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Poverty and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa

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Although possessing a more than proportionate share of the world's minerals and land per head of population, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa[1] are still, together with some south Asian countries, the poorest in the world. Yet, in contrast to the growing body of literature on poverty in other parts of the globe, they have received only peripheral attention. This article seeks, therefore, to restore the balance a little by reviewing the limited evidence and providing a glimpse of the situation as well as of the reasons for the persistence and, in some cases, the growing incidence of poverty and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa.

1. The dimensions of poverty and inequality

The extent of poverty

Any quantitative assessment of the extent of poverty is biased by the criteria one uses in defining poverty as well as by the method one applies to measure it. Even so, nearly all hitherto available estimates on the subject indicate a high level of poverty in Africa. Using data for 1969 Chenery et al.[2] estimated that in many of the sub-Saharan countries included in their study well over 60 per cent of the population were poor, if the poverty line was fixed at an annual per capita income of US$75, and the proportion was still over 40 per cent with a poverty line of US$50. According to the ILO, in 1972 around 69 per cent of the continent's population were "seriously poor"—defined as persons with annual incomes of less than US$115—and 39 per cent were "destitute"—defined as those with incomes below US$59.[3] A more recent estimate by Ahluwalia et al.,[4] which is based on a poverty line equivalent to the income level of the 40th percentile in

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India, puts the incidence of poverty well above 50 per cent for many of the African countries with the lowest levels of per capita GNP.

However, as these estimates are based on constant poverty lines which are applied across all countries, they suffer from the same weaknesses that characterise attempts at international comparisons. We therefore present in table 1 estimates of the incidence of poverty for countries on which we have readily available data.[5] The studies from which these data are obtained have a common approach in that they try to assess the extent of poverty by calculating the minimum income required to meet the basic consumption needs of a family. This method consists of, first, estimating the cost of a healthy, low-cost local diet for the average family or families of different sizes and then adding on the cost of basic non-food items such as clothing, housing and education. The incidence of poverty is then usually indicated by the proportion of households below the minimum income.

Although our estimates refer to a small sample of countries, they are more or less consistent with the results derived from the international comparative studies mentioned earlier, and by and large reflect the over-all situation in the region.

The over-all impression in terms of trends is one of increasing poverty in many parts of Africa.[6] In half a dozen countries—Chad, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Somalia—income per head declined over the period 1960-76.[7] In others, such as Benin, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Upper Volta, per capita income stagnated[8] and there is hardly any doubt that in many of these the position of the poor deteriorated. In Ghana the real income of cocoa producers was 41 per cent lower in 1967 than it was in 1952, and in the urban areas also real minimum wages in 1973 were almost half of those prevailing ten years earlier.[9] The position in other countries may be similar, owing especially to the poor performance of the agricultural sector. Over 20 sub-Saharan countries experienced a decline in their per capita food production, in some cases by well over 20 per cent, during the period from 1965-67 to 1974-76. In view of the large proportion of the population in the rural sector, and the fact that this proportion has decreased only slightly, the decline in agricultural, especially food, production must mean a rise in poverty in many of these countries.

This increase in poverty does not seem to be confined to countries with stagnant growth. Indeed, even in countries where average incomes are thought to have increased, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia, it appears that the real incomes of the poor have declined.[10] In Kenya, for example, the index of real incomes of the poorest 40 per cent of smallholders in Central province decreased from 100 in 1963 to 96 in 1974, while in Nyanza province it fell sharply from 100 in 1970 to 81 in 1974.[11] At the same time, the number of the poor was found to have increased.

Table 1. Poverty and minimum budgets in selected African countries

Country	Year	Minimum annual budget per head	Minimum budget at 1970 prices	Minimum budget (1970) in US$	GDP per head (1970) in US$	Proportion of population below minimum budget
Ghana	1970	₵ 60-75[1] (all areas)	₵ 60-75[1]	56.50-70.60[1]	257	More than 50% in rural areas
Lesotho	1978	R 152.6 (all areas based on urban figures)	R 78.68	109.80	74	.
Sierra Leone	1977	Le 172 (urban areas)	Le 92.00	109.80	147	65%
		Le 125 (rural areas)	Le 66.90	79.80		66%
Somalia	1976	Ssh 864 (all areas)	Ssh 572	90.80	79	42% urban 70% rural
Swaziland	1976	R 77.75 (urban areas)	R 46.30	64.60	270	.
Tanzania	1969	Tsh 457 (urban areas)	Tsh 475	66.50	59	20%
		Tsh 294 (rural areas)	Tsh 305	42.70		65%
Zambia	1974	K 104 (urban areas)	K 85.50	119.70	425	24%
		K 74 (rural areas)	K 60.80	85.10		52%

[1] The two figures are based on different assumptions regarding prices.

