International Migration and European Population Trends

by

Julius ISAAC, Ph. D.

The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (London)

In recent years the International Labour Organisation has been seeking a way to overcome the obstacles to emigration from the overpopulated countries of Europe. All such action must, of course, be planned in the light of demographic trends and the current and future need for emigration. In the following article a specialist in population questions discusses the various factors that have encouraged and discouraged emigration in the past, the problem of assessing future trends and the need for international action.

AT the International Migration Conference in Naples last autumn the International Labour Office presented to the representatives of 30 nations interested in European migration (either as sending or as receiving countries) a plan for the organised transfer over a period of five years of 1,700,000 people from overpopulated countries in Europe to other countries, mostly overseas. This plan was not, however, accepted by the Conference.[1] At the suggestion of the United States the Belgian Government convened a conference of 23 governments, which was held last November in Brussels and which set up a provisional intergovernmental committee for the movement of migrants from Europe (P.I.C.M.M.E.). The purpose of this committee is to make "arrangements for the transport of migrants for whom existing facilities are inadequate

[1] For an account of the Naples Conference see *International Labour Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 2, February 1952, pp. 163-83: "The I.L.O. and Migration Problems".

and who could not otherwise be moved from certain European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration, consistent with the policies of the countries concerned". It represents a preliminary experiment for one year to gauge what achievement is possible in this field. A plan of action provides for the movement of 137,500 European migrants overseas before the end of 1952 at a cost of $41 million. Operations began as from 1 February and by the middle of the year 49,317 Europeans had emigrated under the sponsorship of P.I.C.M.M.E. The extent to which it will be possible in the future to promote emigration from Europe through international action will largely depend on the success of this scheme and on the availability of funds in subsequent years.

It is the object of the present article to consider the scope of and need for organised and spontaneous emigration from Europe in the near future, with special reference to Europe's demographic situation. An assessment of future prospects must draw on past experience. It is not possible to get an idea of future population growth without a knowledge of the factors which have determined past trends and, similarly, the impact of population trends on international migration in the past provides important clues to what it seems reasonable to expect in the future.

The Lesson of Past Trends

Migration Before 1914

During the hundred years between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of the first world war about 50 million emigrants left Europe, mainly for the new continents of America and Australasia. This unprecedented mass emigration was due to the operation of a great variety of forces. Though its volume was subject to wide fluctuations over the period, which were closely correlated with changing economic opportunities, there was a steep upward trend that reached its climax in the decade before 1914, when about 15 million people left Europe. At first the emigrants came mainly from western Europe (the British Isles, Scandinavia and Germany), but after the eighteen-eighties southern and eastern Europe participated in the movement to an ever-growing extent.

A full appraisal of the underlying forces is clearly outside the scope of the present article. Even a discussion of the demographic implications requires some oversimplification. Unless we discuss the population trends in different parts of Europe in more

detail than is possible in this article we must necessarily do less than justice to the important fact that the " demographic revolution " (leading in its first stages to rapid population growth) came first in western Europe—its spread over the rest of the continent took generations and is even now not completed. Moreover, the impact of rapid population growth was different in different countries ; the extent to which it could be absorbed internally depended largely on institutional changes, reserves of natural resources, and the rate of economic progress.

With these provisos in mind, it can be said that mass emigration from Europe to the undeveloped and sparsely populated continents of America and Australasia provided in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a welcome, though not very reliable, safety valve for the population pressure which most European countries experienced during that period. Growing control over mortality unaccompanied by a corresponding control over fertility resulted in high rates of natural increase (excess of births over deaths). In spite of dramatic economic progress set in motion by the Industrial Revolution and great advances in methods of agricultural production, the standards of the masses might well have remained at subsistence level, as Malthus had predicted. Large-scale emigration proved to be extremely beneficial. It was essential for the development of the sparsely populated new continents. Expansion of their agricultural production, made possible through the new settlers, provided cheap food and raw materials for the industrialised countries in Europe, which in turn sold manufactured goods to the new countries.

This division of labour on an international basis, much more than the immediate relief from population pressure through the mass exodus, made it possible for large parts of Europe to overcome the Malthusian checks. As a result of technological progress, they were able to attain rising standards of living and growing wealth although population continued to grow fast. Agricultural countries, such as Italy and Greece, benefited in a different way : remittances from earlier emigrants formed an important item of the national income. Longer expectations of life combined with high birth rates produced population gains in all age groups which, except in the case of Ireland, were only to a small extent offset by losses through emigration. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, urbanisation and higher standards of living created a climate favourable to the control of fertility and thus established the pre-conditions for the next stage of the demographic revolution—a slowing down of population growth due to progress in control over fertility greater than that in the control over mortality.

