

Cultural Pluralism, Equality of Treatment and Equality of Opportunity in the Lebanon¹

A SOCIETY like the Lebanese Republic, which is made up of various communities, constitutes a living and instructive example of the problems encountered in trying to secure equal economic and social rights in any pluralist society. While the communities of the Lebanon are characterised primarily by religion or rite, historical circumstances and geographical facts have combined to give the various denominations, as groups, certain distinctive features in the broader cultural, social and economic fields. Thus, though nominally and fundamentally based on religious or ritual differences, Lebanese pluralism is not exclusively one of religion or rites but involves a more complex combination of factors and characteristics—which can just as easily be found in situations where pluralism is defined by other criteria (ethnic, linguistic, cultural or social).

That is why, in spite of its originality, what is often called “the Lebanese experiment” is of interest beyond the frontiers of the Republic. A list of pluralist societies showing a comparable degree of particularism in all continents and at all levels of economic development should be long indeed, and the varying impact of the problems they face should not obscure their great similarity.

¹ Study prepared by C. Rossillion of the International Labour Office. The Office expresses its gratitude to the Lebanese authorities and to the public and private personalities whom the author met, more particularly in the course of a mission he undertook in the Lebanon, for the facilities and information made available to him.

For other articles concerning equality of opportunity in various countries see John E. MEANS: “Fair employment practices legislation and enforcement in the United States”, in *International Labour Review*, Vol. 93, No. 3, Mar. 1966, pp. 211-247; R. A. MÉTALL and M. PARANHOS DA SILVA: “Equality of opportunity in a multiracial society: Brazil”, *ibid.*, No. 5, May 1966, pp. 477-508; P. M. MENON: “Towards equality of opportunity in India”, *ibid.*, Vol. 94, No. 4, Oct. 1966, pp. 350-374; “Correcting racial imbalance in employment in Kenya”, *ibid.*, Vol. 95, Nos. 1-2, Jan.-Feb. 1967, pp. 61-77; and “Equality of opportunity and pluralism in a federal system: the Canadian experiment”, *ibid.*, No. 5, May 1967, pp. 381-416.

But the international interest of this experiment must also be assessed in the light of its particular features.¹

At the outset one is struck by the fact that the population of the Lebanon is divided between two great traditions, the one Christian, the other Islamic. The figures themselves are rather lacking in precision², but it is generally agreed that the population is almost equally divided into Christians and Moslems.

However—as though to reduce the impact of this cultural dichotomy—each of the two great traditions is further subdivided into various communities corresponding to particular denominations or rites: Maronite Catholics, Sunni Moslems, Shiite Moslems (sometimes called the protestants of Islam), which are the three largest communities (no attempt has been made here to establish any order of importance), Greek Orthodox³, Greek Catholics, Druzes⁴, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac Catholics⁵, Syriac Orthodox, Protestants, Latin Catholics, Chaldeans, Jews, etc.

In this mosaic, where all the important religions originating in the Middle East are represented, with their different rites, another characteristic stands out, namely that no one community constitutes a real “majority”.⁶ Certain broad divisions that could be made would in part be artificial, as each denominational group has its own individual characteristics, which it is generally intent on preserving. Nevertheless, there are obviously more sociological affinities within certain of these broad groupings than between them.

Other factors that must be taken into account are geographical and historical in origin. While the Lebanese Republic is recent—its independence goes back to 1943 and its present frontiers were delimited after the First World War—its constituent communities are infinitely older.

Geography and history of the Lebanon

For a long time the Lebanon was limited to the “Mountain”⁷, designed by nature as a refuge and where, ever since the first centuries of the Christian era and the beginning of the Hegira, the Maronite and other Christian communities as well as the

¹ There is an ample bibliography on Lebanese history and society. Recent sources include Charles RIZK: *Le régime politique libanais*, preface by Maurice DUVERGER (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1966) (see especially the first part and the references mentioned); J. NANTET: *Histoire du Liban* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1963), particularly the bibliography; and Denise BARRAT: *Liban escale du temps*, preface by René HABACHI (Paris, Editions du Centurion, 1967).

² The last census was made in 1932; an official reassessment of the figures is undertaken periodically on the basis of registry office statistics. The latest Lebanese statistics (1963) indicate an aggregate of 2,151,884 Lebanese on 31 December 1961, including emigrants who have kept their nationality (Ministère du Plan, Direction centrale de la statistique: *Recueil de statistiques libanaises, année 1963* (Beirut, 1966)).

³ The adjective “Greek”, like “Syriac”, etc., does not refer to national origin but to a rite.

⁴ Historically linked to Islam but, owing to a deep and long-standing schism, practically separated from the Sunnites and Shiites.

⁵ In other words, of the Syriac rite.

⁶ To reflect that fact, the Lebanon has sometimes been defined as a “nation of minorities”; this image, striking though it is, must be qualified, since the term “minority” retains its proper meaning and implications only if there is a “majority”—which does not really exist in the Lebanon. This is one of the features that distinguish the situation in the Lebanon from the majority-minority one found elsewhere.

⁷ The etymological meaning of “Lebanon” is “white mountain”.

Druzes—very soon separated from the rest of Islam¹—emerged. In particular a Shiite population formed south of the Mountain and in the Bekaa valley (which separates the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges), while the ancient towns of Tripoli (Trablos), Beirut and Sidon (Saida), which grew again on the Mediterranean coast, came to contain a large Sunnite population side by side with other communities, as did the plains forming the hinterland of Tripoli, north of Mount Lebanon. All these regions were incorporated in what was called the “State of Greater Lebanon”, by the settlement that followed the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 after the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, when a large-scale influx of Armenians expanded the small existing Armenian communities, especially in Beirut.² Throughout this whole process the evolution of the different communities and of their relationships naturally followed different courses.

Very early, the Christian communities, partly because of the relative fertility of the lands on which they had settled and partly because of their contacts with other Mediterranean societies having the same religion, had achieved a relatively high standard of wealth, general education and technology, in short, of economic development, in a land-owning society that was quite receptive to outside influences. In another part of the “Mountain”, more to the south, the Druzes had also formed a land-owning society, which was, however, more exclusive and characterised by a fierce isolationism and a very strong feudal structure, for religious as well as political reasons. It was around these Druzes and the Christians—in effect the Maronites—that, after the establishment of Turkish domination in the region and the passing of the Crusades, the multi-denominational character of the Lebanon was crystallised.

