



# ILO EVALUATION

- **Evaluation Title: Enhance the resilience and self-reliance of crisis-affected rural communities through support to livelihoods stabilization and recovery, local governance and improved access to sustainable energy**
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**This evaluation has been conducted according to ILO’s evaluation policies and procedures. It has not been professionally edited, but has undergone quality control by the ILO Evaluation Office**

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Discussions with Ali Dehaq, ILO's National Coordinator and Hasheem Simba, the project's CTA provided us with insight into the workings of the ILO intervention and its design. In the field, meetings with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training and the General Federation of the Trade Unions gave us unparalleled insight into Yemen's current challenges and needs, and the context that frames ERRY. Discussion with the trainers trained by the ILO and young Yemeni women and men who benefitted from the ILO intervention deeply enriched this evaluation providing us with the opportunity to integrate their voices.

Frank Hagemann, Deputy Regional Director of ROAS and all the ILO regional specialists were very generous with their time, deeply insightful on the challenges faced by organizations working in crisis countries, and provided us with candid reflections on the ILO component in the ERRY programme.

The conclusions reached in this evaluation are entirely those of the evaluators and should not be in any way attributed to the ILO.

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## Abbreviations

CfW	Cash for Work
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
COCI	Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ERRY	Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen
EU	European Union
FAO	Food Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GFTU	General Federation of the Trade Unions
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
IP	Implementing Partners
JPU	Joint Programme Unit
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MOSAL	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MTR	Mid Term Review
MFB	My First Business
PUNO	Participating United Nations' Organizations
RA	Rapid Assessments
ROAS	Regional Office for Arab States
RPU	Regional Programming Unit
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VC	Value Chain
VCA	Value Chain Analysis
VCC	Village Community Council
WFP	World Food Programme

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### 1. Background

“Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen” (ERRY) is a Joint Programme funded by the EU and implemented by FAO, ILO, UNDP and the WFP. ERRY’s main goal is to enhance the resilience and self-reliance of crisis affected rural communities through support to livelihoods stabilization and recovery, local governance and improved access to sustainable energy. Implemented in four governorates (Hajjah, Hodeidah, Lahj and Abyan) and targeting the most vulnerable groups affected by the crisis (young people, the unemployed, women, minority groups, IDP’s and host communities), the three-year programme started in March 2016.

The ILO component works towards Output 2.2. which focuses on “*increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery*”. Four core activities were designed toward reaching this output:

- i. Conduct a Participatory Value Chain Analysis and skills needs assessment of non-agricultural sectors with high potential for job creation
- ii. Strengthen the capacity of local training and BDS service providers and employers to implement on the job training and entrepreneurship / enterprise development cooperation
- iii. Design and implement private sector led apprenticeship schemes and business development services including coaching and financial literacy assistance for targeted youth (including upgrading of informal apprenticeship in informal economy).
- iv. Develop, test and institutionalize post Cash for Work services pilot

#### 1.1. Overview of ILO Component as per October 2017

At the time of this mid-term evaluation, the ILO intervention had been operational for approximately 19 months. The project has made tangible progress in the first two activities designed, and lay the groundwork for the third. The first is a value chain analysis identifying three key sectors with high potential for job growth in the non-agricultural sector in Yemen (automotive, mobile services, solar energy). The second is an entrepreneurial training initiative jointly implemented with UNDP and that saw the training of 53 trainers drawn from four governorates, leading to around 1,200 vulnerable Yemeni women and men trained in entrepreneurship, many of which had successfully opened micro businesses. In the third activity, the project had done the preparatory work for the implementation of the upgrading of informal apprenticeship schemes in Yemen targeting vulnerable Yemeni youth. The last activity involving post CfW services had not been implemented yet.

### 2. Purpose and Scope of Evaluation

A midterm independent evaluation was commissioned by the ILO to assess the ILO component within the ERRY programme, with a focus on:

- Whether the project is achieving the planned results
- Strengths and weaknesses in the project design and implementation
- Lessons learned with recommendations for ILO’s considerations in the continuation, upscaling as well as the design for a future project in Yemen.

The project was evaluated according to ILO criteria in accordance with results based management. These include the project’s relevance and strategic fit, validity of design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, effectiveness of management arrangements and sustainability.

### 3. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation was conducted by a team comprised of a lead evaluator who worked remotely and a national evaluator who conducted the field mission to Yemen. The evaluation was based on the following data collection techniques: a desk review of ERRY relevant project documents and frameworks; in depth consultation with ILO ROAS team, the relevant technical back stoppers, ILO team in Yemen and members of ERRY's Joint Coordination unit and UNDP; interviews with the tripartite institutions (at both central and governorate level), and other relevant partners, and focus group discussions with TOT's trained by the ILO team in the targeted governorates and direct beneficiaries.

Overall, 52 people were consulted for this evaluation. A debriefing session with the ILO project team in Yemen to validate initial findings was conducted in Sana'a.

#### 4. Overall Assessment (Summary)

It is too early to assess the overall impact of ILO's outputs in the ERRY programme, although interviews with ILO's constituents and targeted beneficiaries have given positive feedback on the quality, relevance and inherent potential of ILO activities. Good progress has also been made with regards to synergies being established with other Participating UN Agencies and in the engagement of national partners at Sana'a level.

There are however some key challenges that could constrain the ILO component from reaching its full potential. Some of these challenges are inherent to the complex political environment and security risks crippling the country making it difficult for UN agencies to operate in Yemen. Others, however, pertain to gaps in the governance and implementation mechanisms of the project. In the short term an in-depth review of implementation mechanisms and management arrangements of this project is critical if ILO is to reach its planned targets in the ERRY project. In the long term, tangible impact in Yemen must come on the heels of a consolidated strategy that clearly defines the overall scope of ILO's engagement in Yemen.

#### 5. Main Findings and Conclusions

**Relevance:** While it is too early to draw conclusions on whether ERRY has enhanced the resilience of vulnerable communities in Yemen, national stakeholders and ERRY beneficiaries have hailed this programme as highly relevant to their needs, lending credence to the UN and donor community's recognized need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, approach to vulnerabilities. Skills, employment and livelihood recovery are central to this approach, strongly positioning the ILO and its Decent Work agenda.

**Design:** In its design and focus on demand-driven skills in the non-agricultural sector to create sustainable employment opportunities for youth, women and other vulnerable groups, ILO activities under the ERRY programme are deemed highly relevant by all involved stakeholders and beneficiaries. It is the evaluators' view, however, that the project would have benefitted from an individual ILO project strategy to compliment the overall ERRY programme and that specifically works to enhance the implementation mechanisms of the project. This would have aided the team to strategize on a) which activities and sub activities to prioritize<sup>1</sup> b) how to effectively target both men and women c) how to monitor the progress of the activities in the field. Further, this should have been accompanied by detailed independent work plan setting clear timelines and targets, and with a clear M&E strategy.

**Effectiveness of the ILO component:** The project has made tangible progress in identifying key sectors with high potential for job creation through the conduction of a Value Chain Analysis (Activity 1) and in the entrepreneurial component (Activity 2) through the training of 53 trainers drawn from four

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<sup>1</sup> Activities were not launched concurrently. Interviews in the field indicated that limited budget led to implementation of activities in accordance with the available budget each year. Clarifications by the CTA of the project however noted that activities were not launched concurrently since that's how the project was designed – each activity interdependent.

governorates leading to around 1,200 vulnerable Yemeni women and men trained in entrepreneurship. It is also laying the groundwork for the Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship Scheme, which has seen good coordination with national partners who have been actively engaged in its preparatory phase. Synergies are also being established with the other Participating UN agencies involved in ERRY, with reported collaborations underway with UNDP, WFP and FAO (text box 3). At this stage of implementation, however ILO visibility remains low. More efforts also need to be made by the project to strengthen the gender component and to ensure that ILO's activities are not primarily targeting men.

**Impact and Sustainability:** Although premature to gauge impact of the ILO component, some reflections can be made on sustainability. The recommendations of the ERRY MTR, conducted in August 2017 by a team of independent consultants, stressed the need for more coordination at national level and better engagement of Yemen's local authorities in the implementation of ERRY. The ILO is uniquely positioned in this respect because of a close relationship with the tripartite partners cultivated over decades. National stakeholders at central level are already being involved in the preparatory phase of the Upgrading of the Informal Apprenticeship. This is a good opportunity to capitalize on efforts made to date and enhance coordination at both central and governorate level, providing a better chance of sustainability.

**Effectiveness of Management Arrangements:** The effectiveness of the management arrangements is in the evaluator's view the most critical area to address at this stage of the project. The small set up of an international CTA with limited mobility, a national project coordinator and administrative assistant makes for a limited presence against a vast and complex programme such as ERRY. Secondly, the current lack of communication between the project management in Yemen and the regional office risks alienating the project from its regional office and hinder it from getting the attention it deserves. Finally, the need of an overall regional vision that clearly determines the level of ILO engagement in Yemen (what is feasible and what is not) would provide a better framework for the ILO contribution to ERRY. A revision of all the above components would, in the evaluator's view, greatly enhance the potential of the ILO component reaching its full potential.

## **6. Lessons Learnt (See Annex 1)**

- 1. Bridge Communication Gaps to Enhance Overall Performance:** The predominant theme throughout the evaluation was a disconnect between the ILO regional office and its project in Yemen. With restricted access of international staff to Yemen, deficiencies in communication risk alienating projects in Yemen, hindering the potential of getting the attention they deserve. In the context of the ILO component within the ERRY programme the challenge works on two levels. At regional level, a deeper understanding of the difficulties faced by staff operating in crisis countries could enhance attempts to provide more comprehensive support to staff working in Yemen. Capacity building and tailored training of staff operating in crisis countries could enhance communication when access to countries is restricted. At project level, concerted efforts need to be made by the project management to better communicate both gains made, and challenges faced on the ground. In the context of continuation or upscaling of ILO intervention addressing this gap is key.
- 2. Interventions in Yemen would Benefit from Being Part of an Overall Strategy:** The ILO component within the ERRY framework is currently working in the absence of a larger vision for ILO engagement in Yemen. This works to its detriment for several reasons, primarily because it dictates the level of attention it gets. Interviews with both national stakeholders and regional experts alike pointed to the importance of 'being closer to Yemen' now since this will determine whether ILO will play a role in Yemen's recovery. The UN and donor community in Yemen is currently focused on building resilience in governorates in Yemen that are relatively stable. Employment and livelihood recovery is central to this approach. The Damage and Needs Assessment recently conducted by the ILO states that "as soon as bombing stops, local employment plans should engage

residents and displaced persons in infrastructure recovery activities (roads, schools, hospitals) through employment intensive investment programmes [ ...] reconstruction should be an opportunity to improve competencies and skills patters”.<sup>2</sup> Interviews with stakeholders also point to construction already happening in Sana’a. This could be a critical entry point for the ILO but must be consolidated as part of an overall vision for Yemen.

3. **Capitalize on ILO’s History in Yemen and Partnerships Nourished Over the Years:** The support of and cooperation with local authorities has been a key recommendation of the ERRY MTR. This also came with a recognition of the challenges entailed in cooperating with structures whose capacity have been drastically depleted. ILO has had a long history in Yemen and nourished collaborative partnerships that date back to the 1980’s. Within the ERRY programme ILO enjoys a unique mandate of tripartism that even in times of crisis, if not more so, would benefit from being invested in. Already cooperation at central level with local authorities such as the COCI and the MOTEVT might be providing a good platform for dialogue with labour issues as an entry point. Recommendations to better strengthen the capacity of local institutions are already being catered to by UNDP under Output 2. ILO is also very strongly positioned to support the private sector in local economic recovery.
4. **Address M&E Challenges in Future Interventions:** Evaluating the progress of an intervention against whether the project is achieving its set targets is not indicative of its success or failure. In volatile settings such as Yemen, logical frameworks should be treated as “living documents” because of the potential for conditions to change at any given time. Equally, scarce baseline data and indicators (as is the case with ERRY) make it hard to monitor results. Still, the ILO intervention is working in the context of a harmonized logical framework where other agencies are setting clear targets and reporting progress against them. In the second half of the project cycle, and even more importantly in the context of ERRY II, consolidated efforts need to be made to make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework (right from the design) and that concerted efforts are made to ensure the capacity of the project team in Yemen in M&E is enhanced through rigorous training.

## 7. Recommendations

It is important to stress here that recommendations have been reached with the recognition that the project is operating in a very complex and difficult environment, and that the ILO component is in an early phase of implementation. It is also part of a vast and complex programme, involving different agencies and different levels of engagement, which means there is a great deal of learning by doing.

### A. For the ILO Project Team

1. **Increase the “visibility” of the ILO component at both regional and national level**
  - 1.1 **Actively improve communication** with the Regional Office through regular updates on progress of the activities, clear demands on where activities need technical input and regular follow-up with the regional technical back stoppers and desk officer. (High Priority)
  - 1.2 **Enhance the effectiveness of reporting** by also including qualitative progress made on collaborations made with tripartite partners and UN agencies (i.e. elaborate on current and planned synergies created with both national partners and participating UN agencies) (High Priority)

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<sup>2</sup> Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment





**5. Build the Monitoring and Evaluation capacity of the team in Yemen**

**5.1. Provide capacity building of project team in M&E.** If visits to Yemen by the ILO ROAS team are still restricted due to security, efforts need to be made to have the ILO project team in Yemen periodically visit the regional office in order to build their capacity. (High Priority)

**6. Build an Intervention Strategy for Yemen together with all relevant back stoppers and specialists, workers' and employers' specialists, which clearly defines the scope and level of engagement in Yemen**

**6.1. Build an intervention Strategy for Yemen** that clearly defines what is feasible and what is not. (High Priority)

**6.2. Develop clear criteria for staff working in Yemen** identifying relevant skills and training needs accordingly (High Priority)

**6.3. Build the capacity of and invest in staff working in Yemen** with a focus on working in crisis countries. (High Priority)

## 1. Background and Project Description

### 1.1. Context

Largely underreported and with little international focus, Yemen’s war has led to one of the largest humanitarian crisis of our times. As of January 2017, health facilities have reported more than 10,000 deaths and 200,000 injured. An unprecedented 3 million Yemenis are currently displaced, and a staggering 21.2 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, with many vulnerable communities on the brink of famine.<sup>3</sup> The recent outbreak of cholera, in the absence of basic services, is meanwhile rapidly claiming more lives in the country’s poorest regions.

Millions of Yemenis need urgent humanitarian assistance. The clear majority, however, have primarily been affected by the collapse of an economy and public services, fuel and power shortage, poor access to medical services, deterioration of security and infrastructural damage. 8 million<sup>4</sup> Yemenis are thought to have lost their livelihood since the war. Livelihood assessments made in the country have also indicated that at local levels, throughout much of the country, traditional social structures – the fulcrum of Yemeni society – are slowly being eroded. Alongside humanitarian relief, Yemenis need support to restore their livelihoods and communities, rehabilitate damaged infrastructure, invest in education, access energy, goods and quality public services and continue to plan their future.’<sup>5</sup> It is within this context that the ‘Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen’ programme was born.

