



## ILO EVALUATION

**Evaluation Title:** Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment

**ILO Project Code:** MMR/14/01/EEC

**EU Project Code:** DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766

**Type of Evaluation:** Midterm evaluation

**Country(ies):** Myanmar

**Date of the evaluation:** March 1 – June 1, 2017

**Name of consultant(s):** Mathias Kjaer, Team Leader  
Angela B. Thaug, Team Member

**ILO Administrative Office:** Liaison Office–Myanmar

**ILO Technical Backstopping Office:** DEVINVEST, FPRW, SKILLS, ENTERPRISES, DWT- Bangkok  
Other agencies involved in joint evaluation: N/A

**Project Dates:** 15 March 2015-14 March 2019

**Donor: country and budget US\$:** EEC, EUR 7,000,000 (US\$ 8,235,294)

**Evaluation Manager:** Pamornrat Pringsulaka, ROAP

**Evaluation Budget:** € 24,584 (US\$ 27,602)

**Key Words:** Midterm Evaluation, Myanmar, Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, Community Empowerment, Shan State, Ethnic Armed Organization, Community Protection, Community Infrastructure, Conflict-Affect Areas, EU.

**Disclaimer:** This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO's evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office

# Table of Contents

---


<b>List of Tables and Figures</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Map of Programme Sites</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Acronyms</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Programme Background .....	1
Conflict Context .....	2
Programme Progress to Date: .....	4
Evaluation Background .....	4
Overall Approach and Methodology .....	7
<b>Findings</b> .....	<b>10</b>
Coherence .....	10
Relevance .....	19
Effectiveness .....	23
Efficiency .....	28
Sustainability.....	31
Special Aspects.....	34
<b>Conclusions</b> .....	<b>40</b>
<b>Lesson Learned and Emerging Good Practice</b> .....	<b>48</b>
<b>Recommendations</b> .....	<b>51</b>
<b>Annexes</b> .....	<b>53</b>
Annex A: Terms of Reference .....	53
Annex B: Draft Data Collection Instruments.....	60
Annex C: People and Organisations Consulted .....	64
Annex D: Sources Consulted .....	65
Annex E: Lesson Learned Template .....	66
Annex F: Emerging Good Practice Template .....	67
Annex G: Inception Report .....	69

## List of Tables and Figures

---

Figure 1: Diversity of Stakeholders .....	8
Figure 2: Perceptions on PRD's underlying assumptions .....	10
Figure 3: Stakeholder opinions on the need for program redesign .....	12
Figure 4: Use of Program Management Documents .....	14
Figure 5: Coherence of Approach .....	16
Figure 6: Opportunity for Collective Work .....	17
Figure 7: Alignment with Needs of Community .....	19
Figure 8: Extent of Assessment and Consultation .....	20
Figure 9: Extent of Participatory Approach .....	21
Figure 10: Perceptions of Effectiveness of Community Empowerment.....	23
Figure 11: Perceptions on Likelihood of Reaching Objectives.....	24
Figure 12: Extent of Government Interest.....	25
Figure 13: Collaboration with Outside Projects.....	26
Figure 14: Strategic and Timely Use of Resources.....	28
Figure 15: Significance of Funding Issue .....	28
Figure 16: Building on Previous Activities.....	29
Figure 17: Community Buy-In and Ownership.....	31
Figure 18: Capacity of Host-Country Staff .....	31
Figure 19: Activities Continuing After Program End .....	32
Figure 20: Steps Taken to Ensure Sustainability .....	32
Figure 21: Securement of Additional Funding.....	33
Figure 22: Steps to Ensure Gender Mainstreaming.....	34
Figure 23: Response to Identified Sensitivities.....	36
Figure 24: Existence of Community Feedback Mechanisms .....	37

# Map of Programme Sites



Source: Myanmar Management Information Unit

# Acronyms

---

AA	Arakan Army
ASG	AIDS Support Group
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CLOs	Community Liaison Offices
CPCS	Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
CTMR	Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting
EAOs	Ethnic Armed Organisations
EPRP	Ethnic Peace Research Project
EU	European Union
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JPF	Joint Peace Fund
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDCG	Maggin Development Consultancy Group
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MoV	Means of Verification
MP	Member of Parliament
NA-B	Northern Alliance-Burma
NCA	National Ceasefire Agreement
NLD	National League for Democracy
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PAC	Program Advisory Committee
PMU	Programme management unit
PRD	Peace, Reconciliation and Development Programme
PSF	Peace Support Fund
RCSS/SSA-S	Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army - South
ROM	Results-Oriented Management
SCI	Save the Children International
SO	Strategic Objective
SSPP/SSA-N	Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army -- North
SWAN	Shan Women's Action Network
TNLA	Ta'ang National Liberation Army
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

## Acknowledgements

---

The team would like to thank Pamornrat Pringsulaka, Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, for her collegial guidance and support throughout the evaluation. The team would also like to thank the ILO Myanmar team—Matthew Maguire, Khun Saw Aung, Nang Kham Ying Nonk, Win Yu Htwe, Sonish Vaidya, Sai Moe Ko Ko—who worked tirelessly to arranged and facilitate the logistics for the overall evaluation. Likewise, the team would like to thank staff from the four other Consortium partners— AIDS Support Group, Ethnic Peace Resources Project, Maggin Development Consultancy Group, Save the Children International—for welcoming us to their areas and arranging interviews with beneficiaries, local community members, and government officials across Shan state.

Finally, a special thanks is extended to the 156 individuals who took the time to meet with us during our fieldwork. Ultimately, this evaluation would not have been possible without the knowledge, insights, opinions, and concerns shared with us. We hope that this report accurately reflects the views expressed and that it proves useful for strengthening the “Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Shan State” programme in some meaningful way.



The evaluation team with the Laikha Village Development Committee and PRD Consortium staff at a “Youth Training Centre” community infrastructure project in Laikha, southern Shan State. March 2017. Source: Sonish Vaidya, ILO Myanmar.

# Executive Summary

---

## Programme Background

The “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community-Empowerment” (PRD) programme is a four-year (March 2015-March 2019), €7 million European Union (EU) effort to promote the inclusion of community voices in Myanmar’s national peace process. The programme is based on an overarching theory of change (ToC) that “ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.”

PRD expects to reach over 75,000 beneficiaries across 80 villages in Shan state and achieve three overarching Strategic Objectives (SOs):

1. Provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged inclusively in the peace and reconciliation process.
2. Support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict.
3. Facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment.

PRD is implemented by a consortium of five implementing partners—AIDS Support Group (ASG), Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP), Maggin Development Consultancy Group (MDCG), Save the Children International (SCI), and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Each partner is responsible for implementing activities in their own locations, while ILO, as the Consortium Lead, has the additional responsibility of ensuring the quality of reporting to the EU.

## Evaluation Background

This independent midterm evaluation was commissioned by the ILO Regional Office in Bangkok for three reasons. First, the evaluation is part of PRD’s overall monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design as described in both the programme’s proposal to the EU and its subsequent Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) plan developed during its inception period. Second, the evaluation follows ILO’s internal guidance requiring all programmes over US\$5 million and/or lasting more than 30 months to undertake a midterm evaluation.<sup>1</sup> Finally, given recent setbacks in Myanmar’s peace process, the PRD Consortium and EU are interested in assessing the continued relevance of the programme’s original assumptions and ToC.

**Purpose.** The evaluation is intended to promote accountability and learning. Specifically, it aims to provide (1) an objective assessment of the programme’s design and validity of its ToC; (2) assess its current relevance to the Myanmar peace and reconciliation process; (3) judge the

---

<sup>1</sup> International Labour Organisation, "ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-Based Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning, and Managing for Evaluations," ed. Evaluation Unit (EVAL) (Geneva 2013).

effectiveness of the programme and its management; (4) analyse the programme's efficiency; and (5) provide recommendations for strengthening the programme.

**Scope.** The evaluation covers programme activities beginning from the commencement of the programme (March 2015) until its midway point (March 2017). Fieldwork took place between March 8-24, 2017. It included 48 interviews (key informant, small groups, and focus groups) with 156 stakeholders (71 or 46% female) across seven locations (Taunggyi, Tachileik, Laikha, Lashio, Kutkai, and Muse in Shan state and Yangon).

**Audience.** The primary intended audience for the evaluation are the PRD Consortium members and the EU as the funding agency. Secondary audiences including township, state, and Union level officials and EAO representatives, project beneficiaries, ILO Regional and Headquarters staff, and other development partners (current and future) interested in supporting peace, reconciliation, and development through community empowerment in Shan state.

## Methodology

The evaluation followed a non-experimental, qualitatively-dominant design. It utilised a mixed-methods, theory-based approach guided by an overarching framework (see "Evaluation Design Matrix") to collect and analyse information. It was implemented in three phases: (1) an inception phase based on a review of existing documents; (2) a fieldwork phase to collect and analyse primary data; and (3) a data analysis and reporting phase to produce the final evaluation report.

**Limitations.** There was a threat to population validity as only a limited number of project locations (seven) were visited given resource and time constraints. These were often near larger cities and likely resulted in a distorted sample favouring more capacitated civil society partners. There was also a threat to ecological validity as translation was required for a large percentage of interviews. It is also likely that there was some response bias with respondents feeling a natural tendency to provide answers that they believed the interviewer wanted to hear.

The authors have tried to mitigate against these issues by discussing translated responses between the national and internal team member following the interview; triangulating information across a variety of data sources; and utilizing remote interviews and secondary data where access issues prevented primary data collection.

## Key Findings

### Cohherence:



- 80% of interviewees felt that one or more of the major programming assumptions has not materialized, mostly related to duty-bearer response.
- 94% of Consortium staff felt that there was not a coherent implementation approach; however, 88% were interested in future collaboration.

### Relevance:



- All (40 of 40) interview groups felt PRD's community awareness-raising and mobilisation work was relevant to current community needs.
- Nearly half of the community members interviewed had been involved in the planning and design of activities.



- PRD activities are generally aligned with the traditional comparative advantages of Consortium members.

**Efficiency:**



- 70% of interviews with Consortium staff revealed issues in the timeliness and strategic use of resources. The most significant were issues related to fund allocation which had significant negative impacts on activities and threaten the continued participation of some partners.
- The PAC has met on a regular basis and facilitated knowledge-sharing among partners, however the amount of joint planning has been limited.

**Effectiveness:**



- 82% of interviewees felt that the community empowerment component of the project has been effective. However, 65% of interviews, including most interviews with Consortium staff, did not expect PRD to achieve all its other planned objectives by the end of the project.
- PRD has faced significant constraining factors, both predict and unforeseen, that has limited the effectiveness of activities to date. However, PRD has also been facilitated by a couple of significant enabling factors, the most important of which has been strong civil society participation.

**Sustainability:**



- PRD has facilitated a strong sense of community buy-in and interests in its activities; however, it has had limited success securing the interest and buy-in of government counterparts.
- 83% of interviewees think that results thus far can be sustained. However, only 50% reported having taken steps to help ensure sustainability.

**Specialist Aspects:**



- PRD has taken notable steps to capture and report sex-disaggregated data, however additional effort is needed to better understand differences in how activities are experienced by women, men, girls, and boys.
- PRD has a strong focus on ensuring a conflict sensitive approach and has established both formal and informal mechanisms to investigate, understand, and monitor sensitivities in areas where it works.
- PRD activities have resulted in several unanticipated results thus far, both positive and negative. The most significant relates to the safety and protection issues for staff and beneficiaries.
- Tripartite issues have been discussed under ILO's general framework for Myanmar but have not been considered in detail. Internal Labour Standards, however, are directly addressed in the programme.

## Conclusions

- 1. Programming Assumptions.** While some of the program's underlying assumptions have materialized, particularly those around the program's community-empowerment and armed actor sensitization work, other important assumptions around duty-bearer participation and response have not. This has constrained the program's ability to deliver on outcome-level results.
- 2. Coherence.** The programme has struggled to develop and follow a coherent approach to implementation across its consortium. This is partly caused by institutional agreements between Consortium partners; partly by the different thematic and geographical focus areas of partners; and partly by incomplete use of central programme management tools.
- 3. Relevance.** PRD is strongly aligned to the empowerment needs expressed by communities. It is also aligned to the priorities of the EU. However, the lack of government participation indicates that PRD may not be aligned to the peacebuilding priorities of the Shan state government, which admittedly have been vague and poorly defined.
- 4. Effectiveness** The lack of updated M&E data at the time of the evaluation, which occurred prior to end-of-year reporting, limits its ability to make a definitive assessment on the program's effectiveness. However, based on information available and collected during the evaluation, PRD appears unlikely to reach all its current targets and intended results.
- 5. Efficiency.** Issues related to reporting and subsequent release of funds have caused disruptions to activities and even threatened the continued participation of some partners. Additionally, while the PAC has met on a regular basis, it has had limited effect on improving joint planning and efficiencies in implementation across the Consortium.
- 6. Sustainability.** The sustainability of PRD's activities and results appears mixed. While staff and beneficiaries hold positive expectations that activities and results will continue, the evaluation found few examples of tangible steps taken to ensure sustainability. The exception is activities under SO3 which appear to have the highest chance for sustainability, in part due to the strong design addressing sustainability from the outset.
- 7. Special Aspects.** PRD has taken notable steps to capture and report sex-disaggregated data, however additional effort is needed to understand differences in how activities are internalized by women, men, girls, and boys. PRD has had a strong focus on ensuring a conflict sensitive approach and has succeeded in establishing mechanisms to investigate, understand, and monitor sensitivities in areas where it works. The programme has already experienced several unanticipated results, both positive and negative, the most concerning of which relates to safety and protection issues for staff and beneficiaries.

## Lesson Learned/Emerging Good Practice

**Lesson Learned:** The **composition and development of clear roles and responsibilities for the PRD Consortium** could have been more carefully considered during the original proposal process. While the EU's Request for Proposal is culpable of inviting applicants to bid on an overly

ambitious project with too short a proposal deadline, the Consortium members are ultimately responsible for not fully considering how well their institutional capabilities aligned. The ensuing consortium structure, with five equal consortium partners despite large disparities in experience and institutional resources, has resulted in considerable administrative challenges and limited the implementation of a coherent approach.

**Emerging Good Practice:** The “community infrastructure projects” under SO 3 stand out as a particularly well designed activity that promotes the use of local labour and resources; carefully considers conflict-sensitivity, gender, and sustainability issues; and helps provide incentives and “entry points” to establish relationships and pursue more sensitive activities under SOs 1 and 2.

## Recommendations

- 1. PRD should scale back its ambitions on the targets and results feasible in Myanmar’s current peacebuilding context.**

PRD should update its programming assumption and revise its targets and intended results to better reflect its current operating environment. The programme should also adopt a more unified and coherent approach to implementation. This should include increased joint planning, monitoring, and implementation.

**Responsible entity:** PRD Partners and EU.      **Priority:** High      **Timeframe:** 0-6 months.

- 2. PRD should consider focusing more effort on promoting the participation of MPs as part of the program’s effort to encourage “duty-bearer” response.**

The programme should focus on encouraging and supporting MPs to meet regularly with their constituents in project areas and provide workshops to community members about how they can get in touch with their local MPs to express concerns. This will provide a new avenue to encourage government participation and help improve the prospects for government buy-in and strengthen the sustainability of results.

**Responsible entity:** PRD Partners.      **Priority:** High      **Timeframe:** 0-6 months.

- 3. PRD should consider working with fewer local partners and instead provide more in-depth and sustained engagement, including conducting fewer but more joint and high visibility events and awareness-raising platforms.**

PRD should consider adopting the approach implemented by SCI where it has identified five main CBO partners that it then engages, supports, and capacitates over the life of the programme. Additionally, PRD should look to support larger joint events, seminars, and platforms to bring more visibility. ILO and SCI should look to utilise their “convening authority” to encourage the participation of government and MPs, as well as EAGs members to the extent that laws allow.

**Responsible entity:** PRD Partners.      **Priority:** High      **Timeframe:** 0-6 months.

# Introduction

---

## Programme Background

In March 2015, ILO Myanmar and its four Consortium partners—EPRP, SCI, ASG, and MDCG—began implementing a EU funded four-year, €7 million (US\$8.2million) “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation and Development through Community Empowerment” programme (PRD).

The programme’s overall objective is to “contribute to peace, reconciliation and development through the empowerment of conflict-affected communities in Myanmar.”<sup>2</sup> This goal is expected to be achieved through three (SOs):

1. To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged inclusively in the peace and reconciliation process.
2. To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict.
3. To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment.

The programme expects to benefit up to 75,000 beneficiaries across 80 villages in Shan State. Focus areas include “Tachileik District in East Shan, Kutkai and Namkham Townships in Northern Shan, Mansi in Kachin and work with the ceasefire liaison offices (CLOs) across Shan State.”<sup>3</sup>

ILO Myanmar serves as the Consortium lead. Partners are responsible for the management of their own activities but ILO is responsible for the overall results tracking and reporting to the EU. Programme governance is provided through a Programme Advisory Committee (PAC), which meets on a quarterly basis, although the group met more frequently during the programme inception period to discuss ways of promoting coherence and to develop a joint Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) plan.

The programme is guided by an overarching theory of change (ToC) arguing that “ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.” This ToC is further described in a results hierarchy in the program’s MEAL plan. However, while the results hierarchy presents a clear progression of activities and results, it could be strengthened by more clearly articulating some of the underlying programming assumptions or synergies/complementarities between activities which will help achieve results.

In addition to the overarching goal and objectives identified above, the programme aims to:

---

<sup>2</sup> International Labour Organisation, “Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar,” in *Lot 2: Shan State*, ed. EuropeAid (2014). Pg. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Pg. 5.

- Contribute to a deeper, comprehensive understanding of the conflicts in Shan with a focus on needs and concerns in implementation areas.
- Facilitate the incremental but measurable empowerment of target group communities to engage conflict parties on the peace process.
- Establish multi-stakeholder fora; one for communities and one for wider stakeholders such as government, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society, and communities allowing for peace-related concerns to be articulated and raised with conflict parties.
- Improve the understanding of government authorities and EAOs on fundamental rights and responsibilities, good governance, and civilian protection.
- Resource and capacitate over 30 Community Based Organisations (CBOs) to respond to protection needs and the peace process through sub-granting and directed support to enable them to work with communities and Youth Platforms on forced labour, child protection and rights, and the social reintegration of children affected by conflict.
- Improve the functioning of 12 Community Liaison Offices (CLOs) in Shan State as information hubs for their communities by ensuring staff are better informed on conflict resolution, international humanitarian law, and basic media skills.
- Support effective responses across Shan by the Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting (CTMR) of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612,<sup>4</sup> particularly community monitoring of the Tatmadaw and EAOs, as well as incremental progress on the sensitisation of EAOs on child use and recruitment.
- Provide around 35,000 work days in more than 40 villages resulting in community-led and community-managed infrastructure, with 200 people trained in construction related skills.
- Produce a market assessment for implementation sites and non-formal education, livelihoods skills training, and entrepreneurship training for 500 people, of which at least 40% are women.

## Conflict Context

While conflicts in Rakhine and Kachin states generally receive greater media and donor attention, conflict has long raged in Shan state with the roots of some conflicts stretching back nearly 70 years. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, Shan witnessed 231 separate armed clashes between March 2015 and 2016.<sup>5</sup> Troublingly, the fighting has intensified significantly over the past year, proliferating to involve more groups over a wider geographical range.

---

<sup>4</sup> UNSCR 1612 establishes on monitoring and reporting mechanism on the use of child soldiers. According to the UN, the mechanism is intended to “collect and provide timely, objective, accurate and reliable information of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict, and that such a mechanism must operate with the participation of, and in cooperation with, national government and relevant United Nations and civil society actors.”

<sup>5</sup> Liaison Office - Myanmar International Labour Organisation, "Terms of Reference: Independent Midterm Evaluation, 'Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment.'," (Yangon: ILO, February 28, 2017).

The recent escalation of armed violence in northern Shan at the end of 2016 highlighted the importance of Shan to the national peace process. On November 20 four non-NCA signatories—Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA)—formed the “Northern Alliance-Burma” (NA-B) and launched coordinated attacks on police and military installations and three public bridges in Muse, Mong Ko, Pang Sai, Kutkai, and Namkham townships in northern Shan. The attacks continued for two weeks and resulted in more than 170 clashes between government and armed groups, the death of at least 10 people according to government estimates, and an estimated displacement of 17,400 civilians (15,000 refugees and 2,400 Internally Displaced Persons) according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Myanmar. The attacks also had international ramifications, causing significant disruptions to cross-border trade between Myanmar and China, as well as stray munitions falling in Chinese territory.

The conflicts are driven by a variety of issues, dynamics, and historical grievances. These include a long-held desire for ethnic political rights and the creation of a more federal Union; economic incentives over control of land, people, and key trade routes; unequal resource sharing; and a variety of more proximate causes including human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict, an imperfect Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and peacebuilding process, illicit trade and drug production, a breakdown in rule of law, and a destabilising influence of neighbouring China.

The conflicts have shown to be rapidly evolving and several recent developments threaten further instability, including:

- Accusations of Tatmadaw interventions in the planning of the Shan National Conference in advance of the second meeting of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference;
- Access and mobility restrictions on civilians in conflict areas, including considerable impact on local livelihoods and women’s engagement in the peace process;
- An increase in incidents of human trafficking, recruitment, and forced labour;
- A recent Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee restriction on the organisation of local community political dialogue activities, limiting discussions strictly to social affairs, economic, and land issues; and
- A blockage of a recent township level women’s empowerment forum sponsored by Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN).