Migration Between the World Wars

During the twenty years of the inter-war period (1919-1938) the annual flow of emigration from Europe was a fraction of what it had been in the twenty years before the first world war. The average rate, which was about 1½ million a year in 1905-1914, fell to less than 600,000 in 1921-1930 and to about 140,000 in 1931-1938. The Great Depression of the early nineteen-thirties brought, for the first time in modern history, a reversal of the direction of migration : Europe gained population through immigration from overseas countries, largely as the result of the return of earlier emigrants.[1]

The principal reasons for the progressive fall of migration from Europe are well known. In the main receiving country, the United States, Acts of 1921 and 1924 introduced drastic restrictions, with strong discrimination against immigration from southern and eastern Europe. Similar measures were adopted by other " new " countries. They had reached a stage in their development where the benefits to be derived from mass immigration had become problematic, particularly for the lower-income groups. Moreover, these countries had become less attractive to those categories of immigrants which were not subject to restrictions.

The British Dominions continued to welcome immigrants from the United Kingdom. Schemes under the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 assisted some 400,000 British nationals to emigrate to Australia, Canada and New Zealand between 1922 and 1931. Movements on a larger scale had been envisaged. The advent of the Great Depression put a natural end to these schemes ; but even before 1929 the results of assisted emigration had been disappointing for various reasons and were a further indication that the pre-conditions of mass emigration from Europe no longer existed.

To some extent migration within Europe offered an outlet for surplus population in countries with low standards of living. France, for instance, admitted large numbers from Italy, Poland and Spain, a substantial proportion of whom had to return to their home countries after 1929.

[1] The return movement had been substantial in previous decades also. It was partly composed of successful emigrants who preferred to return to their home countries for retirement, partly of those who regarded their emigration as a failure. W. F. Willcox has estimated for the United States that from 1891 to 1914 the return movement amounted to 35-39 per cent. of the immigration ; it was about 15 per cent. in the period 1923-1930 and over 100 per cent. during the Great Depression. But in recent years net immigration from Europe has amounted to over 90 per cent. of gross immigration from Europe.

Economic recovery during the two or three years preceding the second world war gave some scope for a resumption of international migration ; moreover, in the parts of Europe which were under Nazi domination, persecution on religious, ethnic and political grounds accounts after 1933 for the emigration of large numbers of refugees who had little to lose and were not deterred by unfavourable economic conditions in the receiving countries.

Demographic Changes Before 1939

It thus appears at first sight that the drastic contraction of international migration during the inter-war period was entirely determined by political and economic forces, and that demographic changes in the sending and receiving countries did not enter into the chain of causation. It is certainly true that the process of population change is normally a gradual one, whose economic, political and social consequences are only perceptible over many years, while the volume of migration has been subject to abrupt and violent fluctuations. It seems, however, that sudden changes caused by various other forces only concealed the impact of population trends on secular migration trends.

In a strictly demographic sense, Europe as a whole ceased in the course of the inter-war period to produce the population surpluses which in previous generations had provided a seemingly inexhaustible pool for the peopling of the new continents.

The first world war affected European population trends in three respects particularly. Military casualties amounted to about 6½ million persons, mainly male adults in the age-groups from which most emigrants are recruited ; the war directly or indirectly caused the death of about another 5 million persons in the civilian population ; and there was a heavy drop in the birth rate, mainly due to the separation of husbands and wives as a result of mobilisation. The deficit through the loss of births has been estimated at 12.6 million.[1] Higher birth rates immediately after the war partly compensated for this deficit, but the distorted age composition naturally remained and reduced the number of potential emigrants throughout the inter-war period. The disruption of migration during the war years had the opposite effect and arrears from that period account for an appreciable percentage of the emigration in 1919 and 1920.

Of far greater importance than the temporary impact of the war on population trends is the progressive spread of family

[1] The estimates refer to Europe excluding Soviet Russia ; they are based on F. W. NOTESTEIN and others : *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva, League of Nations, 1944).

limitation between the two wars. Europe as a whole had reached a new stage in the demographic cycle : the result of greater progress in the control of fertility than in the control of mortality was a contraction in the average size of the family and a declining rate of population growth. In north-western and central Europe declining mortality and declining fertility produced ageing populations ; declining mortality tended to increase the number of old and elderly people, and declining fertility tended to decrease the number of children and young adults. The number of children born year by year was not sufficient to replace the generations to which their parents belonged. It was easy to show, by projecting this trend into the future, that in the nineteen-fifties large parts of Europe would have to face the prospect of a moderate decline in total numbers and a sharp decline in the younger age-groups.

Obviously, large-scale emigration, normally composed mainly of young adults and children, would have hastened this process. From the merely demographic point of view there was certainly no surplus population available in most countries of north-western and central Europe.

The countries of eastern and southern Europe were in 1939 still in the expanding phase of their demographic development. Fertility, although declining, was well above replacement level ; population growth, even if at a declining rate, was likely to be maintained for at least the next thirty years and the ageing would be less marked than in western and central Europe.

Population pressure on developed resources through population growth had been a characteristic feature in these regions for many years. Discriminatory restrictions on immigration and to some extent restrictions on emigration contributed to increase this pressure during the inter-war period, and it was difficult to see how further population increases could be absorbed by their economies without a fall in standards of living. However, it was unlikely that these surplus populations would have found an outlet in overseas migration.