### 1.2. Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen

The three-year joint programme “Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen” (ERRY) is implemented by FAO, ILO, UNDP and the WFP. ERRY’s main goal is to enhance the resilience and self-reliance of crisis affected rural communities through support to livelihoods stabilization and recovery, local governance and improved access to sustainable energy. Implemented in four governorates (Hajjah, Hodeidah, Lahj and Abyan) and targeting the most vulnerable groups affected by the crisis (young people, the unemployed, women, minority groups, IDP’s and host communities) the programme started in March 2016.

The programme has two outcomes and four outputs, with different UN agencies contributing to the respective outputs according to their comparative advantage. The ILO is primarily involved in Output 2.2. which focuses on “increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery.

Text Box 1	
ERRY Outcomes	Outputs
1. Communities are better able to manage local risks and shocks for increased economic self-reliance and enhanced social cohesion.	1.1 Community livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience and economic self-reliance
	1.2 Communities benefit from solar energy for sustainable livelihoods opportunities

<sup>3</sup> 2017 Needs Humanitarian Overview, UNOCHA.

<sup>4</sup> Humanitarian Situation in Yemen in Facts and Figures. September 11, 2017. UNOCHA

<sup>5</sup> ERRY Annex 1 Description of the Action. Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen 2016 – 2019.

	1.3 Informal networks promote social cohesion through community dialogue and delivery of services
2. Institutions are responsive, accountable and effective to deliver services, build the social contract and meet community identified needs.	2.1 Functions, financing and capacity of local authorities enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to public priorities
	<b>2.2 Increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery</b>

Identifying non-agricultural skills as its main entry point, the ILO devised four key activities to compliment the work of the other three agencies in ERRY. These include

- v. Conduct a Participatory Value Chain Analysis and skills needs assessment of non-agricultural sectors with high potential for job creation
- vi. Strengthen the capacity of local training and BDS service providers and employers to implement on the job training and entrepreneurship / enterprise development cooperation
- vii. Design and implement private sector led apprenticeship schemes and business development services including coaching and financial literacy assistance for targeted youth (including upgrading of informal apprenticeship in informal economy).
- viii. Develop, test and institutionalize post Cash for Work services pilot

Funded by the EU, the ILO component was allocated USD 2,569, 317. ILO, along with FAO, directly implements their activities in Yemen whilst UNDP and WFP subcontract to implementing partners. The ILO component covers four governorates and within that 8 districts:

Governorates	Districts
Hajjah	Abs and Aslam
Al-Hodeidah	Al Zuhrah and Bajel
Abyan	Kenfar and Zenjibar
Lahj	Tuban and Al-Houtah

### 1.3. Overview of ILO Component

At the time of this mid-term evaluation, the ILO intervention had been operational for approximately 19 months. The project has made tangible progress in the first two activities and lay the groundwork for the third. The first is a value chain analysis identifying three key sectors with high potential for job growth in the non-agricultural sector in Yemen (automotive, mobile services, solar energy). The second is an entrepreneurial training initiative jointly implemented with UNDP and that saw the training of 53 trainers drawn from four governorates, leading to around 1,200 vulnerable Yemeni women and men trained in entrepreneurship, many of which had successfully opened micro businesses. The project has also conducted preparatory work for the implementation of the upgrading of informal apprenticeship schemes in Yemen targeting vulnerable Yemeni youth. At such early stage of implementation, it is hard to assess its potential, but stakeholders interviewed hail this intervention as highly relevant to the current context in Yemen, and if implemented correctly one that can tangibly help vulnerable Yemeni youth gain decent employment. The last activity involving post CfW services had not been implemented yet.

The project team in Yemen, based in the UNDP office in Sana's, consists of a Chief Technical Advisor, a National Project Coordinator, an administrative assistant and driver. The ILO national coordinator for Yemen, also plays an important advisory role in the project and has been involved right from its

formulation. At regional level the project is backstopped by technical ILO specialists, more specifically the enterprises specialist and skills specialist.

## 2. Purpose and Scope of Evaluation

A midterm evaluation was commissioned by the ILO to assess the ILO component within the ERRY programme, with a focus on:

- Whether the project is achieving the planned results
- Strengths and weaknesses in the project design and implementation
- Lessons learned with recommendations for ILO's considerations in the continuation, upscaling as well as the design for a future project in Yemen.

The project is evaluated according to ILO criteria in accordance with results based management. These include attention to the project's **relevance and strategic fit, validity of design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, effectiveness of management arrangements** and sustainability.

The knowledge generated by the ILO mid-term evaluation will be used by the ILO ROAS team in the implementation of the remaining period of the project, and in the design of future projects responding to the Yemen crisis and other comparable circumstances. The lessons learned, and recommendations produced will be used to identify new opportunities for ILO engagement and potentially improve the implementation. Attention was also paid to gender issues in this evaluation i.e. are the activities consistently targeting both men and women? If not, what are the constraints inhibiting better outreach? What are the mechanisms in place to ensure gender issues are addressed throughout the ILO component?

The primary beneficiaries of this evaluation are the ILO ROAS team, the ILO project team in Yemen, ILO constituents in Yemen, the ERRY participating UN agencies (PUNO's) and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation. The evaluation field work took place between September 18 and November 3.

## 3. Methodology

Due to security restrictions the evaluation was conducted by a team comprised of a lead evaluator who worked remotely and a national evaluator who conducted the field mission to Yemen. To the extent possible the evaluation worked around the following set of questions:<sup>6</sup>

### **Relevance and strategic fit:**

- How well does the project's approach fit context of the on-going crisis in Yemen?
- How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donors (EU) in Yemen and the region?
- Are the project objectives aligned with tripartite constituents' objectives and needs? What measures were taken to ensure alignment? How does the Project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region?
- To what extent does the project fit into national development and humanitarian response plans?
- To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the Sustainable Development Goals and the agenda 2030?

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<sup>6</sup> The list of questions formulated at the start of the project served as guidelines. Some of these were adapted and others prioritized over others according to the situation on the ground. Others, such as the ones formulated under Outcome 1 and 2 of the project could not be answered at such early stage of project implementation.

- Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- How well does the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address the crisis in Yemen? Does the project's design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions have failed to address?

### **Validity of design:**

- Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are logical correlations between the overall objective, outcomes, and outputs)?
- On the whole, were project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?
- Does the project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing the project's progress? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate? Are the assumptions for each objective and output realistic?
- To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring an increase in self-reliance and an enhancement of social cohesion and the improved capacities of the involved institutions? To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring enhancement of capacities of ILO constituents?
- To what extent did the project design align with the Country Programme Outcome?
- What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established?
- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?

### **Effectiveness:**

- What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the overall objective and outcomes? (analysis of achievements and challenges by outcome is required) In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes? Are the project partners using the outputs? Have the project outputs been transformed by the project partners into outcomes?
- How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives? How effective was the collaboration with the relevant ILO offices, partner UN agencies, media, and non-governmental organizations working on the Syrian refugee crisis, and what has been the added value of this collaboration? What systems been put in place to enhance collaboration with other UN agencies, government institutions working on this issue and how?
- To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects?
- How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- To what extent did synergies with and operation through local organisations help to ensure the sustainability of the impact of the project i.e. through building capacity?
- What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- To what extent did the achievement of the indicators lead to the attainment of the outcomes?
- What unintended outcomes can be identified?

- How effective was collaboration with the media? How efficient has the project been in communicating its results, disseminating success stories and enhancing visibility?
- To what extent has the project, beyond achieving concrete results, contributed to positioning the ILO in the response to the on-going crisis in Yemen? In what ways has this project paved the way for future ILO interventions in this area?
- Specific questions by Outcome (Please provide evidence-based answers to the following):
  - ❖ *Outcome 1:*
  - ❖ To what extent, so far, have communities' livelihoods and productive assets been improved? How has this or will this be measured at the end of the three-year period?
  - ❖ To what extent has the project managed to improve access to solar powered energy and to what degree has this led to improved and more sustainable access to livelihoods for communities?
  - ❖ Has community dialogue and delivery of services through informal networks been successful in promoting social cohesion? To what extent and how?
  - ❖ Have there been any major challenges that would require the project to significantly revise its outputs under this outcome at this stage?
  - ❖ *Outcome 2:*
  - ❖ So far, how have the functions, financing and capacity of the local authorities been improved?
  - ❖ To what extent have collective actions, aid delivery and economic recovery been improved through strengthened capacity of local actors and private sector partnership?
  - ❖ Have there been any major challenges that would require the project to significantly revise its outputs under this outcome at this stage?

#### **Sustainability:**

- Are the results achieved by the project likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project? How will activities and/or management structures be financed when the project ends?
- Did the project put in place measures to ensure the continuity of access to solar energy after the end of the project?
- To what extent was sustainability of impact taken into account during the design of the project?
- To what extent have the interventions advanced strategic gender-related needs?
- What was the role of the project in resource mobilization?

#### **Efficiency:**

- To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? To what extent can the project results justify the time, financial and human resources invested in the project?
- To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?
- What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
- What synergies exist between the ILO and UNDP/WFP /FAO parts of the project? Is there any duplication of efforts? Are activities implemented in an efficient way in terms of resources spent?

#### **Effectiveness of management arrangements:**

- How effective has the joint nature of the programme between the UN agencies been so far? What can be improved in the management arrangements to increase the effectiveness of the project?
- What was the division of work tasks within the project team and between the agencies? Has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? And if not, why not?
- How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between project staff? And between UN agencies?
- How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?
- How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to PROGRAM and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?

### **Impact orientation:**

- What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention?
- What were the interventions long-term effects on more equitable gender relations or reinforcement of existing inequalities?
- To what extent are national partners able and willing to continue with the project? How effectively has the project built national ownership? In what ways are results anchored in national institutions and to what extent can the local partners maintain them financially at end of project?
- At this stage, would considering a continuation of the project to consolidate achievements be justifiable? In what way should the next phase differ from the current one?

### **Lessons learned:**

- What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied to a second phase of this project or similar future projects?
- If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

### **The evaluation was based on the following data collection techniques:**

- a) A desk review of ERRY project documents, UN frameworks, ILO project documentation including progress reports of the project, rapid assessments, trainings and studies commissioned by the ILO and other relevant documentation.
- b) One to one (phone or computer assisted) interviews with ILO ROAS team, the relevant technical back stoppers, ILO team in Yemen and members of ERRY's Joint Coordination unit and UNDP.
- c) One to one interviews with the tripartite institutions (at both central and governorate level), UNDP and the JPU, Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training, relevant implementing partners (i.e. SFD) and other relevant partners.
- d) Focus Group interviews with TOT's trained by the ILO team in the targeted governorates and direct beneficiaries that have benefited from the training
- e) Debriefing session with the ILO project team to validate initial findings



- f) Debriefing calls with ILO ROAS team to discuss evaluation findings

Over 52 people were consulted throughout this evaluation (See Annex 3 for list of people interviewed)

### **3.1. Limitations**

The challenges entailed in evaluating a project remotely are important to highlight. Enormous efforts were spent to make up for this gap and in attempting to get a full grasp of the details, dynamics, and circumstances on the ground. A large part of this evaluation was spent trying to document progress made in the field. Difficulties encountered in reaching the project's CTA, with whom contact was only made halfway through the evaluation, meant that interviews were conducted prior to having had a comprehensive briefing of the project. This meant that some opportunities were missed in extracting more details and into probing synergies and collaborations that emerged later in the course of the evaluation.

The above circumstances however were mitigated by several factors, primarily:

- A resourceful and committed national consultant who conducted all the fieldwork, including interviews with the project's main national partners and direct and indirect beneficiaries.
- Ability of the national consultant to travel to two of the four governorates despite security threats and arduous planning and permits required before travel to Yemen's districts. Focus groups were held with the direct beneficiaries (women and men trained in entrepreneurship) of the ILO component in the ERRY programme bringing a human element to this report by integrating their voices.
- A committed national project team in Yemen who, in coordination with and support from the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officer in charge greatly facilitated the entire process.
- The use of alternative modes of communication (including WhatsApp) for regular updates, debriefs and sharing of documentation failing Skype and more conventional communication channels not working in Yemen.

In the evaluator's view, the conduction of this evaluation itself was a lesson learnt. It showed that despite Yemen's remoteness, effective communication is possible when perseverance and commitment are in place.

#### 4. Status of ILO Activities

##### 1. Activity 2.1.1 Participatory Value Chain Analysis and Skills Needs Assessment of Non-Agricultural Sector

A value chain analysis and skills needs assessment of the non-agricultural sector was conducted by the project to ‘identify non-agricultural value chains where target beneficiaries of the project can produce more competitive products or services that are able to generate growth, create sustainable job opportunities and contribute to poverty reduction’<sup>7</sup>. Additionally, the study aimed to identify key constraints to value chain performance which may adversely impact the poor and provide viable recommendations on how to address the constraints and improve pro-poor outcomes.

Specifically, the study aimed to:

- Identify possible non-agriculture sectors that can support pro-poor development and creation of sustainable employment creation opportunities through strengthening of existing and potential enterprises (to cover potential start-ups), business relationships, improving market structures and business environment;
- Analyse potential sectors for business and economic leadership with focus on the target beneficiaries of the project (i.e. women, the unemployed, youth, the muhamasheen, internally displaced persons and stressed host community) through market mapping including participatory value chain analysis
- Identify barriers and support services (whether financial or non-financial) that prevent the target beneficiaries from accessing and controlling economic resources within the selected value chains, and possible strategies to overcome them;
- Identify support from different stakeholders and propose appropriate plans possible to develop the selected sectors.
- Produce a value chain map for each of the selected value chain, depicting areas of constraints and opportunity for intervention.
- Propose a vision of how the market system needs to change in order to generate improvement for the target groups of the project.

Three non-agriculture sectors with potential to promote more and better jobs for the target beneficiaries of the project.

- The Automotive/Car Mechanics Sector
- Mobile Phones
- Solar System Services

#### Challenges

The VA is still in draft form<sup>8</sup>. The latest copy shared with the consultant still needs a synthesis and consolidation of the findings and recommendations. Consultations with the project CTA in Yemen revealed the extent of the challenges surrounding the conduction of this study due to difficulties in accessing some of Yemen’s governorates (and within that some districts in specific). Heavy bombing, endless roadblocks and permits required from the different authorities holding power in Yemen are just some of the obstacles hindering this study specifically, and all ERRY activities more generally<sup>9</sup>. Data

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<sup>7</sup> Value Chain Analysis and Rapid Market Assessment in Non-Agriculture Sector in Yemen. (Draft Report December 2016).

<sup>8</sup> The draft VC initially shared with the consultant was dated December 2016. Further copies however were later shared by the CTA, the last draft of which is September 2017.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with the CTA.

is however key to advocate for employment needs and the project could have benefitted greatly from having this study guide their interventions from the start. Finalization of this study, in the evaluator's view, should be given priority in the second half of this project.

### **Strengths**

The ILO is in a strong position to improve competencies and improve skill patterns in Yemen and such assessments are key to understanding where potential lies. The study, once synthesized, edited, and disseminated can provide useful information to other participating UN agencies (PUNO's) that can lead to better targeted planning in the non-agricultural sector. Dissemination and launching of the study will enhance ILO visibility but will also advocate for employment in the sectors identified. This is also a good opportunity to engage the national partners in the presentation of the findings. In addition, such sectors, if invested in and further analyzed from a gender perspective can strongly position the ILO in strengthening ERRY's gender component.

