sup> by an Evaluation Manager who is an ILO official and independent of the design and implementation of the project, with quality assurance provided by Regional Evaluation Officer, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. The final evaluation report will be approved by the ILO's Evaluation Office (EVAL) at the ILO HQ in Geneva.

### BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT AND CONTEXT<sup>30</sup>

This project contributes to two of the three country programme priorities of the first Myanmar Decent Work Country Programme (2018-2021):

By 2021, employment and decent work and sustainable entrepreneurship opportunities are available and accessible to all, including for vulnerable populations affected by conflict and disasters;

By 2021, application of Fundamental Principles and Rights at work is strengthened through improved labour market governance. The specific country programme outcomes that the proposal contributes to are:

- Outcome 1.1: More women and men of working age have decent jobs or are engaged in entrepreneurship, especially those in vulnerable employment conditions;

<sup>27</sup> See [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_mas/---program/documents/genericdocument/wcms\\_651152.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_651152.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> United Nations Evaluation Group

<sup>29</sup> Ms Margaret Reade Rounds, Project Manager, ILO Afghanistan

<sup>30</sup> See PROGRAM approval minute of 21 November 2017 for proposal details

- Outcome 2.2: Strengthened protection against vulnerable forms of work, in particular Forced Labour and Child Labour

This project is also part of the *ILO Flagship Programme on Jobs for Peace and Resilience* and is based on the *Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205)*. It builds on consultations with the ILO tripartite constituents and conclusions of the ILO's Governing Body to continue the efforts for the elimination of forced labour.

Job creation and national reconciliation are at the top of the Union Government of Myanmar's development agenda. Whilst these broad policy priorities have been formulated at Union level limited experience exists for the development and implementation of effective conflict-sensitive regional and sectoral strategies and models to operationalise them at State level and contribute to peace and reconciliation.

The continued elimination of forced labour is also an important issue for the Government and the ILO's Governing Body. Significant progress has been made in the action against forced labour<sup>31</sup>, however much work remains to be done, as it persists in many areas across the country. It is a long-standing problem, and in addition to increasing levels of social and economic vulnerability among affected populations, it also fosters distrust of the Government's peace and reconciliation initiatives.

In Myanmar, the causes of conflict are complex and the routes to peace have proven difficult. However, the adoption of effective, conflict-sensitive approaches to job creation that this project are expected to make a critical contribution to the success of wider peace and transition efforts.

Within this context this RBSA funded project builds on, complements and expands on previous and ongoing ILO development cooperation projects in the three conflict affected *Shan, Mon* and *Rakhine* States in Myanmar. It assists the Government and its social partners, and other stakeholders in supporting the peace process by developing effective models and strategies for decent job creation and national reconciliation through employment-intensive investment approaches and models, with a focus on ethnic groups in vulnerable situations and young people in rural areas. Priorities and Outcomes have been identified through a highly consultative process and with the full engagement of the tripartite constituents through the DWCP Technical Working Group. The initiative has been implemented in close collaboration with key Government agencies such as the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population (MoLIP) and the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), with Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) operating in the targeted areas, and in selected local communities.

The *Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community-Empowerment (PRD) (MMR/14/01/EEC)* programme is a four-year (March 2015-March 2019), approximately €7 million European Union (EU) effort to promote the inclusion of community voices in Myanmar's national peace process. The programme is based on an overarching theory of change (ToC) that "*ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.*"

In Rakhine State, the *Skills for Improvement of Livelihoods, Economic Opportunities and Security in Rakhine State (MMR/19/51/UNO)* supports integrated policy reform for skills development in Myanmar. Rakhine State is preparing the workforce and local businesses for current and future skills needs, in a way that is inclusive of poor and rural household, and closely involving the private sector at all stages. Additional funding was also received from the Livelihoods Support Trust Fund (LIFT)

The ILO is well known to people across Myanmar for its role in working with duty bearers such as the military and other governmental institutions to eliminate forced labour. This RBSA funded project also aims to strengthen the capacities and accountabilities of duty bearers on the fight against forced labour through the introduction of employment creation initiatives as alternatives, the building of capacity of communities based organizations to play forced labour monitoring role when and where possible. Also, to act as mediator to mitigate forced labour as well other form of impunities, when possible. . This will in turn lay the basis for the transition towards sustainable action on forced labour, beyond the life of the current *Supplementary Understanding*.

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<sup>31</sup> Including the development of the 2015 Action Plan on the Elimination of Forced Labour



*Project Development Objective* - to support “vulnerable women and men – in particular youth – in conflict affected ethnic areas of rural Myanmar [to] derive social and economic benefits and increased resilience in fragile situations from employment-intensive investments in key infrastructure and demand-driven TVET<sup>32</sup>”.

*Project Theory of Change* - Along with economic benefits, national stakeholders recognize the critical role that job creation and tackling forced labour (which has been widely used by Tatmadaw as one of conflict tools) can have to peace efforts in Myanmar. External job creating support strategies and initiatives in conflict-affected areas can however also do harm if they are not based on well-informed, conflict-sensitive approaches to job creation and tackling forced labour. There still remain gaps in the evidence on which to base economically viable strategies and options for job creation in areas affected by conflict in Myanmar. There is an opportunity – and pressing need - to respond constructively to these gaps, and to combine this with the need for continued efforts in the promotion of decent work and action against forced labour.

*Project Cross-cutting Policy Drivers (CCPDs)* - The proposal addresses the CCPDs through the application of approaches that are inclusive, and participatory, respect international labour standards and decent work principles and practices, promote gender equity and non-discrimination as well as provide climate resilient solutions. International labour standards, gender equity and non-discrimination will be promoted and integrated across the strategy of the project, in all the activities that will be implemented to deliver the various outputs.

*Sustainability* – The project is assisting the Government, both at Union and State levels, community organizations and *Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)* in developing and demonstrating effective models for decent job creation, skills development and peace reconciliation, including the protection against unacceptable forms of work such as forced labour. It supports constituents in making progress towards the achievement of SDG 8 and in fostering linkages with other related SDGs. The strategy includes linkages between its downstream (operational) and upstream (policy) activities. By having demonstrated effective operational models, the Project will be in a good position to effectively advocate at policy level for upscaling/mainstreaming these models and it is expected that this will also increase the likelihood for further Government and/or donor funding for follow-up JRP-type of initiatives. Further contributing to the sustainability of the Project, is its strong emphasis on institutional capacity building. This will ensure that the Project’s partners, recipients and beneficiaries will have increased skills and capacities to enable them to continue the work started under the proposed Project.