This line of argument has been supported by two other considerations. The prosperity of the new countries—except that of the United States—has been held to depend largely on their trade with Europe. A consequence of the decline of population growth was that the European market failed to absorb their expanding production for export of food and raw materials ; for that reason the terms of trade had moved against them.[1]

[1] After 1946 the position was reversed. The terms of trade became favourable to the new countries, partly because of the growing urbanisation and industrialisation of their expanding populations. Other reasons are the slowness with which agricultural production in Europe recovered and the demand from countries outside Europe.

The second point is that progress in the peopling of the new continents, particularly in the United States, had created conditions which were less conducive to the absorption of mass immigration. "The remaining 'open spaces' were not suitable for intensive European settlement without extremely high capitalisation and in any event their products were a glut on the international market." [1] In the industrial sector the fast growing labour force became better organised and more effective in its opposition to the competition of immigrant aliens. "The immigrant is no longer regarded as a welcome partner in the growth and the development of a new land. Instead, countries of immigration are increasingly concerned with the problems of assimilation." [1] The immigrants need an atmosphere of tolerance in the receiving country in order to become settled; its absence is a powerful deterrent to emigration.

Thus greater population density in the new countries, and the economic and social development which is associated with it, account to a large extent for the restrictive policies of the receiving countries during the inter-war period, while demographic trends in Europe tended to reduce the surplus population available for emigration.

After the Second World War

A number of forces in operation during the war produced a setting which was on balance favourable to the resumption of large-scale international migration after the war. It has been estimated that during the first five post-war years nearly 3 million persons emigrated from Europe to countries overseas. This figure may be compared with an estimate by the International Labour Office of 3½ million for the five years 1920-1924 (that is to say, largely before the operation of the United States Quota Act of 1924) and with the figure of about 700,000 for the five years preceding the second world war.

What are the new factors that have determined the volume of migration during the post-war years? If we can foresee their future behaviour, we may be able to form an idea of the migration trends which may be expected in the near future, with the obvious proviso that the conclusions arrived at are bound to be invalid in the event of another war or of the emergence of other unpredictable forces.

[1] Dudley KIRK in *Post-war Problems of Migration* (London, Millbank Memorial Fund, 1947), pp. 58-9.

Factors Favourable to Migration

After the war conditions in both the sending and the receiving countries had in many respects become more conducive to large-scale emigration from Europe. To set against these stimulating forces there were various obstacles arising from the aftermath of the war which prevented a large number of would-be emigrants from carrying out their plans.

Factors in the Sending Countries

Let us begin by considering the main factors which stimulated the tendency to migrate in the sending countries.

Firstly, the disruption of migratory movements during seven years of war had created a backlog consisting largely of families of pre-war emigrants who had left their families behind and of intending emigrants who had been prevented by the war from carrying out their plans. About 125,000 war brides of members of the non-European allied forces serving in Europe, who with their children joined their husbands after the war, can also be regarded as belonging to the category of backlog migration.

In the second place, the end of the war meant for great numbers of people in Europe a change of occupation and/or residence. Demobilisation, reconversion from a war to a peacetime economy and reconstruction of areas damaged through warfare had uprooted many millions. The failure of the western democracies and the Soviet bloc to reach agreement and the prospect of an early third world war in Europe were further incentives to emigration.

Thirdly, after the collapse of Nazi Germany millions of prisoners of war and slave labourers were liberated. The great majority (between 7 and 8 million) were repatriated. The repatriation was carried out by the allied military authorities in co-operation with U.N.R.R.A. and later by the International Refugee Organisation. But for those non-German displaced persons who were unwilling or unable to return to their own countries I.R.O. had to find new homes. When this organisation was wound up in 1951, over a million displaced persons had been resettled under its auspices, largely in extra-European countries. The number of displaced persons still available and suitable for emigration is relatively small.

Fourthly, during the early post-war years over 7 million " expellees " of German nationality or ethnic origin were transferred to western Germany from former German territory occupied by Poland, from Czechoslovakia and other eastern European

countries. In addition western Germany received about a million German refugees from Russian-occupied eastern Germany. Moreover, after Germany's defeat millions of the old residents in western Germany found themselves homeless and without work. There was an additional source of population increase until 1951 in the hundreds of thousands of returning prisoners of war, mainly from Russia. Western Germany is now overpopulated in many respects, and in particular uprooted refugees have become a potential source of large-scale emigration which has only partly been tapped in recent years.

A fifth new factor is related to the extermination of the Jews in Nazi-dominated Europe. Since the eighteen-eighties the Jewish centres in eastern Europe had been, at least over long periods, an important source of emigration. Six million Jews were murdered during the war. To those who survived, the State of Israel offered a new home. It has been estimated that between 1946 and 1950 some 530,000 European Jews—among them 200,000 displaced persons—emigrated to countries outside Europe ; 350,000 went to Palestine (280,000 of them after the establishment of the new State) ; Canada and the United States received about 40,000 ; another 40,000 went to Latin America and Australia. Probably about 2 million are still left in central and eastern Europe, particularly in Soviet Russia, but very few of them are allowed or willing to emigrate. Thus by 1951 the central European Jews had ceased to play a major part in international migratory movements.