## **2. Activity 2.1.2 Strengthen the capacity of local training and BDS service providers and employers to implement on the job training and entrepreneurship/enterprise development cooperation**

Of the four components, the entrepreneurial one has seen most results, both in terms of impact on the ultimate beneficiaries (Yemeni women and men), but also in terms of collaboration and cooperation established between UNDP and the ILO. This component was built on a previous partnership between the ILO and the UNDP in Yemen, where the target was going to be youth under 3x6 approach. "My First Business" (MFB) and "I Too Have a Small Business" are thus well tested and well received ILO training packages, the latter of which is a simpler version created by the ILO to target semi literates, and out of school and unemployed youth. Under the ERRY project the ILO has trained a team of trainers and contextualized the training material based on feedback from the trainers, while UNDP, through their implementing partner SFD, has conducted training of the beneficiaries and provided post-training technical support for the business development, including provision of grants and market linkages. To date<sup>10</sup>

- 53 trainers drawn from the four governorates (27 from MFB and 26 from "I Too Have a Small Business") have been trained by the ILO
- 795 final beneficiaries received training in MFB, of which 34% are women (277 women) in Hajjah and Hodeida.
- 426 final beneficiaries received training in "I too have a small business" of which 32.6% are women (139 women) in Hajjah and Hodeida

According to UNDP estimates

- Out of 2,400 youth participated in CfW, about 1,300, including literates and illiterates received ILO training and curriculums.
- 749 youth established their own businesses, out of which 167 are women
- Arrangements are being finalized to train 600 youth, from Lahj Governorate, using ILO curriculums and trainers. Most of these targeted youths are illiterates.

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<sup>10</sup> At the time of the evaluation, October 2017, trainings by ILO trainers were being conducted in Lahj and Abyan.

## Text Box 2

### **In their words.....**

*We learnt and understood how to develop business plans, how to start our own businesses, dealing with suppliers and clients, buying and selling processes, dealing with competitors and identifying their types and locations, debts management, book keeping, networking and improving relationships, cost – benefit estimation and entrepreneurship. Hajjah beneficiary*

*Training encouraged me to open any business project. It has opened new horizons for me, it just gave me a great motivation. Hodeidah beneficiary*

*Because I loved the training very much, I wish I was a trainer. Hajjah Beneficiary*

*Some trainers used to continue working with us even after their working hours in order to review with trainees every business plan. Hodeidah beneficiary*

*We need support to the projects after their establishment and not to stop the support as soon as the projects are opened. Hajjah beneficiary*

Feedback from the field and focus groups conducted with both the ILO TOT's and final beneficiaries does suggest these trainings are helping people targeted by the project in opening micro businesses potentially contributing to their resilience, although this should not be considered a representative view of the overall UNDP/ILO initiative. The general perception, however, was that these trainings are having a positive impact. Trainers interviewed gave positive feedback on the quality of the ILO training and the training material, as did the ultimate beneficiaries. The success in opening a business was contingent on the level of support by UNDP after the training. Beneficiaries who received the training in January and February 2017 have already established their business which are operational through grants of 225,000 YR provided for each in addition to 45,000YR saved by each participant during cash for work (CfW). Businesses in which women were involved included wedding planning initiatives, sewing labs, catering and clothes shops<sup>11</sup>. For men its was in motorcycle and spare parts, mobile phone services and barber shops. Beneficiaries trained in August 2017 (semi-literate) were still waiting for UNDP grants to open their businesses. Capacity building of business advisors was also deemed by UNDP officials as a potential entry point for the ILO. Such interventions could also include development of the required training materials and guidelines<sup>12</sup>.

At the time of the evaluation, the next steps envisioned for this initiative included:

- 2 workshops with UNDP and the participating organizations to explain the monitoring and reporting process of both ILO programmes being implemented
- A review of all the ILO trainers' reporting in both programmes
- Refresher workshops for the trainers of both programmes to complete the capacity building cycle
- A training technique exam/technical content exam administered to trainers for certification purposes
- Develop a follow-up coaching component to ensure a robust start-up phase of enterprises with high survival rates
- Work on the institutionalization of both programmes to facilitate the exit strategy

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<sup>11</sup> Focus groups conducted with direct beneficiaries of the ILO/UNDP initiative in Hajjah and Hodeidah.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Ali Al Refai, Entrepreneurship Specialist and Livelihood Recovery, UNDP

## Challenges

The biggest challenge reported by the regional backstopper of this initiative is one of monitoring. This general perception was confirmed during the desk review, and the fact that numbers and progress in the field (i.e. how many beneficiaries were trained) only started to emerge as the evaluation progressed. How many rounds of trainings were conducted by the trainers were beyond the scope of this evaluation. Interviews and exchanges with the project team in Yemen do point to documentation of the trainers' reports and the existence of a database for outputs and trainers under this initiative. Such contradictions and reflections on whether monitoring is being conducted points to a larger communication gap. It is suggested that mobilization of more national staff on the ground or perhaps focal points in the governorates would enhance the monitoring of these trainings and future activities in particular. This, in addition, to urgent capacity building of the project team in Yemen by ILO M&E specialists. This is particularly important in light of more entrepreneurial training envisioned under ERRY II.

## Strength

*"The ILO is more qualified. ILO is quality".* ILO Project Coordinator.

In the ERRY programme entrepreneurial training is a key component of the entire programme and a priority area of ERRY II. ILO has clear comparative advantage due to well tested training packages that also target the very poor, the prime target of the ERRY programme. The ILO's "I too have a small business" for example, targeting semi literates, thus including the most marginalized people has in the evaluator's view been a good practice. It has been first tested in North Lebanon, was delivered by Arab trainers and is further being contextualized for the Yemenis by the Yemenis. There is a lot to learn from this experience and in delivering training in crisis contexts and within a joint programme framework. Well documented "lessons learnt" on entrepreneurial training with the overall ERRY programme could better feed envisioned scale-up activities in this field.

### **3. 2.1.3 Design and implement private sector led apprenticeship schemes and business development services including coaching and financial literacy assistance for targeted youth (including upgrading of informal apprenticeship in informal economy).**

*"Informal apprenticeship upgrading can be of the most successful interventions if appropriately implemented and connected to the local needs".* General Director of MOTEVT (Hodeida Branch)

Traditional apprenticeship has long been and still is a main source of providing technical and other skills at work in the informal economy, which is the largest economy in Yemen. ILO experience in Africa has demonstrated that well-designed approaches to informal apprenticeship can improve the quality of the training, enhance employability of the apprentices and increase their employment opportunities. Under this activity the ILO, in cooperation with its social partners wants to target its beneficiaries (mostly vulnerable Yemeni youth) by enhancing the quality, relevance and effectiveness of informal apprenticeship.

The project has identified five sectors in which to pilot the upgrading of informal apprenticeship in Yemen with potential of job creation. These are<sup>13</sup>

- Auto mechanic
- Panel beating and car painting

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<sup>13</sup> Annex 1: Guidelines on the Implementation of Upgraded Informal Apprenticeship Model, ILO Yemen, March 2017.

- Welding and metalwork
- Sewing and dressmaking
- Solar system

Under this initiative 240 apprentices in the informal sector and 120 Master craftsmen will be targeted by the ILO initiative. This will be done through the development of competency based curricula, training of master craftsperson on delivery of competency based curricula and assessment (CBT&A), training of the master craftsperson and apprentices on occupational safety and health (OSH) and training of the apprentices on core skills such as life skills, business development services and a competency based assessment that will lead to the certification of the apprentices. At the time of the evaluation the project team had conducted the following:

1. 2 rapid assessments of Apprenticeship providers (one in the North and one in the South)
2. 5 competency based curriculums developed in the five identified sectors in coordination with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training.
3. Selection of the implementing partner, Youth Leadership Development Foundation (YLDF)
4. Identification of the apprenticeship providers in Lahj and Abyan
5. Identification and training of the field coordinators

### **Challenges**

The upgrading of informal apprenticeship schemes has faced some delays, primarily because of the challenges inherent in choosing the right implementing partner, a difficulty faced by all PUNO's working in the ERRY project, but also delays related to funds disbursement<sup>14</sup>. Of more significance, however, is the fact that unlike the previously tested and implemented entrepreneurial component this is a new modality, engaging different social partners and simultaneously working on different layers of implementation (developing competency based curriculums, training both apprentices and master craftsmen, application of code of practices including compliance to OSH, assessment and certification etc.). Implementation of this activity needs patience, learning through trial and error but also, in the evaluator's view, tremendous support from backstopping units. Also, efforts need to be made to ensure this activity does not end up targeting primarily young men. Sectors chosen are primarily male-dominated sectors bar the sewing and dressmaking<sup>15</sup>. These, however, are in the evaluator's view sectors that are already oversaturated, that reinforce traditional gender roles and with limited returns in terms of income.

### **Strengths**

Interviews with both national (social partners) and international stakeholders (UNDP, JPU) in Yemen have welcomed this activity as holding great potential. This activity has all the right building blocks. It directly targets ERRY's main beneficiaries (vulnerable youth in the informal economy), it engages ILO's social partners (MOSAL, COCI and the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training), it promotes a clear agenda for Decent Work and adherence to labor standards and, once implemented correctly it will enhance ILO's visibility in the ERRY project and beyond. The project team in Yemen should continue to use this intervention as a platform to engage the social partners and to strengthen the link between the private sector and the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training.

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<sup>14</sup> Delays reported as per the answers to written questionnaire sent to CTA

<sup>15</sup> Sewing and dress making are the sectors mentioned in the overall documentation and the "Guidelines on the Implementation of Upgraded Informal Apprenticeship Model". During the debrief conducted with the project team in Sana'a, the CTA specified that it is "embroidery and cloth design" not sewing and dressmaking.

#### 6. **2.1.4. Develop, test and institutionalize post Cash for Work Services Pilot**

Under this activity ILO aims to link with WFP for the development of post Cash for Work services. Specific activities envisioned include:

- Development of ladderized capacity building package to link up Cash for Work participants to follow-on economic opportunities or micro-finance services and then transition to livelihood programmes
- In collaboration with WFP, pilot the capacity-building package as a basic requirement for the continuity of the C/W services
- Provide certificate of recognition to the cash for work beneficiaries upon completion of the capacity building package

There is very limited budget allocated under this component and proposal have been made to cover this activity under ERRY II.

## 5. Main Findings

**Overall Assessment:** It is too early to assess the overall impact of ILO's outputs in the ERRY programme, although interviews with ILO's constituents and targeted beneficiaries have given positive feedback on the quality, relevance and inherent potential of ILO activities. Good progress has also been made with regards to promising synergies being established with other UN agencies and in the engagement of national partners at Sana'a level.

There are however some key challenges that could constrain the ILO component from reaching its full potential. Some of these challenges are inherent to the complex political environment and security risks crippling the country making it difficult for UN agencies to operate in. Others, however, pertain to gaps in the governance and implementation mechanisms of the project. In the short term an in-depth review of implementation mechanisms and management arrangements of this project is critical if ILO is to reach its planned targets in the ERRY project. In the long term, tangible impact in Yemen must come on the heels of a consolidated strategy that clearly defines the overall scope of ILO's engagement in Yemen.

### 5.1 Relevance

*“Humanitarian Assistance is critical, but it is not the only need. Yemen requires a broader approach that allows for support for people to cope and build resilience to recover from the crisis”<sup>16</sup>*

In its third year, the conflict in Yemen continues to have a devastating effect on the country and its people, with estimates of around 8 million having lost their livelihood and with minimal access to basic services. The Mid Term Review of the ERRY programme conducted in August 2017 by a team of independent consultants showed that overall, target communities responded positively to all components of ERRY<sup>17</sup>. This was widely echoed during this evaluation, where some stakeholders described ERRY as one of “the best programmes currently being implemented in Yemen as it provides opportunities to many people”<sup>18</sup>.

The programme interventions are aligned with the UN Strategic Framework for Yemen (2017-2019) whose main goal is “to mitigate the impact of the current conflict on the social and economic conditions in Yemen, and on the capacity of state institutions while contributing to ongoing peace efforts”<sup>19</sup> as well as the EU policy framework that stresses “the recognized need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, long linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on ‘anticipation, prevention and preparedness’<sup>20</sup>. The EU resilience approach also links resilience with the prevention of violent conflict.

*“Under the current conditions, many young people are leaving their schools and joining the war. If not incubated and not involved in training, they will be a source of national problem. That is why the project*

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<sup>16</sup> Conclusions and Recommendations from the final report of the Consultative Meeting for Yemen held in Larnaca from 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> October 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen: Mid Term Review Report – 21 June-31 July 2017, ACAS consulting jointly with Afcar consultancy.

<sup>18</sup> This was expressed by the General Director of the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training in Hodeidah, but also expressed in different interviews conducted for this evaluation.

<sup>19</sup> UN Strategic Framework for Yemen 2017-2019.

<sup>20</sup> Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A Strategic approach to Resilience in the EU's external action.



[ERRY] is distinct and of high relevance compared to other food assistance programs that have temporary impact”<sup>21</sup>

Employment and livelihood recovery is central to this approach, strongly positioning the ILO and its Decent work agenda. Under the ERRY programme the ILO has great potential to deliver immediate results in terms of skills and entrepreneurial training leading to impact in the short term. This also serves to gain credibility among Yemenis, institutions and partners for more long-term engagement in Yemen.

## 5.2 Design

ERRY’s design was reached after intense discussions between the EU, different UN agencies and Yemen’s key stakeholders over two years –2014 and 2015. The project went through two rounds of formulations, in which the project original document was designed by mid-2014 to support the Yemeni Transitional Government in implementing the Youth Employment Action Plan 2013-2014. However, due to the escalated situation since Sept 2014, the donor requested to revisit the project overall objectives and the type of interventions. Another round of formulation thus started in late 2015, to align the project concept to downstream support to the local communities instead of central and upstream level. As harmonized logical framework and joint work plans the ILO’s intervention was built on strategic comparative advantage and complementarities with other sister agencies involved in ERRY by focusing on the identification of market-oriented and demand-driven skills in the non-agricultural sector to create sustainable employment opportunities for youth, women and other vulnerable groups. The relevance of these activities, as discussed above, is echoed by most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation.

A look at the logical framework of the project, and the ILO component specifically, does indicate some gaps. To start with, the desk review revealed inconsistencies when it came to project targets with different numbers reflected in different progress reports (ILO progress reports and ERRY progress reports were compared), which made it hard to evaluate progress against original targets. An interview with the CTA also revealed that the ILO did not have clear indicators in the log frame, which was raised during the induction workshop held in Djibouti in July 2016, organized by the Joint Coordination Unit (JPU) with all PUNOs and EU participating in the development of a joint annual work plan. When the issue of logical framework was raised, it was recommended that it could not be readjusted at that point in time due to contractual obligation<sup>22</sup>.