In practice the Ottoman Empire recognised the autonomy of the two regions³, thus confirming and even strengthening the existing situation. The association of the Druzes and the Maronites in dealing with the Empire took the form, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, of what was virtually an inter-community federation, under the leadership of Christian or Druze princes. After 1840, when disturbances promoted by neighbouring rulers had split the country into two—Maronites in the north and Druzes in the south—a grave conflict between them arose in 1860, which could be solved only by reunifying the country in 1864, with a slightly different complexion.⁴

In the coastal towns like Tripoli and, later, Beirut and Saida the Moslems, or at least the Sunnites, had closer links with the cultural and economic life of the rest of Islam and, to a certain extent, with the administrative life of the Ottoman Empire. Beirut had from time immemorial been a meeting point of the various communities. As the port of the Lebanese “Mountain” until it was separated from it under the settlement of 1864, Beirut possessed an important middle class, originally from the “Mountain” and largely of Christian descent; there, as in other coastal towns, a Moslem middle class also took shape as well as other substantial, though less well-off, urban classes, numbering many Moslems. In 1864, Beirut—like Saida—came under direct Ottoman control, which in practice favoured the Sunnite middle class for

¹ There are also Druzes outside the Lebanon.

² Today's picture would be incomplete if we did not mention the absorption of numerous Palestinian refugees after 1948, the immigration of a fairly large number of Syrian workers (normally on a seasonal or temporary basis) and the flow of individual immigrants, sometimes temporary and sometimes permanent, for economic or political reasons, even though these immigrants are not members of the original Lebanese communities.

³ This went much further than the traditional system of *millet*, under which the Ottoman administration conceded at least a certain autonomy in civil and religious affairs to non-Moslem communities in the Empire. See Antoine FATTAL: *Le statut légal des non-musulmans en pays d'Islam* (Beirut, Imprimerie catholique, 1958).

⁴ In 1860, France, acting on behalf of the Powers, intervened in the Lebanon, by way of a prologue to the Mandate of 1920.

public office; this perhaps tended to a certain extent to confine the Christian middle class to commerce and finance—activities for which it had already displayed an unmistakable aptitude and which, it must be said, were then expanding vigorously, as everywhere else in the world. (This, of course, does not imply that other middle classes did not participate in such activities.)

The northern rural regions had kept to the traditional, semi-nomadic economy of old, and their level of development could not compare with that of other regions, in spite of the fertility of certain lands. The Shiite Moslems remained almost as isolated from the rest of society as the "Mountain" communities, without even benefiting from the conditions that had favoured the development of the latter. Fundamentally rural, settled on poor land in the south (poor, that is, until the introduction of citrus crops in the coastal region), and on somewhat better land in the Bekaa, but in any case long handicapped by a feudal land tenure system, the Shiites were fated by history to start off as the poorest community (however prosperous certain individuals may have been).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the "State of Greater Lebanon" was set up. Its frontiers were drawn in 1920 as a result of negotiations during which the cultural and economic diversities that concern us were not ignored but on which the policy of the Great Powers also had a real influence. Under this voluntary compromise, the "Mountain" combined with the coastal plains and the Christian communities with the Moslem communities. At that time the Lebanon welcomed the fresh additions to its Armenian communities that were fleeing from the collapsing Ottoman Empire and that were, in turn, to find their place in the Lebanese economy.

The policy of the Mandate was, by definition, to safeguard the multi-community character of the Lebanon, and a constitution was promulgated in 1926 expressly confirming that character. The Mandate authority recognised each community's particular civil status.¹ Its intention was to achieve a balanced representation of the different communities in political bodies and public offices, and this policy is still pursued today. However, it is generally admitted that, partly because of circumstances and partly because of cultural kinship, the Christian and more particularly the Catholic communities enjoyed certain advantages over the others in public offices during the 20-odd years of the Mandate. Furthermore, private education in the Christian communities developed remarkably (although open to all, it did in practice favour the Christian communities because of cultural and economic factors), while education in the other communities, historically less advanced, had more leeway to make up; state aid to public education remained relatively limited. More generally, such economic development as took place did, of course, benefit all the communities, but it was not sufficient to make any far-reaching changes in the heritage of the past. This task fell to the Lebanese Republic in 1943, having been further complicated by the contributions of the Mandate to an already complex legacy of pluralism and economic problems.

Social and economic heritage

At the time of the transfer of power in 1943, the most obvious and widely recognised feature was the dual cultural heritage, which the leaders of the different communities, united in the fight for independence, agreed to preserve. The "National Pact", which, though not even written down, founded the Lebanese Republic, confirmed the arrangement of 1920 but with a shift of emphasis.

Quite naturally the main preoccupation was, first, to guarantee equal respect for the distinctive characteristics of the different communities (and therefore the relevant

¹ That is its autonomy in all questions concerning the rights of individuals, marriage, inheritance, etc., as prescribed by religion or custom. This was confirmed by the Community Status Order (No. 60) dated 2 March 1936.

civil liberties) and, secondly, to ensure that public rights were not exercised at the expense of any group or groups. It can be said that the guiding principle of independence was to ensure equality of the various liberties, coupled with safeguards to preserve an equilibrium between groups, which would not necessarily be achieved by the normal working of social forces.

The Lebanese Republic was faced with a sociological situation deep-rooted in history, which could be neither ignored nor expected to lose its significance in the course of 20 or even 40 years of the State's existence; in its essentials, it still exists and conditions all the measures taken by the Republic as well as the effect they have.

The strength of community feelings and patterns originates historically in a series of social, geographic and educational factors. Through centuries of more or less isolated community life social relations were confined to each community and culture; such a situation could not be much altered in a few decades, at least where the bulk of the population was concerned. While inter-community contacts have been accepted and to a lesser extent even sought, as we shall see below, and have naturally been more frequent where educational levels are higher, traditional characteristics have tended to persist at other levels. The tradition of endogamy and the influence of the extended family (or "clan"), which can be found here as in other societies, have also contributed to this phenomenon, in so far as these family ties have been a factor in the community (it is often difficult, in practice, to distinguish clearly between the effects of social relationships and those of community ties), even though, as time went by, social relationships acquired a more "political" flavour in the Lebanon, as elsewhere.