While the recent trend has been towards increased destabilisation and violence, there are also some more encouraging signs that the conflicts can help actors address some of the underlying structural issues that have caused the national peace process to falter. This includes addressing a legacy of nearly 50 years of military rule and a military-drafted constitution which preserves significant military influence over civilian affairs. In March 2017, the United Nationalities Federal Council submitted a nine-point proposal to the State Counsellor outlining its members’ concerns on the NCA process. Several of the points have thus far been accepted in principle, however,

additional discussion is needed on the thorny “inclusivity issue” and agreements on a “code of conduct” following any potential signing of the NCA.<sup>6</sup>

While the road ahead will undoubtedly be difficult, there is room for cautious optimism. There is a widespread desire for peace across Myanmar and a profound hope that the country is on the verge of rectifying long-held grievances and securing greater community and ethnic rights.

## **Programme Progress to Date:**

Midway through its implementation, that programme has already achieved some notable results:

- Holding community dialogue sessions benefitting over 4,000 community members;
- Strengthening the capacity of over 20 CBOs/CSOs in advocacy, community engagement, and organizational management;
- Sensitizing nearly 20,000 community members on forced labour, child protection and child rights issues;
- Starting or completing work on seven community infrastructure programs generating more than 4,500 workdays thus far; and
- Facilitating duty bearer response on community raised issues including working with the Shan State government to address allegations of illegal land grabbing; reports of forced labour with TNLA, RCSS, and the Tatmadaw; and reports of alleged human rights violations to government officials and UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar.

## **Evaluation Background**

This midterm evaluation was commissioned for several reasons. Firstly, the midterm evaluation is part of the programme’s MEAL plan and follows a commitment listed in the programme’s original proposal to the EU.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, it follows general ILO evaluation guidance requiring all projects over US\$5 million and/or lasting more than 30 months to undertake a midterm evaluation.<sup>8</sup> Finally, less on the accountability side and more on the learning side, the programme is interested in a candid, external assessment on its current coherence and relevance given a substantial deterioration of the peace and reconciliation context of Shan.

The evaluation utilises four of the five standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. Given the relatively recent start of programme activities and aligned with the formative nature of the evaluation, the evaluation only partially analyses impact, the fifth OECD/DAC evaluation criterion. Specifically, this is limited to

---

<sup>6</sup> For useful background briefing on the “inclusivity issue” and NCA “code of conduct, see Institute for Security and Development Policy, "Backgrounder: Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement," (October 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Organisation. Pg. 23.

<sup>8</sup> Organisation.

unintended/unanticipated results (positive/negative and primary/secondary). The evaluation has added an additional “coherence” criteria to more thoroughly investigate the continued validity of the programme’s ToC, as well as the complementarity of Consortium partner inputs.

The evaluation is also particularly focused on analysing issues specific to gender and age. This includes not just collecting sex and age disaggregated data but also analysing the relevance and effectiveness of the programme’s gender strategy and activities involving youth.

Finally, the evaluation analyses the conflict sensitivity of both the programme as well as the evaluation itself. Instruments, site and interviewee sampling, and data analysis and presentation were reviewed to understand how they might be influenced by the conflict, and in turn possibly influence the conflict and programme stakeholders interviewed.

### **Purpose and Objectives**

As expressed in the Terms of Reference (ToR), the “main purposes of the midterm independent evaluation are for programme improvements and to promote accountability to ILO key stakeholders and donor, and to enhance learning within the ILO and key stakeholders.”<sup>9</sup>

In line with the OECD/DAC criteria described above, the objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the programme design and its theory of change, specifically whether it is still valid;
- Assess the relevance of the programme in responding to peace and reconciliation in Myanmar;
- Assess the effectiveness of the programme and the effectiveness of its management arrangement;
- Assess the programme implementation efficiency;
- Provide recommendations; and
- Identify emerging potential good practices and lessons learnt

### **Scope**

The evaluation covers programme activities beginning from the commencement of the programme (March 2015) until its midway point (March 2017). Fieldwork took place between March 8-24, 2017. It included 48 interviews (key informant, small groups, and focus groups) with 156 stakeholders (71 or 46% female) across seven locations (Taunggyi, Tachileik, Laikha, Lashio, Kutkai, and Muse in Shan state and Yangon). The team attempted to interview a diversity of stakeholders to help triangulate intentions, perceptions, and on-the-ground realities of the activities reviewed. A detailed breakdown of the different stakeholder groups interviewed can be found in **Annex C**.

### **Audience**

The primary intended audience for the evaluation is the ILO Consortium members and the EU as the funding agency. Secondary audiences including township, state, and Union level officials and EAO representatives, project beneficiaries, ILO Regional and Headquarters staff, and other

---

<sup>9</sup> International Labour Organisation. Pg. 3.



development partners (current and future) interested in supporting peace, reconciliation, and development through community empowerment in Shan state.

### **Revised Evaluation Questions**

The ToR listed a total of 39 evaluation questions and sub-questions. Although there is no fixed number of questions an evaluation should include, good evaluation practice generally recommends trying to limit evaluation questions between three and eight.<sup>10</sup>

The evaluators thus reorganized and developed a more focused list of 17 evaluation questions:

#### **Coherence:**

1. Do the programme design and the underlying ToC remain valid given the limited progress in the peace process and increased conflict in central and northern Shan?
2. To what extent has M&E been utilized and helped provide relevant evidence to inform programming?
3. Has the Consortium followed a coherent and consistent implementation approach?
4. What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?

#### **Relevance:**

5. To what extent has the program responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries?
6. Do the intended results and approach align with ILO's comparative advantages?

#### **Effectiveness:**

7. Is the programme making sufficient progress towards its planned objectives?
8. What issues/factors have facilitated or impeded progress?
9. To what extent does the program build on complementarities?

#### **Efficiency:**

10. To what extent have governance, administration, or technical issues facilitated or impeded progress?
11. Have resources been allocated strategically and timely to achieve results?
12. To what extent have program resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximize impact, if any?

#### **Sustainability:**

13. To what extent are the results of the intervention are likely to be durable or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed?
14. How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?

---

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, [http://www.betterevaluation.org/en/blog/framing\\_an\\_evaluation](http://www.betterevaluation.org/en/blog/framing_an_evaluation).

### Special Aspects:

15. The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation.
16. To what extent has conflict sensitivity been considered in program design and implementation?
17. Are there any unanticipated results (positive or negative) from the activities of the program?

## Overall Approach and Methodology

The evaluation followed a non-experimental, qualitatively-dominant design. It utilised a theory-based approach to collect and analyse information guided by an overarching framework (see **Evaluation Design Matrix**). The evaluation was designed to be implemented in three phases: (1) an inception phase to revise the design of the evaluation based on a review of project documents and early-stage interviews; (2) a fieldwork phase to collect and analyse primary data; and (3) a data analysis and reporting phase to consolidate and report the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the evaluation.

### Data Collection

The evaluation relied mostly on qualitative methods including document review of primary and secondary sources, key informant interviews (KIIs), small group and focus group discussions (SG/FGDs), and direct observations. Quantitative data, primarily derived from secondary sources, was used to validate and complement the qualitative data. Data was collected across of variety of methods for each evaluation question.


### Data Analysis

The evaluation utilized three methods for data analysis described below.

Data analysis tools	Description
<b>Rolling analysis record</b>	A field record documenting key points of interest made by participants, comments raised, evaluators' spontaneous interpretations and impressions, emerging trends and themes, probing questions, and notes for new issues to be explored in further interviews.
<b>In-depth, disaggregated data sheet</b>	A spreadsheet to record and analyse key statistics and figures. This will be disaggregated where possible by gender, age, ethnicity and location.  In instances where data is not available agree proxy data will be used as an alternative.
<b>Debrief workshop</b>	A workshop where Consortium staff and available partners will discuss and validate initial findings and analysis.

## Stakeholder Mapping

A range of potential stakeholders to interview was derived from an initial desk review of programme documents and discussions with Consortium staff. Care was taken to ensure that a diversity of perspectives was included, as well as to ensure that the evaluation would capture and triangulate various opinions. This was done by identifying actors able to speak to the *intentions* of programme and activities, *perceptions* of success of shortcoming, and evidence of actual *realities* in project locations (see **Figure 1** below).



## Interviewee Selection

Based on the desk review and initial consultations, the evaluation team identified and purposefully selected key individuals from each stakeholder group. There was a deliberate effort to conduct interviews with the widest possible range of stakeholders. The selection of interviewees sought to be representative of the demographic characteristics of the geographies selected.

## Quality Standards and Evaluation Ethics

The evaluators committed to respect fundamental human rights, social justice, and the dignity and worth of all subjects interviewed. Informed consent was sought and received at the beginning of each interview. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their answers and that they were free to opt out at any time. Interviews were conducted in a manner that was respectful and ensured that participants fully understood how information from the interviews would be used. Interview responses were aggregated and presented in a way that ensures that sensitive data cannot be traced to institutions or individuals, while still ensuring transparency regarding the information gathered.

## Limitations

Several important limitations threaten the validity of the findings and conclusion contained in this report. These relate primarily to population validity as only a limited number project locations (seven) were visited given resource and time constraints. These were often near larger cities and likely resulted in a distorted sample favouring more developed and capacitated civil society partners. The other threat to validity relates to ecological reliability as translation was required for a large percentage of interviews. This threat was minimized by discussing translated responses with the national evaluator following the interview to ensure accurate translation. It is also likely that there was some level of response bias wherein respondents would feel a natural tendency to provide answers that they believed the interviewer wanted to hear.

The authors have tried to mitigate against these issues by triangulating across a variety of data sources and relying on remote interviewing and secondary data where access issues prevented primary data collection.

# Findings


## Coherence

For readability, the information gathered from the 11 coherence related questions will be presented in four broad categories: (1) coherence and validity of the ToC; (2) coherence, quality, and utility of monitoring and evaluation (M&E); (3) coherence of implementation; and (4) alternate strategies to ensure greater coherence.

### Coherence of ToC

Three major assumptions were identified by the evaluation team’s review of project design documents and initial Yangon-based interviews with the PRD Consortium and EU. The three assumptions were: (1) recent ceasefires would provide new and increased opportunities for communities to articulate their concerns and priority development needs in current or recent conflict areas; (2) that duty-bearers would be interested in listening to these needs and take efforts to respond; and that (3) such community empowerment efforts can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.

Figure 2: Perceptions on PRD's underlying assumptions



### Evidence:

*Do the programme design and the underlying ToC remain valid given the limited progress in the peace process and increased conflict in central and northern Shan?*

- 35 of 44 (80%) of interviewees felt that one or more of the major assumptions underpinning the programme have not materialised.
- The lack of duty-bearer interest and subsequent action was the most commonly cited example of an assumption not holding.

**Disaggregation:** The majority of interviews across all stakeholder groups responded that one or more of the major assumptions have not yet materialised. However, of those responding that the assumptions had held, the majority (six of nine or 66%) were based in Southern Shan. These came from the duty-bearers (government and CLOs) and beneficiary groups (CBOs and community members). Interestingly, two groups (one Consortium partner and one beneficiary group) interviewed from Northern Shan, the project area that has experienced the most recent and intense fighting, also responded that the assumptions behind the PRD project had materialised. Respondents from both groups provided examples of community groups meeting and expressing their concerns which they said was a new and significant development for their

area. The final group responding favourably came from a rural community outside of Tachileik in Eastern Shan.

There was no discernible difference in response by sex, however, the responses by age showed that youth appeared particularly pessimistic on the recent progress (or lack thereof) of the peace process. All youth groups interviewed indicated that one or more assumptions have not held.

Triangulation: While the PRD's first annual report argues that the "Theory of Change of the Action remains that ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of local communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation, and development at the local level,"<sup>11</sup> other secondary documents reviewed by the team support the finding that key assumptions have not held. As part of a separate "listening project," the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) found that respondents in Southern Shan state felt that their basic needs for daily survival needed be met to focus on participating meaningfully in the peace process. As one participant noted, "for most communities [in Southern Shan], peace is tied to the socioeconomic development and availability of secure livelihoods of their region...our future is foggy; we cannot even think about [peace] because we are too busy surviving."<sup>12</sup> Additionally, ILO-produced documents subsequent to the Year 1 annual report argue that several key assumptions have not materialised. A 2017 independent market assessment commissioned by ILO found that "though ceasefires have reduced fighting in Southern Shan, local communities continue to be affected by the legacy of conflict, lacking or insufficient social services, drug abuse, militarisation, and encroachments against civilians by state and non-state military actors."<sup>13</sup> Likewise, an internal field mission report found that "the over-arching theory under the programme that the ceasefires/peace process provide an opportunity to empower communities to engage in the peace process does not apply to this area [Kutkai]."<sup>14</sup>

These findings were supported by a recent high-level visit of US Government representatives to Myanmar supported by the US Institute for Peace (USIP). This high-level delegation included USIP president and for US Agency for International Development Assistant Administrator, Nancy Lindborg, who concluded: "I returned to Myanmar in February [2017] as part of a delegation from the United States Institute of Peace, to see for myself how the country was faring on this score after a year of NLD leadership. What I found from talking to elites and average citizens alike was a combination of disappointment and concern over the trajectory of the NLD's tenure. Few questioned the NLD's good intentions in combating corruption, promoting peace, and the like, but several questioned whether the party's governance style and process encouraged optimism about its future success. Among the concerns they conveyed were: the appointment of ineffective ministers to key positions; lack of a clear economic policy, or apparent priority

---

<sup>11</sup>International Labour Organisation, "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment," (2016). Pg. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Raymond Hyma and Karen Simbulan, *We Want Genuine Peace: Voices of Communities from Myanmar's Ceasefire Areas 2015*, ed. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (2016). Pg. 27.

<sup>13</sup> Benjamin Konstanzer, "Opportunities for Conflict-Affected and Vulnerable Youth: A Conflict Sensitive Economic Assessment in Southern Shan State," ed. ILO (Emerging Markets Consulting, February 2017). Pg. 6.

<sup>14</sup> Internal ILO field mission report. July 2016.

attention to economic issues; inefficient governance that requires all decisions, large and small, to go up to the state counsellor for action; lack of respect for civil society and the media; continued arrests and imprisonment under legacy laws, such as Section 66D of the Telecommunications Act, that limit free speech; and lack of consistent public communication on policies that welcomes feedback, builds public support, and offers a compelling vision for the country's future.”<sup>15</sup>

This also included the recent US Ambassador, Derek Mitchell, who concluded: “Economic underdevelopment, civil war, and degradation of virtually every institution save one -- the military -- over the past 50 years cannot be wiped away by a single election. Nor can legacies of social division, mistrust and corruption created in their wake. A democratic moment such as an election does not equate to creation of a national democratic mind set of cooperation, conciliation. Nor does it make it any easier to forge the compromise essential to lasting peace and unity in such a diverse country as Myanmar.”<sup>16</sup>

---


**Finding 1: Key assumptions around duty-bearer participation and response around which PRD was designed have not materialized over the past two years.**

---

### Need for Program Redesign

While only about one third of respondents felt comfortable commenting on PRD’s programmatic design, an overwhelming majority (13 of 15 or 87%) felt that the programme needed redesign. Interestingly, the two dissenting opinions were expressed by two of the five PRD Consortium members. One of these partners explained that they were only working on SO 1 and that this work remained relevant while the other partner stated that while they admitted their work under SO 1, 2, and 3 was significantly constrained at present, they argued that the conflict situation in Myanmar can change rapidly and they remained hopeful that the operating context would improve in the near future.

**Figure 3: Stakeholder opinions on the need for program redesign**



### Evidence:

*Does the design need to be modified in the second half of the program?*

- 87% of interview groups responding (13 of 15) felt that PRD needed redesign.
- SO 2 was listed as the Strategic Objective most in need of redesign as the demobilisation of child soldiers had not nearly occurred to the level original expected.
- SO 1 was the second most frequently listed Strategic Objective listed in need of redesign. While all groups interviewed felt that the community awareness and mobilisation

---

<sup>15</sup> Derek Mitchell, "Myanmar’s Government — Time for Course Correction?: One Year on, It Is Time for Aung San Suu Kyi and the Nld to Take Stock," *United States Institute for Peace* (March 2017).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

components of SO 1 should continue, these groups also expressed frustration at the lack of government participation in multi-stakeholder forums, capacity-building trainings, and action on responding to community identified needs. There was also mixed response on the utility of working with CLOs and the extent to which they were serving a community liaison role versus being focused almost exclusively on military and business issues.

- SO 3 was widely appreciated by the groups interviewed with the only major suggested change being provided by one of the Consortium partners related to reducing the target number of community infrastructure projects to be completed by project end.

Disaggregation: There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

Triangulation: Preliminary findings from a concurrent EU-supported Results-Oriented Management (ROM) review echoed the need for a considerable redesign of the PRD. The review found that substantial changes need to be made to SO 2; activities and indicators related to government and CLO participation need to be substantially revised or dropped; and a new and fourth SO should be created to include all peace-related work, which was defined as most of the current activities not focused on community awareness-raising, mobilisation, and infrastructure.

Interestingly, while the interviews with PRD Consortium partners indicated a general scepticism on the extent to which work with CLOs could tangibly help promote community empowerment, a 2016 publication by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies advocates strongly for increasing support to CLOs in an effort to build “peace infrastructures” and support community empowerment in the peace process. The publication noted that “it is clear that liaison offices hold great potential as future infrastructures for peace. As the diversity of roles indicate, liaison offices are contextually grounded, responding to local needs on the ground...liaison offices have made significant strides in building local trust and encouraging wider participation in the peace process. This has placed [CLOs] in a position to enhance local active engagement and build a more inclusive and sustainable peace process.”<sup>17</sup>

“Liaison offices are critical in fostering communication and collaboration between key stakeholders including the Myanmar Army, the Myanmar Government, civil society, local communities and EAGs” (pg. 24).

“Not only can supporting liaison offices help strengthen the peace process, but continuing to ignore their potential could be a dangerous oversight” (pg. 28).

~ Quinn Davis, “Building Infrastructures for Peace: The Role of Liaison Offices”

---

**Finding #2: An overwhelming majority of stakeholders responding felt that the Shan State PRD program should be redesigned to reflect current realities.**

---

---

<sup>17</sup> Quinn Davis, *Building Infrastructures for Peace: The Role of Liaison Offices in Myanmar’s Peace Process*, ed. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Cpcs Learning Paper (2016). Pg. 23-24.



## Quality and Utility of M&E


Over the course of its inception period, PRD Consortium partners developed detailed programme management documents, including a MEAL plan, gender frameworks, stakeholder mapping, local conflict assessment, and general annual reporting format. However, the evaluation team found little evidence that these documents were regularly updated or consulted.

### Evidence:

*Is M&E data being regularly collected over time?*

- Complete information for progress against targets could only be provided for 5 of 39 MEAL indicators.
  - There was clear evidence of inconsistency in how each Consortium partner collected and verified monitoring data.
  - Three indicators are missing basic targets (indicators 2.2.4b, 2.2.4c, and 3.2a).
  - Baseline information is missing for nearly all indicators.
  - The Consortium clarified that the incomplete M&E data was due in part to the timing of the evaluation, which occurred prior to Year 2 reporting. While subsequent M&E data has since been collected, the finding that M&E information is used primarily for report, not active programme management remains valid.

Figure 4: Use of Program Management Documents



*How appropriate and useful are the MEAL indicators, targets, and MoVs in assessing the program's progress?*

- 3 of 5 PRD Consortium partners answered that they did not feel that the current MEAL indicators were useful for managing and reporting on their activities.
- Results appear to be self-reported by each Consortium partner with little to no documented evidence supporting those results or other Means of Verification (MoV).

*To what extent are other program management documents used?*

- All five PRD Consortium partners answered that the local conflict assessment was not regularly or formally updated or consulted; however, conflict context updates have been made a standing agenda item at the quarterly PAC meetings. Partners stated that the LCA served as a useful tool for on-boarding new staff or as briefing material to those not as familiar with the conflict context in Shan state.
- There was, however, strong evidence of informal context information sharing within the Consortium and with local partners and beneficiaries.

- Despite being detailed and potentially quite useful for the strategic targeting of activities, the stakeholder mapping document remains a draft and does not appear to be formally consulted for programme decision making.
- Five of five Consortium partners responded that they did not regularly consult and use the PRD Gender Framework; however, gender has been made a standing agenda items at the quarterly PAC meetings.
- The PRD Consortium does not currently have a centralized programme management unit (PMU) responsible for providing programme management support similar to the other EU-funded Kachin and Kayah consortiums.
- However, while there was little evidence of these formal documents being regularly updated and used, there was strong evidence of PRD Consortium members using informal mechanisms to consider key conflict sensitivity and gender issues (see “Special Aspects”).

Disaggregation: While each Consortium member presented evidence of their ability to monitor their activities and report on sex-disaggregated output-level results, there was a disparity across Consortium partners on their ability to capture and report on outcome-level results. Interviews with Consortium partner staff overall found that staff would welcome additional M&E training and reporting guidance from ILO. While a standard annual report format has been shared within the Consortium, there did not appear to be common M&E tools for partners to use.

In terms of the programme’s own ability to report on disaggregated data the Consortium has been successful in capturing sex-disaggregated data, although this seems to be mostly focused on attendance rather than the quality of participation and more nuanced observations on how men, women, girls, and boys understand or benefit from the programme. The programme is strong on reporting geographical differences, likely as a direct result of the highly-targeted implementation areas of each partner. While the programme actively targets youth and reports on the activities of youth groups, it is not yet able to report on the impact of youth-targeted activities or how results differ between children, adolescents, adults, and seniors.