*Inception phase* – during an initial three (3) month inception phase the project proposal was reviewed, and a *Results Framework & Monitoring and Evaluation Framework*<sup>33</sup> developed.

The following three Outcomes were agreed:

- Outcome 1: State-level Government support in Shan, Mon and Rakhine States for the development of conflict-sensitive and economically viable decent job creation policies through employment intensive public investments
- Outcome 2: Demonstrated effective and conflict-sensitive operational models for decent job creation through employment-intensive investments in rural infrastructure in selected areas in Mon State
- Outcome 3: Increased support in Mon, Shan and Rakhine States for the adoption of decent work standards and practices among duty bearers in lieu of forced labour

## **EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE AND CLIENTS**

### **Purpose**

The main purposes of this independent final evaluation are to demonstrate accountability<sup>34</sup> to the ILO member States and key national stakeholders and development partners; and enhance learning within the ILO and amongst stakeholders.

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<sup>32</sup> Technical and vocational education and training

<sup>33</sup> See attached RF & M&E Framework

<sup>34</sup> According to (OECD/DAC, 2002), accountability is the “obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards or to report fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and/or plans. This may require a careful, even legally defensible, demonstration that the work is consistent with the contract terms.”

Specifically:

- Assess the extent to which the project has achieved its stated objectives and expected results as reflected in the project document and subsequent modifications while identifying the support factors and constraints that have led to them;
- Identify unexpected positive and negative results;
- Assess the extent to which the project outcomes will be scalable ;
- Identify lessons learned and good practices, especially regarding models of interventions that can be applied further;
- Establish the validity and the relevance of the project design and implementation strategy in relation to the ILO (i.e. Flagship Programme of Jobs for Peace and Resilience), UN, and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),
- Provide recommendations to project stakeholders to promote sustainability and support the completion, expansion or further development of initiatives that were supported by the project.

### Scope

This evaluation will cover all interventions that have been implemented under the project as they contribute to the Myanmar DWCP (2018-21). It will cover the entire duration of the project, from January 2018 until the time of the final independent evaluation. It will take into consideration the ILO's global Strategic Plan (2018-2021), and the Programme and Budget (2018- 2019).

It will consist of a thorough assessment by an independent evaluator, with feedback from direct and indirect project stakeholders, including the ILO's tripartite constituents, and other key stakeholders.

The core ILO cross-cutting policy drivers - gender equality and non-discrimination, promotion of international labour standards, tripartite processes, and constituent capacity development should be considered in this evaluation. In particular, the gender dimensions will be considered as a cross-cutting concern throughout the methodology, deliverables and final report of the evaluation as mentioned above. To the extent possible, data collection and analysis should be disaggregated by sex as described in the *ILO Evaluation Policy Guidelines and relevant Guidance Notes (Annex 1)*. This information should be accurately included in the inception report and final evaluation report.

The primary end users of the evaluation findings are the project management team and the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, ILO technical departments and the Union Government of Myanmar. Secondary parties utilising the results of the evaluation include the tripartite constituents and other interested stakeholders directly and indirectly involved in supporting the implementation of the Myanmar DWCP.

### EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

The evaluation should address the following ILO evaluation criteria: *(a) relevance, (b) intervention progress and effectiveness, including of management arrangements, (c) efficiency of resource use; and (d) impact orientation and sustainability of the interventions as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for results-based evaluation, 2017.*

The evaluation is expected to address all the questions detailed below, to the extent possible, however the evaluator is also required, in the inception phase, to develop a complete set of questions as appropriate, especially in relation to any follow up on the MTIE. Any fundamental changes should be agreed with the Evaluation Manager.

Suggested evaluation criteria and questions are outlined below:

#### Relevance

- To what extent has the project addressed the identified needs of the beneficiaries, as articulated in the RBSA project proposal, Myanmar DWCP and ILO's regional priorities as outlined in the 2016 Bali Declaration?
- Is the strategy and approach of the project still relevant for the project objectives? Have there been any changes in strategies?
- Is the time frame for project implementation and the sequencing of project activities planned logical and realistic?
- What is the perception of local people with regard to the relationship of the activity to peacebuilding?

- Intervention progress and effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangements)
- How well has the project aligned with the priorities as outlined in the DWCP?

#### **To what extent have the project results been achieved?**

- What, if any, unintended results (both negative and positive) have emerged? Have any innovative and/or creative solutions emerged, and how have they been integrated/reflected in the project results?
- To what extent has the management structure, arrangements, capacities, and consistency and continuity at all levels and in all locations influenced the results achieved?
- To what extent have the stakeholders, and in particular the ILO's tripartite constituents been involved in project oversight and/or implementation? Are project partners able to fulfil the roles expected in the project strategy? Are there any capacity challenges (human resources, funding, etc.)? What has been the impact of their involvement?
- Any other specific questions that will highlight successes and/or challenges that have impacted positively and negatively on the progress and effectiveness of any of the interventions.

#### **Efficiency of resource use (including funds, time, technical and support personnel)**

- To what extent has the project delivered results commensurate with the resources provided, i.e. value for money? Could they have been allocated more efficiently, and if so how?
- How effectively has the project leveraged resources (e.g., by collaborating with other ILO initiatives and other projects)?

#### **Impact orientation and sustainability**

- How has the project concept been considered by parties to conflicts? Was it well received, and are there any obstacles to adopting and implementing it?
- What strategies and/or plans have been put in place to ensure continuation of actions initiated after the project ends? To what extent are these likely to be effective?
- How effective has the project been in establishing and fostering national/local ownership and to what extent has this influenced internal networking and cooperation?
- How far did the programme link and coordinate with other initiatives and activities in order to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability in relation to the peacebuilding objectives, the employment objectives or both?

### **METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation will comply with evaluation norms and standards, and will follow ethical safeguards, as specified in the ILO's evaluation procedures. The ILO adheres to the UN system of evaluation norms and standards as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

This evaluation should be carried out in adherence with the relevant parts of the ILO evaluation policy and ILO evaluation strategy, and in particular the *ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation: principles, rationale, planning and managing for evaluations, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 2017* accessible at [http://www.ilo.ch/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms\\_571339.pdf](http://www.ilo.ch/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_571339.pdf)

Both qualitative and quantitative evaluation approaches should be considered, and the fieldwork should be qualitative, and participatory in nature.