Sources: **Ghana** ILO/JASPA (Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa): *Employment problems in the rural and informal sectors in Ghana* (Addis Ababa, 1977). **Lesotho** Idem: *Options for a dependent economy: development, employment and equity problems in Lesotho* (Addis Ababa, 1978). **Sierra Leone** F. Lisk and R. Van Der Hoeven: "Measurement and interpretation of poverty in Sierra Leone", in *International Labour Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1979. **Somalia** ILO/JASPA: *Economic transformation in a socialist framework: an employment and basic needs oriented development strategy for Somalia* (Addis Ababa, 1977). **Swaziland** Idem: *Reducing dependence: a strategy for productive employment and development in Swaziland* (Addis Ababa, 1977). **Tanzania** W. Van Ginneken: *Rural and urban income inequalities in Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania and Tunisia* (Geneva, ILO, 1976). **Zambia** ILO/JASPA: *Narrowing the gaps: planning for basic needs and productive employment in Zambia* (Addis Ababa, 1977).

Income inequality

Poverty is not only an absolute condition but also a relative one and, as such, must be viewed against the structure of income distribution in a country as well as against changes over time. Furthermore, as noted by Ghai et al.—

an increase in relative inequality in the context of stagnation or only small increases in average incomes would normally also imply an increase in the incidence of absolute poverty. Moreover, even in the absence of data which would allow us to estimate changes in inequality over time, information on the level of inequality prevailing at a given point in time is extremely valuable in so far as it tells us whether a given estimate of poverty is equitably shared or is associated with wide disparities in income levels.[12]

Although information on incomes in Africa is scarce, various studies indicate that their distribution is highly uneven. In some countries, such as Gabon, Kenya, Swaziland and Zambia, income inequality is among the highest in the world. In others, the degree of concentration is somewhat lower but still rather high. More than two-thirds of the total income in several African countries is shared by the top 20 per cent of the population.[13] In Zambia the richest 2 per cent of households in 1974 accounted for roughly 20 per cent of the income, which was about the same as the share of the poorest 50 per cent. In Ghana, also in 1974, the bottom 31 per cent of rural households shared only about 9 per cent of the total income while the richest 7 per cent claimed over 25 per cent.

In addition, income inequality seems to have increased in many countries. In Ghana, for example, where there has been a decline in both agricultural and over-all output per head, the share of total cocoa earnings of the poorest 50 per cent of cocoa producers remained at 12 per cent between 1963-64 and 1970 while the richest 10 per cent increased their share from 40 per cent to 45 per cent.[14] In Zambia also, where the average yearly earnings of farmers showed a decline, income distribution worsened even further so that between 1959 and 1972 the share of the poorest 60 per cent dropped from 27.2 to 19.5 per cent and that of the poorest 20 per cent from 6.3 to 3.7 per cent.[15]

2. Growth and poverty

Progress in the elimination of absolute and relative poverty hinges on rapid and appropriate growth. Therefore an important consideration is the extent to which economic growth in Africa has been rapid and appropriate in terms of generating employment and incomes, on the one hand, and producing the goods and services required to meet the consumption needs of the poor, on the other.

Growth performance

A disturbing fact that emerges from table 2 is the extremely low rate of growth of low-income African countries. In these countries GNP per head grew at an average rate of only 0.95 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1976. Worse still, several countries recorded negative rates of growth.

The experience of the middle-income countries was slightly different: their GNP per head grew at an annual rate of 2.8 per cent during this period. Nevertheless, as they are with very few exceptions predominantly enclave-type economies (based, for example, on mining and agricultural exports), it is probable that the rapid growth indicated by this figure reflects the development of the enclave sector rather than any over-all increase in incomes.