Triangulation: The evaluation team reviewed previous project documents to investigate and triangulate the extent to which results were being captured and reported. As reflected in the perceptions of those interviewed, the first annual report (March 2015-March 2016) and Inception Period Review were both heavy on activity-level reporting and providing sex-disaggregated figures on attendance, for instance, noting that “[PRD partner] has supported and facilitated 30 *community peace dialogues, (total target under the Action – 120)*<sup>18</sup> with total attendees comprised of 432 total female attendees and 313 male attendees”).<sup>19</sup> Evidence of outcome level results was often either anecdotal or vague, for instance, describing that “communities have embraced opportunities to discuss” or “the foundations have been laid” for further work. Further evidence of the need to improve results capture and reporting can be seen in the EU’s decision

---

<sup>18</sup> Italics original.

<sup>19</sup> Organisation, "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment." Pg. 12.


to reject the first draft of the annual report and a subsequent interview with the EU in which they stated their dissatisfaction at the quality of results reporting to date.

**Finding #3: PRD has developed important and potentially useful program management documents; however, these documents are not being regularly updated and consulted for informing program decisions.**

### Coherent Implementation

Both the PRD Activity Proposal and Inception Period Review identified a desire for the programme to be “more than the sum of its parts” by ensuring coherence in activities and general approach across the Consortium. This was envisioned through joint planning and understanding of conflict-sensitive approaches, as well as shared management documents.

Figure 5: Coherence of Approach



#### Evidence:

*Has there been a coherent implementation approach among the consortium members?*

- Nearly all interview groups responding (15 of 17 or 94%) felt that the PRD Consortium has not followed a coherent approach, with the remaining group citing a couple of examples of ILO and EPRP coordinating activities in Taunggyi.
  - There separate geographical areas of coverage was the most frequently cited factor causing the lack of coherence.
  - Differing levels of capacity was also cited by some partners as making collaboration and joint activities difficult.
- Interview responses indicated few instances of joint-planning and that activities and work plans were often developed by Consortium partners in isolation.

“There is no such collaboration because everyone is doing their own activities. At the PAC meeting, we will share successes or constraints from our own work. But we find the activities are done separately with no consultation of other partners.”

~PRD Consortium partner


*Given different geographical targeting by consortium partners, is there an opportunity for the partners to undertake the activities collectively to ensure complementary of approaches?*

- However, interviewees were overwhelmingly positive about the potential to improve future collaboration, with 15 of 17 or 88% responding that they felt there were opportunities for collective work.

**Disaggregation:** There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

**Triangulation:** Project documents indicate an interest in pursuing joint or at least coherent approaches and complementary activities. The original programme proposal suggested holding a “coherence workshop” to share updates on operating contexts and good practices. The proposal also suggested that common programme management documents—such as the MEAL plan, gender framework, local conflict assessment, and stakeholder mapping—would facilitate coherence.

**Figure 6: Opportunity for Collective Work**



“My impression is that it isn’t an integrated consortium – it’s a set of discrete programs by five partners. It never seemed to me that there is a core set of activities and then division of labor, which would then let us build on our comparative advantages.”

~PRD Consortium partner

The Inception Period Review further stated that the longer-than-expected process of developing the MEAL plan “was noted as really aiding coherent approaches across the consortium.”<sup>20</sup> It also highlighted that the inception period has included five separate meetings focused “explicitly on coherence and inception issues.”<sup>21</sup>

**Finding #4: PRD has not followed a coherent implementation approach among consortium members; however, there is a high degree of interest in identifying opportunities for future collaboration.**

### Alternate Strategies

The evaluation team asked respondents if they had any suggestions for strengthening the programme towards the end of nearly every interview. Although suggestions varied, some of the most common responses are presented below.

#### Evidence:

*Do communities themselves have suggestions for other approaches?*

- The most common alternate strategy suggested by interviewees was for PRD to try to access and provide trainings in more remote areas, not just the larger towns like Taunggyi, Tachileik, Lashio, or Yangon.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. Pg. 6.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. Pg. 3.

- Another common suggestion was for PRD to focus on more stable post-conflict areas rather than attempting to implement activities in areas experiencing current conflict. Respondents worried that these activities would be easily disrupted and that their results would be short-lived.

*Is there a way to better align to host-country plans and strategies?*

- Respondents suggested strengthening the collaboration with local stakeholders such as local Members of Parliament (MPs), state or township government officials, and local civil society organisations and networks such as the Committee for Shan State Unity. Following review of the draft report, one PRD partner responded that they have already engaged CSSU and plan to continue doing so going forward.
- A final common suggestion was for PRD to include more activities aimed at addressing drugs and domestic violence, which were the two most commonly cited issues of concern raised by local interviewees.

Disaggregation: Some interesting dichotomies emerged when analysing the suggestions provided by different interview groups. Local respondents strongly favoured PRD increasing its focus on the “demand side” of the programme—raising community awareness and providing forums for community members to express their thoughts and concerns—while international respondents tended to favour looking for ways to encourage more “supply side” participation and response by government and other duty-bearers to these concerns assuming some traction could be reasonably expected. Female respondents were more likely to suggest the PRD include activities focused on highlighting and eliminating domestic violence, while all groups (men and women, youth, and elders) highlighted the need to address the issue of drugs as both a cause and consequence of conflict.

Triangulation: To help assess the viability of some of these suggestions and also gather additional suggestions, the evaluation team interviewed staff from organisations implementing similar EU peacebuilding consortiums in Kachin and Kayah, as well as international partners supporting the Myanmar peace process in general. While these responses all agreed on the importance of encouraging “peacebuilding from below” by involving community voices in the peace process, there was some disagreement on the extent to which PRD should look to push duty-bearer follow-up on community issues raised. While one EU Consortium partner highlighted the benefit of having worked hard to establish close relationships with government officials in terms of facilitate future activities, other partners felt that the peace process had deteriorated to such an extent over the last two years that it was simply unrealistic to think that development partners could reasonably influence duty-bearers to listen and act on these community concerns.

One group raised an interesting suggestion related to alternate strategies for addressing gender which had also been raised by the leader of a women’s organisation in Taunggyi: to shift the target audience for gender activities to men instead of women. This would help facilitate the emergence of “man heroes,” a term used by one interviewee, that could help change the mind-set of other men in their community to encourage greater participation of women in both the peace and local decision-making process.

## Relevance

The ToR contained six questions related which broadly fell into two categories: (1) the extent to which PRD aligns with the needs of its intended beneficiaries; and (2) the extent to which PRD aligns with the comparative advantages of its implementers.


### Needs of Target Groups

#### Evidence:

*Are activities relevant to needs expressed by communities?*

- 100% of the 40 interview groups felt that PRD’s community awareness-raising and mobilisation work was relevant to current community needs.
- Project design and reporting documents demonstrate a strong commitment to addressing the needs of their intended recipients and being “demand-driven.” For example:

Figure 7: Alignment with Needs of Community



“For there to be a genuine peace, communities need to be able to understand what peace means.”

~PRD beneficiary, Lashio

- Trainings under SO 1 are chosen or suggested by training recipients themselves.
- Child protection trainings under SO 2 were designed and implemented following community consultations.
- Infrastructure projects supported under SO 3 are identified and managed by communities themselves.

- Over 220 interviews in Shan from a similar CPCS/Trócaire-led “Listening Project” concluded that “participants expressed their desire to be included in the peace process. They talked about wanting to support and contribute to the peace process as active citizens. However, communities felt that their lack of information and understanding about the peace process prevented them from getting more involved. Giving communities more information and increasing their understanding would be the first step towards greater public engagement in the peace process.”<sup>22</sup>

“It is even more important than in the past that we continue this kind of work. We never had this kind of opportunity to discuss peace, human rights, and democracy. As we believe, we cannot continue any development work unless we have a heritage of peace.”

~PRD Consortium partner

<sup>22</sup> Simbulan. Pg. 17.

**Disaggregation:** There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

**Triangulation:** The consensus across stakeholder groups provides one strong measure of the validity of the above finding. Additionally, while specific activities differ, the overall goal and approach of community empowerment is

likewise pursued by other peacebuilding programs in Myanmar, such as the two other EU-funded consortiums in Kachin and Kayah, and by activities supported by the main peace supporting multi-donor funds, the Joint Peace Fund (JPF) and Peace Support Fund (PSF). As argued by CPCS and Trócaire under their PSF-funded “Listening Project,” “inclusivity and wide ownership are often hailed as the hallmarks of a robust and sustainable peace process. These are built by including communities, the people who will be directly affected by decisions made in the peace process. But because the Myanmar peace process is largely a top-level process that concentrates on dialogue between the Myanmar Government, Tatmadaw and [Non-State Armed Group] leadership, communities are usually left with little opportunity to engage with the process. Despite the direct impact the ongoing peace negotiations will have on their lives, communities often remain voiceless and invisible at the negotiating table.”<sup>23</sup>

“This project is doing peacebuilding in another way...listening to the people and counselling the. Peace is not effective if it is only upper level. No matter what they say at the top level, the reality is that they are still fighting on the ground. The real fact is that whenever there is conflict, the ones who suffer are at the community level.”


~CBO representative, Taunggyi

**Finding #1: PRD is aligned to the needs expressed by its intended community beneficiary communities.**

*To what extent was programming based on assessment and consultation with communities?*

- 33 of 34 interviews (97%) stated that the activities in which they had participated has been based on some degree of community consultation.
- Most examples focused on the choice of workshop or training provided under SO 1 and SO 2, as well as the community infrastructure projects under SO 3.
- However, only 14 of 29 (48%) of interviews responding said that they had been directly involved in the actual design

**Figure 8: Extent of Assessment and Consultation**




<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Pg. 11.

and implementation of activities in which they had participated.

**Disaggregation:** Community-level beneficiaries were most likely to report not being directly involved in the design or implementation of activities (although again nearly all stated that they had at least been consulted), indicating that while consultative, PRD cannot be considered fully participatory which may have implication for sustainability. Likewise, while only one group involving government stakeholders directly answered the question, it was apparent from other government interviews that while they had all been consulted about the activities, they had a very limited subsequent role in the design or implementation of those activities.

**Figure 9: Extent of Participatory Approach**



**Triangulation:** Project documentation provide examples of beneficiaries (CBOs and community groups) being involved in various activities and workshops, however, interview responses demonstrate that this is not always the case. Unfortunately, secondary documents specifically investigating the participatory nature of the program were not available at the time of the midterm evaluation but this an issue that should be further explored in the planned final evaluation.

---

**Finding #2: PRD was based on community consultation and assessment although there is mixed evidence of beneficiaries being involved in the design of the actual activities themselves.**

---

**Alignment with Comparative Advantages**

The original ToR asked the evaluation to assess the comparative advantage of ILO Myanmar specifically, however, this question was expanded in the Inception Report to include all members of the PRD Consortium.

**Evidence:**

*To what extent does PRD align to partners’ traditional comparative advantages?*

- SCI has most clearly linked its work related to SO 2 and child protection issues to its traditional comparative advantages.
- ILO has leveraged its long country presence and relationships established with senior military and EAG officials to facilitate activities under PRD.
- EPRP, MDCG, and ASG have all benefitted from their strong local contextual familiarity to facilitate the implementation of activities.
- However, ASG’s work on peacebuilding is outside of its traditional health thematic focus (previously HIV/AIDS and health), which has and continues to complicate the



implementation of some of its activities with government officials questioning the appropriateness of ASG working on peace-related work.

Disaggregation: Answers to this question were provided primarily from the Consortium partners and Experts/Donor stakeholder groups. The limited number of respondents thus prevents meaningful disaggregation by sex, age, or geography.

Triangulation: A detailed review of each partner’s organisational development was outside of the scope of this evaluation. However, to assess the validity of each partner’s self-assessment and assessment of other partners in the Consortium, the evaluators probed for the opinions of other donors and experts. These interviewees provided similar answers to the Consortium members, stating that the two large international partners—ILO and SCI—built on the advantage of their long country presence and convening authority, and the smaller, more local Consortium partners—EPRP, MDCG, and ASG—to the extent they were familiar to the interviewees, were described as benefitting from their strong contextual understanding and local networks.

---

**Finding #3: The alignment of PRD activities with the traditional comparative advantages of PRD Consortium members is mixed but generally well aligned.**

---

## Effectiveness

The effectiveness questions were organized around three categories: (1) progress towards objectives; (2) enabling and constraining factors; and (3) complementarity and collaboration.


### Progress towards objectives

#### Evidence:

*Are the empowerment activity efforts and approach effective?*

- 31 of 38 (82%) of interviews felt that the community empowerment component of the project had thus far been effective.
  - The most common example provided by respondents to demonstrate new empowerment was the increase level of confidence and participation of community members in discussions around community needs and violations of armed actors in their areas.
  - Interestingly, each group that replied that the community empowerment component had not been effective explained that this was due to a lack of duty-bearer response.
- However, the project has made very little progress on the its duty-bearers response component.
  - Only 3 of a targeted 160 government officials have been training on the topics of governance, rights, responsibilities.
  - Only 13 of a targeted 27 multi-stakeholder forums have taken place to date.
  - None of the child soldier demobilization indicators had been updated with any information on progress and interviews with PRD staff confirm that there has been far less work under this component that original expected.

**Figure 10: Perceptions of Effectiveness of Community Empowerment**



*Will the program likely achieve its planned objectives upon completion?*

- 13 of 20 (65%) of interviews, including 7 of 9 (78%) of interviews with PRD partner staff, did not expect PRD to achieve all of its planned objectives by project end.
- That said, the original targets established at the outset of the programme look to have been unrealistic. A recent EU-commissioned “Results-Oriented Management” review concluded, “target indicators for engagement in the peace and reconciliation process


were in retrospect too high for what is a politically sensitive, 'top-down' negotiated process."<sup>24</sup>

**Disaggregation:** Interestingly, women were most likely to report and provide examples of their increased capacity and sense of empowerment. Examples most often included new confidence to speak up and increased discussion and formal and informal reports of sexual violence committed

by armed actors in their areas. While responses were generally mixed on the question if PRD was likely to achieve its planned objectives in southern and northern Shan, response were all positive in eastern Shan. The reason for this is unclear but could potentially be caused by a relatively "easier" context given the lack of any ongoing armed conflict. Encouragingly, all respondents interviewed in northern Shan, an area that has seen a significant increase in armed conflict, reported an increase in community empowerment in their areas because of the project.

**Triangulation:** PRD's own project reporting largely match the perceptions and opinions gathered during the evaluation interviews. PRD's first annual report concludes "communities affected by conflict are receptive to partnering in efforts to support them "voicing" their concerns and priorities... [however, there is also a] recognition that if community level results are to materialize, they need concomitant action and progress at leadership level."<sup>25</sup> Likewise, CPCS and Trócaire's "Listening Project" supports the claim made by interviewees of the significance of the increased confidence level among community members. "Significantly, communities reflected that the act of having listeners ask them about their opinions of the peace process and local community problems was empowering...A number of participants said this was the first time they had ever been asked to share their opinions and views, and this made them feel important."<sup>26</sup>

**Figure 11: Perceptions on Likelihood of Reaching Objectives**



**Finding #1: PRD's progress towards objectives has been mixed. The program has made significant progress in building local capacity and perceptions of empowerment at the community-level, however the project is unlikely to reach numerous targets across all three Strategic Objectives by project end.**

<sup>24</sup> Koen Versavel, "Eu Results-Oriented Monitoring Mission: Shan State Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Programme," ed. EU (2017 (forthcoming)).

<sup>25</sup> Organisation, "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment." Pg. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Simbulan.

## Enabling/Constraining Factors


### Evidence:

*What are the main constraints, challenges, and areas in need of further attention?*

- The lack of government interest and participation in activities has been the most significant constraining factor to date. An overwhelming number of interviews (33 of 39 or 85%) stated that there was little or no government interest in PRD activities.

- Interviewees cited the participation of junior level duty bearers or complete lack of participation as examples of the lack of government interest.

**Figure 12: Extent of Government Interest**



- Interviewees also widely cited the lack of action on community identified issues as a demonstration of the lack of government interest.

- The escalation in armed conflict and deterioration of the peace process was the second most frequently cited constraining factors across all geographical areas and stakeholder groups.
- Other constraining factors included: an increase in arbitrary arrests and increased human rights violations; low levels of education in rural communities; duty-bearers being overly focused on immediate, short-term goals; cultural issues and social norms hindering the full participation of women; widespread presence of drugs and domestic violence; and the low capacity level of duty-bearers (both government and CLOs).
- The most commonly cited enabling factor was the presence of an active social society.
- Other enabling factors cited included: the presence of international actors in previously off limit “brown” areas; lingering optimism that this round of ceasefires was different; and that the new NLD government would be more receptive to community voices.

**Disaggregation:** Notably but perhaps not surprisingly, government and CLOs were more likely to report their own interest in PRD activities than other stakeholders were to report government and CO interest. This could be caused by a variety of issues. It could be that other respondent groups were not always aware of government or CLO participation in PRD activities. However, given such participation would likely draw attention and be quickly noticed by participants, a more likely explanation might be that government and CLO interviewees might have overstated their interest and participation to “please the interviewer.” It could also be that government and CLO felt genuinely interested in PRD activities but simply do not have the time in their schedules to participate in activities.

**Finding #2: PRD has faced significant constraining factors, both predict and unforeseen, that has limited the effectiveness of activities to date. However, PRD has built on a couple significant enabling factors, the most important of which has been stronger and eager civil society participation.**


## Complementarities and External Collaboration

### Evidence:

*Have consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?*

- 19 of 20 (95%) of interviews stated that there was limited or no complementarity between PRD activities, at least as an intentional strategy.

Figure 13: Collaboration with Outside Projects



- Partners did however state that they were working towards the same goals and thereby their activities complement each other indirectly.
- EPRP and ILO provided a few examples of low-level collaboration, such as sending partners to each other’s workshops.

*Does the program collaborate with other projects and programs to enhance its impact and effectiveness?*

- PRD has only sporadically sought to link or collaborate with other external peacebuilding project. 17 of 24 (71%) of interviews identified limited to no collaboration with outside projects.
  - However, some notable exceptions have occurred. These include:
    - Referral and transfer mechanisms were established between ILO and CTFMR for documenting cases of underage recruits that more relevant to the Forced Labour Complaints Mechanism, and vice versa.
    - Supporting a JPF-sponsored local dialogue led by the RCSS CLO in Tachileik.
    - Facilitating a workshop with a Senior Conflict Advisor from JPF.
    - Connecting women’s groups in northern Shan with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to access “post-rape kits” following reported instances of sexual violence.
    - Representatives from the Kachin Durable Peace Programme presented on their project at a PAC meeting in Yangon.
  - The evaluation team also saw evidence of more informal coordination in project locations, particularly in Taunggyi.

Disaggregation: There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

Triangulation: The original PRD proposal identified several steps that the programme would take to facilitate coordination and collaboration with other projects. "Co-ordination will take place at i) sites of the action - engaging local humanitarian and development partners (bilaterally and under any inter- agency/development partner structures) as well as State and EAO authorities - where activities under the action will contribute to the facilitation of wider co-ordination of external interventions, and ii) at the Yangon/Naypyidaw -levels, with, inter alia, humanitarian and development partners, peace support actors, specifically those engaged in Shan and Kachin states, the MPC and any peace needs assessment initiatives."<sup>27</sup> While there was evidence of informal coordination, particularly in Yangon and Taunggyi, these efforts of coordination look to have been limited in practice. PRD's inception report also states that "there remains a willingness to seek to explore opportunities for tangible collaboration...however interaction presently remains at the level of sharing lessons and insights on inception period."<sup>28</sup>

The evaluation team used the interviews with the other EU supported consortiums to discuss the issues of collaboration and coordination. Representatives from both consortiums said that they would welcome increased collaboration between the three consortia, in theory, pressure to implement their own respective work plans limited such collaboration in practice. One of representatives suggested that the EU could consider taking a more active role in facilitating collaboration and learning between the three consortia by organizing various learning events or identifying specific topics of interest.

---

**Finding #3: There is limited complementarity between PRD's current activities within the Consortium, as well as limited collaboration with other peacebuilding projects despite the potential for both to help enhance the program's effectiveness.**

---

---

<sup>27</sup> Organisation, "Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar."

<sup>28</sup> "Inception Period - Internal Review: Eu-Funded 'Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Programme.'," (October 2015).

## Efficiency

The efficiency questions were organized into two overarching themes: (1) extent that resources were used in a timely and strategic fashion; and (2) governance and administration issues hindering efficiency. The EU “Results Oriented Monitoring” mission which was conducted in parallel to the midterm evaluation looked extensively at efficiency related questions and serves as a valuable resource for project staff to consider (the evaluators did not have access to the final internal EU report).


### Strategic and Timely Resources

#### Evidence:

*Has the program used resources in a strategic and timely way?*

- A majority of interviews with Consortium partners (7 of 10 or 70%) revealed issues in the timeliness and strategic use of resources.
  - The most commonly stated issue related to a delay in funding allocation between fiscal years. This caused significant disruptions to activities between Year 1 and Year 2, to the extent that two partners considered leaving the Consortium.
  - A similar issue looks likely for the transition from Year 2 and Year 3, threatening the continuation of some activities as early as May 2017.
- Project documentation indicate a longer-than-expected inception period and hiring of staff resulted in low fund-utilization rates, especially for the larger international partners ILO and SCI. This in turn has led to the funding allocation issue mentioned above as the programme has been unable to reach its minimum 70% fund utilization requirement needed to trigger the full release of the next tranche of funding. Consequently, €289,000 was withheld which would have helped alleviate part of the funding gap.