Geographical distribution must also be taken into consideration. For instance in towns like Beirut (which in fact contains more than half the country's population, even though a large proportion of its inhabitants are still registered in their native villages for administrative and political purposes) the communities have, to a large extent, traditionally settled in different quarters. The prodigious growth of Beirut has begun to change this situation but has not eliminated it. In the rest of the country the different populations are naturally more isolated. In spite of frequent mingling, close contacts are still, perforce, rather rare, whether in the fields, the workshop or the classroom. Such factors, due to geographical distribution, can hardly be affected by decision-making, although certain town-planning measures and regional development schemes designed to create new economic and social growth points can have some effect.

As regards education in general, the Lebanon has inherited a situation in which private schools have occupied a prominent place, not only because of the community structure of the country but also because public education was for long non-existent or very restricted. In 1943 private schools accounted for 83 per cent of all primary education; today they still account for more than half of primary education and for more than two-thirds of post-primary studies, or, to be more precise, almost three-quarters of all secondary education proper. At university level the Lebanon had, on attaining independence, two very old private universities.¹ The Lebanese University, a public institution, was founded in 1953. Later, a new private university was opened.² The four big universities now operating in the Lebanon, three of which are private, are all attended by large numbers of students. Private institutions, at different levels, are open to all (some are free, like the private state-aided primary schools), but for religious and cultural as well as practical reasons certain communities tend to favour certain types of establishments. The efforts made to avoid divergencies, in this pluralist context, in this field as in others, are described later.

¹ The Saint Joseph University, administered by the Society of Jesus and linked with the French education system, and the American University of Beirut (which attracts a majority of students from a wide range of other countries in the region).

² The Arab University (linked with the University of Alexandria).

Besides the social, natural and psychological factors that have contributed to strengthening community bonds, the historical situation has also produced a number of economic disparities. These can certainly be found in any society, but they deserve special attention in so far as they confirm other factors of social diversity and thus help to explain both the factors and the action taken to deal with them.

Several circumstances have given rise to this situation, which constitutes one of the most deep-rooted features of the Lebanese heritage and, in certain respects, the slowest to be recognised. In the past, educational systems, technology, economic activities, social patterns, etc., did not develop at the same pace in all the communities; which did not command the same resources or display the same inclinations. Purely geographical factors (natural resources, communications) and politics also had their effect. Later, economic structures and ideas in a country with a predominant tertiary sector set in a large and rather poor rural and urban environment did not much favour social and occupational mobility on a large scale; nor could there be effective public intervention in the economy even to redistribute incomes to some extent through taxation and public expenditure. Added to this, community pluralism and the restrictions imposed by tradition and the structures of the State resulted in a tendency to concentrate on private interests, whether of individuals or groups.

Geographical and historical factors inherited from the past have made themselves felt in various ways. In regional terms, the most striking of these, if not perhaps the most important, is the quite strong contrast between central Lebanon (Beirut and Mount Lebanon) on the one hand and the north, the Bekaa in the east, and the south on the other, as regards school equipment, economic infrastructure, productivity, nature and variety of jobs, and other characteristics (health, social, etc.).¹ These contrasts continue to be apparent even in towns with a very mixed population like Beirut, and in social and occupational patterns. Taking the country as a whole, contrasts in these patterns have become more pronounced as a result of the great disparities in incomes², accompanied by a marked imbalance between various sectors of the economy.³ These disparities do not, of course, reflect the subdivision of the nation into communities. However, apart from the important fact that they do reflect the general economic and social situation, it is true that for historical and circumstantial reasons, some communities have, by and large, participated more than others in the benefits of economic advancement and production. Naturally, this is only true of averages over whole groups, but even so it complicates the purely economic problem. Although differences in economic and social opportunity do not have

¹ See in particular the study undertaken from 1959 onwards by the Institute of Research and Training for Harmonised Development (I.R.F.E.D.) (a non-governmental French organisation, administered at the time by Father Lebreton): *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban, 1960-1961* (Beirut, Ministère du Plan, no date), 2 vols., especially Vol. II, pp. 69-70 and 80 ff. See also Rizk, *op. cit.*, Part One, Ch. III, especially pp. 42 ff.

² According to estimates for 1959, nearly 50 per cent. of the population (farmers, craftsmen, wage earners; clerical workers) shared less than 20 per cent. of the national income; approximately 30 per cent. of the population only came near to the average national income and the remaining 20 per cent. (approximately) shared 60 per cent. of the national income (half of which—30 per cent.—went to 4 per cent. of the population). See I.R.F.E.D.: *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban, 1960-1961*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 90-94.

³ For commerce, finance and services, employing 20 to 25 per cent. of the active population, more than 50 per cent. of the national income; for industry and construction together, approximately 20 per cent. both of employed persons and of national income (slightly more for industry); for agriculture, with approximately 50 per cent. of persons employed, less than 15 per cent. of the national income (the latter figure does not, of course, take into account the case of part-time farming or the composite character of family incomes—which mainly affect the central region, because of its relations with Beirut) (*ibid.*, p. 87). The official statistics for 1966 published by the Central Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Planning have also been taken into consideration (see *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11 Nov. 1967).

the same significance when they are due to largely fortuitous historical circumstances as when they are a matter of deliberate policy, the need for a conscious effort to change this state of affairs is urgent, as the Lebanon has become increasingly aware during its 25 years of independent existence.

The need was perceived quite early on by many prominent Lebanese.¹ As from 1958 onwards its authority was strengthened by political circumstances² and greater awareness on the part of the public, the Government took a whole series of steps with a view to reform. First of all, a survey in depth³ was carried out with government backing, and this formed the starting point for the First Five-Year Plan (1964-68), together with various other measures, the nature and consequences of which are discussed later.

All these analyses and measures are, of course, more general in scope than the topics with which we are concerned. But it is worth investigating the way in which the promotion of equality of opportunity at all levels has been fitted in with the emphasis on equality of civil liberties and rights that has characterised the Lebanese Republic from the start.