It therefore appears that in many low-income and some middle-income countries economic stagnation was an important factor in the deterioration of the position of the poor or the slow progress made in improving it. Yet, as was noted earlier, poor growth performance cannot be a sufficient explanation when one considers that the real incomes of the poor have declined and their numbers have increased even in countries that have experienced sustained increases in average incomes.

A prominent feature of African development in the past has been the low and, in the majority of cases, declining rate of growth of agriculture. In several African countries there was an absolute decline in agricultural output in the period 1970 to 1976 and, on the whole, agriculture grew more slowly than population in the low-income countries and barely kept pace with it in the middle-income ones. The decline in per capita food production in many of these countries has led to increased undernourishment and has turned what is potentially a food surplus region into a net importer so that, on a per capita basis, Africa now imports much more food on average than India and China.[16]

The poor performance of agriculture contrasts sharply with that of the industrial sector. Industry in the region grew at an average rate of 7 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1970 even in the low-income countries, and at 5 per cent per annum in the early 1970s. In many countries, however, manufacturing activity was oriented mainly towards assembly operations or the production of goods consumed by the relatively well-to-do. On the input side, it involved mainly the application of capital- and skill-intensive technology. Hence, although industrial expansion was quite impressive, its performance in terms of generating employment and incomes both directly (within itself) and indirectly (in other sectors) as well as producing the goods required to meet mass basic needs was unsatisfactory. In short, the over-all development experience in Africa over the past two decades or so has been one of zero or slow growth in agriculture and faster but inappropriate growth in industry.

Table 2. Macro-economic indicators for developing countries, by level of income (Median values)

Indicator	Low-income[1] developing countries		Middle-income[1] developing countries	
	Africa	World	Africa	World
GNP per head (US$ 1976)	145	150	385	750
Annual growth rates (%)				
GNP per head				
1960-76	0.95	0.9	2.8	2.8
GDP				
1960-70	3.9	3.6	4.9	5.7
1970-76	2.4	2.9	3.6	6.0
Agriculture				
1960-70	2.1	2.3	3.8	3.6
1970-76	1.6	1.6	3.3	3.2
Industry				
1960-70	7.0	6.7	7.6	7.6
1970-76	5.0	4.5	5.6	7.2
Total population				
1960-70	3.0	2.4	2.6	2.7
1970-75	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.7
Urban population				
1960-70	6.4	5.4	5.7	4.8
1970-75	6.1	5.5	5.5	4.5
Labour force				
1960-70	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.3
1970-75	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.7
Food production per head 1974-76 (1965-67 = 100)	92	96	95	104

[1] The low-income countries represented in this table are those with an annual per capita income of US$250 and below, and the middle-income ones those with a per capita income of over US$250. See World Bank: *World development report, 1978* (Washington, 1978), p. 113.
Source: Ibid., various tables.

Development and orientation of public services

So far we have focused on the commodity-producing sectors, yet the development and orientation of public services such as education and health can also play a vital role in generating employment, incomes and growth and hence in combating poverty.[17]

Over the past two decades African countries have made substantial advances in the field of education. Between 1960 and 1972 total school enrolment in the African region as a whole grew on average at a rate of 6.5 per cent a year. As a result net enrolment ratios for the 6-11 age group increased from 30.9 to 44.2 per cent during this period.[18] Similarly, there has been considerable progress in the field of health, as can be seen from the fact that the average number of inhabitants per physician fell from 21,866 in 1960 to 16,866 in 1970,[19] while life expectancy at birth rose from 36 years in 1950-55 to 43 in 1965-70.[20]

Nevertheless, a common feature of the social development of the region is the uneven distribution and inappropriateness of the benefits from educational and health expansion. The type of education provided in many countries often does not prepare students for the world of work outside the very limited employment opportunities in the modern sector. Consequently school leavers are not provided with usable skills that will secure them productive employment. A similar lopsidedness characterises the health systems of many countries; public expenditure is heavily concentrated on curative medical treatment at the expense of preventive and primary health care, which could make a greater contribution to employment creation and the welfare of the poor.