In the evaluator’s view, from the onset, the project would have benefitted from an individual ILO project strategy that complimented the overall ERRY programme but specifically worked to enhance the implementation mechanisms of the ILO project team in Yemen. This would have helped frame the project’s approach to the implementation of activities and could have aided the team to strategize on a) which activities and sub activities to prioritize<sup>23</sup> b) how to effectively target both men and women c) how to monitor the progress of the activities in the field. The prioritization of activities and sub activities is important to assess. The Upgrading of the Informal Apprenticeship in Yemen is yet to be piloted and in the project team’s own words needed more preparation than the entrepreneurial training (already a well-tested modality in Yemen). It is also, in the evaluators’ view, the activity that has significant added value in the ERRY programme because of it being a niche, and one in which the ILO targets direct beneficiaries. Feedback from the ILO regional office has also pointed to the need to have inception reports for new projects in the future, especially when the CTA is not involved in the design of the project.

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with the General Manager of Curriculums and Education Tools Department of the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training, Sana’a.

<sup>22</sup> As per information provided by the CTA in questions sent by the lead evaluator.

<sup>23</sup> Activities were not launched concurrently. Interviews in the field indicated that limited budget led to implementation of activities in accordance with the available budget each year. Clarifications by the CTA of the project however noted that activities were not launched concurrently since that’s how the project was designed – each activity interdependent.

Also of benefit would have been a clear work plan inclusive of activities and sub activities, detailed timelines and targets. When asked about major lessons learnt for the project to date, a member of the project team felt it was the need of “prior and clear planning”, with clearly identified responsibilities, and with independent detailed plans for the ILO component. Equally, the lack of consistent targets set per year and misunderstandings of whether the project is on track or not are, in the evaluator’s view, directly linked with gaps in the above strategy.

When it comes to the use of an M&E framework, interviews with the Joint Coordination Unit indicated that some agencies within the ERRY programme have their own M&E systems. The Joint Programming Unit has an M&E unit, but more efforts are being spent in it working at the level they would desire<sup>24</sup>. Specifically, for the ILO component, there are some signs that monitoring the activities is proving challenging. The project team in Yemen would greatly benefit from their capacity being built on how to monitor their activities. This is particularly important considering the second activity that is about to be implemented - the Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship Schemes.

### 5.3 Efficiency

The allocation to the ILO was only 6% of the total budget allocated by the EU to the PUNOs. High costs incurred by all UN agencies to implement the programme due to insecurity, inflation and higher costs of consumables such as fuel<sup>25</sup> were not envisaged at the design stage of the programme. Interviews with the JPU also indicated that the ILO would need to assess how to share operational costs (currently covered by ERRY funds) from its own budget, in view of ERRY operating in war zone which incurs high costs on provision of security, travel etc.

The fund allocated to the ILO vis-a-vis other agencies is as tabulated below:

PUNO	Resources allocated	% Allocation
UNDP	18,538,346	48.7%
WFP	8,387,195	22.1%
FAO	8,537,195	22.4%
ILO	2,569,316	6.8%
Total	38,032,053	

### 5.4 Effectiveness

**On Progress:** At the time of the evaluation the project had made tangible progress in two of the planned ILO activities (Activity 1&2), conduction of a Value Chain Analysis in the agricultural sector and entrepreneurial training in coordination with UNDP. Activities were not launched concurrently which means that Activity 3 (Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeships) was still in preparatory phase. Activity 4 (post cash for work services pilot) was yet to be implemented and interviews point to this activity potentially being implemented under ERRY II. The project covers the four governorates. Evaluating the progress against set targets would prove futile for two reasons a) there are still inconsistencies with

<sup>24</sup> Interview was conducted with the Head of the Joint Programming Unit (JPU). The M&E specialist Abderrahim El Moulat was not available for interview and was on leave during this evaluation.

<sup>25</sup> As per interview with CTA

regards to targets set per each activity b) in volatile circumstances such as the one prevalent in Yemen situations on the ground change rapidly. Also, whether the project has achieved its targets does not necessarily reflect the success or failure of a project. Attached however is progress of all UN agencies reflected in the first progress report for the ERRY program<sup>26</sup> (See Table 1).

**Engagement of National Partners:** Clear efforts are being made to engage national partners at both central and governorate level, mostly through efforts of the Project National coordinator who, in the absence of more staff and presence in the governorates, and security restrictions imposed on the CTA, is building partnerships with local authorities. Primarily, those involved include the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training. Not enough interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to assess what their involvement is. The General Federation of the Trade Unions, however, were not directly engaged. The MOTEVT and the COCI worked together on the development of curriculums for the Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeships. Those interviewed had a very clear understanding of the ERRY programme, but also in the specifics of the ILO component - more so at central level than in the governorates. Efforts to engage national partners are bearing their fruit. In the words of the COCI *“The project works in coordination with us more than any other project”*<sup>27</sup>. Such coordination mechanisms are good practices, particularly in a programme like ERRY where most activities are implemented through implementing partners and where coordination with the local authorities has been deemed as one area in need of strengthening in the ERRY MTR. The ILO, with its unique mandate of tripartism is uniquely positioned in Yemen to enhance dialogue between national partners.

**ILO Visibility:** To date ILO’s activities include a value chain analysis and skills needs assessment on non-agricultural skills (which is still in draft form) and entrepreneurship trainings where the ILO’s work stops at training the trainers and providing training material. The trainings are delivered by UNDP and its implementing partner SFD. Why ILO visibility is limited, expressed by some stakeholders interviewed, is understandable, particularly when compared to its sister agencies that have hefty interventions on the ground. In the evaluator’s view this is expected to change once the upgrading of informal apprenticeship schemes takes off. This being an initiative that directly targets Yemeni youth and that also creates a niche for the ILO intervention. More efforts however could be done to enhance ILO’s visibility in the second half of the project. To start with many valuable studies conducted by the ILO component (on non-agricultural sectors and on current apprenticeship schemes in Yemen) have not been finalized (for clear reasons expressed elsewhere). Dissemination of valuable data for both national and international agencies in Yemen has the potential to greatly enhance ILO visibility.

**Complementarity of ILO part with WFP, FAO and UNDP:** At central level, clear efforts are being made to establish synergies with other UN agencies. Communications and synergies with the ILO were deemed “good” by the Joint Programming Unit (JPU) of the ERRY programme. The ILO office is also conveniently located at the UNDP office. In the words of the Head of the JPU *“We’re like a family here”*<sup>28</sup>. The collaborations mentioned below are ones that have been relayed by the CTA of the project and reflected in the presentation presented during the Second Steering Committee of ERRY held in Amman in October 2017. It is worth noting, however, that to assess the potential of such collaborations more details would be needed with regards to each collaboration.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY). Annual Report: Year 1, March 2016 – February 2017. Prepared by Abdelrahim El Moulat. M&E specialist.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Mohammed Qaflah, Chairman of the Federation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Amal Al Kuhali, Director of SME’s.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with the Head of the JPU

<sup>29</sup> The evaluator was unable to obtain details on the above collaborations.

**Text Box 3**  
**Current and Planned Synergies between ILO and Sister Agencies in ERRY**

**ILO and UNDP:** ILO's second activity on entrepreneurial training targeting Yemeni youth was jointly developed with UNDP. ILO provided the training material and trained the trainers whilst UNDP conducted the trainings in addition to provision of small grants and market linkages. Further collaborations are being pursued, the most promising of which is the field of solar energy. Within this:

- a) the ILO's non-agriculture value chain analysis identified emerging technologies and business opportunities in the solar sector in Yemen
- b) accordingly, the ILO developed a competency based training curriculum for solar energy equipment installation and maintenance trainees<sup>30</sup>
- c) a value chain study was conducted to identify women-friendly current and future skills needs related to solar technology relevant to the local market<sup>31</sup>
- d) competency based curricula was developed mainstreaming conflict sensitivity based on the new and emerging women-friendly solar technology occupations and
- e) Plans are in place to target some of the beneficiaries of the UNDP in provision of vocational and entrepreneurship skills training (including occupational health hazards awareness and response).

**ILO and FAO:** ILO provides support to the women groups targeted by FAO's milk production with entrepreneurship skills.

**ILO and WFP:** The ILO targets the beneficiaries of WFP's Cash for Work (C4W) with post-cash for Work support such as entrepreneurship training.

#### **5.4 Effectiveness of Management Arrangements**

It is the lead evaluator's<sup>32</sup> view that the management arrangements of this project play a significant (if not the most important) role on whether the ILO component within the ERRY programme stands to reach its full potential and whether it gets the attention it deserves.

**Project Current Set-Up:** On the ground the ILO project team is composed of an international CTA, a National Project Coordinator and an administrative assistant. The ILO National Coordinator for Yemen, also plays an important role for the project and has been involved right from its inception and design. The team is small and led by a CTA who provides leadership in the overall implementation of the project but whose mobility and travel are heavily restricted due to the security restrictions. This is mitigated by the role of the national project coordinator who on top of his many responsibilities is also doing field visits (mostly in the North) and engaging social partners. The ERRY programme however is vast and complex and the ILO intervention, although comparably small, has multiple layers of implementation, some of which are new modalities in Yemen (informal apprenticeship). It is the evaluator's view that the expectations of the ILO component to achieve its full potential under the current set up are unrealistic. And that a revision of the project set up (additional national staff and focal points at governorate level) and mobilization of technical support and attention from the technical specialists (in skills) would enhance the overall performance of the ILO component.

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<sup>30</sup> The Rapid Assessments assessing apprenticeship providers in Yemen had originally identified four sectors with high potential of job growth. The solar component was added purposely added by the ILO team in Yemen to compliment the work of UNDP.

<sup>31</sup> Findings of this study should be consolidated, if necessary translated and disseminated.

<sup>32</sup> Specifying the lead evaluator here since she had access to both interviews at regional level and information extracted at field level.

**Communication between the Project Team and the Regional Office:** Interviews with the regional specialists and staff unanimously point to an office that has “lost sight” of what is happening on the ground and few could explain what gains had been made in Yemen. The challenges in conducting this evaluation, in efforts spent trying to document the gains, as well as the difficulties in reaching the project management in Yemen (the CTA), are, in view of the evaluator, symptomatic of a larger communication gap between the regional office and the project in Yemen. These must be put into context of other interviews and exchanges conducted remotely with stakeholders in Sana’a that were – regardless of the difficult circumstances on the ground – conducted in a timely manner. Communication gaps between a regional office and projects on the ground are common but in a situation where international staff are restricted from entering Yemen, such communication gaps become critical because they risk isolating a project and prevent it from getting the attention it deserves.

### **ILO Scope of Engagement**

*“People need to eat. People still need to live in countries in conflict. We need to give Yemenis hope that there is work, that there is income and that they can make a decent living even in times of war.”* (Interview with ILO Backstopper ROAS)

The success of the ILO component within the ERRY programme cannot come without an analysis of the broader context in which it works in. The latter’s importance is pivotal to the evaluation of the ILO/ERRY component since it has direct implications on the way the project is run. The limitations of the ILO and the fact that it is not crisis oriented is fully recognized by its staff and its constituents. Yet, the consensus among both regional staff and stakeholders in Yemen is that more can be done by the ILO to enhance its overall presence in Yemen. Specialists interviewed reiterated the need to work under an overarching vision of what can and cannot be done in Yemen. This calls for an intervention strategy for Yemen that brings together all the expertise of specialists in Beirut, including worker’ and employers’ specialists, to determine the level of engagement in Yemen and its overall scope. This would also provide the opportunity to assess whether the current resources at hand (human, technical, financial) for the ILO component within ERRY are enough to have it run efficiently.

## **5.5 Impact and Sustainability**

Output 2 of the ERRY programme has “increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery”. The reality is that local authorities, including the government, employers’ and workers’ organizations have been substantially weakened and do not have the minimum capacities required to deliver services.

### **Text Box 4**

#### **A Quick Glance at Some of the Challenges reported by ILO’s Main Social Partners in Yemen**

The private sector, the main partner in Output 2 of the ERRY programme has been hugely hit due to the embargo on the arrival of goods entering Yemen, the block of Yemeni exports and the suspension of banks ‘money transfers from and to Yemen which has a direct impact on merchants<sup>33</sup>. The Federation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry was bombed by the Saudi coalition in January 2016 resulting in the mass destruction of the entire building and internal equipment<sup>34</sup>. The Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training has had numerous institutes destroyed, and after the

<sup>33</sup> Interview with the Head of the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Sana’a

<sup>34</sup> See *Sana’a Chambers of Commerce and Industry Assessment*

Ministry of Defense, it is one of the most affected sectors in terms of number of destroyed structures.<sup>35</sup> In addition, students are not registering because of the lack of salaries of their families (Government of Yemen has been unable to pay their public servants' salaries for over 10 months). Teachers and Instructors of TEVT institutes have also had their salaries reduced.

Under Output 2, the mid-term evaluation of the ERRY programme recognizes the need to build the capacity of local institutions (to which provisions are already being made by the JPU/UNDP including an injection of cash in relevant institution<sup>36</sup>) and to strengthen communication. In this respect the ILO project team is already making clear progress with local authorities at central level. The Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship scheme directly involves the tripartite partners and the MOTEVT at both design and implementation level. The activity can benefit, in view of recommendations put forward by the ERRY MTR and this evaluation, to build on already existent dialogue with the tripartite partners involved and expand such coordination at governorate level to enhance sustainability.

## 6. Gender Issues Assessment

*“Women should be given equal opportunities in all interventions, this is to enable women to be involved in all different vocations”* General Director of Technical Education and Vocational Training (Hodeidah Branch)

Yemeni women are disproportionately affected by the crisis, meaning they are extremely vulnerable, especially female headed households. A rapid assessment assessing the impact of the crisis on employment and livelihoods in Sana'a, Aden and Al Hodeida revealed that high levels of displacement affected mainly the rural population and women, who accounted for 95% of the total displaced population. Men are often absent from IDP households, having gone to seek employment, being engaged in war or become a war fatality. These changes take an incredible toll on women but might also be forming opportunities for change. War can shift the gender dynamics of a labour market. Already, a Damage Needs Assessment conducted by the ILO, indicated that following the interruption of the bombing in Aden the labour market in Aden showed an impressive boost of employment and participation and that “unprecedented levels of women participating in employment in Aden” were recorded.<sup>37</sup>

The ILO intervention targets vulnerable Yemeni women and men through two core activities a) entrepreneurial training and b) upgrading of informal apprenticeship schemes. In the former key measures were taken in selecting an equal balance between women and men trainers. The trainings reached 795 final beneficiaries who were trained in MFB, 277 of which were women. And 426 final beneficiaries received training in “I too have a small business” of which 139 were women.

In the latter, the Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship, activities primarily target men.

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with the Head of the TEVT branch in Hodeidah. Some of the destroyed institutes include Al-Luhaia Institute (was under construction before it was destroyed); Bajel Institute (newly established and destroyed before it started); Al-Hkawkhah Institute (was under construction before it was destroyed); Al-Hawaq Institute in Hodeidah city; Women lab, the biggest women production institute in Yemen; Al-Thawrah Commercial Institute destroyed three days ago which is one of the newly established institutes.