Basic constitutional principles

The need to make allowance for the distinctive features of a pluralist society is reflected in the clauses of the Lebanese Constitution dealing with fundamental rights⁴ and in other provisions or practices deriving therefrom. The clauses adopted or reaffirmed in 1943⁵ were mainly concerned with civil, political and cultural rights. The Constitution does not deal with economic and social rights.⁶ This approach does not necessarily mean that such rights are ignored (in fact the equality with which we are concerned can be deduced from the principle of equality before the law and in the public obligations and duties mentioned in article 7); but when the question is left open in this way, developments will depend on policy, as we shall see later.

The adjustments made in the 1943 Constitution are also important in terms of equality of economic and social rights, since they are concerned, *inter alia*, with participation in public affairs and, more generally, with the building up of a national ethos, which can also affect the economy and private activities.

¹ See, *inter alia*, the proceedings of a social conference held in 1955 (Semaines sociales du Liban, avril-mai 1955: *L'économie libanaise et le progrès social* (Beirut, Les lettres orientales, 1956)), especially the papers on the relations between economic and social factors in industry, commerce and its social impact, the redistribution of incomes, etc.

² Following an acute crisis involving economic and social factors and group loyalties as well as purely political aspects (see RIZK, op. cit., pp. 69 ff.).

³ I.R.F.E.D.: *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban, 1960-1961*, op. cit.

⁴ See *The Lebanese Constitution*, a reference edition in English translation prepared by the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut (Beirut, Khayats, 1960), Part I, Ch. II: "The Lebanese; their rights and duties."

⁵ As stated earlier, the 1943 Constitution embodies most of the provisions of the 1926 Constitution. See *The Lebanese Constitution*, op. cit., which gives details of the changes.

⁶ Unless the general guarantees of individual liberty (article 8) and the rights of ownership (article 15) are considered to be relevant.

In a plural society the desire to make equality before the law something more than a purely abstract principle may actually have two aims—to safeguard the legitimate needs and interests of each group and to promote the harmony that is necessary in relations between the groups and in community life. These two aims are in no way incompatible, but the requirements of each may impose restrictions on the action that can be taken to satisfy the other. The degree to which they are combined therefore varies according to the branch of national life and changing conditions.

Some rights and freedoms, while particularly important in a plural society, are expressed by the Constitution in general terms. This is true, for instance, of article 7: "All Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction." The same applies to article 13: "The freedom to express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of association shall be guaranteed within the limits established by law." The Constitution safeguards individual liberty, inviolability of place of residence and the rights of ownership in the same way (articles 8, 14 and 15).

In other matters, however, the Constitution specifically refers to the plural nature of society. Thus article 9 states that "there shall be absolute freedom of conscience" and adds that "the State in rendering homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds, and shall guarantee under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that the public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantee that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected." Freedom of education is also recognised by article 10: "Education shall be free in so far as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or creeds. There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools, provided they follow the general rules issued by the State regulating public instruction." Lastly, in dealing with public office, article 12, as a logical consequence of the principle of equality before the law, states that "every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference being made except on the basis of merit and competence", although article 95 states that "as a temporary measure and in the interests of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public office and in the composition of the Government, provided that this is not detrimental to the welfare of the State".

All these clauses clearly reflect a number of concerns—individual rights and group rights, and the need not only to respect but also to protect and, if necessary, reconcile the rights and interests of individuals. But a great deal of latitude is left to other measures (such as legislation)

and to practice in defining the scope and relative weight given to these concerns and in shifting the emphasis, when necessary, to suit changing circumstances.

In order to ensure equal respect for different creeds and cultures, the State recognises that it must first and foremost be neutral. Naturally, therefore, there is no state religion or any *de facto* official religion—unless all of them are considered official. The flag contains no religious or cultural emblem (the centre is occupied by a geographical symbol, the cedar). This was done long before such emblems disappeared from other flags or at least lost their significance. Similarly, in its public information policies, the State is at pains to do nothing that might disappoint the expectations of the national communities. The freedom of the press and other media it recognises enables the cultural and linguistic diversity of the country to find expression. Yet the State is not simply a passive spectator but goes out of its way to meet the expectations of the different groups. For example it is not uncommon for an official announcement dealing with an event that mainly concerns one community to be accompanied by items affecting other groups. To take another example, equality before the law does not merely mean the absence of separate legislation for each community in such fields as employment; the Government also acknowledges the right of each citizen to public holidays on the feast days of his religion, even though this amounts cumulatively to a large number of days. In addition, where public affairs are concerned, the requirements of pluralism have led to the principle that all groups must be fairly represented, and this, if need be, overrides equality of individual rights. Freedom of action and expression for the individual is also curtailed by a clause that punishes “any act, publication or speech designed to foment or having the effect of fomenting sectarian or ethnic feeling and of causing disputes between communities or different sections of the population”.¹

However, the consequences drawn from pluralism and the laws or practices that reflect it may vary in significance. They may be merely static, i.e. they may simply recognise the limitations and handicaps due to social divisions, or they may be dynamic, i.e. they may seek to induce different groups to work together for collective ends.² While the spirit of the laws and practices just mentioned seems in the first instance to have been to respect and, where necessary, safeguard group identities, it is interesting to see how the need for positive measures and the changing

¹ Section 317 of the Criminal Code. It is worth noting that this clause is concerned with effects as well as with intentions, i.e. the citizen must also refrain from any carelessness or conduct that would be “objectively” unfitting.

² For example even such provisions as the clause in the Criminal Code just referred to could, depending on circumstances, only be concerned with serious acts or demonstrations endangering the security of the State or could be applicable to all kinds of behaviour or attitudes hampering group relations and solidarity in everyday life.

social pressures now being felt have had their effect on, for example, the working of the principle of fair representation of the communities in public office.

Fair representation of the communities in public office

The arrangements embodied in article 95 of the Constitution are designed to fulfil various aims. The first may simply have been a desire to demonstrate the plural nature of society at certain levels of responsibility, in so far as is practicable. This often leads to flexible practices in a number of plural or federal contexts. In the Lebanon the principles adopted in 1943 (which were a continuation of the practices followed under the Mandate) were concerned with constitutional and political bodies and with public office down to the lowest level, the aim being to give each group a position in public life corresponding to its relative importance.¹ In this case, therefore, greater emphasis was placed on implementing pluralism than in other contexts, largely because economic factors, attitudes, education, etc., would have tended to give some groups proportionately more weight than others.