Qualitative information will be obtained through field visits (if possible), with the criteria for selection to be defined at the Inception phase with inputs from key stakeholders. The field visits will include individual face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. Opinions expressed by stakeholders are expected to both complement and clarify the quantitative data obtained from project documentation. If/where field visits are not possible every effort should be made to see feedback from stakeholders through virtual means, e.g. Skype, e-mails, etc.

Attempts should be made to collect data from different sources, by different methods for each of the evaluation questions, and findings triangulated to draw valid and reliable conclusions. Data will be disaggregated, at a minimum, by sex and by other dimensions where available.

A detailed methodology will be elaborated by the independent evaluator on the basis of this ToR, and should include key and sub-question(s), details methods, data collection instruments and data analysis plans, to be presented as a key element in the inception report.

The cross-cutting policy drivers (ILS, Social Dialogue, Gender quality and non-discrimination, and Just transition to environmental sustainability) should be a concern throughout the methodology, deliverable and final report of the evaluation.

### MAIN OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES

The external evaluator will deliver the following, in English, in line with ILO guidelines for independent evaluations, and using ILO I-eval Resource Kit guidance and formats:

- **Deliverable 1: Inception Report, Draft by 12 January and final by 22 January, 2020**, based on an initial desk review of documents to be provided by the ILO Liaison Office in Yangon and the project team (including the DWCP, Project documents, Progress Reports, etc.), and interviews with the project team. It will include, among other elements, a complete list of evaluation questions and data collection methods and techniques, and the evaluation tools (interview guides, questionnaires, etc.). The instrument needs to make provision for the triangulation of data where possible. It should also include a summary of the key findings from the desk review, and a draft programme, and draft presentational materials, for a half-day stakeholder workshop, to be held at the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar or another designated location<sup>35</sup>. The draft Inception Report, in both English and Mon languages, will be circulated to the key stakeholders by the Evaluation Manager by 13 January, and feedback provided to the Evaluator by Friday, 24 January, for completion by Wednesday, 29 January.
- **Deliverable 2: In-country mission and stakeholder workshop, 2 - 9 February, 2020 (inclusive of 2 travel days)**. Taking into account the particular situation of the project areas the evaluator will have face-to-face discussions with key stakeholders to validate information and data collected through various methods and to share the preliminary findings with the ILO and relevant stakeholders. A final consultation workshop will be organised by the Project team, with assistance from the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, at a venue that enables the inclusion of as many stakeholders as possible.
- **Deliverable 3: First draft Report**, to be submitted to the ILO, **16 February, 2020**. In addition to the findings from the desk review and stakeholder feedback it should include action-oriented, practical and specific recommendations for the various stakeholders and should be prepared per the ILO *I-eval Resource Kit – Checklist 5: Preparing the Evaluation Report*. The quality of the report and evaluation summary will be assessed against the ILO *I-eval Resource Kit – Checklists 5, 6, 7 and 8*. The draft Report will be circulated, by the Evaluation Manager, among key stakeholders, for feedback **by Friday, 28 February, 2020**. The evaluator should consider the comments in the second (semi-final) draft Report.
- **Deliverable 4: Second (semi-final) draft Report**, in digital publishable format should be submitted to the ILO **not later than 6 March, 2020**. Feedback will be invited from relevant stakeholders, by the Evaluation Manager, and conveyed to the Evaluator **not later than Friday, 13 March, 2020**.
- **Deliverable 5: Final Evaluation Report**, in English, in digital publishable format should be submitted to the ILO **not later than Wednesday 18 March, 2020**.

The final Report **should not exceed 30 pages in length** (excluding annexes). The structure of the Report should follow the ILO I-eval Resource Kit Checklist 5: Preparing the Evaluation Report, and should include the following:

- Executive summary, with key findings, conclusions and recommendations
- Background (including description of the project and review methodology)
- Results from discussions on key issues associated with key questions
- Conclusions/key lessons learned
- Recommendations

Appropriate annexes, including the evaluation ToR, list of persons interviewed and interview schedule, workshop participations and programme, and bibliography of documents reviewed.

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<sup>35</sup> Logistical arrangements for the face-to-face stakeholder workshop will be taken care of by the Project management. This will include workshop invitations, venue reservation, IT arrangements, including for virtual participants, refreshments, materials reproduction, written and/or oral translation, etc.

The Report should also, as appropriate, include specific and detailed recommendations by the evaluator, based on the analysis of the stakeholder workshop discussions. All recommendations should indicate the specific organisation/institution responsible for implementation.

Ownership of data from the evaluation rests jointly with the ILO and the evaluator. The copyright of the Report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentations can only be made with the written agreement of the ILO.

## RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

An Evaluation Manager with no prior association to will manage and participate in the evaluation process. The EM’s responsibilities include managing the contract, consulting on methodological issues and facilitating access to primary and secondary data. Secondary data would include CPO data, project evaluation data, etc.

Logistical support will be provided by the project team and the ILO Liaison Office in Yangon. The ILO’s Evaluation Office will provide oversight and guidance.

The evaluation will be conducted with the support of individual consultants, a team or a company with extensive experience in the evaluation of development or social interventions, preferably including practical experience in assessing comprehensive policy/program frameworks or national plans.

The responsibilities and profile of the “evaluation team” can be found in Table 4.

Table 4. Responsibilities and profile of the evaluation consultants. The lead consultant will be responsible for the overall management, and quality of the evaluation document. The Mon speaking consultant will be managed and guided by the lead consultant to ensure that data, and information collected from Mon speaking stakeholders, in particular, is accurately reflected in the evaluation.

Evaluation team	
Responsibility	Profile
Drafting the inception report, producing the draft reports and drafting and presenting a final report; (Lead & Mon speaking evaluators)	Adequate contextual knowledge of the UN, and the ILO, and prior working experience in Myanmar will be considered an asset;
Providing any technical and methodological advice necessary for this evaluation; (Lead & Mon speaking evaluators)	Adequate technical specialization: Demonstrated knowledge and expertise of employment in conflict and/or peacebuilding topics. Experience of working in ceasefire situations would be an advantage;
Ensuring the quality of data (validity, reliability, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. (Lead evaluator, with inputs from the Mon speaking evaluator as required by the Lead evaluator)	At least 5 years’ experience in evaluation policies, strategies, country programmes and organizational effectiveness;
Ensuring the evaluation is conducted as per TORs, including following ILO EVAL guidelines, methodology and formatting requirements. (Lead evaluator)	Experience conducting country programme evaluations for UN organizations  Fluency in spoken and written English and an understanding of ILO cross-cutting issues.

