



# Evaluation Summary



International  
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Evaluation Unit

## *Sustained peace for development: Conflict prevention and peace-building in Sudan through targetted interventions – Mid Term Joint Evaluation*

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** *Sudan*

**Mid-Term Evaluation:** *Jan 2012*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *Independent*

**ILO Administrative responsibility:**  
*DWT/CO-Cairo*

**Technical Area:** *ILO-CRISIS*

**Evaluation Management:** *UNDP, joint IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, ILO, WHO, UNFPA, UN Women*

**Evaluation Team:** *Steve Munroe*

**Project Code:** *SUD/10/50/UND*

**Donor:** MDG Achievement Fund,  
*(US\$ 6,000,000) UNICEF lead*

IOM: 779,017 UNDP: 1,545,743

UNICEF: 1,157,285 FAO: 535,910

ILO: 724,860 WHO: 498,738

UNFPA: 362,169 UNIFEM: 396,278

**Keywords:** *Armed conflict, economic reconstruction, peace building, capacity building*

### Background & Context

The Sustained Peace for Development programme is a two and a half year, multi-agency project that is funded through the

Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F). Its primary aim is to promote peace building and effective conflict management in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan, by addressing capacity gaps in national peacebuilding institutions, and increasing security and peace dividends for communities in the target areas.

This mid-term evaluation was conducted in November-December 2011, with an in-country mission in early November 2011. It covers the first 18 months of implementation from January 2010-June 2011. For a variety of reasons, the progress and overall health of the JP is significantly lower than anticipated. Several areas have been identified where improvements can be made and are explained in detail in this report. Focus is put on looking forward, as the JP in South Sudan became its own project following secession in July 2011. Some of the main issues identified during the evaluation can be broadly grouped as follows:

1) **Coherence of Project Interventions:** Activities are conducted in isolation from each other, with little if any interagency planning and collaboration under the JP.

2) **Management Arrangements:** Since the JP split in July 2011 for the Northern component,

no NSC or PMC has been constituted, nor have JP agencies met in Juba in relation to the project. The focal point from UNDP as lead agency is responsible for 5 projects, and is therefore unable to fulfil the coordination or leadership role required.

**3) Ownership Issues:** Perhaps due to design issues or the fact that the Coordination Team was based in Khartoum, there has never been a great sense of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan. Once the Khartoum-based Coordination Team had no active role following secession, the project has been largely orphaned and running with no guidance, coordination or accountability.

**4) Interagency Coordination:** There is no active coordination of JP activities at the central level. Due to the reduced geographical coverage area of the JP, this has resulted in agencies engaging in overlapping and duplicative activities.

### Main Conclusions & Recommendations

A summary of conclusions and recommendations are as listed below. A discussion of possible ways forward for the JP in South Sudan can be found in paragraphs 72-76 in the main report.

**Conclusion 1:** The lack of a management structure for the JP in South Sudan in the last 6 months has created an ‘orphaned project’, where there is no direction, leadership or accountability.

**Recommendation 1:** A NSC should be constituted in South Sudan as soon as possible, and consideration given to forming a PMC in Kuajok if logistically possible given the (lack of) presence of agencies in the state. The NSC should be formulated based on current, relevant partners who are active in the country.

**Conclusion 2:** The JP had several significant structural design issues that have contributed to a lack of coherence and a fragmented approach to delivery.

**Recommendation 2:** The NCS/JP Management should identify areas of convergence where the inherent fragmentation can be reduced, such as functionally combining outputs where there is opportunity for genuine collaboration between agencies. This is not to suggest an extensive revision of the results framework, but rather to initiate regular coordination meetings where plans can be discussed and ideas for collaborative action identified.

**Conclusion 3:** There is a lack of clarity regarding expenditures and total agency budgets (in some cases) between North and South. This makes it difficult for the JP as a whole to present itself accurately to the GoSS and to plan a ‘whole JP’ approach.

**Recommendation 3:** Agencies should clarify to the NSC on total budget and expenditure information for JP activities in South Sudan. This will be required for reporting to the MDG□F for the second half of 2011.

**Conclusion 4:** There was no credible case made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact. The disparate mandates, local focus and (lack of) presence in Kuajok make coordination difficult under the best of circumstances.