Population pressure in Italy may be mentioned as a sixth factor, although this is not a new post-war phenomenon. Under Fascist rule emigration from Italy to countries outside the Italian Empire was severely restricted, and post-war conditions have undoubtedly added to her surplus population available for permanent emigration. In the years 1948-1950 570,000 emigrants left Italy, mainly for countries in Latin America.

Finally, after the war the Netherlands pursued an active emigration policy. It is true the numbers involved are too small to affect migration trends in general, but Dutch applicants are given preferential treatment in various receiving countries.

Factors in the Receiving Countries

The response of the traditional countries of immigration to these " push " forces was on the whole favourable. Australia, Canada and New Zealand reversed the restrictive policy which they had adopted during the inter-war period and made considerable efforts to attract emigrants from Great Britain. In addition to over 400,000 emigrants from Britain they admitted

between them 300,000 displaced persons and, more recently, thousands of ethnic Germans. Australia's intake was higher than ever before, but it remained far behind the target for 1950 of 200,000 immigrants a year, which was reduced in 1951 to 150,000 a year and in 1952 to 80,000 a year. In the United States the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (amended in June 1950) authorises the admission of 416,000 immigrants belonging to various categories of displaced persons and refugees. By 30 June 1951 263,000 immigrants had been admitted under this Act, in addition to 96,000 alien wives and fiancées of members of the armed forces admitted under the War Brides Act of 1945 or the Act of June 1946, and in addition to normal immigration under the Quota Act. The Latin American countries also showed a much greater willingness to admit suitable immigrants than during the inter-war period. The part which Israel played in absorbing the majority of the Jewish emigrants has already been mentioned.

The post-war years also brought a revival of migration within Europe. Over 157,000 displaced persons found a new home in western Europe (including 86,000 in Great Britain and 38,000 in France). These two countries also admitted for permanent or temporary settlement workers from Italy and other countries with surplus populations, mainly with a view to relieving manpower shortages.

Obstacles to Mass Migration

While the position after the war in both sending and receiving countries had become favourable to large-scale emigration, only a fraction of the potential emigrants actually emigrated. Moreover, certain new developments tended to reduce the flow of migration.

In the first years after the war the main receiving countries were preoccupied with the problems of transition from a war to a peace economy. Later the main stumbling block proved to be the shortage of housing and other capital equipment necessary for the absorption of large numbers of immigrants.

The shipping shortage presented a very effective obstacle to mass emigration. In the early post-war period delays of several years for cheaper passages were not abnormal for non-priority emigrants. Some people were successful in securing air transport, but the available capacity was limited and even this limited capacity could not be fully used for the transport of emigrants because of the high costs.

While experience shows that in periods of general unemployment the proportion of unemployed among the emigrants is relatively small, full employment after the war in most European countries tended to reduce the propensity to emigrate. Full

employment gave a sense of material security and hope of promotion and betterment. New progress towards a welfare state, extended health services, more generous unemployment and old-age benefits, family allowances and other measures aiming at a more equal distribution of the national income had similar effects. The contribution of Marshall Aid to economic recovery and the reduction of population pressure during the post-war years must be mentioned in this connection.

On the other hand, the extension of the Soviet sphere of influence was another factor which substantially reduced the number of potential emigrants from Europe. The former Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Poland (including the former provinces of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line), Rumania and Hungary, which had in the past been countries of large-scale emigration, have virtually debarred their nationals from emigrating to countries outside the Soviet bloc.

Organised Migration

We have seen that after the war the main receiving countries were, at least in theory, prepared to admit large numbers of immigrants and the impact of the war on Europe had produced a strong propensity to emigrate. Broadly speaking, both sending and receiving countries stood to benefit from a revival of international migration. The " pull " and " push " forces, however, were more complex than they had been during the period of *laisser-faire* migration which ended in 1914, and the physical obstacles mentioned above were so effective that without international action and without the active promotion and organisation of migration by the countries concerned only a fraction of the actual migrants could have carried out their plans.

About a third of the emigrants in 1947-1950 were displaced persons under the care of the International Refugee Organisation. A large proportion of the million displaced persons had to be rehabilitated physically and mentally ; they were given vocational training and instruction in language and citizenship in order to bring them up to the standards set by receiving countries for desirable immigrants. For their transport I.R.O. chartered a large fleet of liners (and aeroplanes for special cases). Costs of transport alone, including incidental costs for medical services, transit camps, etc., up to arrival in the country of destination, amounted on the average to $275 per head. It is easy to see that without these efforts a large proportion would have remained stranded and destitute in Europe and would have represented a serious handicap to Europe's recovery.

The many-sided activities of the International Labour Office in facilitating migration cannot be adequately appraised in the present article. They range from the promotion of bilateral treaties between sending and receiving countries to the provision of day-to-day technical advice and assistance through field missions. Undoubtedly they were a great help in removing obstacles to migration and in establishing minimum standards for the living and working conditions of immigrants.

The Future Outlook

Which of the many counteracting factors that have determined the volume of migration during the post-war years have already spent their force and which are likely to gain momentum in the near future ?