Figure 14: Strategic and Timely Use of Resources



*Have any measures that has been put in place?*

- Yes, ILO and SCI provided bridging loans to ASG and EPRP to cover activities during the Year 1 and Year 2 transition.
- ILO has applied and received permission from their Deputy Sectary General to advance funding to Consortium partners

Figure 15: Significance of Funding Issue




to help bridge the period between Fiscal Years beginning as early as July 2017. However, ASG and EPRP have indicated that this funding may not arrive quickly enough to help cover activities.

*Has the programs built on the previous work of Consortium partners?*

- Apart from the funding allocation and budget utilization issues, PRD has utilized its funding strategically. 20 of 21 interviews (95%) indicated the current PRD activities built off activities or relationships developed under other past or present projects.

**Figure 16: Building on Previous Activities**



**Disaggregation:** The funding allocation issue disproportionately affected the three smaller members of the PRD consortium. These organisations have access to far less internal financial capital and therefore are particularly vulnerable to cash flow issues. Two members of the Consortium, ASG and EPRP, were affected to such an extent that EPRP is considering potentially closing down and ASG is considering asking employees to finance interest payments on a bank loan in order to keep activities going. The two larger international partners are sensitive to this issue and provided exceptional bridging loans in 2016. ILO has also requested special approval to advance money to its smaller partners for the upcoming funding year transition. However, this process has been cumbersome, requiring sign off all the way up at the Deputy Director General level in Geneva.

**Triangulation:** The funding issue has been documented in both the Year 1 Annual Report and PAC meeting minutes. “EPRP and MDCG noted that the time lag between utilising Year 1 fund and receipt of Year 2 funds has caused significant problems and prompted organisations considering leaving Consortium. It noted difficulty of funds flows for smaller organisations. All organisations agreed to stay but issue would be raised to ILO.”<sup>29</sup>

---

**Finding #1: Issues related to fund allocation between Year 1 and Year 2 had significant negative impacts on activities and threaten to have similar effects between Year 2 and Year 3.**

---

### Governance and Administration Issues

**Evidence:**

*What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed?*

---

<sup>29</sup> PAC Meeting Minutes, "Minutes from 8th Pac Meeting" (October 6, 2016).



- Minutes were documented from nine PAC meetings over the first 20 months of programme. This indicates that the PAC has met on a more frequent than quarterly basis. Project documentation explaining that additional meetings were needed during the inception period to discuss monitoring and coherence issues.
- Interviews with project staff indicated some disappointment with the PAC meetings as staff explained they were generally just used to update each other on activities conducted since the last meeting rather than as an opportunity for joint-planning.
  - One respondent said “I thought the PAC meetings would have been fertile ground for synergies...a chance to discuss a clear division of labour and responsibilities, to work collectively, and to understand what others are doing. I don’t think this has been the case.”
  - Another suggested, “at moment PAC is only consortium members – maybe the group might want to expand it and include other key members like government and other partners.”

*Has the program received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT- Bangkok, if relevant)? If not why?*

- Consortium partners indicated a desire for additional support in strengthening M&E capacity of staff. At a final debrief at the end of fieldwork the evaluators asked the PAC if they thought the establishment of a PMU similar to those established in the Kachin and Kayah consortiums would be beneficial. This PMU would include 1-2 staff that would serve as a shared resource focused on providing technical assistance and capacity building to each of the Consortium members as needed. Initial discussions indicated that such a PMU would be welcomed.

Disaggregation: Given the small number of respondents to this question meaningful disaggregation is not possible.

Triangulation: Discussions with Consortium partners, the EU, and other Consortia partners all agreed that the establishment of a PMU might help strengthen the quality of monitoring, reporting, and perhaps even the coherence of implementation.

---

**Finding #2: The PAC has met on a frequent and regular basis and facilitate knowledge-sharing among Consortium partners, however the amount of joining planning and implementation during these meetings has been limited.**

---

# Sustainability


## Ownership

*What is the extent of government interest and participation in activities?*

### Evidence:

- There was a strong sense of community buy-in and interest. 31 of 32 (97%) of interviews responding stated that community members demonstrated a commitment to supporting and sustaining PRD activities, while the remaining group responded that there was some but not complete community buy-in.
- However, this finding contrasts sharply with the buy-in and interest from government officials. As shown in Figure 12 (see “Effectiveness” section, p. 25), 33 of 39 interviews (85%) stated that there was little or no government interest in PRD activities.

**Figure 17: Community Buy-In and Ownership**




*To what extent has the capacity of host country partners/staff been built up to manage activities?*

- 36 of 37 (97%) of interviews claimed that the capacity of national staff and community members had been built in some way due to their participation in the project.
- However, most claimed that this was limited based on attendance at one or two workshops.
  - Unsurprisingly, those attending multiple workshops or engaged in longer-term capacity-development efforts such as the community infrastructure projects were more likely to report a higher degree of capacity-building.

**Disaggregation:** There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

**Triangulation:** PRD’s proposal highlights the importance of building host capacity as an effort to ensure both the ownership and sustainability of activities. “The proposed action will build the capacity of Shan civil society,

**Figure 18: Capacity of Host-Country Staff**



including by strengthening community based organisations, youth platforms (in child rights), participatory community development processes, child rights monitoring and child-led research. For example, the action will result in CBOs and youth platforms having the ability to document the child rights situation in their communities and advocate towards local duty bearers for the fulfilment of children's rights after the action.”<sup>30</sup>

**Finding #1: PRD has facilitated a strong sense of community buy-in and interests in its activities; however, it has had limited success securing the interest and buy-in of government counterparts.**

### Prospects for Sustainability

#### Evidence:


*To what extent do respondents think the activities will continue?*

- Interviewees across all stakeholder groups expressed a high degree of confidence that activities would continue following the end of PRD.
- Interviewees cited motivated civil society actors in their communities, as well as a high degree of community interest in sustaining these activities as reasons for their confidence.
- The establishment of maintenance committees and use of left over construction funds for maintenance was also a commonly cited reason for activities under SO 3.
- Interviewees expressed lingering hope that a future, more federal system of governance would support further community consultation and empowerment.


*What steps has the program taken to ensure sustainability?*

- While optimism that activities would be sustained was high, the results were more mixed in terms of identifying what actual steps had been taken to help sustain activities.
- Concrete examples were most often highlighted for activities

**Figure 19: Activities Continuing After Program End**



**Figure 20: Steps Taken to Ensure Sustainability**



<sup>30</sup> Organisation, "Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar."


under SO 3, including the formation of Maintenance Committees.

- Under SO 1 and SO 2, respondents provided examples of training participants forming their own CBOs and providing their own community-level trainings.

*Has the program secured funding for program activities from other sources?*

- In terms of securing funding specifically, the results were again mixed.
- While some CBOs trained under SO 1 and SO 2 stated that they had received funding from other sources, the majority of those responding favourably provided examples related to the village infrastructure projects where sustainability considerations were required by the programme from the outset.

**Figure 21: Securement of Additional Funding**



Disaggregation: Interestingly, the majority of beneficiaries able to provide concrete examples of steps taken to ensure sustainability came from in and around Taunggyi. This is likely due to higher levels of initial capacity among Taunggyi-based civil society actors and a higher concentration of donor projects, past and present, working to capacitate civil society.

Triangulation: The evaluation team was not able to find any secondary sources that could help triangulate interview answers for this question.

---

**Finding #2. While the sustainability of PRD’s activities and results is encouraged by active, motivated, and optimistic civil society partners, only around half of the groups interviewed have taken tangible steps to ensure such sustainability.**

---

## Special Aspects

### Gender

#### Evidence:


*Is the gender action plan being followed and used?*

- As shown in Figure 4 (pg. 7), staff from all five Consortium partners answered that they did not regularly consult and use the Gender Framework.

*What steps has the program taken to ensure gender is mainstreamed into activities?*

- Gender has been added as a standing agenda item at all PAC meetings and PAC meeting minutes confirm that gender has been discussed at all meetings.
- 21 of 24 interview groups (88%) responded that PRD activities have made efforts to consider gender issues.

**Figure 22: Steps to Ensure Gender Mainstreaming**



- The most common example was focused on encouraging the attendance and participation of women during trainings and workshops.
- Under SO 3, PRD guidance states that Village Development Committees must be comprised of at least 35% women.
- PRD has sought to engage and partner with women organizations across Shan State.
- Project documents indicate that gender focused activities have included:
  - Training over 74 participants on the “Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women” (CEDAW).
  - Facilitating “16 Days of Activism” in Lashio.
  - Girl-empowerment activities to promote girl’s leadership at the village level.
  - Confidence building workshops.
  - Vocational training.
- However, the evaluation also noted that these gender focused vocational training activities tended to reinforce traditional gender norms. For example, some of PRD’s “gender” activities focused on providing sewing lessons as vocational training for females and mechanical training for males.
  - The evaluators probed on this issue and found that the majority of respondents felt that this was appropriate to the context. They said that it would be unrealistic

to try and reverse strong gender norms in this project and that the majority of jobs available for women were related to traditional gender roles such as dressmaking, soap making, and selling goods at the local market.

*Does M&E data disaggregate by sex and age?*

- Yes both PRD's MEAL Plan and donors reports submitted thus far (Inception Period Report and Year 1 Annual Report) disaggregate indicators by sex, and some by age (youth).
- However, these indicators tend to focus on attendance at events and not the quality of participation. However, the Year 1 Annual Report did show evidence of at least trying to document how often women spoke up at trainings and events.

Disaggregation: Encouragingly, the vast majority of respondents—male, female, and youth—across all project locations emphasized the importance of encouraging female and youth participation in events. Interviewees explained the importance of combating social norms that often saw women in a subordinate role, especially related to politics and the peace process.

Triangulation: A review of project documents shows a strong emphasis on targeting the needs of women and youth. “The observed limited participation of women, including their frequent marginalisation from local level decision-making, is a major impediment to the strength and sustainability of the peace process. Interventions are essential to increase gender awareness and women's participation. The action includes a comprehensive strategy to mainstream gender issues including by introducing roundtable discussions involving women and men in ethnic communities, developing 'gender-sensitive listening' training materials for the listening project interviewers and CLOs, and the capacity-building of motivated local CSOs/CBOs.”<sup>31</sup> The first annual report further states “Given the socio-cultural operating context it has become clear that the starting point for participation and engagement of women, youth, and children is low and any significant progress against the specific indicators of increasing participation and reflecting concerns of women and youth needs positive encouragement based on mutual trust and confidence was not something Consortium partners could simply demand of communities.”<sup>32</sup>

---

**Finding #1: While PRD has taken notable steps to capture and report sex-disaggregated data, additional effort is needed to effectively capture and understand differences in how activities are experienced and internalized by women, men, girls, and boys.**

---

### **Conflict sensitivity**

*Is the LCA used and regularly updated?*

- As shown in Figure 4 (pg. 14), staff from all five Consortium partners answered that they did not regularly consult and use the Gender Framework.

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.


<sup>32</sup> Organisation, "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment."

- The Inception Period Report indicates that feelings on the utility of the LCA was mixed across the Consortium. “It was noted that the local conflict assessment exercise had been ‘disappointing’ – in not being ‘more local’, in not moving sufficiently from a desk- based exercise shared via e-mail and not being subject to more meaningful discussion and action on-the-ground. Others noted that interactions and findings on-the-ground substantially inform considerations of conflict sensitivity and that this necessarily cannot be captured in a written exercise in advance and that the Local Conflict Assessment was a ‘living document’, not a one-off exercise.”<sup>33</sup>

*To what extent has the program sought to respond to sensitivities?*

- There was strong evidence that PRD has actively sought to consider, monitor, and respond to the conflict sensitivity of its activities.

**Figure 23: Response to Identified Sensitivities**



- 14 of 17 interview groups reported being satisfied with the PRD’s response to sensitivities, while one Consortium partner felt that more could be done while two respondent groups stated that not enough was being done by the programme to ensure the physical safety of staff and beneficiaries in conflict areas.

Project documents also highlight a number of examples of identified sensitivities and steps taken:

- “The suspicions that exist between ethnic groups – between, for example Shan and Pa’oh – Shan and Palaung - were also noted as having become increasingly evident and needed to be kept in view, with programme actions understood in terms of how they might be perceived in the light of those tensions and suspicions and adjusted accordingly.”
- “ILO’s invitation by the PNLO to work in Mawk Mai Township—a Township that has areas controlled by Government, RCSS and the PNLO was raised by EPRP as needing to be approached with caution in order that it not contribute to inter-ethnic tension. ILO noted that aside from PNLO representatives and community members, including religious figures in Mawk Mai they sought discussion on this with four RCSS officials, the Foreign Relations Liaison, the Director of the RCSS Shan State Development Foundation, the Military Liaison Officer and the Public Liaison Officer in Taunggyi—only the latter had expressed reservations and this was in respect of timing given September 2015 fighting.”
- “Concerns were noted in respect of how well resourced and joined-up actions would be in responding to an increase in the demobilisation of child soldiers in Shan State. Any

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.


increase in demobilisation necessitating more responsive reintegration assistance, including livelihoods support and career orientation. In light of this ILO has, in the October 2015 budget revision exercise, sought a modest increase in its budget allocation for reintegration assistance; efforts are underway to identify appropriate referral pathways under other programmes of support in Shan State. ILO’s skills programme and, separately, its small business and entrepreneurship training and an intended project funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund will be utilised.”

- “Two efforts were made to move on the basic photography training, both have faced sensitivities in implementation with concerns by participants that photography outings may cause security problems in militarized areas. It remains under review as to when and where it might be feasible.”
- "The trust and confidence 'baseline' on the part of the SSPP with respect to external agencies is clearly very low - we need to recognise and act on this - failure to deliver on any prospective under-takings with SSPP would be particularly damaging to our relations and potentially set back our ability to work with them over the lifetime of the project."
- Project documents show that PRD commissioned a “Do No Harm”/Conflict Sensitivity workshop involving partner staff from across the Consortium.

*What feedback mechanisms are in place to ensure program does not increase tensions?*

- All interview groups responding felt that some type of feedback mechanism was in place to monitoring possible increases in tensions.
- Formal mechanisms including updates (although limited) to the Local Conflict Assessment and discussions during the quarterly PAC meetings.
- Informal mechanisms included linking CBOs and women’s groups with other human rights focused organizations or documenting violations through ILO’s forced labour mechanism, students reporting the use of corporal punishment in schools following trainings on the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and working with local religious leaders to encourage non-discrimination and provide local dispute resolution.

**Figure 24: Existence of Community Feedback Mechanisms**



**Disaggregation:** There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question given the overwhelming consensus across stakeholder groups.

**Triangulation:** Project documents demonstrate a clear commitment to ensuring the conflict sensitivity of activities. For example, the PRD proposal cautioned that the “[Community dialogue] process should also identify any tensions that could be sparked or aggravated by the selection of infrastructure programmes or livelihoods beneficiaries, and ensure that subsequent decisions in



this area are transparent and clearly understood.” It also argued that “A conflict/context sensitive approach is necessary as many of the CBOs are supporters of the EAOs and programming experience has demonstrated that it is unlikely they will report violations committed by EAOs unless the EAOs themselves are supportive of this.”<sup>34</sup>

---

**Finding #2: PRD has a strong focus on ensuring a conflict sensitive approach and has established both formal and informal mechanisms to investigate, understand, and monitor sensitivities in areas where it works.**

---

### **Unanticipated consequences**

#### Evidence:

*Were there any unexpected reactions/alternate use of activities and resources?*

#### **Positive Unintended Consequences:**

- Use of ILO’s Forced Labour mechanism to report instances of physical and sexual violence in PRD programme areas.
- Students in Mansi reporting instances of corporal punishment in their schools following trainings on the Conventions of the Rights of the Child.
- Community members starting their own CBOs following trainings under SO 1 and SO 2.
- The first annual report noted that “an unanticipated positive benefit of the sensitive listening work is that the youth trained in sensitive listening and interviewing techniques have felt better engaged in a process from which they initially report feeling ‘alienated.’ The interviewers expressed concern and sorrow after hearing so many stories of the bad experiences suffered by those they interviewed and listened to. They did though note that this motivated them to see what they could do ‘for the people.’”<sup>35</sup>

#### **Negative Unintended Consequences:**

- Increasing harassment and threats for the physical safety of programme staff and beneficiaries, especially in northern Shan state.
- Potential bias favouring Christian minority communities in eastern Shan – 8 of 10 communities supported are Christian.
- An instance in Taunggyi where PNLO CLO staff objected to ILO staff consulting with RCSS about a potential infrastructure project in what PNLO considered to be an area under their control. Project staff had to explain to both PNLO and RCSS staff that this was part of their conflict sensitive approach and that both sides would be consulted about projects in disputed areas to ensure full transparency.

---

<sup>34</sup> Organisation, "Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar."

<sup>35</sup> "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment."

- Potential that training and capacity building provided to CLO offices could be used for military purposes.
- A risk of building up expectations among communities that their grievances, issues, and concerns will be addressed by duty-bearers and then not being able to deliver.

Disaggregation: There was no discernible difference by sex, age, or geography on this question.

Triangulation: PRD’s Inception Report echoed the concern expressed by some interviewees that PRD risks building up expectations that it then cannot deliver. “EPRP noted challenges faced by their listening project interviewers in handling and responding to issues being raised by communities. The interviewers are (naturally) finding the issues raised by communities affecting and are seeking to work out when and how they might be in a position to respond to issues raised. MDCG raised the same issue – after hearing issues raised, what next? The observation was made that this is likely to be a recurring theme in community engagement – seeking to raise and enable discussion on sometimes sensitive issues which Consortium partners may or may not be in a position to offer advice, a referral or to assist in a response to and where duty-bearers, either EAOs or Government are not amenable or in a position to acknowledge and respond to community issues and complaints.”

---

**Finding #3: PRD activities have resulted in several unanticipated results, both positive and negative. The most significant related to safety and protection issues for staff and beneficiaries.**

---

### **Tripartite Issues and International Labour Standards**

The evaluation did not initially capture data on tripartite issues and adherence to international labour standards during fieldwork as these issues were primarily ILO-focused and the team was asked to keep their focus on issues relevant across the Consortium. However, based on follow-up discussion with Consortium staff following fieldwork, the team found the following:

- Tripartite issues have been discussed under ILO’s general framework for Myanmar but have not been discussed or considered in detail under the PRD programme. For the ILO framework for Myanmar, Tripartite discussions have focused on preventing the use of forced labour and adhering to international labour standards, with a focus on areas of the country affected by conflict.
- Internal Labour Standards are, however, directly addressed. An example can be seen in SO 3 wherein ILO labour standards have been included in guidance provided to VDCs. As reported by Consortium staff, “activities under this objective are also framed under ILO’s Decent Work Agenda which encompasses job creation, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with gender equality as a crosscutting objective.”

---

**Finding #4: Tripartite issues have been discussed under ILO’s general framework for Myanmar but have not been discussed or considered in detail under the PRD programme. Internal Labour Standards, however, are directly addressed in the programme.**

---

# Conclusions

---

## Assessment on Programming Assumptions

- 1. PRD was designed based on optimistic expectations on the pace and level of reform. While some of the program’s underlying assumptions have materialized, particularly those around the program’s community-empowerment and armed actor sensitization work, other important assumptions around duty-bearer participation and response have not. This has in turn constrained the program’s ability to deliver on outcome-level results which were heavily dependent on duty-bearer response.**

To provide an accurate and valid assessment of the overall performance of any programme, it is critical to consider the context within which that programme took place. This is true for any development program but is particularly the case for peace and reconciliation programs or programs operating in conflict and transitional environments. These programs are less likely to follow linear theories of change and are more susceptible to fluctuations in underlying assumptions. Thus, in formulating an overall assessment of the performance of the PRD program it is important to assess the expectations of the program against what was realistically achievable given changes in the operating context.

PRD was designed during a period on usually high optimism and donor interest in supporting Myanmar’s democratic transition. The ratification of a new constitution in 2010 and emergence of a quasi-civilian government in 2011 following nearly six decades of military rule put Myanmar near the top of many donors lists, including that of the EU. OECD estimates that “Official Development Assistance” to Myanmar tripled from US\$380 in 2011 to \$1.169 billion in 2015, the latest year for which data is published.

This optimism reached a crescendo in late 2014/early 2015, the time during which PRD was developed. This period witnessed increasing momentum in the peace process and the likelihood of sixteen separate EAGs previously at war with the central government signing a “nationwide” ceasefire, as well as burgeoning hopes for the election of a truly democratic government led by the renowned peace activist and Nobel Laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her opposition NLD party. Supporting Myanmar’s ongoing democratic transition was a top EU priority and the initial tender set lofty ambitions for how funding could be used to support reforms.

However, as EU’s latest (June 2016) strategy articulates, many challenges remain and this initial optimism has been diminished by the relative lack of subsequent progress.

“Myanmar/Burma has witnessed remarkable change since reforms began in 2011, and the arrival in office in April 2016 of a new, democratically elected government provides a historic opportunity...The new administration, with limited governing experience, faces enormous challenges. These include consolidating democracy, promoting ethnic peace

and reconciliation, advancing constitutional reforms, institution building and security sector reform, and promoting the rule of law and human rights.”<sup>36</sup>

Specific to community and civil society empowerment, the EU strategy continues that

“Civil society organisations have traditionally played a crucial role in delivery of basic services, in particular in areas affected by conflict. They are also a central driving force in promoting and protecting democracy, including involvement in domestic election observation, human rights, and cultural diversity. Nonetheless, civil society still faces many restrictions.”<sup>37</sup>

The US government offers an even more sober assessment on status of Myanmar’s latest reforms and their effect on community empower.