As regards the constitutional bodies, the Government is mentioned only in article 95 of the Constitution, but it is an established tradition that the President of the Republic should be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunnite and the President of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite.² In the Chamber of Deputies seats are shared out on a more or less proportional basis among the communities under the electoral law.³ The political parties also take on the colouring of the communities or at least of the main denominations or faiths, the latter usually being divided into a number of groups. The Government traditionally contains members of the various communities, and traditions have grown up in the allocation of certain departments to ministers from certain communities (with, of course, some variations depending on circumstances and the number of portfolios available).

In the case of public employment there is no statutory provision regulating the operation of the principle in detail; it is mainly a matter of

¹ On this subject as a whole, see RIZK, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff. and 99 ff.; Halim FAYYAD: *The effects of sectarianism in Lebanese administration* (typewritten thesis) (American University of Beirut, 1956); and Ralph E. Crow: "Religious sectarianism in the Lebanese political system", in *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville (Florida)), Vol. XXIV, Aug. 1962, pp. 489-520.

² There is some argument as to whether the constitutional system should be described as "presidential" or "parliamentary". It seems to combine the features of both, like the French constitutional system of 1875, during its first period, and the 1958 Constitution, though somewhat less obviously. The Lebanese Constitution is flexible, however, and practice is liable to vary depending on circumstances and personalities.

³ Under a complex system of list-voting, which is designed to secure election by the majority of the electorate in each constituency (usually containing several communities) while at the same time enabling members of each community to stand for election.

practice and custom.¹ As was stated earlier, the principle is in fact systematically applied in all branches of the service and down to the lowest levels. Since the principle was designed primarily to meet certain political and social needs, its application has inevitably encountered a number of practical difficulties and has in any event not been easy to enforce with any precision. It is interesting to see how efforts have had to be made to reconcile it with other requirements and with the changing needs of society.

In the general interests of administrative efficiency reforms were made in the organisation of the civil service from 1959 onwards² which led to changes in certain major aspects of the way the principle of fair representation was operated. As a result of these reforms the civil service was subjected to regulations embodying safeguards enforceable by a Civil Service Council. For most types of jobs recruitment is by competitive examination (apart from the exceptions normally allowed by regulations of this kind, such as senior posts).³ These methods and procedures already have some importance, as regards the context in which fair representation can operate, from the point of view of enhancing the prestige of the civil service⁴ and attracting qualified recruits. It has also been suggested⁵ that, legally speaking, article 95 of the Constitution should—in view of its exceptional character—be waived whenever it conflicts with other specific provisions. In this particular instance, therefore, the holding of competitive examinations should mean that the actual order of merit should be observed. In making appointments the authorities should be at liberty to observe the principle of equitable representation in cases where appointment from outside is permitted (mainly to senior posts) and when recruitment is based on aptitude tests

¹ The constitutional principle is simply reproduced in the Civil Service Regulations (Legislative Decree No. 112 dated 12 June 1959), section 96 of which states, *inter alia*, that “in the appointment of civil servants, account shall be taken of the provisions of article 95 of the Constitution”.

² Especially by the above-mentioned Legislative Decree No. 112 implementing the Civil Service Regulations.

³ These examinations are organised by the Civil Service Council; in the case of posts for which a university degree or the equivalent is required, the only source of recruitment since 1964 has, in principle, been the National Institute of Administration and Development (formerly called the National Institute of Public Administration), at which new recruits study for an additional two years.

⁴ The system of equitable representation gave rise to the criticism that undue weight was given to patronage and influence in appointments and promotion.

⁵ In connection with a case submitted to the Council of State (which judges administrative disputes) by a woman candidate in a competitive examination passed over in favour of another candidate with lower marks who was given preferential treatment by ministerial order by virtue of the system of equitable representation (Council of State, 4 Nov. 1966, *Ekrām Soleimane Shamassa v. the State*). The comments following the judgment are concerned with the conclusions submitted by the Government Commissioner (who is not the Government's counsel but is responsible for interpreting the law according to his own conscience). The Council of State did not give any verdict on the substance of the case and turned down the application on a point of procedure.

but should not do so in the case of posts for which competitive examinations must be held by law; this particularly applies to those for which a university or secondary education is required and that are earmarked for career civil servants.

It has also been argued from a less strictly technical standpoint that, by removing the posts in these categories from the inflexible requirements of equitable representation, a major step would be made towards the development foreshadowed by article 95 of the Constitution itself when it describes this principle as "temporary". More generally, the question is also being raised whether equitable representation cannot be achieved on a broader basis instead of by means of a strictly proportionate allocation of jobs between the communities. It is increasingly being felt that the application of the principle of fair representation, with all the technical and political difficulties it involves as soon as a certain degree of strictness is achieved¹, should not in practice be allowed to go beyond—and indeed ultimately against—the "interests of justice and concord" and the concern for the "welfare of the State" expressed in article 95. The prospect of a steady restriction of the application of the principle to certain classes of posts (and ultimately to posts at certain levels of responsibility) now seems to be paving the way for a more flexible system of representing the communities in public employment by making it more apparent and therefore more satisfactory.

Of course, in making these adjustments a number of factors are involved. The weight to be given to the general state of society on the one hand and to political and administrative traditions on the other is a matter for argument, but it is generally agreed that the latter must not be allowed to thwart the requirements of the former. The question also applies to representation in the political bodies. In any event, the changes now taking place in public employment clearly illustrate the complexities of seeking to reflect pluralism in this field and the need to adapt to changing technical conditions and to the whole political and psychological evolution of society.

Fostering the right attitudes

The other areas of social life, unlike the machinery of government, enjoy complete freedom subject only to a minimum number of safeguards, the legal basis for which has been described earlier. Of course, the official ethos does influence the behaviour of individuals by creating a climate and setting an example. The principles of equality

¹ Especially when a genuinely proportionate allocation of many types of jobs is difficult to achieve to the satisfaction of each group and becomes a source of controversy, or when it is decided that certain posts should always be filled by a particular community, or when appointments are held up because of disagreement over the working of equitable representation, etc.

before the law and respect for differences within the community have certainly had an effect on social life in general. However, the attitude of the State is normally one of neutrality and concern for the maintenance of a legal balance that is a reflection of social traditions rather than an influence on them.