<sup>36</sup> See ERRY Mid Term Review Recommendations Action Plan

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

Occupation	Targeted Apprentices by Governorate								Total
	Hodeidah		Hajjah		Lahj		Abyan		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Auto-mechanic	14		14		14		14		56
Panel beating and car painting	12		14		12		12		50
Welding and metalwork	14		10		10		12		46
Sewing and dressmaking		8		10		12		10	40
Solar system	10	2	10	2	10	2	10	2	48
Sub-total	50	10	48	12	46	14	48	12	240
Total		60		60		60		60	240

Of 240 apprentices, 48 are women, the majority of whom are found in sewing and dressmaking. These are sectors that are already oversaturated, that reinforce traditional gender roles and with limited returns in terms of income meaning that women are further marginalized<sup>38</sup>. Prior to the war the participation rate for women was as low as 6%<sup>39</sup> but the rapid increase of poverty levels in Yemen, already pre-crisis was forcing more and more women to seek employment. In the solar sector, a sector that both UNDP and ILO have deemed as a potential niche to engage more women, only two women have been selected from each governorate (see above table).

In the short term more efforts need to be made by the project team to ensure their activities do not primarily target men. If solar systems bear potential to engage more women then more women should be targeted in this sector. In the long term, and something to consider for ERRY II is to conduct rapid assessments in the women's role in the non-agricultural sector, considering changes in the labour market triggered by war circumstances.

## 7. Conclusions

**Relevance:** While it is too early to draw conclusions on whether ERRY has enhanced the resilience of vulnerable communities in Yemen, national stakeholders and ERRY beneficiaries have hailed this programme as highly relevant to their needs, lending credence to the UN and donor community's recognized need to "move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, approach to vulnerabilities". Skills, employment and livelihood recovery are central to this approach, strongly positioning the ILO and its Decent Work agenda.

**Design:** In its design and focus on demand-driven skills in the non-agricultural sector to create sustainable employment opportunities for youth, women and other vulnerable groups, ILO activities under the ERRY programme are deemed highly relevant by all involved stakeholders and beneficiaries. It is the evaluators' view, however, that the project would have benefitted from an individual ILO project strategy to compliment the overall ERRY programme and that specifically works to enhance the implementation mechanisms of the project. This would have aided the team to strategize on a) which activities and sub activities to prioritize<sup>40</sup> b) how to effectively target both men and women c) how to

<sup>38</sup> Uhlenhaut Lara, "Technical Education and Vocational Training for Women. Case Study of Yemen". *Al Raida Journal*, Winter 2010. Lebanese American University.

<sup>39</sup> Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment. Crisis Impact on Employment and Labour Market. ILO

<sup>40</sup> It was not clear why activities were not launched concurrently although interviews indicated that limited budget led to implementation of activities in accordance with the available budget each year.

monitor the progress of the activities in the field. Further, this should have been accompanied by detailed independent workplan setting clear timelines and targets, and with a clear M&E strategy.

**Effectiveness of the ILO component:** The project has made tangible progress in identifying key sectors with high potential for job creation (Activity 1) and in the entrepreneurial component (Activity 2). It is also laying the groundwork for the Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship Scheme, which has seen the engagement of national partners who have been actively engaged in its preparatory phase. At central level, efforts to engage national partners are bearing their fruit. In the words of the COCI “*The project works in coordination with us more than any other project*”<sup>41</sup>. Synergies are also being established with the other Participating UN agencies involved in ERRY, with reported collaborations underway with UNDP, WFP and FAO (text box 3). At this stage of implementation, however ILO visibility remains low. More efforts need to be made by the project to strengthen the gender component and to ensure that ILO’s activities are not primarily targeting men.

**Impact and Sustainability:** It is too early at this point of the project to gauge impact of the ILO component, but some reflections can be made on what would enhance its sustainability. The recommendations of the ERRY MTR, conducted in August 2017, stressed the need for more coordination at national level and better engagement of Yemen’s local authorities in the implementation of ERRY. The ILO is uniquely positioned in this respect because of a close relationship with the tripartite partners cultivated over decades. National stakeholders at central level are already being involved in the preparatory phase of the Upgrading of the Informal Apprenticeship. This is a good opportunity to capitalize on efforts made to date and enhance coordination at both central and governorate level, providing a better chance of sustainability.

**Effectiveness of Management Arrangements:** The effectiveness of the management arrangements is in the evaluator’s view the most critical area to address at this stage of the project. The small set up of an international CTA with limited mobility, a national project coordinator and administrative assistant makes for a limited presence against a vast and complex programme such as ERRY. Secondly, the current lack of efficient communication between the project management in Yemen and the regional office risks alienating the project from its regional office and hinder it from getting the attention it deserves. Finally, the need of an overall regional vision that clearly determine the level of ILO engagement in Yemen (what is feasible and what is not) would provide a better framework for the ILO intervention. A revision of all the above components would, in the evaluator’s view, greatly enhance the potential of the ILO component reaching its full potential.

## 8. Lessons Learnt (See Annex 1)

- 1. Bridge Communication Gaps to Enhance Overall Performance:** The predominant theme throughout the evaluation was a disconnect between the ILO regional office and its project in Yemen. With restricted access of international staff to Yemen, deficiencies in communication risk alienating projects in Yemen, hindering the potential of getting the attention they deserve. In the context of the ILO component within the ERRY programme the challenge works on two levels. At regional level, a deeper understanding of the difficulties faced by staff operating in crisis countries could enhance attempts to provide more comprehensive support to staff working in Yemen. Capacity building and tailored training of staff operating in crisis countries could enhance communication when access to countries is restricted. At project level, concerted efforts need to be made by the project management to better communicate both gains made, and challenges faced on the ground. In the context of continuation or upscaling of ILO intervention addressing this gap is key.

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<sup>41</sup> Interview with Mohammed Qaflah, Chairman of the Federation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Amal Al Kuhali, Director of SME’s.



2. **Interventions in Yemen would Benefit from Being Part of an Overall Strategy:** The ILO component within the ERRY framework is currently working in the absence of a larger vision for ILO engagement in Yemen. This works to its detriment for several reasons, primarily because it dictates the level of attention it gets. Interviews with both national stakeholders and regional experts alike pointed to the importance of ‘being closer to Yemen’ now since this will determine whether ILO will play a role in Yemen’s recovery. The UN and donor community in Yemen is currently focused on building resilience in governorates in Yemen that are relatively stable. Employment and livelihood recovery is central to this approach. The Damage and Needs Assessment recently conducted by the ILO states that “as soon as bombing stops, local employment plans should engage residents and displaced persons in infrastructure recovery activities (roads, schools, hospitals) through employment intensive investment programmes [ ...] reconstruction should be an opportunity to improve competencies and skills patters”.<sup>42</sup> Interviews with stakeholders also point to construction already happening in Sana’a. This could be a critical entry point for the ILO but must be consolidated as part of an overall vision for Yemen.
3. **Capitalize on ILO’s History in Yemen and Partnerships Nourished Over the Years:** The support of and cooperation with local authorities has been a key recommendation of the ERRY MTR. This also came with a recognition of the challenges entailed in cooperating with structures whose capacity have been drastically depleted. ILO has had a long history in Yemen and nourished collaborative partnerships that date back to the 1980’s. Within the ERRY programme ILO enjoys a unique mandate of tripartism that even in times of crisis, if not more so, would benefit from being invested in. Already cooperation at central level with local authorities such as the COCI and the MOTEVT might be providing a good platform for dialogue with labour issues as an entry point. Recommendations to better strengthen the capacity of local institutions are already being catered to by UNDP under Output 2. ILO is also very strongly positioned to support the private sector in local economic recovery.
4. **Address M&E Challenges in Future Interventions:** Evaluating the progress of an intervention against whether the project is achieving its set targets is not indicative of its success or failure. In volatile settings such as Yemen, logical frameworks should be treated as “living documents” because of the potential for conditions to change at any given time. Equally, scarce baseline data and indicators (as is the case with ERRY) make it hard to monitor results. Still, the ILO intervention is working in the context of a harmonized logical framework where other agencies are setting clear targets and reporting progress against them. In the second half of the project cycle, and even more importantly in the context of ERRY II, consolidated efforts need to be made to make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework (right from the design) and that concerted efforts are made to ensure the capacity of the project team in Yemen in M&E is enhanced through rigorous training.

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<sup>42</sup> Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment

## 5. Recommendations

It is important to stress here that recommendations have been reached with the recognition that the project is operating in a very complex and difficult environment, and that the ILO component is in an early phase of implementation. It is also part of a vast and complex programme, involving different agencies and different levels of engagement, which means there is a great deal of learning by doing.

### **A. For the Project's Technical Components:**

#### *Activity 1. Value Chain Analysis*

- **Synthesize the findings** of the VCA and consider developing it into concise briefs in English and Arabic (High Priority)
- **Disseminate the findings** with both UN agencies and national partners who can benefit from this data (COCI, MOTEVT and PUNO's). This has the potential to greatly enhance ILO visibility (High Priority)
- **Launch workshop** to publicize the findings and use it as opportunity to engage national stakeholders (High Priority)

#### *Activity 2. Strengthen the Capacity of Local Service Providers and Employers to implement on the job training on entrepreneurship*

- **Establish an effective M&E mechanism** between UNDP and the project team in Sana'a. Better reporting and effective communication is also needed between the ILO (Sana'a) and the regional office (High Priority)
- **Allocate ILO focal points** in the project four governorates (Medium Priority)

#### *Activity 3. Design and implement private sector led apprenticeship schemes and business development services*

- **Use this intervention as an opportunity to invest in social partners** and enhance dialogue (as per ERRY MTR recommendations) (High Priority)
- **Capitalize on discussions already underway with UNDP** and inroads made in engaging more women in the solar energy sector in Yemen. ILO can have clear comparative advantage in providing skills for young women in this sector. (Medium Priority)

#### *Activity 4. Develop, test and institutionalize post Cash for work services pilot*

- Consider and strategize together with ILO regional back stoppers on whether to keep this component or link with Activity 3 under ERRY II (Medium Priority)

## **B.For the ILO Project Team**

- 1. Increase the “visibility” of the ILO component at both regional and national level**
  - 1.1 Actively improve communication** with the Regional Office through regular updates on progress of the activities, clear demands on where activities need technical input and regular follow-up with the regional technical back stoppers and desk officer. (High Priority)
  - 1.2 Enhance the effectiveness of reporting** by also including qualitative progress made on collaborations made with tripartite partners and UN agencies (i.e. elaborate on current and planned synergies created with both national partners and participating UN agencies) (High Priority)
  - 1.3 Integrate the voices of both direct and indirect beneficiaries targeted** by the project by continuing to capture more case studies and by integrating visuals (i.e. photographs of beneficiaries working in workshops etc.) (High Priority)
- 2. Strengthen the Project Strategy of the ILO component and project work plan to better meet the goals and the objectives of the project.**
  - 2.1.Prioritize activities** (or sub-activities according to the changing situation and volatility on the ground) (High Priority)
  - 2.2 Actively engage the tripartite partners** at both central and governorate level. Ensure to also include the General Federation of the Trade Unions. (High Priority)
  - 2.3 Develop a clear, detailed individual workplan** for the ILO team setting clear targets and timelines (High Priority)
- 3. Strengthen the Gender component of the ILO intervention by ensuring that core activities are targeting both men and women**
  - 3.1. Consider targeting more women** in the apprenticeship intervention beyond sewing and dress making. Ensure to engage more women in non-traditional sectors such as the solar component specifically (High Priority)
  - 3.2. Consider a rapid assessment of women’s role in the non-agricultural sector** (in the four governorates) and that considers changes in the labour market triggered by war (Medium Priority)
  - 3.3. Involve the ROAS Gender Specialist** in future design and monitoring of activities related to the ILO/ERRY component (High Priority)

## **C. For the Regional Office of Arab States (ROAS)**

- 4. Strengthen the Effectiveness of Management Arrangement of this project by revising the current set up.**

**4.1. Define roles and responsibilities** to ensure good management. This includes clear identified roles between the CTA, the Yemen Coordinator, the RPU and technical regional specialists concerned. (High Priority)

**4.2. Consider allocating focal points** in the four governorates to ensure proper implementation and monitoring of activities (Medium Priority)

**4.3. Consider allocation of additional national staff** working at central level (Medium Priority)

**4.4. Ensure to allocate a national coordinator** for the South (High Priority)

**5. Build the Monitoring and Evaluation capacity of the team in Yemen**

**5.1. Provide capacity building of project team in M&E.** If visits to Yemen by the ILO ROAS team are still restricted due to security, efforts need to be made to have the ILO project team in Yemen periodically visit the regional office in order to build their capacity. (High Priority)

**6. Build an Intervention Strategy for Yemen together with all relevant back stoppers and specialists, workers' and employers' specialists, which clearly defines the scope and level of engagement in Yemen**

**6.1. Build an intervention Strategy for Yemen** that clearly defines what is feasible and what is not. (High Priority)

**6.2. Develop clear criteria for staff working in Yemen** identifying relevant skills and training needs accordingly (High Priority)

**6.3. Build the capacity of and invest in staff working in Yemen** with a focus on working in crisis countries. (High Priority)

## ILO Lesson Learned Template (1)

**Project Title:** Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** Yem/15/01/UND

**Name of Evaluator:** Lara Uhlenhaut and Sadeq Al Nabhani

**Date:** January 2018

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<b>Bridging Communication Gaps to Enhance Overall Performance.</b> The predominant theme throughout this mid-term evaluation was a disconnect between the ILO regional office and its project in Yemen. Interviews with the regional specialists and staff unanimously pointed to an office that has “lost sight” of what is happening on the ground and few could explain what gains had been made in Yemen. The challenges faced by the evaluator in conducting this evaluation (remotely), in efforts spent trying to document the gains, as well as the difficulties in reaching the project management in Yemen (the CTA), are symptomatic of a larger communication gap between the regional office and the project in Yemen. In the context of the ILO component within the ERRY programme the challenge works on two levels. At regional level, a deeper understanding of the difficulties faced by staff operating in crisis countries could enhance attempts to provide more comprehensive support to staff working in Yemen. Capacity building and tailored training of staff operating in crisis countries could enhance communication when access to countries is restricted. At project level, concerted efforts need to be made by the project management to better communicate both gains made, and challenges faced on the ground. In the context of continuation or upscaling of ILO intervention addressing this gap is key.
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	The ongoing war and crisis in Yemen means that international staff have limited access to Yemen. For example, none of the RPU visited Yemen to meet with project staff or constituents due to security situation and limitations imposed on missions to Yemen. This had a clear impact on the level of communication.
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	Regional Office of Arab States / ILO Project Team in Yemen
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	With restricted access of international staff to Yemen, deficiencies in communication (as can be already deduced in this project) risk alienating the project, hindering the potential of getting the attention it deserves.