It is estimated that the scope of effort required by the evaluation will be approximately 25 to 30 days. The successful evaluation consultants (1 international + 1 Mon speaking national, or 2 nationals with at least one Mon speaking) will be remunerated on an output based total fee. Expressions of interest for the two consultants will be solicited separately as it may be difficult for non Myanmar nationals to recruit a Mon speaking evaluator outside of Myanmar. Travel and DSA will be provided in a lump-sum. For any field missions to conflict affected areas the ILO Yangon Office will facilitate travel per safety and security requirements/guidelines.

[The ILO Code of Conduct](#) for independent evaluators applies to all evaluation consultants. The principles behind the Code of Conduct are fully consistent with the Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service to which all UN staff is bound. UN staff are also subject to any UNEG member specific staff rules and procedures for the procurement of services. The selected team shall sign and return a copy of the Code of Conduct with their contract.

## Annex 2: Project Components and Outputs

The project has three defined components. The following table summarises each component and associated milestones and outputs.

Component	Milestone	Outputs
<p><b>Component 1:</b> Contribute to adoption and implementation of evidence-based policy by making a case for economically viable and conflict sensitive job strategies (to be funded by RBSA with cofunding from the LIFT-funded Skills project in Rakhine State).</p>	<p><b>Milestone 1:</b> By end of December 2018: Completed initial assessment of employment and income opportunities in Shan and Rakhine States.</p> <p><b>Milestone 2:</b> By end of December 2018: Completed assessment of past and on-going government and donor-assisted initiatives that support(ed) job creation and income generation.</p>	<p>1.1 Evidence-based, in depth assessments of employment and income opportunities at State level (December 2017 – October 2019)</p> <p>1.2 Detailed elaboration of conflict sensitive approaches to implementing strategies and programmes supporting job creation and income generating opportunities (December 2017 – October 2019)</p>
<p><b>Component 2:</b> Demonstrated viable, effective and replicable employment intensive and conflict-sensitive strategies for decent job creation and social and economic empowerment for vulnerable people – particularly youth in conflict affected rural areas in Mon State, which is supported by the Government and EAOs (to be funded RBSA)</p>	<p><b>Milestone 1:</b> By end of December 2018: target communities in Mon State have increased knowledge on the peace process and increased capacities for employability and livelihood engagement</p> <p><b>Milestone 2:</b> By end of December 2018, 30% of the completion of the identified and selected community infrastructure in the target communities in Mon State</p> <p><b>Milestone 3:</b> By end December 2018: Framework for available, effective and replicable EIIP model for decent job creation and social and economic empowerment (which also effectively addresses the forced labour issue) for vulnerable people in conflict affected rural areas prepared and discussion of</p>	<p>2.1 Completed analysis of employment opportunities. This will involve desk research, consultations with different groups of constituents/stakeholders and development partners, ILO in house experts and field assessments and validation</p> <p>2.2 Completed and operational rural infrastructure in the targeted communities – as planned. This will be done through the engagement with communities and local partners with whom the project will collaborate (like government/EAO authorities, steering committees and working groups that will be established, and local training providers) (June 2018 – October 2019)</p> <p>2.3 Number of created short-term employment opportunities realized as planned. These will be realized through the implementation of the physical works and monitoring systems will be established and implementation with involvement of the</p>

	<p>this framework with constituents and key stakeholders started.</p>	<p>Projects' local stakeholders (June 2018 – October 2019)</p> <p>2.4 Empowerment, awareness, skills training and other capacity development activities successfully completed – as planned<sup>10</sup>. Local CSOs, public/private training providers will be involved, and the Project will provide TOT and guidance/support to these training providers (April 2018 – November 2019).</p> <p>2.5 Completed impact study showing the positive impact of the interventions on the livelihood situation of the targeted population. The impact studies will be designed and implemented in close consultation with the targeted communities, constituents and other stakeholders (April 2018 – November 2019).</p> <p>2.6 Documented EIP strategy, model and guidelines for decent employment creation and support to peace reconciliation (including capacity development). Together with involved stakeholders, ILO Project staff will, based on the experiences from the implementation of the EIP approach on the ground, produce the documentation and undertake advocacy activities to link the findings to the policy level and obtain policy support<sup>11</sup>, as well as support from development partners (July 2019 – November 2019).</p> <p>2.7 Evidence of support by the constituents and other key stakeholders of the demonstrated EIP model. This will require high policy level advocacy and dialogue from the ILO (March</p>
<p><b>Component 3.</b> Increased engagement and evidence-based buy-in of duty bearers on promotion and adoption of decent work practice,</p>	<p>Milestone 1: By end of December 2018, increased awareness at State level in conflict areas on decent work,</p>	<p>3.1 State level advocacy activities on decent work (with an emphasis on employment-intensive investments), forced labour and peace are implemented at decentralized level with permission</p>

<p>employment for peace in lieu of forced labour (to be funded with co-funding support from the USAID project on the Forced Labour complaints mechanism)</p>	<p>forced labour and peace through the implementation of advocacy activities</p> <p>Milestone 2: By end of December 2018, increased capacity of Government and EAOs to handle and resolve forced labour cases, including for public infrastructure works, in conflict affected areas through the implementation of the planned training activities</p>	<p>from the Government at State level and EAOs (December 2017 – September 2019)</p> <p>3.2 Training programme for Government and EAOs on decent work (with an emphasis on employment-intensive investments), forced labour and peace agreed, adopted and delivered in line with the Action Plan on the elimination of forced labour and the Decent Work Country Programme (December 2017 – September 2019)</p>
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