“During the early stage of Burma’s transition towards democracy in 2011, most of the significant changes were driven from the top-down: designed and authorized by the Government, with limited public consultation and engagement. Channels for public consultation and dialogue have been relatively new concepts in Burma, and civil society often finds it difficult to engage the Government and authorities due to a lack of historical precedent.”<sup>38</sup>

In short, PRD was designed during a time of particularly high hopes for the future progress of Myanmar’s transition. This meant that some of the program underlying assumptions ended up being overly reliant on more positive enabling factors such as an active and energized civil society, a newly elected popular government, and large injection of international donor support that were expected to help facilitate the achievement of PRD’s ambitious objectives. While some of these assumptions have materialized, particularly those centred around the program’s community-empowerment work, other core assumptions have not. Fewer EAGs in Shan have signed ceasefires with the Tatmadaw than originally expected and the number and intensity of armed clashes have escalated to a point not seen since the previous military government. Even more importantly, the interest and participation of duty-bearers—both government and EAGs—in listening and more importantly acting on community developed suggestions has not occurred to the level expected. This is due in part due to low capacity levels and structural barriers of a heavily centralized governance structure but is also partly caused by a mind-set of duty barriers that local communities are “too uneducated” or otherwise incapable of identifying and articulating their own development needs.

---

<sup>36</sup> High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Elements for an Eu Strategy Vis-a-Vis Myanmar/Burma: A Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity," news release, June 2016. Pgs. 1 and 5.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. Pg. 4.

<sup>38</sup> US Agency for International Development, "Midterm Performance Evaluation of Usaid/Burma Civil Socierty and Media Activity: State of Work," ed. USAID/Burma Democracy and Governance Office (March 2017).

## Assessment of Coherence

- 2. The programme has struggled to develop and follow a coherent approach to implementation across its consortium. This is partly caused by institutional agreements between Consortium partners allowing for a high degree of independence in the management of their respective activities; partly by gaps in the programme’s causal logic and the different thematic and geographical concentrations of partners; and partly due to the incomplete use of central Consortium programme management tools.**

The EU’s original Request for Proposal outlined an ambitious programme that would attempt to facilitate difficult conversations to address deeply rooted issues in Myanmar’s largest and most diverse state. The Consortium’s proposal responded by matching this ambition and focused on quickly assembling a team of institutional partners with a broad range of technical and geographical reach. Previous institutional relationships and an ability to satisfy proposal criteria was given considerable weight while the deadline for proposals constrained the Consortium’s ability to more fully consider ways to ensure synergies and complementarities so that the Consortium as a whole would be “more than the sum of its parts.” As a result, partners developed an informal agreement that each Consortium partner would be given a high degree of autonomy in the design and management of its activities. While ILO, as the Consortium Lead, would be responsible for reporting, each partner was trusted to identify local needs and oversee the day-to-day management of activities. Following the first two years of the programme, this has resulted in the Consortium appearing to be more a collection of individual projects, rather than a unified program with clear synergies targeting similar issues through common approaches.

Additionally, the casual logic linking activities and results could be strengthened. This in part prevents the programme from capturing opportunities for synergy and complementarity of activities, particularly between the different Consortium partners. The “demand driven” focus of the programme, wherein participants are encouraged to suggest their own topics for workshops, while strong on relevance, detracts from the coherence of the project. While this may be caused by organizational agreements between the Consortium partners, this has also resulted in several one-off workshops on a variety of topics with little focus, follow-up, or “critical mass” of participants trained needed to lead to higher level results. That said, the evaluation also notes that technical resources have been shared between partners and trainings are open for partners to join. The Consortium has also tried to improve its coherence by holding nine PAC meetings; conducting seven joint field visits; and organizing numerous smaller meetings between Consortium partners to discuss specific implementation, M&E, and technical issues.

Lastly, while substantial effort has gone into the development of important program documents such as the MEAL plan, Gender Framework, Stakeholder Map, and Local Conflict Assessment, and there is evidence that this has had some important effects on producing a minimal level of coherence across the Consortium, these documents are not being widely used for informing programme management. That said, there was a strong wiliness across the Consortium to improve the coherence and complementarity of activities by revising the PAC meetings and engaging in more joint planning and shared events. Both PRD partners and beneficiaries also suggested that the programme reduce the breadth of activities and instead deepen them through follow-on workshops and repeated engagement with fewer but more regular CBO partners.

## Assessment of Relevance

- 3. PRD is relevant and strongly aligned to the empowerment needs and desires expressed by communities themselves across all locations visited during the evaluation. It is also aligned to the priorities identified in EU strategies and the work of other peacebuilding partners working to promote peace and reconciliation in Shan. However, the lack of government participation to date indicates that PRD may not be fully aligned to the peacebuilding priorities of the Shan state government, which admittedly have been vague and poorly defined.**

There was an overwhelming consensus across all stakeholder groups that the community focused work undertaken by PRD was relevant to the current community-level needs when it comes to governance and peacebuilding issues in Shan state. Respondents indicated that the mere presence of foreigners in previously “brown areas”<sup>39</sup> encouraging community members to gather and express their grievances, needs, and hopes for the future is in and of itself a major result and example of a “peace dividend.” The community-led infrastructure projects were also widely appreciated by various stakeholder groups and were cited as a useful incentive or “hook” to capture government and EAG leaders’ attention.

There was also a strong consensus that PRD activities were based on community consultation and assessment. This likely in part explains the consensus above that the community-focused activities were relevant to the grassroots needs of communities in Shan state. However, while PRD has been strong in its consultation, more can be done to pursue more participatory approaches by involving beneficiaries in the design and implementation of activities. Again, there was wide praise of the community-led infrastructure activities under SO 3. These activities have a strong participatory focus with community members responsible for identifying and ranking priority needs, managing and overseeing construction, and taking responsibility for the maintenance and sustainability of the resulting projects. While there is strong evidence that the workshops under SO 1 and SO 2 were heavily “demand led” and participants were involved in selecting the various topics of workshops and trainings, the actual design and implementation has been primarily conducted by Consortium partners themselves. However, a few notable exceptions exist. These include training materials for the forced labour, entrepreneur training, and youth group trainings which utilised beneficiary focus groups to tailor training materials.

The activities pursued under PRD also look to be relevant to the comparative advantages of the Consortium partners, particularly at the country level. While for ILO peacebuilding falls under its “5 flagships areas,” most peacebuilding observers would generally not associate ILO as particularly strong or well-known in this field. However, in Myanmar, ILO’s long country presence and close relationship with higher levels of Tatmadaw and EAG command make it a unique peacebuilding player. Likewise, SCI’s long country presence and relationships with armed actors

---

<sup>39</sup> As explained by The Asia Foundation, the terms—“white,” “brown,” and “black” areas—are a remnant of the Tatmadaw’s brutal previous “four cuts strategy” that sought to cut off civilian and outside support to EAGs. “White areas” refer to areas under government control, “black areas” refer to areas under EAG control, and “brown areas” refer to areas under mixed control. For additional detail, see Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions,” ed. The Asia Foundation (Myanmar June 2014).

through the CTFMR also make it a strong peacebuilding player in Myanmar. The three smaller partners all benefit from strong local network, in-depth knowledge of their areas, and appear to have gained the trust of their community members. However, one comparative advantage that has thus far been relatively underutilized is the “convening authority” that ILO and SCI could leverage to support joint activities. The smaller consortium partners do not have such an ability to attract government, EAGs, or media representatives. Some of the Consortium partners suggested that SCI and ILO could look for opportunities to support the smaller partners utilizing some of this “convening authority” and helping to raise the profile of their activities.

The relevance and alignment of activities with the priorities of the Shan State government is difficult to determine. While a “Shan State Development Plan” has been draft, and is ostensible supposed to be a public document, it has not yet been finalized or distributed publically. Despite repeated efforts, the programme has also struggled to meet with state government officials, particularly at higher levels, including the Chief Minister. The “Shan State Development Plan” is scheduled to be realised shortly following the evaluation (April 2017) which may provide new opportunities for the programme to engage with state government.

### **Assessment of Effectiveness**

- 4. The lack of updated M&E data at the time of the evaluation, which occurred prior to the end-of-year reporting cycle, makes it difficult to reach a definitive assessment on the program’s effectiveness to date. However, based on information available and collected during the evaluation, PRD appears unlikely to reach its current targets and intended results.**

An assessment of the programme based solely on the indicators presented in the current MEAL Plan would indicate that the program is unlikely to reach its current targets and intended results. However, such an assessment would overlook important results that the current M&E system does not fully capture, such as the changes in attitudes and informal reporting of ceasefire or human rights violations occurring in project areas.

PRD’s mixed performance on effectiveness and results is caused by a variety of factors. First, the inaccuracy of some of the programme’s underlying assumptions have served as significant impediments to results related duty-bearer response, and child soldier demobilization and reintegration under SO 1 and SO 2. Second, flaws in programme and activity design have led to a scattering of activities targeting a relatively large number of groups and individuals through one-off and relatively low intensity activities such as one, two, or three-day trainings and workshops. While each workshop or training may be well designed and facilitated, and likely even result in positive improvements in knowledge and attitudes, they are unlikely to lead to higher, outcome-level results such as tangible changes in behaviour. Three, even if these higher-level results were to happen, PRD’s current M&E system is inadequate for capturing them. While the “Data Analysis and Learning” section of the MEAL plan includes questions allowing for the capture of contributions towards higher level results, the lack of consistency across partner reporting results in a relatively weak-evidence base and mostly anecdotal examples. Four, the Consortium’s lack of coherence or complementarity in approach results in the Consortium failing to live up to its goal of “the whole being more than the sum of its parts.” It terms of its work planning and

activities, the Consortium is more similar to five separate projects working towards shared goals than a team of five partners working in unison to complement, support, and strengthen each other's activities. Lastly, PRD has been challenged by a number of external factors that have constrained its results. These include a faltering peace process, a re-concentration of power to a few national level leaders within the NLD government, a significant escalation in armed conflict in programme areas, significant and ongoing private and rent-seeking interests in maintaining the "status quo," a lack of a clear government peacebuilding strategy, and an increasing crowded "arena" of peacebuilding actors eager to contribute their own ideas on how best to support the Myanmar peace process.

Overall, the evaluation found that PRD has made significant progress on its "demand" or community-focused aspect but has made considerably less progress on its "supply" or duty-bearer focused aspect. This is in part due to unrealistic expectations and targets, in part due to internal issues related to design, monitoring, and overall focus, and in part due to a complex and fluid operating environment uncondusive to linear theories of change.

### **Assessment of Efficiency**

- 5. Issues related to reporting and the subsequent release of programme funds have caused significant disruptions to activities and even threatened the continued participation of some Consortium partners. Additionally, while the Programme Advisory Committee has met on a frequent and regular basis and facilitated knowledge-sharing, it has had limited effect on improving joint planning and efficiencies in implementation across the Consortium to date.**

Fund utilisation and allocation has proven to be a major issue affecting the efficiency of PRD activities. Delays in recruitment for key positions among ILO and SCI resulted in a considerable underspend during the first year of the programme. While the other Consortium partners were quick to staff all positions and utilise their budgets to fund activities in the work plan, PRD ended the first fiscal year with a utilisation rate slightly under the 70% which in turn results in €289,000 being withheld from the next tranche of funding. This sum would have helped minimize the subsequent funding gap period between submission of the annual report and the Consortium's request for payment and receipt of funds.

Deficiencies in the first annual report further delayed the release of the second fiscal year funding. While the larger Consortium partners—ILO and SCI—had sufficient internal financial resources to overcome this cash flow issue and continue activities, the smaller Consortium partners were left with extremely limited resources. While an internal loan arrangement was made to overcome this initial cash flow issue, PRD is experiencing a similar issue during the transition to the third fiscal year. These cash flow issues have caused considerable internal tension within the Consortium and resulted in a significant investment of time and energy which could have been used to oversee and improve programme activities.

The current functioning of the PAC was another area commonly cited where PRD could improve its efficiency. Interviewees reported that PAC meetings were mostly used for retrospective updates on what activities each PRD partner has completed over the past quarter, and not as an



opportunity for more forward-looking joint planning. As discussed in the coherence section, there was clear evidence that the Consortium is not operating based on a coherent or complementary approach internally, and the evaluation found only a few instances where PRD has actively sought to cooperate and complement activities externally with other peacebuilding partners. Discussions with the Kachin and Kayah Consortiums highlighted the utility that their internal PMUs have had on helping to strengthen coherence and the monitoring of activities.

More positively, there was strong evidence of PRD benefitting from and leveraging relationships built under previous projects. This has helped some partners “hit the ground running” and spend less time and energy on initial trust and relationship building.

### **Assessment of Sustainability**

- 6. The sustainability of PRD’s activities and results appears mixed. While staff and beneficiaries hold positive expectations that activities and results will continue following the end of project funding, the evaluation found few examples of tangible steps taken to secure additional funding or otherwise sustain activities. Activities under SO 3 appear to have the highest chance for sustainability, in part due to the strong design of these specific activities which address sustainability from the outset by requiring the establishment of Maintenance Committees for each project.**

It is important to recognize that the sustainability of this type of trust, confidence, and general peacebuilding work is heavily context dependent. Efforts to facilitate peace-promoting attitude and behaviour changes at the grassroots level is heavily influenced by developments at the national level. Setbacks in the national peace process can quickly upend and reverse significant and tangible strides made at the community level. The considerable setbacks in Myanmar’s national peace process have resulted in a significantly less conducive enabling environment than originally assumed as the outset of the programme.

However, a significant weakness threatening PRD’s sustainability has been the programme’s inability to effectively link with government institutions, policies, and peacebuilding structures. It is important to emphasize that the government was widely criticized across all stakeholder groups for having failed to clearly articulate its vision for the overall peace process and share clear strategies and guidance. While the evaluators witnessed first-hand the struggle that the PRD has faced in trying to engage senior level government representatives, this may in part be due to a perception of being a donor supported initiative outside the immediate priorities of the Union government. There is a need for PRD to look for ways to better engage with government as they are ultimately one of the key stakeholders needed for the ultimate success and sustainability of results of programme.

### **Assessment of Special Aspects**

- 7. While PRD has taken notable steps to capture and report sex-disaggregated data, additional effort is needed to effectively capture and understand differences in how activities are experienced and internalized by women, men, girls, and boys. PRD has also had a strong focus on ensuring a conflict sensitive approach and has succeeded in**

**establishing both formal and informal mechanisms to investigate, understand, and monitor sensitivities in areas where it works. The programme has already experienced several unanticipated results, both positive and negative, however, the most significant of which is quite concerning and relates to safety and protection issues.**

There was strong evidence that PRD recognises the importance of identifying and addressing gender issues in order for the program to be effective. While the programme has taken steps to develop a Gender Framework to inform the design and implementation of activities, this does not appear to be widely used. While programme monitoring does disaggregate by sex, and in some instances age, this data is mostly limited to attendance, not the quality of participation or understanding differences in how men, women, boys, and girls experience activities.

It should be recognized, however, that the programme faces strong social norms that were never likely to be effectively changed under a four-year community empowerment programme. That said, the programme's "gender activities" appear to reinforce traditional gender roles and norms rather than trying to address and alter these. While it is not reasonable to expect PRD to be able to fully change these social norms in its programme areas, further steps could be taken to begin part of an incremental change process.

The assessment was much more positive regarding PRD's conflict sensitivity. While the Local Conflict Assessment does not appear to be widely used, it is available to all programme partners and does highlight the key conflict issues, actors, and drivers in PRD programme areas. PRD staff were provided a "Do No Harm"/Conflict Sensitivity training conducted by CDA, a world-renowned organisation providing training on these topics. Even more importantly, the contextual awareness and informal information sharing among PRD partners is high. The evaluators witnessed and benefitted from this directly during fieldwork as partners were in regular contact providing daily updates on security incidents and tensions in areas where they were headed.

The evaluation also captured numerous unanticipated results, both positive and negative. This is not unexpected given the complex and highly fluid context within which the program operates. PRD staff appeared aware of many of these unanticipated results and have already taken steps to address many of them. However, one significant unanticipated risk, or at least unanticipated extent of this risk, are the increasing severity and instances of safety and protection issues for staff and beneficiaries. Partners and beneficiaries, particularly in northern Shan, conveyed troubling accounts of increasing harassments by armed actors and feelings of risk and danger in implementing activities, particularly those related to human rights training or documenting instances of physical or sexual violence.

# Lesson Learned and Emerging Good Practice

---

## Lesson Learned

A lesson learned can be derived from the way the PRD Consortium was assembled and structured during the original proposal process. Interviews with Consortium staff revealed that the proposal process had felt rushed. Interviews with other EU peacebuilding consortium teams (Kayah and Kachin) interestingly also revealed a similar sense of rush indicating that part of the problem might have been with too short a proposal deadline set by the EU during the Request for Proposals. Regardless, the rushed proposal process ultimately resulted in a hurried assembly of Consortium partners relying mostly on previous relationships. Interviewees also suggest that the ability to meet proposal criteria and an interest in maximizing proposal points outweighed a more critical and in-depth assessment of how well institutional capabilities aligned.

The resulting consortium structure gave equal status as full partners to all five members of the Consortium, despite some larger international partners having substantially more experience and resources than the smaller national partners. This equally footing, while empowering and beneficial in terms of capacity building for smaller organizations, led to a high degree of autonomy for each partner to design and oversee activities in their respective areas. This in turn had consequences for the overall coherence of activities and the ability to for one partner to take more of an assertive leadership role and direct the others.

Looking back, both the EU and PRD Consortium partners could have helped avoid this situation. While it is ultimately the responsibilities of applicants to deliver on what they propose, the EU should recognise the reality of the competitive proposal process. Firms will inevitably try to outcompete each other and try to address every client wish listed in the RFP. The EU should recognise that the original RFP was overly broad and in some ways is responsible for firms bidding on a programme that few could actually deliver. That said, the majority of responsibility does fall on the PRD Consortium members. While there are obvious internal pressures to compete for and secure funding, the PRD partners should also have carefully weighed what was actually achievable given the context as they understood it. Rather than trying to match, if not exceed, the EU's ambition in their proposal, the PRD Consortium should have proposed a more focused programme with potentially a less geographically diverse spread. The Consortium should have also considered following more of a prime-sub contractual relationship, with the international organizations taking the lead and mentoring the national organizations as sub-contractors. However, interviews revealed that the decision to make all five members full partners was due to an understanding that there was an explicit requirement in the RFP requiring at least three local partners. Upon checking the original RFP, this appears to have perhaps been misunderstood. The actual language specifies the following:

- **“Inclusive approach:** project design and implementation should be done with the participation and meaningful consultation of all relevant stakeholders affected by the different actions. Additionally, actions implemented in partnership with local

organisations should demonstrate how the partners will be empowered to contribute effectively to the implementation of the action....

- **Partnership:** partnership with at least one entity established in Myanmar is mandatory. Participation by local organizations and/or consortiums of local and international actors is encouraged.”<sup>40</sup>

## Emerging Good Practice

**Community Infrastructure Projects.** The community infrastructure projects under Strategic Objective 3 appear to be a particularly effective strategy for both encouraging communities to identify and address local priority needs, and to serve as a “hook” or enticement to encourage the interest and participation of local duty-bearers.

As explained in an internal consortium document shared with the evaluation team, the community infrastructure projects are intended to “resource, enable, and provide technical guidance to communities in the design, planning and construction of community prioritised, shared infrastructure—for example—community buildings such as school (refurbishment, not new build), low cost youth training centres or community clinics, and the extension of access to drinking water supply for shared by neighbouring villages. These are local programmes, using local resources—both in labour and—to the degree possible—in procurement of materials.”<sup>41</sup>

Use of Locally-Resourced Materials: An important aspect of the activity is the use of locally resourced materials for the projects. According to ILO documents shared with the team, ILO has reviewed over 40 years of experience using locally-resourced versus plant/equipment produced and found that the former is:

1. 10-30% more cost effective.
2. Results in a 25-70% increase in wages or direct inputs into the local community economy.
3. Supported savings and greater community engagement, as well as enhanced community capacity, ownership, and oversight.

Training of Village Committees: Another key aspect of the activity is the training and support provide to the Village Development Committees (VDCs), Maintenance Committee, and Community Contractors. Trainings include a variety of topics, including topics such as: 1) procurement; 2) accounting, including “public auditing;” 3) participatory project management, labour standards and works’ quality standards; 4) monitoring and evaluation; 5) transparency and accountability and; vi) maintenance.

Conflict and gender sensitivity, as well as issues of sustainability are considered from the outset and are part of the trainings provided to community members. This includes trainings on non-

---

<sup>40</sup> The European Union, "Support to Peace, Reconciliation and Development in Shan State: Guidelines for Grant Applicants, Restricted Call for Proposals," in *EuropeAid/135602/DD/ACT/MM* (July 2014). Pg. 7.

<sup>41</sup> ILO Myanmar, "Overview of Ilo Work under Strategic Objective 3 – to Facilitate Participatory Development in Conflict Affected Communities Based on Community Empowerment.," in *Internal Draft*. (March 2017).

discrimination in the procurement of labour or goods, a requirement that VDCs must include at least 30% women, and on how to maintain the projects and raise funds for future repair.

Site Selection: The location of all community infrastructure projects is discussed with both local authorities and the communities themselves. Sites are usually identified by the invitation of State and Township officials, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), or through a request from a local community-based organisation. To date, projects have been implemented equally (one each) between the three major EAOs in Southern Shan: RCSS, PNLO, and SSPP.

The locations chosen need to satisfy a basic criteria of having been affected by conflict. The community works are intended to bring people together from neighbouring villages to enhance inter-village joint oversight of a community asset of more than one village. The willingness on the part of the communities to embrace sound labour standards, transparent accounting and financial management, gender parity and local democratic practices in the management and implementation of the community works is essential and is sounded out in all early discussions with village leaders, community representatives and leaders (religious or administrative).

