



# Evaluation Summary



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## Integrated Livelihood Recovery for Typhoon Haiyan Affected Communities – Final Evaluation

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** *Philippines*

**Final Evaluation:** *July 2015*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *Independent*

**Administrative Office:** *CO-Manila*

**Technical Office:** *DWT-Bangkok*

**Evaluation Manager:** *Tite Habiyakare*

**Evaluation Consultant:** *John Connell, Arvy Origenes*

**Project Code:** *PHI/14/02/JPN*

**Donor & Project Budget:** *UK (US\$ 3,000,000)*

**Keywords:** *Natural disaster, economic reconstruction, skills and enterprise development.*

### Background & Context

**Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure** One of the strongest tropical cyclones recorded, **Typhoon Haiyan** (local name: Yolanda) made its landfall on 08 November 2013 and wrought catastrophic damage throughout Samar and Leyte in the Visayas. As well as the agriculture sector, an estimated 5.6-million workers, of which 40 percent are women, were affected with little or no access to social security. Provision of immediate opportunities for employment was a priority to make up lost sources of income and rebuild livelihoods.

The project development objective was to “*support employment creation, livelihood opportunities and employability of poor and vulnerable workers and*

*families in affected areas*”. It did this through 4 interventions (outputs); (a) provision of social protection (**SP**) for workers; (b) local resource based construction of social infrastructure (**LRB**); (c) skills development (**SD**); and (d) community based enterprise development (**ED**). These were conducted in five sites; Tacloban, Ormoc, Bohol, Cebu, and Coron which track Haiyan’s path across the Philippines.

**Situation of the Project** The Project (12 mth.) began in March 2014. Due to typhoon Hagupit, (4-7 Dec 2014) the completion date was extended by two mth. to 31 May 2015. During implementation some activities were co-funded by two other donors to ILO Haiyan recovery program Norway, and IMEC

### Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

The evaluation aims to promote accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO. The evaluation covered all project components across 3 of the five project sites; Tacloban, Cebu, and Coron and visited 14 of the 39 separate sub-projects.

The clients of the evaluation are the ILO Country Office and Project Team; Technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and Headquarters; tripartite constituents; and the donor (JPN).

### Methodology of evaluation

This included (a) desk study of relevant documents ; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholders and direct observations (2-8 July, 2015); (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm findings (9 July, 2015).

### Limitations

The resources for the evaluation and tight time scale meant data collection was restricted to single-visit

interviews. Final consolidation of project data was still in progress at the time of the evaluation and the final number of beneficiaries was not available for a few sub-projects.

## Main Findings & Conclusions

The project overall reached 7468 workers exceeding its development target by 11%. This was offset by under achieving for its main immediate objective, with LRB type subprojects, achieving 73% of target. It made up with higher number of beneficiaries reached by SD and ED subprojects. (Note: one large LRB subproject had not submitted reports at the time of evaluation which could increase LRB beneficiaries to 87% of target).

Through the open planning approach of the project the ILO field teams identified subprojects and implementing co-partners that responded well to local needs, and produced high and sustainable impacts. These subprojects most likely would not have eventuated with co-partners working separately. The bulk of these used <\$40,000 project funds, but through partnering mobilized a further \$0.9M or about 50% of the deliverable budget.

The time frame of 12 mth, for 'disaster recovery phase' projects was too limited. The process for field teams to identify, construct and mobilize the locally identified subprojects was necessarily time consuming, resulting a slow delivery rate; just 56% of budget expended by Dec. 2014 within 3 mth. of the (design) project completion date. Complex subprojects, particularly ED subprojects which attempted to set up 'new enterprises', could not be provided with necessary social preparation and support within this timeframe, and in some cases were not physically completed. Other aspects of establishing new enterprises, (including Sloping Agricultural Land Technology (SALT) and LRB type sub-project), call into question their suitability for disaster recovery projects.

### Conclusions

#### Strategic Fit

The strategic fit of the project was good at several levels. It directly contributed to the Strategic Response Plan of the IHT: 'Strategic Objective 3, and its immediate objectives addressed three of the four short term outcomes of the government's main recovery plan; RAY. The SP component contributed to the ILO country program to established decent work conditions.

