

The effects of disarmament on employment in the USSR

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Two special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as the 38th regular session that ended in December 1983 and resolutions adopted at the 1979 and 1981 Sessions of the International Labour Conference have all helped to focus attention on the problem of conversion of military resources to civilian uses.

In the USSR careful consideration is given to the conversion proposals put forward by trade unions and experts in the West, but in developing concrete measures we naturally base ourselves on the specific features of socialist society and a planned economy. Consequently, the approach to the question adopted by Soviet researchers is inevitably based on a number of premises that differ substantially from those underlying conversion plans in countries such as the United States or those of Western Europe, as we have had occasion to point out to eminent Western specialists, for example, Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University, who visited the USSR to study the problem of conversion on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The lessons to be learned regarding conversion possibilities in the USSR may be classified under five main heads, relating both to the fairly recent past and to the present and future: the experience with reconversion after the Second World War, the experience with major reductions in the Soviet armed forces in the early 1960s, present practice in the Soviet Union in regard to the structure of the defence industry, the experience with vocational training in the USSR and, finally, the legal rights enjoyed by Soviet workers' collectives and trade unions – a factor that will undoubtedly play an important part in the conversion process.

Post-war reconversion

First of all, a point of terminology needs to be cleared up. In Soviet usage the term "reconversion" means the return to peacetime production, towards the end of the Second World War (1941-45), of civilian under-

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takings which during the war had been turning out military products. The term "conversion" refers to a switch-over of undertakings now forming part of the defence industry to the production of civilian goods. Often, in the West, no distinction is made between "reconversion" and "conversion"; yet it seems to us that such a distinction is necessary, not so much for linguistic reasons as with a view to reflecting more accurately the specific – and very different – historical situations involved.

Turning now to the substance of the matter, the Soviet Government took a number of steps even before the end of the war, when it was apparent that the victory of the Allies over Hitler's Germany could not be far off, to increase production in the civilian sectors of the economy and thereby meet the immediate needs of the people after the ordeals suffered during the war years. Tens of millions of people had been made homeless, since the invaders had destroyed and burned 1,710 towns¹ and more than 70,000 villages, and everywhere there was a desperate need for food and clothing. The Nazis had destroyed and burned some 32,000 industrial undertakings and ravaged and plundered 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms and 2,890 machine and tractor stations.²

A decree issued on 18 March 1943 by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party contained directives on "measures to re-establish the production of agricultural machinery and equipment".³ It stipulated that the People's Commissariat (i.e. Ministry) for Munitions⁴ was to be allocated 11,000 tons of rolled steel in 1943 for turning out non-military products. The People's Commissariat was forbidden to use the metal and related materials earmarked for the production of agricultural machinery for any other purposes, including the production of armaments. Arms production was thus deliberately limited in order to provide needed implements for agriculture, despite the colossal effort required by the Red Army to continue its drive to the West following the famous victory at the Battle of Stalingrad.

An analysis of the situation on the war fronts and of the needs of the national economy carried out in 1943 and early 1944 led to the adoption of a further important decree by the Party and the Government setting goals for the construction of tractor works and the development of industrial capacity for the production of farm tractors.

The decree established firm targets for the production of tractors in factories belonging to the People's Commissariat for the Medium Engineering Industry, which were also turning out equipment for the front. From 5,500 tractors in 1944, output was to rise to 27,000 in 1945. The Gorky automobile factory, for example, which was making tanks and other armaments, was to produce 2,000 engines for combine harvesters.

The timely conversion of a number of production units to peaceful purposes was facilitated also by a decree adopted by the State Defence Committee on 28 February 1944, which called for expanded production of lathes in undertakings belonging to the People's Commissariat for Machine-

Tool Construction. A plan was drawn up to produce 7,000 more lathes in 1944 than in 1943.

The decree also called for the exemption from mobilisation and call-up to the Red Army of highly skilled manual and non-manual workers employed, under the responsibility of various People's Commissariats, in the construction and operation of tractor building works and plants producing electrical equipment for tractors. This directive was extended to associated teaching and training personnel.