Funding: PRD has budgeted around €43,000 per village cluster in a total of 10 village clusters. To date, all community works grants have come in under this target.

Additional Benefits: The benefits of the community works extend beyond simply addressing local priority infrastructure needs. They provide an “entry point” for PRD partners to help develop relationships with local authorities, both government and EAO. They provide an example of a tangible “peace dividend” and allow Consortium partners to suggest future collaboration and address more sensitive issues once a relationship has been established.

Evidence of these additional benefits have already been seen by project staff. These include community discussions and complaints around sensitive topics such as forced labour; sexual violence; double taxation; drug cultivation; land grabs and natural resource exploitation; and the loss of national identity cards needed to access or receive essential government services.

# Recommendations

---

Based on the preceding conclusions, the evaluation offers the following recommendations for the PRD Consortium to consider as it approaches the second half of the programme.

**1. PRD should scale back its ambitions on the targets and results feasible in Myanmar’s current peacebuilding context.**

PRD is working to address major ethnic grievances and governance issues hardened by over six decades of conflict. It is working to support an active but also capacity-constrained and maturing civil society that has historically been side lined from participating in governance issues. PRD should recognise that the results it can hope to influence will be limited and incremental. This, however, does not mean that they will not be significant, especially in the minds of ethnic minority community members who are intended to be the ultimate beneficiaries.

PRD should consider focusing primarily on community-empowerment to promote improved governance and development, not reconciliation, and to address some of the underlying conflict drivers in Shan state. It should consider focusing and decreasing the number of disparate activities it implements and prioritize working with a more limited number of CBOs but through more repeated engagement. This effort will include scaling back the current open-ended, demand-driven approach to the selection of workshops and trainings provided under SO 1. While this strategy has its advantages, and ranks highly on the relevance criterion, it also results in a scattering of activities and prevents a “critical mass” of targeted activities that can help transition from output to outcome level results. This recommendation also includes Consortium partners agreeing to adapting a more unified and coherent approach to implementation than has been the case thus far. This should include increased joint planning, monitoring, and implementation.

Responsible entity: PRD Consortium Partners and EU.

Priority: High

Timeframe: 0-6 months.

**2. PRD should consider focusing more effort on promoting the participation of MPs as part of the program’s effort to encourage “duty-bearer” response.**

PRD had made various efforts to engage government officials at the state and township level, as well as with Union level officials through the former MPC. However, PRD does not appear to have actively targeted working with MPs so far. MPs provide a logical focus for the programme to target as they are the ones responsible for raising the interests and concerns of their constituents to State Parliament and the Chief Minister’s Office. The programme should focus on encouraging and supporting MPs to meet regularly with their constituents in project areas and also provide workshops to community members about how they can get in touch with their local MPs to express concerns. This will provide a new avenue to encourage government participation and help improve the prospects for government buy-in and strengthen the sustainability of results.

Responsible entity: PRD Consortium Partners.

Priority: High

Timeframe: 0-6 months.

- 3. PRD should consider working with fewer local partners and instead provide more in-depth and sustained engagement, including conducting fewer but more joint and high visibility events and awareness-raising platforms.**

PRD is currently providing training and capacity-building to a large number of CBOs across its three project locales. This often includes providing one or two trainings to groups with little follow on support. Instead, the programme should consider adopting the approach implemented by SCI where it has identified five main CBO partners that it then engages, supports, and capacitates over the life of the programme. This is likely to produce more outcome level results and encourage actual changes in the behaviour. The increased capacity is likely to be more sustainable as the lessons learned from workshops and activities are reinforced through continuing action and learning.

Additionally, PRD should look to support larger joint events, seminars, and platforms that bring together actors across PRD project locations. These larger events will bring more visibility and ILO and SCI should look to utilise their “convening authority” to encourage the participation of government and MPs, as well as EAGs members to the extent that laws allow.

Responsible entity: PRD Consortium Partners.

Priority: High

Timeframe: 0-6 months

## Annex A: Terms of Reference

### I. Introduction

This EU funded programme “Shan State – Peace, Reconciliation and Development through community empowerment” – A consortium of ILO-FLD/EPRD-SCI-ASG-MDCG is coming to its mid-point given its commencement in March 2015, the midterm evaluation is thus due as per ILO evaluation policy.

The objective of this midterm evaluation is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence of the interventions’ actions undertaken under the programme. The main focus of the evaluation is to assess if the project design and its theory of change remains valid and whether there have been any changes in the context where the programme operates. The midterm evaluation shall also identify challenges and new opportunities. It will provide lessons learnt, recommendations and possible adjustments if needed for further programme improvement during the remaining period.

The midterm evaluation will seek to test the programme’s theory of change – that ceasefire’s have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and that such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level – specifically identifying what changes occurred, how and why they happened, what contributed to them and which might be judged more relevant and useful for other peace actors?

The evaluation will be carried out from March to May 2017 (with field work and interviews ideally conducted in March). It will be conducted in compliance with the principles, norms and standards for project evaluation set forth in the *ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation: principles, rationales, planning and managing for evaluations, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (July 2013). The midterm evaluation will be carried out in close consultation with the consortium members, target group stakeholders and the EU. The midterm evaluation will take into account the contextual situation of the project that the project has been operating in the middle of the conflict situation in Myanmar.

Responsibility for management of the evaluation is with the ILO’s Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, based at the ILO Regional office- Bangkok who has no prior involvement in the programme with oversight provided ILO Evaluation Office. The evaluation will be carried out by an independent external evaluator. The evaluation will be funded by evaluation provision of the programme and it will comply with UN Norms and Standards<sup>1</sup>.

### II. Background and description of the programme

The programme is being delivered by a Consortium of organisations comprised of Aids Support Group (ASG), the Foundation for Local Development/Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP), the Maggin Development Consultancy Group (MDCG), Save the Children (SC) and the ILO. The ILO is the coordinator of the consortium.

The five partners has been working with a variety of stakeholders in different areas in Shan State, Myanmar. The programme supports up to 80 villages in Shan North, East and State-wide (based on proximity to Ceasefire Liaison Offices – CLOs), reaching an estimated of 74,976 people. The programme focuses specifically its implementation in the townships: Tachileik in East Shan, Kutkai and Namkham in Northern Shan and including Mansi in Kachin (across border from Northern Shan) and in areas of Southern and central Shan State, including southern Mawk Mai Township, Laikha and Mongshu.

The overall objective of this programme is to contribute to peace, reconciliation and development through the empowerment of conflict affected communities in Myanmar. The project has three specific objectives:

- (1) To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged



in the peace and reconciliation process, supporting inclusive peace processes

(2) To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict, and

(3) To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community Empowerment.

Consortium Programme Advisory Committee has been established. The members meet quarterly.

ILO core team for this programme comprises of a Chief Technical Adviser / Programme Manager, a National Project Co-ordinator, an M&E Officer and trainer, an engineer, a finance and administration officer and a driver. The team has technical input from other ILO staff, including an infrastructure expert; the ILO Yangon Liaison Office Programme Officer and (until end 2016) an international expert working on the prevention of the recruitment of child soldiers. The project team falls under the Deputy Liaison Officer along with projects on child labour, forced labour and migration.

Despite the first year of implementation of the programme taking place in a context of on-going and in some areas worsening conflict (recorded armed clashes were more frequent in Shan State - some 231 in the period March 2015 to March 2016) – the Consortium reports reasonable progress on implementation; specifically progress is judged as being identifiable in enabling conflict affected communities to discuss and articulate their concerns – with each other and with duty bearers.

### III. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

#### Purpose

The main purposes of the midterm independent evaluation is for programme improvements and to promote accountability to ILO key stakeholders and donor, and to enhance learning within the ILO and key stakeholders.

The main objective of the evaluation are as follows: -

Assess the programme design and its theory of change, specifically whether it is still valid;

Assess the relevance of the programme in responding to peace and reconciliation in Myanmar;

Assess the effectiveness of the programme and the effectiveness of its management arrangement

Assess the programme implementation efficiency;

Provide recommendations;

Identify emerging potential good practices and lessons learnt **Scope** The evaluation will focus on all interventions under the programme from the start until the time of the midterm evaluation. The evaluation will cover all the geographical coverage of the programme – security permitting for field visits.

The evaluation should cover expected (i.e. planned) and unexpected results in terms of non-planned outputs and outcomes (i.e. side effects or externalities). Some of these unexpected changes could be as relevant as the ones planned. Therefore, the evaluator should reflect on them for learning purposes.

The gender dimension should be considered as a cross-cutting concern throughout the methodology, deliverables and final report of the evaluation. In terms of this evaluation, this implies involving both men and women in the consultation, evaluation analysis and evaluation team. Moreover the evaluators should review data and information that is disaggregated by sex and gender and assess the relevance and effectiveness of gender-related strategies and outcomes to improve lives of women and men. All this information should be accurately included in the inception report and evaluation report.

**Client:** The primary end users of the evaluation findings is the programme management team and the ILO Liaison Office in Myanmar, the Consortium partners, ILO technical departments. Secondary parties making use of the results of the evaluation will include the EU and tripartite constituents.

#### IV. Suggested aspects to be addressed

The evaluation should be carried out in adherence with the ILO Evaluation Framework and Strategy, the ILO Guideline, the UN System Evaluation Standards and Norms, and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standard.

The evaluation will address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (and potential impact) to the extent possible as defined in the ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-Based Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning and Managing for Evaluations (i-eval resource kit)', 2013.

Gender concerns should be addressed in accordance with ILO Guidance note 4: "Considering gender in the monitoring and evaluation of projects" All data should be sex-disaggregated and different needs of women and men and of marginalized groups targeted by the programme should be considered throughout the evaluation process.

Below are the main categories that need to be addressed:

##### **1. Design (the extent to which the design is logical and coherent)**

- Does the programme design (i.e. priorities, outcomes, outputs and activities) and the underlying theory of change still valid given the limited progress in the peace process and the context which has seen conflict continuing in a number of areas in central and Northern Shan State? Assess whether the problems and needs that give rise to the programme still exists or have changed.
- Does the design need to be modified in the second half of the programme?
- How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the programme document in assessing the programme's progress? Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive?
- Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?
- What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?

##### **2. Relevance**

- Examine whether the programme has responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries and still is consistent and relevant to the needs of the peace and reconciliation process in Myanmar?
- Is the programme relevant to the donors' priorities and policy, implementing partners' need? Are the programme results or approach strategic and include the comparative advantage of the ILO?

##### **3. Effectiveness (including effectiveness of management arrangement)**

- Is the programme making sufficient progress towards its planned objectives? Particularly the empowerment activity efforts – assess whether its approach is effective.
- Will the programme likely achieve its planned objectives upon completion? What are the main constraints, problems and areas in need of further attention?
- Have the consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?
- How other stakeholders been involved in programme implementation?
- Does the programme monitoring plan exist and whether the baseline data has been collected and data collected over time?
- Does the programme collaborate with other projects and programmes to enhance its impact and effectiveness?
- What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed?
- Has the project received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT- Bangkok, if relevant)? If not why?

##### **4. Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs i.e. funds, expertise, time etc. are converted to result)**

- Have resources been allocated strategically to achieve results? And have they been delivered in a timely manner? If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs? Any measures that has been put in place?
- Has there been a coherent implementation approaches among the consortium members? Given different geographical targeting by consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches. Would it be possible for the consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium? If so what and how?
- The extent to which the project resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to maximise impact, if any?

## 5. Sustainability

- The extent to which the results of the intervention are likely to be durable and can be maintained or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed
- How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?

## 6. Special aspects to be addressed

- Has there been any synergies/collaboration between the programme and other initiatives in the area? If so, is it likely to enhance the impact of the programme?
- The extent that the programme has promoted ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labour standard (taking into consideration the context of the project)
- The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed gender into its design, and implementation.

## V. Expected outputs of the evaluation

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluator are:

1. Inception report: this report based on the Desk review should describe the evaluation instruments, reflecting the combination of tools and detailed instruments needed to address the range of selected aspects. The instrument needs to make provision for the triangulation of data where possible. It will cover how the more detailed analysis on the focus areas will be integrated in the analysis and reporting.
2. Quantitative and qualitative data collected in the field.
3. Stakeholders' workshops, as part of the in-country field work to gather collective stakeholder views, present proposed focus of the evaluation and as part of full data collection.
4. Draft evaluation report for the project: the evaluation report should include and reflect on findings from the fieldwork and the stakeholders' workshop.
5. Final evaluation report after comments from stakeholders.
6. Upon finalization of the overall evaluation report, the evaluator will be responsible for writing a brief evaluation summary which will be posted on the ILO's website. This report should be prepared following the guidelines included in Annex and submitted to the evaluation manager.

Draft and Final evaluation reports include the following sections:

- Executive Summary (*standard ILO format*) with key findings, conclusions, recommendations, lessons and good practices (*each lesson learn and good practice need to be annexed using standard ILO format*)
- Clearly identified findings
- A table presenting the key results (i.e. figures and qualitative results) achieved per objective (expected and unexpected)
- Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations (i.e. specifying to which actor(s) apply)

- Lessons learned
- Potential good practices and effective models of intervention.
- Appropriate Annexes including present TORs
- Standard evaluation instrument matrix (adjusted version of the one included in the Inception report)

The entire draft and final reports (including key annexes) have to be submitted in English. The total length of the report should be a maximum of 35 pages. This is excluding annexes; additional annexes can provide background and details on specific components of the project evaluated. The report should be sent as one complete document and the file size should not exceed 3 megabytes. Photos, if appropriate to be included, should be inserted using lower resolution to keep overall file size low.

All drafts and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided in electronic version compatible for Word for Windows. Ownership of data from the evaluation rests jointly with ILO, World Bank, and the consultants. The copyright of the evaluation report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentations can only be made with the written agreement of ILO. Key stakeholders can make appropriate use of the evaluation report in line with the original purpose and with appropriate acknowledgement.

The draft reports will be circulated to key stakeholders (including the EU as the donor, the consortium members, tripartite constituents, other key stakeholders and partners and ILO staff i.e. programme management, ILO liaison Office in Myanmar, HQ technical departments, DWT Bangkok, ILO Regional office) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the evaluation manager and will be sent to the evaluation consultant to incorporate them into the revised evaluation report. The evaluation report will be considered final only when it gets final approval by ILO Evaluation Office.

## VI. Methodology

The ILO policy guidelines for results-based evaluation provide the general framework for carrying out the evaluation and writing the evaluation report, including the requirements for the recommendations made, lessons learned and good practices documented in the report ([http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS\\_176814/lang-en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/eval/Evaluationguidance/WCMS_176814/lang-en/index.htm)).

These guidelines adhere to the evaluation norms and standards of the United Nations system, as well as to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. In addition, the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation are to be followed by all parties involved with the process.

The evaluation is to be carried out independently and the final methodology and evaluation questions will be determined by the evaluator, in consultation with the evaluation manager. The following primary and secondary data collection techniques are recommended:

The evaluation process will be participatory. All consortium members and other key stakeholders will have the opportunity to be consulted, provide inputs to the ToR and evaluation report, and use the evaluation findings and lessons learnt, as appropriate.

### a. Sources of information and field visit

The evaluator will conduct a desk review first to be followed by interviews and field visits to programme areas in Myanmar. He/she can make use of the sources of information exhibited below for desk review and interview, namely the review of selected documents (1.1), the consultation of the webpage of the programme (1.2) and the conduct of interviews (1.3).

#### 1. Sources of information

##### 1.1 Documents review

The evaluator will review the following documents to be provided by the programme management through e-mail:

Programme related document:-

- The Description of the Action (the programme document)
- Overview booklet setting out objectives and activities
- Inception period review
- Year 1 Interim Progress Report
- Mission, meeting, workshop and training reports. Project budgets – planned and actual- expenditures. Monitoring and evaluation plan.

### 1.3 Individual interviews/focus group discussions

Individual interviews in person during the field visit, by phone, e-mail or Skype and/or a questionnaire survey can be conducted with the following:

. a) ILO staff in Myanmar

Mr. Rory Mungoven, Liaison Officer,

Ms. Piyamal Pichaiwongse, Deputy Liaison Officer

Mr. Matthew Soudan Maguire, ILO CTA and project staff (including the Administrative and Finance Officer), if relevant

Mr. Selim Benaissa, Chief Technical Advisor, MyPEC

Mr. Michel Jamar, Chief Technical Advisor, SME

Ms. Elkaye Santos, Programme Officer

. b) All representatives from the consortium and the donor (EU)

Save the Children Thanda Kyaw, Head Child Protection

Foundation for Local Development

Maggin Development Consultancy Group – Maung Maung Kyaw Nyein Director

Aids Support Group – Myint Aung, Director

Manuel DE RIVERA LAMO DE ESPINOSA, EU Delegation Yangon

. c) Other key stakeholders:

Community groups/ community organisations (\*including Youth and Women’s groups); CSOs and CBOs.

Ethnic Armed Organisations – principally – the Restoration Council of Shan State – Shan State Army South; the Pa’oh National Liberation Organisation and (less so) the Shan State Progressive Party – Shan State Army North

Local government officials and local political representatives

Beneficiaries

ILO tripartite constituents (to the extent possible taking into account the context of the project – conflict situation)

## VII. Management arrangements

The evaluator will report to the *Evaluation Manager*, Ms. Pamornrat Pringsulaka, Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Office in ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. The evaluation manager takes the responsibility in drafting TOR in consultation with all concerned and will manage the whole evaluation process and will review evaluation report to make sure it has complied to the quality checklist of ILO evaluation report.

*Evaluation Office in Geneva (EVAL)* will do quality assurance of the report and give approval of the final evaluation report.

*ILO Liaison Office for Myanmar* and the ILO project management team will provide administrative and logistical support during the evaluation mission. The project management team will also assist in organizing a detailed evaluation mission agenda, and to ensure that all relevant documentations are up to date and easily accessible by the evaluator.

*Roles of other key stakeholders:* All stakeholders, particularly the relevant ILO staff, the donor, tripartite constituents, relevant government agencies, NGOs and other key partners will be consulted throughout the process and will be engaged at different stages during the process. They will have the opportunities to provide inputs to the TOR and to the draft final evaluation report.

(logistical support by the project)

#### IX. LEGAL AND ETHICAL MATTERS

The evaluation will comply with UN Norms and Standards. UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) ethical guidelines will be followed.

All draft and final outputs, including supporting documents, analytical reports and raw data should be provided in electronic version compatible with WORD for Windows. Ownership of the data from the evaluation rests jointly with the ILO and the ILO consultants. The copyright of the evaluation report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentation can only be made with the agreement of ILO. Key stakeholders can make appropriate use of the evaluation report in line with the original purpose and with appropriate acknowledgement.

## Annex B: Draft Data Collection Instruments

### Consortium Partners

Project: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Location: \_\_\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female  
Confidentiality and Informed Consent Statements: (To be added)

#### Design of Program:

1. As simply as possible, please tell me what the program intends to do? (*Probe on why and how*)
2. To what extent is the Local Conflict Assessment (or other design documents) used?
3. If you could do it all over, would you do anything differently?
4. Does the program collect regular monitoring data?
  - a. What gets collected? How is it used?
  - b. Is it helpful? If no, what would make more helpful?
  - c. Any special focus (gender, conflict sensitivity, etc.)? How is this done?
5. There are a number of organizations working on peacebuilding in Myanmar at the moment. What makes ILO different? (*Probe on comparative advantages*)

#### Functioning of Program:

6. The program works through a Consortium. Can you tell me a bit about how does this function?
  - a. How do partners work together?
  - b. Have there been any major issues affecting collaboration? How about gaps/overlaps?
  - c. Would you do anything differently?
7. In your opinion, does the align with other peacebuilding programs? (*Probe on other INGOs/NGO, Gov, or UN programs?*)
  - a. Other INGOs/NGOs?
  - b. Government?
  - c. UN?
8. Do you have any ideas for how the program could better work with this programs?

#### Community Empowerment:

9. How do community members react to the program?
10. From what you've seen, have community members been involved in the design or implementation of the program so far?
11. In your opinion, what is the extent of local ownership of activities (*probe on both gov and community members*)?

#### Results:

12. From what you've seen, what has the program achieved so far?
  - a. Have there been any major external factors facilitating or constraining results?
13. Have there been any major internal issues affecting implementation? (*Probe on level of support, functioning of CPAC, etc.*).

**14. How about resources? Have these been:**

- a. Timely?
- b. Opportunities to leverage?

**15. Do you think any of the activities/results will continue after the end of the program?**

- a. Which?
- b. Why
- c. Anything that can be done to strengthen sustainability?

**Donors**

Project:

Date:

Location:

\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_ Female

Confidentiality and Informed Consent Statements: (To be added)

**Design, Monitoring and Reporting**

**1. In a few words, please tell us you believe the program intends to achieve (*probe on how and why*).**

- a. What are the key results and casual linkages?
- b. What are some of the key assumptions?
- c. Do these assumptions continue to hold true?

**2. Please tell us briefly about the EU's peacebuilding priorities in Myanmar?**

- a. To what extent does the program align with other peacebuilding efforts you are supporting in Myanmar?
- b. Have you come across any alternate strategies for improving community empowerment that the program may want to consider?
- c. To what extent do you think the program aligns to Government of Myanmar peacebuilding efforts?

**3. Are you satisfied with the reporting you receive from the program?**

- a. Does the report appear to be evidenced-based?
- b. Are the indicators relevant?
- c. Does reporting adequately cover gender and conflict sensitivity issues?

**4. What were some of the reasons that you selected the ILO-led Consortium to lead this program?**

- a. From what you have seen, how well do the partners appear to be working together?
- b. Are there any obvious areas for improved synergies/complementarities?