### Annex 3: Stakeholders interviewed during the review

Sr. No	Name	Gender	Position	Organization
1	Donglin Li	Male	Liaison Officer	ILO
2	Piyamal Pichaiwongse	Female	Deputy Liaison Officer	ILO
3	Bas Athmer	Male	Senior Specialist on Employment Intensive Investments	ILO
4	Sonish Vaidya	Male	Chief Technical Officer	ILO
5	Nai Ong Sorn	Male	Chariman	Ramonnaya Peace Foundation (RPF)
6	Mi Krak Non	Female	Deputy Director	Mon National Education Committee (MNEC)
7	Mi Kyi Myint Nge	Female	Program Coordinator	Mon Comprehensive Development Foundation (MCDF)
8	Mi Htaw Ring	Female	Assitant	Mon Women Organization-MWO (NMSP)
9	Chan Lawi Marn	Female	Secretary	Mon Women Organization-MWO-MLM
10	Nai Hong Prise	Male	Secretary	Mon Youth Progressive Organization (MYPO)
11	Nai Win Zaw	Male	Executive Director	Jeepyah Civil Society Development Organization (JCSDO)
12	Nai Htaw Lawi	Male	Project Coordinator	Mon National Health Committee (MNHC)
13	Naing Tun Oo	Male	Engineer	PIT
14	Ma May Thet Sann	Female	Finance Manager	PIT
15	Min Nay Oo	Male	Assistance Engineer	PIT
16	Aung Ko Latt	Male	Admin and Logistic	PIT
17	Mi Chan Padah Non	Female	M & E officer	PIT
18	Chan Myae Aung	Male	Project Coordinator	PIT
19	Nai Ba Nyar Leir	Male	Central Executive Committee	NMSP
20	Nai Hong Sar Boung Khine	Male	Central Committee	NMSP
21	Nai M Seik Chan	Male	Central Committee	NMSP

22	Ma Ei Thandar Kyaw	Female	Finance	VDC
23	Ma Thae Thae Yu Lhaw	Female	Audit	VDC
24	Daw Khin Aye Mu	Female	Vice Chairman	VDC
25	Phoe Mu Naw	Male	Member	VDC
26	U Soe	Male	Chairman	VDC
27	Mi Dong Malay	Female	MNEC-School Headmaster	VDC
28	Nai Mon Gong Sar	Male		Contractor
29	Nai Myint Oo	Male		Contractor
30	San Lin Oo	Male		Contractor
31	U Hla Win	Male		Contractor
32	Nai Win Kheit Phyo	Male		Contractor
33	Daw Aye Aye Cho	Female		Training Participant
34	Ma Thae Thae Hlaw	Female		Training Participant
35	Ma Ei Phu Pwit	Female		Training Participant
36	Mg Aung Song Mon	Male		Training Participant
37	Mi Lawi Song	Female		Training Participant
38	Air Mon	Male		Training Participant
39	Nai Chan Don	Male		Contractor
40	Nai Sai Myint	Male		Contractor
41	Nai Yong Kyi Maung	Male		Contractor
42	Mi Yin Mon	Female		VDC
43	Nai Ong Janet	Male		VDC

## Annex 4: Photographs of Community infrastructure



## Annex 5: Brief summary of democratisation and the peace process in Myanmar

Governance in Myanmar has made strides towards democratisation and peace in recent decades. On 4 January, 1948, the Myanmar gained independence from the United Kingdom. The military coup who is General Ne Win took power in 1958 and formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1962. Due to uprising in 1988, General Ne Win resigned from Prime Minister. The military coup, Senior General Saw Maung took power which established the State Law and Order Restoration Council in August, 1988. In 1990, the Military Government held the election, which the National League for Democracy (NLD) who was led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi won the majority seats. However, the government ignored the results which placed Daw Aung San Su Kyi under house arrest. In 2003 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) announced a 7 step roadmap to democracy. A constitutional referendum was held in 2010 but the NLD were excluded from participating however they were able to participate in a by-election in 2012 and won. In 2015 another general election was called and the NLD won 86% of the seats, well over the supermajority needed to form Government. Since this time the NLD have dominated the political process, being able to push legislation through parliament with their super majority. In central Myanmar, the main elected opposition is the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a group linked to the junta-era military establishment, holding 8.5 per cent of elected seats in parliament. The parties representing ethnic minorities constitute NLD's main opposition other than the USDP. Together these ethnic parties control around 12 per cent of elected seats. The military, however, have also maintained some control over politics, retaining a proportion seats in the parliament, veto power in the parliament and control over key positions in the public service and sole responsibility for the security sector.

Ethnic tensions in Myanmar go back to colonial times. Ethnic and communist insurgencies existed under colonial rule and ethnic minorities and communists were dissatisfied with the newly formed government. Armed insurgencies among communists and ethnic groups continued. By the early 1980s, politically motivated armed insurgencies had disappeared with ethnic based insurgencies continuing. Several insurgencies groups have negotiated ceasefires and peace agreements with successive governments, which until political reforms between 2011 and 2015 had largely fallen apart. The NCA was a landmark agreement signed between the Government of Myanmar and eight insurgent groups in 2015 and two other insurgent groups joined in 2018. The eight groups that originally signed the peace agreement were:

1. The All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)
2. The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)
3. The Chin National Front (CNF)
4. The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)
5. The Karen National Union (KNU)
6. The KNU/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNU/KNLA PC)
7. The Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and;
8. The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).

On 13 February 2018, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) was signed in the NCA. 7 armed ethnic organisations which have not signed the peace agreement include:

- KIA, Kachin Independence Army
- National United Front of Arakan (AA)
- WNO, Wa National Organization
- PSLF/TNLA, Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta-ang National Liberation Army
- KNPP, Karenni National Progress party

The seven steps of peace process according to the Road map of the NLD Government are: Review "the framework for political dialogue".

1. Amend "the framework for political dialogue".
2. Continue convening Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong based on the framework.
3. Sign the 21'st Century Panglong Conference Agreement based on the outcomes of the 21st Century Panglong Conference.
4. Approve the constitutional amendment in accordance with the Union Agreement.
5. Hold multi-party democratic elections in accordance with the amended Constitution
6. Building of a democratic federal union based on the result of the election.

## Annex 6: Total number of labourers and labour days on the RBSA project

Total labourers by village

Village	Name of Activities	Labourer							Total labour
		Non Youth		Youth (>25)			Total		
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	Female	Male	
Chay Daik	Early Childhood Development Center	45	36	18	29	47	65	63	128
Chay Daik	Water Supply	34	23	20	13	33	36	54	90
Phalarn	Rural Health Center	6	14	9	15	24	29	15	44
Gani	Rural Health Center	12	7	8	8	16	15	20	35
Gani	Water Supply	19	9	19	10	29	19	38	57
Joo Kha Prout	Early Childhood Development Center	19	8	10	15	25	23	29	52
Joo Kha Prout	Training Center	11	8	16	15	31	23	27	50
Suowannabone	Early Childhood Development Center	15	9	11	6	17	15	26	41
Suowannabone	Rural Health Center	9	12	11	8	19	20	20	40
Suowannabone	Primary School renovation	6	2	1	0	1	2	7	9
Nyisar	Water Supply	6	1	8	2	10	3	14	17
Nyisar	Health Centere- re- innovation & Students' hostel	3	2	4	3	7	5	7	12
Nyisar	Students' Desks & Chairs	3	0	2	1	3	1	5	6
Tamaw Kabarn	Water Supply	39	30	26	13	39	43	65	108
Tamaw Kabarn	Health Centere- renovation	3	5	6	3	9	8	9	17
Hong Sar Kwan Tamoi	Suspension Bridge	19	10	6	3	9	13	25	38
Baleh Doon Phike	Suspension Bridge	22	12	8	5	13	17	30	47
		<b>271</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>791</b>