Removal of Physical Obstacles

Considerable progress has been made in overcoming the physical obstacles to large-scale migration. Ships requisitioned as troop transports have been released and reconverted for civilian use ; new ships have been built. Shortage of transport can still be regarded as a bottleneck, but waiting lists with government agencies (in the case of assisted emigrants) and with shipping companies (in the case of emigrants who pay their fares) have become much shorter and are likely to be further reduced in the near future. The fact that it has been possible to preserve the I.R.O. fleet for organised migration will greatly contribute to the solution of the transport problem. Long waiting periods are not only a waste of energy and money, but have also proved to be a considerable deterrent to migration.

In the receiving countries wartime arrears in building have largely been overcome and more can be done for the housing of immigrants. On the other hand large numbers of immigrants have been accommodated in provisional camps and failure to meet their demand for permanent family housing has been a source of disappointment. In the case of Australia the persistent housing shortage is one of the main reasons for the drastic revisions of the immigration target from 200,000 for 1950 to 80,000 for 1953. Thus considerable arrears remain to be dealt with.

Changes in the Source of Migration

Obviously, seven years after the end of hostilities, causes of migration which were the aftermath of the war, such as the re-union of separated families, the return of evacuees and the exodus of

war brides, must have disappeared. These categories, together with the million displaced persons who have been resettled, may account for roughly 50 per cent. of the total emigration in 1946-1950. Israel's intake of European emigrants other than displaced persons accounts for another 7 per cent. of the grand total. This movement also is likely to be drastically reduced in the near future.

Will these categories be replaced from alternative sources or are we to expect a corresponding contraction of international migration ? The foregoing analysis suggests Italy and Germany as potential sources for additional emigration. Post-war emigration of German nationals from Germany was negligible until 1950. Being enemy aliens, they were not welcome as permanent settlers in most allied countries.[1] Moreover, the member countries of I.R.O. had agreed to give priority to the resettlement of displaced persons. Both these factors have now been largely removed and since 1950 the proportion of German nationals (mainly expellees) in organised and spontaneous emigration has steadily increased. The revival of overseas emigration from Italy started in 1947. In 1948 and 1949 she was third in importance as a source of emigration, following closely after I.R.O. and Great Britain. There is general agreement that millions of Italians and Germans are available for emigration if given the opportunity. Britain's future as a source of supply is more doubtful, as will be shown presently. To what extent those who are " available for emigration " can be regarded as surplus population will be discussed in a later section of this article.

Another factor to counteract the drying up of sources of supply once the migration immediately resulting from the war was over might be an increase in the general tendency to emigrate. Political unrest and a deterioration in economic conditions in Europe would be likely to provide a stimulus, but a discussion of such prospects and the likelihood of war is clearly outside the scope of the present article. A factor within our province is the " snowball " effect of emigration. There has always been a tendency for successful immigrants to induce friends and relatives to follow their example. Their favourable reports, in conjunction with active assistance in paying for the passage, in offering accommodation and jobs, and in ensuring admission by acting as nominators or guarantors, account for a large proportion of overseas emigration in the past and are likely to do so in the future.

[1] A selected number of former prisoners of war, however, were allowed to stay. Other categories of workers were admitted on a temporary basis by France and Great Britain.

To be set against this is the fact that during the first post-war years many potential emigrants have got homes and have given up their plans. On balance, however, it appears that, as a result of the fundamental changes which the supply side has undergone during the post-war years, the total numbers available for emigration are still so large that international migration on a larger scale than before 1952 could be expected in the near future, assuming a corresponding readiness in the receiving countries to admit immigrants and to assist them financially.

Future Demand for Immigrants

An examination of the demand side, however, leads to the conclusion that this assumption is unwarranted. It seems that in the absence of international action the volume of migration is likely to contract, even though there are some forces pointing in the opposite direction.

The latter were emphasised by the International Labour Office in a paper prepared for the Naples Conference : " Clearly, immigration is closely linked with the whole process of economic development and acceleration of the rate of such development may also be expected to broaden openings for migrants in overseas countries ". The assumption of continued economic development in overseas countries seems to be realistic, although allowance has to be made for recessions, the effect of which on the willingness to admit immigrants may last for long after recovery. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether and how long an accelerated rate of economic progress can be maintained. In sparsely populated underdeveloped countries this would depend largely on long-term capital investment through the import of capital goods.

These doubts about a future expansion of international migration are brought into relief if we look at the prospects in the main receiving countries.

There is no indication that the United States intends to relax restrictions to any substantial extent. Present immigration under the provisions of the amended Displaced Persons Act greatly exceeds the authorised quota ; but this has been partly achieved at the expense of later immigration, the quota for future years being reduced to 50 per cent. by " mortgaging " in the interest of speedy resettlement of displaced persons.[1]

[1] The annual quota for the main countries with surplus populations (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta and the Netherlands) is 36,600. Between 1911 and 1920, 184,000 Greek immigrants were admitted ; the present quota is 307 a year. In the cases of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 50 per cent. of the quotas have been mortgaged for 90-175 years ahead. Large numbers of unskilled labourers immigrate from Mexico, Puerto Rico and the West Indies.