**Use of Resources and Results**

**5. How would you assess the progress of the program so far?**

- a. What are the notable successes? Shortcomings?
- b. Are there important contextual factors facilitating or constraining results?
- c. In your opinion, how sustainable are the results seen so far?

**6. How would you describe the use of programming resources so far?**

- a. Have they been used in a timely manner?
- b. Have they been used strategically?
- c. Has the program been able to leverage other funding sources?

**7. Have you seen any unanticipated results from the activities (positive or negative)?**

- a. Are there any that you would be particularly concerned about?



8. **Our task is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the program. Are there any questions that we did not ask that we should, or is there anything particularly important that you think we should know about the program that we did not ask?**

#### Beneficiaries

Project:

Date:

Location:

\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_ Female

Confidentiality and Informed Consent Statements: (To be added)

**1. Can you tell us a little about the program.**

- a. What have you heard about the program?
- b. What activities have taken place in your community?
- c. What are your expectations for the future?
- d. If you had the power to change the program, would you do anything differently?

**2. One of the main goals of the program is to empower conflict-affected communities and enable them to make a meaningful, measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation, and development at local levels.**

- a. Do you think this is realistic?
- b. Do past, recent, or ongoing ceasefire discussions provide the space for local community members to get involved in peacebuilding and reconciliation?

**3. If you had the power to design your own community-level peacebuilding program, how would it work?**

- a. What would be the key issues to address?
- b. How would you address them?
- c. Who would you include?
- d. What are some key contextual factors to consider?

**4. Have you seen any unanticipated results of the program (positive or negative)?**

- a. Probe on conflict sensitivity
- b. Probe on gender

**5. Is there anything that we did not ask about that is important for us to better understand the program—what it intends to do, the results achieved so far, key challenges and contextual issues?**

## Experts and Other Donors

Project:

Date:

Location:

\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_ Female



Confidentiality and Informed Consent

### Design and Assumptions:

- 1. Based on your experience, what are the key issues to consider when trying to empower local communities to participate in the peace process?**
  - a. Is this a priority?
  - b. What can reasonably be expected?
  - c. What are some key challenges?
  - d. Have you seen any good approaches for doing so?
  
- 2. Are you familiar with the EU Shan State – Peace, Reconciliation and Development EU-Shan PRD) program?**
  - a. What have you seen/heard?
  - b. What do you think have been notable successes? Shortcomings?
  - c. Do you have a sense of well the consortium functions?
  - d. Do you think the results achieved are sustainable?
  
- 3. Are there any important gender or conflict sensitivity issues to consider when implementing a community empowerment peacebuilding program in Shan?**
  - a. Have you seen any unanticipated consequences from the program?
  
- 4. What do you think are the prospects for community-led peacebuilding efforts in the:**
  - a. Short term?
  - b. Medium term?
  - c. Long term?
  
- 5. Is there anything that we did not ask about that is important for us to better understand the program— what it intends to do, the results achieved so far, key challenges and contextual issues?**

## Annex C: People and Organisations Consulted

- AIDS Support Group
- Ba Wa Thit (Mant Waing Gyi-Kachin)
- Capacity Building for Youth
- Cherry Image
- Ethnic Peace Resources Project
- European Union
- International Labour Organisation
- Joint Peace Fund
- Koen Versalev
- Kutkai Woman Network
- Kutkai Youth Network
- Laikha Township Office
- Maggin Development Consulting Group
- Mercy Corps
- Moon Leng (Namkham-Shan)
- Nump Khone
- Oxfam
- Pa'Oh National Liberation Organisation – Taunggyi
- Pa'oh Youth Organization
- Pi Ti Teacher Network
- Restoration Council of Shan State Community Liaison Office – Tachileik
- Restoration Council of Shan State Community Liaison Office – Taunggyi
- Saung Sae (Mant Waing Gyi-Shan)
- Saung Sae (Namkham-Shan)
- Save the Children International
- Shan Literature and Culture Association
- Shan State Women Organization
- Shan Women's Action Network
- Su Ja Ta Women's Self Help Group
- Ta'aung Student Youth Organization
- Ta'ang Literacy and Cultural Association
- Tachileik youth network group
- Tai Youth Organization
- Taunggyi Youth Centre
- Village Development Committees - Baw Mak , Laikha, and Mong Ko
- We are Tai



## Annex D: Sources Consulted

- Davis, Quinn. *Building Infrastructures for Peace: The Role of Liaison Offices in Myanmar's Peace Process*. Cpcs Learning Paper. Edited by Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2016.
- Development, FLD - Foundation for Local. "About Fld." <http://fldasia.org/index.php/about-us>.
- Development, US Agency for International. "Midterm Performance Evaluation of Usaid/Burma Civil Society and Media Activity: State of Work." edited by USAID/Burma Democracy and Governance Office, March 2017.
- Group, AIDS Support. "Aids Support Group (Asg)." <http://www.lrcmyanmar.org/en/ngo-donor-profiles/aids-support-group-asg>.
- Group, MDCG - Maggin Development Consultancy. "Background History." <http://mdcg-myanmar.org/>.
- International Labour Organisation, Liaison Office - Myanmar. "Terms of Reference: Independent Midterm Evaluation, 'Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment.'" Yangon: ILO, February 28, 2017.
- Jolliffe, Kim. "Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar's Contested Regions." edited by The Asia Foundation. Myanmar, June 2014.
- Konstanzer, Benjamin. "Opportunities for Conflict-Affected and Vulnerable Youth: A Conflict Sensitive Economic Assessment in Southern Shan State." edited by ILO: Emerging Markets Consulting, February 2017.
- Lindborg, Nancy. "Burma Is Still on the Rocky Road to Democracy." (March 17, 2017).
- Minutes, PAC Meeting. "Minutes from 8th Pac Meeting." October 6, 2016.
- Mitchell, Derek. "Myanmar's Government — Time for Course Correction?: One Year on, It Is Time for Aung San Suu Kyi and the Nld to Take Stock." *United States Institute for Peace* (March 2017).
- Myanmar, Save the Children. "Myanmar." <https://myanmar.savethechildren.net/>.
- Organisation, International Labour. "Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar." In *Lot 2: Shan State*, edited by EuropeAid, 2014.
- . "Inception Period - Internal Review: Eu-Funded 'Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Programme.'" October 2015.
- . "Interim Report (March 2015 - March 2016): Shan State - Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment." 2016.
- Organisation, International Labour. "ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-Based Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning, and Managing for Evaluations." edited by Evaluation Unit (EVAL). Geneva, 2013.
- Policy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security. "Elements for an Eu Strategy Vis-a-Vis Myanmar/Burma: A Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity." news release, June 2016.
- Policy, Institute for Security and Development. "Backgrounder: Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement." October 2015.
- Project, EPRP - Myanmar Ethnic Peace Resources. "About: Eprp." <http://www.eprpinformation.org/en/about/>.
- Simbulan, Raymond Hyma and Karen. *We Want Genuine Peace: Voices of Communities from Myanmar's Ceasefire Areas 2015*. Edited by Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2016.
- Versavel, Koen. "Eu Results-Oriented Monitoring Mission: Shan State Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Programme." edited by EU, 2017 (forthcoming).

## Annex E: Lesson Learned Template

### ILO Lesson Learned Template

**Project Title:** ILO/Myanmar's "Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment" Programme

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** MMR/14/01/EEC (EU: DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766)

**Name of Evaluator:** Mathias Kjaer, Angela Thaug

**Date:** June 2017

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p>A lesson learned can be derived from the way the PRD Consortium was assembled and structured during the original proposal process. Interviews with Consortium staff revealed that the proposal process had felt rushed. Interviews with other EU peacebuilding consortium teams (Kayah and Kachin) interestingly also revealed a similar sense of rush indicating that part of the problem might have been with too short a proposal deadline set by the EU during the Request for Proposals. Regardless, the rushed proposal process ultimately resulted in a hurried assembly of Consortium partners relying mostly on previous relationships. Interviewees also suggest that the ability to meet proposal criteria and an interest in maximizing proposal points outweighed a more critical and in-depth assessment of how well institutional capabilities aligned.</p> <p>Looking back, both the EU and PRD Consortium partners could have helped avoid this situation. While it is ultimately the responsibilities of applicants to deliver on what they propose, the EU should recognise the reality of the competitive proposal process. Firms will inevitably try to outcompete each other and try to address every client wish listed in the RFP. The EU should recognise that the original RFP was overly broad and in some ways is responsible for firms bidding on a programme that few could actually deliver. That said, the majority of responsibility does fall on the PRD Consortium members. The Consortium should have also considered following more of a prime-sub contractual relationship, with the international organizations taking the lead and mentoring the national organizations as sub-contractors.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	Proposal development, particularly for programmes in conflict affected contexts.
<b>Targeted users/Beneficiaries</b>	ILO and other development partners working in conflict-affected environments.
<b>Challenges/negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	Time pressure to submit proposal and proposal scoring leading bidders to satisfy all requests listed in RFP.
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	Push back against unrealistic client expectations.
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	Staffing for proposal, internal pressures to secure funding.

## Annex F: Emerging Good Practice Template

### ILO Emerging Good Practice Template

**Project Title:** ILO/Myanmar’s “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment” Programme

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** MMR/14/01/EEC (EU: DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766)

**Name of Evaluator:** Mathias Kjaer, Angela Thuang

**Date:** June 2017

The following emerging good practice has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text can be found in the full evaluation report.

GP Element	Text
<p><b>Brief summary of the good practice (link to project goal or specific deliverable, background, purpose, etc.)</b></p>	<p>The community infrastructure projects under Strategic Objective 3 appear to be a particularly effective strategy for both encouraging communities to identify and address local priority needs, and to serve as a “hook” or enticement to encourage the interest and participation of local duty-bearers.</p> <p>As explained in an internal consortium document shared with the evaluation team, the community infrastructure projects are intended to “resource, enable, and provide technical guidance to communities in the design, planning and construction of community prioritised, shared infrastructure—for example—community buildings such as school (refurbishment, not new build), low cost youth training centres or community clinics, and the extension of access to drinking water supply for shared by neighbouring villages. These are local programmes, using local resources—both in labour and—to the degree possible—in procurement of materials.”<sup>42</sup></p> <p>The benefits of the community works extend beyond simply addressing local priority infrastructure needs. They provide an “entry point” for PRD partners to help develop relationships with local authorities, both government and EAO. They provide an example of a tangible “peace dividend” and allow Consortium partners to suggest future collaboration and address more sensitive issues once a relationship has been established.</p> <p>Evidence of these additional benefits have already been seen by project staff. These include community discussions and complaints around sensitive topics such as forced labour; sexual violence; double taxation; drug cultivation; land grabs and natural resource exploitation; and the loss of national identity cards needed to access or receive essential government services.</p>

---

<sup>42</sup> ILO Myanmar, "Overview of Ilo Work under Strategic Objective 3 – to Facilitate Participatory Development in Conflict Affected Communities Based on Community Empowerment.," in *Internal Draft*. (March 2017).

<p><b>Relevant conditions and Context: limitations or advice in terms of applicability and replicability</b></p>	<p><u>Use of Locally-Resourced Materials:</u> An important aspect of the activity is the use of locally resourced materials for the projects. According to ILO documents shared with the team, ILO has reviewed over 40 years of experience using locally-resourced versus plant/equipment produced and found that the former is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10-30% more cost effective.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Results in a 25-70% increase in wages or direct inputs into the local community economy.</li> <li>5. Supported savings and greater community engagement, as well as enhanced community capacity, ownership, and oversight.</li> </ol> <p><u>Training of Village Committees:</u> Another key aspect of the activity is the training and support provide to the Village Development Committees (VDCs), Maintenance Committee, and Community Contractors. Trainings include a variety of topics, including topics such as: 1) procurement; 2) accounting, including “public auditing;” 3) participatory project management, labour standards and works’ quality standards; 4) monitoring and evaluation; 5) transparency and accountability and; vi) maintenance.</p> <p>Conflict and gender sensitivity, as well as issues of sustainability are considered from the outset and are part of the trainings provided to community members. This includes trainings on non-discrimination in the procurement of labour or goods, a requirement that VDCs must include at least 30% women, and on how to maintain the projects and raise funds for future repair.</p> <p><u>Site Selection:</u> The location of all community infrastructure projects is discussed with both local authorities and the communities themselves. Sites are usually identified by the invitation of State and Township officials, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), or through a request from a local community-based organisation. To date, projects have been implemented equally (one each) between the three major EAOs in Southern Shan: RCSS, PNLO, and SSPP.</p> <p>The locations chosen need to satisfy a basic criteria of having been affected by conflict. The community works are intended to bring people together from neighbouring villages to enhance inter-village joint oversight of a community asset of more than one village. The willingness on the part of the communities to embrace sound labour standards, transparent accounting and financial management, gender parity and local democratic practices in the management and implementation of the community works is essential and is sounded out in all early discussions with village leaders, community representatives and leaders (religious or administrative).</p> <p><u>Funding:</u> PRD has budgeted around €43,000 per village cluster in a total of 10 village clusters. To date, all community works grants have come in under this target.</p>
<p><b>Establish a clear cause-effect relationship</b></p>	<p>Not possible given non-experimental evaluation design.</p>
<p><b>Indicate measurable impact and targeted beneficiaries</b></p>	<p>4,500 workdays created, 7 community infrastructure projects started.</p>
<p><b>Potential for replication and by whom</b></p>	<p>Most/all ILO supported countries that have staff and internal resources (particularly engineering) to oversee design and quality assurance.</p>
<p><b>Upward links to higher ILO Goals</b></p>	<p>Yes, aligns with most of ILO goals.</p>
<p><b>Other documents or relevant comments</b></p>	<p>Contact, Matthew Maguire, ILO Myanmar.</p>

# Annex G: Inception Report

## Introduction

---

### Project Overview

In March 2015, the International Labour Organisation Liaison Office in Myanmar (hereafter simply “ILO Myanmar”) and its four Consortium partners—Foundation for Local Development/Ethnic Peace Resources Project (FLD/EPRP), Save the Children International (SCI), AIDS Support Group (ASG), and Maggin Development Consultancy Group (MDCG)—began implementing a European Union (EU) funded four year, EUR 7 million “Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation and Development through Community Empowerment” program.

The program’s overall objective is to “contribute to peace, reconciliation and development through the empowerment of conflict-affected communities in Myanmar.”<sup>43</sup> This goal is expected to be achieved through three strategic objectives:

4. To provide opportunities for communities and local actors, including women and children, to be engaged inclusively in the peace and reconciliation process.
5. To support all stakeholders to create a safe and protective environment that supports effective and sustainable reintegration of children affected by conflict.
6. To facilitate participatory development in conflict-affected communities based on community empowerment.

The program expects to benefit up to 75,000 beneficiaries across 80 villages in Shan State. Focus areas include “Tachilek District in East Shan, Kutkai and Namhkam Townships in Northern Shan, Mansi in Kachin and work with the ceasefire liaison offices (CLOs) across Shan State.”<sup>44</sup>

ILO Myanmar serves as the Consortium lead. Partners are responsible for the management of their own activities but ILO is responsible for the overall results tracking and reporting to the EU. Program governance is provided through a Consortium Program Advisory Committee (PAC), which is scheduled to meet on a quarterly basis, although has been meeting more frequently during the program inception period.

The program is guided by an overarching *Theory of Change* (ToC) arguing that “ceasefires have made possible efforts in the empowerment of conflict-affected communities and such empowerment can make a measurable contribution to peace, reconciliation and development at the local level.” This ToC is further described in a results hierarchy as part of the program’s Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) plan. However, while the results hierarchy presents a clear progression of activities and results, it does not clearly articulate some of the underlying programming assumptions or causal linkages between results. Some of these assumptions and causal linkages can be found in the narrative sections of the original project proposal, however the program would benefit for a clearer and more direct articulation of key programming assumptions and how individual results can complement each other to ensure that the program is “more than the sum of its parts.”

In terms of results, in addition to the overarching goal and objectives identified above, the program expects to:

- Contribute to a deeper, comprehensive understanding of the conflicts in Shan with a focus on needs and concerns in implementation areas.
- Facilitate the incremental but measurable empowerment of target group communities to engage conflict parties on the peace process.

---

<sup>43</sup> International Labour Organisation, “Full Application Form: Supporting Peace, Reconciliation, and Development in Myanmar,” in *Lot 2: Shan State*, ed. EuropeAid (2014). Pg. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. Pg. 5.



- Establish multi-stakeholder fora, one for communities, one for wider stakeholders (Government, EAOs, civil society and communities) allowing for peace related needs and concerns to be articulated and raised with conflict parties.
- Improve the understanding of Government authorities and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) on fundamental rights and responsibilities, good governance and civilian protection.
- Resource and capacitate over 30 Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to respond to protection needs and the peace process through sub-granting and directed support to enable them to work with communities and Youth Platforms on forced labour, child protection and rights and the social reintegration of children affected by conflict.
- Improve the functioning of 12 Ceasefire Liaison Offices in Shan State as information hubs for their communities; being better informed on conflict resolution, international humanitarian law, and basic media skills.
- Support effective responses across Shan by the Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting of UNSCR1612, particularly community monitoring of the Tatmadaw and EAOs, as well as incremental progress on the sensitization of EAOs on child use and recruitment.
- Provide around 35,000 work days in more than 40 villages resulting in community-led, community-managed prioritized infrastructure, with 200 people trained in construction related skills; and
- Produce of a market assessment for implementation sites and non-formal education, livelihoods skills training or entrepreneurship training for 500 people, of which at least 40 percent are women.

#### Conflict Context

While conflicts in Rakhine and Kachin states generally receive greater media and donor attention, conflict has long raged in Shan state with the roots of some conflicts stretching back nearly 70 years. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, Shan witnessed 231 separate armed clashes between March 2015 and 2016.<sup>45</sup> Troublingly, the fighting has intensified significantly over the past year, proliferating to involve more groups and occurring in wider spread areas.

The recent escalation of armed violence in northern Shan at the end of 2016 that brought Shan into a central focus of the peace process. On November 20 four non-NCA signatories—KIA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA)—formed the “Northern Alliance-Burma” (NA-B) and launched coordinated attacks on police and military installations and three public bridges in Muse, Mong Ko, Pang Sai, Kutkai, and Namkham townships in northern Shan. The attacks continued for two-weeks, resulting in more than 170 clashes between government and armed groups, the death of at least 10 people according to government estimates, and an estimated displacement of 17,400 civilians (15,000 refugees; 2,400 IDPs) according to OCHA Myanmar. The attacks also had international ramifications, causing significant disruptions to cross-border trade between Myanmar and China, as well as stray munitions falling in Chinese territory.

The conflicts are driven by a variety of conflict issues, dynamics, and historical grievances. These include a long-held desire for ethnic political rights and the creation of a more federal Union; economic incentives over control of land, people, and key trade routes; unequal resource sharing; and a variety of more proximate causes including human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict, an imperfect National Ceasefire Agreement and peacebuilding process, illicit trade and drug production, a breakdown in rule of law, and a destabilizing influence of neighbouring China.

The conflicts have shown to be rapidly evolving and several recent developments threaten further instability. A few examples include:

---

<sup>45</sup> Liaison Office - Myanmar International Labour Organisation, "Terms of Reference: Independent Midterm Evaluation, 'Shan State: Peace, Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment.'," (Yangon: ILO, February 28, 2017).

- Accusations of Tatmadaw interventions in the planning of the Shan National Conference in advance of the second meeting of the “21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference” (21CPC);
- Access and mobility restrictions on civilians in conflict areas, including considerable consequences on local livelihoods and women’s engagement in the peace process;
- An increase in incidents of human trafficking, recruitment, and forced labour;
- A recent Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) restriction on the organization of local community political dialogue activities, limiting discussions strictly to social affairs, economic, and land issues.
- A blockage of a recent township level women’s empowerment forum sponsored by SWAN.

The conflicts in Shan have quickly evolved into a central fulcrum for Myanmar’s overall peace process. While the recent trend has been towards increased destabilization and violence, there are also some more encouraging signs that the conflicts can help actors address some of the underlying structural issues that have caused the national peace process to falter. During the first week of March the United Nationalities Federal Council submitted a none point proposal to the State Counsellor outlining its members’ concerns on the NCA process. Several of the points have thus far been accepted “in principle,” however additional discussion is needed on the thorny “inclusivity issue” and agreements on a “code of conduct” following any potential signing of the NCA.

While the road ahead will undoubtedly be difficult, there is room for cautious optimism. There is a widespread desire for peace across Myanmar and a profound hope that the country is on the verge of rectifying long-held grievances and securing greater community and ethnic rights.

### Evaluation Background

This midterm evaluation has been commissioned in response to a variety of factors. Firstly, the midterm evaluation is part of the program’s MEAL plan and follows a commitment listed in the program’s original proposal to the EU (see pg. 23). Secondly, it follows general ILO evaluation guidance requiring all projects over US \$5million and/or lasting more than 30 months to undertake a midterm evaluation.<sup>46</sup> Finally, less on the accountability side and more on the learning side, the program is interested in a candid, external assessment on its current coherence and relevance given a substantial deterioration on the peace and reconciliation context of Shan.

The evaluation will utilize four of the five standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria: “relevance,” “efficiency,” “effectiveness,” and “sustainability.” Given that program activities have recently commenced and the aligned with the formative nature of the evaluation, the evaluation will only partially analyze impact. Specifically, this will be limited to unintended/unanticipated results (positive/negative, primary/secondary). The evaluation will instead add an additional “coherence” criteria to more thoroughly investigate the continued validity of the program’s ToC, as well as the complementarity of Consortium partner inputs.