In this way the Government focused attention on key branches of the economy that were of paramount importance for restoring agriculture and industry, although they could of course be provided with material and staff resources only within the limits dictated by the situation on the war fronts, which was still tense. A number of other steps were also taken even before the end of the war to demobilise entire army units and assign the demobilised troops immediately to work in the civilian economy. Thus when the Soviet forces drove the enemy out of the Petsamo region close to the Norwegian border, over 1,400 officers and men who had previously lived in the liberated towns and worked for the Pechenganikel Combine were demobilised and remained behind to restore the economy destroyed by the invaders.⁵

To be sure, reconversion on a large scale could only be carried out after the war ended. The basic goals were defined in a decree adopted by the State Defence Committee on 26 May 1946 setting out a number of measures for the reconstruction of industry and the reduction of arms production.

The decree listed undertakings that were to be exempted from producing armaments and reconverted to civilian product lines. The People's Commissariats whose undertakings produced military goods were instructed to submit proposals to the Council of People's Commissars and the USSR State Planning Committee concerning the nature and volume of civilian goods to be produced in the units so designated.

The People's Commissariats and government departments were ordered to make an inventory, in the undertakings hitherto engaged in manufacturing armaments, of all finished products, materials, tools, etc., released as a result of the suspension or cancellation of deliveries to the front. This made it possible to ascertain very quickly what resources could be placed at the disposal of undertakings that had switched over to peaceful production, thus avoiding loss or spoilage of materials needed by the national economy, especially in the key production sectors.

The decree of 26 May 1946 took full account of the interests of personnel employed in munitions factories. It was decided that workers who were mastering new types of production would be paid for one to two months at the average rate of remuneration they had received over the preceding three months. New jobs were found for them in all parts of the country and vocational training was provided where necessary.⁶

Close attention was also paid to problems of reconversion in the Act introducing the five-year plan (1946-50) for the recovery and development

of the national economy, adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 18 March 1946. This provided for the completion in 1946 of the post-war reorganisation phase. The goal was to step up agricultural and industrial production of goods to ensure the material well-being of the population. The Act called for improved work organisation and better housing and welfare conditions for staff in civilian industry and transport.⁷ It encouraged the development of highly skilled technical personnel. The achievement of this goal in the USSR significantly increased the number of workers graduating from vocational training colleges and schools and re-established and expanded the industrial training base. The training of highly qualified scientific and technical workers was also considerably expanded.

The post-war reconversion process revealed the enormous importance of such distinctive features of socialist society as the very broad and active participation of workers' collectives in the preparation and implementation of the relevant plans; this largely explains the remarkable speed with which the switch-over was accomplished. Only in 1946 did the rate of growth of gross industrial output fall, and then only slightly. By 1948 gross output was 17 per cent higher than in 1940. There was a considerable increase also in average monthly remuneration (more than 30 per cent between 1946 and 1950).⁸

Let us now look at the reconversion process in specific undertakings. In the "Uralmash" heavy engineering works in the Urals, which had been producing tanks and other armaments, a special group of engineers, technicians, draughtsmen and management and trade union representatives was formed in 1944 to work on the post-war production profile, with the result that when the war ended it was possible to launch immediately into the reconversion process. In consultation with the People's Commissariat for Heavy Engineering and the USSR State Planning Committee, the undertaking's staff submitted to the Government a plan for reorganising production. The plan was approved shortly afterwards and the reorganisation began at once; at the same time a personnel retraining programme was organised. It was found that the works would from the start need large numbers of workers in a wide range of skills, above all metal moulders, machine operators and fitters. It would also be necessary to retrain many foremen and engineers.

The challenges at Uralmash were successfully met. Training was provided under expanded programmes of basic technical training in special-purpose courses. Individual training was also provided for highly skilled workers and specialists. A training division was set up with some 500 teachers and instructors at its disposal. In 1946 alone some 5,000 manual workers, hundreds of foremen and graduate engineers and technicians were given further training or retraining.⁹

Another example is that of the Kolomna steam locomotive works (now the Kolomna "V. V. Kuibyshev" diesel locomotive works). Immediately after the end of the war it was reconverted from arms production to its original function of producing locomotives. In the areas where the

production profile was changed new shops were created. No workers were laid off; indeed, in 1945, 3,000 new workers were taken on. Experienced foremen and technicians were assigned to all shops to instruct workers in the use of the new machines. A special allowance was paid to foremen training young persons, and workers retained their previous pay while familiarising themselves with the new machines. By 1946 most of the shops were ready for mass production using conveyor belt technology.¹⁰

Experience of reconversion in these and other factories that switched over to peacetime production at the end of the war proved that, in a planned economy, production can be speedily reorganised while making due allowance not only for the needs of society as a whole but also for the personal interests of the workers previously engaged in military production.