In 1948-1950 Australia admitted over 400,000 immigrants. If this intake is to be maintained, standards of selection may have to be revised or additional incentives provided. The drastic cuts in the targets for 1952 and 1953 are officially regarded as temporary measures, but after the resettlement of displaced persons has been virtually completed, instead of switching over to other, non-assisted sources of migration, a lower rate of immigration may be preferred in view of the rising costs of living and the difficulties in providing the necessary investment. This would also make it easier to cope with the problem of integrating the newcomers into the social and cultural life of the country.

Immigration into the Latin American countries has been relatively small, except in the case of Argentina.[1] Most of them could absorb large-scale immigration if the capital and expert knowledge needed for their development were forthcoming, but this seems to be doubtful. Moreover, they are all countries of rapid natural increase and their demand for immigrants is not as urgent as in the case of Australia.

The recruitment of foreign workers after the war by western European countries is closely associated with the temporary requirements of reconstruction. Shortages of manpower, mainly due to rearmament, full employment and inflation, still prevail. In spite of objections from organised labour there is some limited scope for the admission of temporary immigrants and for immigrants with special qualifications, but the admission of large numbers of foreign workers for permanent settlement might accentuate rather than mitigate existing economic problems—even in France. An appreciable number of these foreign workers have re-emigrated from western Europe to the United States, the British Dominions and Argentina, or intend to do so.[2]

Post-war Population Trends in Europe

In the foregoing discussion of the favourable and unfavourable factors which determined the volume of actual migration during the last five years no direct mention was made of the impact on migration of population trends in Europe. This impact, as pointed out before, is largely an indirect one. Broadly speaking, people desire to emigrate when they are dissatisfied with con-

[1] The majority of the Italian immigrants have been absorbed as farm labourers in rural districts. The demand there continues because of the drift into the towns. Present regulations restrict immigration to people who " without possibility of doubt " will settle on farms or to specialists.

[2] A clause in the United States amended Displaced Persons Act provides for the admission of former members of the Polish armed forces settled in Britain.

ditions in their homeland and/or when they think that opportunities offered abroad are more attractive. Immigrants are admitted if they are regarded as an asset by the receiving country. Rapid population growth in areas already densely populated tends to generate population pressure and hence to strengthen the tendency to emigrate; conversely, cessation of population growth tends to ease population pressure and hence to reduce the tendency to emigrate. But many factors other than population density and population growth may account for the phenomena which have been described as " population pressure " or " surplus population ". (Under the economic conditions prevailing in the early nineteen-thirties Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have been classified as countries with large " surplus populations " !) The analysis of past movements clearly indicates that the countries with the greatest population pressure have by no means always the largest rate of emigration. Moreover, the outward movement from such countries is usually largely composed of elements which the over populated country can least afford to lose. In selecting their immigrants the receiving countries are little interested in whether the applicant has been surplus or not in his country of origin; their main criterion is whether he is likely to become a desirable citizen in the new country. Thus, if it is one of the objects of welfare policy on an international level to attain a more equal population distribution through migration from surplus areas to underpopulated areas (that is, areas likely to benefit from population increase through immigration) international intervention is necessary.

Population trends have to be taken into account if we try to project the migration experience of the past five years into the future, or if we want to compare the expected volume and structure with that migration which on realistic assumptions might be desirable from the point of view of international welfare.

It seems that the views on future population trends which have been described in a previous section will have to be revised in various respects in the light of wartime and post-war experience. Population transfers, vital losses due to the war, and changes in fertility and mortality, have significantly altered the demographic situation in large parts of Europe. Moreover, in areas impoverished by the war, densities and rates of growth which could be regarded as normal before the war may now be excessive. Among the countries on the western side of the " iron curtain " it is mainly the Federal Republic of Germany which suffered heavy vital losses during the war. Numerically these were more than compensated by the inflow of expellees and refugees from the east and south-east and by a modicum of natural increase. Between

May 1939 and September 1950 western Germany's population rose by 21 per cent.—from 39.4 million to 47.6 million.[1] Further growth through natural increase is likely to be small. Recent projections suggest, in the absence of net migration, increases of 3, 4 and 3 per cent. during each of the decades after 1949.[2]

For various reasons, birth rates soared in all the low-fertility countries, particularly between 1942 and 1948, seeming to belie earlier apprehensions of fertility falling below replacement level and of a population decline. It is still too early to say with confidence whether the higher birth rates indicate a reversal of secular fertility trends. Even such a reversal cannot mean more than a return to birth rates at or slightly above replacement level. Family planning might favour the three-child family instead of the one- or two-child family, but the practice of family limitation cannot be arrested in Europe and is likely to spread further. Evidence for Britain points rather to a purely temporary recovery of fertility. In that case the gains during the past decade would merely delay and mitigate the process of ageing and eventual decline. Even so they are likely to have considerable bearing on the volume of migration in the near future.

