



# Evaluation Summary



International  
Labour  
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Office

## Norwegian support to help recover from the destruction brought by super typhoon Haiyan - Final Evaluation

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** Philippines

**Final Evaluation:** August 2015

**Mode of Evaluation:** Independent

**Administrative Office:** CO-Manila

**Technical Office:** ROAP Employment Intensive Investments

**Evaluation Manager:** Pamornrat Pringsulaka

**Evaluation Consultants:** Felicissimo Junior David and Christoph David Weinmann

**Project End:** 31 October 2015

**Project Code:** PHI/13/05/NOR

**Donor & Project Budget:** Norway (US\$ 5,666,509)

**Keywords** emergency relief, disaster, livelihoods, labour intensive employment, social security beneficiary, minimum wage, community enterprise, community participation, aid coordination, enterprise development, skills development, labour force survey

### Background & Context

#### Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure

The project was designed to support the recovery of livelihoods of poor and vulnerable workers and their families in the areas affected

by super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). Four Immediate Objectives were agreed. (1) Generating immediate income through emergency employment (EE, months 1-4). (2) Local resource-based (LRB), employment intensive, approaches used for small infrastructure repairs and reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation and protection works. (3) Technical vocational training and skills development (SD) provided for affected workers. (4) Sustainable employment is generated through local enterprise recovery.

The project structure consisted of a team composed of an international chief technical adviser, international long-term experts for key areas of intervention (disaster response, early recovery, livelihood and enterprise development [ED]) working in conjunction with national project coordinators deployed in selected locations (hubs) and supported by technical field coordinators, administrative staff and short-term consultants. ILO backstopping was limited, mainly administrative through CO-Manila and ROAP. National project coordinators had strong experience in coordinating employment intensive projects and working on disaster response.

In the Philippines, ILO is the designated Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team Counterpart for the government in the Livelihood cluster. Geographic areas of project intervention were agreed between different

*contributing agencies and the government in line with a coordinated cluster approach.*

*The project worked with local implementing partners in order to deliver the assistance needed. Implementing partners were local non-government and government organizations. These were sub-contracted in order to carry out agreed activities benefiting affected communities and/ or affected populations and usually contributed in-kind to the agreed activities.*

### **Present Situation of the Project**

*The evaluation occurred just prior to project closure. At the time of publication of this summary, the project has been closed.*

### **Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation**

*The purposes of this final evaluation were to fulfil the accountability to the donor, to serve as internal organizational learning and for improvement of similar projects in the future. The evaluation was to assess the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved as per project logical framework, and whether the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation. The evaluation also aimed at identifying lessons learnt and possible good practices, and developing recommendations that can be followed up by key constituents and also ILO. It was also of interest to understand to which extent disaster response is a field of intervention that contributes to achieving strategic objectives of the ILO.*

*Primary stakeholders of the evaluation were project management, ILO (ILO CO-Manila, ROAP), the Governments of the Philippines and of Norway, the other parties involved in the execution of the project, as well as cluster members and tripartite constituents.*

### **Methodology of evaluation**

*The short-notice scheduling of the evaluation generally determined the methodology used. The field visit had to be undertaken prior to the handover of the project documentation. Proper desk review, therefore, could only occur following the field visit. The field visit was well organized, and allowed for independent discussions with a multitude of stakeholders, including national and local government, implementing partners, and beneficiaries of diverse sub-projects, and project staff.*

*The evaluators worked on the basis of semi-structured interviews (following the standard project evaluation criteria set), triangulation of observations in the field, as well as informed judgment. Project monitoring spreadsheets and monitoring reports were analyzed following the field visits and yielded further insights, however could not be used for deeper follow-up and probing as time for the evaluation expired.*

*The preliminary results of the evaluation were presented to stakeholders at the CO-Manila at the end of the field visit.*

## **Main Findings & Conclusions**

*The project was fully relevant to the different processes supported in the target country as well as to ILO and the donor. It contributed to the decent work agenda by successfully convincing the government and other agencies that minimum wages be paid for emergency, recovery, and reconstruction employment, leading to the revision of previous administrative orders. It also set standards by providing personal protective equipment, social security coverage and health insurance.*

*The project may serve as a basis for ILO to develop further interventions in the field of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance subject to observations made in the following section.*

*Existing labour force surveys were instrumental for estimating the affected vulnerable populations with considerable accuracy.*

*The project has been effective in achieving intended outcomes, however enterprise development needs more time and therefore has not been as effective as intended; this has been compensated for by higher effectiveness in emergency employment and LRB.*