In education this freedom has, as explained earlier, been an essential safeguard not only of individual but also of group rights. Article 10 of the Constitution nevertheless allows the State to set general standards for public education; but these standards may vary widely in nature and extent. It is interesting to see how, as needs have changed, greater emphasis has been placed on securing a unity of approach. In the setting of a plural society this has been felt to be essential if certain attitudes are to be fostered.¹ Needless to say, freedom has not meant that those in charge of private education in the communities have not been aware of the importance of their civic function.² But the question was how far this concern was shared by the teaching staffs of the schools themselves—even assuming that they had been given suitable instruction and were kept up to date—and, more generally, whether something should be done about differences of approach to such subjects as history, geography, philosophy, etc., in the various school systems and textbooks. The Government has therefore taken steps to revise the textbooks (at the same time improving their quality and lowering their cost) while endeavouring to combine the freedom of education that is part of the Lebanese system with the maintenance of the general standards laid down by the Constitution as essential safeguards.³ For future generations this is clearly an important development.⁴

More generally, many of the cultural groups and private clubs led by prominent figures from all the communities in every walk of life in Beirut

¹ We shall deal later with other aspects of the educational system as they affect equality of opportunity.

² For example Beirut bookshops stock certain privately published handbooks on moral and civic education that have always stressed the importance of respecting cultural differences, showing religious toleration, working together with other social groups, etc.

³ Proposals made public at a recent press conference held by the Minister of Education (see *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11 Oct. 1967). They cover a number of other educational developments, which will be mentioned later. It is worth noting that the Minister emphasised that the Government was unwilling to impose these reforms "unilaterally", as it was legally entitled to do, but had secured acceptance for them by extensive consultation. It should also be noted that these measures had been called for in demonstrations by the students and schoolchildren themselves.

⁴ They will presumably not be fully felt for another ten or 15 years. As for the short term there have been advocates of some such institution as compulsory military service (which does not exist in the Lebanon) as a way of helping social integration as it has in other countries; others have suggested the organisation of special educational and social activities for youth, and these might be more readily accepted and also turn out to be more beneficial (see for example Zakaria NSOULY: "Recherche pour un vrai Liban", in *L'Orient* (Beirut), 3 Apr. 1967). The idea is still under discussion, bearing in mind the substantial benefits that can be anticipated from any scheme of this kind to assist youth and also the need for very careful study beforehand.

(including politics and administration) have been doing their best to foster the emergence in society of an ethos that is no longer based on balance and particularism alone but is accompanied by greater knowledge and community spirit.¹ Private bodies have in fact pioneered civic education—unlike their counterparts in many countries—while the State has remained strictly aloof and concerned only with maintaining a balance. But there is a growing awareness in government circles that the State itself has a responsibility for the civic education of society as a whole—without in any way neglecting the other safeguards it is required to enforce. The question also arises in other fields such as civil legislation.² As a senior official commented in a more general context³: “If, as Montaigne argued long ago, every man must fashion his own manners, then surely it is for the State to fashion the manners of the community.” This applies just as much to the development of an ethos as it does in other fields (referred to later), which it influences in part and by which it is itself influenced.

Economic measures

As we have seen, the economic and social policies that have been evolved, especially since 1959, have to cope not only with the problems encountered by any other society but also with the special conditions of a plural society faced with the task of creating a climate in which all the communities forming the nation have equal opportunities for economic and social progress. This policy has to some extent been an extension of earlier efforts, but in part it constitutes a new departure.

One extension of earlier efforts, for which the need was widely acknowledged, concerned the educational system. Although the Lebanon has one of the highest school attendance rates in the region, educational facilities have not been evenly shared among the population, either in quantity or in quality, and urgent action was needed to deal with this situation. Major changes have been made in the number of schools (especially in the number of secondary and other post-primary schools),

¹ For example the activities and publications of such bodies as the Lebanese Association, the Development Association, the 22 November Club, etc.

² Under the system of “personal status”, which is guaranteed by article 9 of the Constitution (see pp. 232 and 228), all matters concerned with marriage, consanguinity and inheritance are governed by the religious or customary practices of each community and are dealt with by their own courts. One point now being discussed is whether civil legislation should be passed to release those individuals who wish from the obligation to acquire one of these forms of “personal status” (respect for these forms of status, for those who wish to take advantage of them, does not necessarily imply this obligation). This question is obviously bound up with the whole concept of society and the State in the public mind. Similarly, it is argued from time to time that no mention of an individual’s faith should be made on identity documents.

³ Talk given by Mr. Farid DAHDAH, Chairman of the Civil Service Council, on 27 April 1967 and published in *L'Orient* (Beirut), 1 May 1967.

the number of teachers and the number of pupils.¹ The State has substantially expanded its efforts alongside the private sector²; the share of education in the total state budget has more than doubled since independence and shows a steady upward trend.³ Of course, these efforts are still not enough. It was recently established that the proportion of children not attending school was about 15 per cent. of the total and, above all, that there were fairly substantial variations in school attendance rates as between one part of the country and another. Accordingly, the Government has announced further measures to enlarge and improve school facilities so that schooling can be made compulsory for all children of school age⁴; simultaneously, measures have been taken or are being planned to lower the cost of school attendance, to provide free education on a larger scale (both in state and subsidised private schools) and to enlarge and improve facilities for training teachers, all of these measures being essential if the purpose is to be achieved.

The policy of capital expenditure for economic and social purposes also represents an extension of earlier efforts. The Five-Year Plan for 1964-68 is first and foremost a public works programme, and the schemes that have been approved or are being planned constitute a co-ordinated extension and enlargement of existing projects. This applies particularly to highway construction, improvements in water supplies and irrigation, electrification and similar schemes.⁵

Here too, changes have been made in the interests of balanced regional development and better urban housing, so that a start has now been made on closing the gap between different parts of the country.⁶ In addition, a number of major schemes that had been started earlier, for example on the River Litani (which flows through Southern Bekaa and South Lebanon) were continued. A variety of other measures were also

¹ According to *Recueil de statistiques libanaises, année 1963*, op. cit., from 1955-56 to 1962-63 the number of primary and secondary schools (both state and private) increased by 50 per cent. while the number of secondary and other post-primary schools increased by 150 per cent. The number of teachers more than doubled, and it is estimated that the number of pupils went up by 50 per cent. in the primary schools and 100 per cent. in the secondary and other post-primary schools.

