



# FINAL EVALUATION

**Lebanon**

Thematic window  
Conflict Prevention & Peace Building

## **Programme Title:**

Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in  
North Lebanon

# Prologue

This final evaluation report has been coordinated by the MDG Achievement Fund joint programme in an effort to assess results at the completion point of the programme. As stipulated in the monitoring and evaluation strategy of the Fund, all 130 programmes, in 8 thematic windows, are required to commission and finance an independent final evaluation, in addition to the programme's mid-term evaluation.

Each final evaluation has been commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in the respective programme country. The MDG-F Secretariat has provided guidance and quality assurance to the country team in the evaluation process, including through the review of the TORs and the evaluation reports. All final evaluations are expected to be conducted in line with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network "Quality Standards for Development Evaluation", and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Standards for Evaluation in the UN System".

Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes. They also generate substantive evidence-based knowledge on each of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to other development interventions and policy-making at local, national, and global levels.

We thank the UN Resident Coordinator and their respective coordination office, as well as the joint programme team for their efforts in undertaking this final evaluation.

MDG-F Secretariat

*The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Programme or MDG-F Secretariat.*

**Final evaluation of the Joint Programme:**

**Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North  
Lebanon (MDG-F 1976)**

**Prepared by: Carlos Carravilla and Nasser Yassin**

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## Acronyms

AECID	Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation
CBO	Civil Based Organization
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peace Building
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ILO	International Labour Organization
LEDA	Local Economic Development Agency
LPDC	Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee
MoEHE	Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoL	Lebanese Ministry of Labour
MSL	Mouvement Sociale
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
NBC	Nahr el Bared Camp
NCLW	National Commission for Lebanese Women
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSC	National Steering Committee
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PC	Popular Committee
PMC	Programme Management Committee
RRC/PMO-RRC	Reconstruction and Recovery Cell of the Prime Minister's Office
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	Evaluation Group of the United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This is an individual and final evaluation of the joint programme (JP) entitled ‘Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon’ (MDG-F 1976). The JP had a main objective of mitigating the risk of relapse into violent conflict through promotion of socioeconomic development and peace building in conflict prone communities in North Lebanon.

2. The evaluation was carried out following a qualitative design. It has promoted a learning process essentially participatory and inclusive, giving voice to different population groups and institutions involved in the programme.

3. The JP has been the first joint experience for most partners and as such, it has been both a management challenge and an opportunity for institutions with different mandates and visions to discover new ways of working.

4. Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB) is a multifaceted issue that would require multi-sectoral interventions. A joint programme, thus, seems to be a wise option where agencies contribute each in its own expertise and mandate. While the logic of joint programming stands, there appear some complexities of such initiative. Chiefly, working in a joint manner is very demanding for the partners in terms of the efforts that have to be invested in coordinating with other partners (i.e. the transaction costs), especially when the number of agencies and/or national partners is high as in the case of the JP under study. Furthermore, the joint work appears to be minimal among agencies working within the JP with some reported cases of duplication. Although the coordination role of Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) helped in moving in the direction of ‘Delivering as One’, agencies by and large continued to do their business as usual in terms of the nature and modality of implementing the activities within context of the JP albeit under a ‘lite’ mechanism of coordination and joint reporting.

5. While the implementation of number of commendable activities at the local level has positively contributed to building capacities of local partners, and in lessening tension and re-normalizing social relations between ‘war’ affected communities, especially the Lebanese and Palestinians post Nahr el Bared Camp (NBC), it is remarkable the low profile of the program in terms of upstream actions and objectives related to the development of public policies and legal frameworks regarding CPPB. This is especially the case when CPPB is an area where joint programs, by involving multiple agencies and institutions, could have played a great transformative capacity. Two remarkable cases are worth mentioning, however, and

include the support to the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), which has been engaged in preparations needed for legislative changes and awareness raising related to situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) scaling-up the experience of citizenships education in schools in Tripoli to be incorporated in the National Education Civic Programme.

6. Some of the pitfalls that appeared in the early stage of implementation and in some instances sustained during the course of the JP were primarily related to a spur-of-the-moment design. The context, when the JP was designed, was mostly of fractured relations between Lebanese and Palestinian communities in the North in 2007 and a context of limited presence of political institutions that were paralyzed in 2007 and 2008. However, the limited participatory nature of the design, where no real participatory assessments were conducted and in particular with prospective beneficiaries, and the thin evidence utilized and lack of reliable data have affected the implementation and later impact of the JP. The lack of participation during the design was remedied to some extent during the design of activities, when several participatory processes were undertaken. Finally, though the context and the design have certainly been sources of difficulties, very probably some internal factors have had even greater influence in the development of the programme; among them it's worth highlighting: **(1)** Difficulty in coordinating all partners without a Programme Coordinator at the beginning; **(2)** low efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making processes; **(3)** time-consuming procurement procedures; and **(4)** difficulties in the communication and coordination among staff in the field and management structures in Beirut.

7. While all partners, at both the centre and local levels, appreciated the leading and catalyzing role of agencies and their staff in being out there and paving the way especially in bringing different groups and communities together, the JP as a joint initiative had remarkably low-visibility especially among beneficiaries and local partners. The JP's communication strategy seems to be timid and was short of transmitting an image or message of the joint-nature of the Programme.

8. Approximately 72% of the expected targets were achieved, which means that the JP could have operated with improved effectiveness. None of the agencies spent the corresponding total budget transferred, which in general terms indicates that the efficiency in the management of economic resources could have been better.

9. Sustainability of the activities implemented within context of JP will depend largely on the presence of the agency or implementing partner in North Lebanon. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through its long-established regional development programme in Akkar and in North Lebanon, stands out

as most effective in ensuring continuity of activities delivered as part of the JP. Other partners, especially well-established national NGOs, will ensure the sustainability of activities through their own programmes.

10. Finally, a comprehensive design phase based on solid evidence together with an accurate monitoring framework (including gender sensitive and conflict sensitive indicators) and an efficient decision making scheme at the operational level could have significantly improved the overall implementation of the programme.

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1. Background**

11. The Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) is an international cooperation mechanism whose aim is to accelerate progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) worldwide. Established in December 2006 with a contribution of €528 million from the Spanish Government to the United Nations system, the MDG-F supports national governments, local authorities and citizen organizations in their efforts to tackle poverty and inequality. In September 2008 at the UN High Level Event on MDGs, Spain committed an additional €90 million to the MDG-F.

12. The MDG-F operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions in line with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint Programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint Programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

13. This evaluation is part of a monitoring and evaluation strategy based on results designed by MDG-F Secretariat. The strategy is based on the principles of the Evaluation Group of the United Nations (UNEG) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the quality and independence of the evaluations. Additionally, this evaluation will seek to continue the mid-term evaluation process and its recommendations.



## 1.2. Goals and methodology of evaluation

14. **1.2.1. Specific objectives of the evaluation:** (1) To measure to what extent the JP has contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase as well as the problems of the most marginalized groups in the targeted population. (2) To measure the programme's degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised. (3) To measure to what extent the JP has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants and the most marginalized whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc. (4) To measure the programme's contribution to the objectives set in its respective specific thematic windows as well as the overall MDG-F objectives at local and national level. (5) To identify and document substantive lessons learned and good and bad practices.

### 1.2.2. Methodology and approach

15. This is an individual and final evaluation carried out following a qualitative design. It has promoted a learning process essentially participatory and inclusive, giving voice to different population groups and institutions involved in the programme. Main characteristics of the evaluation approach: (1) the evaluation was conducted under a gender perspective facilitated by including specific information requirements in each evaluation criteria<sup>1</sup>. (2) Human Rights and Human Security Approach with special attention to international conventions and regulatory frameworks such as United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR) 1325. (3) Do No Harm approach, which is especially pertinent to the evaluation as the JP has its main objectives mitigating the risk of relapse into violent conflict. Particular attention will be put to assess the degree that the JP has been designed and implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner.

### 1.2.3. About the information collection tools

16. The main information collection tool has been individual interview. Individual interviews were defined following the ToR to include all the evaluation questions proposed. The types of interviews applied depending on the situation and the interviewee, were: (1) Casual conversation, (2) guided interview and (3) standardized open-ended interview. Other information collection tools included desk review, Focus Group

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<sup>1</sup> This was be done through the application of the **Harvard Analytical Framework**. It has three main components: An activity profile, an access and control profile, and an analysis of influencing factors. This framework will be applied indirectly, through the inclusion of its components in the various evaluation questions, focus groups sessions, etc.

Discussions (FGD), participative work sessions, direct observation and individual videotaped testimonials. The different tools were applied flexibly in order to achieve their adaptation to the working conditions.

17. The following **participative work sessions** took place: **(1)** presentation of the evaluation methodology to the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG); **(2)** workshop dedicated to the contextualization of main findings with the ERG after the first half of the evaluation mission; **(3)** final workshop dedicated to the contextualization of final conclusions and recommendations with the ERG.

18. **1.2.4. Evaluation users:** Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), Nahr el Bared Camp (NBC) Popular Committee, Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE), Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation (AECID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Secretariat of the Millennium Development Goals Fund (MDG-F), and the persons who have participated in the various activities promoted by the programme.

19. **1.2.5. Evaluation team:** The evaluation has been conducted by Carlos Carravilla (Lead Consultant), founding member and member of the board of the *Col·lectiu d'Estudis sobre Cooperació i Desenvolupament (El Col·lectiu)*<sup>2</sup>, external consultant specializing in tools and methodologies of international cooperation and Nasser Yassin (National Consultant), professor at the American University of Beirut and development planning specialist.

20. **1.2.6. Constrain and limitations to the evaluation study:** The evaluation process has not faced any major limitations, although there are two issues that could have been better handled: **(1)** the evaluation team had to partially take care of the management of the evaluation agenda, which demanded some time; **(2)** the deadline to deliver the first version of the evaluation report after the field work was a bit too tight.

### **1.3. Description of the joint programme and the work context**

#### **1.3.1. Context analysis**

##### **1.3.1.1. The post-war landscape and pendulum of conflict**

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.portal-dbts.org/>

21. While not precisely a country at war, nor exactly at peace, Lebanon is best described as a country continuously shaped by a pendulum of never-ending political tussles and conflicts. Since gaining independence from the French mandating authorities in 1943, conflicts have shaped the modern history of Lebanon starting with a short-lived Civil War in 1958, a second and devastating Civil War between 1975-1990, and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon 1978-2000. The post civil war era (1991 and on and especially as of 2004) has seen a series of violent incidents that jeopardized the finely balanced peaceful co-existence. The assassination of nine prominent political figures including the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri between 2005 and 2007 were major watersheds; similarly, The July War between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 that was followed by the Nahr El Bared War between the Lebanese Army and Fateh El Islam armed group in North Lebanon in 2007, the armed hostilities between the affiliates of the 14 March and 8 March coalitions in 2008, reaching the recent clashes between Sunni and Alawites communities in Tripoli, North Lebanon.

22. While the post-civil war landscape witnessed some impressive reconstruction efforts and initiatives, it was not accompanied with substantial improvement in the social and economic fields, especially in regard to the universality across regions and social groups. Nor did the efforts of post-war rehabilitation take on reconciliation as priority or succeed in reconstructing a shared feeling of citizenship.

23. Recently, Lebanon has been going through slow economic growth at the national level with a staggering debt with an estimated debt-to-GDP ratio of 140% in 2011. This is heightening the disparities. Estimates point to a broad discrepancy in per capita consumption amid the bottom 20% and the top 20% of the total population. While the former holds a little less than half of the total consumption (43.5%), the latter possesses merely 7.1% of the total consumption, marking the unequal distribution of resources among the different social strata<sup>3</sup>. This presumed inequality in consumption is mostly pronounced within the different governorates of Lebanon, with only 8% of aggregate inequality being attributed to inter-governorate disparities<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, disparities in income exist across Lebanese regions, where the highest mean income was reported in Beirut (909,000 L.L.), and the lowest means were reported in the Northern governorate (577,000 L.L.) (CAS/UNDP, 2008).

24. In the same vein, institutional reforms have been sluggish. Modernization of the public sector has been erratic as its best and often stumbling in the face of the strongly established system of sectarian - political

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<sup>3</sup> UNDP, 2008

<sup>4</sup> Laithy, Abu-Ismail, and Hamdan, 2008

patronage. Corruption with its multi-facets is still very high. The Corruption Perception Index for 2011 ranked Lebanon on 134 among 182 countries with number 1 being the least corrupt<sup>5</sup>.

25. The patronage system is still widely the mode of operation of everyday politics in Lebanon, and plays a major role in maintaining corruption and nepotism. Political and sectarian chieftains engage in a transactional relation with their constituency by providing services often in form of jobs in public sector or through skewing the process of allocation of public funds and resources. In return, followers are expected to return back in voting for them in elections and in showing support often in public display of power of the chieftain or party. Undoubtedly, clientelist networks offer a quick remedy for the needs of people. They facilitate their endeavours to get access to the state and its resources. The clientelist system and its practices, however, reinforce the eminence of traditional and sectarian leaders who act as the patrons, ‘gate-keeper’, brokers, and facilitators to state-related goods and services.

26. In many ways the above *state of affairs* has affected how Lebanese citizens perceive their State. As put in the last NHDR (2009)<sup>6</sup>, there is ‘...considerable confusion in the ways in which citizens view their leaders and institutions and their understandings of concepts such as public or national good and shared public space. This confusion has solidified the position of the sect or community, as the main authority or reference point for citizens and the mandatory access point for citizens to state institutions. The sect in this regard becomes the principle conduit that shapes the formation of citizens’ attitudes and that of their communities towards the state and its institutions. It is also the key lens through which the image that citizens have of their own political identities and those of others is refracted.’