Total labour days by village

Village	Name of Activities	Workdays							Workdays Total
		Non Youth		Youth (>25)			Total		
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	Female	Male	
Chay Daik	Early Childhood Development Center	302	138	81	106	187	244	383	627
Chay Daik	Water Supply	127	120	112	18	130	138	239	377
Phalarn	Rural Health Center	276	195	175	49	224	244	451	695
Gani	Rural Health Center	287	60.5	170.5	182	352.5	242.5	457.5	700
Gani	Water Supply	208	44	43	96	139	140	251	391
Joo Kha Prout	Early Childhood Development Center	284	88.5	156	156	312	244.5	440	684.5
Joo Kha Prout	Training Center	267.5	108.5	361.5	213	574.5	321.5	629	950.5
Suowannabone	Early Childhood Development Center	328	150	153	126	279	276	481	757
Suowannabone	Rural Health Center	230	171	217	62	279	233	447	680
Suowannabone	Primary School renovation	98	70	25	0	25	70	123	193
Nyisar	Water Supply	59	65	76	13	89	78	135	213
Nyisar	Health Center- re- innovation & Students' hostel	90	65	112	45	157	110	202	312
Nyisar	Students' Desks & Chairs	72	25	22	31	53	56	94	150
Tamaw Kabarn	Water Supply	198	158	165	12	177	170	363	533
Tamaw Kabarn	Health Centere- renovation	43	67	39	6	45	73	82	155
Hong Sar Kwan Tamoi	Suspension Bridge	142.5	81.5	43.5	18.5	62	100	186	286
Baleh Doon Phike	Suspension Bridge	153	96	45	24	69	120	198	318
		<b>3165</b>	<b>1703</b>	<b>1996.5</b>	<b>1157.5</b>	<b>3154</b>	<b>2860.5</b>	<b>5161.5</b>	<b>8022</b>



## Annex 7: CSOs Operating in Mon State

Name of CSOs	Activities	Target Area
Mon National Education Committee (MNEC) was formed in 1992.	Formal Education (Basic Education) /Mon National Schools Mon Post-ten Student Hostel Capacity Building for staffs and teachers professional development Curriculum development Textbook writing and publishing (Mon and Mon History) Fundraising for sustainable development Education Policy Development Schools and Students Supplies Monitoring and Evaluation	Mon State, Kayin State and Tanintaryi Division
Mon Women Organization (MWO-MLM)  Registered in Mon State level	<b>Trainings:</b> Leadership and Management Training, Political and Democracy training, Gender-base violence training, Drugs additive for youth, case management and so on; <b>Advocate to:</b> Women and Government and Pushing policy level to stakeholders <b>Research on:</b> women empowerment inclusive in political situation <b>Producing Journal (newsletter),</b> <b>Internship program for women and;</b> <b>Income Generation program.</b>	Mon, Kayin and Tanintaryi
Mon Women Organization (MWO-NMSP)	Livelihood training: sewing training and so on.	Under NMSP
Ramonnaya Peace Foundation (RPF) was registered in Mon State.	<b>Peace building and process:</b> provide training for the public and stakeholders <b>Provide Training:</b> organizational development training for partnerships and so on; <b>Mine awareness:</b> for public	Mon, Kayin and Tanintaryi
Mon Cetana Development Foundation (MCDF) was registered in Mon State.	<b>Livelihood program:</b> provides awareness and skills training. They support small grants to trainees after the training such as livestock project and an agriculture project. <b>Microfinance program:</b>	Mon, Kayin and Tanintaryi Division
Mon Youth Progressive Organisation (MYPO)	<b>Trainings:</b> Drugs addition for youth, Mon language trainings, capacity building training for youth, English and Computer training, and so on. <b>Journal publication:</b> <b>Advocacy to:</b> community and international communities. <b>Organise Events Activities: Youth day and so on.</b>	Mon, Kayin and Tanintaryi Division
Jeepyah Civil Society Development Organization (JCSDO)	Women Empowerment: Community Development: Community Mobilization: Child Rights: Migrant Program: Journal publication: Management Training Program: Good Governance training for partners, 6-8 months of Management program training for youth in training center, civic education training and so on.	Based in Mawlamyine (Mon State). They implement in Mon State, Kayin State and Tanintaryi Division.
Mon National Health Committee (MNHC) was established in 1992.	Health promotion and prevention training, health volunteer training and community health training Providing health service: medic training, open community clinic and so on.	Under control of NMSP (Mon, Kayin and Tanintaryi)

## Annex 8: Lessons Learned

LESSON NO.1 A PROJECT BUDGET SHOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ACTIVITY TYPE. INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS CAN ABSORB SIZEABLE BUDGETS AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH THEM TO MAXIMISE ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND GAIN ATTENTION OF COUNTERPARTS WITH WHOM THE AGENCY IS ATTEMPTING TO ENGAGE IN POLICY DISCUSSIONS.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**

NAME OF EVALUATOR: FRANCES BARNES

DATE: 8 APRIL 2020

THE FOLLOWING LESSON LEARNED HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVALUATION. FURTHER TEXT EXPLAINING THE LESSON MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE FULL EVALUATION REPORT.