² For example it accounts for two-thirds of the increase in the number of secondary and other post-primary schools.

³ It amounted to less than 8 per cent. in 1943 and 12.54 per cent. in 1955 and will total 16.20 per cent. in 1968, according to the statement (quoted earlier) by the Minister of Education (see *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11 Oct. 1967).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Under the Plan, expenditure is allocated as follows: 28 per cent. for highways, 17 per cent. for the provision of drinking water, 16 per cent. for electrification, 14 per cent. for irrigation and 25 per cent. for other schemes.

⁶ The figures for 1967 alone show, for example, that over 50 villages in North Lebanon were equipped with drinking-water supplies; a dam making it possible to irrigate the northern plains as far as Akkar was completed; 214 villages were provided with electricity, 96 of them in South Lebanon and 66 in North Lebanon; etc. (figures published by the National Information Agency in *L'Orient* (Beirut), 21 Nov. 1967).

devised ¹ and launched to speed up rural development in the broadest sense. The Social Development Office, which was set up in 1959 ² to co-ordinate, assist or execute various social development programmes, has in fact mainly operated in the villages hitherto. All these basic economic and social programmes have not yet, of course, had their full impact, and in addition they have suffered from difficulties over finance and delays in execution. However, the Government announced in autumn 1967 that operations would be extended and speeded up and to this end submitted a number of proposals to the National Assembly.³

Employment policy

In addition to these efforts, the need has been felt to take other measures, of a less basic character, to bring a more direct influence to bear on the pattern and direction of the economy. The Plan set certain targets, using a technique that was flexible and indicative but very limited in effectiveness. It was acknowledged, as a result of the studies on which the Plan was based ⁴, that enough new jobs must be created to absorb the younger generation—whatever the type and level of education and training—while at the same time achieving greater equality of opportunity and earnings and a better balance of the economy as a whole, and that this made it necessary to expand agriculture and, above all, industry (having regard to the limitations under which agriculture labours and the predominance of the urban areas); to this end, a number of growth points would have to be started (the most urgently needed being Tripoli). Today the implications of these needs, namely an employment policy and an education policy ⁵, are being perceived more and more clearly, as is the fact that the needs have a whole series of economic and financial, sociological and psychological causes, all of which point in the same direction. Accordingly, if equality of opportunity is to be achieved, not only must the whole economic and social base of the Lebanon be expanded but suitable employment opportunities must be created, backed up by adequate training and guidance facilities.

One point to be borne in mind is that since the jobs available outside agriculture have hitherto tended to be predominantly in commerce,

¹ With help from the I.L.O., among others.

² Legislative Decree No. 155 dated 12 June 1959 (I.L.O.: *Legislative Series*, 1959—Leb. 1).

³ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 27 and 28 Oct. 1967; see also the statements by the President of the Republic on Independence Day (*ibid.*, 22 Nov. 1967).

⁴ See I.R.F.E.D.: *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban, 1960-1961*, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 145 ff., 273 ff., 327 ff., and 345-346.

⁵ See, for example, Hyam MALLAT and Ousama ACHOU: "Pour une politique de l'emploi au Liban", in *L'Orient* (Beirut), 16 Oct. 1967; and Joseph ZAAROUR (Director of Education): "Quelques jalons pour une politique scolaire", *ibid.*, 4, 5 and 7 Nov. 1967.

finance and services ¹, i.e. in small firms ², personal factors and family or social connections play an important part in the filling of jobs. Because of various circumstances and traditions, members of some groups have tended to have greater difficulty than others in finding suitable employment.³ Another aspect of the problem is the existence of a number of "educated unemployed". Of course, a general effort will have to be made simultaneously to expand employment in new sectors, such as industry, to provide suitable training facilities ⁴, and to shift the emphasis within the educational system ⁵ (together with the changes that can be expected to take place in traditional methods of recruitment ⁶).

In all these fields, something more than direct action by the State itself is clearly needed. But the State does bear responsibility for providing the essential facilities for development and for increasing the emphasis on technical education, although a great deal is already being done along these lines by private schools of all kinds. The actual development of employment and production in the sectors and growth points where this is needed implies in any event an effort by private enterprise, although the State can help it along by providing incentives and various forms of aid. The employers' organisations and the unions also have an important part to play in fostering an awareness of the needs and creating the necessary positive attitudes. The fact that they are not divided along denominational lines is one advantage, although they will have to overcome the handicaps imposed on them hitherto by the present economic and social structure, which they themselves reflect.

¹ See p. 230, footnote 3.

² It is estimated that out of the total number of establishments (other than agricultural and administrative), 90 per cent. employ fewer than ten wage earners and 75 per cent. fewer than five. Over half the total number of jobs are in firms of this kind (according to social security statistics compiled in 1964 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in collaboration with the I.L.O., and those published in 1963 by the Central Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Planning (*Recueil de statistiques libanaises, année 1963*, op. cit.)).

³ It is usually considered that there is no deliberate discrimination in employment but that some preferences may make themselves felt if a choice has to be made in filling a job, although the extent to which this occurs varies considerably according to the person one talks to. It has also been noted that employers may be conscious of the advantages, from the psychological standpoint, of, for example, employing workers from the same community or fairly similar communities, especially if they are rather poorly educated (see A. E. MILLS: *Private enterprise in Lebanon* (American University of Beirut, 1959), pp. 48 and 98).

⁴ It is estimated that until recently most young school leavers had at most a primary or secondary education without any vocational training. Since 1960 the Government has taken steps to expand and diversify the technical education system, and a vocational training centre for adults has also been opened.

⁵ It is acknowledged that something must be done to curtail the undue predominance of courses in arts subjects and the law and, more generally, the emphasis on clerical work and commerce. In the universities arts students continue to account for the overwhelming majority and only 12 to 15 per cent. graduate in scientific and technical subjects.

⁶ The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the trade unions are conscious of the importance of expanding the public employment offices system (sections 110 and 111 of the 1946 Labour Code), which have hitherto been fairly inactive, at least in placing Lebanese nationals, because of the nature of the jobs being sought and the existence of traditional channels.