<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	A clear recognition and willingness from the ILO ROAS team in Yemen that more needs to be done to enhance effective communication
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	Considering restrictions on international experts and regional ILO staff travelling to Yemen, efforts need to be made to have the national project team periodically visit the regional office in order to enhance communication

## ILO Lesson Learned Template (2)

**Project Title:** Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** Yem/15/01/UND

**Name of Evaluator:** Lara Uhlenhaut and Sadeq Al Nabhani

**Date:** January 2018

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Interventions in Yemen would Benefit from Being Part of an Overall Intervention Strategy:</b> The success of the ILO component within the ERRY programme cannot come without an analysis of the broader context in which it works in. The latter's importance is pivotal to the evaluation of the ILO/ERRY component since it has direct implications on the way the project is run. The limitations of the ILO and the fact that it is not crisis oriented is fully recognized by its staff and its constituents. Yet, the consensus among both regional staff and stakeholders in Yemen is that more can be done by the ILO to enhance its overall presence in Yemen. Specialists interviewed reiterated the need to work under an overarching vision of what can and cannot be done in Yemen. This calls for an intervention strategy for Yemen that brings together all the expertise of specialists in Beirut, including worker' and employers' specialists, to determine the level of engagement in Yemen and its overall scope. This would also provide the opportunity to assess whether the current resources at hand (human, technical, financial) for the ILO component within ERRY are enough to have it run efficiently.</p>

<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	The ILO has a long history of technical cooperation in Yemen that dates to the 1980's. ILO had numerous large-scale technical cooperation projects in the field of Labour Market Information Systems, Child Labour, Gender Equality, Youth employment as well as an overarching Decent Work Country Programme. Most operations came to a halt following the uprisings in Yemen in 2011 and the ensuing war that continues to date. The Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen Joint programme is currently the only significant operational ILO project in Yemen.
<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	Regional Office of Arab States / Project Team in Yemen
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	The absence of an overall intervention strategy in Yemen has direct effect on several important factors including a) level of attention it gets from regional office and the ILO's visibility on the ground and amidst donors and other UN agencies. More importantly, it also determines what role the ILO will play in Yemen's recovery in the future.
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	The dilemma faced by the ILO when working in crisis countries is well recognized by all people interviewed, both in terms of ILO staff and in terms of the ILO's beneficiaries.
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	A Damage and Needs Assessment for Yemen recently conducted by the ILO states that "as soon as bombing stops, local employment plans should engage residents and displaced persons in infrastructure recovery activities (roads, schools, hospitals) through employment intensive investment programmes. Interviews with stakeholders also point to construction already happening in Sana'a. This could be a critical entry point for the ILO but must be consolidated as part of an overall vision (strategy) for Yemen.

## ILO Lesson Learned Template (3)

**Project Title:** Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen

**Project TC/SYMBOL:** Yem/15/01/UND

**Name of Evaluator:** Lara Uhlenhaut and Sadeq Al Nabhani

**Date:** January 2018

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

**LL Element**

**Text**

<p><b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b></p>	<p><b>Capitalize on ILO’s History in Yemen and Partnerships Nourished Over the Years:</b> Under Output 2, the mid-term evaluation of the ERRY programme recognizes the need to build the capacity of local institutions (to which provisions are already being made by the JPU/UNDP including an injection of cash in relevant institution) and to strengthen communication. In this respect the ILO project team is already making clear progress with local authorities at central level. One of the activities designed for this project, the “Upgrading of Informal Apprenticeship Scheme” directly involves the tripartite partners and the MOTEVT at both design and implementation level. The activity can benefit to build on already existent dialogue with the tripartite partners involved and expand such coordination at governorate level to enhance sustainability. Among the UN agencies involved in the implementation of the ERRY programme, the ILO enjoys a unique mandate of tripartism that even in times of crisis, if not more so, would benefit from being invested in. Already cooperation at central level with local authorities such as the COCI and the MOTEVT might be providing a good platform for dialogue with labour issues as an entry point.</p>
<p><b>Context and any related preconditions</b></p>	<p>The ILO has a long history of technical cooperation in Yemen that dates to the 1980’s. ILO had numerous large-scale technical cooperation projects in the field of Labour Market Information Systems, Child Labour, Gender Equality, Youth employment and an overarching Decent Work Country Programme. Most operations came to a halt following the uprisings in Yemen in 2011 and the ensuing war that continues to date. The Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen Joint programme is currently the only significant operational ILO project in Yemen.</p>
<p><b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b></p>	<p>Regional Office of Arab States / Project Team in Yemen</p>
<p><b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b></p>	<p>Output 2 of the ERRY programme has “increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery”. The reality is that local authorities, including the government, employers’ and workers’ organizations have been substantially weakened and do not have the minimum capacities required to deliver services.</p>
<p><b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b></p>	<p>Clear efforts are being made to engage national partners. Those interviewed had a very clear understanding of the ERRY programme, but also in the specifics of the ILO component - more so at central level than in the governorates. Efforts to engage national partners are bearing their fruit. In the words of the COCI “<i>The project works in coordination with us more than any other project</i>”<sup>43</sup>. Such coordination mechanisms are good practices, particularly in a programme like ERRY where most activities are implemented through implementing partners and where coordination with the local authorities has been deemed as one area in need of strengthening in the ERRY MTR.</p>

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Mohammed Qaflah, Chairman of the Federation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Amal Al Kuhali, Director of SME’s.



<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	<p>The ILO, with its unique mandate of tripartism is uniquely positioned in Yemen to enhance dialogue between national partners. Recommendations to better strengthen the capacity of local institutions are already being catered to by UNDP under Output 2. ILO is also very strongly positioned to support the private sector in local economic recovery.</p>
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#### ILO Lesson Learned Template (4)

**Project Title:** Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen      **Project TC/SYMBOL:** Yem/15/01/UND

**Name of Evaluator:** Lara Uhlenhaut and Sadeq Al Nabhani      **Date:** January 2018

The following lesson learned has been identified during the course of the evaluation. Further text explaining the lesson may be included in the full evaluation report.

LL Element	Text
<b>Brief description of lesson learned (link to specific action or task)</b>	<p><b>Address M&amp;E Challenges in Future Interventions.</b> Evaluating the progress of an intervention against whether the project is achieving its set targets is not indicative of its success or failure. In volatile settings such as Yemen, logical frameworks should be treated as “living documents” because of the potential for conditions to change at any given time. Equally, scarce baseline data and indicators (as is the case with ERRY) make it hard to monitor results. However, the ILO intervention is working in the context of a harmonized logical framework where other agencies are setting clear targets and reporting progress against them. The lack of consistent targets set per year for the ILO component and misunderstandings of whether the project is on track or not are, in the evaluator’s view, directly linked with gaps in the M&amp;E strategy.</p>
<b>Context and any related preconditions</b>	<p>ERRY’s design was reached after two weeks of intense discussions between the EU, different UN agencies and Yemen’s key stakeholders in Amman in late 2015. The project has a harmonized logical framework and joint workplans. A look at the logical framework of the ERRY project, and the ILO component specifically, does indicate some gaps. The desk review revealed inconsistencies when it came to project targets with different numbers reflected in different progress reports (ILO progress reports and ERRY progress reports were compared), which made it hard to evaluate progress against original targets. An interview with the CTA also revealed that the ILO did not have clear indicators in the log frame, which was raised during the induction workshop held in Djibouti in July 2016, organized by the Joint Coordination Unit (JPU) with all PUNOs and EU participating in the development of a joint annual work plan.</p>

<b>Targeted users / Beneficiaries</b>	Regional Office of Arab States / Project Team in Yemen
<b>Challenges /negative lessons - Causal factors</b>	The ILO component would have benefitted from an individual M&E strategy that complimented the overall ERRY programme but specifically worked to enhance both the implementation and the monitoring mechanisms of the ILO project team in Yemen. This would have aided the team to strategize on a) which activities and sub activities to prioritize b) how to effectively target both men and women c) how to monitor the progress of the activities in the field. The prioritization of activities and sub activities is important to assess. For instance, the “Upgrading of the Informal Apprenticeship in Yemen” is yet to be piloted in Yemen and in the project team’s own words needed more preparation than the entrepreneurial training (already a well-tested modality in Yemen). The project however did not launch the activities concurrently which means a very complex and multi-layered activity is yet to be implemented in the second half of the project.
<b>Success / Positive Issues - Causal factors</b>	
<b>ILO Administrative Issues (staff, resources, design, implementation)</b>	In the second half of the project cycle, and even more importantly in the context of ERRY II, consolidated efforts need to be made to make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework (right from the design) and that concerted efforts are made to ensure the capacity of the project team in Yemen in M&E is enhanced through rigorous training. Due to security concerns and limitations imposed on international staff traveling to Yemen, it is recommended for the ILO project team in Yemen to make periodical, capacity building visits to the Regional Office in Beirut.



**INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION  
TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

**Terms of Reference (ToR) for Midterm Project Evaluation  
“Joint Programme: Enhanced rural resilience in Yemen”**

<b>I. KEY FACTS</b>	
<b>TC Symbol:</b>	YEM/15/01/UND
<b>Country:</b>	Yemen
<b>Project titles:</b>	Enhanced rural resilience in Yemen
<b>Duration:</b>	36 months
<b>Start Date:</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> January 2016
<b>End Date:</b>	31 <sup>st</sup> December 2018
<b>Administrative unit:</b>	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
<b>Technical Backstopping Unit:</b>	Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)
<b>Collaborating ILO Units:</b>	Employment-Intensive Investment Unit (DEVINVEST)
<b>Evaluation requirements:</b>	Midterm Evaluation
<b>Donor:</b>	EU (through UNDP)
<b>Budget:</b>	EU: US\$ 2,569,317

**2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

**Project Background**

Yemen’s transition has tragically spiralled downwards into a full-scale war with little immediate prospect of warring parties finding a peaceful way out. Yemeni men, women, children, young and old, bear the brunt of casualties and suffering of war. This has led to the collapse of the state, economy and security.

More than half of the 25 million Yemeni population were already below the poverty line before the escalation of the war, with 8 million Yemenis receiving humanitarian assistance. Development and public services had already stalled in the aftermath of the 2011 crisis. Six months into the protracted crisis, humanitarian actors estimate that 80% of Yemen’s population is now in need of assistance to cope<sup>44</sup>.

The transition process had largely centered on the political dialogue and Sana’a focused state reforms and humanitarian assistance. The remarkable resilience of the Yemeni population that endured decades of underdevelopment is now being tested to its limits. The prolonged war erodes all remaining coping mechanisms that they have left, plunging them into vulnerability, poverty and insecurity in an unprecedented scale of humanitarian disaster. The need for restoring resilience for survival and foundation building of communities, institutions and peace is urgent and essential as is humanitarian relief and political dialogue to end the war.

Yemen’s political transition was triggered by Yemeni youth and women demanding democracy and opportunities amidst the wave of Arab Spring demonstrations in 2011. Many events followed starting from the transition agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in November 2011 and ending with the current war. Given the scope of the emergency and the deteriorating situation, the United Nations revised the Humanitarian Response Plan in June, calling for USD 1.6 billion in assistance to target 11.7 million people out of the 21.1 million people in need.

The three-year joint programme “*Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen*” (ERRY) will be implemented by FAO, ILO, UNDP and WFP in four governorates: Hajjah, Hodeidah, Lahj and Abyan.

The overall objective of the programme:

***To enhance the resilience<sup>45</sup> and self-reliance of crisis-affected rural communities through support to livelihoods stabilization and recovery, local governance and improved access to sustainable energy.***

## Immediate Objectives and Outputs

<b>Outcome 1</b>		
Communities are better able to manage local risks and shocks for increased economic self-reliance and enhanced social cohesion.		
<b>Output 1.1</b> Community livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience and economic self-reliance	<b>Output 1.2</b> Communities benefit from improved and more sustainable livelihoods opportunities through better access to solar energy	<b>Output 1.3</b> Informal networks promote social cohesion through community dialogue and delivery of services
<b>Outcome 2</b>		

<sup>44</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview, June 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Resilience is commonly described as the ability of individuals, communities and institutions to better cope with a crisis, shock or stressor.

Institutions are responsive, accountable and effective to deliver services, build the social contract and meet community identified needs.	
<b>Output 2.1</b> Functions, financing and capacity of local authorities enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to public priorities	<b>Output 2.2</b> Increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance collective actions, aid delivery and economic recovery

## Beneficiaries

Target groups will focus on the most vulnerable such as women, the unemployed, youth, the Muhamasheen, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and stressed host communities, using inclusive, participatory and conflict-sensitive tools to mobilize and involve them in the proposed activities. Active partnerships with local authorities, the private sector, communities, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and NGOs will be sought for the successful implementation of the programme.

## Fund Management Arrangements

This UN Joint Programme follows the pass-through fund management modality according to the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Guidelines on UN Joint Programming. As outlined, the UNDP MPTF Office, serving as the Administrative Agent (AA) for the Joint Programme, as set out in the Standard Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Joint Projects using Pass-Through Fund Management performs the following functions:

- Establish a separate ledger account under its financial regulations and rules for the receipt and administration of the funds received from the donor(s) pursuant the Administrative Arrangement. This Joint Programme Account will be administered by the Administrative Agent in accordance with the regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to it, including those relating to interest;
- Make disbursements to Participating UN Organizations from the Joint programme Account based on instructions from the Steering Committee, in line with the budget set forth in the Joint Programme Document.

The Participating UN Organizations:

- Assume full programmatic and financial responsibility and accountability for the funds disbursed by the AA as detailed in the Management Arrangements and Coordination section;
- Establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent.

## 3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

### Evaluation Background

ILO considers evaluation as an integral part of the implementation of technical cooperation activities. Provisions are made in all projects in accordance with ILO evaluation policy and based on the nature of the project and the specific requirements agreed upon at the time of the project design and during the project as per established procedures. The Regional Evaluation Officer at the ILO ROAS provides the evaluation function for all ILO projects.

The project document states that a midterm evaluation will be conducted during the project implementation to assess the progress towards the results, identify the main difficulties/constraints and formulate practical recommendations to improve the programme implementation as to achieve the expected results. A final evaluation will be realized to assess the achievement of the results and the impact of the programme for the targeted populations.

ILO's established procedures for technical cooperation projects are followed for monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the project throughout the project cycle and at different stages of project execution. Specific components of the ILO's M&E plan include a multi-layered logical framework and work plan to measure the timely achievement of results at the activity and output level as well as change at the outcome and development objective level.

Monitoring of individual objectives and activities based on indicators in the logical framework feed into the progress reports.

### **Purpose**

A midterm evaluation will be conducted to examine the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, potential impact and sustainability of the project. The evaluation report shall reflect findings from this evaluation on:

- whether the project is achieving the planned results,
- strengths and weaknesses in the project design, strategy, and implementation,
- lessons learned with recommendations for ILO's considerations in the continuation, upscaling, as well as the design of a future project in Yemen.

The midterm evaluation is being carried out at this time as the project is around half-way through.

The knowledge generated by the evaluation will be used by ILO ROAS in the design of future projects responding to the Yemen crisis and other comparable circumstances. In particular the good practices, lessons learned, and recommendations produced will be used to identify new opportunities for ILO engagement, improve the implementation and subsequently enhance the resultant impact of projects.

### **Scope**

The evaluation will cover the ILO outcomes and outputs under the project 'Enhanced rural resilience in Yemen' for its entire duration so far.

The evaluation should focus on all the activities that have been implemented since the start of the projects to the moment of the field visits.

The project was active in Yemen and the travel will be to Yemen, where the project team is based, and to Lebanon, where the Regional Office for Arab States (ROAS) is located.

The independent evaluation will take place between August and September 2017 with 12 days of field visit to Yemen and Lebanon to collect information from different stakeholders.

The evaluation will integrate gender equality as a cross-cutting concern throughout its methodology and all deliverables, including the final report.

The primary clients of this evaluation are ILO ROAS, ILO constituents in Yemen, the partner UN agencies and the donors. Secondary users include other project stakeholders and units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation.