#### 1.3.1.2. North Lebanon: Akkar, Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh

27. As shown in the aforementioned sections, the lowest income coupled with high unemployment and illiteracy rates categorize North Lebanon region as is the most marginalized region in Lebanon. While Akkar is considered the most underprivileged region in North Lebanon, Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh are the most politically instable regions in North Lebanon. The following sections will present a briefing on the latter regions:

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<sup>5</sup> <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>

<sup>6</sup> UNDP, 2009: 18

## Akkar

28. As the second most populated Caza in North of Lebanon, Akkar, has 285,000 inhabitants distributed between a Sunni Muslim majority, a Christian and Alawites minority, and very few number of Shiaa (UNRCSN, 2011). Akkar's low socioeconomic status characterized by a very young population with the highest poverty rate (63.3%), the highest illiteracy rates (25%), among the highest school drop outs is very high, very high dependency ratio compared to the national average (86.6 %), very low participation rate of women (5.2%), and the lowest average individual income level (40% of the population receive income that is below the minimum wage). Moreover, people in Akkar receive limited support from the public sector and the civil society, in addition to having limited access to electricity, potable water, and health services. Akkar was excluded from most national and international emergency funding donated to rebuild and rehabilitate the country.

29. Akkar has been significantly influenced by the armed conflicts in 2006 and 2007. Whereas, the July war in 2006 lead many families in Akkar to lose their sources of income, the NBC War in 2007 had much severe repercussions. Among the many consequences, the NBC War destroyed residential buildings, damaged commercial enterprises, shattered the infrastructure, and lost a vital commercial centre for the families, and reduced access to cheap products and services in Syria (due to the closure of Syrian border). In addition to that, the Sectarian conflicts between Alawites in Jabal Mohsen and Sunni Muslims in Bab Tabbaneh in Tripoli negatively influenced the social relations between different sects in Akkar.

## Jabal Mohsen and Bab al Tabbaneh

30. Jabal Mohsen and Bab al Tabbaneh are the poorest neighbourhoods in Tripoli, North Lebanon with a population of 60,000 inhabitants distributed between Alawites in Jabal Mohsen and Sunni Muslims Bab al Tabbaneh. Similar to other marginalized areas, the poverty profile in the latter two neighbourhoods is best characterized by high unemployment rates, high drop-out rates, and inadequate access to health services.

31. Of particular relevance to Jabal Mohsen and Bab al Tabbaneh is the sectarian conflict, which has been ongoing ever since 1976. The absence of a national reconciliation initiative following the Lebanese Civil War, together with Syrian interferences in sectarian affairs in the North, has lead to the continuous inter and intra communal conflicts. It is worth noting that political interferences used the economic disparities in the neighbourhood to convince the youth to join armed forces in exchange of financial returns.

### 1.3.1.3. Palestinian situation in Lebanon

#### General overview of Palestinian history in Lebanon

32. UNRWA reports that a total of 414,000 Palestinians reside in Lebanon, although the actual number is much less due to migration. Around half of Palestinians live in 12 different Palestinian camps within the Lebanese territories. Most studies have revealed that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are “the most unfortunate and destitute grouping of Palestinian refugees in any Arab host country” (Suleiman, 2006 p.3). Palestinian refugees disadvantage is manifest by low levels of education, high rated of school dropout, and high rates of unemployment (Ugland, 2003). Palestinians who work earn lower wages compared to Lebanese workers who have the same level of education or who work in similar occupations (Abdulrahim & Khawaja, 2010; Ugland, 2003).

33. The history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is profoundly shaped by successive socio-political junctures. With the establishment of Israel in 1948, at least 100,000 Palestinians, mostly from Northern villages and towns arrived to Lebanon. Catering to what was thought to be a temporary stay, the Lebanese government in the early 1950s expressed their support to the Palestinian case by granting the first cohort of refugees humanitarian assistance and freedom of mobility (Sayigh, 1998). In the following period (1958 and 1970), Lebanese-Palestinian relations experienced a major shift, mainly as an outcome of three momentous events – the Lebanese army’s security measures, the Cairo agreement, and PLO operations in Lebanon.

34. In 1958, the Lebanese army security agency (Deuxieme Bureau) and the paramilitary security forces exercised strict oppressive practices, and mobility control measures on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Knudsen, 2009; Sayigh, 1998; Natour, 1997). Whereas these measures aimed at safeguarding Lebanon from political turmoil, it escalated the tension between Lebanese and Palestinian relationships.

35. A second critical landmark in Palestinian history in Lebanon is signing the Cairo agreement in 1969, which secured the administrative autonomy of the camps, granted the Palestinian the right to work, and most importantly, authorized Palestinian cross-border operational attacks of Israel from Lebanon (Roberts, 2010).

36. A third juncture in the Palestinian history was the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Following their expulsion from Jordan in 1970, the PLO resorted and institutionalized

their bases in Lebanon. Described as a “State within a State”, the PLO operated an advanced military as well as civil machinery in Lebanon. Adding fuel to the already tense socio-political internal Lebanese environment based of socioeconomic regional and sectarian disparities PLO’s economic and political growth served as the final catalyst for the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. The involvement of the Palestinians in the atrocities of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) developed a culture of blame and mistrust between Lebanese and Palestinians (Knudsen, 2009; Said, 1999).

37. Shortly after the Lebanese Civil War officially ended, the *Oslo Accords in 1993*, which left the situation of Palestinian refugees pending to be later settled in the “final statement” (Knudsen, 2009) augmented fears about the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. The Palestinian question, consequently, emerged as a divisive factor in Lebanese political landscape. Against the backdrop of ‘fear of naturalization’ several restrictions were put on the Palestinians in Lebanon affecting their living conditions and further marginalizing them.

38. As such, Palestinians in Lebanon have been denied the right to work in 72 professions, to access public higher education, to own land or to build (Baraka, 2008; Suleiman, 2006; Knudsen, 2009; *Said, 1999*). In August 2010, however, intense discussions among Lebanese parliament members representing different political parties resulted in revoking few of the restrictions imposed on Palestinian employment in Lebanon. These reforms granted Palestinians the right to have a work permit without fees and the right to work in any field open to foreigners (this excludes professional or civil service jobs) with limited occupational benefits from their own social security fund.

#### [Palestinian Camps in North Lebanon: Naher El Bared and Beddawi Palestinian Camps](#)

39. Naher El Bared and Beddawi Palestinian Camps are located near Tripoli, North Lebanon. Similar to the case of other Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the socioeconomic status of the camps is low and characterized by high youth rate, high dropout rate, high youth unemployment rate, low economic participation of women (Tiltne, 2007).

40. Aside from the low socioeconomic situation, NBC and Beddawi are linked to a memorable armed conflict that has significantly shaped the Lebanese-Palestinian relations in North Lebanon. In specific, a short ‘war’ erupted in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared (NBC) between the Lebanese army and a new militia group calling itself ‘Fatah al-Islam’. The NBC war was the biggest ‘internal’ violent incident since the civil war ended and added significantly to the country’s political turmoil. The death toll was close to 500 and destruction of the camp led to the displacement of around 30,000 Palestinians to

already crowded Palestinian camps in the country. Affected by the same-armed dispute, Lebanese living in surrounding municipalities (Muhammara, Bebnine, Bhanine, Minieh, Beddawi, and Deir Amar) lost their houses and source of living, became internally displaced, and sought shelter in neighbouring communities.

#### Lebanese-Palestinian relations in North Lebanon

41. The relationship between the Lebanese and Palestinians is often described as tense (Khazen, 1998). Several factors might be attributed to the nervous relation between the latter two groups, such as the participation of some Palestinian factions in the Lebanese Civil war (1975-1990), the economic threat posed by Palestinian labour force participation, and the political threat of Palestinian settlement in Lebanon (its effect on the sectarian balance).

42. Aside from the troubled history, reports show that reasons for the inter and intra communal tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese in North Lebanon is related to the dilemma of the governance of the 12 Palestinian camps and the different security mechanisms governing the camps. In specific, the departure of the PLO in 1982 left the Palestinian camps to be governed by representative of the 23 different political Palestinian factions. In the absence of a formal protection mechanism, disputes between the different Palestinian factions cause instability at the camp level, which might expand to cause instability at the Lebanese regions surrounding the camps. In this line of thought, reports show that there is mistrust between the Palestinian and the Lebanese communities due to lack of effective security systems, poor governance structure, and lack of rule of law in the camp.

43. **1.3.2. The joint programme (JP):** The programme Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon (MDG-F 1976) has, as main objective to mitigate the risk of relapse into violent conflict through promotion of socioeconomic development and peace building in conflict prone communities. Its specific objectives are: (1) identification and promotion of sustainable conflict prevention tools to facilitate resolution of inter-and intra communal tensions between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities; (2) implementation of equitable socio-economic development interventions decreasing the divide amongst the communities; and (3) promotion of youth and women's active participation in local level development.



Table 1. JP results framework

EXPECTED OUTCOME	EXPECTED OUTPUT
<b>Outcome 1:</b> Conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms developed and sustained in order to facilitate the resolution of inter- and intra-communal tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese.	<b>Output 1:</b> Role of formal Lebanese-Palestinian resolution mechanisms and Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), strengthened.
	<b>Output 2 (Beddawi and Naher el-Bared camps/Lebanese surrounding communities):</b> Two forums in support of community-based conflict resolution and social service delivery initiatives in selected area of intervention established and operational. (1. Beddawi and surrounding Lebanese municipality and 2. Nahr el-Bared and surrounding Lebanese municipalities). <b>Output 2 (Tebbaneh / Jabal Mohsen area):</b> One forum in support of community-based conflict resolution and social service delivery initiatives in selected area of intervention established and operational.
	<b>Output 3:</b> Culture of Peace, Human Rights & Gender Mainstreaming Capacities of Women Committees & NGOs in 10 Communities of the targeted areas strengthened
	<b>Output 4:</b> Conflict resolution capacities of Youth and NGOs/CBOs working with youth in the selected areas improved
	<b>Output 5:</b> Capacities of the Popular Committees improved, particularly with regard to conflict resolution methods
	<b>Output 6:</b> A Media Campaign to Raise Lebanese-Palestinian Issues, Conducted
<b>Outcome 2:</b> Conflict risk in North Lebanon communities reduced through the design and implementation of inclusive socio-economic initiatives.	<b>Output 1:</b> Local stakeholders' capacities in 15 communities strengthened in the areas of inclusive local governance, and social development planning
	<b>Output 2:</b> Local Socio-Economic Development Plans Developed for the three sub-regions (Sahel, High and Mid-Dreib)
	<b>Output 3:</b> Socio-Economic initiatives implemented in the three targeted sub-regions (Sahel, Mid and High Dreih).
	<b>Output 4:</b> Coordination support provided

44. **Areas of intervention:** (1) Selected Palestinian refugee camps (Nahr el Bared and Beddawi) and surrounding Lebanese populations; (2) marginalized border communities in Akkar area; (3) Jabal Mohsen (alawites) and Bab Tabbaneh (sunni) neighbourhoods in Tripoli.

45. **UN Agencies and Lebanese partners involved in the JP:** The JP involves six different organizations of the United Nations with a total approved budget of 5,000,000.00 USD distributed as follows: UNDP 2,533,984 USD (50.3%); UNFPA 473,361 USD (9.6%); UNICEF 684,820 USD (13.9%); UNRWA 256,867 USD (5.2%); ILO 876,539 USD (17.8%); UNESCO 154,429 USD (3.1%).

46. **Lebanese partners:** National level: Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE), Popular Committee of the Nahr el Bared Camp (NBC); and the Reconstruction and Recovery Cell (RRC) of the Prime Minister Office. Local level: municipalities and seven Civil Society organizations participated in implementation.

## 2. FINDINGS BY LEVEL OF ANALYSIS AND INFORMATION NEEDS

### 2.1. DESIGN LEVEL

47. The programme was modified during a revision process conducted from December 2010 to February 2011. The Programme Management Committee (PMC) approved the result in April 2011 and the NSC approved the corresponding Improvement Plan on 2 November 2011; finally the MDG-F Secretariat endorsed the Improvement Plan on 12 December 2011. The starting date of the programme was 3 September 2009. After approval of two six months extensions by the MDG-F Secretariat, the end date was be 31 August 2012.

#### 2.1.1. Relevance

48. **Quality of the design (internal coherence) and of the monitoring and evaluation framework:** The direct relationship between the achievement of outputs with the attainment of two outcomes indicates a cohesive internal design for the JP. A better in-depth assessment of the internal consistency of the design, however, requires a thorough assessment of the means through which [the analysis of alternatives was performed](#). Unfortunately, the available information was not enough to conduct such an assessment. Finally, development results could have included the promotion of [gender equity](#) more specifically.

49. **Indicators:** (1) The set indicators fall short in measuring the level of progress in achieving the results. Such a shortcoming is evident in several indicators, which present the direct deliverables such as to products, type activities, or number of activities conducted as opposed to changes in the living conditions of the persons involved in the programme. (2) **Measurability:** The wording of some of the indicators includes hard to measure concepts such as “level of awareness” or “level of improvement”. These concepts can only be measured through the implementation of experimental or quasi-experimental monitoring systems that were not applied in the programme.

50. **Baseline:** The desk review of the programme report shows that [no comprehensive baseline study was conducted](#) before the implementation of the programme. In the absence of actual updated data, the programme is built on preconceptions and imprecise data.

51. **Targets:** (1) **Similarity of targets:** As aforementioned, several indicators refer to products, type of activities, or number of conducted activities rather than to changes in living conditions of the persons involved in the programme, the corresponding targets seem to have the same characteristic. (2)

**Measurability of the targets:** Some targets require measurement of the increased level of awareness, which, as already mentioned, would require an experimental or quasi-experimental monitoring system.

52. **Relevance mismatches of the programme:** (1) Some beneficiaries in NBC consider that the JP has addressed consequences of the conflicts between Lebanese and Palestinians but not the causes of these conflicts. The two main reasons behind the latter concern are that not all activities involved both collectives, and issues regarding the labour rights of Palestinians did not have a high priority. (2) Interviewees in Akkar consider that the title of the programme does not match the real situation in the area, where different communities live together without any major problems.

53. **Gender sensitivity of the M&E system:** The M&E system cannot be considered completely gender sensitive. In support to the latter, the reports show that only 6 indicators out of 37 could be considered to some extent as gender sensitive.<sup>7</sup>

### **Reshaping process**

54. The modification can be assessed as almost a complete reshape of the programme that respects the wording of outcomes and most outputs (Output 5 and Output 6/Outcome1; and Output 2 and Output 3/Outcome 2 were slightly modified) while affecting indicators, targets and activities. The reshaping of activities can be considered as really important.