No unemployment resulted from the post-war reconversion process. By 1948 8.5 million ex-servicemen and 4.5 million deportees repatriated to the USSR from Germany had been integrated into the national economy¹¹ without putting a single Soviet citizen out of a job. On the contrary, additional workers were taken on everywhere and trained either in the undertakings or in outside vocational training centres.

To be sure, any future process of disarmament and conversion will not be identical to that following the Second World War, since not only production technology but also socio-economic conditions have changed. None the less important lessons were learned from the reconversion efforts in the immediate post-war period, and close study of that experience can undoubtedly be of great assistance to the USSR's planning bodies in organising conversion more effectively when the international situation permits.

Reductions in the armed forces in the early 1960s

In examining how the conversion process might be organised in the USSR under present conditions, useful lessons may also be learned from the mass transfer of military personnel to the civilian sectors of the economy, including agriculture and services, that took place in the wake of subsequent large-scale reductions in the armed forces, such as the run-down following the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960 to cut their size by 1.2 million.¹²

To ensure proper placing and housing of Soviet army and navy personnel discharged under this enactment, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on 20 January 1960 containing detailed provisions regarding discharge procedures and the material well-being of those discharged. This text made it incumbent on the ministries and government departments, the Party organs and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to find jobs for ex-servicemen, bearing in mind their skills and work experience, no later than one month from the date of their arrival at their place of residence.

The decree provided additional benefits for ex-servicemen prepared to settle and work in the North, Siberia, the Urals, the Far East and the Kazakhstan SSR or on collective and state farms in regions of Russia and Kazakhstan with virgin land or land having long since lain fallow. Provision was made in particular for outright grants and the payment of travel expenses.

Discharged officers were granted loans for building and equipping their own homes, and were given priority in buying building materials in short supply. Special attention was also paid to the placement of discharged officers, many of whom had only military training and, on being transferred to civilian occupations, naturally experienced some difficulties. Moreover, many officers' families, as a result of frequent moves from one duty station to another, did not have homes of their own. The decree provided for a number of measures to help them overcome these difficulties. For example, officers placed on the reserve or retired list were to be given, no later than three months after the date of arrival at their place of residence, rent-free accommodation at the expense of the Government and of the local Soviets of Workers' Deputies. In all areas special committees were set up under the local authorities to examine the wishes and claims of discharged officers. Special attention was devoted to helping officers placed on the reserve list to master a trade. During the training period they were paid an allowance and offered places (specially created so as not to prejudice civilians applying for admission) in higher and secondary educational establishments.

The measures which the Party and the Government had adopted for reducing the armed forces in 1960 were all implemented smoothly within the prescribed time. Demobilised servicemen were rapidly and fairly easily absorbed into the various spheres of the national economy.

Experience gained through the large-scale cuts in the country's armed forces, especially those of 1960, provided the basis for the conversion measures worked out in the following years by the Soviet Government.

Two decades ago, in June 1964, the Soviet Union submitted a document to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which had been asked to collect data on disarmament measures, containing information on its approach to conversion and setting forth its views on questions relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament.¹³ It constitutes a clear and detailed statement of the Government's views on a number of aspects of the arms limitation process and the practical implementation of disarmament.

The document stresses the point that the unilateral Soviet reduction of its armed forces released substantial resources. The savings "were directed into various branches of industry, agriculture, transportation, commerce, science, culture and public health". Thanks to these savings the volume of housing construction in the second half of the 1950s was more than twice as high as in the first half, the development of virgin land was accelerated, the pensions paid to Soviet citizens were increased and the working day was shortened without loss of earnings.

The document also contains information on measures taken by the USSR Government to channel material and other resources released by disarmament into the civilian economy. It noted in particular that "those types of released military property that were analogous in character to corresponding civilian property (buildings, means of transportation, raw material and fuel supplies, etc.) became the property of civilian undertakings and institutions. We might note, for example, the military administration's transfer of buildings to educational institutions."