The evaluation will also have a particular focus on analyzing issues specific to **gender and age**. This will include not just collecting sex and age disaggregated data but also analyzing the relevance and effectiveness of the program’s gender strategy and activities involving youth.

Finally, the evaluation will not only analyze the **conflict sensitivity** of the program but also the evaluation itself. Instruments, site and interviewee sampling, and data analysis and presentation will all be reviewed to understand how they might be influenced by the conflict and in turn how the evaluation itself could influence local conflict dynamics and possibly jeopardize any program stakeholders interviewed.

---

<sup>46</sup> International Labour Organisation, "ILO Policy Guidelines for Results-Based Evaluation: Principles, Rationale, Planning, and Managing for Evaluations," ed. Evaluation Unit (EVAL) (Geneva2013).

## **Purpose and Objectives**

As clearly expressed in the Terms of Reference (ToR), the “main purposes of the midterm independent evaluation is for programme improvements and to promote accountability to ILO key stakeholders and donor, and to enhance learning within the ILO and key stakeholders.”<sup>47</sup>

In line with the OECD/DAC criteria described above, the objectives of the evaluation, again as defined by the ToR are to:

- Assess the programme design and its theory of change, specifically whether it is still valid;
- Assess the relevance of the programme in responding to peace and reconciliation in Myanmar;
- Assess the effectiveness of the programme and the effectiveness of its management arrangement
- Assess the programme implementation efficiency;
- Provide recommendations;
- Identify emerging potential good practices and lessons learnt

## **Scope**

The evaluation will cover program activities beginning from the commencement of the program (March 2015) until its midway point (March 2017). It will review information from the full geographical coverage of the program, however, fieldwork will be limited to program sites in/around Ban Mak, Kutkai, Mai Hai, Namkham, Tachileik, Taunggyi, and Yangon.

## **Audience**

The **primary intended audience** for the evaluation is the ILO-Consortium members and EU as the funding agency. **Secondary audiences** including township, state, and Union level officials and EAO representatives, project beneficiaries, ILO Regional and Headquarters staff, and other development partners (current and future) interested in supporting peace, reconciliation, and development through community empowerment in Shan state.

## **Revised Evaluation Questions**

The ToR lists a total of 39 evaluation questions and sub-questions. Although there is no fixed number of questions an evaluation should include, good evaluation practice generally recommends trying to limit evaluation questions between three and eight.<sup>48</sup>

The evaluators have thus attempted to reorganize and focus the evaluation questions while still collecting information on most of the original questions. The “Evaluation Design Matrix” presents a more focused list of 17 evaluation questions and related “lines of enquiry.” These lines of enquiry will help focus the collection of information during interviews to ultimately help answer the main evaluation questions.

## **Deliverables**

1. **Inception report** highlighting findings from the desk review and presenting proposed data collection instruments and schedule (**March 7**).
2. **Data collection** involving quantitative and qualitative data collection in Yangon and various sites in Shan State (**March 8 -24**).
3. **Stakeholders’ workshop** at the end of fieldwork to validate preliminary findings (**March 24**).
4. **Draft evaluation report** following in-depth data analysis (**April 14**).
5. **Final evaluation report** following receipt of comments on draft (**May 5**).
6. **Evaluation Summary** (**May 12**).

---

<sup>47</sup> International Labour Organisation. Pg. 3.

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, [http://www.betterevaluation.org/en/blog/framing\\_an\\_evaluation](http://www.betterevaluation.org/en/blog/framing_an_evaluation).

### Overall Approach

The evaluation will follow a non-experimental, qualitatively-dominant design. It will follow a *Theory-Based Approach* guided by an overarching framework (see **Evaluation Design Matrix**) to collecting and analyzing information. The methodology is to employ a range of tools aligned to the research design matrix and designed to deliver an evidence base derived from clear and verified answers to the 17 evaluation questions arranged along six evaluation criteria.

The evaluation will follow a mixed methods approach. The focus is on qualitative research as this is deemed more appropriate to garner an in-depth understanding of perceptions and processes. Interviews and discussion groups will be used to test working assumptions, probe issues, gauge perceptions, and explore potential solutions. To support this qualitative exploration, a quantitative component will be used as a follow up to test ideas, assumptions, and trends identified and provide greater validity and reliability to the evaluation’s conclusions.

The evaluation has been designed in three phases; an inception phase to design the evaluation based on a review of existing documents and early-stage interviews; a fieldwork phase to collect and analyze primary data; and a data analysis and reporting phase.

### Approach and Methods

**Data Collection.** Following approval of the Inception Report, the evaluators will begin the data collection phase. They will conduct initial interviews with key stakeholders in Yangon and other remote-based interviews, as needed. The evaluators will then travel to Shan state to interview key stakeholders, partners, and beneficiaries. They will use semi-structured guidelines to facilitate interviews and group discussions to ensure consistency, continuity, and quality while allowing flexibility, progressive probing, and greater linkages of analysis.

The evaluators will focus their data collection to reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the casual logic, plausibility of the various assumptions in the ToC, and identify where additional evidence is needed for observed results, assumptions about the ToC, and other influencing factors. The evaluators will collect evidence on key results and evidence that the program was implemented as planned or how implementation was altered. They will also collect evidence demonstrating if the various assumptions in the Theory of Change are valid or not. Finally, they will examine other significant factors that may have an influence.

**Data Analysis.** Data from interviews and group discussions will be recorded and organized systematically to facilitate data analysis. During fieldwork, the evaluators will note emergent trends and themes and will produce written summaries of interview finding; sanitized versions can be made available upon request. This will also allow for a rolling analysis of trends during fieldwork. The evaluators will plan to hold a mid-point check-in with ILO Evaluation Manager to discuss progress, concerns, and jointly assess if any adjustments to the questions or methodology need to be made. Following fieldwork, the evaluators will conduct a more in-depth analysis of the data.

Data analysis tools	Description
Rolling analysis record	A field record documenting key points of interest made by participants, comments raised, evaluators’ spontaneous interpretations and impressions, emerging trends and themes, probing questions, and notes for new issues to be explored in further interviews.
Disaggregated data sheet	A spreadsheet to record and analyze key statistics and figures. This will be disaggregated where possible by gender, age, ethnicity and location.  In instances where data is not available agree proxy data will be used as an alternative.
De-brief workshop	A workshop where Consortium staff and available partners will discuss and validate initial findings and analysis.

### Sampling of Field Sites

The selection of data collection sites was determined based on the geographical coverage of Consortium partners. As the program works through a decentralized approach that emphasizes a significant degree of autonomy for each

partner, it is necessary for the team to travel to southern, eastern, and northern Shan to interview stakeholders and observe activities across all three specific objectives. Security conditions also significantly hindered site selection with travel authorization and ongoing armed skirmishes limiting the team's ability to access more remote and conflict affected areas.

### Stakeholder Mapping

**Stakeholder Groups.** A range of potential stakeholders to interview was derived from an initial desk review of program documents and discussions with Consortium staff. Care was taken to ensure that a diversity of perspectives was included, as well as to ensure the evaluation captures and triangulates various opinions. This was done by identifying actors able to speak to the *intentions* of program and activities, *perceptions* of success or shortcoming, and evidence of actual *realities* in project locations.

**Interviewee Selection.** Based on the desk review and initial consultations, the evaluation team will identify and purposefully select key individuals from within the identified stakeholder groups. There will be a deliberate effort to conduct interviews with the widest possible range of stakeholders, including a large number that were neither beneficiaries of the projects, nor operationally involved in them. The selection of interviewees will seek to be representative of the demographic characteristics of the geographies selected.

### Quality Standards and Evaluation Ethics

**Standards and Ethics.** The evaluators committed to respect fundamental human rights, social justice, and the dignity and worth of all subjects interviewed. Informed consent was sought and received at the beginning of each interview. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their answers and that they were free to opt out at any time. Interviews were conducted in a manner that was respectful and ensured that participants fully understood how information from the interviews would be used. Interview responses were aggregated and presented in a way that ensures that sensitive data cannot be traced to institutions or individuals, while still ensuring transparency regarding the information gathered.

Evaluation Design Matrix (Data Collection Worksheet)

Criteria	Evaluation Question	Lines of Inquiry	Indicator	Relevance/ Use	Data Source	Means of Analysis
Coherence	1. To what extent does the programme design and the underlying ToC remain valid given the limited progress in the peace process and increased conflict in central and northern Shan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To what extent do programming assumptions continue to hold true?</li> <li>- Do activities reflect findings from the Local Conflict Assessment?</li> <li>- Is the causal logic linking intended results clear and realistic?</li> <li>- Does the design need to be modified in the second half of the programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- # of issues raised in current program logic.</li> <li>- % of evaluation respondents reporting that design is relevant/ irrelevant.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central question for midterm evaluation and possible program adjustments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Program documents</li> <li>- Secondary documents</li> <li>- Interview responses (all stakeholders)</li> <li>- Survey responses (all stakeholders)</li> </ul>	Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.
	2. To what extent has M&E been utilized and helped provide relevant evidence to inform programming?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How appropriate and useful are the MEAL indicators in assessing the program’s progress?</li> <li>- Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked?</li> <li>- Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate?</li> <li>- Are the indicators gender-sensitive?</li> <li>- Is M&amp;E data being regularly collected over time?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of indicators reported on.</li> <li>- # of changes to program plans made using M&amp;E information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To inform refinements to MEAL plan and partner reporting.</li> <li>- Strengthen learning and accountability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Program docs</li> <li>- PRD M&amp;E staff (ILO and SCI)</li> <li>- PAC interviews</li> <li>- EU interviews</li> </ul>	Quantitative – simple descriptive.
	3. To what extent does the Consortium follow a coherent and consistent implementation approach?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has there been a coherent implementation approach among the consortium members?</li> <li>- Given different geographical targeting by</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- # of examples provided</li> <li>- % of respondents reporting coherence or lack of.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To follow up on PAC discussions to be “greater than sum of parts”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews with</li> </ul>	Content Analysis of Project Documents

	<p>consortium partners, whether there is opportunity for the consortium partners to undertake the activities collectively giving the intention of complementary approaches?</p> <p>– Would it be possible for the consortium partners to undertake more activities collectively and collaboratively in the Consortium?</p> <p>4. What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?</p> <p>– What strategies are other partners working on peace, reconciliation, and development in Shan following?</p> <p>– Do communities themselves have suggestions for other approaches?</p> <p>– Is there a way to better align to host-country plans and strategies?</p>	<p>– Yes/No</p>	<p>– To inform possible adaptations/ refinements in program design.</p>	<p>consortium members</p> <p>– Interviews with EU and other partners</p> <p>– Desk review</p> <p>– Interviews</p> <p>– Survey responses</p>	
Relevance	<p>5. To what extent has the program responded to the real needs of the beneficiaries?</p> <p>– To what extent have other stakeholders been involved in program design and implementation?</p> <p>– What needs do community members themselves express?</p> <p>– To what extent was programming based on assessment and</p>	<p>– - % of community members feeling program addresses priority needs.</p> <p>- # of alternate needs provided.</p>	<p>– To assess extent program is following a key intentional of improving community empowerment.</p>	<p>– Desk review</p> <p>– Interviews with Consortium staff, partners, and community members.</p>	<p>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.</p> <p>Content Analysis of Project Documents</p>

	consultation with communities?					
	6. Do the intended results and approach align with ILO's comparative advantages?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– What does ILO staff consider to be ILO Myanmar's comparative advantages?</li> <li>– What do other development partners consider to be ILO's comparative advantages?</li> <li>– To what extent has the program promoted ILO's mandate on social dialogue and international labor standard (taking into consideration the context of the program)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– % of respondents reporting program is/ is not within ILO's comparative advantage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To inform decisions on ILO Myanmar's future engagement with peacebuilding issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Program documents</li> <li>– Interviews with ILO, other UN agencies</li> </ul>	
Effectiveness	7. Is the programme making sufficient progress towards its planned objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Will the programme likely achieve its planned objectives upon completion?</li> <li>– Are the empowerment activity efforts and approach effective?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– % of M&amp;E indicators on track.</li> <li>– % of respondents feeling program is on-track given contextual challenges.</li> <li>– # of major contextual challenges encountered</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To assess progress to date and identify options to increase progress going forward</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Interviews (all stakeholders)</li> <li>– Survey results (all stakeholders)</li> <li>– Program Docs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.</li> <li>Quantitative – simple descriptive.</li> </ul>
	8. What issues/factors have facilitated or impeded progress?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– What are the main constraints, challenges, and areas in need of further attention?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– # of issues raised.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To understand how contextual factors are affecting performance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Content Analysis of</li> </ul>	



	<p>9. To what extent does the program build on complementarities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Have consortium members worked in complementing one another to enhance the effectiveness (and impact) of the interventions?</li> <li>– Does the programme collaborate with other projects and programs to enhance its impact and effectiveness?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– # of examples of complementarities</li> <li>– # of examples of collaborations with other projects.</li> <li>– # of “missed opportunities” identified by interviewees.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To assess ways in which Consortium can deliver results more than “the sum of its parts”</li> </ul>		Project Documents
	<p>10. To what extent have governance, administration, or technical issues facilitated or impeded progress?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– What has been the role of Consortium Programme Advisory Committee? And does it work well? Any areas of improvement needed?</li> <li>– Has the program received adequate administrative, technical and if needed, political support from concerned ILO offices (liaison Office, HQ technical department and DWT- Bangkok, if relevant)? If not why?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– # of issues identified</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To identify and suggest options for remedying operational challenges.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Program docs.</li> <li>– Interviews with Consortium staff</li> <li>– Interviews with ILO staff (all levels)</li> <li>– Interviews with EU</li> </ul>	<p>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.</p> <p>Content Analysis of Project Documents</p>
Efficiency	<p>11. Have resources been allocated strategically and timely to achieve results?</p> <p>12. To what extent have program resources have been leveraged with other related interventions to</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– If not, what were the factors that have hindered timely delivery of outputs?</li> <li>– Any measures that has been put in place?</li> <li>– Has the programs built on the previous work of Consortium partners?</li> <li>– Has the program secured funding for program</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– % of respondents indicating inputs have/ have not been strategic and timely.</li> <li>– # of examples where funding have been leveraged</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To identify and assess how inputs have been converted to results.</li> <li>– To identify ways that the program has or has not sought to increase “Value for Money”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Program docs and budget</li> <li>– Interviews with Consortium staff</li> <li>– Interviews with EU</li> </ul>	<p>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.</p> <p>Content Analysis of Project Documents</p>

	maximize impact, if any?	activities from other sources?				
Sustainability	13. To what extent are the results of the intervention are likely to be durable or even scaled up and replicated by intervention partners after major assistance has been completed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Are any of the activities revenue generating?</li> <li>– What is the extent of community buy-in and ownership?</li> <li>– To what extent to respondents think the activities will continue?</li> <li>– What steps has the program taken to ensure sustainability?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– # of examples of sustainability.</li> <li>– % of respondents reporting that activities are likely to be sustained or scaled up.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To assess sustainability, ownership, and buy-in in program activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Project docs</li> <li>– Interviews (all stakeholders)</li> <li>– Survey results (all stakeholders).</li> </ul>	<p>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and expert review.</p> <p>Quantitative – simple descriptive.</p> <p>Content Analysis of Project Documents</p>
	14. How effective has the programme been in establishing national/local ownership?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To what extent has the capacity of host country partners/staff been built up to manage activities?</li> <li>– What is the extent of government interest and participation in activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– % of community members reporting activities likely to be sustained.</li> <li>– # of examples of funds have/are being raised to sustain activities.</li> <li>– # of linkages to other activities to sustain activities.</li> </ul>			
Special Aspects	15. The extent to which the programme has mainstreamed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– What steps has the program taken to ensure gender is mainstreamed into activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– # of sex and age disaggregated indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To assess the extent to which the program has sought to identify</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Project docs</li> <li>– Interviews (all stakeholders)</li> </ul>	<p>Qualitative – rolling, thematic, and</p>

gender into its design, and implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is the gender action plan being followed and used?</li> <li>- How is the program tracking gender specific results?</li> <li>- Does M&amp;E data disaggregate by sex and age?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of gender issues identified by the program that activities have sought to address</li> <li>- % of respondents feeling that gender has been adequately considered.</li> </ul>	and remedy gender and age specific issues in programming.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Survey results (all stakeholders).</li> </ul>	expert review.
16. To what extent has conflict sensitivity been considered in program design and implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is the LCA used and regularly updated?</li> <li>- To what extent has the program sought to respond to sensitivities?</li> <li>- What feedback mechanisms are in place to ensure program doesn't increase tensions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of respondents agreeing that program works to be conflict sensitive.</li> <li>- # of examples of program adapting activities to be more conflict sensitive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To ensure that "Do No Harm" principles are maintained and that tensions in community do not increase as a result of the activity.</li> </ul>	Quantitative - simple descriptive.	Content Analysis of Project Documents
17. Are there any unanticipated results (positive or negative) from the activities of the program?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were there any unexpected reactions/ alternate use of activities and resources?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- # of unanticipated results identified.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To monitor unexpected/ unplanned results of the program and ensure "Do No Harm."</li> </ul>		

The scheduling and logistical arrangements for the evaluation are complicated by a variety of factors, including recent and ongoing armed clashes, parallel EU Results-Oriented Monitoring missions, and the upcoming second meeting of the “21CPC” and Myanmar New Year. Given these challenges, the evaluators have been requested to follow the draft schedule outlined below:

**Thursday 9 March**

- Morning – Meeting with EU Delegation, Peace Funding Manager, Manuel de Rivera.
- 1130hrs – Meeting with ILO Liaison Officer – Rory Mungoven (ILO office)
- 1215 – Meeting with ILO Deputy Liaison Officer – Piyamal Pichaiwongse (ILO office)
- 1400 hrs – Meeting with all consortium partners – ILO office Yangon

**Friday 10 March**

- Meeting with individual Consortium partners in **Yangon ILO Office**.
  - 9:00 – ASG (Aids Support Group)
  - 10:30 – SC (Save The Children)
  - 13:00 – MDCG (Maggin Development Consultancy Group)
  - 14:30 – ILO (International Labour Organisation)
  - 15:00 – EPRP (Ethnic Peace Resources Project)

**Saturday 11 March**

- Travel - **Yangon to Taunggyi** with ILO (Matthew Maguire), ETA Taunggyi – 1530hrs

**Sunday 12 March**

- Meeting ceasefire liaison officers in **Taunggyi** (ILO lead)
  - 1030hrs – Pa’oh National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) Ceasefire Liaison Officer – Khun Minn Thein (@ PNLO CLO)
  - tbc - Restoration Council of Shan State – Shan State Army South (RCSS-SSA-S) – Sai Ohm Kai, Public Ceasefire Liaison Office (@ RCSS CLO).
  - tbc - Shan State Progressive Party – Shan State Army South (SSPP-SSA-N) – Sai Kyaw Zaw, Ceasefire Liaison Officer (@ SSPP CLO)
  - 1900 hrs – dinner with ILO team at Aythaya Wine Lodge.

**Monday 13 March**

- 1000-1400 - Meeting with villagers from Southern Mawk Mai villages in Taunggyi – to be confirmed.
- 0800 hrs AND/OR 1500 – individual CSO meetings
  - Cooperation for Peace & Development
  - Pa’oh Youth Organisation and/or Taunggyi Youth Centre

**Tuesday 14 March**

- Meeting with Shan State Government, Shan State Chief Minister (ILO lead)
- Meet CSOs and Youth Groups

**Wednesday 15 March**

- Morning – observation of EPRP Federalism workshop with CSOs.
- 1400 hrs – introductory meeting with Koen Versavel, EU ROM consultant
- 1500hrs – joint MIE and ROM meeting with CSOs and Youth Groups
- 1700hrs – joint MIE and ROM meeting with EPRP and available partners – ILO Taunggyi project office (unless otherwise noted by EPRP)

**Thursday 16 March**

- 0530 – 1800hrs – Travel and joint MIE and ROM consultants in **Laikha Township** (gov controlled town but near RCSS).
  - Meetings with community project representatives, ‘community contractors’ and ILO and EPRP partner: *Capacity Building for Youth* and any available local village heads or Parliamentarians.
- 10hrs – Township Administrator (GAD)
- ? - CBY sub-grant recipient from EPRP and ILO partnership on forced labor, advocacy, federalism.
- ? – VDC.
- ? – Community Members.

#### **Friday 17 March**

- Travel from Heho to Tachileik (Yangon Airways - depart Heho 1225hrs – arrive Tachileik 1455)
- Meetings with ASG and partners in **Tachileik** (@ ASG office)

#### **Saturday 18 March**

- Meetings with ASG and partners in **Tachileik and/or other township (\*ASG to advise)**
- Depart Tachileik 1420 hrs – arrive Lashio 1500 hrs.
- Travel Lashio to **Kutkai** to meet with MDCG and partners – arrive 1700hrs (overnight in Kutkai)

#### **Sunday 19 March**

- 0530/0600hrs Kutkai to **Namkham** (arrive Namkham 1200hrs) meeting with Save and partners.
- 1630hrs depart Namkham to Muse (overnight Muse)

#### **Monday 20 March**

- Muse to **Kutkai** – 0500/0600 hrs – arrive Kutkai 0900hrs/0930 hrs.
- Morning meeting(s) with MDCG and partners, in **Kutkai** then onto potentially **Pansay Village** (MDCG to advise)
- Depart Kutkai @ 1200 hrs (latest)
- Meetings with wider protection actors – return to YGN **tb**

#### **Tuesday 21 March to Thursday March 23**

- Follow up interviews and consultations in Yangon.

#### **Thursday 23 March**

#### **Friday 24 March**

- Morning -1000hrs (ILO Yangon Office) - joint MIE and ROM debriefing with all consortium partners.