**Recommendation 4:** Collaboration between agencies should be strategic and rational, based on complimentary activities and priorities in the JP target areas. Potential areas of synergy emerged during the evaluation mission, such as UNW and UNICEF both planning community dialogues at the County

level. These more specific opportunities for joint action should be identified and pursued, as they are more likely to a) occur, and b) have an added value in doing so.

**Conclusion 5:** The JP did not adequately plan for the possible separation of South Sudan, or the degree to which it would delay project implementation. As it currently stands, there is little likelihood that the JP will achieve the outcomes or outputs envisaged.

**Recommendation 5:** Given the many challenges facing the project (internal and external) it is not recommended that the JP request or be given an extension until/unless a credible decision is taken regarding a way forward (discussed in paras 76–80). Following discussions on the current status of the project activities, as well as present needs and priorities, could lead to a narrowing of programmatic focus.

**Conclusion 6:** Progress to date has been heavy on assessments, light on tangible “dividends of peace” that are considered to be a cornerstone of post-conflict recovery in South Sudan.

**Recommendation 6:** Stronger focus should be put on providing some tangible support to affected communities, within a coherent framework.

**Conclusion 7:** There is no communication or advocacy strategy for the project, despite this being a clear requirement and priority of the Fund. An almost complete absence of identity (use of logo on communication material, visibility materials, etc) reduces the visibility of the project and the opportunity for advocacy for the MDG’s and the UN reform agenda.

**Recommendation 7:** A clear communication strategy should be adopted based on the MDG–F guidance note, and implemented

immediately. The JP’s could serve as a visible example of the UN family working together in support of South Sudan.

**Conclusion 8:** Despite its importance throughout the lifecycle of the project cycle, particularly in a volatile operating environment such as South Sudan, risk management is not being done.

**Recommendation 8:** A risk management plan should be developed/updated looking forward at the final months of the project. The updated risk matrix should be supplied to the NSC prior to meetings to ensure management is fully informed of current risks and proposed mitigation steps.

**Conclusion 9:** The Government of South Sudan is not engaged at a managerial or oversight level, and has limited awareness of the JP as a unique project.

**Recommendation 9:** An NSC should be constituted urgently under the leadership of the GoSS.

**Conclusion 10:** 10. Leadership of the JP has been lacking in the UNCT/RCO as well as UNDP as the lead agency. The deprioritization of the JP is likely influenced by the comparatively small budget and the complexity of coordinating various agencies in a fluid, post–conflict setting.

**Recommendation 11:** Revised organizational composition of the JP is discussed in detail in paras 76–80 in terms of management arrangements. If the JP is to continue, renewed engagement by the RCO will be critical in encouraging and leading sustained commitment by all agencies.

**Conclusion 11:** Monitoring at the JP level is currently not being done at all, nor are there structures in place to do so.

**Recommendation 11:** The NSC should prioritize establishing an M&E function, possibly within the lead agency or as an additional staff member to support the coordinator.

**Conclusion 12:** The current focal point within UNDP for the JP handles 4 other projects and is thus unable to fulfill the function of coordinator with any degree of engagement. Without the JP being adequately staffed there is very little likelihood in a meaningful improvement in project performance.

**Recommendation 12:** Depending on a decision on a way forward (discussed in paras 76–80), a dedicated staff member (s) should be appointed to the JP.

**Conclusion 13:** The joint assessments provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies' decisions about what activities they would engage in.

**Recommendation 13:** JP activities need to be reviewed in a NSC/PMC setting to ensure that they are in line with the assessments and linkages are developed where possible.

**Conclusion 14:** The combination of narrowing the geographic scope to three counties in Warrap with a lack of coordination has led to a high degree of duplication, likely more than for other, non-IA projects. The JP has not met the base purpose of IA coordination, which is to avoid duplication of efforts.

**Recommendation 14:** JP activities need to be reviewed in a PMC setting to ensure that they are in line with the assessments and a coherent plan established to eliminate duplication and develop linkages.

**Conclusion 15:** The JP is not on target to achieve the strategic results envisaged under a multi-agency programme. The lack of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan, coupled with the JP Coordination Team being based in Khartoum, has created a coordination vacuum that has deepened since independence.

**Recommendation 15:** A meeting/workshop should be held to take an honest review of the spirit of the JP, current context, and ensure that all activities are appropriately aligned. There should be a dedicated JP Coordinator fielded to replicate the work done by the Coordination Team in KRT.