### LL ELEMENT

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	A project budget should be commensurate with the activity type. Infrastructure projects can absorb sizeable budgets and should be provided with them to maximise economies of scale and gain attention of counterparts with whom the agency is attempting to engage in policy discussions.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	Since 2013, the World Bank has provided a \$500 million loan to the GoM for the Myanmar National Community Driven Development (CDD) Project. The CDD project, implemented by the GoM, is also providing community level infrastructure and employment for community members. The existence of this project has led the Government to have less interest in engaging with the ILO about their promotion of the RBSA model which is small in comparison at \$1 million. This is unfortunate as the RBSA project has lessons that complement the CDD project. First, the ILO project is community managed as well as generating local employment whereas the CDD project is managed by external subcontractors. Second, the ILO project works in EAO areas whereas the CDD project is only implemented in Government controlled areas. The project design intended to work in EAO areas but due to their dissatisfaction with the NCA the EAOs refused to be involved.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	Unfortunately, due to the diversion of resources towards the Covid 19 response the ILO Myanmar Liaison office as of April 2020 donor funding is not currently available for a follow on project. Moreover, funding has not been available
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	The proposal for a second phase of funding was ranked successful prior to diversion of funding to the Covid-19 response indicating that the ILO, the LRB approach and the proposal for continuation of the RBSA project was well regarded by the donor. This bodes well for the future of the ILO LRB program in Myanmar, in spite of the current challenging funding environment.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A



LESSON NO.2: IN COMPLEX POLITICAL CONTEXTS, THE PATHWAY FOR DEMONSTRATING AND SCALING UP SUITABLE MODELS FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS IS NOT STRAIGHTFORWARD. THERE IS A NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME AND FLEXIBILITY TO BE BUILT INTO IMPLEMENTATION FOR STRATEGIES TO BE SUCCESSFUL. IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THIS TO OCCUR IS A TIMEFRAME OF TWO YEARS.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	In a complex and volatile political context, it is not effective to have a short project. There is a need for sufficient time and flexibility to be built into implementation for strategies to be successful. It is not realistic to expect this to occur is a timeframe of two years.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	While the interventions produced good results for beneficiaries and the modelling in the case study was sound, the assumption that the demonstration that the LRB approach provided social and economic benefits to the community would lead to take up of the approach by authorities proved problematic upon implementation. The UGoM has put job creation for peacebuilding at the top of its formal policy agenda in the Myanmar context, however, the political economy context impeded the potential for roll out of this agenda evenly across Government controlled and EAO controlled areas. Given the challenges, two years was not a realistic timeframe in which to achieve uptake by either the Government or EAOs of the LRB model for job creation and infrastructure development at national level or within EAO led states.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	<b>ILO Liaison Office, donors</b>
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	A key challenge is the difficulty of providing development assistance aimed at improving service delivery and livelihoods in the Myanmar political context where, while a formal ceasefire agreement has been signed between parties to conflict, a collaborative approach to implementation has not ensued as was hoped.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	The possibilities of benefits for local communities of the LRB model have been witnessed by EAOs the Government. Data is available upon which to advocate for uptake of the approach.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.3: SIGNING THE NCA DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE NMSP TAKING A STRONG LEADERSHIP ROLE ON STRATEGIES FOR JOB CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE LOCAL REGION.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**

NAME OF EVALUATOR: FRANCES BARNES

DATE: 8 APRIL 2020

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	Signing the NCA does not necessarily lead to the NSMP taking a strong leadership role on strategies for job creation and development in the local region.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	There has been an unclear structure regarding interim arrangements for implementing the NCA. According to the formal agreement, following the signing of the ceasefire, parties to ceasefire will develop a joint implementation plan relating to the provision of service delivery in areas such as livelihoods, education and health care, etc. The NCA required this to be discussed quickly after signing among parties. However, the Government did not move forward with discussions, but rather appeared to make assumptions that areas of ceasefire were under the control of the Government, and that EAOs had seceded control to the Government through signing the NCA. This decreased the propensity of the NMSP to cooperate on service delivery.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	To achieve effective leadership, the NMSP needs capacity building to strengthen its systems and processes. However, there are sensitivities around external involvement in its internal affairs. Several project stakeholders stated that the NMSP lacked capacity and a strong drive to lead development activities within their jurisdiction. Support for institutional strengthening will be key but establishing the level of trust required is not easy in the fraught political environment.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	The initial support from ILO over a two-year period should provide an initial basis for a trusting relationship from which support by ILO to the NMSP for institutional strengthening could be established.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.4: TO PROMOTE CONFLICT SENSITIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES SUPPORTING INTER-EAO COLLABORATION MAY BE AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH.  
 PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM  
 PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**  
 NAME OF EVALUATOR: FRANCES BARNES  
 DATE: 8 APRIL 2020  
 THE FOLLOWING LESSON LEARNED HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVALUATION. FURTHER TEXT EXPLAINING THE LESSON MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE FULL EVALUATION REPORT.

<b>LL ELEMENT</b>	
<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	To promote conflict sensitive economic development strategies supporting inter-EAO collaboration may be an effective approach.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	Conflict in Mon State is not only in relation to disputes between an EAO and the <i>Tatmawdaw</i> (Military) but also other EAOs. Over the project duration, conflict broke out between the Karen National Army and the NMSP. Fresh landmines were planted, undermining work in landmine removal led by Norwegian Peace Aid resulting in three accidents involving landmine explosions in March 2020.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	Inter-EAO conflict has undermined investment in peace by international and local development partners
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	NMSP and community stakeholders in Mon state are supportive of collaborating with political leaders and community members in other EAO localities.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.5: ON THE BASIS OF COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS PROJECTS WHERE THE ILO WORKED WITH EAOS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS ONLY AND THE RBSA PROJECT WHERE THE PROJECT TEAM COLLABORATED WITH CSOS TO DELIVER PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, IT WAS MORE EFFECTIVE TO INCLUDE CSOS IN THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT MIX AS THEY WERE MORE ENTHUSIASTIC AND ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS WHEN IT CAME TO ATTENDING MEETINGS, ACTIONING TASKS ETC.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	On the basis of comparisons with previous projects where the ILO worked with EAOs and community members only and the RBSA project where the project team collaborated with CSOs to deliver project implementation, it was more effective to include CSOs in the project management mix as they were more enthusiastic and active participants when it came to attending meetings, actioning tasks etc.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	In a previous project in Shan State with communities, the ILO partnered with the EAO to support communities. In the RBSA project in Mon State, the ILO collaborated with local CSOs in addition to the NMSP. The ILO found that working with CSOs improved project outcomes as they were more willing to engage in processes through attending meetings etc. The CSOs have been working on development issues in the region for a long time.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors, CSOs
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	The resources and capacity of EAOs are limited. EAOs tend to be focused on conflict and political matters etc and to some extent business and to a lesser extent on sustainable development of local communities.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	ILO staff expressed a view that they would like to see a change in the mentality of the EAOs to become more focused on development issues. This is likely to take some time.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.6: PRACTICAL TRAINING THAT LEADS TO COST SAVINGS AND INCOME OPPORTUNITIES FOR BENEFICIARIES IS HIGHLY VALUED BY COMMUNITY MEMBERS. TRAINING OF MORE THAN A FEW DAYS DURATION MAY BE NEEDED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BENEFIT TO TRAINEES.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	Practical training that leads to cost savings and income opportunities for beneficiaries is highly valued by community members. Training of more than a few days duration may be needed to provide sufficient benefit to trainees.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	The findings of the review suggest that beneficiaries had minimal previous access to training. Data from the baseline and end-line studies shows that prior to the project implementation, 94.5% of respondents had no access to training courses in the previous 12 months.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors, CSOs
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	The training courses were limited in duration to 2 to 7 days so there was a limit in the extent of behaviour change that could be expected.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	During the review meetings, beneficiaries mentioned that they strongly appreciated the training in soap making and several were making soap for home use and sale. Participants also appreciated the dress making training for similar reasons. Participants strongly appreciated the ecological farming training, particularly training in making natural fertiliser.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.7: THE DESIGN OF “SOFT” SKILL TRAINING COURSES SHOULD BE SPECIFIC IN THE OUTCOMES IT IS TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN HOW MUCH TIME AND WHAT STRATEGIES ARE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OUTCOMES.