The question in the case of Britain is whether her demographic position is compatible with continued performance of her traditional function as a source of emigration for the sparsely populated Dominions. This problem was studied, but not conclusively answered, by the Royal Commission on Population which reported in 1950. They accepted the widely held view that for a new country a rate of growth of 2 per cent. a year is practicable and desirable, and that therefore the difference between 2 per cent. and the rate of natural increase represents the desirable volume of net immigration. This would require the following annual inflow of immigrants:

Canada	110,000
Australia	85,000
New Zealand	18,000
South Africa	13,000
Total for the four Dominions	226,000 [3]

[1] For the whole of Germany the increase between May 1939 and October 1946 amounted to 8½ per cent.; for western Germany alone to 11 per cent. (Displaced persons of foreign nationality are not included in these figures.)

[2] *Report of the E.C.A. Technical Assistance Commission on the Integration of the Refugees in the German Republic* (March 1951).

[3] The actual intake amounted to 296,000 immigrants in 1949 and to 285,000 in 1950. Australia exceeded the calculated figure by 100 per cent. but still remained behind her target of 200,000 (later reduced). There was little emigration except from South Africa.

The Royal Commission suggests that it would be feasible for Britain to supply up to a third of these needs if fertility "is maintained at replacement level or a little over—which is the most that seems probable ". On these assumptions the four Dominions would have to recruit outside the United Kingdom about 150,000 immigrants every year. The bearing of this academic calculation on future actual movements is this : if it is accepted that an outward movement exceeding 75,000 a year is undesirable and if (as has been the case since 1946) the actual outflow is considerably higher, Britain can either replace her emigrants by the admission of immigrants or she can reduce the volume of emigration by discontinuing assistance to the Dominions in recruiting immigrants in Britain. The former policy has been pursued by the British Government, although mainly for non-demographic reasons. The available evidence suggests that net losses through emigration did not exceed 30,000 persons a year on the average.[1]

The problem of assessing Britain's migration requirements in the light of her population trends is perhaps more difficult and complex than for any other country. Is it justifiable to consider them in isolation, disregarding the benefits which a more equal population distribution between motherland and Dominions is likely to yield for the Commonwealth as a whole ? The second question which was posed by the Royal Commission on Population, but which cannot be conclusively answered, is whether in the long run a slight and gradual decrease in total numbers might be desirable for Britain, even at the cost of a somewhat less favourable age composition. Standards of living in Britain, it was argued, depend to a large extent on the terms on which she can trade her manufactured goods for essential imports of food and raw materials. If the terms of trade continue to turn against Britain, population losses might make it easier to maintain the standard of living. This would be a strong reason for a greater contribution by Britain to the peopling of the Dominions, while the encouragement of immigration would be undesirable on population grounds.

Europe's Surplus Population

Attempts were recently made by the International Labour Office and by the International Refugee Organisation to assess the present size of Europe's surplus population, and these estimates were submitted as an indication of the desirable outward move-

[1] Cf. J. Isaac : *British Post-War Migration—A Socio-Economic Analysis* (Cambridge University Press) *(in the press)*.

ment and of the extent to which international action is needed in order to bring about the desired emigration. The International Refugee Organisation considered that " including the new refugees constantly arriving, the best estimate of Europe's 'surplus' population in mid-1951 is approximately five million (Italy: 3,000,000; Germany: 1,500,000; Austria, Greece, the Netherlands, Malta: 500,000. Total: 5,000,000) ".[1] The I.L.O., after discussing surplus populations in various European countries, reached the following conclusion : " According to the best information available to the I.L.O. it may be conservatively estimated that 5,000,000 persons are available for emigration from Europe during the next five years. . . If the same number of persons move as in the past five years on their own initiative and with national assistance, there would still remain 3,000,000 persons to be moved through international action, in order to reduce European manpower to a level corresponding to existing and prospective opportunities for integration into the economies of these countries ".[2]

It may be coincidence that the result of both estimates is the same: 5,000,000 persons. According to I.R.O. they represent Europe's " surplus " population, and according to the I.L.O. they are persons " available for emigration during the next five years ". Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted definition associated with either of these concepts, nor are such definitions attached to the I.L.O. and I.R.O. estimates. It appears, however, that the I.L.O. estimate is largely based on information given by the governments of the main countries of emigration in their replies to a questionnaire issued by the I.L.O. But different criteria were used by different countries (such as general unemployment in Italy ; high rates of natural increase in the Netherlands and Malta ; civil war refugees, urban unemployment and rural underemployment in Greece ; unsettled refugees and expellees in Germany and Austria). The aggregate derived from this information amounts to a " surplus population " of 5,585,000 persons, and according to the I.L.O. 150,000 displaced persons who have not yet been resettled have to be added to this figure.

It is, however, obvious that on the one hand the whole of the surplus population is by no means " available for emigration " —there are, for instance, those who do not want to emigrate—

[1] INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANISATION : *Migration from Europe* (Geneva Doc. GC/199/Rev. 1, September 1951).