Just as serious is the limited access that the poor have to education and health care as a result of the uneven spatial distribution and, in some cases, the high cost of these services relative to their income level. In Tanzania, for example, a study of primary schools showed that attendance declined markedly for children living more than a mile from school.[21] Similarly, in the field of health, a study on Uganda showed that the effective radius of a clinic in rural areas is probably no more than five miles.[22] The problems arising from distance may be exacerbated by the absence or inadequacy of physical and social infrastructure.

Even when educational facilities are there, the poor may not utilise them either because they are unable to pay the fees or, where schooling is provided free, because they cannot manage without their children's earnings or unpaid labour. Secondary education in Uganda, admittedly an extreme example, can cost as much as 40 per cent of the minimum wage in Kampala in direct expenses alone; this is far more than the cash income of most rural people and nearly all those employed in the informal sector.[23] In some cases this may even be a cause of further impoverishment; for example, meeting school fees is cited by Kenya's smallholders as a major reason for selling land.[24]

Finally, irrespective of the payment of school fees, the need to employ children during periods of peak labour demand and the uncertain return from investment in formal education can sometimes reduce the school attendance of children from families with especially low incomes.

Thus one finds that in the areas of education and health care the poor benefit relatively less than they otherwise would because of the mis-specification in the content and quality of these services and their uneven spatial distribution, biases that are accentuated by the very condition of poverty.

3. The roots of the problem

If the unsatisfactory performance in reducing poverty is due to the inappropriate pattern of development, an important question that arises is, what were the forces that generated or shaped this pattern?

A fairly common structural feature of the African economies, as noted earlier, is the unequal distribution of income and wealth. The degree of inequality considerably influences what is produced, how much is produced and how it is produced, and hence the size and structure of the market, the flow of investment and the level and structure of employment. In many African countries the unequal distribution of income and wealth, reinforced by the types of policies pursued in both the colonial and the post-colonial periods, also accounts in large measure for the tempo and structure of their growth.

This inequality is not a totally new phenomenon. Indeed, contrary to romantic flights of imagination, serious imbalances in power and wealth did exist in the African past which many writers idealise as a state of equality and harmony. What is different, however, about contemporary inequality in Africa, whose historical roots can be traced to the colonial economy, is its extent and the processes and policies that generate and sustain it.

It is hardly necessary to delve yet again into the well trodden area of the colonial economy and, therefore, only a few observations will suffice for our purpose. The colonial economy was dominated by the income and consumption needs of a tiny—mainly European—minority, which relied principally on export-oriented agriculture and mining for income and revenue, while moulding the production and import structure to suit its consumption requirements. This entailed the continuation and even the accentuation of poverty in various ways. Primarily it meant that the goods and services required to meet the basic needs of the poor majority were not forthcoming, resulting in the persistence of a large body of unmet needs in spite of increased growth. Furthermore, as production for the luxury market was usually undertaken by formal modern enterprises or estate agriculture, the development of small-scale and informal sector enterprises as well as peasant agriculture was neglected, and in some cases was even discouraged either because they did not meet the standards of urban and regional development set by the élite or because they represented a possible source of competition. This bias towards modern industry, along with the observed tendency for luxury goods to be more capital-intensive than goods consumed by low-income groups, also tended to limit the growth of employment opportunities. Perhaps an even more important effect of these inequalities, in our view, was their impact on the values, aspirations and ethos of the then emerging African ruling groups, and hence on the content and style of development pursued in post-colonial Africa. This included "excessive mimicry in every field",[25] which was reflected in manifold ways ranging from the model of development that many African governments followed to the life-style that became the all-important preoccupation of the ruling groups and the ever elusive dream of the masses. Thus, nearly two decades after the end of formal colonial domination, one finds that the mechanisms and processes that generated poverty during the colonial era are still very much a hallmark of the African scene.