Arms and munitions reserves, the document goes on, were used for civilian purposes either directly or in the form of scrap metal. Explosives, for example, were extensively used for different kinds of earth- and rock-moving work – in the construction of hundreds of reservoirs in arid regions, in the building of large dams, in open-cut mining and in the creation of artificial islands for oil recovery from reservoir bottoms. The document accordingly argues that in the process of conversion it will in most cases be best not to shut down armaments factories and military establishments, "but to adapt them to peaceful production, making use of the existing equipment and staff. . . . The change-over to peaceful production can therefore be made comparatively quickly, sometimes even without interrupting the work of the enterprise or establishment."

Another important conclusion regarding methods of conversion is that "the use of military enterprises and establishments for related civilian work will necessitate no great alterations or wholesale replacement of equipment, and no extensive relocation of labour or mass retraining. There will be some changes, of course, but the great mass of workers and the basic equipment will remain at the same enterprises as before."

The document further contains references to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations for examination,¹⁴ which proposes that resources released by disarmament should be used to provide economic and technical assistance for developing countries. It also refers to other Soviet proposals relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament, based in particular on the notion that an important precondition for successful conversion is the reduction of military expenditure even before a treaty on general and complete disarmament is concluded. Furthermore, it notes that if military expenditure were reduced it would be very important to reduce taxes too, first and foremost on low incomes, and to earmark more funds for urgent social and economic projects. Such measures would help to increase effective demand and thus expand employment.

Structure of the defence industry in the Soviet Union

A characteristic of many defence undertakings in the Soviet Union is that, besides producing armaments, they also turn out goods for the civilian population. At the 24th Communist Party Congress in 1971 it was pointed

out that fully 42 per cent of defence industry output was for civilian purposes. Such a large proportion obviously makes conversion easier.¹⁵

Moreover, the defence industry has tended consistently to turn out more civilian products. In the document entitled "Principal goals of the national economy of the USSR in 1976-80" approved by the 25th Communist Party Congress in 1976, it was proposed to almost double the output of civilian goods by defence undertakings over that five-year period.¹⁶ Factories working in the defence area did in fact do much during that time to increase the output of goods in growing demand among the population – refrigerators, air-conditioners, colour and portable television sets, video recorders, cine and still cameras, washing machines and other labour-saving household appliances, etc. At the plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee in October 1980 it was noted that the production of many such consumer goods by the various branches of the defence industry had increased considerably.¹⁷

The guide-lines set by the 24th and 25th Party Congresses for the production of civilian goods in branches of the defence industry were confirmed by the 26th Congress in 1981. The main lines for the country's economic and social development in 1981-85 laid down by the 26th Congress formed the basis for the next (11th) five-year plan. The report adopted by the Congress recommended that further steps should be taken to equip undertakings and shops producing consumer goods with advanced technology and to improve the supply of high-quality raw materials and other inputs.¹⁸ These directives naturally applied in full also to those sectors of the defence industry turning out civilian products.

That undertakings engaged in military production make an extensive contribution to the civilian branches of the economy may be illustrated by the statement made early in 1983 by the USSR Minister for the Meat and Dairy Industry when, speaking on behalf of the industry's personnel, he thanked the workforce of defence industry factories "for their helpfulness in creating new equipment of a high technical quality permitting more efficient processing with minimum wastage".¹⁹

When the time for conversion comes, the existence of highly skilled engineers and technical and production workers experienced in producing civilian goods, together with the availability of up-to-date equipment for the purpose, will clearly make it easier to expand the output of consumer goods.

Another factor that will facilitate conversion in the USSR is the development of the social infrastructure, particularly housing. Building plans for 1981-85 call for 530 million square metres of new floor space. Thus, in the comparatively few cases where manual or non-manual workers may be asked to move to another town, an apartment can be provided at the new place of residence fairly quickly. The fact that during the same period pre-school establishments will have been built to accommodate no fewer than 2.9 million children²⁰ and the national education system will have been further developed means that the children of workers moving to another locality as

part of the conversion process can be accommodated without difficulty in kindergartens, crèches, schools or other educational establishments close to their new homes. All this helps to explain why so few workers in the USSR defence industry feel any anxiety about the job implications of conversion.