The need for action was recently demonstrated once again by the statistics for 1966, which showed, for example, that the share of each sector in the economy had changed little over the previous ten years.¹ The Government therefore announced an additional scheme in autumn 1967² to encourage new sources of employment, especially in industry³, and the President of the Republic emphasised that the aim must be simultaneously "to strengthen our economy and to achieve greater social justice; this must be done at the production as well as the distribution stage".⁴ All of this, of course, faces the State with an awkward financial problem⁵, and the schemes announced recently will involve a change in financial and taxation policy.⁶

Lastly, it is emphasised in many quarters that the measures of all kinds that are required both from the State and from private enterprise imply a sense of purpose, and that this, especially if it is to be maintained, in turn imposes certain obligations on the State and on public opinion. This links up with the question of the promotion of the right attitudes mentioned earlier and also with the whole concept of society.⁷

The private clubs, associations and societies referred to earlier have all helped to focus attention on the need for new economic and social programmes to deal with the subdivision of Lebanese society and have helped to foster the growth of an awareness of the problem. It has in fact

¹ Figures published by the Central Statistics Directorate on the breakdown of the national income by sector of the economy for 1966 (*L'Orient* (Beirut), 11 Nov. 1967); they were used earlier in this article in discussing the conclusions of the I.R.F.E.D. survey.

² See the statement by the Head of the Central Statistics Directorate in connection with the publication of these figures (*ibid*).

³ Legislative Decree No. 30, dated 5 August 1967, to reorganise industry and improve its efficiency (*Al-jarida al-rasmiya*, 10 Aug. 1967). This decree establishes an Industrial Development Office to supervise industry and provides for customs protection and preference in the allocation of state contracts to industries considered to be of importance to the national economy (see R. O. TABBAKH: "Faits et événements économiques", in *Le commerce du Levant* (Beirut), Sep. and Nov. 1967, especially as regards differences of opinion between commercial and industrial employers on this subject).

⁴ Speech on Independence Day (*L'Orient* (Beirut), 22 Nov. 1967).

⁵ The amount remaining to be done is demonstrated by the fact that while the state budget, which was estimated to take 9 per cent. of the national product in 1953-54, took some 20 per cent. by 1960, the amount earmarked for direct expenditure on equipment and development remained fairly small (see, for example, RIZK, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff.).

⁶ Emphasising the need for this, a Lebanese expert recently pointed out that "in the first place, the development of the economy has not been balanced, and in the second place, all citizens and all parts of the country have not benefited equally by it. In the past it was possible to ignore this state of affairs but now it has become essential to change our approach." (Mohammad ATALLAH: "Pour une nouvelle politique financière au Liban", in *Le commerce du Levant* (Beirut), Sep. 1967, pp. 16 ff.).

⁷ This would be needed, for example, to overcome such phenomena as the "alienation" that, to quote the harsh words of a recently published criticism, is apt to make the individual think as follows: "Alienation from the community means that my faith is merely a means of finding a job and obtaining influence. Alienation from society means that my faith entitles me to regard the State with a good conscience as an enemy or an accomplice, to regard society as simply a profitable market and to regard the economy as an opportunity for self-seeking." (Father Selim ABou, S.J., in *Travaux et Jours* (Beirut), No. 24, July-Sep. 1967, p. 7.)

been argued that a new National Pact is needed with a greater emphasis on social justice, or at least that the initial Pact on which the Lebanon was founded should be implemented in full. One observer recently stated: "Liberty was carved on our monuments and embodied in our Constitution before it was put into practice in our national life. From now on we must realise that liberty is a dynamic concept and not simply a matter of legal safeguards. It amounts in the last analysis to enabling every citizen to live decently in the livelihood that corresponds to his own choice and abilities." ¹

Conclusion

The cultural, social and economic diversity inherited by the Lebanon is a challenge that is extremely difficult to meet and does not readily lend itself to the drawing of conclusions. However, one should take great care not to give way to the romantic attitude that makes a fetish of a pluralism through which this diversity is in some way to be harmonised. At the same time, one should not succumb to defeatism in the face of cultural and social complexity and assume that nothing can be done, at least in the foreseeable future. The one attitude is over-ambitious, while the other does not go far enough; either would prejudice the future. Would it not be more sensible to recognise that after a little more than 20 years' independence, the Lebanon has made a good deal of progress towards the solution of its own special problems but that much still remains to be done? In any event, in deciding what steps to take, one should not be afraid to gamble on success—provided that the hurdles in its way are clearly recognised.

The Lebanon began by acknowledging and safeguarding the equality of all citizens before the law and equal status for all cultures; it did so not only in its Constitution but also in a whole series of regulations and practices. With its distinctive social structure, it has had to try to safeguard this equality not only for individuals but for groups as well. It has endeavoured to provide freedom combined with mutual respect for the character of each group. As needs have evolved, it has also become clear that this attitude must be combined with a community spirit—as we have seen in connection with questions such as the promotion of attitudes in school and elsewhere and the representation of the groups in public life.

But equality before the law and all the implications of this principle in the Lebanon have also had to be enlarged so as to provide equal economic and social opportunity, which is not automatically guaranteed by civil and cultural equality. The programme launched by the Lebanon since 1959 involves a whole series of measures aimed at both regional and

¹ Hyam MALLAT: "22 Novembre", in *L'Orient* (Beirut), 20 Nov. 1967.

social development, such as the expansion and modernisation of industry and education, coupled with a comprehensive employment policy, which is tending to emerge as the most important issue of all.

The most significant development, where equality of opportunity is concerned, however, appears to be the changes actually taking place in the economy and society, which are making it essential to rethink the whole purpose of the nation's structure. In this way the Lebanon will ultimately be able to achieve its aim of promoting the development of "every man and the whole man"¹ in the midst of diversity, while respecting the special characteristics of each community.

This is a need which is encountered in many situations, and in the last analysis it applies to the world as a whole. The Lebanon is an almost unique crossroads of different cultures and development requirements. Its destiny may well be to provide an example of the way in which these cultures can be associated and the requirements met. From being a meeting point of civilisations in the past the Lebanon can become an example of the way in which they can combine for the purpose of development.

¹ See I.R.F.E.D.: *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban, 1960-1961*, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 23. The term is also used in Pope Paul VI's encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1967) (see the English text published by the Vatican Polyglot Press, para. 42).