#### Validity of Design

The open planning by which ILO field teams at each site could respond to the wide and varied needs on the spot, was considered a suitable approach in this disaster context. The LRB and SD sub-projects activities in particular directly addressed the RAY objectives.

Given time required for project start-up, sub-project identification and then mobilization, a project timeframe of 12 mth is somewhat short. A timeframe of 18 mth would allow ILO field teams to give opportunity to identifying the highly effective micro-sub-projects, and then providing on-going coordination and support.

The ED component was designed to be applied at two levels; (a) rebuilding of existing enterprises and (b) support for 'new enterprises'. The first of these should have significant impact and was highly cost effective. However the second requires considerable social preparation and follow-up to establish production and market management. This type of intervention should not be included in short (12 mth) disaster recovery projects.

#### Project Effectiveness

The project identified and supported 39 sub-projects (the SP support packages were applied to these and for the evaluation not considered as separate sub-projects), which were highly varied and responsive to local needs. In this regard the project was highly successful. Of these all are physically completed except 3 larger sub-projects (DSWD; SALT II, and 1 ED project)

The project reached a total of **7468 (m-4064/f-3404) workers**, exceeding its overall development target by about 11%. This was mainly through exceeding targets for the SD and ED sub-projects, while **LRB** achieve reaching **3368 (m-1808/f-1560) workers**, the largest target it was under-achieved by 26% (Note: no beneficiaries for the DSWD LRB/ED project, with 600 approved LRB beneficiaries. were included as no report had been submitted at the time of the evaluation). The achievements for **SD**, **2336 (m-1240/f-1096)** trainees, exceeded its targets by 33%. The **ED** reached **1764 (m-1016/f-748)** small businesses and so exceeded its target by more than 3x, mainly delivery of the CBED training package.

The ILO field teams were key to the identification and construction of the sub-projects along with

effective implementing partners. As much as this process added to the quality of the projects thus identified, the process for proposal development was time-consuming and resulted in slow delivery (see Validity of Design above).

With multiple implementing partners, management of sub-project was complex. On-going coordination of approved sub-projects by the ILO field team could have facilitated this, but was lacking due to limited field orientated staff in the teams, and the need for further sub-project development. The ED sub-projects had a particular need for support with community based enterprise development approaches, but this was lacking both within the ILO teams and the implementing partners. As a result ongoing ownership of assets and sustainability of these projects is of concern.

#### Efficiency

Project delivery was initially slow with only 16% of budget expended in first 6 mth., and still 56% by December, just 3 mth before project design completion date. Field team composition had only 2 field orientated staff insufficient for a short (12 mth) disaster recovery project. Constricting processes for sub-project approval further delayed sub-projects.

The ED funds expended for C-BED training, just \$13,769, was extremely effective in reaching 1511 micro, medium and small businesses. These in most cases have on-going support from implementing partners. The ED sub-projects which supported establishing 'new enterprises' were either not fully established or physically uncompleted.

#### Impact

The LRB sub-projects all had a direct and immediate impact of providing income to the beneficiaries for a limited period. The locally identified 23 micro sub-projects, mainly LRB type for reconstruction of social infrastructure (i.e. schools, roads, mortuary, etc.) have enabled resumption of normal social and economic life of communities. These have an impact far beyond the immediate beneficiaries counted. These sub-projects thus make a significant contribution to the major development objective of the project

Similarly for the SD sub-projects. The trainees have gained employment following their training,

and more importantly will enable them to shift from the large pool of unskilled labour to continue obtain well paid and responsible positions in the future.

The main ED sub-project provided C-BED training to a large number of existing micro, medium and small businesses, appears to be well received. Real impact must wait for the tracer study to be completed later in 2015. As noted above ED sub-projects for 'new enterprises' were not considered fully operational and thus do not yet deliver impact. Sub-projects which provided follow-up allow skills to be built upon. These can provide forums or focal points for self-employed workers, such as STEER and the tri-cycle drivers foundation, which can lead to associations for self-employed workers.