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<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	The design of “soft” skill training courses should be specific in the outcomes it is trying to achieve to ascertain how much time and what strategies are needed to achieve outcomes.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	There were literacy and translation challenges pertaining to training delivery. One report stated that 1/3 of participants could not read in Mon or Burmese. The evaluations of training courses were not rigorous so it is difficult to exactly understand the outcomes particularly in regard to the “soft skills” training.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors, CSOs
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	Trainers and evaluation reports mentioned that given that the time spent was short (of only a few days duration) and the recipients generally had a low level of education, the training was not sufficient to see major shifts in attitudes and behaviour. Respondents are operating in an environment that is not conducive and does not reflect the lessons they learned through the training, particularly for human rights, democratisation and gender equality which makes it harder for trainees to take these lessons on board.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	There are opportunities for continual improvement in training effectiveness, such as designing training courses to be designed to be more specific about what they are trying to achieve. This may help to ascertain how much time training is needed to achieve outcomes. Training evaluation should also be more thorough. Consideration should be given to increasing the duration of training as the depth and breadth of the material covered was limited.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.8: THE ILO SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE AMOUNT OF CONTINGENCY FUNDS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUB-CONTRACTS FOR COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS TO ENSURE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS ARE NOT OUT OF POCKET.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	The ILO should consider carefully the amount of contingency funds to be included in the sub-contracts for community contractors to ensure community contractors are not out of pocket.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	The delay in commencement and lack of flexibility in extending the end date of the project resulted in construction and training activities taking place during the wet season. This caused inefficiencies including loss of supplies (cement), a longer time taken to complete works and the need to purchase supplies from Thailand. Some of these additional costs were born by contractors who received negative profit.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, donors, CSOs
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	As above
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	As above
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A

LESSON NO.9: MORE SUPPORT AND DISCUSSION AROUND GENDER ISSUES IS REQUIRED FOR GENDER EQUALITY TO BE FULLY ABSORBED BY THE COMMUNITIES. GENDER EQUALITY GOES AGAINST SOME OF THE LOCAL CULTURAL PRACTICES AND PROGRESS IN THIS AREA MAY TAKE SOME TIME.

PROJECT TITLE: MORE AND QUALITY JOBS ARE CREATED THROUGH BETTER POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS AND STRENGTHENED LABOUR MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

PROJECT TC/SYMBOL: **MMR/16/03/RBS**

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DATE: 8 APRIL 2020

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**LL ELEMENT**

<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LESSON LEARNED (LINK TO SPECIFIC ACTION OR TASK)</b>	More support and discussion around gender issues is required for gender equality to be fully absorbed by the communities. Gender equality goes against some of the local cultural practices and progress in this area and may take some time to achieve.
<b>CONTEXT AND ANY RELATED PRECONDITIONS</b>	Some beneficiaries, including NMSP did not fully agree with the ILO policy of equal pay for women and men (although payment was output not time based and the approach was clearly explained to all stakeholders). Trainers reported that younger men were responsive to the messages around equal rights for both sexes and strategies for eliminating domestic violence, but the perspectives were unfamiliar to them.
<b>TARGETED USERS / BENEFICIARIES</b>	ILO Liaison Office, Donors, CSOs
<b>CHALLENGES /NEGATIVE LESSONS - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	Gender equality goes against some of the local cultural practices and progress in this area and may take some time to achieve.
<b>SUCCESS / POSITIVE ISSUES - CAUSAL FACTORS</b>	There were some good achievements by the project in the area of gender. The project team required that least 35% of workers were female. Upon implementation 43% of workers were females. Women received equal pay for equal work to men with payment made on the basis of work outputs rather than time. 40% of VDC members were required to be female and females were included in key decision-making positions. Domestic violence and gender legal awareness were included in the training curriculum. This work provides a solid base for future projects to continue work around improving gender equality.
<b>ILO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (STAFF, RESOURCES, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION)</b>	N/A



## Annex 9: References

Bee Rae Baseline Survey

Bee Rae End-line Survey data

ILO Myanmar *Decent Work Country Programme (2018 – 2021)*

“Karen, Mon Forces Discuss Fighting on Thai-Myanmar Border”, *the Irrawaddy*, found at <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/karen-mon-forces-discuss-fighting-thai-myanmar-border.html> retrieved on 27/02/2020

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<sup>1</sup> The Government of Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018 – 2030) found at [https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core\\_Doc\\_Myanmar\\_Sustainable\\_Development\\_Plan\\_2018\\_-\\_2030\\_Aug2018.pdf](https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core_Doc_Myanmar_Sustainable_Development_Plan_2018_-_2030_Aug2018.pdf) retrieved on 27/2/2020

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ILO Myanmar *Benefits of Employment-Intensive and Local Resource-Based Investments in Basic Rural Infrastructure in the Context of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018 -2030: A Case Study*

<sup>1</sup> ILO, *the Bali Declaration* found at [https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/asia/aprm-16/WCMS\\_537445/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/asia/aprm-16/WCMS_537445/lang--en/index.htm) retrieved on 27/2/2020

RBSA JPR First Progress Report

RBSA JPR Second Progress Report

RBSA JPR Third Progress Report

## Annex 10 : Map of Project Area

### Map with Location of the Project Target Villages