55. The reasons for the reshaping (Annex 3) can be basically grouped as follows: (1) The change of leadership in the LPDC in December 2009 and the appointment of a new President in April 2010 led to the development of a new strategy for the LPDC regarding the Palestinian agenda. (2) During the course of the implementation of the JP, the Lebanese Parliament voted in August 2010 amendments to the existing Labour Law. (3) The delay in the starting phase of the programme made it unrealistic to achieve some of the set targets. (5) Assessments and diagnostic studies conducted once the programme had begun were considered in the modified version although they could have been better used by the agencies. (7) To expand the territorial coverage of the programme to address inter-group conflict dynamics which prevail in the border areas.

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<sup>7</sup> Gender sensitive indicators can be basically classified in two categories: (i) indicators disaggregated by sex, and (ii) indicators that measure gender gap related to health, education and economic status. In the context of a programme these indicators should allow measuring differentially how men and women are progressing towards the results planned of an intervention.

## **Participation of national and local counterparts during the reshaping**

56. The reshaping process was essentially conducted by the agencies while national and local partners were involved in the validation of the results. There are two exceptions to the previous statement: **(1)** the MoEHE was invited by UNICEF to participate in the reshaping and as a result a very interesting initiative was included in the new design, which consisted of mainstreaming gender and conflict prevention concepts in the text books used by the Civic Education (Grade 1 to Grade 12) subject, which is obligatory in every public or private Lebanese school; **(2)** Mouvement Sociale was involved in the redesign of the Programme.

57. Also, some consultations were conducted to define specific activities in the field: **(1)** The municipality of Mohammara and the Popular Committee of NBC decided, within UNDP's component, to purchase a bobcat to be operated by the municipality and to be used as well by the NBC Popular Committee (PC); and to fund the installation of a drainage and sewerage system to benefit both Lebanese and Palestinian communities in Mohammara and NBC. **(2)** After the training plan for the Popular Committee designed by UNRWA was rejected, new training activities were identified together with the Popular Committee. **(3)** The process to formulate activities for the creation of the cooperative in Sahel was highly participative and entailed forming a group or committee that was trained on Participatory Rapid Appraisal research (PRA). The group undertook a needs assessment under the guidance of a UNDP consultant and came up with a suggestion to establish a coop. **(4)** After the JP had been launched, the CBOs in Akkar were contacted to brainstorm the ideas of common projects and activities between the Lebanese and Palestinians. They were invited to submit proposals that come as a product of joint planning.

58. Some assessments were conducted before the reshaping, like the Conflict Analysis in the Border Area of North Lebanon (September 2010) and the Women and Young Girls Needs Assessment (end of 2010). The reshaped version of the JP did not manage to benefit from the information produced by the latter given that the modified design of the JP cannot be considered as gender sensitive, although all the partners have tried to implement the activities involving women. In addition, the design and reshaping could have benefitted more of existing knowledge.

59. Finally, each agency conducted its own assessments while it would have been advisable to conduct joint assessments to improve efficiency and also promote joint implementation.

60. **The CPPB programme contributes to the following Millennium Development Goals:** MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty & hunger. **Target 1.A:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day. **Target 1.B:** Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people. **Target 1.C:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. **MDG 3:** Promote gender equality and empower women. **Target 3.A:** Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.

61. **Joint programming response to development and conflict challenges:** CPPB is a multifaceted issue so a joint programme seems to be a wise option when working in this field. Prior to taking the conducting a joint initiative, the implementing partners need to assess their level of commitment to the programme. In specific, taking on a joint program demands partners to invest ample efforts to ensure coordination (ex: transaction costs), especially when the number of agencies and/or national partners is high.

#### **Selection of agencies, national and local partners and implementing partners.**

62. The evaluation team couldn't find any information about the criteria used to determine which agencies and national and local partners would participate in the programme. Additionally, several agencies that outsourced implementation did not apply selection criteria or selection processes to decide which implementing partners were the most suitable to be subcontracted by the agencies; although methodological proposals were required before signing some of the contracts. For example, Mouvement Sociale and Al Majmoua were hired because of their recognized experience in their fields of expertise<sup>8</sup>. In the case of Al Majmoua, the contract with ILO was awarded without a technical and methodological proposal. It also seems that some of the contracts signed by agencies and implementing partners were not very detailed; i.e. Al Majmoua highlighted that the conditions in the contract with ILO could have been more comprehensive and that basically the institution had to fulfil a number of indicators related to the average loans amount and number and profile of persons benefited. The contract signed between ILO and Al Majmoua for a total amount of USD 176,500 includes a clause to allow ILO to ask for any information about the management of the funds disbursed during a period of five years after completion of the contract, which was signed on 14 April 2010 with a duration of 23 months; but does not include any detail about what will happen to the funds disbursed after these five years.

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<sup>8</sup> UNICEF selected the implementing partners for the Lebanese schools based on consultation with MEHE, which requested working with MS since the NGO had worked with them in the past on citizenship and they were satisfied with their work. As for the UNRWA schools, the selection of the implementing partner was done in consultation with and based on recommendation from UNRWA who also had ran a similar project with PPM.

63. In relation to implementation, the CPPB program followed a different model than that used in other joint programmes experiences elsewhere. Contrary to the case of other countries, which implemented the joint programs based on a national implementation modality<sup>9</sup> through the structure and staff of their ministries, the CPPB in Lebanon opted for direct implementation by the agencies themselves.

### **Equity approach, Human Rights Approach, labour standards and gender mainstreaming**

64. **Human Rights and gender mainstreaming:** The third output of the first outcome is partially dedicated to strengthen capacities of Women Committees and NGOs related to Human Rights and gender mainstreaming. The output was thought to cover aspects such as UNSCR 1325, gender based violence and positive action measures to enhance the leading role of women. While this output is righteous, it holds several problems: (1) The third output seems to be disconnected, as it doesn't fall in line with the other outputs. (2) Although the Human Rights approach is mentioned in the wording of the output, it does not have any indicator related to Human Rights. (3) Though indicators referring gender are included, they cannot be considered as an accurate means of measuring changes in gender relationships.

65. **Labour standards:** The second output of the first outcome is dedicated to the promotion of Palestinian Labour Rights through forums, dialogues, information campaigns and the design and implementation of a pilot project on employment. The output, however, doesn't set any incidence on public policies, norms or standards. In the line of thought, the outputs included in this outcome do not consider any indicator related to labour standards.

66. **Equity approach:** The fourth output of the first outcome 1 is dedicated to improve the conflict resolution capacities of the youth; so youth together with women are two disadvantaged groups that the programme has benefited, which has to be considered as a pro equity approach. This output, however, includes only one indicator out of seven related to equity: *Percentage of women and girls participating in activities*. Finally, indicators of the third output of the first outcome (Human Rights and gender mainstreaming) do not include references to gender equity.

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<sup>9</sup> In some countries it is the main national partner who takes responsibility for the implementation, monitoring and authorizing all expenditures

## Appropriateness of the proposed strategy

67. Notwithstanding the implementing partners' transformative capacity, the review of the documents shows that the JP's strategy fails to set actions and objectives related to the development of public policies and legal frameworks regarding CPPB. The only exceptions to that latter are the experience promoted by UNICEF in schools in Tripoli, which has been incorporated into the National Education Civic Programme; and the support to the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC).

68. Strategy to address the key issues affecting women and the youth: The programme has approached women and the youth through trainings to improve capacities for conflict prevention and resolution, awareness raising sessions, the promotion of dialogue instances and the provision of livelihood support. It is important to note, however, that latter activities have been implanted, without the identification of any specific strategies. Moreover, while a gender Women and Young Girls Needs Assessment (2010) was commissioned by UNFPA and disseminated, reshaped version of the JP did not manage to benefit from the information produced<sup>10</sup> by the latter. For that particular reason the modified design of the JP cannot be considered as gender sensitive.

69. The CPPB is aligned with the national priorities of having a peaceful co-existence in all parts of Lebanon. It goes in tune with UNDAF Lebanon 2010-2014. Such particular alignment is evident in the direct link between the JP and UNDAF as presented in Outcome 1, and a link between the JP and UNDAF Lebanon 2010-2014 as presented in Outcome 2. The JP matches two categories of activities to be promoted during the UNDAF implementation period, namely post conflict recovery activities, and tension reduction in the surrounding Lebanese municipalities.

## 2.2. PROCESS LEVEL

70. **The main external issues that have adversely affected implementation:** (1) The postponement in the formation of the Government following the parliamentary elections in June 2009; (2) the municipal elections held in May 2010; (3) the Chair of LPDC resigned and the replacement was assigned after four months. The LPDC has therefore been ongoing a period of transition, initially in the absence of political

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<sup>10</sup> The Secretariat of the MDG-F required some further explanations on how the programme had been adjusted following the findings of this assessment to enhance the inclusion of the gender approach in the overall programme in the no-cost extension memo sent to the UNRCO in Lebanon on the 12<sup>th</sup> December 2011.

leadership, and after in the context of developing a new strategy for the Palestinian file.

71. In the opinion of several interviewees external factors have been undoubtedly a source of difficulties, but very probably some **internal factors** have had even greater influence in the development of the programme. Some of these main internal issues have been: **(1)** Difficulty in coordinating all partners without a Programme Coordinator at the beginning and at the end: the JP did not have Programme Coordinator during the initial seven months and the last six months of implementation; as a consequence of this situation, some of the responsibilities of the Programme Coordinator were taken over by the UNRCO during the last months. **(2)** Low efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making processes (lack of a clear leadership to make operational decisions). **(3)** Time-consuming procurement procedures, **(4)** difficulties in the communication and coordination among staff in the field and management structures in Beirut, and **(5)** lack of clarity among partners about the responsibilities of the Programme Coordinator.

### 2.2.1. Efficiency

#### Governance structure, coordination mechanisms and administrative procedures

72. The political and strategic leadership of the JP rested with the **National Steering Committee (NSC)**: Co-chaired by the representative of the CDR and the UNRCO with a representative of AECID. The JP also has had a **Programme Management Committee (PMC)**: chaired by the UNRCO and integrated by the Reconstruction and Recovery Cell of the Prime Minister's Office (RRC), the LPDC, the MoEHE, the MoL, the Palestinian Embassy and the six UN Agencies involved in the programme. The involvement of the heads of the agencies within the described management scheme has been rather poor.

73. **Coordination mechanisms:** **(1)** In order to improve the coordination efforts a **joint budget** was approved in the 1st quarter of 2011 by the participating UN agencies; **(2)** field coordination mechanism consisting of: **(i)** three Regional Working Groups representing local stakeholders in targeted areas, although only the two in Akkar related to the cooperatives created were active, **(ii)** bi-weekly field coordination meetings, **(iii)** joint field visits, **(iv)** a joint field office in Tripoli that has not played a relevant role with the exception of the UNDP's JP field manager; **(3)** the **Programme Coordinator** has had a significant role in monitoring the joint implementation approach.

74. The funds were disbursed using the "pass through" modality with UNDP as the Administrative Agent (AA) at Head Quarters level. Once the funds were disbursed, according to the parallel funding modality, each organization kept programmatic and financial responsibility according to their administrative norms



and procedures. Parallel funding seems to be generally speaking more efficient than the pooled funding modality.

75. The comments made during the NSC meeting on 26 July 2011 by the representative of the Council for Development and Reconstruction showed that that coordination with other ongoing initiatives was weak during the first two years of implementation. While the situation improved in the last part of the programme, coordination is still not optimal.

76. **Decision-making:** As an important component of efficiency, the evaluation revealed some problems in the decision-making processes in the JP. While most of the interviewees acknowledged the active role of the Programme Coordinator in presenting his opinion, most agreed that his lack of autonomy to make decisions and the absence of clarity among partners of his functions and responsibilities has negatively reflected the efficiency of the programme. Such inefficiency was translated into delays and inconsistency in implementing activities.

77. **Joint implementation:** While intended to be a common initiative, the JP programme has been implemented as a set of interventions<sup>11</sup>, with too ambitious targets, led independently by different agencies. The lack of joint implementation is clearly illustrated by the Improvement Plan, where each agency is responsible for a number of activities but there are not activities to be carried by more than one agency.

78. **Information flows:** The evaluation exercise shows that information sharing was a major problem, one that affected the overall efficiency of the JP. Although information was available to national partners upon request, interviewees expressed the need for more information sharing among agencies, among national partners, and among agencies and national/local partners. There appears some lack of information circulation among agencies and sharing information about the activities conducted by other agencies in the same areas, which led in some instances to disconnection and misunderstandings between agencies' staff in Beirut and the staff deployed in the field.

79. **Administrative procedures:** Local partners in Akkar agreed that the inefficiency in procurement procedures lead to delays in the daily payments for local suppliers, which subsequently complicated implementation in the field. Furthermore, procurement procedures to get equipments and hire professional

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<sup>11</sup> The MDG-F Mission Report Lebanon, Jordan and the Occupied Palestinian Territory December 2009 already highlighted that agencies must continue to work together and jointly manage the programme.

services could have been conducted in a more transparent way by sharing information with local partners and beneficiaries.

80. **Financial difficulties:** The financial management has worked well. The only exception, however, was in the delays in receiving the second tranche. For instance, some agencies, which had reached the required 70% of spending of the first disbursement before others, had to reduce their pace of implementation until the whole programme reached the required 70%.

81. **The PMC:** The PMC could have been more efficient. While supposed to serve as an opportunity for joint planning, the PMC was more of a economic resource control administrative unit. The same mode of inefficiency applies to coordination meetings.

82. **Staff turnover:** The high staff turnover rate was presented as issue that significantly hampered communication and affected the efficiency of the program. Furthermore, some agencies did not have permanent personnel in the office in Tripoli, making coordination more difficult. Only UNDP maintained a person in Tripoli working continuously for the programme; something highlighted by several local partners as really supportive.

