



# Evaluation Summaries

## Strengthening cultural and creative industries and inclusive policies in Mozambique - Final Joint Evaluation

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** *Mozambique*

**Final Evaluation:** *Jan 2012*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *independent / joint*

**Technical Area:** *EMP/SEED*

**Evaluation Management:** *UNESCO*

**Evaluation Team:** *Joint team*

**Project Code:** *MOZ/08/56/UND*

**Keywords:** Enterprise creation, employment policy, joint evaluation

### Taken from the Joint Evaluation executive summary

#### Introduction

This report represents the final evaluation of the Joint Programme (JP) on Culture and Development for Mozambique, also known as the Joint Programme on Strengthening Cultural and Creative Industries and Inclusive Policies in Mozambique. It was initially a three year programme for 2008-2011, financed by the Spanish Government through the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) with a \$5 million budget. In June 2010, immediately following the mid-term evaluation, the programme was reformulated from its original ambitious scope from two components and six outcomes to two components and three outcomes. It was also extended for five months (to February 2012).

The JP counted on six United Nations (UN) agencies and ten Government of Mozambique (GoM) ministries in its implementation. The

programme covered 6 areas: Maputo City, Zavala District, Inhambane City, Mossuril District, Ilha de Moçambique District and Nampula City (including Maratane Refugee Camp, on the outskirts of Nampula).

#### Methodology of the Final Evaluation

The final evaluation was carried out based on the reformulated programme and the respective log frame of June 2010 and it responds to the TOR prepared by the MDG-F Secretariat and adapted by the Evaluation Reference Group in Mozambique. This evaluation was conducted from mid October 2011 to mid-January 2012. The team collected information over a six-week period (in October and November of 2011). The evaluation team collected data from primary and secondary sources, and used mixed methods aiming at gathering both quantitative and qualitative information. The methodology used in the evaluation comprised the following steps:

1. Collection and analysis of key documents
2. Development of assessment tools
3. Field visits
4. Administration of a questionnaire
5. Interviews with key stakeholders (PMC Members, Ministries, UN and Output Related Staff in Provinces)
6. Focus Group Discussions with Implementers/Beneficiaries

The questionnaire was developed to gather quantitative data. A web-based version was also used for its administration (in addition to a paper based version), allowing for a further collection of responses. A total of 46 individuals filled in the questionnaire and 32 of these were interviewed (in all 6 implementation areas of the JP) for further

collection of qualitative data. In addition, 16 focus group discussions were conducted, involving more than 60 individuals.

In line with the TORs, the evaluation team collected data and information on two levels: firstly, an analysis on the basis of the performance of each of the Programme's 12 specific outputs; and secondly, an analysis of the performance of the JP on the basis of five criteria: relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Therefore, this report presents findings on these two levels.

### **Complexity of the Joint Programme**

Before presenting the results of this evaluation, the evaluation team finds it relevant to first consider a number of aspects around the JP's design, planning and implementation that were recurrently mentioned during interviews, especially by the JP coordination team. These are:

*Design:* The JP called on the active participation of six UN agencies, ten ministries, various implementing organisations and short-term consultants in its implementation. The JP entailed thus a complex coordination, management and implementation structure, composed of many institutions, each with their respective expectations, objectives, needs and priorities. The amount and quality of coordination necessary to ensure that all institutions are aligned and in unison should not be taken lightly.

*Deliverables:* The quantity and scope of outcomes, outputs and their respective activities remained highly ambitious, even after the reformulation of the JP and the decrease from 6 to 3 outcomes and 18 to 12 outputs. Complexity increases with the vast geographical dispersion of the locations where these outputs were supposed to occur, ranging from Maputo to Ilha de Moçambique.

*Planning:* The JP remained largely "idle" during the first eight months of year one. This resulted in procurement and contracting processes initiating much later than expected, resulting in further time loss.

*Timeframe:* After the reformulation in June 2010, the remaining time available to successfully implement activities and conclude all the outputs was extremely short, as many of the activities were linked to each other and a delay in the first activity under a certain output implied that all the

remaining activities would also be implemented later than planned. Another important aspect to take into consideration in terms of time is that the JP also aimed to change the mind-frame of its stakeholders in relation to what culture entails. This is not an easy task to accomplish in such a small period of time.

To conclude, as recurrently mentioned by stakeholders involved in this evaluation, even if the JP would have had a full three years to implement, the expectations for the outputs were set unattainably high. The JP as a programme was an ambitious undertaking from its start and was confronted with various challenges.

## **Conclusions & Lessons Learned**

This section outlines main evaluation findings in terms of best practices (and positive aspects), lessons learned (and aspects to be improved in the future) and other conclusions.

### **Best Practices**

- Even though the understanding of what is meant by culture is still limited at best and ambiguous at worst, through its inter-sectoral and holistic approach to culture and development, the JP contributed to culture being part of government plans. This should be further promoted in the future.
- The JP has contributed to a much more participatory and integrated approach to planning in three districts. The approach and methodologies used should be leveraged to other districts.
- The JP has shown how cultural tourism can generate income for many different actors. The model that has been developed and tested can, in principle, be used in other districts.
- The integrated approach to health issues of output 2.1.4 was almost unanimously considered the JP's big success.