## **4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS**

The evaluation utilizes the standard ILO framework and follows its major criteria:

- ✓ **Relevance and strategic fit** – the extent to which the objectives are aligned with sub-regional, national and local priorities and needs, the constituents’ priorities and needs, and the donor’s priorities for the project countries;
- ✓ **Validity of design** – the extent to which the project design, logic, strategy and elements are/remain valid vis-à-vis problems and needs;
- ✓ **Efficiency** - the productivity of the project implementation process taken as a measure of the extent to which the outputs achieved are derived from an efficient use of financial, material and human resources;
- ✓ **Effectiveness** - the extent to which the project can be said to have contributed to the development objectives and the immediate objectives and more concretely whether the stated outputs have been produced satisfactorily; in addition to building synergies with national initiatives and with other donor-supported projects, project visibility;
- ✓ **Impact** - positive and negative changes and effects caused by the Project at the sub regional and national levels, i.e. the impact with social partners and various implementing partner organizations;
- ✓ **Effectiveness of management arrangements;** and
- ✓ **Sustainability** – the extent to which adequate capacity building of social partners has taken place to ensure mechanisms are in place to sustain activities and whether the existing results are likely to be maintained beyond project completion; the extent to which the knowledge developed throughout the project (research papers, manuals and other tools) can still be utilized after the end of the project to inform policies and practitioners,

#### Relevance and strategic fit:

- ❖ How well does the project’s approach fit context of the on-going crisis in Yemen?
- ❖ How do the project objectives respond to the priorities of the donors (EU) in Yemen and the region?
- ❖ Are the project objectives aligned with tripartite constituents’ objectives and needs? What measures were taken to ensure alignment? How does the Project deal with shortcomings of tripartism characteristic of the region?
- ❖ To what extent does the project fit into national development and humanitarian response plans?
- ❖ To what extent are project activities linked to the global commitments of the ILO including the Sustainable Development Goals and the agenda 2030?
- ❖ Are the planned project objectives and outcomes relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- ❖ How well does the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address the crisis in Yemen? Does the project’s design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions have failed to address?

#### Validity of design:

- ❖ Is the project strategy and structure coherent and logical (what are logical correlations between the overall objective, outcomes, and outputs)?

- ❖ On the whole, were project assumptions realistic; did the project undergo a risk analysis and design readjustment when necessary?
- ❖ Does the project make use of a monitoring and evaluation framework? How appropriate and useful are the indicators in assessing the project's progress? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are indicators gender sensitive? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate? Are the assumptions for each objective and output realistic?
- ❖ To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring an increase in self-reliance and an enhancement of social cohesion and the improved capacities of the involved institutions? To what extent were the indicators used effective in measuring enhancement of capacities of ILO constituents?
- ❖ To what extent did the project design align with the Country Programme Outcome?
- ❖ What was the baseline condition at the beginning of the project? How was it established?
- ❖ Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes, how? Was the approach taken appropriate to the context?

Effectiveness:

- ❖ What progress has the project made so far towards achieving the overall objective and outcomes? (analysis of achievements and challenges by outcome is required) In cases where challenges have been faced, what intermediate results can be reported towards reaching the outcomes? Are the project partners using the outputs? Have the project outputs been transformed by the project partners into outcomes?
- ❖ How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? To what extent has the project management been participatory and has the participation contributed towards achievement of the project objectives? How effective was the collaboration with the relevant ILO offices, partner UN agencies, media, and non-governmental organizations working on the Syrian refugee crisis, and what has been the added value of this collaboration? What systems been put in place to enhance collaboration with other UN agencies, government institutions working on this issue and how?
- ❖ To what extent did the project build synergies with national and regional initiatives and with other donor-supported projects?
- ❖ How did outputs and outcomes contribute to ILO's mainstreamed strategies including gender equality, social dialogue, poverty reduction and labour standards?
- ❖ To what extent did synergies with and operation through local organizations help to ensure the sustainability of the impact of the project i.e. through building capacity?
- ❖ What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- ❖ To what extent did the achievement of the indicators lead to the attainment of the outcomes?
- ❖ What unintended outcomes can be identified?
- ❖ How effective was collaboration with the media? How efficient has the project been in communicating its results, disseminating success stories and enhancing visibility?



- ❖ To what extent has the project, beyond achieving concrete results, contributed to positioning the ILO in the response to the on-going crisis in Yemen? In what ways has this project paved the way for future ILO interventions in this area?
- ❖ Specific questions by Outcome (Please provide evidence-based answers to the following):
- ❖ *Outcome 1:*
- ❖ To what extent, so far, have communities' livelihoods and productive assets been improved? How has this or will this be measured at the end of the three-year period?
- ❖ To what extent has the project managed to improve access to solar powered energy and to what degree has this led to improved and more sustainable access to livelihoods for communities?
- ❖ Has community dialogue and delivery of services through informal networks been successful in promoting social cohesion? To what extent and how?
- ❖ Have there been any major challenges that would require the project to significantly revise its outputs under this outcome at this stage?
- ❖ *Outcome 2:*
- ❖ So far, how have the functions, financing and capacity of the local authorities been improved?
- ❖ To what extent have collective actions, aid delivery and economic recovery been improved through strengthened capacity of local actors and private sector partnership?
- ❖ Have there been any major challenges that would require the project to significantly revise its outputs under this outcome at this stage?

#### Sustainability:

- ❖ Are the results achieved by the project likely to be sustainable? What measures have been considered to ensure that the key components of the project are sustainable beyond the life of the project? How will activities and/or management structures be financed when the project ends?
- ❖ Did the project put in place measures to ensure the continuity of access to solar energy after the end of the project?
- ❖ To what extent was sustainability of impact taken into account during the design of the project?
- ❖ To what extent have the interventions advanced strategic gender-related needs?
- ❖ What was the role of the project in resource mobilization?

#### Efficiency:

- ❖ To what extent have project activities been cost-effective? Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes? To what extent can the project results justify the time, financial and human resources invested in the project?
- ❖ To what extent has the project been able to build on other ILO or non-ILO initiatives either nationally or regionally, in particular with regard to the creation of synergies in cost sharing?
- ❖ What were the intervention benefits and related costs of integrating gender equality?
- ❖ What synergies exist between the ILO and UNDP/WFP /FAO parts of the project? Is there any duplication of efforts? Are activities implemented in an efficient way in terms of resources spent?

#### Effectiveness of management arrangements:

- ❖ How effective has the joint nature of the programme between the UN agencies been so far? What can be improved in the management arrangements to increase the effectiveness of the project?
- ❖ What was the division of work tasks within the project team and between the agencies? Has the use of local skills been effective? How does the project governance structure facilitate good results and efficient delivery? And if not, why not?
- ❖ How clear is the understanding of roles and responsibilities and division of labour between project staff? And between UN agencies?
- ❖ How effective was communication between the project team, the regional office and the responsible technical department at headquarters? Has the project received adequate technical and administrative support/response from the ILO backstopping units?
- ❖ How effectively does the project management monitor project performance and results? Does the project report on progress in a regular and systematic manner, both at regional level, to PROGRAM and the donors? What M&E system has been put in place, and how effective has it been?

Impact orientation:

- ❖ What is the likely contribution of the project initiatives to the stated objectives of the intervention?
- ❖ What were the interventions long-term effects on more equitable gender relations or reinforcement of existing inequalities?
- ❖ To what extent are national partners able and willing to continue with the project? How effectively has the project built national ownership? In what ways are results anchored in national institutions and to what extent can the local partners maintain them financially at end of project?
- ❖ At this stage, would considering a continuation of the project to consolidate achievements be justifiable? In what way should the next phase differ from the current one?

Lessons learned:

- ❖ What good practices can be learned from the project that can be applied to a second phase of this project or similar future projects?
- ❖ If it were possible, what could have been implemented differently for greater relevance, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

## 5. METHODOLOGY

An independent evaluator will be hired by the ILO to conduct the evaluation. The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. Any changes to the methodology should be discussed with and approved by the REO and the Project.

### I. Desk Review

The evaluator will review project background materials before conducting any interviews or trips to the country.

## 2. Briefing

The evaluator will have an initial consultation with the REO, relevant ILO specialists and support staff in ROAS. The objective of the consultation is to reach a common understanding regarding the status of the project, the priority assessment questions, available data sources and data collection instruments and an outline of the final assessment report. The following topics will be covered: status of logistical arrangements, project background and materials, key evaluation questions and priorities, outline of the inception and final report.

## 3. Individual Interviews and/or Group Interviews

Following the initial briefing, the desk review and the inception report, the evaluator will have a mission to Yemen, and have meetings with constituents/stakeholders together with interpreters supporting the process if needed. Individual or group interviews will be conducted with the following:

- a) Project staff/consultants that have been active;
- b) ILO ROAS DWT Director, RPU, and Senior Specialists in Gender, Employers' and Workers' Organizations, Employment Policy and Skills;
- c) ILO Headquarters technical departments;
- d) EU representatives;
- e) Interviews with national counterparts (government, public institutions, social partners, IPs, etc.);
- f) Interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries;
- g) Other international agencies working in relevant fields.

## 4. Debriefing

Upon completion of the missions, the evaluator will provide a debriefing to the Project team, ILO DWT and HQ on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations in Beirut at ROAS. The evaluator will also debrief stakeholders to validate results.

### Evaluation Timeframe

Responsible person	Tasks	Number of Working days	Tentative timeline
Evaluator	Desk review of project documents and phone interview with key informants	4	
Evaluator	Inception report		
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in respective countries	Evaluation missions to Yemen	10	
Evaluator with the logistical support of project staff in respective countries	Stakeholders Workshop and presenting preliminary findings	1	
Evaluator	Drafting report	5	

Evaluator	Submission of the report to the evaluation manager		
Evaluation manager	Circulating the draft report to key stakeholders		
Evaluation manager	Send consolidated comments to evaluator		
Evaluator	Second Draft	3	
Evaluation Manager	Review of Second Draft		
Evaluation Manager	EVAL approval		
Evaluator	Integration of comments and finalization of the report	1	

Total days: 24 Days

### **Evaluation Management**

The evaluator will report to the ILO REO in ROAS and should discuss any technical and methodological matters with the REO, should issues arise. The ILO ROAS office will provide administrative and logistical support during the evaluation mission.

## **6. MAIN DELIVERABLES**

The main outputs of the evaluation consist of the following:

- Deliverable 1: Inception Report
- Deliverable 2: Draft evaluation report
- Deliverable 3: Stakeholder debrief and PowerPoint Presentation (PPP)
- Deliverable 4: Final evaluation report with executive summary (report will be considered final after an additional review by EVAL. Comments will have to be integrated)
- Translation of the final report to Arabic (Project team)

### **Inception Report**

The evaluator will draft an Inception Report, which should describe, provide reflection and fine-tuning of the following issues:

- Project background
- Purpose, scope and beneficiaries of the evaluation
- Evaluation criteria and questions
- Methodology and instruments
- Main deliverables
- Management arrangements and work plan.

### **Final Report**

The final version of the report will follow the below format and be in a range of 20-25 pages in length, excluding the annexes:

1. Title page
2. Table of Contents, including List of Appendices, Tables
3. List of Acronyms or Abbreviations

4. Executive Summary with key findings, conclusions and recommendations
5. Background and Project Description
6. Purpose of Evaluation
7. Evaluation Methodology and Evaluation Questions
8. Status of objectives
9. Clearly identified findings
10. A table presenting the key results (i.e. figures and qualitative results) achieved per objective (expected and unexpected)
11. Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations (identifying which stakeholders are responsible)
12. Lessons Learned
13. Potential good practices
14. Annexes (list of interviews, TORs, list of documents consulted, etc.)

The quality of the report will be assessed against the EVAL Checklists 4, 5, and 6.

The deliverables will be submitted in the English language, and structured according to the templates provided by the ILO.

## 7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND WORKPLAN

### REQUIREMENTS

The evaluator will have experience in the evaluation of development interventions, expertise in the Entrepreneurship, Skills Training, Business Development Service Providers and other relevant subject matter, an understanding of the ILO's tripartite culture, and knowledge of the Yemeni and regional context. He/she will be guided by high professional standards and principles of integrity in accordance with the guiding principles of the international evaluation professionals associations. The evaluator should have an advanced degree in social sciences, proven expertise on evaluation methods, and knowledge about labour market, skills and conflict issues and the ILO approach. Full command of English will be required. Command of the national language would be an advantage.

The final selection of the evaluator will be approved by the Regional Evaluation Focal Point in the ILO ROAS based on a short list of candidates prepared in consultations with the ILO technical specialists, EVAL, ILO HQ technical departments, etc.

### ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

*The External Evaluator is responsible for conducting the evaluation according to the terms of reference (ToR). He/she will:*

- Review the ToR and provide input, propose any refinements to assessment questions, as necessary.
- Review project background materials (e.g., project document, progress reports).
- Prepare an inception report
- Develop and implement the evaluation methodology (i.e. conduct interviews, review documents) to answer the evaluation questions.
- Conduct preparatory consultations with the ILO REO prior to the evaluation mission.
- Conduct field research, interviews, as appropriate and collect information according to the suggested format.
- Present preliminary findings to the constituents.
- Prepare an initial draft of the evaluation report with input from ILO specialists and constituents/stakeholders.

- Conduct briefing on findings, conclusions and recommendation of the evaluation to ILO ROAS.
- Prepare the final report based on the ILO, donor and constituents feedback obtained on the draft report.

*The ILO Evaluation Manager is responsible for:*

- Drafting the ToR;
- Finalizing the ToR with input from colleagues;
- Preparing a short list of candidates for submission to the Regional Evaluation Officer, ILO/ROAS and EVAL for final selection;
- Hiring the consultant;
- Providing the consultant with the project background materials;
- Participating in preparatory consultations (briefing) prior to the assessment mission;
- Assisting in the implementation of the assessment methodology, as appropriate (i.e., participate in meetings, review documents);
- Reviewing the initial draft report, circulating it for comments and providing consolidated feedback to the External Evaluators (for the inception report and the final report);
- Reviewing the final draft of the report;
- Disseminating the final report to all the stakeholders;
- Coordinating follow-up as necessary.

*The ILO REO<sup>46</sup>:*

- Provides support to the planning of the evaluation;
- Approves selection of evaluation consultant and final versions of TOR;
- Reviews the evaluation draft and final report and submits to EVAL;
- Disseminates as appropriate.

*The Project Team Leaders in consultation are responsible for:*

- Reviewing the draft TOR and providing input, as necessary;
- Providing project background materials, including studies, analytical papers, reports, tools, publications produced, and any relevant background notes;
- Providing a list of stakeholders;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the inception report;
- Participating in preparatory briefing prior to the assessment missions;
- Scheduling all meetings and interviews for the missions;
- Ensuring necessary logistical arrangements for the missions;
- Reviewing and providing comments on the initial draft report;
- Participating in debriefing on findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
- Providing translation for any needed documents: TOR, PPP, final report.
- Making sure appropriate follow-up action is taken

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<sup>46</sup> The REO is also the evaluation manager.