83. **Overlaps:** The evaluation discussions presented overlaps in the work of the different agencies, such as CDR, LPDC, Reconstruction and Recovery Cell, UNICEF, UNESCO, and UNDP (the three latter agencies facilitated similar activities in schools<sup>12</sup>) to be another factor that might have affected the efficiency. Some other examples of overlaps: (1) While Al Majmoua was providing training on micro business management in the Akkar area, other partners were facilitating vocational trainings, something within the capacities of Al Majmoua, with different beneficiaries in the same zones. (2) The collaboration of the Non Governmental Organization Mouvement Sociale (MSL) with the programme working in seven schools in Tripoli and three schools in Akkar delivering trainings on conflict prevention started with UNICEF<sup>13</sup> and then continued with UNDP. The activities did not change but the source of funds. (3)

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<sup>12</sup> Although UNICEF's activities in secondary schools and in Palestinian and Lebanese Public schools were originally and exclusively planned from the beginning of the programme, involving three agencies in delivering activities of a similar nature in schools cannot be considered as an efficient option since duplicated operational and personnel costs have been added to the process. Assessing overlap situations needs to take into account two concepts: Added value and efficiency. Every case is different and has to be carefully analyzed. Two or more agencies involved in funding activities of a similar nature without clear differentiated added value has to be considered as an overlap situation. More efficient ways of doing things could have been chosen from the very beginning through a better joint planning. Probably just one agency could have delivered all activities in schools: UNESCO could have done this; or UNICEF/UNDP following the new methodology designed by UNESCO.

<sup>13</sup> UNICEF also supported activities in 10 UNRWA schools in collaboration with PPM and UNRWA.

UNDP and ILO have been working with the two cooperatives in Akkar with apparently no substantive differences between the two supports.

84. **Reshaping process:** A number of interviewees mentioned that the reshaping process was too time consuming. In this regard it has to be mentioned that all the reshaping was done through the NSC and MDG-F Secretariat while the PMC could have approved reformulations of activities not affecting outputs and outcomes.

#### **Performance (efficiency and effectiveness) of the NSC and the PMC**

85. The evaluators found that both the NSC and the PMC have not been keeping up with the previously set meeting dates. On the one part, during NSC's first meeting in November (2 months after the beginning of the JP), it was stated that the NSC would meet on a bi-annual basis. However, the next meeting was in July 2011(20 months later) and again in November 2011 and June 2012. *Even though NSC was not very active during the first phase of implementation, it seems that it played its role adequately, resolving those issues that were raised by the PMC.*

86. PMC on the other hand, met for the first time in March 2010, six months after the beginning of the JP. During this meeting it was agreed that the PMC would meet quarterly. The following meetings were held in September 2010, April 2011, October 2011 and March 2012, which means that the PMC has been meeting on a bi-annual basis.

87. The performance of PMC and NSC had some duplication, which might have affected the overall efficiency of the programme. The evaluators found that PMC might have invested too much efforts in administrative control issues that were eventually raised to the NSC for final decisions; but little efforts in profoundly discussing strategic topics such as the situation of activities linked to the labour rights of Palestinians or the Tripoli Initiative. As a consequence *PMC and NSC have been basically taking care of very similar matters.*

88. In reference to sharing of information, sometimes members of the PMC did not have updated information on the activities implemented in the field before meetings and consequently lacked a comprehensive understanding on the processes promoted.

89. Several national partners included in the PMC and that were active at the beginning of the programme stopped attending meetings during the second part of the programme. This caused that issues raised to the

NSC during the last part of the programme were basically discussed among agencies, like the reshaping of the programme. Probably the lack of national ownership has been one of the causes that led national partners to stop attending PMC meetings.

### **Contribution of the NSC and PMC to Delivering as One**

90. During the NSC meeting held on 26 July 2011 the CDR raised several concerns that, in the opinion of the CDR; required the UN agencies to take action. One of these concerns was [the necessity of improving communication and coordination among UN agencies for a more coherent approach to beneficiaries and better efficacy](#). At the end of the meeting the Resident Coordinator assured that all the concerns and recommendation raised by the NSC would be communicated to the participating UN Agencies to take necessary action; and that the UNRCO would follow-up on the implementation of the NSC decisions and the finalization of the mid-term evaluation process. Accordingly some measures were taken, such as the joint preparation of the Improvement Plan and the Exit and Sustainability Strategy. While this measures can be considered as a progress to a more coherent performance, it did not contribute to any of the three principles of the UN Reform.

91. It is also worth noting that during the course of implementation the PMC created a [joint coordination budget](#), administered by the RCO (PMC meeting held on 17 September 2010). This coordination budget has been a good basis for joint work, particularly as refers to joint monitoring activities.

92. **Contributions of the JP to Delivering as One.** [One Budget and One Office principles](#): Each agency has been autonomously responsible for its portion of the JP budget and activities in accordance with their own administrative norms and procedures. The financial information was consolidated at the end of each period to produce a joint financial report. [One Leader](#): The UNRCO has played an active role facilitating and promoting coordination and helping to report jointly.

### **Contribution of the NSC and PMC to promote ownership of the process**

93. During the NSC meeting held on 26 July 2011 the CDR raised several issues that needed to be addressed by the NSC and PMC to enhance the performance of the programme. One of them was: [Consulting with the Government Counterparts before undertaking major changes to the programme such as changing the geographical coverage, the original approach and scope of work, and the allocation of funds](#). As already mentioned, at the end of the meeting the Resident Coordinator assured that all the concerns and recommendation raised by the NSC would be communicated to the participating UN

Agencies to take necessary action; and that the UNRCO would follow-up on the implementation of the NSC decisions and the finalization of the mid-term evaluation process. After the mid-term evaluation the NSC encouraged the PMC and all agencies to involve more national and local partners to promote ownership by designing and Improvement Plan more linked to them.

94. Nonetheless, in general terms it can be said that the implementation of the different programme components has been under the autonomous and direct control of each participating UN organization, with little participation of local and national actors in decision-making. The following two narratives support the argument that some important decisions were made without participation of relevant national partners: (1) During the PMC meeting held on 20 April 2011 the Ambassador of Palestine expressed his concern about the suspension of activities in Ein el-Helweh and asked about the motive behind this decision; and the RRC requested clarifications on the budget reallocation between outcomes. These two situations suggest. (2) During the PMC meeting held on 20 October 2011, the Prime Ministers' Office representative requested clarification about funds committed so far and arrangements to accelerate delivery, and more specifically the disbursement of funds.

95. It is worth mentioning that the activities corresponding to the support given to the Tripoli Initiative within UNDP's component were conducted without comprehensive information sharing with the members of the NSC or PMC thus creating a situation not conducive to collaborative relations and collective ownership.

96. **Direct contribution of the NSC to the attainment of expected results:** the NSC has made some important decisions that can be considered as a direct contribution to the achievement of results: (1) Stopping the Tripoli Initiative after it was implemented without complete information sharing, which clearly is against the Paris declaration principle of mutual accountability, and subsequent reallocation of the remaining funds dedicated to its related activities; (2) approval of extension requests raised by the PMC.

97. Although some of the policies related to the issues treated by the programme have suffered dramatic changes during the years of implementation, the PMC could have tried to elevate the programme to more strategic levels taking advantage of the flexible results framework of the programme.

98. **Efficiency in reaching traditionally excluded collectives such as women and the youth:** since the programme was not designed from a gender sensitive participatory assessment with an inclusive approach (this means paying attention to different collectives with differentiated needs and interests), the design is

necessarily based on assumptions about these collectives, which makes it very difficult for the program to efficiently deliver interesting development results for traditionally excluded collectives. Finally, although a few indicators and targets were worded to promote to the extent possible the inclusion of women in the dynamics of the programme, these are just exceptions not framed in a global work strategy.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system**

99. M&E has been done through two elements, a set of monitoring tools applied by the implementing partners and two external evaluations: Mid-term and final. The main monitoring tools, that were compiled by the UNRCO from individual reports prepared by the agencies to produce joint reporting have been: Biannual monitoring joint reports: 2<sup>nd</sup> semester 2009, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> semester 2010, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> semesters 2011; JP results framework report with financial information: December 2010 and December 2011; JP monitoring system update: December 2011; Multi Donors Trust Fund reports. Also, the NSC met when significant issues were raised but did not receive reports regularly.

100. Although the reshaping process slightly improved the monitoring framework, the already mentioned low technical quality of the indicators<sup>14</sup>, baseline and targets have made difficult to conduct accurate monitoring and evaluation of progress towards planned results. As a consequence most reports basically describe activities implemented and difficulties encountered but provide little information on achievements.

101. ILO decided to commission an evaluation on its own component that was really helpful. The reasons for commissioning this evaluation were: the mid-term evaluation did not cover some issues that were interesting for ILO; also the agency wanted to record the experience in detail and to have specific documentation to increase accountability to their beneficiaries and partners.

### **Impact of the mid-term evaluation and its improvement plan**

102. According to the PMC meeting held on 20 October 2011, all PMC members agreed on the Improvement Plan and Extension Work Plan, which were endorsed by the NSC on 2 November 2011. The MDG-F Secretariat recommended on 11 December 2011 the implementation of the Improvement Plan.

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<sup>14</sup> The need to improve indicators was already mentioned by the Secretariat of the MDG-F in its Mission Report Lebanon 29 November-3 December 2010.


The final consolidated status report of the Improvement Plan is annexed to the evaluation report as Annex 4; those key actions that have not been satisfactorily applied are highlighted in light blue.

103. **Comments on the key actions included in the Improvement Plan: 1.1.** The weak participation of national partners in the PMC meetings, especially in the case of the MoL and the MoA is commented in section 2.2.2. Ownership in the process. **1.4.** The memorandum of Understanding between ILO, UNDP and the MoA on Akkar component was not finally signed because ILO has no financial commitment beyond the project. **6.1.** The activities affected by the key action (labour rights and advocacy) were not conducted but replaced by the refurbishment of the Directorate General of Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPRA), which was completed. **7.1.** Members of the cooperatives were not included in the awareness sessions to improve gender equity.

### Progress of the JP in financial terms

104. Financial progress reported until 31 December 2010 was very low in the cases UNDP and UNRWA: fifteen months after the programme started they had spent 14% and 27% of the transferred funds respectively.

Table 2




Source: Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office 2010 Administrative Agent Brief

105. Financial progress reported until 31 December 2011 was very low in the cases UNDP and UNRWA: after two thirds of the total duration of the programme their expenditure rates were 40% and 35% respectively.

106. These slow paces of implementing probably illustrate a general slow implementation because UNDP and UNRWA together have managed almost 60% of the total budget of the programme.

Table 3<sup>15</sup>



Source: Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office 2010 Administrative Agent Brief

<sup>15</sup> The amount stated under contracts should also go under training of counterparts since the IP with whom the contracts were signed, also handed the training of youth and teachers under the same project.



Table 4. Final financial status

	Total approved budget (USD)	Total budget transferred (USD)	Total budget committed (USD)	Total budget disbursed (USD)
UNICEF	684,820.00	684,820.00	684,803	684,803
UNESCO	154,429.00	154,429.00	153,079.65	147,997.15
UNRWA	256,867.00	256,867.00	256,728.00	109,496.00
UNDP	Information not available			
ILO	876,559.00	876,559.00	865,580.00	762,692.00
UNFPA	473,361.00	473,361.00	473,360.28	444,379.28

### 2.2.2. Ownership in the process

107. The lack of participation in the design had a negative influence on general ownership of the programme and on the perceived relevance of some activities. Some of the local and national stakeholders initially felt that the JP was being dumped on them and resisted getting involved in the activities. This initial resistance was overcome to some extent, but with a cost in terms of time and efforts needed to ensure the buying in of the programme during implementation, thus hindering efficiency. The Regional Working Groups could have been an excellent tool to enhance ownership<sup>16</sup> at the local level but these structures were not fully exploited by the programme.

108. Several national partners included in the PMC and who had been active at the beginning of the programme stopped attending meetings. As such, the composition of the PMC at the end of the programme was not balanced, with an important presence of agencies and a weak presence of national partners. This has caused that issues discussed by the NSC during the last part of the programme, like the reshaping of the programme, to be discussed among agencies.

109. Although national ownership was discussed during the programme and despite the NSC encouraged it and some measures were taken, few things were finally done in this regard.. For instance, a greater participation of schoolteachers, school directors and of the parents in designing the programme and defining the content and methodology of the activities could have lead to better outcomes. Such outcomes

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<sup>16</sup> The Secretariat of the MDG-F recommended enhancing national and local ownership through the RWG in its Mission Report Lebanon 29 November-3 December 2010.

include: improving the effectiveness of the trainings delivered at schools to both students and teachers, and developing a greater sense of local ownership and commitment.

### **Inclusion of the Do No Harm Approach in the programme**

110. As a principle of vital importance in intervention/project implementation, the principle of “do no harm” was indirectly addressed by the JP. Do no harm states that projects ought to fulfil the objectives without inducing any further expected or unexpected harm on the community and the stakeholders. Abiding by the latter principle was indirectly evident at two phases: Assessment, and implementation. At the assessment phase, the mapping initiatives (ex: conflict mapping, and risk assessment) prepared the ground and gained the approval/cooperation of the locals. This step by itself avoided the potential clash between the locals and the project implementers. Moreover, the mapping exercises allowed the implementing partners to have a better understanding of the context of North Lebanon in specific, and Lebanon in general. This understanding was vital in avoiding any potential harm induced at the local and national level. An example of which is UNDP’s work with local leaders (mayors and municipality council members).

## **2.3. RESULTS LEVEL**

### **2.3.1. Effectiveness**

#### **Level of achievement of expected results**

111. The final monitoring report is annexed to the evaluation report as Annex 5; those targets not completely achieved are highlighted in light green. Only targets that have not been completely achieved are commented when necessary in this report<sup>17</sup>.

Outcome 1: Conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms developed and sustained in order to facilitate the resolution of inter- and intra-communal tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese.
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Output 1: Role of formal Lebanese-Palestinian resolution mechanisms and Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), strengthened.

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<sup>17</sup> It is worth highlighting that the programme formed four forums (output 2) in support of community based conflict resolution.

112. **Indicator:** Policy advice provided to Lebanese Government on access issues (including NBC reconstruction). **Target:** Support the design of a strategic framework for NBC access and return. **Achievement of target:** The NBC working group, which is a security sub-committee of the LPDC, was established. **Comment:** the JP managed to establish the working group to prepare the strategic framework but the strategy was not designed.