[2] INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, Doc. C.Mig./I/5/1951 ; the arguments of this document prepared for the Naples Conference are included in a condensed form in " The I.L.O. and Migration Problems " *(International Labour Review, loc. cit.)*.

and on the other hand a substantial percentage of all would-be emigrants cannot be regarded as surplus in their home countries. These considerations have presumably been taken into account in the estimate mentioned above of " 5,000,000 Europeans available for emigration during the next five years ". The evidence which has been submitted in its support is not convincing ; in particular, as has been suggested earlier, the incidence of unemployment is a very questionable indicator of surplus population. In the absence of any comprehensive research in this field it might have been wiser to refrain from quantitative estimates, which are necessarily inconclusive and difficult to substantiate. As Professor Sauvy has recently pointed out in connection with Europe's migration problem : " It is generally held that western Europe is overpopulated. The official reports of the various international agencies speak of a surplus of 3 million persons. Others go much further and give very high figures. Unfortunately, the preciseness of the estimates stands in contrast with the uncertainty as to the very definition of overpopulation ."[1] Similarly, little meaning or significance can be attached to estimates of persons " available for emigration " or of " migration potentials " or of the volume of " desirable emigration " unless the underlying assumptions are clearly stated. It is therefore hardly possible within the scope of the present article to offer revisions of the estimates whose value has been questioned.

Certain broad conclusions as to future trends and future needs can, however, be drawn from a study of past movements, their causation and consequences, provided that the impact of recent changes in the determining factors can be taken into account. The preceding description of the main features of such a study seems to justify the following conclusions.

Conditions have become definitely more favourable to international migration on a fairly large scale than they were during the inter-war period. Compared with the mass emigration from Europe before 1914, the scope for future movements appears to be very limited, but the drastic decline in the volume of migration during the inter-war period was partly due to forces which ceased to operate after the second world war. Dislocations caused by the war, in particular the movements of refugees, account for a large proportion of the emigration from Europe in 1946-1951. Such movements can be regarded as non-recurrent and are likely to become less important in the near future. They could be carried out without much friction in spite of physical obstacles (such as

[1] A. SAUVY : *Productivité, emploi et population : Application à l'Europe occidentale*. Research Group for European Migration Problems, Bulletin No. I (The Hague, April 1952). (Translated from French text).

the shipping and housing shortages) largely because they were backed by international action and because of acute manpower demand in some of the traditional countries of immigration. It seems that for various reasons, with the gradual return to "normalcy", countries of immigration tend to become more reluctant to admit large numbers of foreign immigrants, even if such an inflow is conducive to economic progress. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that relief from population pressure through emigration would improve economic and social conditions in a number of European countries, particularly in Italy, Germany, Greece, Malta and perhaps in the Netherlands.

It can be assumed that a proportion of this "surplus" population—which, with dependants, may well amount to several millions—will find outlets for emigration within the framework of national schemes, through their own efforts, or through the assistance of friends and relatives already settled in new countries. This proportion is bound to be small if the determining factors have been correctly appraised in the present article.

The Need for International Action

It appears that the post-war revival of international migration is likely to lose momentum unless it is stimulated by international action. It will be inadequate as an outlet for the absorption of Europe's would-be emigrants. Many, perhaps millions, might remain indefinitely idle or underemployed and a burden to the community. It may be true that in most sending countries there is considerable scope for reducing population pressure and increasing national income through land reform and similar social measures. Capital investment is perhaps an equally important factor, but the financial situation of these countries allows little scope for this and most of the capital would have to be imported from countries with high standards of living. A higher yield in terms of international welfare might be expected from investment in underpopulated and underdeveloped countries with a view to settling migrants from Europe. The provision of capital and equipment for the settlement of immigrants is primarily the responsibility of the receiving countries, which stand to benefit from it; if they were not to benefit, they could hardly be persuaded to admit and welcome immigrants even if free transport were provided for them. It would clearly be against the interests of all parties concerned—the sending country, the receiving country and the migrants—if schemes were internationally sponsored whose financial and economic basis is doubtful.

A number of promising projects have not been carried out or have produced disappointing results mainly because the necessary investment was not forthcoming. Others failed from the outset because they were fundamentally unsound. Existing facilities for the financing of national economic development in relation to migration seem not to be fully exploited ; the United States Government stated at the Naples Conference that, among the applications for funds from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, there has so far been only one application related to the settlement of immigrants. Receiving countries should be encouraged to draw up projects, with the assistance of the international agencies concerned, for economic development through the settlement of European immigrants ; if outside capital is needed for such projects the co-operation of the International Bank should be sought.[1]

The present article is confined to a discussion of the international movements of Europeans. It is perhaps necessary to remember that problems arising from population pressure in Europe and the demand for European immigrants in the new continents are of secondary importance compared with those arising from rapid population growth in the countries of Asia. The claims of Asian countries for technical and financial assistance in coping with their population problems might be regarded as more urgent and more deserving of priority.

The plan referred to in the introduction to this article—the organisation and financing of the transport of 137,500 European migrants overseas during the current year, in addition to spontaneous and nationally organised migration—does not appear to be very ambitious in the light of the present situation. But regarded as a " preliminary experiment " it is of the greatest significance. This empirical approach may in the long run produce a greater contribution to the solution of the European migration problem than much more ambitious five-year plans. The results of these plans might have been disappointing and might have discouraged further support if they had over-rated either the propensity to emigrate or the willingness and capacity of the receiving countries to absorb immigrants from Europe.

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[1] A number of such studies or surveys have been or are being carried out in various Latin American countries.