Vocational training and retraining to smooth conversion

When the time comes to implement the conversion process in the Soviet Union, the measures that have been and are being taken to improve workers' skills in vocational or technical training establishments as well as within undertakings will greatly facilitate the employment adjustment that will be required. Back in October 1968 model rules for in-plant initial and further training became operative with the agreement of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. These rules provided for a wide range of measures, including incentives for the trainees.²¹

A further step, taken some ten years later (1979), that had a direct bearing on the outlook for conversion was the adoption by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the USSR Council of Ministers of a decree laying down measures for the further improvement of in-plant initial and further training.²² Ministries and government departments were instructed to fix targets, to be achieved over the period 1981-85, for the setting-up or expansion of facilities for such training by the industrial associations, undertakings and organisations coming under their authority. A further goal was to supply training centres, classrooms and training workshops with additional aids and equipment, and to strengthen the system of on-the-job training provided by highly skilled workers.

As a result of this programme, it may be noted that in 1981 alone 3.5 million new workers received in-plant training, 1.4 million underwent retraining and 10.5 million further training.²³ Initial and further training have been expanded not only in the undertakings but also in institutions and other organisations. In 1983 a total of 36.9 million workers, including 25.8 million manual workers, were given further training.²⁴ The material infrastructure for industrial technical training in the undertakings and organisations was also expanded; 140 training centres, 192 training sections and more than 11,000 classrooms and workshops were opened in 1981.²⁵ Between 1982 and 1984 the facilities were expanded even further and the initial and further training of workers continued apace. These figures show that the extensive network of vocational training and retraining facilities in the USSR for manual, non-manual, engineering and technical workers will undoubtedly have a solid contribution to make, when the time comes, in tackling employment problems associated with the conversion process.

Nor should it be overlooked that workers who acquire multiple skills as well as those employed in particularly responsible and highly skilled jobs are entitled to wage supplements.²⁶ This provides further incentives for workers to improve their skills and acquire additional ones. In particular, it will make

it much easier for former military production workers to be re-employed in new highly skilled occupations.

Rights of workers' collectives and trade unions

Under USSR legislation the conversion from military to civilian production, like any other measure affecting work organisation, is to be carried out with the active participation of workers' representatives, i.e. the workers' collectives and trade union bodies. In this respect, particular significance attaches to the Act on workers' collectives and on increasing their role in the management of undertakings, institutions and organisations which came into force on 1 August 1983.²⁷

The Act defines the workers' collective in an undertaking as "an association of all workers performing work in common in a state or public undertaking". The USSR Constitution provides that workers' collectives are to take part in discussing and deciding state and public affairs (article 8), while the Act provides that "the bodies of state authority and administration, when taking decisions involving the activities of relevant undertakings, institutions and organisations, take into account the opinions and proposals" of workers' collectives (section 3). The Act also contains a section devoted to training, which, as already noted, will inevitably be an important aspect of conversion. Section 13 states that workers' collectives "consider matters relating to the improvement of skills of personnel, training in new trades, development of tutorship, and the work carried out by schools to study progressive methods of work". These and many other provisions of the Act will do much to safeguard the interests of workers affected by the conversion process.

Similarly, in the matter of job stability and avoidance of unjustified dismissals, the rules laid down in section 35 of the Labour Code of the Russian SFSR and similar provisions in the labour codes of the other Union Republics, under which management may not terminate the employment contract of a manual or non-manual worker without the approval of the factory, works or local trade union committee, will play an important part in protecting workers' rights.

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Recent literature has often raised the question of obstacles to conversion, and it is true that economic, political and psychological barriers do exist.

The psychological barriers are easier to overcome than the others. Of course, the advantages of conversion will have to be explained more fully to the people, to give the lie to the argument that the abrupt closure of hundreds of military undertakings will mean joblessness for large numbers of workers, engineers and non-manual workers. That is certainly not true: conversion is not an instantaneous process, involving the closing down overnight of all

armaments factories and creating such a sudden and massive demand for jobs that, for every vacancy, a vast number of applicants would have to be turned down. It will inevitably take time: that much we already know. The international talks on disarmament, in particular, have made it clear that arms reduction will be a step-by-step process, entailing at each stage a gradual reduction in the share of military production and an increase in that of civilian output in undertakings selected for conversion.