Output 2: Three forums in support of community-based conflict resolution and social service delivery initiatives in selected area of intervention established and operational.

113. **Indicator:** Level of awareness on new labour law. **Target:** Dissemination of information related to new labour law among Lebanese employers, Palestinian workers, and local authorities. **Achievement of target:** Level of awareness still comparable to baseline. **Comment:** the achievement of this target has been negatively affected by the delay in the approval of the national decree to implement the new Labour Law.

Output 4: Conflict resolution capacities of Youth and NGOs/CBOs working with youth in the selected areas improved.

114. **Indicator:** Level of awareness of parents of inter-personal conflict origin and prevention issues. **Target:** At least 30% increase from the baseline in awareness among parents. **Achievement of target:** Level of awareness unknown.

115. **Indicator:** Percentage of women and girls participating in activities. **Target:** At least 50% of participants benefiting from the activities are girls and women. **Achievement of target:** Almost 50% of participants in activities are girls and women. Girls' participation reached 40% in UNICEF's activities while in the case of UNESCO it exceeded 40%.

116. **Indicator:** Number of young people capable of using peer-to-peer approach with emphasis on gender equity and equality. **Target:** At least 5 to 7 young people capable of using peer to peer approach. **Achievement of target:** It was difficult to identify young people for attending a 7 days training workshop on peer-to-peer; hence trained peer educators conducted outreach sessions to 180 Lebanese / Palestinian young people.

Output 5: Capacities of the Popular Committees improved, particularly with regard to the conflict management skills.

117. **Indicator:** Level of improvement made in PCs knowledge in relation to conflict resolution and prevention. **Target:** Increase the level of knowledge of 25 % of PCs members. **Achievement of target:** Level of knowledge immeasurable.

118. **Indicator:** Extent to which PCs are engaging the community in decision-making. **Target:** Design and implement 2 local initiatives based on a participatory approach between PCs and community representatives. **Achievement of target:** 5 project proposal received from community (0 implemented due to sustainability issues). Reprogramming: expansion of the NBC cemetery and development of the complaints and claims mechanism for NBC displaced families.

119. **Output 6: A Media Campaign to Raise Lebanese-Palestinian issues conducted:** the targets concerned were not reached because the corresponding activities were changed into the refurbishment of the DPRA, which was completed in August.

**Outcome 2: Conflict risk in North Lebanon communities reduced through the design and implementation of inclusive socio-economic initiatives.**

#### **Output 3: Socio-Economic Initiatives Implemented in the three sub-regions**

120. **Indicator:** level of access of women and youth to financial and non-financial services. **Target:** at least 40 loans and business management training targeting youth and women provided in the three sub-regions. **Achievement of target:** 36 loans disbursed in the identified regions; 40 women participate in get ahead training; 91 individuals benefit from business management training. **Comment:** the number of loans delivered is slightly inferior to the planned target.

121. **Contribution to the goals set by the thematic window:** The JP has contributed to the following priority areas of the CPPB thematic window: I. Enhancing systems and capacities for conflict prevention and Management; and IV. Supporting sustainable recovery and reintegration at the local level.

122. **Mutual accountability:** As already mentioned, during the PMC meeting held on 20 October 2011, two years after the beginning of the JP, the Prime Ministers' Office representative requested clarification about funds committed so far and arrangements to accelerate delivery, and more specifically the

disbursement of funds. Since there's a lack of information sharing<sup>18</sup> about the situation of the funds, it can be said that UN agencies have not completely promoted the principle mutual accountability. Moreover some local partners and beneficiaries believe that they should have been consulted and updated during the procurement procedures applied to purchase equipments and contract professional services.

123. **Ownership:** Ownership of the programme has been hampered by the (1) choice of the direct execution modality, which leaves the control of the programme to UN agencies; and by the (2) lack of participation of national and local stakeholders during the design phase.

124. **Harmonization:** There are some situations already mentioned that suggest that coordination with ongoing initiatives could have been better<sup>19</sup>, especially during the first half of the programme. An example that clearly illustrates this statement is that during the NSC meeting held on 16 July 2011, almost two years after the beginning of the programme, the CDR raised the need to coordinate implementation with ongoing UN and Government supported initiatives, particularly with the Regional Development Programme in Akkar to make use of the local development plans prepared previously; and to cooperate with the Local Economic Development Agency (LEDA) to assess the best options to assist local communities by providing small and medium size loans versus micro financing. UNDP has made an effort to coordinate with the LEDA during the last part of implementation. On the other hand the design of the Peace Building Fund took into account information and lessons learned coming from the CPPB JP.

125. Activities devoted to improve the socio economic situation in the area of Akkar could have been implemented in a more coherent and comprehensive way by focusing in a specific group of beneficiaries: at the same time Al Majmoua was providing training on micro business management, other partners were facilitating vocational training to different groups of beneficiaries in the same zones. Additionally, the micro credits did not benefit members of the cooperatives promoted in the Akkar area, which could have been a way to focus impact.

126. **Communication and Advocacy Strategy and visibility:** The JP and MDG-F have had limited visibility particularly in Tripoli. The Mayor of Mohammara has only had contact with the UNDP and occasionally with the Programme Coordinator with very limited knowledge of other UN agencies in this

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<sup>18</sup> The need to implement an Information Sharing System was mentioned by the Secretariat of the MDG-F in its Mission Report Lebanon 29 November-3 December 2010.

<sup>19</sup> The Secretariat of the MDG-F highlighted the need to improve coordination with ongoing initiatives its Mission Report Lebanon 29 November-3 December 2010.

JP or of its working mechanism. Implementing partners in Akkar have not been reached with any specific communication and visibility materials or actions and don't even know that the Programme has a Communication and Visibility Strategy. Very few national or local partners were involved in the definition of the Communication and Advocacy Strategy and none reported have received any information related to this strategy.

### 2.3.2. Sustainability

127. The **Exit and Sustainability strategy** specifies for each component the documentation that should be prepared in order to ensure the transfer of lessons learnt to national and local partners and within the UN system. This strategy describes: (1) actions to be taken by the local authorities and Civil Society organizations in the continuation of the intervention, and (2) potential sources of financing to continue. The strategy, however, had some limitations. For instance, **with the exception of LPDC, this strategy was not prepared in consultation with national and local partners. Moreover, no action plan, dissemination plan, or implementation plan took following the preparation of the strategy.**

128. **Challenges:** (1) Although CBOs in Akkar will continue their on-going activities; they will lack the resources to undertake similar projects. The facilitating role of the UNDP (or other agencies) will be also needed to ensure that the dialogue process continues; (2) the Regional Working Groups will probably not continue their activities after the JP; (3) sustainability of the microcredit and business management activities facilitated by Al Majmoua could have improved if the credit products delivered by Al Majmoua were customized to agricultural activities; (4) the conflict prevention training activities delivered by MSL with funds from UNDP and UNICEF cannot continue without funding from external sources.

129. **Contributions:** (1) Al Majmoua plans to continue its activities in the Akkar area but with products adapted to the specific needs in the region. (2) The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the cooperatives and UNDP organises the relationship after the end of the JP, where UNDP will provide follow-up through the North Lebanon Regional Development Project. (3) UNDP has recently developed a new project document for continuing the support provided to the LPDC. (4) The UNDP ART GOLD development project will continue the support being provided to the two cooperatives in Akkar in cooperation with LEDA (Local Economic Development Agency) that UNDP is supporting.

130. **Support of national and/or local institutions to the JP:** The JP was received and treated with different ranges of support by the national, and public, local institutions. While the CDR, the MoEHE and the majority of the schools showed high level of activity and support to the JP, the commitment of MoA,

and the MoL was weak. The fragile commitment of the MoL probably because activities related to the promotion of the Labour Rights of Palestinians were adversely affected by the uncertainty around the approval or not of the national decree affecting this issue.

### **Capacity Development of national and local partners**

131. **Capacity Development programme for CBOs/NGOs working with youth in the North of Lebanon:** Participants assessed the quality of the training sessions as good or very good. Issues covered: reproductive health, characterization of the youth, characterization of the North region, rights of the youth in the North, life skills, animation and group dynamics, problems faced by the youth.

132. **Capacity Development of Popular Committees in Naher el-Bared and Beddawi camps project:** The training initially designed by UNRWA for the Popular Committee in NBC was totally rejected. After reshaping the training and conducting its activities the members of the Popular Committee felt satisfied with the progresses. The topics covered by the training sessions were: introduction to international law, introduction to Human Rights law, introduction to protection and role of UNRWA, refugees law, gaps in the protection of the Palestinian refugees, Lebanese-Palestinian relations between past and present, introduction to gender equality, introduction to psychosocial support and role of community during emergencies, leadership and representation, conflict resolution, team building and team work, effective communication, negotiation skills, and conflict prevention.

133. **Capacity Development of the MoEHE:** The MoEHE highlighted the great quality of the capacity building activities delivered to teachers and assessed the experience as highly sustainable. For instance, the teachers who were trained as trainers of trainers (ToT), will play an important role as they will be part of a pilot project in fifty schools all along the country. The importance of this project is that it would eventually escalated at a national level if new funding arrived. Also, trained teachers will participate in a new programme promoted by European Union on Peace Building.

134. **Capacity Development of Al Majmoua:** The JP, through ILO, funded the participation of four members (three of which graduated) of Al Majmoua's staff in the course "Making Finance Work for Managers", which aims to train students to be ToT in the Arab area in matters related to business management. Furthermore Al Majmoua mentioned during the interview that the programme has allowed them to expand their business to the Akkar area, where the institution now plans to open a branch in the area.

135. Capacity Development of the personnel related to the olive sector in Higher and Middle Dreib and Sahel funded by UNDP and ILO: Most trainees classified the degree of response to their expectations to be above the average and more 18/22 for the Higher Dreib, 10/12 for the Middle Dreib and 22/24 for the Sahel. These good results do not guarantee a positive impact since the context in the area will probably have higher influence than the capacity building delivered to 70 people in the future development and sustainability of the olive sector in the area, but obviously, they have to be considered as a positive direct effect of the programme on the population of the targeted areas..

### 2.3.3. Impact

#### **Processes promoted by the JP that can be considered as catalyst of CPPB dynamics in the targeted areas**

136. All the CPPB activities addressing the youth have to be considered as catalysts of positive dynamics oriented to minimize both conflict problems identified in the design and the ongoing conflict. Especially, the component developed by the MoEHE seems to have had a direct and quick impact on the attitudes of students in schools. The relevance of the intervention in schools supported by the programme has made the schools 'believe' in its necessity; also some changes in the behaviour of students considered as troublemakers were detected just after the training sessions.

137. For the first time there is documentation on an agreement between municipalities and the Popular Committees since 1948: The municipality and NBC Popular Committee signed a memorandum of understanding to organize and formalize the working relationship; although formal meetings don't seem to be continuing without the facilitating role of UNDP or another UN body.

138. The formation of the two cooperatives in Akkar was successful in cementing already existing working relationship between community leaders from the villages of the Sahel. The members of the newly established cooperatives had been in dialogue prior to the JP; however, the engagement of ILO and UNDP within the context of the JP facilitated and concretized the relationship into a very well designed and equipped common project. It is worth mentioning here that the title of the JP as CPPB might have been less relevant, as social relations in the Sahel were not tense or in conflict.



### **Positive effects on women and the youth**

139. UNRWA promoted the creation of groups of women and youth groups in NBC and Beddawi. Activities included training them on subjects such as journalism, proposal writing, community needs assessment; and the identification of a number of small projects at the community level with the intention of funding them. Regarding the later, participants in the focus group highlighted the intermittent nature of the collaboration with UNRWA that finally was interrupted because of the mentioned reallocation.

140. The youth from Bab El Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen are a remarkable example of working with excluded groups since very few of the participants in UNDP youth activities have ever participated in any other activity with NGOs. This is especially important considering that these activities were designed to address issues related to conflict resolution and peace building, something that most of these youth had not thought about before.

### **Contribution to increase stakeholder/citizen dialogue**

141. The Youth Dialogue Clubs created in seven schools (four Lebanese schools and three UNRWA schools) have promoted dialogue between Palestinian and Lebanese youth. Some Lebanese, visited the camps for the first time to participate in activities organized by these clubs.

142. Moreover, the cooperatives promoted by ILO are not only economic initiatives but also spaces of common interest where persons of different beliefs getting together. Seven municipalities are represented in a single cooperative.

143. In the opinion of the Mayor of Mohammara the activities funded by the programme and led by UNDP (bobcat and sewerage system) have created real dialogue between Palestinian and Lebanese; through the objective of alleviating harm from both neighbouring communities, the relations have eased between them. Working together to achieve a common good has proved to be effective in ‘normalizing’ the social relations.

144. **Direct influence of the JP in the capabilities of the LPDC:** (1) the JP has enhanced the reach of the LPDC by funding some positions through the component developed by UNDP; (2) UNESCO has trained LPDC social facilitators to work with the youth.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

#### 3.1. CONCLUSIONS ON THE DESIGN LEVEL

145. **Conclusion 1.** Internal coherence of the design seems to be correct since there is a direct relationship between the achievement of outputs and the attainment of the two outcomes. Also the combination of the two outcomes seems to be conducive to CPPB in North Lebanon. However an in depth assessment of the internal consistency of the design would require to study how the analysis of alternatives was performed (information not available).

146. **C2.** The M&E framework does not meet basic requirements to be able to measure with accuracy the level of progress towards planned results. Additionally, the M&E framework cannot be considered as gender sensitive. The low technical quality of the indicators and baseline has been an important limitation to perform accurate monitoring and evaluation. Finally, there are no joint indicators, where the progress to each indicator has only contribution from one agency. This separation suggests that the design was not a joint work; rather it took the form of a set projects separately developed and independently implemented by the different agencies. This situation was not modified during the reshaping of the programme.

147. **C3.** The multi-dimensional reasons for the reshaping, which are complex and difficult to analyze by an external evaluation, seem sufficient to justify the modifications. Additionally the opportunity to reshape the programme probably could have been better used to adapt the programme to the reality. Finally, any re-shaping/reprogramming is an opportunity to revisit the indicators, enhance their quality (**SMART: Specific, Measurable, Accurate, Reliable, Time Bound**) and adapt them to reality, especially if such re-shaping occurs due to change in the situation/environment when the programme was designed.