*The project has generally been efficient as a result of a highly dedicated, experienced, and productive team in the field. Optimal cooperation with implementing partners and mobilizing contributions in kind has increased its leverage.*

*The project, as typical for activities of emergency relief and disaster response did not have sustainability as a principal focus, but managed to contribute to many sustainable processes. Alignment with the government and unison with the cluster approach ensured that emergency activities minimized distortions and strengthened the existing institutional landscape.*

*The within-project transition from emergency response to the next phases (recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction) needs to be accompanied by appropriate change in management approaches. The project team operated in "emergency mode" for too long. This has led to overburdening and exhaustion of field teams. The project also had difficulties to make available stronger administrative support in the field.*

*The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has been self-developed and was not suitable to timely yield fully reliable M&E information, although it certainly was instrumental for project and sub-project management. Careful attention needs to be paid to setting up an M&E system from the outset for project that deals with large numbers of beneficiaries and*

*respectively sub-projects in a short amount of time.*

*A significantly higher share of emergency employment was created for male beneficiaries than for female beneficiaries. Part of the explanation is that a large share of EE consisted of clearing debris. Female beneficiaries benefited more from LRB and ED. It will be important to think of ways of increasing the female share in EE because this is the most immediate assistance available in disaster response. ED, on the other hand, takes more time to lead to results and therefore may not be the first-best solution.*

## **Recommendations & Lessons Learned**

### **Main recommendations and follow-up**

1. By participating in emergency and disaster response and recovery, ILO is able to promote the decent work agenda because ILO may influence standards of the response. *It therefore is recommended that ILO develop a strategy for dealing with emergencies and disasters on the basis of the Haiyan response and other experience accumulated in the Philippines (and possibly selected other responses).*
2. If interested in professionalizing interventions in the field of emergency or disaster response, *ILO will need to develop a genuine surge capacity.* Usually, this would require establishing a pool of experts who accept deployment at short notice and possess of the required qualifications. Ideally, some of these experts continuously work on emergency and disaster response, for example by participating in preparedness, mitigation, and prevention activities.
3. Disaster response requires an administrative backbone on which the

field teams can rely. Sufficient and sufficiently experienced or trained administrative staff needs to be secured early on in order to provide support to the technical team at all levels. The project cannot operate with a front office only, a strong back office needs to be in place.

4. *A substitution mechanism needs to be in place for field staff to be able to take leave in due course without risking any neglect of duties.*
5. *Where large numbers of sub-projects are being implemented in a short time, monitoring is not achievable en passant. It requires proper design and proper user training. It should be supported by a software solution that facilitates not only reporting, but also enhances the quality of collected data (e.g. by screening out errors, using plausibility checks, verifying outliers).*
6. *Both EE and LRB have proven to yield good results. They should be the cornerstone of future emergency and disaster responses by ILO.*
7. *Particular attention needs to be given to ensure that the share of female beneficiaries of EE is increased. Conditions for this may vary between emergency/ disaster zones.*
8. *While using emergency and disaster response for standard setting and promoting the decent work agenda is legitimate, it is important that actuarial studies should be commissioned or consulted in order to anticipate any potential effect on the social security system and health insurance prior to enrolling emergency employment beneficiaries in social security and health insurance. This is because retention of emergency employees in social security and health insurance*

cannot be guaranteed following the termination of the emergency.

9. *The CO-Manila will need to work with Social Security System (SSS) of the Philippines in order to ensure that liabilities related to burial expenses because of short-term employment under the Haiyan project cannot impair the financial position of the SSS.*

### **Lessons learned**

- **Emergency and disaster response is not a core activity of the ILO. However, ILO can make good contributions to responses based on its experience with employment intensive and labour based programmes. Up to date labour force surveys may be used for quickly targeting vulnerable populations. Wage and OSH standards may enhance the quality of the response while contributing to the decent work agenda. However, ILO lacks the required surge capacity to participate in emergency and disaster response on a significant scale.**
- **Where large numbers of sub-projects need to be organized in order to deal with an emergency, it is important to have developed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools at hand that reduce the work load of the ILO team.**
- **Where emergency or disaster response is linked to livelihood development, it is important to ensure that field teams are able to return to normal working conditions once the (emergency) response phase is over and the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases are reached. Otherwise, the field team members are likely to suffer from burnout or unhealthy lifestyles sooner or later, with all potential consequences. Adequate capacities for substitution and strong administrative backup is also required in order to ensure sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.**