### **Lessons Learned**

- One conclusion that is shared by practically all stakeholders is that too much ambition and too much complexity do not help the implementation of a program like the JP.
- While the conclusion that the programme was overambitious was already reached before the mid-term evaluation, even after the

reformulation of 2010 it was still not realistic to expect all the outputs to be finalised by the end of 2011. As a result, even at the end of the programme, many of the activities were being implemented and were therefore not ready for an outcome evaluation.

- Outcome leads were established in late 2010 and installed in early 2011, in response to a recommendation in the mid-term evaluation. Although TORs for the role existed and were divulged, outcome leads remained unclear about their roles and expectations and unable to translate these into concrete management activities. As a result, this did not improve the ownership and leadership in the coordination structure on the part of the Government, as was expected.
- The involvement of several UN agencies in the same output/activity, each with their expectations, own methodology and procedures, specifically financial procedures, very frequently lead to miscommunication and slowed down the implementation of those activities.
- Generally, there has been a lack of synergy between the different outputs of the JP. Each output seems to be a project on its own, working with its own specific subset of beneficiaries. Opportunities were missed for certain activities to benefit from others. Future programmes should put in place strategies to leverage potential synergies among different outputs.
- The JP has experienced a high level of staff turnover, especially within Government institutions. This has naturally had a negative impact on effectiveness.
- In general, the level of commitment on the part of government officials concerning activities related to the JP has been low. While focal points of the JP inside government institutions could have potentially opened doors and facilitated JP activities that require government intervention, this has only rarely been the case, thus causing delays to JP activities.
- There is a relatively high degree of pessimism about the sustainability of the programme's results, both among Government officials and UN staff, especially because of the lack of financial capacity of the Government and Civil Society Organisations. This also points to the poor ownership amongst the beneficiaries as many initiatives were piloted but not yet fully implemented. Until stakeholders see results

more clearly, the likelihood of continuing the path of the Joint Programme is very low.

- Critical issues hampering the viability and sustainability of artisans were not or insufficiently addressed by the JP, such as availability of financial incentives, bank finance, sourcing of raw materials, identification of market demand to guarantee sales, access to funds in general, management tools for associations and technical assistance in producing craft. Although it is acknowledged that some of these were not part of the design or objectives of this JP, this should be considered when designing future programmes.
- No proper instruments for the collection of data for M&E have been developed and used, possibly because the programme did not have an M&E specialist for most of its duration.
- Although the focal points were supposed to actively gather data for M&E, they were never properly trained for that specific task.
- The two different aspects of the JP (the promotion of cultural/creative industries and the role of culture in human development) were not really integrated and coexisted as two separate conceptions of what culture is and what role it can play. The design of the programme did not aim at integrating this. Future programmes should consider whether such different components should be part of the same programme and, if yes, mechanism to leverage potential synergies between them should be put in place.

### **Recommendations**

- Many of the positive products and results of the JP only started to make themselves felt towards the very end of the program. It would be very unfortunate if they would get lost because the Programme ends. Often the monetary values needed to keep activities going are not very high. Some of the outputs of the JP can probably be transformed into independent projects, involving the respective Ministries and UN agencies. The evaluation team recommends that two immediate actions should be considered:
- The JP should, if at all possible, be extended for six months to reinforce ownership and sustainability of its outputs and products through: a) conclusion of ongoing activities; b) complete handover of outputs to the respective GoM institutions; and c) technical support to

the implementation of the drafted exit strategy by the GoM institutions.

- Governmental institutions and UN agencies that have been involved in each of the 12 outputs should analyse and decide what support can be given for the sustainability, continuation and leverage of the JP's products and results.
- The Government of Mozambique should consider the possibility of creating a special programme to promote cultural tourism in Mozambique, along the lines of what the JP did in Ilha de Moçambique and Inhambane; this programme could involve MICULT, MITUR, UNESCO and ITC.
- Future projects in the cultural sector would do well in trying to involve national educational institutions involved in art and culture such as the *Instituto Superior de Artes e Cultura*.
- Future Joint Programmes should consider limiting the ministries and UN agencies involved to a more manageable number. Future Joint Programmes should also consider limiting the number of outcomes and outputs to be delivered within the lifetime of the Programme.
- Changing the mind-set of stakeholders about "culture" and its role in economy and in development is not something that can be achieved in a short timeframe. In general, cultural projects should have a duration that is longer than what MDG-F allows for Joint Programmes. Furthermore, promoting the role of culture in socio-economic development and its role in the economy generally should be part of internal GoM's advocacy efforts (arguably within MICULT).
- Future Joint Programmes on Culture and Development should consider not including the two aspects of Culture into one programme, unless ways are found to make them complementary and mutually supportive.