148. **C4.** The reshaping process, though based on some assessments previously conducted, was not fully participative, since it only included consultation with national stakeholders in order to get their approval of the result of the process. There have been some exceptions to the previous statement: The MoEHE and Mouvement Sociale were invited by UNICEF to take part in the design or redesign processes; in addition LPDC was also heavily involved in the reshaping of the UNDP's component. It was also evident that the above-mentioned assessments did not include a gender perspective.

149. **C5.** The evaluation team couldn't find any information about the selection of participating agencies and national and local partners. The programme seems to have selected implementing NGOs through an

ad-hoc and informal manner relying on previous track record while missing forming such partnerships in an open and equal opportunity manner.

150. **C6.** The JP opted for direct implementation and several UN agencies have actually outsourced implementation by subcontracting national and local NGOS. In this scenario the real value added by the agencies is seriously diminished. In this modality the real value added by the agencies could be reduced to becoming funding and coordinating bodies. Additionally selection processes were not always applied to decide which implementing partners were the most suitable to be subcontracted by the agencies.

151. **C7.** The whole programme has to be considered as a contribution to Human Rights and equity because of the living conditions of targeted population. Gender mainstreaming is covered by the third output of the first outcome in isolation from the rest of the programme. The second output of the first outcome is dedicated to the promotion of Palestinian Labour Rights, although there is not a contribution to the improvement of labour standards. Finally, the design does not include M&E indicators to measure progress in these four areas.

152. **C8.** It the programme did not include actions and objectives related to upstream intervention such as influencing public policies and legal frameworks regarding CPPB.<sup>20</sup>

153. **C9.** The programme has not reached women and youth following a defined strategy, but mostly through different activities independently implemented from different approaches depending on the agency involved.

154. **C10.** The programme has a clear contribution to MDG1 and is linked to MDG3. Alignment with UNDAF Lebanon 2010-2014 can be assessed as very consistent.

### 3.2. CONCLUSIONS ON THE PROCESS LEVEL

155. **C11.** External factors have been undoubtedly a source of difficulties, but very probably some **internal factors** have had even greater influence in the development of the programme. Probably the most important among these internal were: **(1)** low efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making processes (lack of a clear leadership to make operational decisions); **(2)** time-consuming procurement procedures; **(3)** difficulties in the communication and coordination among staff in the field and

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<sup>20</sup> Probably the instable political situation during the design contributed to the “low political profile” of the design.

management structures in Beirut.

156. **C12.** The programme was conceived to be implemented in an area of extreme volatility within a general context of political instability. Some of the issues that turned to adversely affect the development of activities were identified in the original and reshaped designs but no alternative strategies were defined in that case of identified risks.

157. **C13.** The management model that was based on a NSC, PMC together with a Programme Coordinator and coordination meetings seems necessary and sufficient to manage a programme of this nature, but faced some difficulties in the practical functioning of this model. In specific, the lack of a clear authority to make timely operational decisions and the limited efficiency of the PMC have transformed this theoretically adequate model into an inefficient one. Such inefficiency was evident particularly during the first half of the programme, with some improvement in its last part, facilitating the extension of the programme and its reshaping.

158. **C14.** There has not been a real joint implementation. The partners have implemented parallel interventions multiplying efforts and the JP has been perceived by national partners as a fragmented group of activities.

159. **C15.** Coordination, communication and information flows could have been better at all levels, among agencies, among national partners and among agencies and national partners. Poor coordination and communication were mentioned in the NSC meeting held on 26 July 2011 but it seems that the situation was not adequately addressed or resolved. The agencies weakness in working jointly can only experience a transformation in the long term through programmes of this kind. .

160. **C16.** There have been some overlaps among national partners; and also among agencies. Examples of overlap include UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP which have funded similar activities in schools and sometimes even through the same implementing partners; UNDP and ILO which have supported similar activities during the creation of the two cooperatives in Akkar.

161. **C17.** There has been a limited synergy, especially in the beginning, with other ongoing interventions and programmes led by UN and national institutions. After the issue was discussed during the NSC held on 26 July 2011 the situation improved through initiatives such as enhancing coordination with the LEDA and the launching of the ART GOLD, both initiatives promoted by UNDP.

162. **C18.** Despite the NSC was not very active during the first phase of implementation it seems that it played its role adequately, resolving those issues that were raised by the PMC. On the other hand, the PMC has not dedicated much time to profoundly discuss strategic topics and make decisions according to the debates focusing more on administrative issues. Also, the NSC and the PMC have dedicated most of the meetings to deal with very similar issues, so the combination of both instances has not been efficient.

163. **C19.** The NSC recommended the agencies to improve coordination and communication and to approach beneficiaries in a more coherent way (NSC held on 26 July 2011) but no specific measures to enhance Delivering as One (One Leader, One Budget and One Office) were issued by the NSC. The PMC has made some decisions conducive to the principles of Delivering as One, such as the creation of a coordination budget.

164. **C20.** The role played by the RCO in facilitating and promoting coordination among agencies and joint reporting has surely enhanced interagency harmonization and helped to move towards Delivering as One.

165. **C21.** The NSC has promoted national ownership in the process by recommending agencies to consult with the Government counterparts before undertaking major changes to the programme (NSC held on 26 July 2011). The participation of national counterparts in the PMC has not met the desired quality, with a low capacity to influence in decision-making or important processes like the modification of the design. Probably, the poor levels of ownership, especially in the design phase, have had an influence in the mentioned low quality participation.

166. **C22.** Joint reporting has been done by compiling individual reports. The mid-term evaluation was quite useful and it can be stated that the JP has not implemented a proper M&E system since the low technical quality of indicators, baseline and targets has made it not viable.

167. **C23.** The decision of reallocating funds to expand the Martyrs Cemetery, create the Claims and Appeals System and the reconstruction database in NBC has had a negative effect on some of the beneficiaries: The persons who participated in the trainings and workshops aimed at identifying small scale projects at the community level that were never implemented because the mentioned reallocation of funds felt frustrated after investing time and efforts. Besides, the three new activities, although conducive

to CPPB in NBC, are not part of the whole process promoted by UNRWA within the framework of the JP and should have been conducted as a part of a different project.

168. **C24.** Almost all the key actions included in the Improvement Plan were applied. However, a couple of issues were not completely addressed: **(1)** The improvement of the involvement of national partners in the PMC meetings: the role played by the MoL and MoA has been rather reduced; **(2)** activities related to the promotion of the labour rights<sup>21</sup> of the Palestinians were not implemented because of the delay in the approval of the national decree to implement the new Labour Law, situation discussed during PMC meetings that could have been prevented through a better reformulation of the concerned activities during the reshaping process.

169. **C25.** Financial progress has been somewhat concentrated in the last year of implementation with a slow pace of implementation during the two first years. Additionally, only UNICEF has disbursed its corresponding total budget approved. UNDP's final financial status was not available at the end of the final evaluation process.

### 3.3. CONCLUSIONS ON THE RESULTS LEVEL

170. **C26.** Approximately 72% (26 out of 36) of the expected targets were achieved, while 10 expected targets were not achieved or not measured. This percentage has to be considered indicative given the difficulty of measuring a number of goals. Among the targets that were not achieved it's worth highlighting that: **(1)** The dissemination of information related to new labour law among Lebanese employers, Palestinian workers, and local authorities was not possible because of the delay in the approval of the national decree to implement the new Labour Law. **(2)** The planned percentage of girls involved in some activities was not reached. **(3)** The design and implementation of two local initiatives based on a participatory approach between PCs and community representatives (Led by UNRWA) was not possible because of the reallocation of funds to the expansion of the Martyrs Cemetery and the creation of the NBC Complaints and Appeals system. **(4)** Targets concerning Output 6 (A Media Campaign to Raise Lebanese-Palestinian issues conducted) were not reached because the corresponding activities were changed into the refurbishment of the DPRA.

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<sup>21</sup> The Secretariat of the MDG-F required some further explanations about the status of the related activities in the no-cost extension memo sent to the UNRCO in Lebanon on the 12<sup>th</sup> December 2011.

171. **C27.** Ownership of the programme has been negatively affected by the (1) choice of the direct implementation modality, which leaves the control of the programme to UN agencies; and by the (2) lack of participation of national and local stakeholders during the design phase.

172. **C28.** Mutual accountability: Information sharing about the situation of the funds has been weak, although information was available upon request. The support provided to the Tripoli Initiative has hampered mutual accountability<sup>22</sup>.

173. **C29.** The JP has not been developed as a coherent and compact intervention but as set of fragmented activities.

174. **C30.** The JP seems to have had minimal visibility as a joint UN initiative where partners have limited knowledge of the joint nature of the programme. This situation is especially acute in Tripoli and Akkar. Additionally, partners and beneficiaries have not been reached by any activity or materials corresponding to Communication and Advocacy Strategy and even don't know about the existence of this strategy.

175. **C31.** The actions taken to ensure sustainability, namely capacity building and the formulation of an Exit and Sustainability Strategy, can be assessed as very relevant, although some important national and local partners did not participate in definition of the strategy and have not received any information about it since it was approved<sup>23</sup>.

176. **C32.** Sustainability of the achieved results will largely depend on the commitment of the Government and concerned municipal authorities in a scenario of low national and local ownership, so sustainability of a good number of components is not guaranteed without external support.

177. **C33.** The JP has had an interesting contribution to Capacity Development at the grass roots level while the effects on Capacity Development at the national level, basically concentrated in the MoEHE, could have been more ambitious.

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<sup>22</sup> The Paris Declaration mentions literally in the section dedicated to Mutual Accountability that "Donors commit to: Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.

<sup>23</sup> The Secretariat of the MDG-F recommended following up to key actions required to ensure sustainability in the no-cost extension memo sent to the UNRCO in Lebanon on the 12<sup>th</sup> December 2011.

178. **C34.** Processes promoted by the JP that may have a positive impact on CPPB in the long term: (1) The JP has managed to create some entry points to promote CPPB in the North. (2) CPPB activities addressed towards the youth can be considered as catalysts of positive dynamics oriented to minimize both conflict problems identified in the design and the ongoing conflict. (3) For the first time there is documentation on an agreement between municipalities and the Popular Committees since 1948. (4) For the first time some women have been accepted as members of Popular Committees.

179. **C35.** Processes promoted by the programme that may have a positive effect on CPPB in the short term: (1) The members of the Popular Committee in NBC recognize that the JP has showed them the need to be open to the UN System and international donors. (2) The formation of the two cooperatives in Akkar was successful in cementing already existing working relationship between community leaders from the villages of the Sahel. (3) The expansion of the Martyrs Cemetery seems to have had contributed to smooth tensions among the population of the camp. (4) The creation of a Claims and Appeals System to allow NBC inhabitants to raise their concerns related to the conduction of the reconstruction of the camp has helped to solve a number of the conflicts among neighbours and between neighbours and the UNRWA linked to the size of the houses, design of the houses, etc.

180. **C36.** The programme has had a very minimal influence on shaping or re-shaping public policies, regulations, norms and standards: Just the contribution to the Civic Education text books by mainstreaming gender and conflict prevention topics developed by the MoEHE.

181. **C37.** The JP has had an interesting contribution to promote dialogue on CPPB among different collectives at the grass roots level, especially among Palestinian and Lebanese youth; while effects on dialogue at a larger scale have been limited to enhance the scope of the work of the LPCD.

182. **C38.** Given that much of the conflicts are rooted in the struggle for resources it seems clear that development interventions do contribute to CPPB. In addition, the JP has shown that bringing together different communities to implement practical tasks of common interest facilitates dialogue and promotes mutual understanding.



## 4. GOOD PRACTICES, SUCCESS STORIES AND LESSONS LEARNED

### Good practices

183. **National policy.** Probably the most interesting initiative promoted by the JP is the collaboration with the MoEHE, consisting of mainstreaming gender and conflict prevention concepts in text books for Civic Education and training teachers as ToT on this issues. This initiative did not require a great investment of funds and is highly replicable, sustainable and scalable. Moreover, this has been a good example of up streaming knowledge and experiences from the schools level to the modification of the curricula at a national level.

184. **Joint programme.** The JP has successfully managed reallocations of funds among agencies through inter agency contracts whenever funds from several agencies has been required to finance a certain activity or position.

185. **Success stories: (1) Local intervention.** The Social Media Training delivered by UNESCO to the youth transforming a computer training into a complete social media training. The teachers were trained by UNDP. **(2) National partner.** UNDP has promoted within the LPDC a new way of working not only focusing on policies but also having a presence in the field. The LPDC visited the camps for the first time in the context of the JP. **(3) Local intervention.** Some gender issues have been addressed by UNFPA when working in very conservative communities: Gender Based Violence and early marriage. **(4) Local interventions.** To sit down together different factions to discuss practical issues affecting the quality of living conditions has been successful to promote dialogue.

### Lessons learned

186. **Joint programme.** The design has to be based on solid evidence and involve all relevant stakeholders from the very beginning. Objectives of both the initial and the modified design have been too ambitious.

187. **Joint programme.** Support to activities, as those related to the Tripoli Initiative, that for any reason require not reporting and/or not sharing information should not be part of an international cooperation programme since the principle of mutual accountability is seriously damaged.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>24</sup>

### 5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DESIGN LEVEL

188. **Recommendation 1. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** It's recommended to hire a person or team specializing in programme design and with the ability to define monitoring indicators for conflict and gender sensitive issues and to facilitate a joint design process. Some alternatives to hiring external personnel, depending on the particularities of each situation, could be to assign the facilitation of the design to the RCO or to a combined team formed by a representative of the RCO and representatives of the leading agency and the main national partner. In all cases it would be advisable to implement quality assurance measures at the national level to guarantee the technical quality and relevance of the products of the design phase.

189. **R2. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** Every design should be based on solid evidence and reliable data referring to the context of intervention and the institutions and persons affected. Participatory assessments, with a fully inclusive approach of all groups and communities;, are strongly recommended before or during the design stage. This type of work has to be done by a person or team with adequate expertise in the application of participatory assessment tools as well as conflict and gender analysis tools.