With few exceptions, the advent of independence did not result in significant changes in the structure of the economy or in the distribution of income and wealth. In some countries, the foreign dominance in the economic sphere was left more or less intact or was even extended, and the associated features of a dualistic economy and substantial financial outflows abroad persisted.[26] In many others, the response to the inequalities in income and wealth and the concentration of the economic surplus took the form of the Africanisation of the state apparatus as well as a partial or complete take-over of the positions and means of production previously held by foreigners. The result was the emergence of an African bureaucratic élite[27] enjoying the status and financial privileges of the former foreign élite and closely allied with the small but powerful class of rural capitalists that grew up with the launching of rural development policies focusing on the "progressive" farmer as the main agent of rural growth.[28]

Even in sectors where small-scale units operated, the new economic and investment opportunities provided by the withdrawal of non-Africans were often exploited not by the poor but by the small urban and rural élites. For example, Elliott, in his discussion on rural differentiation in East Africa, observes that—

> the investment opportunities created by the withdrawal of Asian traders from the rural areas have not been seized by the rural poor (in whose name the Asians were often driven out) but by the rising rural élites, which tend to offer poorer service at a higher mark-up than did the Asians whom they so vociferously condemned as exploiters.[29]

Hence, although racial inequalities were almost certainly reduced, the gap between the top and the bottom within the African population appears to have increased.[30] Independence notwithstanding, the inequalities that characterised and shaped the growth and structure of the colonial economy continued to provide the framework for uneven and inequitable growth in post-colonial Africa.[31]

Although the structure of the economy was a major determinant in this process, the price, technology and investment policies (to mention only a few) pursued by governments were also important. In many cases these policies were guided by the neoclassical efficiency algorithm of growth maximisation at the expense of distributional considerations. The bias of public investment towards urban areas and, within these, towards capital-intensive projects with their well known adverse consequences on employment and incomes, is one example that comes immediately to mind.

In the rural areas, too, what little public investment there was went mostly into the development of large-scale commercial agriculture or into the promotion of "progressive" farmers rather than the development of peasant agriculture.

Even aid was biased against the poor. In Kenya, for example, it was reported that only 11 per cent of the development assistance committed as at December 1976 seemed likely to be really effective in reaching the very poor; only a third was directly concerned with rural development and most of this went to relatively well-off farmers.[32]

Given, therefore, the endemic inability of the poor to exploit new opportunities, the bias in investment, coupled with similar biases in other areas such as education, health, physical infrastructure, technology, credit, etc., could not but have perpetuated and even accentuated the dualism, inequalities and poverty that characterise both rural and urban areas.

4. Conclusion

The past two decades or more of African economic development have been a period of unfulfilled expectations. Yet there is precious little sign that the future will be better so long as the old inequalities and dualities persist and the pattern of growth continues unaltered.

The poor are prevented from improving their backward position principally because they have little or no access to education and to scarce productive assets such as capital, credit and (in some cases) land. This structural constraint hinders them from making full use of new economic opportunities provided, for example, by the availability of technological innovations (such as improved seeds, fertilisers and implements) or new sources of employment. On the other hand, those with more capital, credit and land as well as more education are better placed to take full advantage of existing or new investment opportunities, new sources of finance and improved employment openings.

These inequalities and disparities in economic prospects have an impact not only on the present generation but on future ones as well. Thus the better-off and more powerful groups are in a better position to pass on their acquired wealth and status to their children. On the other hand the poor, lacking both education and assets, find it increasingly difficult to overcome their poverty and, even worse, are compelled to transmit it to their children. Disconcerting as the current situation is, far more alarming is the possibility that the present social stratification by income and education will evolve into rigid class differences that will perpetuate poverty and inequality and render future countervailing measures ineffective. The implication for policy, therefore, is that if African countries are to arrest the trend towards massive misery for a large proportion of their population, they need to formulate a coherent strategy for rapid economic growth backed by vigorous redistributive measures that can lead to a more equal sharing of the benefits of growth.

Notes

[1] The term "sub-Saharan Africa" refers roughly to that part of the continent lying south of the Sahara and north of the Republic of South Africa.

[2] H. Chenery et al.: *Redistribution with growth* (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 12.

[3] ILO: *Employment, growth and basic needs* (Geneva, 1976), p. 22.

[4] M. S. Ahluwalia, N. G. Carter and H. B. Chenery: *Growth and poverty in developing countries* (Washington, World Bank, 1978), p. 6.

[5] Some of the adjustments we have made are described in our longer unpublished paper: *Poverty and inequality in Africa* (Geneva, ILO, 1979).

[6] The number of people who were seriously poor or destitute in Africa is estimated to have increased by 12.2 per cent between 1963 and 1972 (ILO: *Employment, growth and basic needs*, op. cit., p. 23).