So far as the USSR is concerned, it is clear from the foregoing that the experience gained from the conversion of the Soviet economy from military to civilian production after the Second World War and an analysis of the present situation suggest that conversion following eventual disarmament would not create threats of unemployment or harm the workers in any way. It would, on the contrary, make it easier for the economy to secure the manpower it needs and consequently help to accelerate the social and economic progress of socialist society. Indeed the whole question of disarmament and conversion has assumed an added significance for the Soviet Union in the light of the decision taken in April 1985 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to step up the social and economic development of the country, to accelerate its progress in science and technology and to make production more efficient.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union supports the view that the relaxation of world tensions and the strengthening of mutual confidence between nations would go a long way towards solving the problems of conversion. Disarmament, it firmly believes, is the path not only to peace but to prosperity. The desire to strengthen the security of peoples and to create peaceful conditions in which they can carry on their work can never be realised until we resolve to halt the arms race, along with the senseless squandering of huge material, intellectual and labour resources it entails.

Notes

¹ In the 1940s a town was defined as a settlement with at least 1,000 inhabitants, not more than a quarter of whom were engaged in agriculture.

² "Soobchenie chrezvychainoy gosudarstvennoy komissii po ustanovleniyu i rassledovaniyu zlodeyany nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov", in *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza 1945 g. Dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1949), p. 36.

³ *Reshenia partii i pravitelstva po khozyaistvennym voprosam 1917-1967*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, Politicheskaya Literatura, 1968), p. 115.

⁴ After March 1946 the People's Commissariats in the USSR were renamed "Ministries".

⁵ M. I. Khlusov: *Razvitie sovetskoy industrii 1946-1958* (Moscow, Nauka, 1977), p. 89.

⁶ *Reshenia* . . . , op. cit., pp. 231-232.

⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

- ⁸ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let* (Moscow, Statistika, 1977), p. 472.
- ⁹ E. Makarov: *Otets zavodov* (Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossia, 1960), pp. 99-100.
- ¹⁰ G. P. Efimtsev: *Istoria kolomenskogo zavoda* (Moscow, Mysl, 1973), pp. 226-231.
- ¹¹ Khlusov, op. cit., p. 90.
- ¹² This was in addition to the previous unilateral reduction of 2.14 million in 1955-58. *50 let borby SSSR za razorushenie*. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, Mysl, 1967), pp. 416-417 and 352.
- ¹³ United Nations Economic and Social Council: *Economic and social consequences of disarmament*, doc. E/3893/Add. 1, 3 June 1964, pp. 5-21.
- ¹⁴ For details see United Nations: *The United Nations and disarmament, 1945-1970* (New York, 1970).
- ¹⁵ *Materialy XXIV sezda KPSS* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1971), p. 46.
- ¹⁶ *Materialy XXV sezda KPSS* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1976), p. 195.
- ¹⁷ *Pravda* (Moscow), 23 Oct. 1980.
- ¹⁸ *Materialy XXVI sezda KPSS* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1981), p. 161.
- ¹⁹ *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 4, 1983, pp. 81-82.
- ²⁰ N. Baibakov: *O gosudarstvennom plane na 1981-1985 gg* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1981), p. 25.
- ²¹ *Normativnye akty po ispolzovaniyu trudovykh resursov* (Moscow, Profizdat, 1972), p. 350.
- ²² *Trud* (Moscow), 30 Oct. 1979.
- ²³ *Sbornik postanovleniy VTSSPS (aprel-yun 1981)* (Moscow, Profizdat, 1982), p. 45.
- ²⁴ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1983 g. Statistichesky ezhegodnik* (Moscow, Statistika, 1984), p. 405.
- ²⁵ *Sbornik . . .*, op. cit., p. 45.
- ²⁶ *Planovoe khozyaistvo* (Moscow), No. 10, 1979, p. 44.
- ²⁷ *Legislative Series* (Geneva, ILO), 1983 - USSR 1. See also A. Siline: "The new role of workers' collectives in the USSR", in *International Labour Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1984.