190. **R3. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** Also a higher involvement of the RCO and the heads of the agencies during the design could have an interesting contribution to joint programming.

191. **R4. MDG-F Secretariat. Future joint programmes (P1).** It's recommended to extend to approximately six months the time between the approval of concept notes and the endorsement by the Secretariat of the final design of joint programmes to allow partners to conduct the assessments and studies required to properly design interventions. Also the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UNDOCO) could be an interesting resource to guide design phases.

192. **R5. MDG-F Secretariat (P3).** CPPB dialogue processes cannot be properly addressed within reduced time frames; two or three years are not enough for this kind of dialogues. It's recommended to consider CPPB programmes including the promotion of dialogues on conflict prevention and peace building as special cases that need more time than other programmes to achieve some relevant results.

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<sup>24</sup> **NOTE:** P1: highest priority; P2: regular priority; P3: lowest priority

193. **R6. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** Systematic selection processes open to equal opportunity to determine implementing partners are highly recommended.

194. **R7. Future joint programmes (P1).** The national implementation modality is recommended in every case as the first option in order to improve national leadership and ownership: time frames and activities planning should take into account any potential restrictions associated to governmental bureaucratic procedures if necessary. In case direct implementation was a better option because of special constraints, it's recommended to include in the design activities related to capacity development to ensure that expertise of the agencies is transferred to the extent possible to national and local counterparts and also to the implementing partners when some of the components are outsourced. Additionally, selection processes to subcontract implementing partners are highly recommended in order to improve transparency, efficiency and quality.

195. **R8. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** Since joint programmes involve the efforts and capacities of several agencies and national stakeholders it's advisable to take advantage of the added value of each partner and their synergy to plan targets usually out of the reach of conventional interventions. Examples include effects on policymaking, legal frameworks, regulations, norms and standards. Also activities aimed at creating upstream effects on public policies, legal frameworks and regulations are advisable.

196. **R9. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** It's recommended to involve a strong strategic national partner linked to the work in gender equity during the design and implementation in order to produce some sustainable effects on gender-based gaps and inequities across all interventions. Also it is recommended to introduce some quality assurance measures to ensure that the implementation respects commitments regarding gender issues is recommended: a committee including the mentioned strategic national partner and the agencies with a gender expertise participating in the intervention could be an interesting way to facilitate this quality assurance.

197. **R10. UN agencies (P1).** It's strongly recommended to actively involve all relevant stakeholders and the beneficiaries in the design or redesign of any intervention. Such process will help in creating ownership, which is an obligatory requisite to attain for successful implementation and later sustainability. Also, main national stakeholders need to be involved in the programmes with a clear and specific role to

prevent situations occurred in the CPPB programme: the Ministry of Labour has played a minor role and so has the Ministry of Agriculture.

## 5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROCESS LEVEL

198. **R11. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** During the design of any intervention a risks and assumptions assessment has to be conducted and alternative implementation options have also to be designed to react in case of negative influence of identified risks. Also, the risks assessment has to consider whether the intervention is feasible or not.

199. **R12. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** It is likely that in difficult and volatile contexts and especially when an intervention is innovative to some extent and addresses sensitive issues it can be advisable to design pilot interventions that are focused geographically and that would address a reasonable number of issues to eventually replicate and/or scale up after assessing their success. In fact, some components of the CPPB programme have been pilot interventions but implemented from different approaches and geographically dispersed.

200. **R13. MDG-F Secretariat (P2).** It would be interesting to make more flexible the disbursement scheme to allow agencies that reach faster than others the required 70% of spending continuing implementation.

201. **R14. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** A national implementation model with a clear national leader with authority to make operational decisions would be advisable to make implementation more efficient and obviously promoting national ownership. Another option would be to include among the functions of the PMC the capability to make decisions related to technical and operational oversight and coordination. Also, a combination of the two mentioned schemes could be interesting.

202. **R15. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** A higher involvement of the heads of the agencies at the strategic level through the NSC could improve agencies' commitment to joint programmes.

203. **R16. Partners of future joint programmes (P1).** Special care has to be taken during the design phase to avoid overlapping mandates, activities and type of activities among the different partners. Defining a set of criteria based on value added could help to decide which agencies and national partners are the most suitable ones in each case and to involve the minimum number of partners required for better efficiency.

204. **R17. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** The PMC, since it is the most relevant coordination body for joint implementation, should devote time and efforts to substantive discussions about the programme and the adopted approaches.

205. **R18. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** It's recommended, to address traditionally excluded groups and to use specific analysis tools during the design phase to get a real understanding of their needs and priorities. Listening to the needs of these groups is paramount as they don't have the means nor the opportunity to express their demands.

### 5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE RESULTS LEVEL

206. **R19. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** It would be advisable to make some efforts in transmitting an image of the JP as a compact intervention through the development of a communication strategy from the very beginning highlighting the joint nature of the intervention from the very beginning. This would increase the feeling of joint programming among partners and also would contribute to reach people with unified messaging.

207. **R20. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** Sustainability needs to be built since the design phase by guaranteeing a quality participation of national and local stakeholders because sustainability is extremely difficult to be promoted from poor ownership in the design.

208. **R20. Partners of future joint programmes (P2).** Sustainability strategies and plans need to be defined with the implication of all relevant stakeholders and have to be widely disseminated to be able to attain their main objective, which is promoting continuity of the benefits delivered and because in most cases sustainability relies on national and local partners' commitment.

## I. Evaluation Matrix

CRITERIA	KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS	SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTIONS	INFORMATION SOURCES AND TOOLS	CODE
<b>DESIGN LEVEL</b>				
	R2. To what extent joint programming was the best option to respond to development and conflict challenges stated in the programme document?	To what extent joint programming was the best option to respond to development and conflict challenges stated in the programme document?	Programme documentation	<b>R2</b>
	R3. To what extent the implementing partners participating in the JP had an added value to overcome the development and conflict challenges stated in the programme document?	To what extent the implementing partners and UN agencies participating in the JP had an added value to overcome the development and conflict challenges stated in the programme document?	Programme documentation	<b>R31</b>
		What is the specific added value of your agency to the process?	Interview UN agencies	<b>R32</b>
	R4. Quality of the monitoring and evaluation framework.	Quality of the monitoring and evaluation framework.	Programme documentation	<b>R4</b>
	R5-2. If the programme was revised, did it reflect the changes that were needed?	What were the reasons for the reshaping?	Programme documentation	<b>R5-21</b>
			Interview JP team	
			Interview implementing partners	
			Interview UN agencies	
		How participative was the reshaping process?	Programme documentation	<b>R5-22</b>
			Interview JP team	
			Interview implementing partners	
			Interview UN agencies	

	R6. What is the relevance in relation to the equity approach, as well as foundation strategies such as the Human Rights based approach to programming, and Gender Mainstreaming?	What is the relevance in relation to the equity approach, as well as foundation strategies such as the Human Rights based approach to programming and Gender Mainstreaming?	Programme documentation	<b>R6</b>
	R7. What does the literature and current experience suggest about the appropriateness of the proposed strategy? How did the strategy address the key issues affecting worst-off groups?	What does the literature and current experience suggest about the appropriateness of the proposed strategy? How did the strategy address the key issues affecting worst-off groups?	Programme documentation	<b>R7</b>
		R8. What do you think of using development as a conflict prevention tool (roughly, is there a peace dividend)?	Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	<b>R8</b>
	R9. To what extent was the design and strategy of the development intervention relevant (assess including link to MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities, stakeholder participation, national ownership design process)?	To what extent was the design and strategy of the development intervention relevant (assess including link to MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities, stakeholder participation, national ownership design process)?	Programme documentation	<b>R91</b>
		What workshops were conducted in order to design the JP and who participated in them?	Interview implementing partners Interview local authorities	<b>R92</b>
<b>PROCESS LEVEL</b>				
<b>EFFICIENCY</b>	EFFI1. To what extent did the JP's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management) was efficient in comparison to the results attained?	How would you improve the efficiency of the management model (instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management)?	Interview implementing partners Interview JP team Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI11</b>
		How would you improve efficiency of the work carried out in collaboration with NGOs, CBOs, municipalities, etc.?	Interview implementing partners Interview JP team	<b>EFFI12</b>

	EFFI2. To what extent was the implementation of a joint programme intervention (group of agencies) more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency's intervention?	To what extent was the implementation of a joint programme intervention (group of agencies) more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency's intervention?	Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	<b>EFFI21</b>
		Which aspects of the NSC have been efficient and which could be improved in terms of efficiency?	Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI22</b>
			Programme documentation	
		Which aspects of the PMC have been efficient and which could be improved in terms of efficiency?	Interview JP team	<b>EFFI23</b>
			Programme documentation	
		What specific measures has the NSC promoted to Deliver as One?	Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI24</b>
			Programme documentation	
		What specific measures has the PMC promoted to Deliver as One?	Interview JP team	<b>EFFI25</b>
			Programme documentation	
		How has the NSC promoted ownership of the process?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI26</b>
			Interview UN agencies	
		How has the PMC promoted ownership of the process?	Interview JP team	<b>EFFI27</b>
			Interview UN agencies	
			Programme documentation	
			Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	
		Could you mention a clear example of how the NSC	Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI28</b>



		has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?	Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	
		Could you mention a clear example of how the PMC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?	Interview JP team Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI29</b>
	EFFI3. To what extent and in what ways did the joint programme increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes, especially for the most marginalized?	How efficient has been the JP in reaching traditionally excluded collectives such as women, the youth and minorities and how the JO could have improved this?	Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to women groups, young participants and minorities.	<b>EFFI31</b>
			Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	
			Programme documentation	
		What would you improve to increase efficiency when working several agencies jointly?	Interview JP team Interview UN agencies	<b>EFFI32</b>
	EFFI4. To what extent has the programme been implemented, monitored and evaluated jointly?	What mechanisms have been implemented to take decisions jointly among all agencies and institutions involved in the JP and how their performance could have been improved?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI41</b>
			Interview implementing partners	
			Interview UN agencies	
		What joint M&E tools and mechanisms have been used and how these could be improved to have a more useful, functional and reliable the M&E strategy to measure development results?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI42</b>
			Interviews JP team	
			Interview UN agencies	
	EFFI5. What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices	What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices have the implementing p	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI5</b>

	has the implementing partners used to increase efficiency in delivering as one?	partners used to increase efficiency in delivering as one and how could these be improved?	Interview JP team	
			Interview UN agencies	
			Interview implementing partners	
	EFFI6. What type of (administrative, financial and managerial) obstacles did the joint programme face and to what extent have this affected its efficiency?	What obstacles (administrative, financial and managerial) did the JP face and to what extent have they affected efficiency?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI6</b>
			Interview JP team	
			Interview UN agencies	
			Interview implementing partners	<b>EFFI7</b>
	EFFI7. To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation have an impact on the joint programme? Was it useful? Did the joint programme implement the improvement plan? If not, what were the bottlenecks?	Did the JP implement the improvement plan? If not, what were the bottlenecks?	Programme documentation	
			Interview JP team	
		How would you assess the support received from your HQ?	Interview JP team	<b>EFFI8</b>
	EFFI9. What was the progress of the JP in financial terms, indicating amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts & as percentage of total) by agency? Where there are large discrepancies between agencies, these should be analyzed.	What was the progress of the JP in financial terms, indicating amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts & as percentage of total) by agency? Where there are large discrepancies between agencies, these should be analyzed	Programme documentation	<b>EFFI9</b>
<b>OWNERSHIP IN THE PROCESS</b>	OP2. To what extent and in what ways has ownership or the lack of it, impacted in the efficiency and effectiveness of the joint programme?	To what extent and in what ways has ownership or the lack of it, impacted on the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP?	Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	<b>OP2</b>

	OP3. To what extent did the JP contribute to the understanding by the local and national partners of the principles of the Paris Declaration&Accra Agenda for Action?	What do you know about the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action? Were these principles implemented?	Interview implementing partners	<b>OP3</b>
	OP4. To what extent the JP was designed and implemented following the Do No Harm Approach?	To what extent the JP was designed and implemented following the Do No Harm Approach?	Programme documentation Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	<b>OP4</b>
<b>RESULTS LEVEL</b>				
<b>EFFECTIVENESS</b>	EFPE1. To what extent did the joint programme contribute to the attainment of peace building and conflict prevention outputs and outcomes initially expected /stipulated in the programme document?	Where expected results achieved?	Programme documentation	<b>EFPE1</b>
	EFPE2. To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to the goals set by the thematic window?	To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to the goals set by the thematic window?	Programme documentation	<b>EFPE2</b>
	EFPE3. To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to improve the implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?	To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to improve the implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?	Programme documentation	<b>EFPE3</b>
			COMPLEMENTED BY OP3 Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	
	EFPE4. To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to the goals of Delivering as One at the country level?	To what extent and in what ways did the JP contribute to the goals of Delivering as One at the country level?	Programme documentation Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process. COMPLEMENTED BY EFFI24 AND EFFI25	<b>EFPE4</b>