[7] See World Bank: *World development report, 1978* (Washington, 1978), table 1, p. 76.

[8] Ibid.

[9] ILO/JASPA: *Employment problems in the rural and informal sectors in Ghana* (Addis Ababa, 1977), p. 43. See also K. Griffin: *International inequality and national poverty* (London, Macmillan, 1978), p. 147.

[10] Griffin, op. cit., p. 147.

[11] D. Ghai, M. Godfrey and F. Lisk: *Planning for basic needs in Kenya: performance, policies and prospects* (Geneva, ILO, 1979), p. 22.

[12] D. Ghai, E. Lee and S. Radwan: *Rural poverty in the Third World: trends, causes and policy reorientations* (Geneva, ILO, 1979; mimeographed World Employment Programme research working paper; restricted), p. 18.

[13] Chenery et al., op. cit., p. 8.

[14] T. K. Buxton: *The distribution of cocoa income among the producers: some policy implications* (University of Cape Coast, Centre for Development Studies, 1976), cited in ILO/JASPA: *Employment problems in the rural and informal sectors in Ghana*, op. cit., p. 32.

[15] ILO/JASPA: *Narrowing the gaps: planning for basic needs and productive employment in Zambia* (Addis Ababa, 1977), p. 292; and R. Van Der Hoeven: *Zambia's income distribution during the early seventies* (Geneva, ILO, 1977; mimeographed World Employment Programme research working paper; restricted).

[16] E. Rado and R. Sinha: "Africa: a continent in transition", in *World Development* (Oxford), May-July 1977, p. 450.

[17] For an analysis of these inter-relationships see A. Bequele and D. H. Freedman: "Employment and basic needs: an overview", in *International Labour Review*, May-June 1979, pp. 315-329.

[18] ILO: *A basic-needs strategy for Africa*, Report of the Director-General, Fifth African Regional Conference, Abidjan, 1977, p. 11.

[19] Ibid., p. 10.

[20] D. Morawetz: *Twenty-five years of economic development, 1950 to 1975* (Washington, World Bank, 1977), table 13, p. 48.

[21] G. A. Auger (co-ordinator): *Absenteeism in primary schools in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Institute of Education, 1970), cited in C. Elliott: *Patterns of poverty in the Third World* (New York, Praeger, 1975), p. 230.

[22] M. King (ed.): *Medical care in developing countries* (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), cited in Elliott, op. cit., p. 317.

[23] Elliott, op. cit., p. 236.

[24] P. Collier: *Notes on the problem of poverty in Kenya* (1978), cited in Ghai et al.: *Planning for basic needs in Kenya...*, op. cit., p. 47.

25 Organisation of African Unity: *What kind of Africa by the year 2000?* Final report of the Monrovia Symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000 (Addis Ababa, 1979), p. 15. See also A. Tévoédjrè: *Poverty: wealth of mankind* (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979), Ch. II.

26 See, for example, the case of the Ivory Coast in Elliott, op. cit., p. 49; and the series of articles by A. Rondos entitled "Ivory Coast: whose success?", in *West Africa* (London), 16 Apr. 1979; "Ivory Coast: a mortgaged economy", ibid., 23 Apr. 1979; and "Ivory Coast: the French factor", ibid., 30 Apr. 1979. See further the case of Swaziland in ILO/JASPA: *Reducing dependence: a strategy for productive employment and development in Swaziland* (Addis Ababa, 1977), p. 135.

27 See, for example, René Dumont's parabolic comparison between the spending pattern of the court of Louis XVI in 1788 and that of a presidency in present-day Africa. R. Dumont: *False start in Africa* (London, Sphere Books, 1968), p. 67.

28 See, among others, Elliott, op. cit., pp. 25-30, and the series of articles on the Ivory Coast cited in note 26.

29 Elliott, op. cit., p. 32.

30 See, for example, ILO: *Employment, incomes and equality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya* (Geneva, 1972), p. 96.

31 For a more recent but critical and concerned assessment of the situation, see the papers by E. Kodjo, A. Adedeji and M. D. Kingué and the final report by A. Tévoédjrè in OAU: *What kind of Africa by the year 2000?*, op. cit.

32 Ghai et al.: *Planning for basic needs in Kenya...*, op. cit., p. 59.