The SP provided to the direct beneficiaries of the other sub-projects, did not confer any impact at this point. It has alerted workers to their rights which may result in them progressively seeking or demanding these in future work opportunities. Similarly this experience may also served to have alerted the relevant agencies responsible to ensure decent work conditions in the {Philippines (DOLE, DSDW).

#### Sustainability

The bulk of the LRB projects for re-construction of social infrastructure will continue to provide benefits to the communities where they are located. Similarly for the beneficiaries of SD sub-projects. They will to obtain skilled employment; good wages and confidence to further advance themselves. The main input for ED was C-BED training which was well accepted and should see a reasonable number of the small businesses apply its messages, and thus derive on-going benefits. The training package itself has been accepted by a number of larger NGOs including Plan, CARE and Oxfam, who can be expected to apply it.

### Recomendations & Lessons Learned

#### **Main recommendations and follow-up**

##### **1# Strengthened resources for disaster phase projects**

While there is an urgency to deliver benefits during the disaster phase and need to conserved budgets several changes should be considered to project design

- (a) Increase timeframe from 12 to 18 mth., to enable field teams to identify and mobilize greater number of the highly effective micro sub-projects.
- (b) Field teams should continue to monitor and guide sub-projects particularly where there are multiple partners. This can be achieved through including clear validation points in proposals, and ensuring field teams have adequate staff.
- (c) Include staff with community development experience in the field teams, particularly as noted for (b) above and 2# below.

**2# Avoidance of complex initiatives for short (12 mth) disaster recovery projects.** Sub-projects such as SALT and establishment of new enterprises require substantial social preparation and ongoing engagement to ensure outcomes. SALT should only be considered in very limited cases. Establishment of 'new enterprises' does have potential, but requires longer time-frame, and staff with community based experience. Challenging issues such as asset ownership, production management and marketing etc. need to be addressed in proposals.

**3# Provide follow-up activities** Where training inputs are provided, through TESDA or C-BED, structured activities within 2-3 mth should be conducted to provide feed-back, exchange and top-up training. This would greatly stimulate impact and effective application of training.

**4# Apply lesson from disaster recovery to mainstream programs.** Where interventions have been effective in disaster recovery projects they can be considered for mainstream programs; i.e. review of day-to-day protocols that slow mobilization; LRB type projects which could be used as vehicle to introduce decent work to rural areas; initiatives (e.g. small enterprises) that create focal points for dispersed and independent workers.

**5# Improved internal management for short disaster recovery projects.** These need to be prepared ahead of disaster and ready to application:

- (a) streamline procedures for sub-project development; standardized monitoring procedures; closer links between project advisors and field team (e.g. technical advisors located in affected areas close to field teams).

## **Lessons learned**

1# On-going monitoring and guidance for sub-projects: While much effort goes into proposal development, where sub-projects have multiple implementing partners there is a real need for ILO field teams to provide on-going monitoring and guidance.

2# In-completed or vulnerable establishment of new enterprise : The sub-projects for establishment of 'new enterprises' tended to be 'uncompleted' with production and markets not reliably established. These are complex activities and should not be included in short (12 mth) disaster recovery projects due to a range of issues (i.e. asset ownership, production management and marketing).

3# Un-sustainable SALT interventions: SALT activities appear to be viewed as a cash4work activity rather than an 'extension activity' requiring substantial social preparation and follow-up. While the SALT sites were more or less installed (contour strips not developed due to drought), there were unlikely to continue to be functional for erosion control, or to see continued group cultivation. As such, SALT activities should not be included in short (2 mth) disaster recovery projects.

## **Emerging Best Practice**

1# Open Planning: The 'open planning' approach appears suitable in the disaster recovery context. It allows field teams to identify local issues; possible sub-projects to address these, and then assemble implementing teams from a range of agencies. As such it appeared to be more effective than many of the larger institutional sub-projects

2# Follow-up support to training inputs to build on impacts. STEER provided additional training (business and financial) to the SD trainees, but also brought trainees together. This allows exchange of experiences and top-up of skills. Potentially is a pathway to these self-employed workers to group and form associations. The effect of providing such 'focus points' was seen with increased dynamic operation of the tri-cycle drivers foundation in Tacloban. Such structured follow-up could be provided more frequently.