	EFFE5. To what extent were joint programme's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent to produce development results?	To what extent were joint programme's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent to produce development results?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFE5</b>
	EFFE6. Have any good practices, success stories, lessons learned or transferable examples been identified? Please describe and document them.	What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, transferable or scalable practice?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFE6</b>
			Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to women groups, young participants and minorities.	
			Interview JP team	
			Interview local authorities	
			Interview implementing partners	
			Interview UN agencies	
	EFFE7. To what extent has the communication strategy contributed to maximizing the visibility of the project's objectives at national and local levels?	Where all the planned activities implemented? To what extent has the communication strategy contributed to maximizing the visibility of the project's objectives at national and local levels?	Direct observation and/or analysis of data gathered during the whole evaluation process.	<b>EFFE71</b>
			National and local newspapers and other relevant media.	
			Interview JP team	
		Is the C&A strategy gender sensitive?	Programme documentation	<b>EFFE72</b>
<b>SUSTAINABILITY</b>	S1. To what extent the joint programme decision making bodies and implementing partners	Which are the main sustainability actions taken, with special attention to the effects on women, young people, minorities and other possible traditionally	Interview implementing partners	<b>S1</b>
			Interview JP team	

	have undertaken the necessary decisions and course of actions to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme and the impact on worst-off groups likely to continue when support is withdrawn?	excluded groups?	Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to groups women, young participants and minorities.	
	S2. To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?	To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?	Interview JP team Interview local authorities Interview UN agencies Interview implementing partners	<b>S2</b>
	S4. Did these institutions show technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme or to scale it up?	Do you think that your institution will be able to continue delivering the benefits provided by the programme without external support (technical and financial reasons)? Which joint mechanisms developed by the JP to address new conflicts will keep working in the future without external support; and how?	Interview local authorities Interview implementing partners	<b>S4</b>
	S5. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national and local partners?	What capacities have been created and/or reinforced in your institution through the support of the JP?	Interview implementing partners	<b>S5</b>
	S7. To what extent is the Exit and Sustainability Strategy known by the implementing partners?	Did your institution participate in the definition of the Exit and Sustainability Strategy? Do you know this strategy?	Interview local authorities Interview implementing partners	<b>S7</b>
<b>IMPACT</b>	I1. How much and in what ways did the JP contribute to minimize the conflict problems identified in the design phase and the ongoing conflict?	What processes promoted by the JP can be considered as catalysts for (1) minimizing the conflict problems identified in the design phase and ongoing conflict; and (2) promoting CPPB at local and national levels?	Programme documentation	<b>I1</b>
			Interview implementing partners	
			Interview JP team	

			Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to women groups, young participants and minorities.	
I2. To what extent did the joint programme had a n impact on the targeted marginalized communities?	What differentiated effects (expected, unexpected, positive and negative) attributable to the JP on the participating population according to sex, race, and ethnic group, rural or urban setting can you highlight?	Programme documentation	Interview implementing partners	<b>I2</b>
		Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to women groups, young participants and minorities.		
		Interview JP team		
I3. To what extent has the joint programme contributed to the advancement and the progress of fostering national ownership processes and outcomes (the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc.)	What are the main effects (expected and unexpected) of the JP, and clearly attributable to the JP, on the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc.?	Programme documentation	Interview JP team	<b>I3</b>
I4. To what extent did the joint programme help to increase stakeholder/citizen dialogue and or engagement on development issues and policies?	Can you mention dialogue instances created or promoted by the JP about development issues and policies and their main achievements attributable to the support of the JP?	Interview local authorities	Interview implementing partners	<b>I41</b>
		Interview UN agencies	Interview participants/Focus groups with special attention to women groups, young participants and minorities.	
	How has the JP directly influenced in the capabilities of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC)?	Interview UN agencies	LPDC	<b>I42</b>

## II. Interview guides

### QUESTIONNAIRE UN AGENCIES

**Location:**  
**Name:**  
**Male Female**  
**Institution:**  
**Role in the programme:**

**RELEVANCE:** The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals

1. R32. What is the specific added value of your agency to the process?
2. R5-21. What were the reasons for the reshaping?
3. R5-22. How participative was the reshaping process?

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

4. EFFI11. How would you improve the efficiency of the management model (instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management)?
5. EFFI22. Which aspects of the NSC have been efficient and which could be improved in terms of efficiency?
6. EFFI24. What specific measures has the NSC promoted to Deliver as One?
7. EFFI26. How has the NSC promoted ownership of the process?
8. EFFI28. Could you mention a clear example of how the NSC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?
9. EFFI29. Could you mention a clear example of how the PMC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?
10. EFFI32. What would you improve to increase efficiency when working several agencies jointly?
11. EFFI41. What mechanisms have been implemented to take decisions jointly among all agencies and institutions involved in the JP and how their performance could have been improved?
12. EFFI42. What joint M&E tools and mechanisms have been used and how these could be improved to have a more useful, functional and reliable the M&E strategy to measure development results?

- 13. EFFI5.** What types of work methodologies, financial instruments and business practices have the implementing partners used to increase efficiency in Delivering as One and how could these be improved?
- 14. EFFI6.** What obstacles (administrative, financial and managerial) did the JP face and to what extent have they affected efficiency?

**EFFECTIVENESS:** Extent to which objectives of the development intervention have been achieved

- 15. EFFE6.** What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, and transferable or scalable practice?

**SUSTAINABILITY:** Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term

- 16. S2.** To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?

**IMPACT:** Effects (expected, non-expected, positive and negative) of the JP

- 17. I41.** Can you mention dialogue instances created or promoted by the JP about development issues and policies and their main achievements attributable to the support of the JP?
- 18. I42.** How has the JP directly influenced in the capabilities of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC)?



## QUESTIONNAIRE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

**Location:**  
**Name:**  
**Male   Female**  
**Institution:**  
**Role in the programme:**

Addressing conflict prevention and peace building would require multifaceted approach for the complexity of the subject; what can you tell us about your experience with the JP.

**EFFECTIVENESS:** Extent to which objectives of the development intervention have been achieved

1. EFFE6. What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, and as transferable or scalable practice?

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

2. EFFI1. To what extent did the JP's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management) was efficient in comparison to the results attained?

**RELEVANCE:** The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals

3. R92. Have you participated in the design phase of the JP; have you been consulted or participated in order to design the JP?
4. R8. What do you think of using development as a conflict prevention tool (roughly, is there a peace dividend)?

**SUSTAINABILITY:** Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term

5. S5. What capacities have been created and/or reinforced in your institution through the support of the JP?
6. S2. To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?
7. S4. Do you think that your institution will be able to continue delivering the benefits provided by the programme without external support (technical and financial reasons)? Which joint mechanisms developed by the JP to address new conflicts will keep working in the future without external support; and how?

8. Did your institution participate in the definition of the Exit and Sustainability Strategy? What's your opinion of this strategy?

IMPACT: Effects (expected, non-expected, positive and negative) of the JP

9. I3. What are the main effects (expected and unexpected) of the JP, and clearly attributable to the JP, on the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc.?
10. I41. Can you mention dialogue instances created or promoted by the JP about development issues and policies and their main achievements attributable to the support of the JP?

## QUESTIONNAIRE JP TEAM

**Location:**

**Name:**

**Male Female**

**Institution:**

**Role in the programme:**

**RELEVANCE:** The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals

1. R5-21. What were the reasons for the reshaping?
2. R5-22. How participative was the reshaping process?

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

3. EFFI11. How would you improve the efficiency of the management model (instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management)?
4. EFFI23. Which aspects of the PMC have been efficient and which could be improved in terms of efficiency?
5. EFFI25. What specific measures has the PMC promoted to Deliver as One?
6. EFFI27. How has the PMC promoted ownership of the process?
7. EFFI29. Could you mention a clear example of how the PMC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?
8. EFFI32. What would you improve to increase efficiency when working several agencies jointly?
9. EFFI42. What joint M&E tools and mechanisms have been used and how these could be improved to have a more useful, functional and reliable the M&E strategy to measure development results?
10. EFFI5. What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices has the implementing partners used to increase efficiency in delivering as one and how could these be improved?
11. EFFI6. What obstacles (administrative, financial and managerial) did the JP face and to what extent have they affected efficiency?
12. EFFI8. How would you assess the support received from your HQ?

**EFFECTIVENESS:** Extent to which objectives of the development intervention have been achieved

13. EFFI7. Did the JP implement the improvement plan? If not, what were the bottlenecks?

14. EFFE6. What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, and transferable or scalable practice?
15. EFFE72. Where all the C&A planned activities implemented? To what extent has the communication strategy contributed to maximizing the visibility of the project's objectives at national and local levels?

**SUSTAINABILITY: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term**

16. S1. Which are the main sustainability actions taken, with special attention to the effects on women, young people, minorities and other possible traditionally excluded groups?
17. S2. To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?
18. I1. What processes promoted by the JP can be considered as catalysts for (1) minimizing the conflict problems identified in the design phase and the ongoing conflict; (2) promoting CPPB at local and national levels?
19. I2. What differentiated effects (expected, unexpected, positive and negative) attributable to the JP on the participating population according to sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting can you highlight?
20. I3. What are the main effects (expected and unexpected) of the JP, and clearly attributable to the JP, on the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc.?

## QUESTIONNAIRE/FOCUS GROUPS PARTICIPANTS

**Location:**  
**Name:**  
**Male Female**  
**Institution:**  
**Role in the programme:**

Addressing conflict prevention and peace building would require multifaceted approach for the complexity of the subject; what can you tell us about your experience with the JP.

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

1. EFFI31. How efficient has been the JP in reaching traditionally excluded collectives such as women, the youth and minorities and how the JO could have improved this?

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

2. EFFI1. To what extent did the JP's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management) was efficient in comparison to the results attained?

**RELEVANCE:** The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals

3. R92. Have you participated in the design phase of the JP; have you been consulted or participated in order to design the JP?

**EFFECTIVENESS:** Extent to which objectives of the development intervention have been achieved

4. EFFE6. What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, and transferable or scalable practice?

**IMPACT:** Effects (expected, non-expected, positive and negative) of the JP

5. I1. What processes promoted by the JP can be considered as catalysts for (1) minimizing the conflict problems identified in the design phase and the ongoing conflict; (2) promoting CPPB at local and national levels?
6. I2. What differentiated effects (expected, unexpected, positive and negative) attributable to the JP on the participating population according to sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting can you highlight?
7. I41. Can you mention dialogue instances created or promoted by the JP about development issues and policies and their main achievements attributable to the support of the JP?

SUSTAINABILITY: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term

8. S1. Which are the main sustainability actions taken, with special attention to the effects on women, young people, minorities and other possible traditionally excluded groups?

## QUESTIONNAIRE RCO

**Location:**  
**Name:**  
**Male Female**  
**Institution:**  
**Role in the programme:**

**RELEVANCE:** The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals

**19. R2.** To what extent joint programming was the best option to respond to development and conflict challenges stated in the programme document?

**20. R32.** What is the specific added value of your agency to the process?

**21. R5-21.** What were the reasons for the reshaping?

**22. R5-22.** How participative was the reshaping process?

**EFFICIENCY:** Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results

**23. EFFI11.** How would you improve the efficiency of the management model (instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision making in management)?

**24. EFFI22.** Which aspects of the NSC have been efficient and which could be improved in terms of efficiency?

**25. EFFI24.** What specific measures has the NSC promoted to Deliver as One? How would you assess the ability of the NSC to follow up its own recommendations?

**26. EFFI26.** How has the NSC promoted ownership of the process?

**27. EFFI28.** Could you mention a clear example of how the NSC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?

**28. EFFI29.** Could you mention a clear example of how the PMC has had a direct contribution to the attainment of expected results?

**29. EFFI32.** What would you improve to increase efficiency when working several agencies jointly?

**30. EFFI41.** What mechanisms have been implemented to take decisions jointly among all agencies and institutions involved in the JP and how their performance could have been improved?

**31. EFFI42.** What joint M&E tools and mechanisms have been used and how these could be improved to have a more useful, functional and reliable the M&E strategy to measure development results?

32. EFFI5. What types of work methodologies, financial instruments and business practices have the implementing partners used to increase efficiency in Delivering as One and how could these be improved?
33. EFFI6. What obstacles (administrative, financial and managerial) did the JP face and to what extent have they affected efficiency?

**EFFECTIVENESS: Extent to which objectives of the development intervention have been achieved**

34. EFFE3. How would you assess the coordination between the Programme and other donors will be managed through the UNRCO? Note: PMC 31 March 2010: The coordination between the Programme and other donors will be managed through the UNRCO.
35. EFFE6. What would you highlight as a good practice, a success story, lesson learned, and transferable or scalable practice?

**SUSTAINABILITY: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term**

36. S2. To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?

**IMPACT: Effects (expected, non-expected, positive and negative) of the JP**

37. I1. What processes promoted by the JP can be considered as catalysts for (1) minimizing the conflict problems identified in the design phase and the ongoing conflict; (2) promoting CPPB at local and national levels?
38. I41. Can you mention dialogue instances created or promoted by the JP about development issues and policies and their main achievements attributable to the support of the JP?
39. I42. How has the JP directly influenced in the capabilities of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC)?



### III. **List of persons interviewed** (by region)

#### Beirut

1. Ibrahim Abou. Senior Field Officer. Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC).
2. Amal Karaki. Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).
3. Walid Nasr. UNRCO.
4. Alexander Costy. Head of Office. UNRCO.
5. Shaza Al Jondi (UN Reform Programme Analyst), Ahmed Mroueh (National Consultant) and Reem Askar (Project Assistant). ILO.
6. Shombi Sharp (Deputy Country Director), Sanna Tasala (Programme Analyst Crisis Prevention and Recovery) and Indra El-Hoge (NBC-BC-Tripoli Area Project Coordinator). UNDP.
7. Hezagi Yaseen (Regional Programme Specialist of Basic Education and Adult Education in Arab States) and May Abou Ajram (Project Coordinator). UNESCO.
8. Karoum Abi Yazbeck. Project Manager. UNFPA.
9. Asma C. Kurdai. Assistant Representative. UNFPA.
10. Joseph Younes. Coordinator. MoEHE.
11. Mahmoud M. Zeidan (Project Officer) and Ghada Armali. UNRWA.
12. Manal Hassoun. Training Manager. Al Majmoua.
13. Abdullah Barake. National Institutions of Social Care and Vocational Training.

#### Tripoli

14. Abdel Menem Osman. Mayor of Mohammara.
15. Ms. Rola Ghamrawi. Ribat NGO, Beddawi.
16. Assad Abdel-Al, Jamal Faour, Ahmad Ayoub. Beddawi Youth Group.

#### Nahr El Bared Camp

17. UNRWA team in NBC.
18. Mr. Abou Salim Ghoneim. NBC Popular Committee (In addition to all members of NBC PC).
19. Ms. Manal Abdel-Al, Ms. Tharwat Al Amer, Ms. Nazira Hajj. NBC Women group.

20. Walid Mishlawi. NBC Youth Group.

#### Akkar

21. Mohamad Masri, Iskandar Iskandar, William Ibrahim. Sahel Coop.

22. Shaheer Mahmoud, Maan. Dreib Coop and Mayor of Kherbet Shar.

23. Corinne Sakr. World Vision Akkar – Women Group.

24. Hanan Sayed, Janan Khalil, Alia Shaaban. Akkar Women Group.