### Annex 3. List of People Interviewed

No	Name	Governorate	Position
<b>Project Team in Yemen</b>			
1.	Hasheem Simba	Sana'a	ILO CTA
2.	Ali Dehaq	Sana'a	ILO National program coordinator
3.	Tawfik Jaber	Sana'a	ERRY project coordinator
<b>ILO Regional Office</b>			
4.	Patrick Daru	Amman	Skills and employability specialist
5.	Mustapha Said	Beirut	Workers specialist
6.	Rania Bikhazi	Beirut	Enterprises specialist
7.	Lama Oueijan	Beirut	Employers specialist
8.	Lars Johansen	Beirut	Chief RPU
9.	Frank Hagemann	Beirut	DRD
10.	Shaza Al Jundi	Beirut	Programme Officer
11.	Nathalie Bavitch	Beirut	Regional M&E Officer
<b>ERRY Joint Coordination Unit</b>			
12.	Ahmed Jamal	Sana'a	ERRY JCU program manager
13.	Abderrahim Elmoulat	Sana'a	ERRY JCU M&E
<b>UNDP</b>			
14.	Ali Al-Refaei	Sana'a	Entrepreneur Specialist - Livelihood component – UNDP
15.	Mahmoud Shediewah	Sana'a	Solar component coordinator - UNDP
<b>National Social Partners</b>			
16.	Mohamed Qafrah'	Sana'a	Chairman Of Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry
17.	Amal ALKUHALI	Sana'a	Director of SMEs' Promotion Unit in the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
18.	Ali Hamoud Taher	Sana'a	G.D of Curriculum and Accreditation Department – TEVET
19.	Saleh Hamid Naji Al-Ba'adani	Sana'a	G.M. of Occupational Health and Safety - MOSAL
20.	Ali Ahmed Bal Khader	Sana'a	Head of Yemeni Labours Federation
21.	Hassan Abdulbari	Hodeida	G.D of TEVET office
22.	Muhanad Hajjr	Hodeida	G.D of Sustainable development foundation (SDF) Office in Hodeida
23.	Ibrahim Khairat	Hodeida	TEVET office, Head of TOT Department
24.	Yaser Mohamed Abdullah	Hodeidah	Head of Quality Control Unit in TEVT Office in Hodeidah)
25.	Yehya Ali Dawood	Hodeidah	TEVT Hodeidah - Trainer in "my first business"
26.	Nasreen Al-Maqrani	Hodeidah	Trainer in "my first business"
27.	Sarah Ahmed Hassan Shaban	Hodeidah	Trainer in "my first business"



No	Name	Governorate	Position
<b>Project Team in Yemen</b>			
28.	Ghada Rashed Abdo Al-Ghani Al-Khateeb	Hodeidah Bajel district	Trainee
29.	Ilham Abdullah Salem Dubaish	Hodeidah Bajel district	Trainee
30.	Faisal Abkar QaseM	Hodeidah Bajel district	Trainee
31.	Akram Ahmed Ismaeil	Hodeidah Bajel district	Trainee
32.	Mohamed Basha Ibrahim Basha	Hodeidah - Al-Zuhrah District	Trainee
33.	Matar Khaled Matar	Hodeidah – Al-Zuhrah District	Trainee
34.	Hanan Ahmed -	Hodeidah – Al-Zuhrah District	Trainee
35.	Shamiah Daba’a	Hodeidah – Al-Zuhrah District	Trainee
36.	Abdullah Mohamed Sabrah	Hajjah	G.D of TEVET office
37.	Mohamed Yehya Al-Jarbani	Hajjah	G.D of Chamber of Commerce Office in Hajjah
38.	Nabeila Al-Moghanage	Hajjah	G.D of Sustainable development foundation (SDF) office in Hajjah
<b>Trainers in Hajjah</b>			
39.	Muneer Hilal Yehya Al-A’awar	Hajjah	Trainer Semiliterate trainers
40.	Saddam Husein Ahmed Shali	Hajjah	Trainer (MFB trainer)
41.	Ahmadiyah Muhajjab	Hajjah	Trainer (Support trainer with MFB)
42.	Afrah Badidi	Hajjah	Trainer (Support trainer with MFB)
43.	Hala Mohamed Barat	Hajjah	Trainer MFB trainer
44.	Ibrahim Radwan	Hajjah	Trainer ( Support trainer with MFB)
45.	Najat Ali Hassan Shae’e	Hajjah - Aslam	Trainee
46.	Halima Abdo Yehya Sagheer Dahmash	Hajjah - Abs	Trainee
47.	Matar Ibrahim Ahmed Jahafi	Hajjah- Abs	Trainee
48.	Abdo Ali Yousef Mudeikha	Hajjah - Abs	Trainee
49.	Mariam Abdo Mohamed Qashmeer	Hajjah - Abs	Trainee
50.	Hayel Hassan Abdo Husni	Hajjah - Aslam	Trainee
51.	Amal Ali Shue’ei Saleh A’ati	Hajjah – Abs	Trainee
52.	Mohamed Ali Jubran Al-Jarw	Hajjah-	Trainee

#### Annex 4. Documents Consulted

	<b>Document Name</b>
1.	ERRY Main Project Document
2.	ERRY Second Joint Programme Steering Committee Meeting (Programme Implementation – Year 1)
3.	ERRY Second Joint Programme Meeting (Annual Work Plan Year 2)
4.	ERRY Mid-Term Review Report (ACAS Consulting)
5.	ERRY Initial EU Action document
6.	UN Strategic Framework for Yemen (2017-2019)
7.	Report on “I Too have a Small Business” Training Package for Semi Literates by Ziad Haddara
8.	Rapid Assessment on Upgrading Informal Apprenticeship in Yemen
9.	Rapid Assessment in Informal Apprenticeship (Lahj and Abyan Governorates by Adnan Qatinah
10.	Technical Cooperation Progress Report (April-June 2017)
11.	Technical Cooperation Progress Report (March 2016-March 2017)
12.	First Quarterly Report (July-September 2016)
12.	ERRY Programme Annual Review 19-20 December 2016 (Power Point Presentation)
13.	ERRY Joint Programme Consolidated Annual Work-Plan March 2017-Feb 2018
14.	Document on potential upscaling activities
15.	Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment , ILO January 2016
16.	Guidelines on the Implementation of Upgraded Informal Apprenticeship Model, ILO Yemen, March 2017.
15.	ILO Guidelines on Evaluations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Checklist 3 Writing the Inception Report</li> <li>• Checklist 4 Validating Methodologies</li> <li>• Checklist 5 Preparing the Evaluation Report</li> <li>• ILO Policy Guidelines for Results Based Evaluations</li> </ul>

Annex 5. ERRY Overall Performance Year 1

**Table 1. ERRY Performance (according to each output) – Year 1**

**March 2016-March 2017**

Indicator	Baseline	Project Target	Target Y1	Achievement Y1	Progress Y1
Outcome 1: Communities are better able to manage local risks and shocks for increased economic self-reliance and enhanced social cohesion					
Output 1.1: Community livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience and economic self-reliance					
# of the community resilience plans developed	No community plans exist	100	160	160	100%
# of the men and women benefitting indirectly from technical and economic capacities built on agriculture value chains	0	21,000	12,9500	11,893	92%
# of men and women benefitting indirectly from technical and economic capacities built on agriculture value chains	0	28,000	14,000	16,900	121%
# of vulnerable and food insecure HH's who received cash (disaggregated by women, men and girls)	0	14,000	14,000	16,065	115%
# of months of cash distribution	0	12	6	5	83%
Total USD amount of cash channeled into the programme areas through FFA activities	0	\$5,876,640	\$2,938,320	\$1,922,930	65%

# of Community based assets restored and/or built	0	104	52	62	119%
# of men and women with improved incomes and livelihoods	0		1000	0	0% * this output will be measured starting Q1 – Year 2 a first year was devoted to delivery of skills and livelihood assets
<b>Output 1.2 Communities benefit from solar energy for sustainable livelihoods opportunities</b>					
# of solar energy resilience building programming initiatives formulated and implemented	0	7	3	3	100%
# of rural communities who improved their access to solar energy	0	100	40	40	100%
# of economically productive assets improved through introduction of solar energy application					
%solar energy market mix implemented and networks developed among solar dealers	0	01	01	01	100%
<b>Output 1.3 Informal networks promote social cohesion through community dialogue and delivery of services</b>					
# of communities where WUA's developed a mechanism to facilitate dialogues for water resource management,	0	30	To be reported starting year 2		

agriculture production system, and crop production system					
# of insider mediators recruited and trained to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution	0	200	135	228	125%
# of community based mechanisms established and facilitated by insider mediators	34	60	0	0	These activities are planned for year II of the programme's implementation
Qualitative evidence of efforts to build consensus and resolve disputes peacefully	-	-	0	0	
<b>Outcome 2.1 Institutions are responsive, accountable and effective to deliver services, build the social contract and meet community identified needs</b>					
<b>Output 2.1. Functions, Financing and capacity of local authorities enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to public priorities</b>					
# of local authorities showing improved capacity for planning, budgeting and monitoring basic services delivery	0	8	0		Capacity assessments of local authorities' ability to support economic recovery and provide basic social services have been conducted
Institutional frameworks developed to engage private sector and citizens in local recovery plans	3	12	08	0%	Activities related to this output will start during year II
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Project Target</b>	<b>Target Y1</b>	<b>Achievement YI</b>	<b>Progress Y1</b>
<b>Outcome 2.2 Increased Capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery</b>					
# of community members who indirectly benefit from	0	1400	400	220	55% Training of Trainers have been conducted

<b>business development services</b>					<b>and training material developed</b>
<b># of community members who indirectly benefit from informal upgrading apprenticeship schemes</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,400</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>  Number of community members benefitting from apprenticeship schemes was not systematically tracked during Y1. A system is being implemented to survey the community of beneficiaries
<b>Percentage of CfW beneficiaries from the previous year who re-applied for cash for work with SFD</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>Activities related to this output will start being implemented starting Year II of the programme</b>		
<b>#of business association /economic institutions with governorate coverage which had their capacity needs assessed and addressed for greater enterprise recovery</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100% complete</b>

\*Adapted by the Evaluator from the original table presented in the Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY) Annual Report: Year 1, March 2016-February 2017

## Annex 6. Key Results for ILO Component

### Key Results for ERRY Project (ILO Component)

Progress of Activities as of October 2017

<b>ERRY Output 2.2 Increased capacity of local actors and strengthened partnership of private sector to enhance economic recovery</b>				
<b>ILO Activity</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Challenges</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Next Steps</b>
2.1.1: Conduct Participatory Value Chain analysis and skills needs assessments of non - agricultural sectors with high potential for job creation	- Report of Value Chain Analysis and Rapid Market Assessment in Non-Agricultural Sector in Yemen (draft). Three sectors identified (automotive industry, mobile maintenance and solar power)	Difficulties in accessing the governorates due to security threats and arduous permits needed to get clearance from relevant government arms means the report is not finalized yet. At the time of this evaluation findings still needed to be synthesized and workshop to be conducted to validate the findings.  Sectors identified are primarily male dominated sectors with limited female participation for women. More efforts need to be made to assess what opportunities these three sectors hold for women.	When edited, published and disseminated the assessment can provide valuable key information for all ERRY relevant stakeholders that can better inform future activities  Dissemination and launch of this core study can also enhance ILO visibility	-Within the sectors identified (automotive, mobile maintenance and solar power) assessments need to be made to identify where exactly in the chain are women more likely to participate. -The Project should consider rapid assessments to capture shifting gender dynamics triggered by the war (i.e. a damage needs assessment conducted by the ILO indicates “unprecedented levels of women participation in early recovery employment in Aden”). This should be probed.
2.1.2: Strengthen the capacity of local training and BDS service providers and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>53 trainers have been trained by the ILO.</b> 27 on My First Business</li> </ul>	Effective monitoring of these trainings and in the communication flow	Of the four components, the entrepreneurial one has seen promising results, both in	An effective monitoring mechanism needs to be established between UNDP

<p>employers to implement on the job training and entrepreneurship/enterprise development cooperation</p>	<p>(MFB) and 26 trained in “I too have a small business” targeting semi literates</p> <p><b>UNDP estimates:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>795 final beneficiaries</b> received training in MFB, of which 34% are women (277 women) in Hajjah and Hodeidah.</li> <li>• <b>426 final beneficiaries</b> received training in “I too have a small business” of which 32.6% are women (139 women) in Hajjah and Hodeidah</li> <li>• <b>Out of 2400 youth participated in CFW, about 1300,</b> including literates and illiterates received ILO training and curriculums.</li> <li>• <b>749 youth</b> established their own businesses, out of which 167 are women</li> </ul>	<p>between the implementing partners (SDF), UNDP and ILO is needed to ensure the trainings are being conducted through the proper channels.</p> <p>Capacity building of the ILO project team needed on how to effectively monitor their activities.</p>	<p>terms of impact on the ultimate beneficiaries (Yemeni women and men, especially youth), but also in terms of synergies established between UNDP and the ILO which has led to bigger impact.</p> <p>Entrepreneurial training at a time where government salaries have been cut is hugely relevant and features prominently in ERRY II. Within this the ILO has comparative advantage because of well tested tools that are well received in Yemen. .</p> <p>The adaptation of material for semiliterate people “I too have a small business” is particularly well received as it targets the poorest segment of society. This is a good practice</p>	<p>and the project management team in Sana’a. Better reporting and effective communication needed between the ILO (Sana’a) and the regional office</p> <p>ILO focal points in the governorates where the project is operative could enhance the monitoring of these trainings</p>
<p>2.1.3 Design and implement private sector led apprenticeship schemes and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>2 rapid assessments</b> of Apprenticeship</li> </ul>	<p>The intervention has faced some delays and is still in preparatory phase.</p>	<p>Clear anticipation from both UN agencies and national stakeholders that hail this</p>	<p>Use this intervention as an opportunity to invest in social partners and enhance</p>



<p>business development services including coaching and financial literacy assistance for targeted youth (including upgrading of informal apprenticeship in informal economy).</p>	<p>providers (on in the North and one in the South)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Five identified sectors</b> a) automotive sector; b) panel beating and painting c) dress making and embroidery; d) Welding and iron works e) solar energy services</li> <li>• <b>5 competency based</b> curriculums developed in the five identified sectors in coordination with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training</li> <li>• Selection of the <b>implementing partner</b>, Youth Leadership Development Foundation (YLDF)</li> </ul>	<p>Sectors identified primarily target men and those that target women (sewing and dressmaking) are oversaturated sectors and with little return.</p> <p>This intervention is a new modality and yet to be piloted in Yemen. It also works with different layers of implementation and holds huge potential in the context of the ERRY programme as it directly targets ultimate beneficiaries. Enhanced technical support from the relevant backstopping units in the implementation and monitoring of this initiative would ensure this intervention reaches its full potential.</p>	<p>activity as particularly relevant since it works in Yemen’s largest economy (the informal) and with the prime target of ERRY (vulnerable youth)</p> <p><i>“Informal apprenticeship upgrading can be of the most successful interventions if appropriately implemented and connected to the local needs”</i>. General Director of MOT EVT (Hodeida Branch)</p>	<p>dialogue (as per MTR recommendations)</p> <p>Capitalize on discussions already underway with UNDP and inroads made in engaging more women in the solar energy sector. ILO can have clear comparative advantage in providing skills for young women in this sector.</p>
<p><b>2.1.4. Develop, test and institutionalize post Cash for Work Services Pilot</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No budget allocated under this component.</li> </ul>			